@fingerly/types 0.1.2 → 0.4.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +103 -4
- package/dist/index.cjs +119 -0
- package/dist/index.d.cts +265 -251
- package/dist/index.d.ts +265 -251
- package/dist/index.js +112 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -4,17 +4,62 @@
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* Nothing here touches the DOM. A type that only a browser can populate still
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* belongs in this file, because the server and the mobile SDKs both need to
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* name it; what does not belong here is the code that reads a `window`.
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*
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* Every closed set of values is an `as const` object with a same-named type,
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* so `result.suspectLevel === SuspectLevel.High` and
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* `result.suspectLevel === 'high'` both type-check. A member is its value in
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* PascalCase, word by word: `fingerprint_suppressed` is
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* `Signal.FingerprintSuppressed`, `react-native-ios` is
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* `SdkPlatform.ReactNativeIos`.
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*/
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/** Which SDK collected a report. Mirrors `schemas.SDKInfo` on the server. */
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declare const SdkPlatform: {
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readonly Web: "web";
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readonly Android: "android";
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readonly Ios: "ios";
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readonly ReactNativeIos: "react-native-ios";
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readonly ReactNativeAndroid: "react-native-android";
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readonly FlutterIos: "flutter-ios";
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readonly FlutterAndroid: "flutter-android";
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readonly LynxIos: "lynx-ios";
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readonly LynxAndroid: "lynx-android";
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};
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/** One of the platforms in {@link SdkPlatform}. */
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type SdkPlatform = (typeof SdkPlatform)[keyof typeof SdkPlatform];
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/**
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-
*
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*
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* `ios` or `android` in the string — see `models.RiskPlatformFor`. A React
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* Native app reporting only `react-native` falls through to the browser
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* profile, where `jailbreak` is not a signal at all and everything the native
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* SDK went to the trouble of collecting is worth nothing.
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* Whether opt-in extended incognito probes (such as Chromium IndexedDB
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* durability timing) execute alongside zero-write standard probes.
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*/
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-
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declare const IncognitoDetection: {
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readonly Standard: "standard";
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readonly Extended: "extended";
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};
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/** One of the modes in {@link IncognitoDetection}. */
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type IncognitoDetection = (typeof IncognitoDetection)[keyof typeof IncognitoDetection];
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/** Minimal runtime-agnostic `AbortSignal` contract (compiles under pure ES2020 without DOM). */
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interface AbortSignalLike {
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readonly aborted: boolean;
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readonly reason?: unknown;
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addEventListener(type: 'abort', listener: () => void, options?: {
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once?: boolean;
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}): void;
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removeEventListener(type: 'abort', listener: () => void): void;
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}
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/** Options for offline signal collection (`collect()`). */
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interface CollectOptions {
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/** Cancels collection (`AbortSignal`). */
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signal?: AbortSignalLike;
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/**
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* Controls whether opt-in extended incognito probes run (`'extended'`) or
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* only standard zero-write probes run (`'standard'`). Defaults to `'standard'`.
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*/
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incognitoDetection?: IncognitoDetection;
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}
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/** Options for single-pass identification (`identify()`). */
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interface IdentifyOptions extends CollectOptions {
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/** Echoed back on the finished event, for the caller's own correlation. */
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tag?: string;
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}
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/** Configuration shared by JavaScript-based native SDK facades. */
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interface MobileFingerlyOptions {
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/** The SDK key, from the dashboard. */
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@@ -26,7 +71,7 @@ interface MobileFingerlyOptions {
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interface MobileIdentifyOptions {
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/** Echoed back on the finished event, for the caller's own correlation. */
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tag?: string;
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/** Collect
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/** Collect without submitting when false (native mobile bridges). Defaults to true. */
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submit?: boolean;
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}
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/**
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@@ -35,36 +80,27 @@ interface MobileIdentifyOptions {
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* `pending` is the default: an SDK identifies nobody until it is told
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* `granted`. `pending` and `denied` mean the same thing to the SDK - run no
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* source, touch no storage, send nothing, and fail `identify()` with a consent
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* error - and
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* are kept apart only because a consent tool reports them apart, and a page
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* deciding whether to show its banner wants to know which one it has.
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* error - and are kept apart only because a consent tool reports them apart.
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*/
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-
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declare const ConsentState: {
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readonly Granted: "granted";
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readonly Pending: "pending";
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readonly Denied: "denied";
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};
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/** One of the states in {@link ConsentState}. */
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type ConsentState = (typeof ConsentState)[keyof typeof ConsentState];
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/**
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* How a source finished.
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*
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* Collapsing every failure into one `error` token would make a browser that
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* lacks an API, a privacy extension that blocked it, and a throttled tab that
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* ran out of time all hash identically. They are three different facts about a visitor:
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*
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* - `ok` the source produced a value.
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* - `unsupported` the API is not present. A property of the device/browser.
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* - `blocked` the API is present and refused, or returned deliberate noise.
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*
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*
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* - `timeout` the source overran its slice of the budget. Says something
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* about load and throttling, and nothing about the device.
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* - `error` the source threw for a reason we did not anticipate.
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* - `timeout` the source overran its slice of the budget.
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* - `error` the source threw for an unexpected reason.
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*/
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type SignalStatus = 'ok' | 'unsupported' | 'blocked' | 'timeout' | 'error';
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/**
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* What one source reported.
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*
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* `ms` is recorded for every status, failures included. A source that took
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* 3ms to be unsupported and one that took 300ms to be blocked are telling
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* different stories, and the duration is frequently the more stable of the two
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* numbers - timing is itself an entropy source, which is why it is kept rather
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* than discarded on the failure path.
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*/
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interface SignalOutcome<T = unknown> {
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status: SignalStatus;
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@@ -74,37 +110,29 @@ interface SignalOutcome<T = unknown> {
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value?: T;
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/**
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* Why, for the statuses that have a why. A short stable token such as
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* `SecurityError` or `
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* unstable across versions and would poison any matching built on it.
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* `SecurityError` or `rfp-canvas-prompt-avoided`.
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*/
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reason?: string;
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}
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/**
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*
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*
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* `
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* inside the fast budget because a page is waiting on the submission. `deferred`
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* sources are the expensive ones - font measurement, audio rendering, WebGL
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* shader precision - which are worth having but not worth blocking a checkout
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* button for.
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* Internal two-stage browser scheduler barrier:
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* - `prerequisite` runs first (`engine` + Gecko RFP timer gate).
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* - `collect` runs second with access to completed prerequisite outcomes.
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*/
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type
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/**
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type SourceStage = 'prerequisite' | 'collect';
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/** Kinds of runtime prototype, descriptor, brand, or native-code tampering. */
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type LieKind = 'not-native' | 'descriptor' | 'prototype' | 'contradiction' | 'missing' | 'brand' | 'to-string-threw' | 'unverified_realm';
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/** A native function, descriptor, brand, or prototype that is not what it should be. */
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interface Lie {
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/** Stable identifier, such as `navigator.hardwareConcurrency.getter`. */
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id: string;
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/** What kind of tampering was observed. */
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kind:
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kind: LieKind;
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/** Optional short detail. Kept stable across versions or left off. */
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detail?: string;
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}
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/**
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* What the browser is, as opposed to what it says it is.
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*
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* `claimed` comes from the user-agent and the UA-CH headers - a string anyone
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* can set. `observed` is derived from engine behaviour that a spoofer has to
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* patch a JS builtin to change, at which point `lies` catches them instead.
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* A disagreement between the two is worth more than either one alone.
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*/
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interface EngineIdentity {
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claimed?: string;
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@@ -119,12 +147,7 @@ interface IntegrityReport {
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engine: EngineIdentity;
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}
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/**
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* The whole client-side observation, as submitted
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*
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* This is what lands in `signals` on the wire. The server types that field as
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* `map[string]any` and deliberately does not interpret it (see
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* `server/services/identify.go`), so this interface is the only place the
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* shape is written down until the event store exists.
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* The whole client-side observation, as submitted inside `signals`.
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*/
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interface SignalReport {
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/** Bumped when a field changes meaning, never when one is added. */
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budget_ms: number;
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/** What collection actually cost. */
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elapsed_ms: number;
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/** Which tiers ran. A fast-only report is not a degraded full one. */
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tiers: SourceTier[];
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sources: Record<string, SignalOutcome>;
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integrity: IntegrityReport;
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}
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/** How sure the server is of a finding. Matches its `*_confidence` fields. */
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-
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declare const Confidence: {
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readonly Low: "low";
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readonly Medium: "medium";
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readonly High: "high";
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};
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/** One of the grades in {@link Confidence}. */
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type Confidence = (typeof Confidence)[keyof typeof Confidence];
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/** Categorical risk band returned by the server. */
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declare const SuspectLevel: {
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readonly Low: "low";
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readonly Medium: "medium";
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readonly High: "high";
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};
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/** One of the levels in {@link SuspectLevel}. */
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type SuspectLevel = (typeof SuspectLevel)[keyof typeof SuspectLevel];
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/**
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* Every signal group and raw detector identifier the server reports, the same
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* list as `Signal` in `@fingerly/node`. A trigger's `signal` is a raw
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* detector, such as `vpn_public`; its `group` is the group it is reported
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* under, such as `vpn`.
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*/
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declare const Signal: {
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readonly Tor: "tor";
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readonly DatacenterProxy: "datacenter_proxy";
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readonly Proxy: "proxy";
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readonly DatacenterIp: "datacenter_ip";
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readonly ResidentialProxy: "residential_proxy";
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readonly ResidentialProxyLowConfidence: "residential_proxy_low_confidence";
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readonly ResidentialProxyMediumConfidence: "residential_proxy_medium_confidence";
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readonly ResidentialProxyHighConfidence: "residential_proxy_high_confidence";
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readonly Vpn: "vpn";
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readonly VpnPublic: "vpn_public";
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readonly VpnTimezone: "vpn_timezone";
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readonly VpnRelay: "vpn_relay";
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readonly VpnMobile: "vpn_mobile";
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readonly VpnOsMismatch: "vpn_os_mismatch";
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readonly VpnLowConfidence: "vpn_low_confidence";
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readonly VpnMediumConfidence: "vpn_medium_confidence";
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readonly VpnHighConfidence: "vpn_high_confidence";
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readonly IpBlocklist: "ip_blocklist";
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readonly IpBlocklistEmailSpam: "ip_blocklist_email_spam";
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readonly IpBlocklistAttackSource: "ip_blocklist_attack_source";
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readonly IpReputation: "ip_reputation";
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readonly IpAbuser: "ip_abuser";
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readonly NetworkAnomaly: "network_anomaly";
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readonly BogonIp: "bogon_ip";
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readonly AnycastIp: "anycast_ip";
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readonly LocationSpoofing: "location_spoofing";
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readonly GeoMismatch: "geo_mismatch";
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readonly IosSimulator: "ios_simulator";
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readonly Simulator: "simulator";
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readonly AndroidEmulator: "android_emulator";
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readonly Emulator: "emulator";
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readonly VirtualMachine: "virtual_machine";
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readonly JailbrokenDevice: "jailbroken_device";
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readonly Jailbreak: "jailbreak";
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readonly RootedDevice: "rooted_device";
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readonly RootApps: "root_apps";
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readonly PlayDeviceIntegrityFailed: "play_device_integrity_failed";
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readonly ClonedApp: "cloned_app";
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readonly AppCloner: "app_cloner";
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readonly PlayAppUnrecognized: "play_app_unrecognized";
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readonly DeviceFarm: "device_farm";
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readonly RepeatedReinstall: "repeated_reinstall";
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readonly DeviceActivityHigh: "device_activity_high";
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readonly DeviceActivityVeryHigh: "device_activity_very_high";
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readonly MitmAttack: "mitm_attack";
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readonly FridaDetected: "frida_detected";
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readonly Frida: "frida";
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readonly BrowserTampering: "browser_tampering";
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readonly Tampering: "tampering";
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readonly AntidetectBrowser: "antidetect_browser";
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readonly FingerprintSuppressed: "fingerprint_suppressed";
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readonly DeveloperTools: "developer_tools";
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readonly RemoteControl: "remote_control";
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readonly Bot: "bot";
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readonly Automation: "automation";
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readonly BadBot: "bad_bot";
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readonly FetchMetadataMissing: "fetch_metadata_missing";
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readonly WebTicketMissing: "web_ticket_missing";
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readonly WebTicketInvalid: "web_ticket_invalid";
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readonly HighActivity: "high_activity";
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readonly IncognitoMode: "incognito_mode";
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readonly Incognito: "incognito";
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readonly PrivacySettings: "privacy_settings";
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readonly EmbeddedWebView: "embedded_web_view";
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readonly ActiveCall: "active_call";
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readonly AttestationMissing: "attestation_missing";
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readonly AttestationFailed: "attestation_failed";
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readonly AttestationDowngrade: "attestation_downgrade";
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readonly DeviceInconsistent: "device_inconsistent";
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readonly ReportIncomplete: "report_incomplete";
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readonly ProbeErrors: "probe_errors";
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readonly CustomRootCa: "custom_root_ca";
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readonly SecondaryUserProfile: "secondary_user_profile";
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};
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/** One of the signals in {@link Signal}. */
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type Signal = (typeof Signal)[keyof typeof Signal];
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/**
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* One of the signals in {@link Signal}, or a value a newer server added, so
|
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* code built today still compiles against it.
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*/
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type SignalName = Signal | (string & {});
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/** The canonical v3 risk signal catalogue: the closed {@link Signal} list. */
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type RiskSignal = Signal;
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/**
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* An identification's `state`, the same list as `EventState` in
|
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* `@fingerly/node`: `Enriched` when it was fully processed, `Unavailable`
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* when the network lookup could not run, so it was not scored. `Pending` is
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* a server read's "not recorded yet"; an identify answer is never pending.
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*/
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declare const EventState: {
|
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readonly Pending: "pending";
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readonly Enriched: "enriched";
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readonly Unavailable: "unavailable";
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};
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/** One of the states in {@link EventState}. */
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type EventState = (typeof EventState)[keyof typeof EventState];
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|
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/** One active risk trigger (`IdentifyTriggerOut` in OpenAPI). */
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interface IdentifyTrigger {
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signal: SignalName;
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group?: SignalName;
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weight?: number | null;
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confidence?: Confidence | (string & {});
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}
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/** What a native `identify()` resolves with. See [[IdentifyResult]]. */
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interface NativeIdentifyResult {
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requestId: string;
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/** Who this visitor is
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/** Who this visitor is (`""` when `identifiable === false`). */
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visitorId: string;
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/** `null` when the server did not say, which is not the same as `false`. */
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visitorIsNew: boolean | null;
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/**
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* How sure the server is, 0 to 100
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*
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* How sure the server is, 0 to 100 (`0` when `visitorId === ""`). `null`
|
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* when it did not say.
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*/
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299
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visitorConfidence: number | null;
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/** `null` when the server did not say. */
|
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|
identifiable: boolean | null;
|
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|
/**
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|
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* True when this submission was answered before
|
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|
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* `null` when the server did not say.
|
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|
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* True when this submission was answered before under the same idempotency
|
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* key and the stored verdict was replayed. `null` when the server did not say.
|
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|
*/
|
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306
|
duplicate: boolean | null;
|
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|
/** As [[IdentifyResult.state]]. */
|
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|
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state: string;
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|
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state: EventState | (string & {});
|
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|
/** `null` when absent: unscored, or hidden by the SDK key. Not the same as zero. */
|
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|
suspectScore: number | null;
|
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311
|
/** `null` when absent, for the same reasons as [[suspectScore]]. */
|
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|
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suspectLevel:
|
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|
+
suspectLevel: SuspectLevel | null;
|
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|
report: SignalReport;
|
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314
|
}
|
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|
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/** A submission, as the body of `POST /api/v1/ingest`. */
|
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|
+
/** A v3 submission, as the body of `POST /api/v1/ingest`. */
|
|
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316
|
interface IdentifySubmission {
|
|
317
|
+
/** Wire envelope version. Must equal `3`. */
|
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|
+
v: 3;
|
|
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|
sdk: {
|
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173
320
|
platform: SdkPlatform;
|
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174
321
|
version: string;
|
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175
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|
};
|
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|
/**
|
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324
|
* The SDK's consent state when it sent this. Always `granted`, since an SDK
|
|
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|
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* sends nothing otherwise; the server refuses any other value with
|
|
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|
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* `consent_required`.
|
|
325
|
+
* sends nothing otherwise; the server refuses any other value with `consent_required`.
|
|
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326
|
*/
|
|
181
327
|
consent: ConsentState;
|
|
182
328
|
signals: SignalReport;
|
|
183
329
|
tag?: string;
|
|
330
|
+
/**
|
|
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|
+
* A single-use freshness ticket the server issued to this page (web only).
|
|
332
|
+
* Omitted when none could be fetched; the server then scores
|
|
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|
+
* `web_ticket_missing` and still answers.
|
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
335
|
+
ticket?: string;
|
|
336
|
+
/**
|
|
337
|
+
* The proof of work for `ticket`, as a decimal nonce, when the ticket asked
|
|
338
|
+
* for one (`pow_bits` above 0) and it was solved within the budget.
|
|
339
|
+
*/
|
|
340
|
+
ticket_pow?: string;
|
|
184
341
|
}
|
|
185
|
-
/**
|
|
186
|
-
|
|
342
|
+
/**
|
|
343
|
+
* The body of a web ticket request, posted to the same path as a report.
|
|
344
|
+
*/
|
|
345
|
+
interface TicketRequest {
|
|
346
|
+
v: 3;
|
|
347
|
+
op: 'ticket';
|
|
187
348
|
sdk: {
|
|
188
|
-
platform:
|
|
349
|
+
platform: 'web';
|
|
189
350
|
version: string;
|
|
190
351
|
};
|
|
191
|
-
/** As on [[IdentifySubmission.consent]]. */
|
|
192
|
-
consent: ConsentState;
|
|
193
|
-
signals: SignalReport;
|
|
194
|
-
token: string;
|
|
195
352
|
}
|
|
196
|
-
|
|
197
|
-
|
|
198
|
-
|
|
199
|
-
|
|
200
|
-
|
|
201
|
-
|
|
353
|
+
/**
|
|
354
|
+
* A single-use web freshness ticket: the answer to a ticket request, and the
|
|
355
|
+
* `next_ticket` of a web identification answer.
|
|
356
|
+
*/
|
|
357
|
+
interface FreshnessTicket {
|
|
358
|
+
/** Unpadded base64url. Opaque to the SDK. */
|
|
359
|
+
ticket: string;
|
|
360
|
+
/** RFC 3339 UTC. */
|
|
361
|
+
expires_at: string;
|
|
202
362
|
/**
|
|
203
|
-
*
|
|
204
|
-
*
|
|
363
|
+
* Leading zero bits the ticket's proof of work needs (1 to 22). Absent or 0
|
|
364
|
+
* when the SDK key does not ask for one.
|
|
205
365
|
*/
|
|
206
|
-
|
|
207
|
-
}
|
|
208
|
-
status: 'failed';
|
|
209
|
-
error: Error;
|
|
210
|
-
report?: SignalReport;
|
|
211
|
-
combinedReport?: SignalReport;
|
|
212
|
-
};
|
|
366
|
+
pow_bits?: number;
|
|
367
|
+
}
|
|
213
368
|
/**
|
|
214
|
-
* The answer.
|
|
215
|
-
*
|
|
216
|
-
* Note what is absent: there is no visitor identifier computed here, because
|
|
217
|
-
* the client does not compute one. Hashing components in the page would make
|
|
218
|
-
* the identity forgeable by the visitor and freeze the matching algorithm
|
|
219
|
-
* into whatever SDK version a customer deployed. Fingerly
|
|
220
|
-
* submits the raw report and lets the server decide who this is - and then
|
|
221
|
-
* tells you, in the same response.
|
|
369
|
+
* The server's v3 identification answer (`IdentifyOut`).
|
|
222
370
|
*/
|
|
223
371
|
interface IdentifyResult {
|
|
224
372
|
requestId: string;
|
|
225
373
|
/**
|
|
226
|
-
*
|
|
227
|
-
*
|
|
228
|
-
*
|
|
229
|
-
* submission was a [[duplicate]]. Otherwise always present: a report too thin
|
|
230
|
-
* to match anyone still gets an identifier, minted rather than matched, so
|
|
231
|
-
* that every event has a key.
|
|
374
|
+
* Stable project-scoped visitor identifier, or `""` whenever
|
|
375
|
+
* `identifiable === false`, the report came from a genuine embedded WebView,
|
|
376
|
+
* or an unmatched Web report is high-risk (Option B).
|
|
232
377
|
*/
|
|
233
378
|
visitorId: string;
|
|
234
|
-
/**
|
|
379
|
+
/**
|
|
380
|
+
* `true` only when a new visitor row was minted; always `false` when
|
|
381
|
+
* `visitorId === ""`.
|
|
382
|
+
*/
|
|
235
383
|
visitorIsNew: boolean;
|
|
236
384
|
/**
|
|
237
|
-
*
|
|
238
|
-
*
|
|
239
|
-
* 100 when this exact device has been seen before, 85-99 when it drifted -
|
|
240
|
-
* a browser update, a new monitor - and was recognised by similarity, and 0
|
|
241
|
-
* when the identifier was minted because nothing matched.
|
|
242
|
-
*
|
|
243
|
-
* Read this rather than inferring trust from [[identifiable]], which only
|
|
244
|
-
* says whether the report was rich enough to attempt a match.
|
|
385
|
+
* Match confidence from 0 to 100 (`0` when `visitorId === ""` or freshly minted).
|
|
245
386
|
*/
|
|
246
387
|
visitorConfidence: number;
|
|
247
388
|
/**
|
|
248
|
-
*
|
|
249
|
-
*
|
|
250
|
-
* A hardened browser produces this honestly; so does a client that would
|
|
251
|
-
* rather not be recognised. Either way the submission is still answered and
|
|
252
|
-
* still scored - more highly, because suppressing a fingerprint is itself
|
|
253
|
-
* evidence - and it is charged at a lower rate, because the address lookup
|
|
254
|
-
* happened and the identification did not.
|
|
389
|
+
* `false` when the report carried too little independent entropy to identify
|
|
390
|
+
* a device.
|
|
255
391
|
*/
|
|
256
392
|
identifiable: boolean;
|
|
257
393
|
/**
|
|
258
|
-
*
|
|
259
|
-
*
|
|
260
|
-
*
|
|
261
|
-
* The verdict belongs to that first submission and is not repeated, so the
|
|
262
|
-
* fields above are empty. Keep the first response, or fetch the event by
|
|
263
|
-
* [[requestId]]. Without this flag an empty visitor would read as "nobody
|
|
264
|
-
* could be identified", which is the opposite of what happened.
|
|
394
|
+
* `true` when this submission replayed a cached verdict under the same
|
|
395
|
+
* `Idempotency-Key`.
|
|
265
396
|
*/
|
|
266
|
-
duplicate
|
|
397
|
+
duplicate?: boolean;
|
|
267
398
|
/**
|
|
268
399
|
* `enriched`, or `unavailable` when the address could not be looked up.
|
|
269
|
-
*
|
|
270
|
-
* Why an `unavailable` submission went unscored describes the service's own
|
|
271
|
-
* infrastructure, which is nothing a visitor's page should be able to read,
|
|
272
|
-
* so it is not on this result. Your backend reads it as `reason` on the
|
|
273
|
-
* server-side event read (`GET /api/v1/events/{request_id}` with a secret
|
|
274
|
-
* key), by [[requestId]].
|
|
275
400
|
*/
|
|
276
|
-
state: string;
|
|
401
|
+
state: EventState | (string & {});
|
|
277
402
|
/**
|
|
278
|
-
*
|
|
279
|
-
*
|
|
280
|
-
*
|
|
281
|
-
* `null` when the submission was not scored, or when the SDK key hides the
|
|
282
|
-
* score from public callers: the page is not told which, and your backend
|
|
283
|
-
* still reads the score on the event. Either is a different answer from
|
|
284
|
-
* zero: an ordinary visitor scores zero. Anything computed as a share of your
|
|
285
|
-
* traffic divides by one of those populations, so collapsing them makes the
|
|
286
|
-
* number plausible and wrong.
|
|
287
|
-
*
|
|
288
|
-
* Not a percentage and not capped. Normalising it to 0-100 would discard the
|
|
289
|
-
* difference between "over the line" and "far over the line".
|
|
403
|
+
* Weighted sum of the signals that fired, or `null` when unscored or hidden
|
|
404
|
+
* by `hide_client_score` on public keys.
|
|
290
405
|
*/
|
|
291
406
|
suspectScore: number | null;
|
|
292
|
-
/** `low`, `medium
|
|
293
|
-
suspectLevel:
|
|
294
|
-
/**
|
|
295
|
-
|
|
296
|
-
|
|
297
|
-
|
|
298
|
-
|
|
299
|
-
interface IdentificationConfidence {
|
|
300
|
-
score: number;
|
|
301
|
-
version: string;
|
|
302
|
-
}
|
|
303
|
-
interface Identification {
|
|
304
|
-
visitor_id: string;
|
|
305
|
-
confidence: IdentificationConfidence;
|
|
306
|
-
visitor_found: boolean;
|
|
307
|
-
first_seen_at: number;
|
|
308
|
-
last_seen_at: number;
|
|
309
|
-
}
|
|
310
|
-
interface IpGeolocation {
|
|
311
|
-
accuracy_radius: number;
|
|
312
|
-
latitude: number;
|
|
313
|
-
longitude: number;
|
|
314
|
-
postal_code: string;
|
|
315
|
-
timezone: string;
|
|
316
|
-
city_name: string;
|
|
317
|
-
country_code: string;
|
|
318
|
-
country_name: string;
|
|
319
|
-
continent_code: string;
|
|
320
|
-
continent_name: string;
|
|
321
|
-
subdivisions: {
|
|
322
|
-
iso_code: string;
|
|
323
|
-
name: string;
|
|
324
|
-
}[];
|
|
325
|
-
}
|
|
326
|
-
interface IpInfoV4 {
|
|
327
|
-
address: string;
|
|
328
|
-
geolocation: IpGeolocation;
|
|
329
|
-
asn: string;
|
|
330
|
-
asn_name: string;
|
|
331
|
-
asn_network: string;
|
|
332
|
-
asn_type: string;
|
|
333
|
-
datacenter_result: boolean;
|
|
334
|
-
}
|
|
335
|
-
interface VelocityWindow {
|
|
336
|
-
'5_minutes': number;
|
|
337
|
-
'1_hour': number;
|
|
338
|
-
'24_hours': number;
|
|
339
|
-
}
|
|
340
|
-
interface Velocity {
|
|
341
|
-
distinct_ip: VelocityWindow;
|
|
342
|
-
distinct_country: VelocityWindow;
|
|
343
|
-
events: VelocityWindow;
|
|
344
|
-
ip_events: VelocityWindow;
|
|
345
|
-
}
|
|
346
|
-
/** Fields every platform reports. */
|
|
347
|
-
interface FingerlyEventBase {
|
|
348
|
-
event_id: string;
|
|
349
|
-
timestamp: number;
|
|
350
|
-
source: 'device';
|
|
351
|
-
sdk: {
|
|
352
|
-
platform: SdkPlatform;
|
|
353
|
-
version: string;
|
|
354
|
-
};
|
|
355
|
-
replayed: boolean;
|
|
356
|
-
identification: Identification;
|
|
357
|
-
ip_address: string;
|
|
358
|
-
ip_info: {
|
|
359
|
-
v4: IpInfoV4;
|
|
360
|
-
};
|
|
361
|
-
proxy: boolean;
|
|
362
|
-
proxy_confidence: Confidence;
|
|
363
|
-
vpn: boolean;
|
|
364
|
-
vpn_confidence: Confidence;
|
|
365
|
-
tampering: boolean;
|
|
366
|
-
tampering_confidence: Confidence;
|
|
367
|
-
suspect_score: number;
|
|
368
|
-
velocity: Velocity;
|
|
369
|
-
}
|
|
370
|
-
/**
|
|
371
|
-
* Signals only a native app can observe.
|
|
372
|
-
*
|
|
373
|
-
* Absent on web rather than `false`, because a browser cannot look for a root
|
|
374
|
-
* app and reporting "no" would be a claim nobody made.
|
|
375
|
-
*/
|
|
376
|
-
interface FingerlyMobileEvent extends FingerlyEventBase {
|
|
377
|
-
sdk: {
|
|
378
|
-
platform: 'android' | 'ios';
|
|
379
|
-
version: string;
|
|
380
|
-
};
|
|
381
|
-
package_name: string;
|
|
382
|
-
emulator: boolean;
|
|
383
|
-
root_apps: boolean;
|
|
384
|
-
cloned_app: boolean;
|
|
385
|
-
frida: boolean;
|
|
386
|
-
developer_tools: boolean;
|
|
387
|
-
factory_reset_timestamp?: number;
|
|
388
|
-
active_call: boolean;
|
|
389
|
-
}
|
|
390
|
-
interface FingerlyWebEvent extends FingerlyEventBase {
|
|
391
|
-
sdk: {
|
|
392
|
-
platform: 'web';
|
|
393
|
-
version: string;
|
|
394
|
-
};
|
|
395
|
-
browser_name: string;
|
|
396
|
-
browser_version: string;
|
|
397
|
-
incognito: boolean;
|
|
398
|
-
ad_blocker: boolean;
|
|
407
|
+
/** `low`, `medium`, or `high`; `null` whenever [[suspectScore]] is `null`. */
|
|
408
|
+
suspectLevel: SuspectLevel | null;
|
|
409
|
+
/**
|
|
410
|
+
* Active risk signals and weights (populated only for direct secret-key
|
|
411
|
+
* callers; omitted on public browser keys).
|
|
412
|
+
*/
|
|
413
|
+
triggers?: IdentifyTrigger[];
|
|
399
414
|
}
|
|
400
|
-
type FingerlyEvent = FingerlyMobileEvent | FingerlyWebEvent;
|
|
401
415
|
|
|
402
|
-
export type
|
|
416
|
+
export { type AbortSignalLike, type CollectOptions, Confidence, ConsentState, type EngineIdentity, EventState, type FreshnessTicket, type IdentifyOptions, type IdentifyResult, type IdentifySubmission, type IdentifyTrigger, IncognitoDetection, type IntegrityReport, type Lie, type LieKind, type MobileFingerlyOptions, type MobileIdentifyOptions, type NativeIdentifyResult, type RiskSignal, SdkPlatform, Signal, type SignalName, type SignalOutcome, type SignalReport, type SignalStatus, type SourceStage, SuspectLevel, type TicketRequest };
|