@finchtech/cli 0.3.4 → 0.3.5
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +124 -120
- package/dist/finch.js +29 -17
- package/package.json +4 -4
package/README.md
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# Finch Agent CLI
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Install the public npm package with `npm install -g @finchtech/cli`, then run `finch --help`. The primary executable is `finch`; `finchtech` is an equivalent fallback for machines where another application already owns the `finch` command.
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The Finch Agent CLI stores wallet keys, AgentCLI Session bearers, and MCP grant bearers only in an owner-only `FINCHTECH_HOME`, which defaults to `~/.finchtech`; secrets are never accepted as command arguments or emitted to stdout.
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For an existing private key, run `finch wallet use --file <PATH>` on a fresh installation, then `finch login --help` to choose an authentication chain. The file must contain a single 0x-prefixed 32-byte hex private key and have owner-only permissions. First import is offline and makes that wallet current. `finch wallet create` generates a new identity instead. An existing Account switch requires login and remote revocation before changing the current wallet. Incomplete wallet files require recovery from backup; residual local authorization requires restoring the original wallet or explicitly clearing local authorization with `finch logout --local`.
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`finch logout` revokes Account-bound remote authority before removing local Session and grant state. If invalid, corrupt, or legacy Session metadata prevents that flow, `finch logout --local` performs an explicit offline reset of only `session/` and `grants/`. It makes no network request and reports `remoteRevoked: false`; it remains available while an irreversible recovery is pending and preserves profiles, registered wallets, transaction journals, and recovery records so the user can log in again and run the recorded recovery command. Ordinary logout and wallet switching remain blocked until that recovery completes.
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CLI-authored EVM addresses accept canonical lowercase or valid EIP-55 input and are normalized to lowercase before request validation and transport. Invalid mixed-case and uppercase forms are rejected. Remote responses and Remote MCP plans remain strictly lowercase so normalization cannot change signed or hashed plan bytes.
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Valid remote Identity, Agent, Task, Skill, and OAuth errors are emitted in their original domain envelope with the remote trace ID. Local transport failures use `CLI_REMOTE_UNAVAILABLE`; malformed or contract-invalid responses use `CLI_RESPONSE_INVALID`. Locally synthesized failures use a null trace ID rather than impersonating a server trace.
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Skill upload failures also retain the final `uploadBytes`, `uploadObjectKind`, HTTP `remoteStatus` (null when no response was obtained), and available allowlisted `remoteCode`, `remoteRequestId`, and `remoteTraceId` in the JSON-encoded `state`. Locally synthesized errors retain the existing null `reasonCode` and `traceId` contract; downstream evidence is labelled explicitly in `state`. These fields never include raw response text, upload filenames, credentials, or transport causes. `not_attempted` refers only to chain submission: storage may have accepted an object before a response was lost. Follow `contact_support` until the individual attempt is reconciled; another publication's status is not evidence about this attempt.
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ZIP import failures return `AGENT_MARKET_REQUEST_INVALID`, exit code `2`, and `fix_request` before upload. The JSON-encoded `state` identifies `SKILL_SOURCE_ZIP_INVALID` and a `zipReason`: `archive_too_large`, `expanded_content_too_large`, `utf8_flag_missing`, `filename_encoding_invalid`, or `invalid_archive`. Size failures include `actualBytes`, `maxBytes` (10,485,760), and `sizeBasis`: `archive` measures the compressed input; `declared_expanded` is the cumulative uncompressed size declared by entries at the first limit violation, before decompression. A safely decoded root-relative entry `path` is included when available. Non-ASCII filenames require valid UTF-8 bytes and bit 11 in the ZIP headers; rebuilding with those flags preserves file contents. These import limits are independent of final upload admission.
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Intent HTTP failures include `remotePath: "/api/skills/intents"`, `remoteStatus`, and available safe correlation IDs. `responseIssue` distinguishes `transport_failed`, `body_read_failed`, `empty_body`, `invalid_content_length`, `response_too_large`, `invalid_json`, and `schema_mismatch`. Schema failures include at most eight `schemaIssues` with known field paths and validation keywords; an empty path means the response root or an unrecognized field, whose name is withheld. No response values, arbitrary property names, URLs, or raw causes are printed. Malformed success responses are rejected during `intent`, before signing or writing a pending-send marker. Use the returned recovery command for the same publication; the CLI never automatically retries intent requests or resubmits transactions. The fingerprint identifies the local recovery journal, not a server trace; use returned remote IDs to correlate server logs.
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The CLI measures the exact final multipart request, including metadata and framing. Requests above 4,000,000 bytes emit a structured SKILL_UPLOAD_NEAR_LIMIT warning on stderr and continue; requests above 4,500,000 bytes fail before upload. Exactly 4,000,000 bytes do not warn; exactly 4,500,000 bytes warn and continue. These MB thresholds are decimal. The manifest allowance is separately 3 MiB (3,145,728 bytes) on upload and reads. Repacking a compressed source ZIP may increase its size. Passing admission does not certify production upload success or authorize replaying a previously failed publication.
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The command groups are `wallet`, `login/status/logout`, `site`, `mcp doctor`, `mcp authorize`, `mcp grant`, `creator`, `credentials`, `intent`, `operation show`, `purchase`, `task`, and `skill`. Run `finch --help` for the exact command list as one JSON value.
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`finch site open` creates a sixty-second one-use handoff from the active AgentCLI Session and opens the exact configured Finch origin in the local default Browser. `finch site login <REQUEST_URL>` binds a website-created five-minute request once, then opens the same confirmation page. Both commands require the wallet, CLI, and graphical Browser on the user's machine. A launch failure returns `BROWSER_OPEN_FAILED` without printing the secret completion URL. The Browser receives only a normal seven-day Finch Web Session; wallet signing, broadcast, and market confirmation remain local CLI actions.
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`finch mcp doctor` is read-only. It returns a `checks` object for endpoint, wallet, local Session, remote Session authority, and MCP discovery. Each check reports `ok`, `missing`, `invalid`, `unavailable`, or `skipped`, with guidance for unhealthy checks. Missing login or wallet state does not prevent independent discovery checks; an invalid endpoint prevents network checks. The command emits one JSON report with exit code 0 when ready, or 2 when any required check is unhealthy. It verifies that the active CLI authority, AgentCLI Session, local wallet, MCP challenge, OAuth metadata, and source-controlled persistent-Harness manifest agree. The Agent Harness owns Remote MCP configuration, OAuth credentials, and refresh; the CLI does not configure or launch Codex and never reads Harness OAuth material. During the Harness's native OAuth flow, the authorization page supplies an exact `finch mcp authorize <REQUEST_TOKEN>` command. The versioned base64url token carries the original OAuth request without shell metacharacters so Windows package-manager and Volta launchers cannot split it; the CLI decodes it before applying the existing origin, callback, state, and scope checks. That command uses only the active local AgentCLI Session and opens the verified callback without returning its one-use code. It never uses a Browser Session, Social account, or extension wallet as Agent authority. Configure `https://www.finchtech.ai/mcp` once through the Harness, then use MCP `identity_actor_get` together with `finch status` to verify exact Account and wallet alignment before custody. The server-reported environment is diagnostic and never selects the CLI endpoint or a transaction chain.
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Doctor's `ready: true` is scoped by `readinessScope: "cli_session_and_mcp_discovery"`. Its `harnessOAuth.status` is always `not_checked`: CLI login and valid discovery metadata do not establish that the connected Harness has usable OAuth credentials, a saved issuer, or working refresh. The result includes identity-verification and native reauthorization guidance. If the Harness reports an OAuth failure, complete its native MCP authorization flow and the authorization page's fresh `finch mcp authorize` command, then verify MCP identity again.
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Run `finch login --help` to list supported production authentication chain IDs (1, 10, 56, 8453, 42161). For example, `finch login --chain-id 56` selects BNB Smart Chain for authentication only.
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Ordinary installs require no profile file or environment selection. Network commands default to the PROD endpoint at `https://www.finchtech.ai`. `finch login --chain-id <CHAIN_ID>` explicitly selects only the authentication chain, which the selected server must support. Market transaction chains come from Remote MCP/API plans and are independent of the login chain. `intent approve` signs only the shared publication-v2 or Local-purchase-v1 EIP-712 authorization; it cannot sign arbitrary transaction calldata.
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`operation show` and signing-decision recovery require an active, unexpired MCP grant for the current account and endpoint with `agent_market:operations:read`. The CLI selects that grant from protected local state and never substitutes the AgentCLI Session bearer.
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Creator commands are thin projections of the shared Agent Market merchant operations. Reads require `agent_market:merchant:read`; mutations require `agent_market:merchant:write`, a stable caller-chosen `--request-id` UUID for local idempotency recovery, and `--expected-revision` wherever the shared operation requires If-Match. Structured request bodies come from bounded JSON `--from-file` documents and are validated against the same shared schemas before HTTP.
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Local AgentOn HMAC generation is not a product command. `credentials material-download <setupId> --out-file <absolute-path>` claims the AgentOn setup, downloads only its exact live lease as raw FCR1, and creates a new owner-only file; stdout contains only `keyId` and `path`. `credentials fulfill` accepts only Direct credential uploads. It accepts either an existing protected FCR1 with `--from-file <path>`, or a protected raw Bearer token with `--bearer-token-file <path> --key-id <keyId>`; the latter validates one whitespace-free token and adds the `Bearer ` prefix only in CLI memory. Secret bytes never enter argv or stdout.
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`purchase transaction <operationId>` is read-only. It requires an active `agent_market:buyer:purchase` MCP grant and returns the two server-composed transaction requests plus their chain authority; it does not sign or broadcast arbitrary calldata.
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`purchase submit <operationId>` requires the same grant and uses only the source-controlled public RPCs for the plan's chain. It uses the protected wallet to re-encode and submit the exact server-composed USDC approval and AgentService Vault purchase. Before signing it verifies `eth_chainId`, the reviewed chain contract authority, every transaction field, and a successful `eth_call` simulation. Every returned broadcast hash is atomically checkpointed before receipt waiting; a restart re-verifies the exact wallet, call, receipt, block, and current server authority and never re-broadcasts a known phase. Finch then verifies the canonical confirmation event and creates Call Rights. If the purchase receipt conclusively reverts, the paired zero-allowance cleanup follows the same checkpoint discipline; unknown receipts are never guessed. The RPC owns nonce selection. User RPC and environment variables are ignored, and neither RPC URLs nor wallet keys are emitted.
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`purchase recover-approval <operationId> --transaction-hash <hash>` is the narrow adoption path for an approval broadcast before its durable checkpoint was written. It re-fetches the current server authority and active wallet, then verifies the exact successful approval transaction and sufficient live token allowance on the plan chain before writing one owner-only recovery journal. It never broadcasts, confirms, scans chain history, or accepts a nonce. A subsequent `purchase submit` continues with the purchase phase without approving again.
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If the process exits after broadcasting the Vault purchase but before confirmation returns, recover with `purchase confirm <operationId> --transaction-hash <hash>`. This command never trusts the supplied hash: Finch fetches and decodes the canonical chain receipt before any Call Rights mutation.
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Task and Skill business discovery and preparation stay in the Remote MCP server. The `task` commands only fund an exact prepared Task pool, sign exact prepared awards, or submit an exact prepared reclaim. Skill purchase, conversion, price, and supply commands submit strict MCP preparations. `skill publish-submit --path <file-or-directory> --from-file <plan>` and `skill version-submit` accept either one file or one directory, then apply the plan's independent `plaintext`, `finchip_v2`, or `lit` content mode; filtering, deterministic ZIP construction, encryption, upload, and key custody remain local. `skill asset-upload --path <cover> --from-file <plan>` uploads a separately prepared public cover, and `skill presentation-submit --from-file <plan>` publishes bounded public presentation metadata without changing protected package bytes. `skill download --from-file <delivery> --out-file <new-file>` downloads IPFS content directly or signs with the entitled local wallet for protected content, verifies the SkillRoot and every file (or the plaintext ZIP hash for historical Skills), and creates an owner-only file. Every transaction action uses its plan's chain, source-controlled public RPCs, and reviewed chain-level contract authority. The CLI recomputes transaction bytes locally and rejects mismatched chains, destinations, calldata, values, source commits, or envelope tags.
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## ZIP import and SkillRoot publication
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Version 0.3.1 fixes Skill search continuation: pass the returned `nextCursor` unchanged as
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`--cursor`. Search uses the server rules; the CLI does not implement a matching algorithm.
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Older clients receive an upgrade message from the Skill search API.
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Version 0.3.0 upgrades Skill publication and encrypted delivery together. Upgrade with
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`pnpm add -g @finchtech/cli@0.3.
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or downloading encrypted Skills from the upgraded gateway. Older CLI versions cannot use
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the new encrypted delivery, including for historical Skills; 0.3.0 retains historical package support.
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A single `.zip` passed to `skill publish-submit --path` or `skill version-submit --path` is expanded locally before filtering and primary-document hashing; request a `file` source plan for this input. Directory inputs keep ZIP assets as ordinary files. Imports support stored/DEFLATE ZIPs up to 10 MiB compressed and expanded, with at most 1024 entries. Unsafe paths, symbolic links, encrypted ZIPs, ZIP64, conflicting entries, and corrupt content are refused. Include `SKILL.md`, `README.md`, or one unambiguous root Markdown document.
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New Skills publish a DAG-CBOR SkillRoot hash in one graph bundle. Existing Skill identities keep ZIP-hash updates. New Skills require this updated CLI; it verifies every object and decrypts protected files locally into an ordinary ZIP. Historical ZIP downloads and whole-package decryption remain supported. A pending publication reuses its uploaded bytes and saved root commitment on resume.
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The [publication ADR](../../docs/adr/ADR-0064-20260908-skillroot-publication.md) specifies the pinned draft, bundle/profile format, compatibility trust boundary, and rollout order.
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Finch-managed and Lit downloads use Oracle V2 device-sealed grants and a non-extractable local CryptoKey.
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The updated gateway also supports historical Finch-managed and Lit ZIPs through this delivery. It refuses
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old bare-key buyer requests; use the updated CLI. Both providers use the same sealed delivery. See
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[ADR-0065](../../docs/adr/ADR-0065-20260908-skill-oracle-v2-delivery.md) for deployment requirements.
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Publication preparation accepts an optional `summary` (up to 500 characters). It is committed in
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SkillRoot exactly as supplied, matching Browser publication metadata; omission means an empty summary.
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Equal public file bytes, paths, name, summary, version and history produce equal roots. Encrypted
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publications use random keys/IVs and need not produce the same root. Updates send the proposed
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manifest for server validation; URI intents are prepared after the new chain binding is confirmed.
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Finch-managed publication key requests use a signed timestamp and a one-time nonce. Each request is
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valid for five minutes; retrying after expiry or a lost response requires a fresh signature. The
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gateway rejects older CLI publication requests without timestamps. Historical downloads are unchanged.
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### Local publication failures
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Directory publication rejects symbolic links, including internal relative links and broken links.
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It skips excluded paths (for example `.git`, `node_modules`, `.aws`, and credential files) before reading
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or descending into them. `excluded` lists a skipped directory once instead of enumerating its children.
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Keep required resource paths functional when preparing a link-free source; deleting required links is
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not a valid repair. ZIP imports also reject symbolic links.
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Source errors keep exit code 2 and `AGENT_MARKET_REQUEST_INVALID`. Parse the JSON string in `error.state`
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for `diagnosticCode`: `SKILL_SOURCE_SYMLINK_UNSUPPORTED`, `SKILL_SOURCE_UNREADABLE`, or
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`SKILL_UPLOAD_SIZE_INVALID`, `SKILL_SOURCE_ZIP_INVALID`, `SKILL_SOURCE_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT_INVALID`, `SKILL_UPLOAD_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE`, or `SKILL_MANIFEST_SIZE_INVALID`. Source diagnostics include a root-relative `path` (`.` for the selected
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root); size diagnostics include `actualBytes` and `maxBytes`. The 10 MiB internal packaging bound is independent of the stricter HTTP limit and applies to the final
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upload object, including SkillRoot metadata and encryption overhead. STORE ZIP construction does not
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compress files. A size rejection occurs before that upload and before transaction submission.
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Publish, version, and publication-recovery failures also include `phase`, `fingerprint`,
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`transactionHashes` (keyed by `primary`, `uri`, or `lit`), `submissionStatus`, and `recoveryCommand` in
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`error.state`. `packaging` includes local hashing/encryption; `transaction` covers signing, broadcast,
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and receipt handling. A validated remote error keeps its code, message, trace and HTTP status
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(`remoteStatus`), with its original state retained as `remoteState`; publication retry guidance takes
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precedence over a remote service's generic retry flag. Private causes, RPC URLs, credentials and
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journal contents are never printed.
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Publication failures set `retryable: false`: this is not permission to replay a paid operation.
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`not_attempted` means no send was attempted in this invocation and no hashes were found in the
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validated journal; it is not proof about other invocations. `hash_known` includes known transaction
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hashes. `uncertain` means sending or durable checkpointing failed; contact support before retrying or
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recovering, even when a hash is shown. A non-null `recoveryCommand` is provided only after a journal
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is validated or saved and no submission/checkpoint uncertainty was observed. Recheck CLI/MCP identity
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and use that command rather than repeating publish-submit. Cleanup failures do not claim a journal
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still exists. If source is unavailable or its excluded-path inventory changed across CLI versions,
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the fingerprint-only recovery command can use the already stored publication bytes.
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These fixes require CLI 0.3.3 or newer; npm 0.3.2 does not include them. Updating a Skill does not upgrade the installed CLI. Journal v6 saves a pending stage before signing/submitting. Missing hashes in a pending stage or a legacy v4/v5 journal block automatic resubmission; contact support. Known hashes are verified without rebroadcast. The pending marker also blocks destructive local authorization/wallet cleanup through the recovery inventory.
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## Bootstrap and health reports (CLI 0.3.4+)
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First-wallet offline import, installed Account-switch revocation, partial doctor checks and exit code 2, contextual wallet recovery guidance, login authentication-chain help, and strict OAuth UUID response validation require CLI 0.3.4 or newer. Updating the website or Skill does not upgrade an installed CLI.
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# Finch Agent CLI
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Install the public npm package with `npm install -g @finchtech/cli`, then run `finch --help`. The primary executable is `finch`; `finchtech` is an equivalent fallback for machines where another application already owns the `finch` command.
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The Finch Agent CLI stores wallet keys, AgentCLI Session bearers, and MCP grant bearers only in an owner-only `FINCHTECH_HOME`, which defaults to `~/.finchtech`; secrets are never accepted as command arguments or emitted to stdout.
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For an existing private key, run `finch wallet use --file <PATH>` on a fresh installation, then `finch login --help` to choose an authentication chain. The file must contain a single 0x-prefixed 32-byte hex private key and have owner-only permissions. First import is offline and makes that wallet current. `finch wallet create` generates a new identity instead. An existing Account switch requires login and remote revocation before changing the current wallet. Incomplete wallet files require recovery from backup; residual local authorization requires restoring the original wallet or explicitly clearing local authorization with `finch logout --local`.
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`finch logout` revokes Account-bound remote authority before removing local Session and grant state. If invalid, corrupt, or legacy Session metadata prevents that flow, `finch logout --local` performs an explicit offline reset of only `session/` and `grants/`. It makes no network request and reports `remoteRevoked: false`; it remains available while an irreversible recovery is pending and preserves profiles, registered wallets, transaction journals, and recovery records so the user can log in again and run the recorded recovery command. Ordinary logout and wallet switching remain blocked until that recovery completes.
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CLI-authored EVM addresses accept canonical lowercase or valid EIP-55 input and are normalized to lowercase before request validation and transport. Invalid mixed-case and uppercase forms are rejected. Remote responses and Remote MCP plans remain strictly lowercase so normalization cannot change signed or hashed plan bytes.
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Valid remote Identity, Agent, Task, Skill, and OAuth errors are emitted in their original domain envelope with the remote trace ID. Local transport failures use `CLI_REMOTE_UNAVAILABLE`; malformed or contract-invalid responses use `CLI_RESPONSE_INVALID`. Locally synthesized failures use a null trace ID rather than impersonating a server trace.
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Skill upload failures also retain the final `uploadBytes`, `uploadObjectKind`, HTTP `remoteStatus` (null when no response was obtained), and available allowlisted `remoteCode`, `remoteRequestId`, and `remoteTraceId` in the JSON-encoded `state`. Locally synthesized errors retain the existing null `reasonCode` and `traceId` contract; downstream evidence is labelled explicitly in `state`. These fields never include raw response text, upload filenames, credentials, or transport causes. `not_attempted` refers only to chain submission: storage may have accepted an object before a response was lost. Follow `contact_support` until the individual attempt is reconciled; another publication's status is not evidence about this attempt.
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ZIP import failures return `AGENT_MARKET_REQUEST_INVALID`, exit code `2`, and `fix_request` before upload. The JSON-encoded `state` identifies `SKILL_SOURCE_ZIP_INVALID` and a `zipReason`: `archive_too_large`, `expanded_content_too_large`, `utf8_flag_missing`, `filename_encoding_invalid`, or `invalid_archive`. Size failures include `actualBytes`, `maxBytes` (10,485,760), and `sizeBasis`: `archive` measures the compressed input; `declared_expanded` is the cumulative uncompressed size declared by entries at the first limit violation, before decompression. A safely decoded root-relative entry `path` is included when available. Non-ASCII filenames require valid UTF-8 bytes and bit 11 in the ZIP headers; rebuilding with those flags preserves file contents. These import limits are independent of final upload admission.
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Intent HTTP failures include `remotePath: "/api/skills/intents"`, `remoteStatus`, and available safe correlation IDs. `responseIssue` distinguishes `transport_failed`, `body_read_failed`, `empty_body`, `invalid_content_length`, `response_too_large`, `invalid_json`, and `schema_mismatch`. Schema failures include at most eight `schemaIssues` with known field paths and validation keywords; an empty path means the response root or an unrecognized field, whose name is withheld. No response values, arbitrary property names, URLs, or raw causes are printed. Malformed success responses are rejected during `intent`, before signing or writing a pending-send marker. Use the returned recovery command for the same publication; the CLI never automatically retries intent requests or resubmits transactions. The fingerprint identifies the local recovery journal, not a server trace; use returned remote IDs to correlate server logs.
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The CLI measures the exact final multipart request, including metadata and framing. Requests above 4,000,000 bytes emit a structured SKILL_UPLOAD_NEAR_LIMIT warning on stderr and continue; requests above 4,500,000 bytes fail before upload. Exactly 4,000,000 bytes do not warn; exactly 4,500,000 bytes warn and continue. These MB thresholds are decimal. The manifest allowance is separately 3 MiB (3,145,728 bytes) on upload and reads. Repacking a compressed source ZIP may increase its size. Passing admission does not certify production upload success or authorize replaying a previously failed publication.
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
The command groups are `wallet`, `login/status/logout`, `site`, `mcp doctor`, `mcp authorize`, `mcp grant`, `creator`, `credentials`, `intent`, `operation show`, `purchase`, `task`, and `skill`. Run `finch --help` for the exact command list as one JSON value.
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
`finch site open` creates a sixty-second one-use handoff from the active AgentCLI Session and opens the exact configured Finch origin in the local default Browser. `finch site login <REQUEST_URL>` binds a website-created five-minute request once, then opens the same confirmation page. Both commands require the wallet, CLI, and graphical Browser on the user's machine. A launch failure returns `BROWSER_OPEN_FAILED` without printing the secret completion URL. The Browser receives only a normal seven-day Finch Web Session; wallet signing, broadcast, and market confirmation remain local CLI actions.
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
`finch mcp doctor` is read-only. It returns a `checks` object for endpoint, wallet, local Session, remote Session authority, and MCP discovery. Each check reports `ok`, `missing`, `invalid`, `unavailable`, or `skipped`, with guidance for unhealthy checks. Missing login or wallet state does not prevent independent discovery checks; an invalid endpoint prevents network checks. The command emits one JSON report with exit code 0 when ready, or 2 when any required check is unhealthy. It verifies that the active CLI authority, AgentCLI Session, local wallet, MCP challenge, OAuth metadata, and source-controlled persistent-Harness manifest agree. The Agent Harness owns Remote MCP configuration, OAuth credentials, and refresh; the CLI does not configure or launch Codex and never reads Harness OAuth material. During the Harness's native OAuth flow, the authorization page supplies an exact `finch mcp authorize <REQUEST_TOKEN>` command. The versioned base64url token carries the original OAuth request without shell metacharacters so Windows package-manager and Volta launchers cannot split it; the CLI decodes it before applying the existing origin, callback, state, and scope checks. That command uses only the active local AgentCLI Session and opens the verified callback without returning its one-use code. It never uses a Browser Session, Social account, or extension wallet as Agent authority. Configure `https://www.finchtech.ai/mcp` once through the Harness, then use MCP `identity_actor_get` together with `finch status` to verify exact Account and wallet alignment before custody. The server-reported environment is diagnostic and never selects the CLI endpoint or a transaction chain.
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
Doctor's `ready: true` is scoped by `readinessScope: "cli_session_and_mcp_discovery"`. Its `harnessOAuth.status` is always `not_checked`: CLI login and valid discovery metadata do not establish that the connected Harness has usable OAuth credentials, a saved issuer, or working refresh. The result includes identity-verification and native reauthorization guidance. If the Harness reports an OAuth failure, complete its native MCP authorization flow and the authorization page's fresh `finch mcp authorize` command, then verify MCP identity again.
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
Run `finch login --help` to list supported production authentication chain IDs (1, 10, 56, 8453, 42161). For example, `finch login --chain-id 56` selects BNB Smart Chain for authentication only.
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
Ordinary installs require no profile file or environment selection. Network commands default to the PROD endpoint at `https://www.finchtech.ai`. `finch login --chain-id <CHAIN_ID>` explicitly selects only the authentication chain, which the selected server must support. Market transaction chains come from Remote MCP/API plans and are independent of the login chain. `intent approve` signs only the shared publication-v2 or Local-purchase-v1 EIP-712 authorization; it cannot sign arbitrary transaction calldata.
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
`operation show` and signing-decision recovery require an active, unexpired MCP grant for the current account and endpoint with `agent_market:operations:read`. The CLI selects that grant from protected local state and never substitutes the AgentCLI Session bearer.
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
Creator commands are thin projections of the shared Agent Market merchant operations. Reads require `agent_market:merchant:read`; mutations require `agent_market:merchant:write`, a stable caller-chosen `--request-id` UUID for local idempotency recovery, and `--expected-revision` wherever the shared operation requires If-Match. Structured request bodies come from bounded JSON `--from-file` documents and are validated against the same shared schemas before HTTP.
|
|
38
|
+
|
|
39
|
+
Local AgentOn HMAC generation is not a product command. `credentials material-download <setupId> --out-file <absolute-path>` claims the AgentOn setup, downloads only its exact live lease as raw FCR1, and creates a new owner-only file; stdout contains only `keyId` and `path`. `credentials fulfill` accepts only Direct credential uploads. It accepts either an existing protected FCR1 with `--from-file <path>`, or a protected raw Bearer token with `--bearer-token-file <path> --key-id <keyId>`; the latter validates one whitespace-free token and adds the `Bearer ` prefix only in CLI memory. Secret bytes never enter argv or stdout.
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
`purchase transaction <operationId>` is read-only. It requires an active `agent_market:buyer:purchase` MCP grant and returns the two server-composed transaction requests plus their chain authority; it does not sign or broadcast arbitrary calldata.
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
`purchase submit <operationId>` requires the same grant and uses only the source-controlled public RPCs for the plan's chain. It uses the protected wallet to re-encode and submit the exact server-composed USDC approval and AgentService Vault purchase. Before signing it verifies `eth_chainId`, the reviewed chain contract authority, every transaction field, and a successful `eth_call` simulation. Every returned broadcast hash is atomically checkpointed before receipt waiting; a restart re-verifies the exact wallet, call, receipt, block, and current server authority and never re-broadcasts a known phase. Finch then verifies the canonical confirmation event and creates Call Rights. If the purchase receipt conclusively reverts, the paired zero-allowance cleanup follows the same checkpoint discipline; unknown receipts are never guessed. The RPC owns nonce selection. User RPC and environment variables are ignored, and neither RPC URLs nor wallet keys are emitted.
|
|
44
|
+
|
|
45
|
+
`purchase recover-approval <operationId> --transaction-hash <hash>` is the narrow adoption path for an approval broadcast before its durable checkpoint was written. It re-fetches the current server authority and active wallet, then verifies the exact successful approval transaction and sufficient live token allowance on the plan chain before writing one owner-only recovery journal. It never broadcasts, confirms, scans chain history, or accepts a nonce. A subsequent `purchase submit` continues with the purchase phase without approving again.
|
|
46
|
+
|
|
47
|
+
If the process exits after broadcasting the Vault purchase but before confirmation returns, recover with `purchase confirm <operationId> --transaction-hash <hash>`. This command never trusts the supplied hash: Finch fetches and decodes the canonical chain receipt before any Call Rights mutation.
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
Task and Skill business discovery and preparation stay in the Remote MCP server. The `task` commands only fund an exact prepared Task pool, sign exact prepared awards, or submit an exact prepared reclaim. Skill purchase, conversion, price, and supply commands submit strict MCP preparations. `skill publish-submit --path <file-or-directory> --from-file <plan>` and `skill version-submit` accept either one file or one directory, then apply the plan's independent `plaintext`, `finchip_v2`, or `lit` content mode; filtering, deterministic ZIP construction, encryption, upload, and key custody remain local. `skill asset-upload --path <cover> --from-file <plan>` uploads a separately prepared public cover, and `skill presentation-submit --from-file <plan>` publishes bounded public presentation metadata without changing protected package bytes. `skill download --from-file <delivery> --out-file <new-file>` downloads IPFS content directly or signs with the entitled local wallet for protected content, verifies the SkillRoot and every file (or the plaintext ZIP hash for historical Skills), and creates an owner-only file. Every transaction action uses its plan's chain, source-controlled public RPCs, and reviewed chain-level contract authority. The CLI recomputes transaction bytes locally and rejects mismatched chains, destinations, calldata, values, source commits, or envelope tags.
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
## ZIP import and SkillRoot publication
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
Version 0.3.1 fixes Skill search continuation: pass the returned `nextCursor` unchanged as
|
|
54
|
+
`--cursor`. Search uses the server rules; the CLI does not implement a matching algorithm.
|
|
55
|
+
Older clients receive an upgrade message from the Skill search API.
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
Version 0.3.0 upgrades Skill publication and encrypted delivery together. Upgrade with
|
|
58
|
+
`pnpm add -g @finchtech/cli@0.3.5` and verify `finch --version` before publishing new Skills
|
|
59
|
+
or downloading encrypted Skills from the upgraded gateway. Older CLI versions cannot use
|
|
60
|
+
the new encrypted delivery, including for historical Skills; 0.3.0 retains historical package support.
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
A single `.zip` passed to `skill publish-submit --path` or `skill version-submit --path` is expanded locally before filtering and primary-document hashing; request a `file` source plan for this input. Directory inputs keep ZIP assets as ordinary files. Imports support stored/DEFLATE ZIPs up to 10 MiB compressed and expanded, with at most 1024 entries. Unsafe paths, symbolic links, encrypted ZIPs, ZIP64, conflicting entries, and corrupt content are refused. Include `SKILL.md`, `README.md`, or one unambiguous root Markdown document.
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
New Skills publish a DAG-CBOR SkillRoot hash in one graph bundle. Existing Skill identities keep ZIP-hash updates. New Skills require this updated CLI; it verifies every object and decrypts protected files locally into an ordinary ZIP. Historical ZIP downloads and whole-package decryption remain supported. A pending publication reuses its uploaded bytes and saved root commitment on resume.
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
The [publication ADR](../../docs/adr/ADR-0064-20260908-skillroot-publication.md) specifies the pinned draft, bundle/profile format, compatibility trust boundary, and rollout order.
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
Finch-managed and Lit downloads use Oracle V2 device-sealed grants and a non-extractable local CryptoKey.
|
|
69
|
+
The updated gateway also supports historical Finch-managed and Lit ZIPs through this delivery. It refuses
|
|
70
|
+
old bare-key buyer requests; use the updated CLI. Both providers use the same sealed delivery. See
|
|
71
|
+
[ADR-0065](../../docs/adr/ADR-0065-20260908-skill-oracle-v2-delivery.md) for deployment requirements.
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
Publication preparation accepts an optional `summary` (up to 500 characters). It is committed in
|
|
74
|
+
SkillRoot exactly as supplied, matching Browser publication metadata; omission means an empty summary.
|
|
75
|
+
Equal public file bytes, paths, name, summary, version and history produce equal roots. Encrypted
|
|
76
|
+
publications use random keys/IVs and need not produce the same root. Updates send the proposed
|
|
77
|
+
manifest for server validation; URI intents are prepared after the new chain binding is confirmed.
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
79
|
+
Finch-managed publication key requests use a signed timestamp and a one-time nonce. Each request is
|
|
80
|
+
valid for five minutes; retrying after expiry or a lost response requires a fresh signature. The
|
|
81
|
+
gateway rejects older CLI publication requests without timestamps. Historical downloads are unchanged.
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
### Local publication failures
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
Directory publication rejects symbolic links, including internal relative links and broken links.
|
|
86
|
+
It skips excluded paths (for example `.git`, `node_modules`, `.aws`, and credential files) before reading
|
|
87
|
+
or descending into them. `excluded` lists a skipped directory once instead of enumerating its children.
|
|
88
|
+
Keep required resource paths functional when preparing a link-free source; deleting required links is
|
|
89
|
+
not a valid repair. ZIP imports also reject symbolic links.
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
Source errors keep exit code 2 and `AGENT_MARKET_REQUEST_INVALID`. Parse the JSON string in `error.state`
|
|
92
|
+
for `diagnosticCode`: `SKILL_SOURCE_SYMLINK_UNSUPPORTED`, `SKILL_SOURCE_UNREADABLE`, or
|
|
93
|
+
`SKILL_UPLOAD_SIZE_INVALID`, `SKILL_SOURCE_ZIP_INVALID`, `SKILL_SOURCE_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT_INVALID`, `SKILL_UPLOAD_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE`, or `SKILL_MANIFEST_SIZE_INVALID`. Source diagnostics include a root-relative `path` (`.` for the selected
|
|
94
|
+
root); size diagnostics include `actualBytes` and `maxBytes`. The 10 MiB internal packaging bound is independent of the stricter HTTP limit and applies to the final
|
|
95
|
+
upload object, including SkillRoot metadata and encryption overhead. STORE ZIP construction does not
|
|
96
|
+
compress files. A size rejection occurs before that upload and before transaction submission.
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
Publish, version, and publication-recovery failures also include `phase`, `fingerprint`,
|
|
99
|
+
`transactionHashes` (keyed by `primary`, `uri`, or `lit`), `submissionStatus`, and `recoveryCommand` in
|
|
100
|
+
`error.state`. `packaging` includes local hashing/encryption; `transaction` covers signing, broadcast,
|
|
101
|
+
and receipt handling. A validated remote error keeps its code, message, trace and HTTP status
|
|
102
|
+
(`remoteStatus`), with its original state retained as `remoteState`; publication retry guidance takes
|
|
103
|
+
precedence over a remote service's generic retry flag. Private causes, RPC URLs, credentials and
|
|
104
|
+
journal contents are never printed.
|
|
105
|
+
|
|
106
|
+
Publication failures set `retryable: false`: this is not permission to replay a paid operation.
|
|
107
|
+
`not_attempted` means no send was attempted in this invocation and no hashes were found in the
|
|
108
|
+
validated journal; it is not proof about other invocations. `hash_known` includes known transaction
|
|
109
|
+
hashes. `uncertain` means sending or durable checkpointing failed; contact support before retrying or
|
|
110
|
+
recovering, even when a hash is shown. A non-null `recoveryCommand` is provided only after a journal
|
|
111
|
+
is validated or saved and no submission/checkpoint uncertainty was observed. Recheck CLI/MCP identity
|
|
112
|
+
and use that command rather than repeating publish-submit. Cleanup failures do not claim a journal
|
|
113
|
+
still exists. If source is unavailable or its excluded-path inventory changed across CLI versions,
|
|
114
|
+
the fingerprint-only recovery command can use the already stored publication bytes.
|
|
115
|
+
|
|
116
|
+
These fixes require CLI 0.3.3 or newer; npm 0.3.2 does not include them. Updating a Skill does not upgrade the installed CLI. Journal v6 saves a pending stage before signing/submitting. Missing hashes in a pending stage or a legacy v4/v5 journal block automatic resubmission; contact support. Known hashes are verified without rebroadcast. The pending marker also blocks destructive local authorization/wallet cleanup through the recovery inventory.
|
|
117
|
+
|
|
118
|
+
## Bootstrap and health reports (CLI 0.3.4+)
|
|
119
|
+
|
|
120
|
+
First-wallet offline import, installed Account-switch revocation, partial doctor checks and exit code 2, contextual wallet recovery guidance, login authentication-chain help, and strict OAuth UUID response validation require CLI 0.3.4 or newer. Updating the website or Skill does not upgrade an installed CLI.
|
|
121
|
+
|
|
122
|
+
## WebP image detection (CLI 0.3.5+)
|
|
123
|
+
|
|
124
|
+
CLI 0.3.5 fixes valid WebP covers and packaged detail images being rejected when binary file-size bytes were decoded as UTF-8. Upgrade the installed CLI to receive the local detection fix; website or Skill updates alone do not update the executable. Image types, size limits, and publication recovery rules are unchanged.
|
package/dist/finch.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -7224,11 +7224,32 @@ var init_delivery_message = __esm({
|
|
|
7224
7224
|
}
|
|
7225
7225
|
});
|
|
7226
7226
|
|
|
7227
|
+
// ../../packages/skill-content/src/image-signature.ts
|
|
7228
|
+
function matchesAscii(bytes, offset, tag) {
|
|
7229
|
+
if (bytes.length < offset + tag.length) return false;
|
|
7230
|
+
return [...tag].every((character, index2) => bytes[offset + index2] === character.charCodeAt(0));
|
|
7231
|
+
}
|
|
7232
|
+
function detectedImageMediaType(bytes) {
|
|
7233
|
+
if (bytes.length >= PNG_SIGNATURE.length && PNG_SIGNATURE.every((byte, index2) => bytes[index2] === byte)) return "image/png";
|
|
7234
|
+
if (bytes.length >= 3 && bytes[0] === 255 && bytes[1] === 216 && bytes[2] === 255) return "image/jpeg";
|
|
7235
|
+
if (matchesAscii(bytes, 0, "GIF87a") || matchesAscii(bytes, 0, "GIF89a")) return "image/gif";
|
|
7236
|
+
if (matchesAscii(bytes, 0, "RIFF") && matchesAscii(bytes, 8, "WEBP")) return "image/webp";
|
|
7237
|
+
return null;
|
|
7238
|
+
}
|
|
7239
|
+
var PNG_SIGNATURE;
|
|
7240
|
+
var init_image_signature = __esm({
|
|
7241
|
+
"../../packages/skill-content/src/image-signature.ts"() {
|
|
7242
|
+
"use strict";
|
|
7243
|
+
PNG_SIGNATURE = [137, 80, 78, 71, 13, 10, 26, 10];
|
|
7244
|
+
}
|
|
7245
|
+
});
|
|
7246
|
+
|
|
7227
7247
|
// ../../packages/skill-content/src/static-detail.ts
|
|
7228
7248
|
var MAX_SKILL_DETAIL_OBJECT_BYTES, MAX_SKILL_DETAIL_DOCUMENT_BYTES, NAMED_REFERENCES;
|
|
7229
7249
|
var init_static_detail = __esm({
|
|
7230
7250
|
"../../packages/skill-content/src/static-detail.ts"() {
|
|
7231
7251
|
"use strict";
|
|
7252
|
+
init_image_signature();
|
|
7232
7253
|
MAX_SKILL_DETAIL_OBJECT_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
|
|
7233
7254
|
MAX_SKILL_DETAIL_DOCUMENT_BYTES = MAX_SKILL_DETAIL_OBJECT_BYTES;
|
|
7234
7255
|
NAMED_REFERENCES = Object.freeze({
|
|
@@ -11737,6 +11758,7 @@ var init_src2 = __esm({
|
|
|
11737
11758
|
init_crypto();
|
|
11738
11759
|
init_delivery_message();
|
|
11739
11760
|
init_detail_documents();
|
|
11761
|
+
init_image_signature();
|
|
11740
11762
|
init_manifest();
|
|
11741
11763
|
init_packaging();
|
|
11742
11764
|
init_static_detail();
|
|
@@ -32940,12 +32962,12 @@ var init_skill_protocol = __esm({
|
|
|
32940
32962
|
name: "BNB Smart Chain",
|
|
32941
32963
|
explorerUrl: "https://bscscan.com",
|
|
32942
32964
|
defaultRpcUrls: [
|
|
32965
|
+
"https://bsc.rpc.blxrbdn.com",
|
|
32943
32966
|
"https://0.48.club",
|
|
32944
|
-
"https://bsc-mainnet.public.blastapi.io",
|
|
32945
32967
|
"https://bsc-dataseed.binance.org",
|
|
32946
32968
|
"https://bsc-dataseed1.defibit.io"
|
|
32947
32969
|
],
|
|
32948
|
-
maxLogBlockRange:
|
|
32970
|
+
maxLogBlockRange: 5e3
|
|
32949
32971
|
},
|
|
32950
32972
|
sourceRepository: "FinchipAI/finchip-protocol",
|
|
32951
32973
|
sourceCommit: "89e54d6ff46dbfba61122e90c5e77f409f02fe5e",
|
|
@@ -32971,8 +32993,7 @@ var init_skill_protocol = __esm({
|
|
|
32971
32993
|
name: "Base",
|
|
32972
32994
|
explorerUrl: "https://basescan.org",
|
|
32973
32995
|
defaultRpcUrls: [
|
|
32974
|
-
"https://mainnet.base.org"
|
|
32975
|
-
"https://base.drpc.org"
|
|
32996
|
+
"https://mainnet.base.org"
|
|
32976
32997
|
],
|
|
32977
32998
|
maxLogBlockRange: 2e3
|
|
32978
32999
|
},
|
|
@@ -33858,12 +33879,12 @@ var init_merchant_avatar_video = __esm({
|
|
|
33858
33879
|
test: {
|
|
33859
33880
|
enabled: true,
|
|
33860
33881
|
offerId: "e72aeda7-da44-5685-b5a0-4d90cfa63c2d",
|
|
33861
|
-
dailyLimit:
|
|
33882
|
+
dailyLimit: 3
|
|
33862
33883
|
},
|
|
33863
33884
|
production: {
|
|
33864
33885
|
enabled: true,
|
|
33865
33886
|
offerId: "1cf22f74-a451-54f0-894a-baff6221693d",
|
|
33866
|
-
dailyLimit:
|
|
33887
|
+
dailyLimit: 3
|
|
33867
33888
|
}
|
|
33868
33889
|
}
|
|
33869
33890
|
};
|
|
@@ -56304,15 +56325,6 @@ function assetPlan(value, walletAddress2) {
|
|
|
56304
56325
|
}
|
|
56305
56326
|
return { chainId, skillId, acceptedMediaTypes: accepted, maxBytes: plan.maxBytes };
|
|
56306
56327
|
}
|
|
56307
|
-
function coverMediaType(bytes) {
|
|
56308
|
-
const png = [137, 80, 78, 71, 13, 10, 26, 10];
|
|
56309
|
-
if (bytes.length >= 8 && png.every((byte, index2) => bytes[index2] === byte)) return "image/png";
|
|
56310
|
-
if (bytes.length >= 3 && bytes[0] === 255 && bytes[1] === 216 && bytes[2] === 255) return "image/jpeg";
|
|
56311
|
-
const head = new TextDecoder().decode(bytes.slice(0, 12));
|
|
56312
|
-
if (head.startsWith("GIF87a") || head.startsWith("GIF89a")) return "image/gif";
|
|
56313
|
-
if (head.startsWith("RIFF") && head.slice(8, 12) === "WEBP") return "image/webp";
|
|
56314
|
-
return null;
|
|
56315
|
-
}
|
|
56316
56328
|
function isPlaintextSkillDelivery(value) {
|
|
56317
56329
|
return value !== null && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value) && value.plaintext === true;
|
|
56318
56330
|
}
|
|
@@ -57189,7 +57201,7 @@ var init_skill_local_flow = __esm({
|
|
|
57189
57201
|
if (!stat.isFile() || stat.isSymbolicLink()) throw new TypeError("Skill cover path must be one regular file.");
|
|
57190
57202
|
if (stat.size < 1 || stat.size > plan.maxBytes) throw new TypeError("Skill cover size is outside the prepared bound.");
|
|
57191
57203
|
const bytes = new Uint8Array(await readFile2(absolute));
|
|
57192
|
-
const mediaType =
|
|
57204
|
+
const mediaType = detectedImageMediaType(bytes);
|
|
57193
57205
|
if (mediaType === null || !plan.acceptedMediaTypes.includes(mediaType)) {
|
|
57194
57206
|
throw new TypeError("Skill cover bytes do not match an accepted image type.");
|
|
57195
57207
|
}
|
|
@@ -59045,7 +59057,7 @@ var init_package = __esm({
|
|
|
59045
59057
|
"package.json"() {
|
|
59046
59058
|
package_default = {
|
|
59047
59059
|
name: "@finchtech/cli",
|
|
59048
|
-
version: "0.3.
|
|
59060
|
+
version: "0.3.5",
|
|
59049
59061
|
description: "Finch Agent CLI for wallet-owned marketplace and MCP workflows.",
|
|
59050
59062
|
type: "module",
|
|
59051
59063
|
bin: {
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@finchtech/cli",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.3.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.3.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Finch Agent CLI for wallet-owned marketplace and MCP workflows.",
|
|
5
5
|
"type": "module",
|
|
6
6
|
"bin": {
|
|
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@
|
|
|
34
34
|
"typescript-eslint": "8.67.0",
|
|
35
35
|
"viem": "2.55.15",
|
|
36
36
|
"vitest": "4.1.10",
|
|
37
|
-
"@finch/deployment-manifest": "0.1.0",
|
|
38
37
|
"@finch/agent-market-contracts": "0.1.0",
|
|
39
|
-
"@finch/skill-market-contracts": "0.1.0",
|
|
40
38
|
"@finch/skill-content": "0.1.0",
|
|
41
|
-
"@finch/
|
|
39
|
+
"@finch/deployment-manifest": "0.1.0",
|
|
40
|
+
"@finch/task-market-contracts": "0.1.0",
|
|
41
|
+
"@finch/skill-market-contracts": "0.1.0"
|
|
42
42
|
},
|
|
43
43
|
"scripts": {
|
|
44
44
|
"build": "esbuild src/bootstrap.ts --bundle --platform=node --format=esm --target=node20 --outfile=dist/finch.js --banner:js=\"#!/usr/bin/env node\"",
|