@finchtech/cli 0.2.1 → 0.2.3

package/README.md

@@ -8,22 +8,22 @@ The command groups are `wallet`, `login/status/logout`, `site`, `mcp doctor`, `m
 
 `finch site open` creates a sixty-second one-use handoff from the active AgentCLI Session and opens the exact configured Finch origin in the local default Browser. `finch site login <REQUEST_URL>` binds a website-created five-minute request once, then opens the same confirmation page. Both commands require the wallet, CLI, and graphical Browser on the user's machine. A launch failure returns `BROWSER_OPEN_FAILED` without printing the secret completion URL. The Browser receives only a normal seven-day Finch Web Session; wallet signing, broadcast, and market confirmation remain local CLI actions.
 
-`finch mcp doctor` is read-only. It verifies that the active CLI authority, AgentCLI Session, local wallet, MCP challenge, OAuth metadata, and source-controlled persistent-Harness manifest agree. The Agent Harness owns Remote MCP configuration, OAuth credentials, and refresh; the CLI does not configure or launch Codex and never reads Harness OAuth material. During the Harness's native OAuth flow, the authorization page supplies the exact `finch mcp authorize <REQUEST_URL>` command. That command uses only the active local AgentCLI Session, verifies the callback against the registered redirect and state, and opens it without returning its one-use code. It never uses a Browser Session, Social account, or extension wallet as Agent authority. Configure `https://www.finchtech.ai/mcp` once through the Harness, then use MCP `identity_actor_get` together with `finch status` to verify exact Account, wallet, and environment alignment before custody.
+`finch mcp doctor` is read-only. It verifies that the active CLI authority, AgentCLI Session, local wallet, MCP challenge, OAuth metadata, and source-controlled persistent-Harness manifest agree. The Agent Harness owns Remote MCP configuration, OAuth credentials, and refresh; the CLI does not configure or launch Codex and never reads Harness OAuth material. During the Harness's native OAuth flow, the authorization page supplies the exact `finch mcp authorize <REQUEST_URL>` command. That command uses only the active local AgentCLI Session, verifies the callback against the registered redirect and state, and opens it without returning its one-use code. It never uses a Browser Session, Social account, or extension wallet as Agent authority. Configure `https://www.finchtech.ai/mcp` once through the Harness, then use MCP `identity_actor_get` together with `finch status` to verify exact Account and wallet alignment before custody. The server-reported environment is diagnostic and never selects the CLI endpoint or a transaction chain.
 
-Ordinary installs require no profile file or environment selection. Network commands use the reviewed built-in PROD authority at `https://www.finchtech.ai` and its source-controlled mainnet deployments. The public command tree has no profile, environment, origin, or chain selector, and conflicting local deployment state fails closed. `intent approve` signs only the shared publication-v2 or Local-purchase-v1 EIP-712 authorization; it cannot sign arbitrary transaction calldata.
+Ordinary installs require no profile file or environment selection. Network commands default to the PROD endpoint at `https://www.finchtech.ai`. An internal TEST installation may provide one strict owner-only `{ "version": 1, "origin": "..." }` profile override; it cannot configure an environment, chain, contract, or RPC. `finch login --chain-id <CHAIN_ID>` explicitly selects only the authentication chain, which the selected server must support. Market transaction chains come from Remote MCP/API plans and are independent of the login chain. `intent approve` signs only the shared publication-v2 or Local-purchase-v1 EIP-712 authorization; it cannot sign arbitrary transaction calldata.
 
-`operation show` and signing-decision recovery require an active, unexpired MCP grant for the current account and environment with `agent_market:operations:read`. The CLI selects that grant from protected local state and never substitutes the AgentCLI Session bearer.
+`operation show` and signing-decision recovery require an active, unexpired MCP grant for the current account and endpoint with `agent_market:operations:read`. The CLI selects that grant from protected local state and never substitutes the AgentCLI Session bearer.
 
 Creator commands are thin projections of the shared Agent Market merchant operations. Reads require `agent_market:merchant:read`; mutations require `agent_market:merchant:write`, a stable caller-chosen `--request-id` UUID for local idempotency recovery, and `--expected-revision` wherever the shared operation requires If-Match. Structured request bodies come from bounded JSON `--from-file` documents and are validated against the same shared schemas before HTTP.
 
 Local AgentOn HMAC generation is not a product command. `credentials material-download <setupId> --out-file <absolute-path>` claims the AgentOn setup, downloads only its exact live lease as raw FCR1, and creates a new owner-only file; stdout contains only `keyId` and `path`. `credentials fulfill` accepts only Direct credential uploads. It accepts either an existing protected FCR1 with `--from-file <path>`, or a protected raw Bearer token with `--bearer-token-file <path> --key-id <keyId>`; the latter validates one whitespace-free token and adds the `Bearer ` prefix only in CLI memory. Secret bytes never enter argv or stdout.
 
-`purchase transaction <operationId>` is read-only and available only for the authoritative Base Sepolia TEST profile. It requires an active `agent_market:buyer:purchase` MCP grant and returns the two server-composed transaction requests; it does not sign or broadcast arbitrary calldata.
+`purchase transaction <operationId>` is read-only. It requires an active `agent_market:buyer:purchase` MCP grant and returns the two server-composed transaction requests plus their chain authority; it does not sign or broadcast arbitrary calldata.
 
-`purchase submit <operationId>` requires the same grant and uses the profile's source-controlled HTTPS RPC default unless `FINCHTECH_RPC_URL_84532` explicitly selects another HTTPS endpoint for the process. It uses the protected wallet to submit the exact server-composed USDC approval and AgentService Vault purchase. Every returned broadcast hash is atomically checkpointed before receipt waiting; a restart re-verifies the exact wallet, call, receipt, block, and current server authority and never re-broadcasts a known phase. Finch then verifies the canonical two-confirmation event and creates Call Rights. If the purchase receipt conclusively reverts, the paired zero-allowance cleanup follows the same checkpoint discipline; unknown receipts are never guessed. The RPC owns nonce selection. The CLI refuses other chains, nonzero native value, inconsistent destinations, expired transactions, and Local/production profiles. The RPC URL and wallet key are never emitted.
+`purchase submit <operationId>` requires the same grant and uses only the source-controlled public RPCs for the plan's chain. It uses the protected wallet to re-encode and submit the exact server-composed USDC approval and AgentService Vault purchase. Before signing it verifies `eth_chainId`, the reviewed chain contract authority, every transaction field, and a successful `eth_call` simulation. Every returned broadcast hash is atomically checkpointed before receipt waiting; a restart re-verifies the exact wallet, call, receipt, block, and current server authority and never re-broadcasts a known phase. Finch then verifies the canonical confirmation event and creates Call Rights. If the purchase receipt conclusively reverts, the paired zero-allowance cleanup follows the same checkpoint discipline; unknown receipts are never guessed. The RPC owns nonce selection. User RPC and environment variables are ignored, and neither RPC URLs nor wallet keys are emitted.
 
-`purchase recover-approval <operationId> --transaction-hash <hash>` is the narrow adoption path for an approval broadcast by an older CLI before durable checkpoints existed. It re-fetches the current server authority and active wallet, then verifies the exact successful approval transaction and sufficient live token allowance on Base Sepolia before writing one owner-only recovery journal. It never broadcasts, confirms, scans chain history, or accepts a nonce. A subsequent `purchase submit` continues with the purchase phase without approving again.
+`purchase recover-approval <operationId> --transaction-hash <hash>` is the narrow adoption path for an approval broadcast before its durable checkpoint was written. It re-fetches the current server authority and active wallet, then verifies the exact successful approval transaction and sufficient live token allowance on the plan chain before writing one owner-only recovery journal. It never broadcasts, confirms, scans chain history, or accepts a nonce. A subsequent `purchase submit` continues with the purchase phase without approving again.
 
 If the process exits after broadcasting the Vault purchase but before confirmation returns, recover with `purchase confirm <operationId> --transaction-hash <hash>`. This command never trusts the supplied hash: Finch fetches and decodes the canonical chain receipt before any Call Rights mutation.
 
-Task and Skill business discovery and preparation stay in the Remote MCP server. The `task` commands only fund an exact prepared Task pool, sign exact prepared awards, or submit an exact prepared reclaim. Skill purchase, conversion, price, and supply commands submit strict MCP preparations. `skill publish-submit --path <file-or-directory> --from-file <plan>` and `skill version-submit` accept either one file or one directory, then apply the plan's independent `plaintext`, `finchip_v2`, or `lit` content mode; filtering, deterministic ZIP construction, encryption, upload, and key custody remain local. `skill asset-upload --path <cover> --from-file <plan>` uploads a separately prepared public cover, and `skill presentation-submit --from-file <plan>` publishes bounded public presentation metadata without changing protected package bytes. `skill download --from-file <delivery> --out-file <new-file>` downloads IPFS content directly or signs with the entitled local wallet for protected content, verifies the plaintext package hash, and creates an owner-only file. Skill actions use the manifest-selected Base Sepolia TEST or Base production authority and the matching `FINCHTECH_RPC_URL_84532` or `FINCHTECH_RPC_URL_8453` override; Task transactions remain restricted to their reviewed authority. Every action is recomputed locally from the protected wallet and frozen deployment pins and rejects arbitrary destinations or calldata.
+Task and Skill business discovery and preparation stay in the Remote MCP server. The `task` commands only fund an exact prepared Task pool, sign exact prepared awards, or submit an exact prepared reclaim. Skill purchase, conversion, price, and supply commands submit strict MCP preparations. `skill publish-submit --path <file-or-directory> --from-file <plan>` and `skill version-submit` accept either one file or one directory, then apply the plan's independent `plaintext`, `finchip_v2`, or `lit` content mode; filtering, deterministic ZIP construction, encryption, upload, and key custody remain local. `skill asset-upload --path <cover> --from-file <plan>` uploads a separately prepared public cover, and `skill presentation-submit --from-file <plan>` publishes bounded public presentation metadata without changing protected package bytes. `skill download --from-file <delivery> --out-file <new-file>` downloads IPFS content directly or signs with the entitled local wallet for protected content, verifies the plaintext package hash, and creates an owner-only file. Every transaction action uses its plan's chain, source-controlled public RPCs, and reviewed chain-level contract authority. The CLI recomputes transaction bytes locally and rejects mismatched chains, destinations, calldata, values, source commits, or envelope tags.