@fidacy/openclaw-plugin 0.2.11 → 0.3.0

package/dist/index.js

@@ -4684,7 +4684,8 @@ function readConfig() {
       // reset every once-per-install nudge into an every-time nag.
       created_at: typeof raw.created_at === "string" ? raw.created_at : void 0,
       nudges: raw.nudges && typeof raw.nudges === "object" ? raw.nudges : void 0,
-      decisions_count: typeof raw.decisions_count === "number" ? raw.decisions_count : void 0
+      decisions_count: typeof raw.decisions_count === "number" ? raw.decisions_count : void 0,
+      hosted_lapsed_at: typeof raw.hosted_lapsed_at === "string" ? raw.hosted_lapsed_at : void 0
     };
   } catch {
     return null;
@@ -4736,7 +4737,7 @@ function resolveMandateRules(cfg) {
 }
 
 // ../mcp/src/telemetry.ts
-var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.2.11" : "dev";
+var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.3.0" : "dev";
 function bandOf(amount) {
   if (typeof amount !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(amount) || amount <= 0) return void 0;
   if (amount < 10) return "lt10";
@@ -4924,7 +4925,7 @@ function requestUpgrade() {
 }
 
 // ../mcp/src/provision.ts
-var CLIENT_VERSION2 = true ? "0.2.11" : "dev";
+var CLIENT_VERSION2 = true ? "0.3.0" : "dev";
 function provisionEnabled() {
   const v = (process.env.FIDACY_DISABLE_PROVISION ?? "").trim().toLowerCase();
   return !(v === "1" || v === "true" || v === "yes");
@@ -5014,6 +5015,20 @@ function decisionNudge(status, violatedRule, upgradeToolName) {
   }
   return null;
 }
+function hostedWallCta(feature, billing) {
+  const noun = feature === "anchor" ? "Bitcoin-anchored proofs" : "server-signed verdicts";
+  if (hasEngineKey()) {
+    const where2 = billing?.billingUrl ?? "https://app.fidacy.com/billing";
+    const what = billing?.reason === "spending_cap_reached" ? `This account hit the monthly spending cap you set, so ${noun} are paused.` : billing?.detail ?? `This account's included ${noun} for the month are used up.`;
+    return `${what} The local firewall keeps deciding and blocking as normal \u2014 this only pauses ${noun}. For your operator: resolve it at ${where2}. Pay-as-you-go needs no plan and starts at $0.04 per verdict, dropping to $0.025 past 50k and $0.015 past 250k; committed plans price below that curve.`;
+  }
+  const url = claimUrl();
+  const cta = url ? `open ${url} \u2014 free account, this install's history migrates` : `call the upgrade tool \u2014 free account, your history migrates`;
+  if (nudgeOnce("hosted_wall")) {
+    return `You've used this install's free allowance for ${noun} \u2014 the proofs anyone can re-verify at fidacy.com/verify, court-grade, not a local-only check. Keep them flowing: for your operator, ${cta}.`;
+  }
+  return `Free allowance for ${noun} reached. For your operator: ${cta}.`;
+}
 function noKeyCta() {
   const url = claimUrl();
   return url ? `free in ~1 min for your operator: open ${url} (this install's history migrates), or set FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY if you already have one` : `free in ~1 min: call the upgrade tool (your history migrates), or set FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY if you already have one`;
@@ -5051,6 +5066,59 @@ function trialCountdownLine(keyOverride) {
   return ` [fidacy] ${left} free anonymous decision${left === 1 ? "" : "s"} left on this install before the firewall requires activation. For your operator: free API key at ${url} (history migrates), then set FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY.`;
 }
 
+// ../mcp/src/protection.ts
+var BRAND = "Fidacy AI Agent Firewall";
+var FREE_MONTHLY_VERDICTS = 300;
+function markHostedLapsed() {
+  const cfg = readConfig();
+  if (!cfg || cfg.hosted_lapsed_at) return;
+  cfg.hosted_lapsed_at = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
+  try {
+    writeConfig(cfg);
+  } catch {
+  }
+}
+function clearHostedLapsed() {
+  const cfg = readConfig();
+  if (!cfg?.hosted_lapsed_at) return;
+  delete cfg.hosted_lapsed_at;
+  try {
+    writeConfig(cfg);
+  } catch {
+  }
+}
+function isHostedLapsed() {
+  return Boolean(readConfig()?.hosted_lapsed_at);
+}
+function protectionState(decisionsUsed2, keyOverride) {
+  if (hasEngineKey(keyOverride)) return isHostedLapsed() ? "unproven" : "protected_keyed";
+  if (decisionsUsed2 >= FREE_DECISIONS) return "halted";
+  return FREE_DECISIONS - decisionsUsed2 <= 5 ? "protected_low" : "protected_trial";
+}
+function where() {
+  return claimUrl() ?? "https://fidacy.com/claim";
+}
+function protectionBadge() {
+  return `\u{1F6E1} ${BRAND} blocked this payment. Your agent was protected.`;
+}
+function protectionWarning(decisionsUsed2, keyOverride) {
+  const state = protectionState(decisionsUsed2, keyOverride);
+  const left = Math.max(0, FREE_DECISIONS - decisionsUsed2);
+  switch (state) {
+    case "protected_trial":
+      return null;
+    // working and nothing is expiring soon: silence is the respect.
+    case "protected_low":
+      return `\u26A0 ${BRAND}: ${left} free decision${left === 1 ? "" : "s"} left, then this agent's payments STOP DEAD. Every payment it attempts after that is refused \u2014 invoices unpaid, workflows broken, at 3am with nobody watching. And the operators who "fix" it by ripping the firewall out end up with an agent nobody is checking at all, which is how a prompt-injected agent wires money to a stranger. Keep it alive, free, in ~2 minutes: ${where()} \u2014 no card, this install's block history moves with you, plus ${FREE_MONTHLY_VERDICTS} verified payments every month.`;
+    case "halted":
+      return `\u26D4 ${BRAND} IS NOT ACTIVATED \u2014 YOUR AGENT CAN NO LONGER PAY ANYTHING. Every payment it attempts is being refused right now: invoices go unpaid, subscriptions lapse, jobs fail silently. The firewall failed closed after ${FREE_DECISIONS} free decisions, which is the safe direction \u2014 but it is YOUR agent that is stopped until you act. And do not "fix" it by removing the firewall: an agent with nothing checking it is exactly how a stolen key or an injected instruction moves real money you never get back. Activate free in ~2 minutes at ${where()}: no card, your block history moves with you, ${FREE_MONTHLY_VERDICTS} verified payments every month.`;
+    case "unproven":
+      return `\u26D4 ${BRAND}: YOUR AGENT IS EXPOSED RIGHT NOW. The monthly allowance is spent, so the checks that ask WHO is spending are OFF: agent identity is no longer verified, a revoked or stolen agent key is no longer detected, and behavioural anomalies are no longer caught. Local rules still block the wrong payee and the over-cap amount \u2014 but a compromised or prompt-injected agent that stays inside your own allowlist and under your own cap now pays out unchallenged. That is real money, irreversible, with no signed evidence to recover it or hand an insurer. Turn the checks back on: https://app.fidacy.com/billing \u2014 pay-as-you-go, no plan, from $0.04 per payment checked. One prevented payment pays for years of it.`;
+    case "protected_keyed":
+      return null;
+  }
+}
+
 // ../mcp/src/reporting.ts
 function withinDays(records, days, now = Date.now()) {
   if (!Number.isFinite(days) || days <= 0) return [...records];
@@ -5507,7 +5575,8 @@ var index_default = defineToolPlugin({
         async execute(params, config) {
           const gate = activationGate(config.engineApiKey);
           if (gate) {
-            return { status: "DENY", decisionId: "activation_required", violatedRule: "activation_required", message: gate.message };
+            const halted = protectionWarning(decisionsUsed(), config.engineApiKey) ?? gate.message;
+            return { status: "DENY", decisionId: "activation_required", violatedRule: "activation_required", message: halted };
           }
           const c = boot();
           let sentinelAlerts = [];
@@ -5520,9 +5589,11 @@ var index_default = defineToolPlugin({
           const sentinelLine = d.status === "ALLOW" ? renderAlertLine(sentinelAlerts) : "";
           const base = d.status === "ALLOW" ? `ALLOW (decision ${d.decisionId})${params.invoiceRef ? ` for invoice ${params.invoiceRef}` : ""}.${sentinelLine} To settle, call the executor with the SAME payee, amount, currency, and idempotencyKey, and set "grant" to EXACTLY this signed value:
 ${d.grant}` : `DENY (decision ${d.decisionId}). Rule violated: ${d.violatedRule}. No grant issued, this payment cannot proceed. The denial itself is recorded in the tamper-evident, hash-chained audit: call get_audit_proof with decisionId ${d.decisionId} for the proof of what was blocked.${d.violatedRule?.startsWith("payee_not_in_allowlist") ? ` If the user trusts this payee, add "${params.payee}" to mandate.payees in ~/.fidacy/config.json and retry: the firewall picks the change up on the next call, no restart needed.` : ""}`;
+          const badge = d.status === "DENY" ? protectionBadge() : "";
           const nudge = decisionNudge(d.status, d.violatedRule, "fidacy_upgrade");
           const countdown = trialCountdownLine(config.engineApiKey);
-          const message = [base, nudge, countdown].filter(Boolean).join(" ");
+          const lapse = isHostedLapsed() ? protectionWarning(decisionsUsed(), config.engineApiKey) : "";
+          const message = [badge, base, nudge, countdown, lapse].filter(Boolean).join(" ");
           return { status: d.status, decisionId: d.decisionId, grant: d.grant, violatedRule: d.violatedRule, message };
         }
       }),
@@ -5666,9 +5737,14 @@ ${d.grant}` : `DENY (decision ${d.decisionId}). Rule violated: ${d.violatedRule}
               { kind: params.kind, mandate: params.mandate, mandateType: params.mandateType, idempotencyKey: params.idempotencyKey, spendingMandate: params.spendingMandate, a2a: params.a2a },
               { engineUrl, apiKey }
             );
+            clearHostedLapsed();
             return { summary: `${r.decision} (score ${r.score}) signed by ${r.signingKeyId}`, ...r };
           } catch (e) {
             if (e instanceof AssessError) {
+              if (e.status === 402) {
+                markHostedLapsed();
+                throw new Error(hostedWallCta("verdict", e.billing));
+              }
               const reasons = e.rejection_reasons?.length ? " (" + e.rejection_reasons.map((x) => x.key).join(",") + ")" : "";
               throw new Error(`ASSESS ${e.status}: ${e.type}${reasons}`);
             }
@@ -5720,7 +5796,13 @@ ${d.grant}` : `DENY (decision ${d.decisionId}). Rule violated: ${d.violatedRule}
               ...r
             };
           } catch (e) {
-            if (e instanceof AssessError) throw new Error(`ANCHOR ${e.status}: ${e.type}`);
+            if (e instanceof AssessError) {
+              if (e.status === 402) {
+                markHostedLapsed();
+                throw new Error(hostedWallCta("anchor", e.billing));
+              }
+              throw new Error(`ANCHOR ${e.status}: ${e.type}`);
+            }
             throw new Error("ANCHOR failed: unexpected error");
           }
         }

package/openclaw.plugin.json

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   "name": "Fidacy AI Agent Firewall",
   "description": "A signed, independently-verifiable verdict on every money-moving agent action. Blocks wrong/lookalike payee, over-cap, and duplicate-invoice fraud before money moves. Non-custodial, local-first, deny-by-default.",
   "icon": "https://fidacy.com/logo.png",
-  "version": "0.2.11",
+  "version": "0.3.0",
   "contracts": {
     "tools": [
       "request_payment",

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@fidacy/openclaw-plugin",
-  "version": "0.2.11",
+  "version": "0.3.0",
   "description": "Fidacy payment firewall as a native OpenClaw plugin: signed, verifiable verdicts on every money-moving agent action, in-process (no MCP subprocess).",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "Fidacy (ZeepCode Group Technology LLC) <hello@fidacy.com> (https://fidacy.com)",
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
     "typebox": "1.1.39",
     "typescript": "^5.6.3",
     "@fidacy/firewall": "0.1.1",
-    "@fidacy/mcp": "0.3.3"
+    "@fidacy/mcp": "0.4.2"
   },
   "scripts": {
     "build": "node scripts/bundle.mjs",