@fidacy/openclaw-plugin 0.1.15 → 0.1.17

package/dist/index.js

@@ -4690,7 +4690,7 @@ function resolveMandateRules(cfg) {
 }
 
 // ../mcp/src/telemetry.ts
-var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.1.15" : "dev";
+var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.1.17" : "dev";
 function bandOf(amount) {
   if (typeof amount !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(amount) || amount <= 0) return void 0;
   if (amount < 10) return "lt10";
@@ -4867,7 +4867,7 @@ function requestUpgrade() {
 }
 
 // ../mcp/src/provision.ts
-var CLIENT_VERSION2 = true ? "0.1.15" : "dev";
+var CLIENT_VERSION2 = true ? "0.1.17" : "dev";
 function provisionEnabled() {
   const v = (process.env.FIDACY_DISABLE_PROVISION ?? "").trim().toLowerCase();
   return !(v === "1" || v === "true" || v === "yes");
@@ -4933,7 +4933,7 @@ function bumpDecisionCount() {
 function decisionNudge(status, violatedRule, upgradeToolName) {
   const count = bumpDecisionCount();
   const url = claimUrl();
-  const claimPath = url ? `open ${url} to see everything blocked on this install and claim it (free account, this history migrates)` : `call the ${upgradeToolName} tool (free account, this history migrates)`;
+  const claimPath = url ? `free account + free API key at ${url} (this install's history migrates)` : `call the ${upgradeToolName} tool (free account + free API key, this history migrates)`;
   if (status === "DENY" && violatedRule?.startsWith("duplicate_invoice") && nudgeOnce("bec_catch")) {
     return `That was a duplicate-invoice (BEC) catch, the #1 payment fraud. For your operator: ${claimPath}. On a hosted account every block like this is server-signed and anchored to Bitcoin: court-grade evidence.`;
   }
@@ -4948,6 +4948,10 @@ function decisionNudge(status, violatedRule, upgradeToolName) {
   }
   return null;
 }
+function noKeyCta() {
+  const url = claimUrl();
+  return url ? `free in ~1 min for your operator: open ${url} (this install's history migrates), or set FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY if you already have one` : `free in ~1 min: call the upgrade tool (your history migrates), or set FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY if you already have one`;
+}
 
 // ../mcp/src/assess.ts
 var AssessError = class extends Error {
@@ -5131,16 +5135,20 @@ async function findArtifacts(sha2562, cfg) {
 }
 
 // src/index.ts
+var loaded = false;
+function onPluginLoad() {
+  if (loaded) return;
+  loaded = true;
+  setTelemetryShell("openclaw-plugin");
+  const state = ensureState();
+  if (state.firstRun) recordInstall();
+  recordAgentActive();
+  void autoProvision();
+}
 var core;
 function boot() {
-  if (!core) {
-    setTelemetryShell("openclaw-plugin");
-    const state = ensureState();
-    core = makeCore();
-    if (state.firstRun) recordInstall();
-    recordAgentActive();
-    void autoProvision();
-  }
+  onPluginLoad();
+  if (!core) core = makeCore();
   return core;
 }
 function subjectOf(config) {
@@ -5171,225 +5179,237 @@ var index_default = defineToolPlugin({
     },
     { additionalProperties: false }
   ),
-  tools: (tool) => [
-    // ACTION FIREWALL. The agent calls this INSTEAD of any raw payment tool.
-    // ALLOW returns a short-lived Ed25519 grant the executor requires; DENY
-    // returns no grant: the action is dead on arrival.
-    tool({
-      name: "request_payment",
-      label: "Request Payment Authorization",
-      description: "Authorize a payment action against the active Fidacy mandate. Returns an ALLOW with a signed grant, or a DENY with the violated rule. The downstream executor MUST require the grant. Call this before any payment; never pay without it.",
-      parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
-        payee: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Payee identifier" }),
-        amount: typebox_exports.Number({ minimum: 0, description: "Amount in the mandate currency (must be positive)" }),
-        currency: typebox_exports.String({ minLength: 3, maxLength: 3, description: "ISO 4217 currency code" }),
-        purpose: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Human-readable purpose" }),
-        category: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Purpose category (must be allowed by the mandate)" }),
-        idempotencyKey: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Caller-supplied idempotency key" }),
-        invoiceRef: typebox_exports.Optional(
-          typebox_exports.String({
-            description: "Optional invoice identity. When set, Fidacy enforces one payment per invoice: a second request for the same invoiceRef is DENIED, at any amount."
-          })
-        )
-      }),
-      async execute(params, config) {
-        const d = await boot().decide(params, subjectOf(config));
-        const base = d.status === "ALLOW" ? `ALLOW (decision ${d.decisionId})${params.invoiceRef ? ` for invoice ${params.invoiceRef}` : ""}. To settle, call the executor with the SAME payee, amount, currency, and idempotencyKey, and set "grant" to EXACTLY this signed value:
-${d.grant}` : `DENY (decision ${d.decisionId}). Rule violated: ${d.violatedRule}. No grant issued, this payment cannot proceed. The denial itself is recorded in the tamper-evident, hash-chained audit: call get_audit_proof with decisionId ${d.decisionId} for the proof of what was blocked.${d.violatedRule?.startsWith("payee_not_in_allowlist") ? ` If the user trusts this payee, add "${params.payee}" to mandate.payees in ~/.fidacy/config.json and retry: the firewall picks the change up on the next call, no restart needed.` : ""}`;
-        const nudge = decisionNudge(d.status, d.violatedRule, "fidacy_upgrade");
-        const message = nudge ? `${base} ${nudge}` : base;
-        return { status: d.status, decisionId: d.decisionId, grant: d.grant, violatedRule: d.violatedRule, message };
-      }
-    }),
-    // Read-only: surface the guardrails so the agent/human can see the envelope
-    // and pin Fidacy's public key for grant verification.
-    tool({
-      name: "verify_mandate",
-      label: "Verify Active Mandate",
-      description: "Return the active mandate envelope (caps, allowed payees/categories, window, revocation) and Fidacy's Ed25519 public key for grant verification.",
-      parameters: typebox_exports.Object({}),
-      async execute(_params, config) {
-        const c = boot();
-        const mandate = await c.getMandate(subjectOf(config));
-        return { mandate, fidacyPublicKey: c.publicKey() };
-      }
-    }),
-    // Read-only: portable, hash-chained proof for a decision. The non-repudiation
-    // artifact for audit, reinsurance, or dispute.
-    tool({
-      name: "get_audit_proof",
-      label: "Get Audit Proof",
-      description: "Return the tamper-evident, hash-chained proof for a decision id, including whether the chain is intact and the public key it verifies against.",
-      parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
-        decisionId: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Decision id returned by request_payment" })
-      }),
-      async execute(params) {
-        const proof = await boot().getProof(params.decisionId);
-        if (!proof) throw new Error(`No proof found for ${params.decisionId}`);
-        return proof;
-      }
-    }),
-    // VERDICT LAYER (advisory). Calls the LIVE Fidacy engine POST /v1/assess and
-    // returns the SIGNED trust verdict (riskPayloadJws + signingKeyId), verifiable
-    // by anyone via @fidacy/verify against the engine JWKS. Moves no money.
-    // Registration never requires a key: only CALLING it without one errors.
-    tool({
-      name: "assess_action",
-      label: "Assess Action (Signed Trust Verdict)",
-      description: "Return a SIGNED Fidacy trust verdict from the live engine (default https://api.fidacy.com) for a proposed action. The signed proof is `riskPayloadJws` + `signingKeyId`, verifiable by anyone via @fidacy/verify against the engine JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json. `kind` is one of ap2_payment, message_send, voice_call, custom, claim_document; `mandate` is the action/mandate object for that kind. This is the verdict (advisory) layer and moves no money; it complements the payment-firewall tools (request_payment et al.) in the same install.",
-      parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
-        kind: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.Union(ASSESS_KINDS.map((k) => typebox_exports.Literal(k)))),
-        mandate: typebox_exports.Record(typebox_exports.String(), typebox_exports.Unknown(), {
-          description: "The action/mandate object for this kind"
+  tools: (tool) => {
+    onPluginLoad();
+    return [
+      // ACTION FIREWALL. The agent calls this INSTEAD of any raw payment tool.
+      // ALLOW returns a short-lived Ed25519 grant the executor requires; DENY
+      // returns no grant: the action is dead on arrival.
+      tool({
+        name: "request_payment",
+        label: "Request Payment Authorization",
+        description: "Authorize a payment action against the active Fidacy mandate. Returns an ALLOW with a signed grant, or a DENY with the violated rule. The downstream executor MUST require the grant. Call this before any payment; never pay without it.",
+        parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
+          payee: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Payee identifier" }),
+          amount: typebox_exports.Number({ minimum: 0, description: "Amount in the mandate currency (must be positive)" }),
+          currency: typebox_exports.String({ minLength: 3, maxLength: 3, description: "ISO 4217 currency code" }),
+          purpose: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Human-readable purpose" }),
+          category: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Purpose category (must be allowed by the mandate)" }),
+          idempotencyKey: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Caller-supplied idempotency key" }),
+          invoiceRef: typebox_exports.Optional(
+            typebox_exports.String({
+              description: "Optional invoice identity. When set, Fidacy enforces one payment per invoice: a second request for the same invoiceRef is DENIED, at any amount."
+            })
+          )
         }),
-        mandateType: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String()),
-        idempotencyKey: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String()),
-        spendingMandate: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.Record(typebox_exports.String(), typebox_exports.Unknown())),
-        a2a: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.Object({ task_id: typebox_exports.String() }))
-      }),
-      async execute(params, config) {
-        boot();
-        const engineUrl = config.engineUrl ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_URL ?? "https://api.fidacy.com";
-        const apiKey = (config.engineApiKey ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY ?? "").trim();
-        if (!apiKey) {
-          throw new Error(
-            "assess_action requires an engine API key (an fky_live_/fky_test_ key with assess:write). Set plugins.entries.fidacy.config.engineApiKey or FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY to enable signed verdicts."
-          );
+        async execute(params, config) {
+          const d = await boot().decide(params, subjectOf(config));
+          const base = d.status === "ALLOW" ? `ALLOW (decision ${d.decisionId})${params.invoiceRef ? ` for invoice ${params.invoiceRef}` : ""}. To settle, call the executor with the SAME payee, amount, currency, and idempotencyKey, and set "grant" to EXACTLY this signed value:
+${d.grant}` : `DENY (decision ${d.decisionId}). Rule violated: ${d.violatedRule}. No grant issued, this payment cannot proceed. The denial itself is recorded in the tamper-evident, hash-chained audit: call get_audit_proof with decisionId ${d.decisionId} for the proof of what was blocked.${d.violatedRule?.startsWith("payee_not_in_allowlist") ? ` If the user trusts this payee, add "${params.payee}" to mandate.payees in ~/.fidacy/config.json and retry: the firewall picks the change up on the next call, no restart needed.` : ""}`;
+          const nudge = decisionNudge(d.status, d.violatedRule, "fidacy_upgrade");
+          const message = nudge ? `${base} ${nudge}` : base;
+          return { status: d.status, decisionId: d.decisionId, grant: d.grant, violatedRule: d.violatedRule, message };
         }
-        try {
-          const r = await assessAction(
-            { kind: params.kind, mandate: params.mandate, mandateType: params.mandateType, idempotencyKey: params.idempotencyKey, spendingMandate: params.spendingMandate, a2a: params.a2a },
-            { engineUrl, apiKey }
-          );
-          return { summary: `${r.decision} (score ${r.score}) signed by ${r.signingKeyId}`, ...r };
-        } catch (e) {
-          if (e instanceof AssessError) {
-            const reasons = e.rejection_reasons?.length ? " (" + e.rejection_reasons.map((x) => x.key).join(",") + ")" : "";
-            throw new Error(`ASSESS ${e.status}: ${e.type}${reasons}`);
+      }),
+      // Read-only: surface the guardrails so the agent/human can see the envelope
+      // and pin Fidacy's public key for grant verification.
+      tool({
+        name: "verify_mandate",
+        label: "Verify Active Mandate",
+        description: "Return the active mandate envelope (caps, allowed payees/categories, window, revocation) and Fidacy's Ed25519 public key for grant verification.",
+        parameters: typebox_exports.Object({}),
+        async execute(_params, config) {
+          const c = boot();
+          const mandate = await c.getMandate(subjectOf(config));
+          const hasKey = (config.engineApiKey ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY ?? "").trim().length > 0;
+          const claim = hasKey ? null : claimUrl();
+          if (claim) {
+            return {
+              mandate,
+              fidacyPublicKey: c.publicKey(),
+              message: `For your operator: free account + free API key, and this install's history migrates: ${claim}`
+            };
           }
-          throw new Error("ASSESS failed: unexpected error");
+          return { mandate, fidacyPublicKey: c.publicKey() };
         }
-      }
-    }),
-    // ARTIFACT ANCHORING. Hash-only integrity/existence proof: the file is hashed
-    // locally (streaming) and never uploaded; the SHA-256 joins the same
-    // Bitcoin-checkpointed audit chain as the verdicts. Receipt = offline JWS.
-    tool({
-      name: "anchor_artifact",
-      label: "Anchor Artifact (Bitcoin-anchored integrity proof)",
-      description: "Prove an artifact existed exactly as-is at this moment, and make any later tampering detectable. Give a file `path` (hashed locally with SHA-256 \u2014 the file itself is NEVER uploaded) or a precomputed `sha256`. The hash is registered on Fidacy's tamper-evident audit chain, which is checkpointed to the Bitcoin blockchain, and you get a signed receipt (JWS) verifiable offline against the engine JWKS. Use it for contracts, invoices, medical prescriptions, insurance claims, images, audio, video. `kind` defaults to document; optional `label` is a short reference (no PII).",
-      parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
-        path: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String()),
-        sha256: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String({ pattern: "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" })),
-        kind: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.Union(ARTIFACT_KINDS.map((k) => typebox_exports.Literal(k)))),
-        label: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String({ maxLength: 120 })),
-        subject: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String({ maxLength: 120 }))
       }),
-      async execute(params, config) {
-        boot();
-        const engineUrl = config.engineUrl ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_URL ?? "https://api.fidacy.com";
-        const apiKey = (config.engineApiKey ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY ?? "").trim();
-        if (!apiKey) {
-          throw new Error(
-            "anchor_artifact requires an engine API key (an fky_live_/fky_test_ key with assess:write). Set plugins.entries.fidacy.config.engineApiKey or FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY."
-          );
-        }
-        if (!params.path && !params.sha256) {
-          throw new Error("Give a file `path` (hashed locally) or a precomputed `sha256`.");
+      // Read-only: portable, hash-chained proof for a decision. The non-repudiation
+      // artifact for audit, reinsurance, or dispute.
+      tool({
+        name: "get_audit_proof",
+        label: "Get Audit Proof",
+        description: "Return the tamper-evident, hash-chained proof for a decision id, including whether the chain is intact and the public key it verifies against.",
+        parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
+          decisionId: typebox_exports.String({ description: "Decision id returned by request_payment" })
+        }),
+        async execute(params) {
+          const proof = await boot().getProof(params.decisionId);
+          if (!proof) throw new Error(`No proof found for ${params.decisionId}`);
+          return proof;
         }
-        let hash = params.sha256 ?? "";
-        if (!hash && params.path) {
+      }),
+      // VERDICT LAYER (advisory). Calls the LIVE Fidacy engine POST /v1/assess and
+      // returns the SIGNED trust verdict (riskPayloadJws + signingKeyId), verifiable
+      // by anyone via @fidacy/verify against the engine JWKS. Moves no money.
+      // Registration never requires a key: only CALLING it without one errors.
+      tool({
+        name: "assess_action",
+        label: "Assess Action (Signed Trust Verdict)",
+        description: "Return a SIGNED Fidacy trust verdict from the live engine (default https://api.fidacy.com) for a proposed action. The signed proof is `riskPayloadJws` + `signingKeyId`, verifiable by anyone via @fidacy/verify against the engine JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json. `kind` is one of ap2_payment, message_send, voice_call, custom, claim_document; `mandate` is the action/mandate object for that kind. This is the verdict (advisory) layer and moves no money; it complements the payment-firewall tools (request_payment et al.) in the same install.",
+        parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
+          kind: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.Union(ASSESS_KINDS.map((k) => typebox_exports.Literal(k)))),
+          mandate: typebox_exports.Record(typebox_exports.String(), typebox_exports.Unknown(), {
+            description: "The action/mandate object for this kind"
+          }),
+          mandateType: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String()),
+          idempotencyKey: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String()),
+          spendingMandate: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.Record(typebox_exports.String(), typebox_exports.Unknown())),
+          a2a: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.Object({ task_id: typebox_exports.String() }))
+        }),
+        async execute(params, config) {
+          boot();
+          const engineUrl = config.engineUrl ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_URL ?? "https://api.fidacy.com";
+          const apiKey = (config.engineApiKey ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY ?? "").trim();
+          if (!apiKey) {
+            throw new Error(
+              `assess_action needs an engine key \u2014 ${noKeyCta()}. (Or set plugins.entries.fidacy.config.engineApiKey.)`
+            );
+          }
           try {
-            hash = await hashFile(params.path);
-          } catch {
-            throw new Error("Could not read that file locally (check the path and permissions). Nothing was sent anywhere.");
+            const r = await assessAction(
+              { kind: params.kind, mandate: params.mandate, mandateType: params.mandateType, idempotencyKey: params.idempotencyKey, spendingMandate: params.spendingMandate, a2a: params.a2a },
+              { engineUrl, apiKey }
+            );
+            return { summary: `${r.decision} (score ${r.score}) signed by ${r.signingKeyId}`, ...r };
+          } catch (e) {
+            if (e instanceof AssessError) {
+              const reasons = e.rejection_reasons?.length ? " (" + e.rejection_reasons.map((x) => x.key).join(",") + ")" : "";
+              throw new Error(`ASSESS ${e.status}: ${e.type}${reasons}`);
+            }
+            throw new Error("ASSESS failed: unexpected error");
           }
         }
-        try {
-          const r = await anchorArtifact(
-            { sha256: hash, kind: params.kind ?? "document", ...params.label ? { label: params.label } : {}, ...params.subject ? { subject: params.subject } : {} },
-            { engineUrl, apiKey }
-          );
-          return {
-            summary: `ANCHORED ${r.kind} \xB7 sha256 ${hash.slice(0, 16)}\u2026 \xB7 audit seq ${r.audit.seq} \xB7 Bitcoin checkpoint: ${r.anchor.status}. The file never left this machine.`,
-            ...r
-          };
-        } catch (e) {
-          if (e instanceof AssessError) throw new Error(`ANCHOR ${e.status}: ${e.type}`);
-          throw new Error("ANCHOR failed: unexpected error");
-        }
-      }
-    }),
-    // Verification half: was this exact content anchored, and did it reach Bitcoin?
-    tool({
-      name: "check_artifact",
-      label: "Check Artifact (was this hash anchored?)",
-      description: "Check whether an artifact was anchored by this account and the state of its Bitcoin checkpoint. Give a file `path` (hashed locally, never uploaded) or a `sha256`. If the current hash of a file does NOT match an anchored record you expected, the file changed since anchoring \u2014 that is the tampering signal.",
-      parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
-        path: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String()),
-        sha256: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String({ pattern: "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" }))
       }),
-      async execute(params, config) {
-        boot();
-        const engineUrl = config.engineUrl ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_URL ?? "https://api.fidacy.com";
-        const apiKey = (config.engineApiKey ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY ?? "").trim();
-        if (!apiKey) {
-          throw new Error(
-            "check_artifact requires an engine API key. Set plugins.entries.fidacy.config.engineApiKey or FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY."
-          );
-        }
-        if (!params.path && !params.sha256) {
-          throw new Error("Give a file `path` (hashed locally) or a `sha256`.");
-        }
-        let hash = params.sha256 ?? "";
-        if (!hash && params.path) {
+      // ARTIFACT ANCHORING. Hash-only integrity/existence proof: the file is hashed
+      // locally (streaming) and never uploaded; the SHA-256 joins the same
+      // Bitcoin-checkpointed audit chain as the verdicts. Receipt = offline JWS.
+      tool({
+        name: "anchor_artifact",
+        label: "Anchor Artifact (Bitcoin-anchored integrity proof)",
+        description: "Prove an artifact existed exactly as-is at this moment, and make any later tampering detectable. Give a file `path` (hashed locally with SHA-256 \u2014 the file itself is NEVER uploaded) or a precomputed `sha256`. The hash is registered on Fidacy's tamper-evident audit chain, which is checkpointed to the Bitcoin blockchain, and you get a signed receipt (JWS) verifiable offline against the engine JWKS. Use it for contracts, invoices, medical prescriptions, insurance claims, images, audio, video. `kind` defaults to document; optional `label` is a short reference (no PII).",
+        parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
+          path: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String()),
+          sha256: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String({ pattern: "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" })),
+          kind: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.Union(ARTIFACT_KINDS.map((k) => typebox_exports.Literal(k)))),
+          label: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String({ maxLength: 120 })),
+          subject: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String({ maxLength: 120 }))
+        }),
+        async execute(params, config) {
+          boot();
+          const engineUrl = config.engineUrl ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_URL ?? "https://api.fidacy.com";
+          const apiKey = (config.engineApiKey ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY ?? "").trim();
+          if (!apiKey) {
+            throw new Error(
+              `anchor_artifact needs an engine key \u2014 ${noKeyCta()}. (Or set plugins.entries.fidacy.config.engineApiKey.)`
+            );
+          }
+          if (!params.path && !params.sha256) {
+            throw new Error("Give a file `path` (hashed locally) or a precomputed `sha256`.");
+          }
+          let hash = params.sha256 ?? "";
+          if (!hash && params.path) {
+            try {
+              hash = await hashFile(params.path);
+            } catch {
+              throw new Error("Could not read that file locally (check the path and permissions). Nothing was sent anywhere.");
+            }
+          }
           try {
-            hash = await hashFile(params.path);
-          } catch {
-            throw new Error("Could not read that file locally (check the path and permissions). Nothing was sent anywhere.");
+            const r = await anchorArtifact(
+              { sha256: hash, kind: params.kind ?? "document", ...params.label ? { label: params.label } : {}, ...params.subject ? { subject: params.subject } : {} },
+              { engineUrl, apiKey }
+            );
+            return {
+              summary: `ANCHORED ${r.kind} \xB7 sha256 ${hash.slice(0, 16)}\u2026 \xB7 audit seq ${r.audit.seq} \xB7 Bitcoin checkpoint: ${r.anchor.status}. The file never left this machine.`,
+              ...r
+            };
+          } catch (e) {
+            if (e instanceof AssessError) throw new Error(`ANCHOR ${e.status}: ${e.type}`);
+            throw new Error("ANCHOR failed: unexpected error");
           }
         }
-        try {
-          const r = await findArtifacts(hash, { engineUrl, apiKey });
-          if (!r.artifacts.length) {
+      }),
+      // Verification half: was this exact content anchored, and did it reach Bitcoin?
+      tool({
+        name: "check_artifact",
+        label: "Check Artifact (was this hash anchored?)",
+        description: "Check whether an artifact was anchored by this account and the state of its Bitcoin checkpoint. Give a file `path` (hashed locally, never uploaded) or a `sha256`. If the current hash of a file does NOT match an anchored record you expected, the file changed since anchoring \u2014 that is the tampering signal.",
+        parameters: typebox_exports.Object({
+          path: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String()),
+          sha256: typebox_exports.Optional(typebox_exports.String({ pattern: "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" }))
+        }),
+        async execute(params, config) {
+          boot();
+          const engineUrl = config.engineUrl ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_URL ?? "https://api.fidacy.com";
+          const apiKey = (config.engineApiKey ?? process.env.FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY ?? "").trim();
+          if (!apiKey) {
+            throw new Error(
+              `check_artifact needs an engine key \u2014 ${noKeyCta()}. (Or set plugins.entries.fidacy.config.engineApiKey.)`
+            );
+          }
+          if (!params.path && !params.sha256) {
+            throw new Error("Give a file `path` (hashed locally) or a `sha256`.");
+          }
+          let hash = params.sha256 ?? "";
+          if (!hash && params.path) {
+            try {
+              hash = await hashFile(params.path);
+            } catch {
+              throw new Error("Could not read that file locally (check the path and permissions). Nothing was sent anywhere.");
+            }
+          }
+          try {
+            const r = await findArtifacts(hash, { engineUrl, apiKey });
+            if (!r.artifacts.length) {
+              return {
+                summary: `NOT FOUND \xB7 sha256 ${hash.slice(0, 16)}\u2026 has no anchored record in this account. If you expected a match, the file changed since anchoring.`,
+                sha256: hash,
+                artifacts: []
+              };
+            }
+            const first = r.artifacts[0];
             return {
-              summary: `NOT FOUND \xB7 sha256 ${hash.slice(0, 16)}\u2026 has no anchored record in this account. If you expected a match, the file changed since anchoring.`,
+              summary: `FOUND ${r.artifacts.length} record(s) \xB7 newest: ${String(first.kind)} anchored ${String(first.createdAt)} (audit seq ${String(first.auditSeq)}). Content matches the anchored hash byte for byte.`,
               sha256: hash,
-              artifacts: []
+              ...r
             };
+          } catch (e) {
+            if (e instanceof AssessError) throw new Error(`CHECK ${e.status}: ${e.type}`);
+            throw new Error("CHECK failed: unexpected error");
           }
-          const first = r.artifacts[0];
-          return {
-            summary: `FOUND ${r.artifacts.length} record(s) \xB7 newest: ${String(first.kind)} anchored ${String(first.createdAt)} (audit seq ${String(first.auditSeq)}). Content matches the anchored hash byte for byte.`,
-            sha256: hash,
-            ...r
-          };
-        } catch (e) {
-          if (e instanceof AssessError) throw new Error(`CHECK ${e.status}: ${e.type}`);
-          throw new Error("CHECK failed: unexpected error");
         }
-      }
-    }),
-    // Upgrade funnel. Records the intent signal and returns the real-account link;
-    // the anon_id travels in the URL so the engine binds past usage to the tenant.
-    tool({
-      name: "fidacy_upgrade",
-      label: "Upgrade to a Fidacy account",
-      description: "Start upgrading this local install to a real Fidacy account (server-backed signed verdicts, anchored proof, higher volume). Returns a link to open; your anonymous usage is preserved and migrated to the new account.",
-      parameters: typebox_exports.Object({}),
-      async execute() {
-        boot();
-        const { url } = requestUpgrade();
-        return {
-          upgradeUrl: url,
-          message: `To upgrade, open:
+      }),
+      // Upgrade funnel. Records the intent signal and returns the real-account link;
+      // the anon_id travels in the URL so the engine binds past usage to the tenant.
+      tool({
+        name: "fidacy_upgrade",
+        label: "Upgrade to a Fidacy account",
+        description: "Start upgrading this local install to a real Fidacy account (server-backed signed verdicts, anchored proof, higher volume). Returns a link to open; your anonymous usage is preserved and migrated to the new account.",
+        parameters: typebox_exports.Object({}),
+        async execute() {
+          boot();
+          const { url } = requestUpgrade();
+          return {
+            upgradeUrl: url,
+            message: `To upgrade, open:
 ${url}
 
 Your local protection keeps working meanwhile; your usage history migrates to the new account on completion.`
-        };
-      }
-    })
-  ]
+          };
+        }
+      })
+    ];
+  }
 });
 export {
   index_default as default

package/openclaw.plugin.json

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 {
   "id": "fidacy",
-  "name": "Fidacy \u2014 Payment Firewall",
+  "name": "Fidacy — Payment Firewall",
   "description": "A signed, independently-verifiable verdict on every money-moving agent action. Blocks wrong/lookalike payee, over-cap, and duplicate-invoice fraud before money moves. Non-custodial, local-first, deny-by-default.",
   "icon": "https://fidacy.com/logo.png",
-  "version": "0.1.15",
+  "version": "0.1.17",
   "contracts": {
     "tools": [
       "request_payment",
@@ -51,4 +51,4 @@
       "advanced": true
     }
   }
-}
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@fidacy/openclaw-plugin",
-  "version": "0.1.15",
+  "version": "0.1.17",
   "description": "Fidacy payment firewall as a native OpenClaw plugin: signed, verifiable verdicts on every money-moving agent action, in-process (no MCP subprocess).",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "homepage": "https://fidacy.com",
@@ -46,20 +46,20 @@
       "npmSpec": "@fidacy/openclaw-plugin"
     }
   },
-  "scripts": {
-    "build": "node scripts/bundle.mjs",
-    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
-  },
   "engines": {
     "node": ">=20"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@fidacy/firewall": "workspace:*",
-    "@fidacy/mcp": "workspace:*",
     "@types/node": "^22.10.0",
     "esbuild": "^0.24.0",
     "openclaw": "2026.6.11",
     "typebox": "1.1.39",
-    "typescript": "^5.6.3"
+    "typescript": "^5.6.3",
+    "@fidacy/firewall": "0.1.1",
+    "@fidacy/mcp": "0.1.25"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "node scripts/bundle.mjs",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
   }
-}
+}