@fidacy/mcp 0.2.3 → 0.2.4

package/dist/core.js

@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ function resolveMandateRules(cfg) {
 }
 
 // src/telemetry.ts
-var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.2.3" : "dev";
+var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.2.4" : "dev";
 function bandOf(amount) {
   if (typeof amount !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(amount) || amount <= 0) return void 0;
   if (amount < 10) return "lt10";

package/dist/index.js

@@ -217,17 +217,17 @@ var DevFidacyCore = class {
   }
   async decide(req, subject2) {
     const decisionId = randomUUID();
-    const ts = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
+    const ts2 = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
     const invalid = validateRequest(req);
     if (invalid) {
-      const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject: subject2, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: invalid, ts };
+      const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject: subject2, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: invalid, ts: ts2 };
       this.store.append(decision2);
       this.onDecision?.(decision2);
       return decision2;
     }
     const violated = evaluate(this.mandate, req, this.spent);
     if (violated) {
-      const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject: subject2, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: violated, ts };
+      const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject: subject2, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: violated, ts: ts2 };
       this.store.append(decision2);
       this.onDecision?.(decision2);
       return decision2;
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ var DevFidacyCore = class {
     if (invoice) {
       const k = `${subject2}|${invoice}`;
       if (this.claimedInvoices.has(k)) {
-        const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject: subject2, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: `duplicate_invoice:${invoice}`, ts };
+        const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject: subject2, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: `duplicate_invoice:${invoice}`, ts: ts2 };
         this.store.append(decision2);
         this.onDecision?.(decision2);
         return decision2;
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ var DevFidacyCore = class {
     const grantPayload = { decisionId, subject: subject2, payee: req.payee, amount: req.amount, currency: req.currency, exp: Date.now() + 12e4, ...req.invoiceRef ? { invoiceRef: req.invoiceRef } : {} };
     const grantBody = Buffer.from(stableStringify(grantPayload), "utf8").toString("base64url");
     const grant = `${grantBody}.${sign(this.priv, grantBody)}`;
-    const decision = { decisionId, status: "ALLOW", subject: subject2, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, grant, ts };
+    const decision = { decisionId, status: "ALLOW", subject: subject2, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, grant, ts: ts2 };
     this.spent += req.amount;
     this.store.append(decision);
     this.onDecision?.(decision);
@@ -358,10 +358,10 @@ var FileAuditStore = class {
   append(decision) {
     const prevHash = this.head();
     const seq = this.chain.length;
-    const ts = decision.ts;
+    const ts2 = decision.ts;
     const digest = sha256(stableStringify({ decisionId: decision.decisionId, status: decision.status, request: decision.request, violatedRule: decision.violatedRule ?? null }));
-    const hash = sha256(`${prevHash}|${digest}|${seq}|${ts}`);
-    const record2 = { seq, decisionId: decision.decisionId, status: decision.status, subject: decision.subject, digest, prevHash, hash, ts };
+    const hash = sha256(`${prevHash}|${digest}|${seq}|${ts2}`);
+    const record2 = { seq, decisionId: decision.decisionId, status: decision.status, subject: decision.subject, digest, prevHash, hash, ts: ts2 };
     if (typeof decision.request?.purpose === "string" && decision.request.purpose.trim()) {
       record2.purpose = decision.request.purpose.slice(0, 500);
     }
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ function resolveMandateRules(cfg) {
 }
 
 // src/telemetry.ts
-var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.2.3" : "dev";
+var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.2.4" : "dev";
 function bandOf(amount) {
   if (typeof amount !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(amount) || amount <= 0) return void 0;
   if (amount < 10) return "lt10";
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ async function findArtifacts(sha2562, cfg) {
 }
 
 // src/provision.ts
-var CLIENT_VERSION2 = true ? "0.2.3" : "dev";
+var CLIENT_VERSION2 = true ? "0.2.4" : "dev";
 function provisionEnabled() {
   const v = (process.env.FIDACY_DISABLE_PROVISION ?? "").trim().toLowerCase();
   return !(v === "1" || v === "true" || v === "yes");
@@ -1118,11 +1118,94 @@ function explainRule(rule, payee) {
   return `The mandate rule "${rule}" was violated.`;
 }
 
+// src/sentinel.ts
+var SENTINEL = {
+  /** amount >= SPIKE_FACTOR x the historical max ALLOW to the same payee. */
+  SPIKE_FACTOR: 3,
+  /** minimum prior ALLOWs to a payee before a spike is judged (else first_payee covers it). */
+  SPIKE_MIN_HISTORY: 2,
+  /** decisions within BURST_WINDOW_MS to trip velocity_burst. */
+  BURST_COUNT: 5,
+  BURST_WINDOW_MS: 10 * 6e4,
+  /** fraction of perTxMax that counts as riding the ceiling. */
+  CAP_CREEP_RATIO: 0.8,
+  /** a DENY for the same payee within this window makes a new attempt a retry. */
+  RETRY_WINDOW_MS: 30 * 6e4
+};
+var ts = (r) => {
+  const t = Date.parse(r.ts);
+  return Number.isFinite(t) ? t : 0;
+};
+function assessPattern(records, req, opts = {}) {
+  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now();
+  const alerts = [];
+  const toPayee = records.filter((r) => r.payee === req.payee);
+  const allowedToPayee = toPayee.filter((r) => r.status === "ALLOW");
+  if (req.payee && allowedToPayee.length === 0) {
+    alerts.push({
+      rule: "first_payee",
+      severity: "warning",
+      message: `First payment ever from this agent to "${req.payee}". A swapped or lookalike vendor always looks like a first payee; worth a human glance before anything settles.`
+    });
+  }
+  if (allowedToPayee.length >= SENTINEL.SPIKE_MIN_HISTORY && typeof req.amount === "number") {
+    const maxSeen = Math.max(...allowedToPayee.map((r) => typeof r.amount === "number" ? r.amount : 0));
+    if (maxSeen > 0 && req.amount >= maxSeen * SENTINEL.SPIKE_FACTOR) {
+      alerts.push({
+        rule: "amount_spike",
+        severity: "warning",
+        message: `${req.amount.toLocaleString("en-US")} is ${(req.amount / maxSeen).toFixed(1)}x the largest amount this agent has ever paid "${req.payee}" (${maxSeen.toLocaleString("en-US")}). Inflated re-presentations of a known vendor look exactly like this.`
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  const recent = records.filter((r) => now - ts(r) <= SENTINEL.BURST_WINDOW_MS);
+  if (recent.length + 1 >= SENTINEL.BURST_COUNT) {
+    alerts.push({
+      rule: "velocity_burst",
+      severity: "warning",
+      message: `${recent.length + 1} payment decisions inside ${Math.round(SENTINEL.BURST_WINDOW_MS / 6e4)} minutes. Runaway loops and drain attempts announce themselves as bursts before they announce themselves as losses.`
+    });
+  }
+  if (typeof opts.perTxMax === "number" && opts.perTxMax > 0 && typeof req.amount === "number") {
+    if (req.amount >= opts.perTxMax * SENTINEL.CAP_CREEP_RATIO && req.amount <= opts.perTxMax) {
+      alerts.push({
+        rule: "cap_creep",
+        severity: "notice",
+        message: `${req.amount.toLocaleString("en-US")} is ${Math.round(req.amount / opts.perTxMax * 100)}% of the per-transaction ceiling. An attacker probing a mandate pays just under the cap; a human authorizing a real bill usually doesn't land this close.`
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  const recentDeny = toPayee.find((r) => r.status === "DENY" && now - ts(r) <= SENTINEL.RETRY_WINDOW_MS);
+  if (recentDeny) {
+    alerts.push({
+      rule: "retry_after_deny",
+      severity: "warning",
+      message: `This agent was DENIED a payment to "${req.payee}" ${Math.max(1, Math.round((now - ts(recentDeny)) / 6e4))} minute(s) ago (${recentDeny.violatedRule ?? "rule on record"}) and is now trying again. Our public Model Watch benchmark measures exactly this behavior; in an autonomous agent it is the pattern that precedes a loss.`
+    });
+  }
+  return alerts;
+}
+function sweep(records, opts = {}) {
+  const out = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < records.length; i++) {
+    const r = records[i];
+    if (!r.payee) continue;
+    const alerts = assessPattern(records.slice(0, i), { payee: r.payee, amount: r.amount }, { perTxMax: opts.perTxMax, now: ts(r) });
+    if (alerts.length) out.push({ decisionId: r.decisionId, ts: r.ts, status: r.status, payee: r.payee, alerts });
+  }
+  return out.slice(-(opts.limit ?? 20)).reverse();
+}
+function renderAlertLine(alerts) {
+  if (!alerts.length) return "";
+  const worst = alerts.some((a) => a.severity === "warning") ? "SENTINEL WARNING" : "SENTINEL NOTICE";
+  return ` [${worst}: ${alerts.map((a) => a.message).join(" Also: ")}]`;
+}
+
 // src/index.ts
 var state = ensureState();
 var core = makeCore();
 var subject = process.env.FIDACY_SUBJECT ?? "agent:demo";
-var SERVER_VERSION = true ? "0.2.3" : "dev";
+var SERVER_VERSION = true ? "0.2.4" : "dev";
 var bootClaim = claimUrl();
 var server = new McpServer(
   { name: "fidacy", version: SERVER_VERSION },
@@ -1163,9 +1246,16 @@ server.registerTool(
       return { content: [{ type: "text", text: gate.message }], structuredContent: out2 };
     }
     const req = args;
+    let sentinelAlerts = [];
+    try {
+      const [before, mandate] = await Promise.all([core.history(5e3), core.getMandate(subject)]);
+      sentinelAlerts = assessPattern(before, { payee: req.payee, amount: req.amount }, { perTxMax: mandate?.allow?.perTxMax });
+    } catch {
+    }
     const d = await core.decide(req, subject);
     const out = { status: d.status, decisionId: d.decisionId, grant: d.grant, violatedRule: d.violatedRule };
-    const base = d.status === "ALLOW" ? `ALLOW (decision ${d.decisionId})${req.invoiceRef ? ` for invoice ${req.invoiceRef}` : ""}. To settle, call execute_payment with the SAME payee, amount, currency, and idempotencyKey, and set "grant" to EXACTLY this signed value:
+    const sentinelLine = d.status === "ALLOW" ? renderAlertLine(sentinelAlerts) : "";
+    const base = d.status === "ALLOW" ? `ALLOW (decision ${d.decisionId})${req.invoiceRef ? ` for invoice ${req.invoiceRef}` : ""}.${sentinelLine} To settle, call execute_payment with the SAME payee, amount, currency, and idempotencyKey, and set "grant" to EXACTLY this signed value:
 ${d.grant}` : `DENY (decision ${d.decisionId}). Rule violated: ${d.violatedRule}. No grant issued, this payment cannot proceed. The denial itself is recorded in the tamper-evident, hash-chained audit: call get_audit_proof with decisionId ${d.decisionId} for the proof of what was blocked.${d.violatedRule?.startsWith("payee_not_in_allowlist") ? ` If the user trusts this payee, add "${req.payee}" to mandate.payees in ~/.fidacy/config.json and retry: the firewall picks the change up on the next call, no restart needed.` : d.violatedRule?.startsWith("category_not_allowed") ? ` If the user considers "${req.category}" a legitimate purpose for this agent, add it to mandate.categories in ~/.fidacy/config.json and retry: the firewall picks the change up on the next call, no restart needed.` : d.violatedRule?.startsWith("currency_not_allowed") ? ` The mandate is single-currency and set to another one (mandate.currency in ~/.fidacy/config.json, default USD). If this agent legitimately pays in ${req.currency}, update it there and retry: hot-reloaded, no restart.` : ""}`;
     const nudge = decisionNudge(d.status, d.violatedRule, "upgrade");
     const countdown = trialCountdownLine();
@@ -1284,6 +1374,26 @@ Proof: entry #${record2.seq} in the hash-chained audit, chain currently ${proof.
     return { content: [{ type: "text", text: head + why + said + integrity }], structuredContent: payload };
   }
 );
+server.registerTool(
+  "sentinel_alerts",
+  {
+    title: "Sentinel Alerts (allowed, but outside this agent's pattern)",
+    description: "Predictive pattern alerts from the local audit chain: first-ever payee, amount spikes vs this agent's own history, velocity bursts, payments riding the mandate ceiling, and retries after a denial (the behavior our Model Watch benchmark measures). Deterministic and explainable, no model. Use to answer 'has anything unusual happened' before it becomes a loss.",
+    inputSchema: {
+      limit: z.number().int().positive().max(100).optional().describe("How many flagged decisions to return. Default 20.")
+    },
+    annotations: { readOnlyHint: true, destructiveHint: false, idempotentHint: true, openWorldHint: false }
+  },
+  async ({ limit }) => {
+    const [records, mandate] = await Promise.all([core.history(5e3), core.getMandate(subject).catch(() => null)]);
+    const flagged = sweep(records, { perTxMax: mandate?.allow?.perTxMax, limit: limit ?? 20 });
+    const text = flagged.length ? flagged.map((f) => `#${f.decisionId.slice(0, 8)} ${f.ts} ${f.status} to ${f.payee}: ${f.alerts.map((a) => `[${a.rule}] ${a.message}`).join(" ")}`).join("\n") : "No pattern alerts on this chain. Every decision so far sits inside this agent's own historical pattern.";
+    return {
+      content: [{ type: "text", text }],
+      structuredContent: { count: flagged.length, thresholds: SENTINEL, flagged }
+    };
+  }
+);
 server.registerTool(
   "assess_action",
   {

package/dist/lib.js

@@ -248,17 +248,17 @@ var DevFidacyCore = class {
   }
   async decide(req, subject) {
     const decisionId = randomUUID();
-    const ts = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
+    const ts2 = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
     const invalid = validateRequest(req);
     if (invalid) {
-      const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: invalid, ts };
+      const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: invalid, ts: ts2 };
       this.store.append(decision2);
       this.onDecision?.(decision2);
       return decision2;
     }
     const violated = evaluate(this.mandate, req, this.spent);
     if (violated) {
-      const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: violated, ts };
+      const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: violated, ts: ts2 };
       this.store.append(decision2);
       this.onDecision?.(decision2);
       return decision2;
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ var DevFidacyCore = class {
     if (invoice) {
       const k = `${subject}|${invoice}`;
       if (this.claimedInvoices.has(k)) {
-        const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: `duplicate_invoice:${invoice}`, ts };
+        const decision2 = { decisionId, status: "DENY", subject, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, violatedRule: `duplicate_invoice:${invoice}`, ts: ts2 };
         this.store.append(decision2);
         this.onDecision?.(decision2);
         return decision2;
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ var DevFidacyCore = class {
     const grantPayload = { decisionId, subject, payee: req.payee, amount: req.amount, currency: req.currency, exp: Date.now() + 12e4, ...req.invoiceRef ? { invoiceRef: req.invoiceRef } : {} };
     const grantBody = Buffer.from(stableStringify(grantPayload), "utf8").toString("base64url");
     const grant = `${grantBody}.${sign(this.priv, grantBody)}`;
-    const decision = { decisionId, status: "ALLOW", subject, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, grant, ts };
+    const decision = { decisionId, status: "ALLOW", subject, mandateId: this.mandate.id, request: req, grant, ts: ts2 };
     this.spent += req.amount;
     this.store.append(decision);
     this.onDecision?.(decision);
@@ -389,10 +389,10 @@ var FileAuditStore = class {
   append(decision) {
     const prevHash = this.head();
     const seq = this.chain.length;
-    const ts = decision.ts;
+    const ts2 = decision.ts;
     const digest = sha256(stableStringify({ decisionId: decision.decisionId, status: decision.status, request: decision.request, violatedRule: decision.violatedRule ?? null }));
-    const hash = sha256(`${prevHash}|${digest}|${seq}|${ts}`);
-    const record2 = { seq, decisionId: decision.decisionId, status: decision.status, subject: decision.subject, digest, prevHash, hash, ts };
+    const hash = sha256(`${prevHash}|${digest}|${seq}|${ts2}`);
+    const record2 = { seq, decisionId: decision.decisionId, status: decision.status, subject: decision.subject, digest, prevHash, hash, ts: ts2 };
     if (typeof decision.request?.purpose === "string" && decision.request.purpose.trim()) {
       record2.purpose = decision.request.purpose.slice(0, 500);
     }
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ function resolveMandateRules(cfg) {
 }
 
 // src/telemetry.ts
-var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.2.3" : "dev";
+var CLIENT_VERSION = true ? "0.2.4" : "dev";
 function bandOf(amount) {
   if (typeof amount !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(amount) || amount <= 0) return void 0;
   if (amount < 10) return "lt10";
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ function requestUpgrade() {
 }
 
 // src/provision.ts
-var CLIENT_VERSION2 = true ? "0.2.3" : "dev";
+var CLIENT_VERSION2 = true ? "0.2.4" : "dev";
 function provisionEnabled() {
   const v = (process.env.FIDACY_DISABLE_PROVISION ?? "").trim().toLowerCase();
   return !(v === "1" || v === "true" || v === "yes");
@@ -1053,6 +1053,89 @@ function explainRule(rule, payee) {
     return "The anonymous trial had been used up, so the firewall failed closed. No money can move until the install is activated with a free API key.";
   return `The mandate rule "${rule}" was violated.`;
 }
+
+// src/sentinel.ts
+var SENTINEL = {
+  /** amount >= SPIKE_FACTOR x the historical max ALLOW to the same payee. */
+  SPIKE_FACTOR: 3,
+  /** minimum prior ALLOWs to a payee before a spike is judged (else first_payee covers it). */
+  SPIKE_MIN_HISTORY: 2,
+  /** decisions within BURST_WINDOW_MS to trip velocity_burst. */
+  BURST_COUNT: 5,
+  BURST_WINDOW_MS: 10 * 6e4,
+  /** fraction of perTxMax that counts as riding the ceiling. */
+  CAP_CREEP_RATIO: 0.8,
+  /** a DENY for the same payee within this window makes a new attempt a retry. */
+  RETRY_WINDOW_MS: 30 * 6e4
+};
+var ts = (r) => {
+  const t = Date.parse(r.ts);
+  return Number.isFinite(t) ? t : 0;
+};
+function assessPattern(records, req, opts = {}) {
+  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now();
+  const alerts = [];
+  const toPayee = records.filter((r) => r.payee === req.payee);
+  const allowedToPayee = toPayee.filter((r) => r.status === "ALLOW");
+  if (req.payee && allowedToPayee.length === 0) {
+    alerts.push({
+      rule: "first_payee",
+      severity: "warning",
+      message: `First payment ever from this agent to "${req.payee}". A swapped or lookalike vendor always looks like a first payee; worth a human glance before anything settles.`
+    });
+  }
+  if (allowedToPayee.length >= SENTINEL.SPIKE_MIN_HISTORY && typeof req.amount === "number") {
+    const maxSeen = Math.max(...allowedToPayee.map((r) => typeof r.amount === "number" ? r.amount : 0));
+    if (maxSeen > 0 && req.amount >= maxSeen * SENTINEL.SPIKE_FACTOR) {
+      alerts.push({
+        rule: "amount_spike",
+        severity: "warning",
+        message: `${req.amount.toLocaleString("en-US")} is ${(req.amount / maxSeen).toFixed(1)}x the largest amount this agent has ever paid "${req.payee}" (${maxSeen.toLocaleString("en-US")}). Inflated re-presentations of a known vendor look exactly like this.`
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  const recent = records.filter((r) => now - ts(r) <= SENTINEL.BURST_WINDOW_MS);
+  if (recent.length + 1 >= SENTINEL.BURST_COUNT) {
+    alerts.push({
+      rule: "velocity_burst",
+      severity: "warning",
+      message: `${recent.length + 1} payment decisions inside ${Math.round(SENTINEL.BURST_WINDOW_MS / 6e4)} minutes. Runaway loops and drain attempts announce themselves as bursts before they announce themselves as losses.`
+    });
+  }
+  if (typeof opts.perTxMax === "number" && opts.perTxMax > 0 && typeof req.amount === "number") {
+    if (req.amount >= opts.perTxMax * SENTINEL.CAP_CREEP_RATIO && req.amount <= opts.perTxMax) {
+      alerts.push({
+        rule: "cap_creep",
+        severity: "notice",
+        message: `${req.amount.toLocaleString("en-US")} is ${Math.round(req.amount / opts.perTxMax * 100)}% of the per-transaction ceiling. An attacker probing a mandate pays just under the cap; a human authorizing a real bill usually doesn't land this close.`
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  const recentDeny = toPayee.find((r) => r.status === "DENY" && now - ts(r) <= SENTINEL.RETRY_WINDOW_MS);
+  if (recentDeny) {
+    alerts.push({
+      rule: "retry_after_deny",
+      severity: "warning",
+      message: `This agent was DENIED a payment to "${req.payee}" ${Math.max(1, Math.round((now - ts(recentDeny)) / 6e4))} minute(s) ago (${recentDeny.violatedRule ?? "rule on record"}) and is now trying again. Our public Model Watch benchmark measures exactly this behavior; in an autonomous agent it is the pattern that precedes a loss.`
+    });
+  }
+  return alerts;
+}
+function sweep(records, opts = {}) {
+  const out = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < records.length; i++) {
+    const r = records[i];
+    if (!r.payee) continue;
+    const alerts = assessPattern(records.slice(0, i), { payee: r.payee, amount: r.amount }, { perTxMax: opts.perTxMax, now: ts(r) });
+    if (alerts.length) out.push({ decisionId: r.decisionId, ts: r.ts, status: r.status, payee: r.payee, alerts });
+  }
+  return out.slice(-(opts.limit ?? 20)).reverse();
+}
+function renderAlertLine(alerts) {
+  if (!alerts.length) return "";
+  const worst = alerts.some((a) => a.severity === "warning") ? "SENTINEL WARNING" : "SENTINEL NOTICE";
+  return ` [${worst}: ${alerts.map((a) => a.message).join(" Also: ")}]`;
+}
 export {
   DevFidacyCore,
   FREE_DECISIONS,
@@ -1060,8 +1143,10 @@ export {
   GrantEnforcingExecutor,
   HttpFidacyCore,
   ReferenceRail,
+  SENTINEL,
   activationBootLine,
   activationGate,
+  assessPattern,
   autoProvision,
   canonInvoice,
   claimUrl,
@@ -1082,6 +1167,7 @@ export {
   recordAgentActive,
   recordInstall,
   remainingFree,
+  renderAlertLine,
   renderRows,
   renderSummary,
   requestUpgrade,
@@ -1091,6 +1177,7 @@ export {
   sign,
   stableStringify,
   summarize,
+  sweep,
   toRows,
   trialCountdownLine,
   upgradeUrl,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@fidacy/mcp",
-  "version": "0.2.3",
+  "version": "0.2.4",
   "description": "Fidacy action firewall for AI agents. Mandate-gated payment authorization as an MCP server.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "homepage": "https://fidacy.com",