@fedify/fedify 2.4.0-dev.2169 → 2.4.0-dev.2190

package/dist/{http-BGpexPO7.js → http-BqN5kyUf.js}

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import serialize from "json-canon";
 import { ATTR_HTTP_REQUEST_HEADER, ATTR_HTTP_REQUEST_METHOD, ATTR_URL_FULL } from "@opentelemetry/semantic-conventions";
 //#region deno.json
 var name = "@fedify/fedify";
-var version = "2.4.0-dev.2169+0a45df07";
+var version = "2.4.0-dev.2190+be3a8be0";
 //#endregion
 //#region src/sig/portable-key-id.ts
 const COMPATIBLE_KEY_ID_PATH_PATTERN = /^\/\.well-known\/apgateway\/did(?::|%3A)/i;
@@ -115,6 +115,50 @@ function getCanonicalPortableId(id) {
 	}
 }
 /**
+* Gets the [FEP-fe34] origin of an ID for same-origin checks.  The origin of
+* an `ap:` or `ap+ef61:` URI, or of a compatible identifier on any gateway,
+* is the DID of its canonical portable ID, as FEP-ef61 treats a compatible
+* identifier as the portable ID it stands for; unlike `getFe34Origin()`,
+* which gives a compatible identifier the web origin of its gateway.  The
+* origin of any other HTTP(S) URL is its web origin, and that of a DID URL
+* is its DID.
+*
+* Only the parsed `URL` is validated, so dot segments that URL parsing has
+* already resolved cannot be detected here.
+*
+* [FEP-fe34]: https://w3id.org/fep/fe34
+* @returns The origin, or `null` if the ID has none that is supported, or is
+*          a malformed portable ID or compatible identifier.
+* @internal
+*/
+function getAuthenticationOrigin(id) {
+	try {
+		if (isPortableId(id)) {
+			const canonical = getCanonicalPortableId(id);
+			return canonical == null ? null : getFe34Origin(canonical);
+		}
+		return getFe34Origin(id);
+	} catch (error) {
+		if (error instanceof TypeError) return null;
+		throw error;
+	}
+}
+/**
+* Checks whether two IDs identify the same object.  Two portable IDs, i.e.,
+* `ap:` or `ap+ef61:` URIs or compatible identifiers, are compared by their
+* canonical portable IDs, so that the same object on different gateways and
+* with different location hints matches.  Other IDs have to be equal as
+* they are.
+* @internal
+*/
+function isSameObjectId(a, b) {
+	const aPortable = isPortableId(a);
+	if (aPortable !== isPortableId(b)) return false;
+	if (!aPortable) return a.href === b.href;
+	const canonical = getCanonicalPortableId(a);
+	return canonical != null && canonical === getCanonicalPortableId(b);
+}
+/**
 * Gets the canonical portable ID of an `ap:` or `ap+ef61:` URI or
 * a compatible identifier as it is written, before any URL parsing.
 * Parsing an ID into a `URL` resolves dot segments in its path, which would
@@ -5056,16 +5100,19 @@ function parseDraftSignature(signature) {
 * Lists the HTTP Signatures that a request claims to carry, without verifying
 * any of them.  Signatures whose key IDs are not URLs are left out.
 * @param request The request.
+* @param maxSignatures The maximum number of RFC 9421 signatures to consider,
+*                      counted the same way as by {@link verifyRequest}, so
+*                      that the signatures it ignores are not listed either.
 * @returns The signatures; RFC 9421 ones if the request has
 *          a `Signature-Input` header, or a draft-cavage one otherwise.
 * @internal
 */
-function listRequestSignatures(request) {
+function listRequestSignatures(request, maxSignatures = 3) {
 	const signatureInput = request.headers.get("Signature-Input");
 	if (signatureInput != null) {
 		const signatures = [];
-		const inputs = parseRfc9421SignatureInput(signatureInput);
-		for (const [label, input] of Object.entries(inputs)) {
+		const inputs = Object.entries(parseRfc9421SignatureInput(signatureInput));
+		for (const [label, input] of inputs.slice(0, maxSignatures)) {
 			const keyId = parseKeyId(input.keyId);
 			if (keyId == null) continue;
 			signatures.push({
@@ -5193,6 +5240,18 @@ async function signRequestRfc9421(request, privateKey, keyId, span, currentTime,
 		body
 	});
 }
+/**
+* Checks that a maximum number of signatures to verify is a positive safe
+* integer or `Infinity`.
+* @param value The value to check.
+* @param name The name of the option, used in the error message.
+* @throws {RangeError} Thrown if the value is not valid.
+* @internal
+*/
+function validateMaxSignatures(value, name) {
+	if (value === Infinity || Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value >= 1) return;
+	throw new RangeError(`${name} must be a positive integer or Infinity.`);
+}
 const supportedHashAlgorithms = {
 	"sha": "SHA-1",
 	"sha-256": "SHA-256",
@@ -5285,6 +5344,8 @@ function recordVerificationResult(span, result) {
 * @param options Options for verifying the request.
 * @returns The public key of the verified signature, or `null` if the signature
 *          could not be verified.
+* @throws {RangeError} Thrown if {@link VerifyRequestOptions.maxSignatures}
+*         is not a positive integer or `Infinity`.
 */
 async function verifyRequest(request, options = {}) {
 	const result = await verifyRequestDetailed(request, options);
@@ -5297,9 +5358,12 @@ async function verifyRequest(request, options = {}) {
 * @param request The request to verify.
 * @param options Options for verifying the request.
 * @returns The verified public key, or a structured verification failure.
+* @throws {RangeError} Thrown if {@link VerifyRequestOptions.maxSignatures}
+*         is not a positive integer or `Infinity`.
 * @since 2.1.0
 */
 async function verifyRequestDetailed(request, options = {}) {
+	if (options.maxSignatures !== void 0) validateMaxSignatures(options.maxSignatures, "maxSignatures");
 	return await (options.tracerProvider ?? trace.getTracerProvider()).getTracer(name, version).startActiveSpan("http_signatures.verify", async (span) => {
 		if (span.isRecording()) {
 			span.setAttribute(ATTR_HTTP_REQUEST_METHOD, request.method);
@@ -5608,7 +5672,100 @@ async function verifyRfc9421ContentDigest(digestHeader, body) {
 	}
 	return false;
 }
-async function verifyRequestRfc9421(request, span, metricsContext, { documentLoader, contextLoader, timeWindow, currentTime, keyCache, meterProvider, tracerProvider } = {}) {
+/**
+* Verifies one RFC 9421 signature of a request with a key.
+* @param request The request, whose body may be consumed already.
+* @param sigInput The parsed `Signature-Input` member of the signature.
+* @param sigBytes The bytes of the signature.
+* @param key The public key named by the signature.
+* @param span The span to record the algorithm and the signature on.
+* @returns Whether the signature is verified, and the algorithm of the
+*          signature if it is supported.
+*/
+async function verifyRfc9421SignatureWithKey(request, sigInput, sigBytes, key, span) {
+	const logger = getLogger([
+		"fedify",
+		"sig",
+		"http"
+	]);
+	let alg = sigInput.alg?.toLowerCase();
+	if (alg == null) {
+		if (key.publicKey.algorithm.name === "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5") alg = "hash" in key.publicKey.algorithm ? key.publicKey.algorithm.hash === "SHA-512" ? "rsa-v1_5-sha512" : "rsa-v1_5-sha256" : "rsa-v1_5-sha256";
+		else if (key.publicKey.algorithm.name === "RSA-PSS") alg = "rsa-pss-sha512";
+		else if (key.publicKey.algorithm.name === "ECDSA") alg = "namedCurve" in key.publicKey.algorithm && key.publicKey.algorithm.namedCurve === "P-256" ? "ecdsa-p256-sha256" : "ecdsa-p384-sha384";
+		else if (key.publicKey.algorithm.name === "Ed25519") alg = "ed25519";
+	}
+	if (alg) span?.setAttribute("http_signatures.algorithm", alg);
+	const algorithm = alg && rfc9421AlgorithmMap[alg];
+	if (!algorithm) {
+		logger.debug("Failed to verify; unsupported algorithm: {algorithm}", {
+			algorithm: sigInput.alg,
+			supported: Object.keys(rfc9421AlgorithmMap)
+		});
+		return {
+			verified: false,
+			mismatched: false
+		};
+	}
+	const metricAlgorithm = alg;
+	let signatureBase;
+	try {
+		signatureBase = createRfc9421SignatureBase(request, sigInput.components, sigInput.parameters);
+	} catch (error) {
+		logger.debug("Failed to create signature base for verification: {error}", {
+			error,
+			signatureInput: sigInput
+		});
+		return {
+			verified: false,
+			algorithm: metricAlgorithm,
+			mismatched: false
+		};
+	}
+	const signatureBaseBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(signatureBase);
+	span?.setAttribute("http_signatures.signature", encodeHex(sigBytes));
+	const algorithmName = typeof algorithm === "string" ? algorithm : algorithm.name;
+	if (key.publicKey.algorithm.name !== algorithmName) {
+		logger.debug("Failed to verify; key {keyId} is not a key for algorithm {algorithm}.", {
+			keyId: sigInput.keyId,
+			algorithm: alg
+		});
+		return {
+			verified: false,
+			algorithm: metricAlgorithm,
+			mismatched: true
+		};
+	}
+	let verified;
+	try {
+		verified = await crypto.subtle.verify(algorithm, key.publicKey, sigBytes.slice(), signatureBaseBytes);
+	} catch (error) {
+		logger.debug("Error during signature verification: {error}", {
+			error,
+			keyId: sigInput.keyId,
+			algorithm: sigInput.alg
+		});
+		return {
+			verified: false,
+			algorithm: metricAlgorithm,
+			mismatched: false
+		};
+	}
+	if (verified) return {
+		verified: true,
+		algorithm: metricAlgorithm
+	};
+	logger.debug("Failed to verify signature with key {keyId}; signature invalid.", {
+		keyId: sigInput.keyId,
+		signatureBase
+	});
+	return {
+		verified: false,
+		algorithm: metricAlgorithm,
+		mismatched: true
+	};
+}
+async function verifyRequestRfc9421(request, span, metricsContext, { documentLoader, contextLoader, timeWindow, currentTime, keyCache, maxSignatures = 3, meterProvider, tracerProvider } = {}) {
 	const logger = getLogger([
 		"fedify",
 		"sig",
@@ -5621,7 +5778,6 @@ async function verifyRequestRfc9421(request, span, metricsContext, { documentLoa
 		logger.error("Failed to verify; the request body is locked.", { url: request.url });
 		return noSignatureResult();
 	}
-	const originalRequest = request;
 	request = request.clone();
 	const signatureInputHeader = request.headers.get("Signature-Input");
 	if (!signatureInputHeader) {
@@ -5641,6 +5797,29 @@ async function verifyRequestRfc9421(request, span, metricsContext, { documentLoa
 		logger.debug("Failed to verify; no valid signatures found in Signature-Input header.", { header: signatureInputHeader });
 		return invalidSignatureResult(null);
 	}
+	if (signatureNames.length > maxSignatures) {
+		logger.debug("Verifying only the first {maxSignatures} of the {count} signatures in the Signature-Input header; the rest are ignored.", {
+			maxSignatures,
+			count: signatureNames.length
+		});
+		signatureNames.splice(maxSignatures);
+	}
+	const keyLookups = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	const refreshedKeyIds = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	const lookUpKey = (keyId, keyCache) => measureSignatureKeyFetch(meterProvider, "http", () => fetchKeyDetailed(keyId, CryptographicKey, {
+		documentLoader,
+		contextLoader,
+		keyCache,
+		tracerProvider,
+		meterProvider,
+		portableKeyResolvers: createPortableKeyResolvers({
+			documentLoader,
+			contextLoader,
+			keyCache,
+			tracerProvider,
+			meterProvider
+		})
+	}));
 	let failure = noSignatureResult();
 	let failureAlgorithm;
 	const setFailure = (result, algorithm) => {
@@ -5714,94 +5893,40 @@ async function verifyRequestRfc9421(request, span, metricsContext, { documentLoa
 			setFailure(invalidSignatureResult(null));
 			continue;
 		}
-		const { key, cached, fetchError } = await measureSignatureKeyFetch(meterProvider, "http", () => fetchKeyDetailed(keyId, CryptographicKey, {
-			documentLoader,
-			contextLoader,
-			keyCache,
-			tracerProvider,
-			meterProvider,
-			portableKeyResolvers: createPortableKeyResolvers({
-				documentLoader,
-				contextLoader,
-				keyCache,
-				tracerProvider,
-				meterProvider
-			})
-		}));
-		if (fetchError != null) {
-			setFailure(keyFetchErrorResult(keyId, fetchError));
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (!key) {
-			logger.debug("Failed to fetch key: {keyId}", { keyId: sigInput.keyId });
-			setFailure(invalidSignatureResult(keyId));
-			continue;
-		}
-		let alg = sigInput.alg?.toLowerCase();
-		if (alg == null) {
-			if (key.publicKey.algorithm.name === "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5") alg = "hash" in key.publicKey.algorithm ? key.publicKey.algorithm.hash === "SHA-512" ? "rsa-v1_5-sha512" : "rsa-v1_5-sha256" : "rsa-v1_5-sha256";
-			else if (key.publicKey.algorithm.name === "RSA-PSS") alg = "rsa-pss-sha512";
-			else if (key.publicKey.algorithm.name === "ECDSA") alg = "namedCurve" in key.publicKey.algorithm && key.publicKey.algorithm.namedCurve === "P-256" ? "ecdsa-p256-sha256" : "ecdsa-p384-sha384";
-			else if (key.publicKey.algorithm.name === "Ed25519") alg = "ed25519";
-		}
-		if (alg) span?.setAttribute("http_signatures.algorithm", alg);
-		const algorithm = alg && rfc9421AlgorithmMap[alg];
-		const candidateAlgorithm = algorithm ? alg : void 0;
-		if (!algorithm) {
-			logger.debug("Failed to verify; unsupported algorithm: {algorithm}", {
-				algorithm: sigInput.alg,
-				supported: Object.keys(rfc9421AlgorithmMap)
-			});
-			setFailure(invalidSignatureResult(keyId));
-			continue;
-		}
-		let signatureBase;
-		try {
-			signatureBase = createRfc9421SignatureBase(request, sigInput.components, sigInput.parameters);
-		} catch (error) {
-			logger.debug("Failed to create signature base for verification: {error}", {
-				error,
-				signatureInput: sigInput
-			});
-			setFailure(invalidSignatureResult(keyId), candidateAlgorithm);
-			continue;
+		let lookup = keyLookups.get(keyId.href);
+		if (lookup == null) {
+			lookup = await lookUpKey(keyId, keyCache);
+			keyLookups.set(keyId.href, lookup);
 		}
-		const signatureBaseBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(signatureBase);
-		span?.setAttribute("http_signatures.signature", encodeHex(sigBytes));
-		try {
-			if (await crypto.subtle.verify(algorithm, key.publicKey, sigBytes.slice(), signatureBaseBytes)) {
-				metricsContext.algorithm = candidateAlgorithm;
+		while (true) {
+			const { key, cached, fetchError } = lookup;
+			if (fetchError != null) {
+				setFailure(keyFetchErrorResult(keyId, fetchError));
+				break;
+			}
+			if (!key) {
+				logger.debug("Failed to fetch key: {keyId}", { keyId: sigInput.keyId });
+				setFailure(invalidSignatureResult(keyId));
+				break;
+			}
+			const result = await verifyRfc9421SignatureWithKey(request, sigInput, sigBytes, key, span);
+			if (result.verified) {
+				metricsContext.algorithm = result.algorithm;
 				return {
 					verified: true,
 					key,
 					signatureLabel: sigName
 				};
-			} else if (cached) {
+			}
+			if (result.mismatched && cached && !refreshedKeyIds.has(keyId.href)) {
 				logger.debug("Failed to verify with cached key {keyId}; retrying with fresh key...", { keyId: sigInput.keyId });
-				return await verifyRequestRfc9421(originalRequest, span, metricsContext, {
-					documentLoader,
-					contextLoader,
-					timeWindow,
-					currentTime,
-					keyCache: bypassKeyCacheReads(keyCache),
-					spec: "rfc9421",
-					meterProvider,
-					tracerProvider
-				});
-			} else {
-				logger.debug("Failed to verify signature with fetched key {keyId}; signature invalid.", {
-					keyId: sigInput.keyId,
-					signatureBase
-				});
-				setFailure(invalidSignatureResult(keyId), candidateAlgorithm);
+				refreshedKeyIds.add(keyId.href);
+				lookup = await lookUpKey(keyId, bypassKeyCacheReads(keyCache));
+				keyLookups.set(keyId.href, lookup);
+				continue;
 			}
-		} catch (error) {
-			logger.debug("Error during signature verification: {error}", {
-				error,
-				keyId: sigInput.keyId,
-				algorithm: sigInput.alg
-			});
-			setFailure(invalidSignatureResult(keyId), candidateAlgorithm);
+			setFailure(invalidSignatureResult(keyId), result.algorithm);
+			break;
 		}
 	}
 	metricsContext.algorithm = failureAlgorithm;
@@ -5901,16 +6026,19 @@ async function doubleKnock(request, identity, options = {}) {
 }
 async function doubleKnockInternal(request, identity, options, redirected = 0, visited = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set()) {
 	const { specDeterminer, log, tracerProvider, signal } = options;
+	signal?.throwIfAborted();
 	const maximumRedirection = options.maxRedirection ?? DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTION;
 	visited.add(request.url);
 	const origin = new URL(request.url).origin;
 	const firstTrySpec = specDeterminer == null ? "rfc9421" : await specDeterminer.determineSpec(origin);
+	signal?.throwIfAborted();
 	const body = options.body !== void 0 ? options.body : request.method !== "GET" && request.method !== "HEAD" ? await request.clone().arrayBuffer() : null;
 	let signedRequest = await signRequest(request, identity.privateKey, identity.keyId, {
 		spec: firstTrySpec,
 		tracerProvider,
 		body
 	});
+	signal?.throwIfAborted();
 	log?.(signedRequest);
 	let response = await fetchDoubleKnockRequest(request, signedRequest, signal);
 	if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400 && response.headers.has("Location")) {
@@ -5935,6 +6063,7 @@ async function doubleKnockInternal(request, identity, options, redirected = 0, v
 			let fulfilled = false;
 			let challengeRequest;
 			for (const entry of entries) {
+				signal?.throwIfAborted();
 				const rfc9421 = fulfillAcceptSignature(entry, localKeyId, localAlg);
 				if (rfc9421 == null) continue;
 				logger.debug("Received Accept-Signature challenge; accumulating label {label} and components {components}.", {
@@ -5957,6 +6086,7 @@ async function doubleKnockInternal(request, identity, options, redirected = 0, v
 				}
 			}
 			if (fulfilled && challengeRequest != null) {
+				signal?.throwIfAborted();
 				signedRequest = challengeRequest;
 				log?.(signedRequest);
 				response = await fetch(signedRequest, {
@@ -5981,11 +6111,13 @@ async function doubleKnockInternal(request, identity, options, redirected = 0, v
 			status: response.status,
 			statusText: response.statusText
 		});
+		signal?.throwIfAborted();
 		signedRequest = await signRequest(request, identity.privateKey, identity.keyId, {
 			spec,
 			tracerProvider,
 			body
 		});
+		signal?.throwIfAborted();
 		log?.(signedRequest);
 		response = await fetchDoubleKnockRequest(request, signedRequest, signal);
 		if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400 && response.headers.has("Location")) {
@@ -6028,4 +6160,4 @@ function timingSafeEqual(a, b) {
 	return result === 0;
 }
 //#endregion
-export { isAbortError$1 as $, hasSignatureLike as A, fetchKey as B, assertSafeJsonLd as C, isPortableId as Ct, detachSignature as D, name as Dt, createSignature as E, isSamePublicKey as Et, verifyJsonLd as F, verifyKeyOwnership as G, generateCryptoKeyPair as H, verifySignature as I, parseKeyOwnerEvidence as J, MAX_PORTABLE_KEY_TTL as K, wrapContextLoaderForJsonLd as L, isInvalidUrlTypeError as M, signJsonLd as N, getNormalizationContextLoader as O, version as Ot, verifyCompactJsonLd as P, instrumentDocumentLoader as Q, exportJwk as R, InvalidContextReferenceError as S, isCompatibleKeyId as St, compactJsonLd as T, isPortableUri as Tt, importJwk as U, fetchKeyDetailed as V, validateCryptoKey as W, getFederationMetrics as X, getDurationMs as Y, getRemoteHost as Z, verifyPortableObjectProof as _, getCanonicalPortableId as _t, signRequest as a, recordDocumentCache as at, verifyProof as b, getRawCanonicalPortableId as bt, fetchPortableGatewayKey as c, recordOutboxActivity as ct, classifyFep2277CoreType as d, registerQueueDepthGauge as dt, recordCircuitBreakerStateChange as et, createProof as f, preloadedOnlyDocumentLoader as ft, verifyObject as g, validateAcceptSignature as gt, verifyMapLocalProof as h, parseAcceptSignature as ht, selectRequestSignature as i, recordCollectionTotalItems as it, isClearlyMalformedContextReference as j, hasSignature as k, resolvePortableActorKey as l, recordOutboxEnqueue as lt, signObject as m, fulfillAcceptSignature as mt, listRequestSignatures as n, recordCollectionPageItems as nt, verifyRequest as o, recordFanoutRecipients as ot, hasProofLike as p, formatAcceptSignature as pt, getVerifiedKeyOwnerEvidence as q, parseRfc9421SignatureInput as r, recordCollectionRequest as rt, verifyRequestDetailed as s, recordInboxActivity as st, doubleKnock as t, recordCollectionDispatchDuration as tt, InvalidPortableObjectIdError as u, recordWebFingerHandle as ut, verifyPortableObjectProofPolicy as v, getGatewayKeyBase as vt, attachSignature as w, isPortableKeyId as wt, normalizeOutgoingActivityJsonLd as x, hasPortableActor as xt, verifyPortableObjectProofWithRoot as y, getPortableDid as yt, fetchActorDocument as z };
+export { instrumentDocumentLoader as $, hasSignature as A, name as At, fetchActorDocument as B, InvalidContextReferenceError as C, hasPortableActor as Ct, createSignature as D, isPortableUri as Dt, compactJsonLd as E, isPortableKeyId as Et, verifyCompactJsonLd as F, validateCryptoKey as G, fetchKeyDetailed as H, verifyJsonLd as I, getVerifiedKeyOwnerEvidence as J, verifyKeyOwnership as K, verifySignature as L, isClearlyMalformedContextReference as M, isInvalidUrlTypeError as N, detachSignature as O, isSameObjectId as Ot, signJsonLd as P, getRemoteHost as Q, wrapContextLoaderForJsonLd as R, normalizeOutgoingActivityJsonLd as S, getRawCanonicalPortableId as St, attachSignature as T, isPortableId as Tt, generateCryptoKeyPair as U, fetchKey as V, importJwk as W, getDurationMs as X, parseKeyOwnerEvidence as Y, getFederationMetrics as Z, verifyObject as _, validateAcceptSignature as _t, signRequest as a, recordCollectionTotalItems as at, verifyPortableObjectProofWithRoot as b, getGatewayKeyBase as bt, verifyRequestDetailed as c, recordInboxActivity as ct, InvalidPortableObjectIdError as d, recordWebFingerHandle as dt, isAbortError$1 as et, classifyFep2277CoreType as f, registerQueueDepthGauge as ft, verifyMapLocalProof as g, parseAcceptSignature as gt, signObject as h, fulfillAcceptSignature as ht, selectRequestSignature as i, recordCollectionRequest as it, hasSignatureLike as j, version as jt, getNormalizationContextLoader as k, isSamePublicKey as kt, fetchPortableGatewayKey as l, recordOutboxActivity as lt, hasProofLike as m, formatAcceptSignature as mt, listRequestSignatures as n, recordCollectionDispatchDuration as nt, validateMaxSignatures as o, recordDocumentCache as ot, createProof as p, preloadedOnlyDocumentLoader as pt, MAX_PORTABLE_KEY_TTL as q, parseRfc9421SignatureInput as r, recordCollectionPageItems as rt, verifyRequest as s, recordFanoutRecipients as st, doubleKnock as t, recordCircuitBreakerStateChange as tt, resolvePortableActorKey as u, recordOutboxEnqueue as ut, verifyPortableObjectProof as v, getAuthenticationOrigin as vt, assertSafeJsonLd as w, isCompatibleKeyId as wt, verifyProof as x, getPortableDid as xt, verifyPortableObjectProofPolicy as y, getCanonicalPortableId as yt, exportJwk as z };

package/dist/{http-Cok5-vIC.d.ts → http-BrwKINQn.d.cts}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /// <reference lib="esnext.temporal" />
 import { Actor, CryptographicKey, Multikey } from "@fedify/vocab";
-import { MeterProvider, TracerProvider } from "@opentelemetry/api";
 import { DocumentLoader } from "@fedify/vocab-runtime";
+import { MeterProvider, TracerProvider } from "@opentelemetry/api";
 
 //#region src/sig/portable-key.d.ts
 /**
@@ -601,6 +601,30 @@ interface VerifyRequestOptions {
   */
   spec?: HttpMessageSignaturesSpec;
   /**
+  * The maximum number of [RFC 9421] signatures of a request to verify.
+  * A request can carry several signatures, each of which may make Fedify
+  * fetch the key that it names, so only the first ones in the order of
+  * the `Signature-Input` header are verified, and the rest are ignored as
+  * if they were absent.  Every signature among the first ones counts, even
+  * if it fails before its key is fetched, e.g., because it is too old, or
+  * names the same key as another one.  The key of a key ID is looked up
+  * only once for all the signatures that name it.
+  *
+  * It has to be a positive integer, or `Infinity` to verify every
+  * signature, which lets a single request make Fedify fetch any number of
+  * keys.  Draft-cavage HTTP Signatures carry a single signature, so this
+  * option does not affect them.
+  *
+  * Three by default.
+  *
+  * [RFC 9421]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421
+  * @throws {RangeError} Thrown by {@link verifyRequest} and
+  *         {@link verifyRequestDetailed} if the value is not a positive
+  *         integer or `Infinity`.
+  * @since 2.4.0
+  */
+  maxSignatures?: number;
+  /**
   * The OpenTelemetry tracer provider.  If omitted, the global tracer provider
   * is used.
   * @since 1.3.0
@@ -651,6 +675,8 @@ type VerifyRequestDetailedResult = {
 * @param options Options for verifying the request.
 * @returns The public key of the verified signature, or `null` if the signature
 *          could not be verified.
+* @throws {RangeError} Thrown if {@link VerifyRequestOptions.maxSignatures}
+*         is not a positive integer or `Infinity`.
 */
 declare function verifyRequest(request: Request, options?: VerifyRequestOptions): Promise<CryptographicKey | null>;
 /**
@@ -660,6 +686,8 @@ declare function verifyRequest(request: Request, options?: VerifyRequestOptions)
 * @param request The request to verify.
 * @param options Options for verifying the request.
 * @returns The verified public key, or a structured verification failure.
+* @throws {RangeError} Thrown if {@link VerifyRequestOptions.maxSignatures}
+*         is not a positive integer or `Infinity`.
 * @since 2.1.0
 */
 declare function verifyRequestDetailed(request: Request, options?: VerifyRequestOptions): Promise<VerifyRequestDetailedResult>;