@fayz-ai/core 0.8.4 → 0.8.5

package/dist/access/engine.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import type { PermissionProfile, PermissionAction } from '../types/permissions';
+import type { PermissionProfile, PermissionAction, SystemPermission } from '../types/permissions';
 import type { Plan } from '../types/billing';
 /** Why an access request was denied. `limit` only occurs on guarded writes. */
 export type DenyReason = 'role' | 'plan' | 'limit';
@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ export declare function isOwnerProfile(profile: PermissionProfile): boolean;
  * semantics.
  */
 export declare function profileHasPermission(profile: PermissionProfile | null, feature: string, action?: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * The org-management side of a profile: managing team, billing, settings and
+ * permissions themselves. Separate axis from `grants` — these gate the settings
+ * tabs, not a feature's rows — and it follows the same owner bypass, so the one
+ * person who can hand out access is never locked out of doing it.
+ */
+export declare function profileHasSystemPermission(profile: PermissionProfile | null, permission: SystemPermission): boolean;
 /**
  * Does the current plan entitle `feature`? A plan gates a feature ONLY with an
  * explicit `false`; absent means "not gated by this plan" (allowed). This keeps

package/dist/access/engine.d.ts.map

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package/dist/access/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export { isOwnerProfile, profileHasPermission, isEntitledByPlan, resolveAccess, resolveLimit, } from './engine';
+export { isOwnerProfile, profileHasPermission, profileHasSystemPermission, isEntitledByPlan, resolveAccess, resolveLimit, } from './engine';
 export type { DenyReason, AccessDecision, AccessSubject } from './engine';
 export { UPGRADE_URL, agentDenial } from './denial';
 export type { AgentDenial, AgentDenialLimit, AgentGuardResult } from './denial';

package/dist/access/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/access/index.js

@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@ function profileHasPermission(profile, feature, action) {
   if (!action) return actions.length > 0;
   return actions.includes(action) || actions.includes("manage");
 }
+function profileHasSystemPermission(profile, permission) {
+  if (!profile) return true;
+  if (isOwnerProfile(profile)) return true;
+  return profile.systemPermissions?.includes(permission) ?? false;
+}
 function isEntitledByPlan(plan, feature) {
   return plan?.entitlements?.features?.[feature] !== false;
 }
@@ -46,6 +51,6 @@ function mergeLimitDeclarations(...layers) {
   return Array.from(byKey.values());
 }
 
-export { UPGRADE_URL, agentDenial, isEntitledByPlan, isOwnerProfile, mergeLimitDeclarations, profileHasPermission, resolveAccess, resolveLimit };
+export { UPGRADE_URL, agentDenial, isEntitledByPlan, isOwnerProfile, mergeLimitDeclarations, profileHasPermission, profileHasSystemPermission, resolveAccess, resolveLimit };
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/access/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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We match by id first, falling back to the\n * (possibly localized) name for safety.\n */\nexport function isOwnerProfile(profile: PermissionProfile): boolean {\n  return profile.id === 'owner' || profile.name?.toLowerCase() === 'owner'\n}\n\n/**\n * The single role-side permission check. The plan axis composes ON TOP of it in\n * {@link resolveAccess} instead of reimplementing owner-bypass / `manage`\n * semantics.\n */\nexport function profileHasPermission(\n  profile: PermissionProfile | null,\n  feature: string,\n  action?: string,\n): boolean {\n  if (!profile) return true\n\n  // Owner bypass: never lock the owner out, even if the RBAC catalog is empty\n  // or still loading. 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Role — reuses `profileHasPermission` (owner bypass + `manage` semantics\n *    live there, and impersonation composes for free because `profile` is the\n *    previewed role). Denied → `{ allowed:false, reason:'role' }`.\n * 2. Plan — even the owner does NOT bypass the plan: upgrading is the tenant's\n *    decision, not a role power. Denied → `{ allowed:false, reason:'plan' }`.\n */\nexport function resolveAccess(\n  subject: AccessSubject,\n  feature: string,\n  action?: PermissionAction,\n): AccessDecision {\n  if (!profileHasPermission(subject.profile, feature, action)) {\n    return { allowed: false, reason: 'role' }\n  }\n  if (!isEntitledByPlan(subject.plan, feature)) {\n    return { allowed: false, reason: 'plan' }\n  }\n  return { allowed: true }\n}\n\n/**\n * Pure numeric side of a limit: given the plan cap, whether a countable\n * declaration exists, and the current usage, derive the limit math. 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One shape for every\n// executor — FAB client-plane, the Fayz broker, and the pool RPCs (which emit\n// its jsonb mirror in their `denial` field) — so the model can explain the\n// denial and offer the upgrade path conversationally.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Where a denied tenant goes to upgrade — the conversational UpgradeModal. */\nexport const UPGRADE_URL = '/settings/subscription'\n\nexport interface AgentDenialLimit {\n  key: string\n  max: number\n  used: number\n}\n\nexport interface AgentDenial {\n  allowed: false\n  reason: DenyReason\n  /** Present when `reason === 'limit'`. */\n  limit?: AgentDenialLimit\n  upgradeUrl: string\n}\n\nexport type AgentGuardResult = { allowed: true } | AgentDenial\n\n/** Build a denial with the canonical upgrade URL attached. */\nexport function agentDenial(reason: DenyReason, limit?: AgentDenialLimit): AgentDenial {\n  return { allowed: false, reason, ...(limit ? { limit } : {}), upgradeUrl: UPGRADE_URL }\n}\n","import type { LimitDeclaration } from '../types/entitlements'\n\n/**\n * The 4-layer limit-declaration merge, extracted so the browser AccessProvider\n * and the manifest derivation (`fayz manifest emit`) resolve the EXACT same\n * final set: core built-ins < entity-derived < plugin `declaredLimits` < app\n * overrides. 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Guarded by scripts/check-access-purity.mjs.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Why an access request was denied. `limit` only occurs on guarded writes. */\nexport type DenyReason = 'role' | 'plan' | 'limit'\n\nexport interface AccessDecision {\n  allowed: boolean\n  reason?: DenyReason\n}\n\n/** The minimal subject a decision needs — a projection of any richer session. */\nexport interface AccessSubject {\n  /** Effective RBAC profile — the previewed role during impersonation. */\n  profile: PermissionProfile | null\n  /** The tenant's currently-active plan. */\n  plan: Plan | null\n}\n\n/**\n * The org owner has every permission implicitly. Owner is represented by the\n * canonical role id `owner` across adapters (see org/adapters/supabase.ts\n * buildPermissionProfiles, which also grants owner all catalog perms, and the\n * mock adapter's `owner` fallback). We match by id first, falling back to the\n * (possibly localized) name for safety.\n */\nexport function isOwnerProfile(profile: PermissionProfile): boolean {\n  return profile.id === 'owner' || profile.name?.toLowerCase() === 'owner'\n}\n\n/**\n * The single role-side permission check. The plan axis composes ON TOP of it in\n * {@link resolveAccess} instead of reimplementing owner-bypass / `manage`\n * semantics.\n */\nexport function profileHasPermission(\n  profile: PermissionProfile | null,\n  feature: string,\n  action?: string,\n): boolean {\n  if (!profile) return true\n\n  // Owner bypass: never lock the owner out, even if the RBAC catalog is empty\n  // or still loading. Because permission checks read the *effective* profile,\n  // an owner previewing a non-owner role correctly loses this bypass — the\n  // preview stays honest.\n  if (isOwnerProfile(profile)) return true\n\n  const actions = profile.grants[feature]\n  if (!actions) return false\n\n  if (!action) return actions.length > 0\n\n  return actions.includes(action) || actions.includes('manage')\n}\n\n/**\n * The org-management side of a profile: managing team, billing, settings and\n * permissions themselves. Separate axis from `grants` — these gate the settings\n * tabs, not a feature's rows — and it follows the same owner bypass, so the one\n * person who can hand out access is never locked out of doing it.\n */\nexport function profileHasSystemPermission(\n  profile: PermissionProfile | null,\n  permission: SystemPermission,\n): boolean {\n  if (!profile) return true\n  if (isOwnerProfile(profile)) return true\n  return profile.systemPermissions?.includes(permission) ?? false\n}\n\n/**\n * Does the current plan entitle `feature`? A plan gates a feature ONLY with an\n * explicit `false`; absent means \"not gated by this plan\" (allowed). This keeps\n * entitlements additive and safe: a feature the plan has never heard of stays\n * open rather than silently locking.\n */\nexport function isEntitledByPlan(plan: Plan | null, feature: string): boolean {\n  return plan?.entitlements?.features?.[feature] !== false\n}\n\n/**\n * The single access decision: role FIRST, then plan.\n *\n * 1. Role — reuses `profileHasPermission` (owner bypass + `manage` semantics\n *    live there, and impersonation composes for free because `profile` is the\n *    previewed role). Denied → `{ allowed:false, reason:'role' }`.\n * 2. Plan — even the owner does NOT bypass the plan: upgrading is the tenant's\n *    decision, not a role power. Denied → `{ allowed:false, reason:'plan' }`.\n */\nexport function resolveAccess(\n  subject: AccessSubject,\n  feature: string,\n  action?: PermissionAction,\n): AccessDecision {\n  if (!profileHasPermission(subject.profile, feature, action)) {\n    return { allowed: false, reason: 'role' }\n  }\n  if (!isEntitledByPlan(subject.plan, feature)) {\n    return { allowed: false, reason: 'plan' }\n  }\n  return { allowed: true }\n}\n\n/**\n * Pure numeric side of a limit: given the plan cap, whether a countable\n * declaration exists, and the current usage, derive the limit math. Unlimited\n * when there's no declaration to count, no cap on the plan, or the cap is `-1`.\n */\nexport function resolveLimit(params: { cap: number | undefined; hasDeclaration: boolean; used: number }): {\n  max: number\n  used: number\n  remaining: number\n  atLimit: boolean\n  unlimited: boolean\n} {\n  const { cap, hasDeclaration, used } = params\n  const unlimited = !hasDeclaration || cap === undefined || cap === -1\n  const max = unlimited ? Infinity : cap\n  const remaining = unlimited ? Infinity : Math.max(0, max - used)\n  const atLimit = !unlimited && used >= max\n  return { max, used, remaining, atLimit, unlimited }\n}\n","import type { DenyReason } from './engine'\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// The structured denial an AGENT surface returns instead of failing silently\n// (docs/ENTITLEMENTS.md § \"Superfície de agentes de IA\"). One shape for every\n// executor — FAB client-plane, the Fayz broker, and the pool RPCs (which emit\n// its jsonb mirror in their `denial` field) — so the model can explain the\n// denial and offer the upgrade path conversationally.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Where a denied tenant goes to upgrade — the conversational UpgradeModal. */\nexport const UPGRADE_URL = '/settings/subscription'\n\nexport interface AgentDenialLimit {\n  key: string\n  max: number\n  used: number\n}\n\nexport interface AgentDenial {\n  allowed: false\n  reason: DenyReason\n  /** Present when `reason === 'limit'`. */\n  limit?: AgentDenialLimit\n  upgradeUrl: string\n}\n\nexport type AgentGuardResult = { allowed: true } | AgentDenial\n\n/** Build a denial with the canonical upgrade URL attached. */\nexport function agentDenial(reason: DenyReason, limit?: AgentDenialLimit): AgentDenial {\n  return { allowed: false, reason, ...(limit ? { limit } : {}), upgradeUrl: UPGRADE_URL }\n}\n","import type { LimitDeclaration } from '../types/entitlements'\n\n/**\n * The 4-layer limit-declaration merge, extracted so the browser AccessProvider\n * and the manifest derivation (`fayz manifest emit`) resolve the EXACT same\n * final set: core built-ins < entity-derived < plugin `declaredLimits` < app\n * overrides. Later layers win by key. Pure: pass the layers in, get the merge\n * out — deriving a declaration FROM an entity stays at the call site.\n */\nexport function mergeLimitDeclarations(\n  ...layers: Array<LimitDeclaration[] | undefined>\n): LimitDeclaration[] {\n  const byKey = new Map<string, LimitDeclaration>()\n  for (const layer of layers) {\n    for (const decl of layer ?? []) byKey.set(decl.key, decl)\n  }\n  return Array.from(byKey.values())\n}\n"]}