@exposify/supabase 0.1.0

package/package.json

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+{
+  "name": "@exposify/supabase",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "./dist/index.cjs",
+  "module": "./dist/index.js",
+  "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+  "bin": {
+    "agentify-supabase": "./dist/cli.js"
+  },
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/index.js",
+      "require": "./dist/index.cjs"
+    }
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "dist",
+    "sql"
+  ],
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsup src/index.ts --format esm,cjs --dts --clean && tsup bin/cli.ts --format esm --outDir dist --shims --no-clean",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
+    "prepack": "yarn build"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@exposify/core": "0.0.0",
+    "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.12.0",
+    "zod": "^3.24.0"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+    "tsup": "^8.3.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.6.0",
+    "vitest": "^3.0.0"
+  },
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public"
+  }
+}

package/sql/agentify_meta.sql

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+-- agentify-supabase: schema introspection function.
+--
+-- Exposes, per PostgREST's RPC convention (POST /rpc/agentify_meta), one row
+-- per column of every ordinary table in the `public` schema: whether Row
+-- Level Security is enabled on its table, and the table/column comments an
+-- owner wrote via `COMMENT ON TABLE` / `COMMENT ON COLUMN`.
+--
+-- This is the runtime source of truth for the DB exposure policy (RLS-gated,
+-- reads auto) and for tool/param descriptions -- see the design spec's "DB
+-- tool surface" section. It is SECURITY DEFINER because reading
+-- `pg_catalog`'s RLS flag and comments for tables the calling role can't
+-- necessarily SELECT from would otherwise be blocked; the function only ever
+-- returns catalog metadata, never row data, so this does not leak anything
+-- RLS would otherwise protect.
+create or replace function public.agentify_meta()
+returns table (
+  table_name text,
+  rls_enabled boolean,
+  table_comment text,
+  column_name text,
+  column_comment text
+)
+language sql
+security definer
+set search_path = public, pg_catalog
+as $$
+  select
+    c.relname as table_name,
+    c.relrowsecurity as rls_enabled,
+    obj_description(c.oid, 'pg_class') as table_comment,
+    a.attname as column_name,
+    col_description(c.oid, a.attnum) as column_comment
+  from pg_catalog.pg_class c
+  join pg_catalog.pg_namespace n on n.oid = c.relnamespace
+  join pg_catalog.pg_attribute a on a.attrelid = c.oid
+  where n.nspname = 'public'
+    and c.relkind = 'r'          -- ordinary tables only (no views, no partitions' children complexity)
+    and a.attnum > 0             -- skip system columns
+    and not a.attisdropped
+  order by c.relname, a.attnum;
+$$;
+
+-- PostgREST's `anon`/`authenticated` roles must be able to call this RPC;
+-- the SECURITY DEFINER body above is what makes that safe (catalog metadata
+-- only, never row data).
+grant execute on function public.agentify_meta() to anon, authenticated;