@expo/code-review-cli 0.5.2 → 0.7.0

package/build/core/auth.js

@@ -8,6 +8,21 @@ const PROVIDER_KEY_ENV = {
     google: "GOOGLE_GENERATIVE_AI_API_KEY",
     openrouter: "OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
 };
+/**
+ * Provider-owned credential env vars BEYOND the x-api-key ones above: Anthropic's
+ * OAuth/subscription bearer envs. CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN holds the long-lived (1-year)
+ * Claude Max/Team subscription token that `ecr setup-auth`/`claude setup-token` export,
+ * and ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN is Anthropic's documented bearer var. They belong to
+ * anthropic, so the cross-provider guard below refuses a non-anthropic entry that names
+ * one — without this, `{provider:"openai", tokenEnv:"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"}` passes
+ * (neither a FORBIDDEN secret nor a PROVIDER_KEY_ENV value) and prepareAuth forwards the
+ * Anthropic subscription token to a foreign provider as its bearer. They are NOT in
+ * FORBIDDEN_TOKEN_ENVS because an anthropic entry may legitimately name them.
+ */
+const ANTHROPIC_TOKEN_ENVS = {
+    CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN: "anthropic",
+    ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: "anthropic",
+};
 /**
  * Env vars that must NEVER be forwarded to a model provider. `auth.tokenEnv` names
  * the env var whose value becomes the provider credential — but that config is
@@ -159,17 +174,58 @@ export function checkAuthEntry(entry, env = process.env) {
     // point its provider/upstream somewhere else, sending one provider's key to a
     // different provider.
     if (tokenEnv) {
-        const keyOwner = Object.entries(PROVIDER_KEY_ENV).find(([, env]) => env === tokenEnv)?.[0];
+        const keyOwner = Object.entries(PROVIDER_KEY_ENV).find(([, env]) => env === tokenEnv)?.[0] ??
+            ANTHROPIC_TOKEN_ENVS[tokenEnv];
         if (keyOwner && keyOwner !== provider && keyOwner !== upstream) {
             return {
                 ok: false,
                 detail: `auth for ${provider} names tokenEnv "${tokenEnv}", which is ${keyOwner}'s ` +
-                    `well-known key env — refusing to send one provider's credential to another. ` +
+                    `well-known credential env — refusing to send one provider's credential to another. ` +
                     `Use a credential minted for ${provider}${upstream ? ` (upstream ${upstream})` : ""}, ` +
                     `or fix the provider/upstream mapping.`,
             };
         }
     }
+    // anthropic is ALWAYS served by the Claude Code CLI (engine inferred from the
+    // `anthropic/…` model, not from `mode`), so `mode` is irrelevant here. The
+    // credential is the machine's `claude` login, an ambient CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN,
+    // or a named tokenEnv. The CLI validates the token, so the only token-shape check
+    // here is a coarse exfil guard on a NAMED tokenEnv's value (below); the
+    // FORBIDDEN/cross-provider guards above already block the well-known secrets.
+    if (provider === "anthropic") {
+        // A named-but-unset tokenEnv is NOT fatal: startClaudeCode falls back to the
+        // machine's `claude` login (the common local case — the config names the CI
+        // secret). startClaudeCode still fails fast when neither credential exists.
+        if (tokenEnv && !env[tokenEnv]) {
+            return {
+                ok: true,
+                detail: `anthropic via the Claude Code CLI; falling back to the local \`claude\` login`,
+                warning: `token env "${tokenEnv}" is not set — using the machine's \`claude\` login ` +
+                    `(set it for CI/headless runs; mint with \`claude setup-token\`).`,
+            };
+        }
+        // tokenEnv is set AND present: its value is forwarded to api.anthropic.com as the
+        // bearer. The destination is ALWAYS Anthropic, so a value that is not an Anthropic
+        // credential ("sk-ant-…" covers both the "sk-ant-oat" OAuth token and "sk-ant-api"
+        // keys) cannot authenticate there but CAN be a foreign CI secret the config named
+        // — refuse it. This meets the "cannot be valid" bar the shape heuristics use, and
+        // fires at both prepareAuth and startClaudeCode's forwarding-site recheck.
+        if (tokenEnv && env[tokenEnv] && !env[tokenEnv].startsWith("sk-ant-")) {
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                detail: `token env "${tokenEnv}" does not hold an Anthropic credential (expected "sk-ant-…", ` +
+                    `the shape \`claude setup-token\` prints, or an Anthropic API key). anthropic is served ` +
+                    `by the Claude Code CLI, which authenticates to Anthropic, so a value of another shape ` +
+                    `cannot work there and would leak that secret to Anthropic — point auth.tokenEnv at a ` +
+                    `token minted for Anthropic.`,
+            };
+        }
+        return {
+            ok: true,
+            detail: `anthropic via the Claude Code CLI; ` +
+                (tokenEnv ? `token env ${tokenEnv} is set` : "using the local `claude` login"),
+        };
+    }
     if (mode === "oauth") {
         if (!tokenEnv) {
             return {
@@ -233,13 +289,49 @@ export function checkAuthEntry(entry, env = process.env) {
     };
 }
 /**
- * Decide whether EVERY configured provider credential is usable, WITHOUT
- * mutating the environment. Shared by `prepareAuth` (fail fast before spinning up
- * the server and every pass) and `doctor` (report), so the two never drift.
+ * The set of providers this config actually routes a model to: the `provider/`
+ * prefix of every agent model plus the coordinator's. Returns null when no model
+ * information is available (e.g. a bare config in a unit test) — callers read that
+ * as "can't scope, consider every entry". Every real config loaded by
+ * loadReviewConfig has agents, so scoping always applies at runtime.
+ *
+ * The fixed cross-cutting/verifier roles reuse an agent's model, so their provider
+ * is already covered by the agent set — mirrors engineForModel's `provider/` split.
+ */
+function providersInUse(config) {
+    const models = [];
+    for (const agent of config.agents ?? []) {
+        if (agent.model) {
+            models.push(agent.model);
+        }
+    }
+    if (config.coordinator?.model) {
+        models.push(config.coordinator.model);
+    }
+    if (models.length === 0) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const providers = new Set();
+    for (const model of models) {
+        const slash = model.indexOf("/");
+        providers.add(slash > 0 ? model.slice(0, slash) : model);
+    }
+    return providers;
+}
+/**
+ * Decide whether EVERY configured provider credential a model actually uses is
+ * usable, WITHOUT mutating the environment. Shared by `prepareAuth` (fail fast
+ * before spinning up the server and every pass) and `doctor` (report), so the two
+ * never drift.
  *
- * All entries must pass — a mixed setup with one broken credential would fail
- * exactly the passes routed to it, which is the silent-degradation this check
- * exists to prevent. `REVIEWER_MODEL` bypasses provider auth entirely.
+ * Scoped to providers in use: an `auth` entry for a provider no agent routes to is
+ * dead config (the shipped default is `api-key`/openai, so a config that switches
+ * every model to `anthropic/…` but leaves — or omits — the `auth` block would
+ * otherwise be spuriously blocked demanding OPENAI_API_KEY, defeating the
+ * `claude`-login fallback). Only used entries gate the run; all of them must pass —
+ * a mixed setup with one broken credential would fail exactly the passes routed to
+ * it, which is the silent-degradation this check exists to prevent. `REVIEWER_MODEL`
+ * bypasses provider auth entirely.
  */
 export function checkProviderAuth(config, env = process.env) {
     if (env.REVIEWER_MODEL) {
@@ -248,9 +340,13 @@ export function checkProviderAuth(config, env = process.env) {
             detail: `REVIEWER_MODEL override (${env.REVIEWER_MODEL}); using OpenCode's own login for that model`,
         };
     }
+    const inUse = providersInUse(config);
     const details = [];
     const warnings = [];
     for (const entry of config.auth) {
+        if (inUse && !inUse.has(entry.provider)) {
+            continue;
+        }
         const readiness = checkAuthEntry(entry, env);
         if (!readiness.ok) {
             return readiness;
@@ -262,7 +358,10 @@ export function checkProviderAuth(config, env = process.env) {
     }
     return {
         ok: true,
-        detail: details.join("; "),
+        // No used entry (e.g. every model is anthropic and the only `auth` block is the
+        // shipped openai default): the run relies on the Claude Code CLI's own login.
+        detail: details.join("; ") ||
+            "no provider credential needed for the models in use (relying on the engine's own login)",
         ...(warnings.length > 0 ? { warning: warnings.join("; ") } : {}),
     };
 }
@@ -338,10 +437,24 @@ export async function prepareAuth(config) {
     if (!readiness.ok) {
         throw new Error(readiness.detail);
     }
+    // Same scoping as checkProviderAuth: only forward credentials for providers a
+    // model actually routes to. A dead entry for an unused provider must not have its
+    // tokenEnv copied into a key env — checkProviderAuth skipped its guard, so
+    // forwarding it here would reintroduce the exact secret-forwarding it prevents.
+    const inUse = providersInUse(config);
     const authJson = {};
     for (const entry of config.auth) {
         const { mode, provider, tokenEnv, upstream } = entry;
+        if (inUse && !inUse.has(provider)) {
+            continue;
+        }
         const value = tokenEnv ? process.env[tokenEnv] : undefined;
+        // anthropic is claude-engine-only: it never writes an OpenCode auth.json /
+        // XDG_DATA_HOME nor injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY here — its credential is passed
+        // per-invocation via the child env built in startClaudeCode.
+        if (provider === "anthropic") {
+            continue;
+        }
         if (mode === "api-key") {
             // Upstream aliases read {env:tokenEnv} from the synthesized provider block.
             if (!upstream && tokenEnv && value) {