@everfur/cli 0.9.1 → 0.9.2

package/dist/{chunk-FWEDPKKK.js → chunk-5GXXNW3F.js}

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /*! @everfur/cli. Copyright (c) 2026 Strand Health Inc. dba Everfur. All rights reserved. Use is subject to the Everfur SDK License: https://docs.everfur.com/license */
-import { hostnameOf, listen, close, writeJson, serveStatelessMcp } from './chunk-JURZYOMH.js';
-import { createHostedTokenVerifier, tokenBucketOf, isAccessTokenShaped, buildServer, MCP_SCOPE, tenantContextOf, sendTestUserRef, hostedVerifyUserRef, REVOKED_AUTHORIZATION_REMEDY, SYNTHETIC_USER_REF_PREFIX } from './chunk-FLW4ZANY.js';
-import { BASE_URL_ENV_VAR, resolveEndpoint, fetchTransport, systemClock, createApiClient, withPrefix, ephemeralCredential, validateContractText, isJsonObject, describeFailure } from './chunk-VUXILRME.js';
+import { hostnameOf, listen, close, writeJson, serveStatelessMcp } from './chunk-LH4AWYCB.js';
+import { createHostedTokenVerifier, tokenBucketOf, isAccessTokenShaped, buildServer, MCP_SCOPE, tenantContextOf, sendTestUserRef, hostedVerifyUserRef, REVOKED_AUTHORIZATION_REMEDY, SYNTHETIC_USER_REF_PREFIX } from './chunk-G7CJK7Z5.js';
+import { BASE_URL_ENV_VAR, resolveEndpoint, fetchTransport, systemClock, createApiClient, withPrefix, ephemeralCredential, validateContractText, isJsonObject, describeFailure } from './chunk-VSZ4RPKA.js';
 import { createServer } from 'http';
 import { InvalidTokenError, TooManyRequestsError, TemporarilyUnavailableError } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/auth/errors.js';
 import { isIP } from 'net';

package/dist/{chunk-FLW4ZANY.js → chunk-G7CJK7Z5.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /*! @everfur/cli. Copyright (c) 2026 Strand Health Inc. dba Everfur. All rights reserved. Use is subject to the Everfur SDK License: https://docs.everfur.com/license */
-import { ENVIRONMENTS, ENVELOPE_SHAPE, SURFACES, VERIFY_IDENTITY_MODES, digestOfProjection, ephemeralCredential, refusal, API_BASE_URL_BY_ENVIRONMENT, fetchContract, NO_CONTRACT_CACHE, systemClock, fetchTransport, describeFailure, loadDecisionSpaceFromContract, uuidFromKey, resolveEndpoint, createApiClient, createContractProvider, nodeContractCache, CLI_VERSION, withPrefix, isJsonObject, REFUSAL_POLICY, error_explanation_v1_schema_default, verification_v1_schema_default, diagnosis_v1_schema_default, plan_v1_schema_default, NEXT_ACTIONS, IDENTITY_QUESTION, IDENTITY_TREE, CAPABILITY_QUESTION, CAPABILITIES_TREE, WEB_EMBEDDING_QUESTION, PLATFORM_TREE, loadDecisionSpace, nodeFileSystem, expandCapabilities, detectThemeFromText, planIntegration, parseOrigin, parseLoaderUrl, isEverfurLoaderHost, EVERFUR_LOADER_HOSTS, resolveCredential, PARTNER_KEY, runVerification, themePropFromSource, normalizeSurfaces, failedResult, buildSupportBundle, chooseWidgetAuth, DIAGNOSTICS_PATH, diagnoseFailure, parseDiagnostics, buildDiagnosisDocument, toolCodeExplanation, resolveOffline, resolveWithoutRegistry, knownCodes, loadErrorRegistryFromContract, loadErrorRegistry, resolveAfterRegistryMiss, TOOL_CODES, registryAlsoIn, buildExplanationDocument, nextActionFor, CLAIMS_INBOUND_SECRET, WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET, detectProject, BASE_URL_ENV_VAR, checkTenantMode, isWorkspaceRootEvidence, plannableCapabilities, blockedCapabilities, offlineDocument, toolCodeMeaning, SESSION_TOKEN, PLAN_DOCUMENT_KIND, PLAN_SCHEMA_VERSION, secretKeyHostProblem, ALLOW_CUSTOM_API_HOST_ENV_VAR, PARTNER_SECRET_KEY, SESSION_MINT_TREE, BACKEND_LANGUAGE_QUESTION, ALL_CAPABILITIES, WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_PATH, WEBHOOK_RECEIVER_PATH, TransportError, webhookRouteFile, importPath, hmacSha256, hmacSha256Hex, API_BASE_URL_PLACEHOLDER } from './chunk-VUXILRME.js';
+import { ENVIRONMENTS, ENVELOPE_SHAPE, SURFACES, VERIFY_IDENTITY_MODES, digestOfProjection, ephemeralCredential, refusal, API_BASE_URL_BY_ENVIRONMENT, fetchContract, NO_CONTRACT_CACHE, systemClock, fetchTransport, describeFailure, loadDecisionSpaceFromContract, uuidFromKey, resolveEndpoint, createApiClient, createContractProvider, nodeContractCache, CLI_VERSION, withPrefix, isJsonObject, REFUSAL_POLICY, error_explanation_v1_schema_default, verification_v1_schema_default, diagnosis_v1_schema_default, plan_v1_schema_default, NEXT_ACTIONS, IDENTITY_QUESTION, IDENTITY_TREE, CAPABILITY_QUESTION, CAPABILITIES_TREE, WEB_EMBEDDING_QUESTION, PLATFORM_TREE, loadDecisionSpace, nodeFileSystem, expandCapabilities, detectThemeFromText, planIntegration, parseOrigin, parseLoaderUrl, isEverfurLoaderHost, EVERFUR_LOADER_HOSTS, resolveCredential, PARTNER_KEY, runVerification, themePropFromSource, normalizeSurfaces, failedResult, buildSupportBundle, chooseWidgetAuth, DIAGNOSTICS_PATH, diagnoseFailure, parseDiagnostics, buildDiagnosisDocument, toolCodeExplanation, resolveOffline, resolveWithoutRegistry, knownCodes, loadErrorRegistryFromContract, loadErrorRegistry, resolveAfterRegistryMiss, TOOL_CODES, registryAlsoIn, buildExplanationDocument, nextActionFor, CLAIMS_INBOUND_SECRET, WEBHOOK_SIGNING_SECRET, detectProject, BASE_URL_ENV_VAR, checkTenantMode, isWorkspaceRootEvidence, plannableCapabilities, blockedCapabilities, offlineDocument, toolCodeMeaning, SESSION_TOKEN, PLAN_DOCUMENT_KIND, PLAN_SCHEMA_VERSION, errorCodeOf, secretKeyHostProblem, ALLOW_CUSTOM_API_HOST_ENV_VAR, PARTNER_SECRET_KEY, SESSION_MINT_TREE, BACKEND_LANGUAGE_QUESTION, ALL_CAPABILITIES, WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_PATH, WEBHOOK_RECEIVER_PATH, TransportError, webhookRouteFile, importPath, hmacSha256, hmacSha256Hex, API_BASE_URL_PLACEHOLDER } from './chunk-VSZ4RPKA.js';
 import { z } from 'zod';
 import { McpServer, ResourceTemplate } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
 import { StdioServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js';
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ var PLAN_INPUT_SHAPE = {
     "For a remote MCP: the text of the project's tailwind.config.{js,ts}, the CSS that declares its theme (a Tailwind v4 @theme block or :root custom properties), or a React Native theme or colours file, so the plan can match the generated surface to the project's own theme. Read statically and never executed. With project_root the project is read from disk instead; this argument, when given, wins. The plan refuses to guess a theme it cannot read and names the missing facts in its match-theme step."
   ),
   capabilities: z.array(CAPABILITY).optional().describe(
-    'Which Everfur capabilities this integration uses, as the contract names them. The ids the contract can plan today are "chat", "entitlements", "events", "notifications", "photo", "records", "records-clinic" and "televet"; "animations", "health-plan", "records-push", "records-transfer", "server-pets", "texting" and "video" are blocked today and a plan refuses them with the reason. Pass ["all"] for every plannable capability. The loaded contract is the authority: an UNKNOWN_OPTION refusal lists its exact ids. The plan holds no credential, so everfur_verify_integration (not this tool) is the fail-closed check of what the tenant actually has. The native setup an in-app vet call needs (the Daily modules, an Expo config plugin, a clean prebuild, camera and microphone declarations, and a warning naming the missing-native-module error Expo Go produces) is planned only when the generated React Native file mounts that call; a plan whose file mounts only the vet visit button installs none of it. Omit if unknown; the tool will refuse and list the ids.'
+    'Which Everfur capabilities this integration uses, as the contract names them. The ids the contract can plan today are "chat", "entitlements", "events", "notifications", "photo", "records", "records-clinic" and "televet"; "animations", "claims", "health-plan", "records-push", "records-transfer", "server-pets", "texting" and "video" are blocked today and a plan refuses them with the reason. Pass ["all"] for every plannable capability. The loaded contract is the authority: an UNKNOWN_OPTION refusal lists its exact ids. The plan holds no credential, so everfur_verify_integration (not this tool) is the fail-closed check of what the tenant actually has. The native setup an in-app vet call needs (the Daily modules, an Expo config plugin, a clean prebuild, camera and microphone declarations, and a warning naming the missing-native-module error Expo Go produces) is planned only when the generated React Native file mounts that call; a plan whose file mounts only the vet visit button installs none of it. Omit if unknown; the tool will refuse and list the ids.'
   ),
   identity_mode: IDENTITY_MODE.optional().describe('anonymous = no backend, scoped to the device. partner-user-ref = your backend mints a session against your own user id. shopify-app-proxy = a Shopify storefront, where Shopify vouches for the signed-in customer and no partner backend mints. "personalized" is accepted as an alias for partner-user-ref.'),
   session_mint_language: MINT_LANGUAGE.optional().describe("Backend language that will mint sessions. Only meaningful when identity_mode is partner-user-ref."),
@@ -800,10 +800,11 @@ async function planIntegrationTool(args, context, ports = {}) {
     );
   }
   if (plan.status === "blocked") {
+    const claims = (args.capabilities ?? []).some((value) => /claim/i.test(value));
     return refusal(
       "CAPABILITIES_BLOCKED",
-      "Everything this integration asked for is blocked by the contract, so nothing can be built today. Each reason and who owns it are below; no plan works around a blocked surface.",
-      { blocked: plan.blocked, warnings: plan.warnings, plan, next_call: null }
+      "Everything this integration asked for is blocked by the contract, so nothing can be built today. Each reason and who owns it are below; no plan works around a blocked surface." + (claims ? " A claims integration is planned by everfur_plan_claims_integration, which needs no project." : ""),
+      { blocked: plan.blocked, warnings: plan.warnings, plan, next_call: null, ...claims ? { see_also: "everfur_plan_claims_integration" } : {} }
     );
   }
   const ready = mode.warning === null ? plan : { ...plan, warnings: [...plan.warnings, mode.warning] };
@@ -1187,9 +1188,9 @@ var EXPLAIN_ERROR_OUTPUT_SHAPE = {
 };
 var INBOUND_DOOR_PREFIX = "/partners/claims/inbound/";
 var INBOUND_SANDBOX_ROUTE = "/partners/sandbox/claims-inbound";
-var RESERVED_CLAIM_IDS = Object.freeze(["inbound"]);
+var RESERVED_CLAIM_IDS = Object.freeze(["inbound", "batches", "profiles", "pets", "outcomes"]);
 function isReservedClaimId(value) {
-  return RESERVED_CLAIM_IDS.includes(value);
+  return RESERVED_CLAIM_IDS.includes(value.toLowerCase());
 }
 var INBOUND_TOKEN_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
 var INBOUND_SECRET_ENV = "EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_SECRET";
@@ -1385,6 +1386,38 @@ var PII_KEY_PATTERNS = Object.freeze([
 function foldKey(key) {
   return key.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, "");
 }
+var OWNER_CONTEXT_WORDS = Object.freeze([
+  "owner",
+  "holder",
+  "policyholder",
+  "customer",
+  "member",
+  "insured",
+  "client",
+  "parent",
+  "guardian",
+  "contact",
+  "billing",
+  "payer",
+  "payee",
+  "account"
+]);
+var OWNER_SUFFIXES = Object.freeze(["s", "info", "details", "data", "profile"]);
+function isOwnerContextKey(key) {
+  const folded = foldKey(key);
+  if (OWNER_CONTEXT_WORDS.includes(folded)) return true;
+  return OWNER_SUFFIXES.some((suffix) => folded.endsWith(suffix) && OWNER_CONTEXT_WORDS.includes(folded.slice(0, -suffix.length)));
+}
+function isRefKey(key) {
+  const lowered = key.toLowerCase();
+  if (lowered === "id" || lowered === "ref" || /^.+[_.-](?:id|ref)$/.test(lowered)) return true;
+  return /^.*[a-z0-9](?:Id|ID|Ref|REF)$/.test(key);
+}
+function ownerPathProblem(keys) {
+  if (!keys.some(isOwnerContextKey)) return null;
+  const last = keys[keys.length - 1];
+  return last !== void 0 && isRefKey(last) ? null : "a source path under an owner key (owner, holder, customer, contact, ...) may only read an id or ref key";
+}
 function isPiiKey(key) {
   const folded = foldKey(key);
   return folded.length > 0 && PII_KEY_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(folded));
@@ -1965,7 +1998,7 @@ var INBOUND_CODES = Object.freeze([
     409,
     "stop",
     "The sandbox tenant already has its inbound endpoint, and it has one at most. Its URL and secret were shown once, when it was created. Nothing was created.",
-    `Set ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} from where it was saved. For a new secret call ${SETUP} with rotate_secret: true, for a new URL with rotate_token: true. No route deletes a sandbox endpoint.`
+    `Set ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} from where it was saved. For a new secret call ${SETUP} with rotate_secret: true, for a new URL with rotate_token: true. To start over on a sandbox tenant, delete_endpoint: true and create again.`
   ),
   inbound(
     "events_invalid",
@@ -4574,7 +4607,7 @@ function rotateDetail() {
   return `Secret rotation with no downtime: after a rotation the previous secret keeps verifying for previous_valid_seconds (default ${DEFAULT_PREVIOUS_VALID_SECONDS}, at most ${MAX_PREVIOUS_VALID_SECONDS}), so both are accepted while the claims system switches. Sandbox: ${SETUP2} with rotate_secret: true and secret_env_file ${LOCAL_ONLY} writes the new ${INBOUND_SECRET_ENV} to that file (never returned) and answers previous_secret_expires_at; put the new secret in the claims system's secrets store and switch the webhook to it before that time, then confirm with ${SAMPLES2}. previous_valid_seconds 0 cuts the old secret at once: only for a leak. A planned rotation while the previous secret of an earlier one is still valid answers 409 rotation_in_progress: wait for previous_secret_expires_at, or rotate with 0. URL token rotation: if the inbound URL leaks (a log line, a ticket, the chat), rotate its token with ${SETUP2} with rotate_token: true and secret_env_file ${LOCAL_ONLY}; it writes the new ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} to that file (never returned). The old URL answers 404 at once, with no overlap, so put the new URL in the claims system right away; the secret and the signing are unchanged. Live: ask Everfur for a secret rotation with the window wanted, or a token rotation; the new secret or URL is handed over once through a secure channel, and the same switch-over applies.`;
 }
 function goLiveDetail() {
-  return `Live setup is done by Everfur; the MCP never touches the live account. (1) Ask Everfur for the live endpoint, with the same signing config as the sandbox one, which must be hmac with signed_payload timestamp_body (a live endpoint refuses any other signing: 422 signing_mode_sandbox_only), and for the reviewed sandbox mapping (its active version) to be made active on the live account. (2) Everfur hands over the live URL and shared secret once, through a secure channel: put them in the claims system's secrets store for its production environment, never in an MCP configuration, an env file in a repository or the chat. (3) Everfur switches the inbound webhook on for the live account; until then the live URL answers a plain 404. (4) Point the production webhook at the live URL with the same event types, signing and retry settings as the sandbox. (5) Watch the first real events: the claims system's delivery log shows 202 (or 200 duplicate) for each; any other status is explained by ${EXPLAIN}. A 202 is received, not yet applied, and the live account has no event log route of its own, so ask Everfur to read the live event log for the first events, and check the claims appear in the claims portal. (6) Tell Everfur before changing the event format, so the mapping changes with it.`;
+  return `Live setup is done by Everfur; the MCP never touches the live account. (1) Ask Everfur for the live endpoint, with the same signing config as the sandbox one, which must be hmac with signed_payload timestamp_body (a live endpoint refuses any other signing: 422 signing_mode_sandbox_only), and for the reviewed sandbox mapping (its active version) to be made active on the live account. (2) Everfur hands over the live URL and shared secret once, through a secure channel: put them in the claims system's secrets store for its production environment, never in an MCP configuration, an env file in a repository or the chat. (3) Everfur switches the inbound webhook on for the live account; until then the live URL answers a plain 404. (4) Point the production webhook at the live URL with the same event types, signing and retry settings as the sandbox. (5) Watch the first real events: the claims system's delivery log shows 202 (or 200 duplicate) for each; any other status is explained by ${EXPLAIN}. A 202 is received, not yet applied: the claims system's own servers read the live event log with the live secret key (GET /api/v1/partners/claims/inbound/events, the same view read_event_log shows for the sandbox; never through the MCP), so watch the first events reach applied there and the claims appear in the claims portal. (6) Tell Everfur before changing the event format, so the mapping changes with it.`;
 }
 function portalDetail() {
   return `Every claim the events file lands in the Everfur claims portal for the insurer's adjusters; ask Everfur for the adjusters' portal access. Evidence carries its sources (document, page and quoted text), with invoice lines, coverage gaps and the pre-existing check against past claims from profile events. Opening a claim moves it to in_review; asking for more records moves it to records_requested, answered by a documents_added event with packet_complete true. The adjuster records the decision (${list(DECISIONS)}), the amount paid in cents and a reason; Everfur never decides a claim. In the sandbox every claim runs straight to evidence_ready. Results can also be sent back to the insurer's own systems by the optional outbound webhooks (the optional section).`;
@@ -5021,7 +5054,7 @@ function checkMappingDocument(document) {
     extraKeys(kind, ["path", "values"], "kind", at);
     const path = kind["path"];
     if (typeof path !== "string") at("kind.path", "kind.path is required");
-    else pathProblem(path, "forbidden", "kind.path", at);
+    else sourcePathProblem(path, "forbidden", [], "kind.path", at);
     const values = kind["values"];
     if (!isObject(values) || Object.keys(values).length === 0 || Object.keys(values).length > MAX_KIND_VALUES) {
       at("kind.values", `kind.values maps 1 to ${MAX_KIND_VALUES} native values to a kind`);
@@ -5086,6 +5119,8 @@ function checkMappingDocument(document) {
       extraKeys(listed, ["path", "fields"], `kinds.${name}.${list2}`, at);
       if (typeof listed["path"] !== "string") at(`kinds.${name}.${list2}.path`, "a list's path is required");
       else pathProblem(listed["path"], "required", `kinds.${name}.${list2}.path`, at);
+      const listSteps = typeof listed["path"] === "string" ? parsePath(listed["path"], "required") : "not a path";
+      const listKeys = typeof listSteps === "string" ? null : keysOf(listSteps);
       const listFields = listed["fields"];
       if (!isObject(listFields) || Object.keys(listFields).length === 0 || Object.keys(listFields).length > MAX_LIST_FIELDS) {
         at(`kinds.${name}.${list2}.fields`, `a list maps 1 to ${MAX_LIST_FIELDS} targets`);
@@ -5093,7 +5128,7 @@ function checkMappingDocument(document) {
       }
       for (const [target, field] of Object.entries(listFields)) {
         if (!allowed.includes(target)) at(`kinds.${name}.${list2}.fields.${target}`, `${list2} has no target ${target.slice(0, 64)}; targets: ${allowed.join(", ")}`);
-        checkField(field, `kinds.${name}.${list2}.fields.${target}`, at);
+        checkField(field, `kinds.${name}.${list2}.fields.${target}`, at, listKeys);
       }
     }
   }
@@ -5111,7 +5146,19 @@ function pathProblem(text, star, where, at) {
   const parsed = parsePath(text, star);
   if (typeof parsed === "string") at(where, parsed);
 }
-function checkField(field, where, at) {
+function keysOf(steps) {
+  return steps.flatMap((step3) => step3.kind === "key" ? [step3.key] : []);
+}
+function sourcePathProblem(text, star, prefix, where, at) {
+  const parsed = parsePath(text, star);
+  if (typeof parsed === "string") {
+    at(where, parsed);
+    return;
+  }
+  const problem = ownerPathProblem([...prefix, ...keysOf(parsed)]);
+  if (problem !== null) at(where, problem);
+}
+function checkField(field, where, at, prefix = []) {
   if (!isObject(field)) {
     at(where, "a field is an object: {path} or {paths}, with optional transforms");
     return;
@@ -5132,7 +5179,8 @@ function checkField(field, where, at) {
   if (path === void 0 && paths === void 0 && !constant) at(where, "a field needs a path, paths or a leading constant transform");
   if (path !== void 0) {
     if (typeof path !== "string") at(`${where}.path`, "a path is a string");
-    else pathProblem(path, "forbidden", `${where}.path`, at);
+    else if (prefix === null) pathProblem(path, "forbidden", `${where}.path`, at);
+    else sourcePathProblem(path, "forbidden", prefix, `${where}.path`, at);
   }
   if (paths !== void 0) {
     if (!Array.isArray(paths) || paths.length === 0 || paths.length > MAX_FIELD_PATHS) {
@@ -5140,7 +5188,8 @@ function checkField(field, where, at) {
     } else {
       paths.forEach((text, index) => {
         if (typeof text !== "string") at(`${where}.paths[${index}]`, "a path is a string");
-        else pathProblem(text, "forbidden", `${where}.paths[${index}]`, at);
+        else if (prefix === null) pathProblem(text, "forbidden", `${where}.paths[${index}]`, at);
+        else sourcePathProblem(text, "forbidden", prefix, `${where}.paths[${index}]`, at);
       });
     }
   }
@@ -5327,7 +5376,7 @@ var CLAIM_RULES = Object.freeze([
   { target: "amount_claimed_cents", scope: "claim", names: ["amountclaimed", "claimedamount", "claimamount", "requestedamount", "amountrequested", "claimed", "requested"], shape: "money", unscoped: true },
   { target: "billed_cents", scope: "claim", names: ["billedamount", "billed", "total", "totalamount", "invoicetotal", "invoiceamount", "amount", "totalbilled", "cost", "charges"], shape: "money", unscoped: true },
   { target: "clinic_name", scope: "clinic", names: ["name", "clinicname", "clinic", "vetname", "hospitalname", "practicename", "providername", "vet", "hospital", "practice", "provider"], shape: "text" },
-  { target: "packet_complete", scope: "claim", names: ["packetcomplete", "complete", "iscomplete", "final", "isfinal", "finalized", "finalised", "ready", "documentscomplete", "docscomplete"], shape: "bool", unscoped: true },
+  { target: "packet_complete", scope: "claim", names: ["packetcomplete", "complete", "iscomplete", "final", "isfinal", "finalized", "finalised", "ready", "documentscomplete", "docscomplete", "alldocumentsreceived", "alldocsreceived", "documentsreceived", "docsreceived", "allreceived", "allfilesreceived", "filescomplete", "packetready", "readyforreview", "submissioncomplete"], shape: "bool", unscoped: true },
   { target: "pet.pet_ref", scope: "pet", names: ["petid", "petref", "petnumber", "animalid", "patientid", ...ID_NAMES], shape: "ref" },
   { target: "pet.name", scope: "pet", names: ["name", "petname", "animalname", "patientname", "callname"], shape: "text" },
   { target: "pet.species", scope: "pet", names: ["species", "speciescode", "kind", "type", "animaltype", "pettype", "animalkind"], shape: "species" },
@@ -5364,7 +5413,7 @@ function rulesFor(kind) {
   return Object.entries(PROFILE_FROM_CLAIM).map(([target, from]) => ({ ...byTarget.get(from), target }));
 }
 var DOCUMENT_RULES = Object.freeze([
-  { target: "base64", scope: null, names: ["base64", "content", "contents", "data", "body", "bytes", "file", "filedata", "blob", "payload", "encoded", "filecontent"], shape: "base64", unscoped: true },
+  { target: "base64", scope: null, names: ["base64", "contentbase64", "base64content", "filebase64", "base64data", "database64", "documentbase64", "base64file", "content", "contents", "data", "body", "bytes", "file", "filedata", "blob", "payload", "encoded", "filecontent"], shape: "base64", unscoped: true },
   { target: "url", scope: null, names: ["url", "link", "href", "uri", "downloadurl", "fileurl", "location", "signedurl", "presignedurl", "download"], shape: "url", unscoped: true },
   { target: "file_name", scope: null, names: ["filename", "name", "title", "documentname", "originalname", "originalfilename", "label"], shape: "file_name", unscoped: true },
   { target: "kind", scope: null, names: ["kind", "category", "type", "documenttype", "doctype", "documentkind", "doccategory", "class"], shape: "doc_kind", unscoped: true },
@@ -5385,6 +5434,8 @@ var SPECIES_SYNONYMS = Object.freeze({
   d: "dog",
   puppy: "dog",
   canin: "dog",
+  can: "dog",
+  cn: "dog",
   cat: "cat",
   cats: "cat",
   feline: "cat",
@@ -5466,7 +5517,7 @@ function shapeFits(shape, leaf) {
     case "content_type":
       return only("ref", "text", "int", "bool");
     case "base64":
-      return only("base64");
+      return only("base64") || foldKey(leaf.keys[leaf.keys.length - 1] ?? "").includes("base64") && only("base64", "ref", "text") && present(leaf.values).every((value) => BASE64.test(String(value).replace(/\s+/g, "")));
     case "url":
       return only("url");
   }
@@ -5731,11 +5782,12 @@ function transformsFor(shape, leaf, order, target, orderDecided = false) {
   }
   return { transforms, why, confidence, reviewNote, untrustedCodes };
 }
-function pick(rule, leaves, used, parentKeys, documentElement = false) {
+function pick(rule, leaves, used, parentKeys, documentElement = false, ownerRule = true) {
   let best = null;
   let bestScore = 0;
   for (const leaf of leaves) {
     if (used.has(leaf.path)) continue;
+    if (ownerRule && ownerPathProblem([...parentKeys, ...leaf.keys]) !== null) continue;
     if (rule.target !== "member_ref" && personalData(leaf, parentKeys, documentElement) !== null) continue;
     if (rule.target === "member_ref" && (isPiiKey(leaf.keys[leaf.keys.length - 1] ?? "") || leaf.shapes.has("email") || leaf.shapes.has("phone"))) continue;
     if (!shapeFits(rule.shape, leaf)) continue;
@@ -5942,8 +5994,26 @@ function proposeMapping(input) {
       const pinnedPath = pinned[rule.target];
       const leaf = pinnedPath !== void 0 ? flat.leaves.get(pinnedPath) ?? { path: pinnedPath, keys: pinnedPath.split("."), values: [], shapes: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["text"]) } : pick(rule, flat.leaves.values(), used, []);
       const required = REQUIRED_TARGETS[kind].includes(rule.target);
+      const refused = leaf === null && pinnedPath === void 0 ? pick(rule, flat.leaves.values(), used, [], false, false) : null;
+      if (refused !== null) {
+        const where = echoCode(refused.path, "[a path not shown]");
+        addGap({
+          kind,
+          target: rule.target,
+          required,
+          code: "unfilled",
+          why: `${rule.target} reads like ${where}, but that key sits under an owner object (owner, holder, member, customer, ...) and is not named like an id or ref. The door's scrub drops it before mapping, and the API refuses a mapping that reads it (mapping_invalid).`,
+          fix: "Have the claims system also send the value under a key named like an id or ref inside that object (memberId, member_id, memberRef, id), or outside the owner object; then pin it with hints.field_paths."
+        });
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (pinnedPath !== void 0 && ownerPathProblem(pinnedPath.split(".").map((part) => part.replace(/\[.*$/, ""))) !== null) {
+        addGap({ kind, target: rule.target, required, code: "unfilled", why: "the pinned path passes through an owner object and its last key is not named like an id or ref; the scrub drops it and the API refuses the mapping (mapping_invalid)", fix: "Pin a key named like an id or ref (memberId, member_id, id), or one outside the owner object." });
+        continue;
+      }
       if (leaf === null) {
         if (required) addGap({ kind, target: rule.target, required, code: "unfilled", why: `no field in the ${kind} samples reads like ${rule.target}`, fix: `Pass hints.field_paths.${kind}["${rule.target}"] with the path that holds it, or make the insurer system send it.` });
+        else if (rule.target === "packet_complete") addGap({ kind, target: rule.target, required: false, code: "needs_review", why: 'no field reads like "all documents are in". packet_complete is false when unmapped, and only an event with packet_complete true sends the claim to review, so with none mapped no claim ever leaves intake.', fix: `Map packet_complete to the claims system's own "documents complete" flag (hints.field_paths.${kind}["packet_complete"], a bool), or to a constant true when every ${kind} event carries the whole packet.` });
         continue;
       }
       if (pinnedPath !== void 0 && personalData(leaf) !== null && rule.target !== "member_ref") {
@@ -6430,7 +6500,7 @@ function inboundFailure(failure, action, notFound) {
   }
   return sandboxFailure(failure, action);
 }
-var CREATE_ONCE = `The sandbox key can create the sandbox inbound endpoint once, with ${SETUP3} (create_endpoint: true, signing, secret_env_file and confirm: true from a person): its inbound URL (with the token) and first secret are shown once, in that answer, and are written to secret_env_file as ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} and ${INBOUND_SECRET_ENV}. Live inbound endpoints are set up by Everfur.`;
+var CREATE_ONCE = `The sandbox key can create the sandbox inbound endpoint (one per tenant) with ${SETUP3} (create_endpoint: true, signing, secret_env_file and confirm: true from a person): its inbound URL (with the token) and first secret are shown once, in that answer, and are written to secret_env_file as ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} and ${INBOUND_SECRET_ENV}. Live inbound endpoints are set up by Everfur.`;
 var URL_SHOWN_ONCE = `The inbound URL was shown once, when the endpoint was created: set ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} from where it was saved (the env file the create wrote, or the claims system's config). No route shows it again: rotate_secret gives a new secret, and rotate_token a new URL (the old one stops at once).`;
 var ENDPOINT_404 = `The sandbox claims-inbound routes answered 404: the inbound webhook is not switched on for this deployment or this sandbox tenant, the tenant has no claims portal, or no inbound endpoint exists for it yet. The first two are settings Everfur holds. ${CREATE_ONCE}`;
 var CREATE_404 = "The create answered 404: the sandbox claims-inbound routes are not switched on for this deployment or this sandbox tenant, or the tenant has no claims portal. Both are settings Everfur holds. Nothing was created.";
@@ -6481,21 +6551,28 @@ function mappingSummary(view) {
 }
 function validationErrors(body) {
   if (typeof body !== "object" || body === null) return [];
-  const errors = body["errors"];
+  const record = body;
+  const detail = record["detail"];
+  const errors = !Array.isArray(record["errors"]) && typeof detail === "object" && detail !== null ? detail["errors"] : record["errors"];
   if (!Array.isArray(errors)) return [];
   return errors.slice(0, 20).flatMap((item) => {
     if (typeof item !== "object" || item === null) return [];
-    const record = item;
-    const loc = Array.isArray(record["loc"]) ? record["loc"].map(String).join(".") : String(record["loc"] ?? "");
-    const msg = typeof record["msg"] === "string" ? record["msg"] : "";
+    const record2 = item;
+    const loc = Array.isArray(record2["loc"]) ? record2["loc"].map(String).join(".") : String(record2["loc"] ?? "");
+    const msg = typeof record2["msg"] === "string" ? record2["msg"] : "";
     return [{ loc: loc.slice(0, 200), msg: msg.slice(0, 300) }];
   });
 }
 function bodyCode(body) {
-  if (typeof body !== "object" || body === null) return null;
-  const record = body;
-  const code = record["error"] ?? record["code"];
-  return typeof code === "string" ? code : null;
+  return errorCodeOf(body).code;
+}
+function unexpectedRefusal(answer, action, nothing) {
+  const code = bodyCode(answer.value);
+  return refusal(
+    "CLAIMS_SANDBOX_CALL_FAILED",
+    `The API answered ${answer.status} ${code === null ? "(no code)" : relayedReason(code)}, which this action does not expect. ${nothing}` + (code === null ? "" : " everfur_explain_claims_error explains the code."),
+    { action, status: answer.status, code: code === null ? null : relayedReason(code), request_id: answer.requestId }
+  );
 }
 var SAMPLE_EVENT = z.record(z.string(), z.unknown());
 function loadSamples(samples, files, scope) {
@@ -6580,7 +6657,16 @@ var PREVIEW_RESULT = z.object({
 });
 async function preview(sandbox, mapping, events, action) {
   const body = { ...mapping === void 0 ? {} : { mapping }, events };
-  const answer = await sandbox.client.request({ method: "POST", path: `${INBOUND_SANDBOX_ROUTE}/mapping/preview`, credentials: sandbox.credentials, body });
+  const answer = await sandbox.client.request({ method: "POST", path: `${INBOUND_SANDBOX_ROUTE}/mapping/preview`, credentials: sandbox.credentials, body, acceptStatuses: [422] });
+  if (answer.ok && answer.status === 422) {
+    const code = bodyCode(answer.value);
+    const problems = bodyInvalidErrors(answer.value);
+    return refusal(
+      code === "mapping_invalid" ? "CLAIMS_MAPPING_INVALID" : "CLAIMS_ARGUMENTS_INVALID",
+      `The preview answered 422 ${code === null ? "(no code)" : relayedReason(code)}: ${problems.length > 0 ? problems.join("; ") : "the API named no field"}. Nothing was stored.`,
+      { action, status: 422, code: code === null ? null : relayedReason(code), problems, request_id: answer.requestId }
+    );
+  }
   if (!answer.ok) {
     return inboundFailure(answer, action, mapping === void 0 ? `The preview answered 404: no mapping was passed and there is no draft to preview (an activated draft is no longer a draft). ${MAPPING_ROUTES_404}` : MAPPING_ROUTES_404);
   }
@@ -6657,7 +6743,9 @@ async function proposeClaimsMappingTool(args, context, ports = {}, options = {})
       } else {
         const results = await preview(sandbox, proposal.mapping, loaded.samples, "preview");
         if (!Array.isArray(results)) {
-          document["server_preview"] = { skipped: true, why: results.document["message"] ?? "the preview failed", code: results.document["error"]?.code ?? null };
+          const error = results.document["error"];
+          const problems = Array.isArray(error?.details?.problems) ? error.details.problems : results.document["problems"] ?? void 0;
+          document["server_preview"] = { skipped: true, why: results.document["message"] ?? "the preview failed", code: error?.code ?? null, ...problems === void 0 ? {} : { problems } };
         } else {
           const relayed = results.map((item, index) => relayPreview(item, index));
           document["server_preview"] = { passed: relayed.every((item) => item["gaps"].length === 0), results: relayed };
@@ -6732,6 +6820,7 @@ async function saveClaimsMappingTool(args, context, ports = {}) {
     });
     if (!answer2.ok) return inboundFailure(answer2, action, MAPPING_ROUTES_404);
     if (answer2.status === 422) {
+      if (bodyCode(answer2.value) !== "mapping_invalid") return unexpectedRefusal(answer2, action, "Nothing was saved.");
       return refusal("CLAIMS_MAPPING_INVALID", "The API refused the mapping (mapping_invalid); nothing was saved.", {
         action,
         problems: validationErrors(answer2.value).map((item) => `${item.loc}: ${item.msg}`),
@@ -6803,11 +6892,12 @@ async function saveClaimsMappingTool(args, context, ports = {}) {
     );
   }
   if (answer.status === 409 || answer.status === 422) {
-    const code = bodyCode(answer.value) ?? "";
+    const code = bodyCode(answer.value);
+    if (code !== "event_time_mapping_required" && code !== "mapping_invalid") return unexpectedRefusal(answer, action, "Nothing was activated.");
     return refusal(
       "CLAIMS_MAPPING_INVALID",
       code === "event_time_mapping_required" ? "The endpoint's signing signs no time (a body-only signature or a secret header), so the mapping must name event_time before it can be activated. Nothing was activated." : "The API refused to activate the draft (mapping_invalid). Nothing was activated.",
-      { action, code: code === "" ? null : code, problems: validationErrors(answer.value).map((item) => `${item.loc}: ${item.msg}`), request_id: answer.requestId }
+      { action, code, problems: validationErrors(answer.value).map((item) => `${item.loc}: ${item.msg}`), request_id: answer.requestId }
     );
   }
   const view = MAPPING_VIEW.safeParse(answer.value);
@@ -6821,7 +6911,9 @@ function describeSigning(signing) {
 var CLAIMS_INBOUND_SIGNING_SETUP_INPUT_SHAPE = {
   create_endpoint: z.boolean().optional().describe(`Create the sandbox inbound endpoint, once, with signing, and write its inbound URL and first secret to secret_env_file as ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} and ${INBOUND_SECRET_ENV}. Needs confirm: true. The API shows the URL and secret only in that answer; neither is returned. Default false.`),
   signing: SIGNING_CONFIG.optional().describe("create_endpoint: the signing config the claims system will use. Use hmac with signed_payload timestamp_body: it is the only signing a live endpoint accepts. hmac over the body alone and secret_header are sandbox only (a live endpoint refuses them with 422 signing_mode_sandbox_only)."),
-  confirm: z.boolean().optional().describe("create_endpoint: true only when a human has read the signing config and asked for the endpoint to be created. It is a one-time action: no route deletes a sandbox endpoint. Never set it on your own."),
+  confirm: z.boolean().optional().describe("create_endpoint: true only when a human has read the signing config and asked for the endpoint to be created, changed (set_signing) or deleted (delete_endpoint). Never set it on your own."),
+  set_signing: z.boolean().optional().describe("Change the sandbox endpoint's signing config to signing (the header names, the prefix, the encoding, the mode). The URL and secret stay the same. Needs signing and confirm: true. Default false."),
+  delete_endpoint: z.boolean().optional().describe("Delete the sandbox inbound endpoint: its URL answers 404 at once, and the event log and mappings stay, so create_endpoint can make a new one (a new URL and secret). Needs confirm: true. Live endpoints are kept by Everfur. Default false."),
   rotate_secret: z.boolean().optional().describe("Rotate the sandbox endpoint's shared secret and write the new one to secret_env_file. Default false: only read."),
   rotate_token: z.boolean().optional().describe(`Rotate the sandbox endpoint's URL token, after the inbound URL leaked, and write the new inbound URL to secret_env_file as ${INBOUND_URL_ENV}. The old URL answers 404 at once, with no overlap; the secret and the signing are unchanged. The new URL is never returned. Default false: only read.`),
   secret_env_file: z.string().min(1).max(1024).optional().describe(`create_endpoint, rotate_secret and rotate_token: absolute path of a local env file the secret is written to as ${INBOUND_SECRET_ENV}=... (on create also, and on rotate_token only, the inbound URL as ${INBOUND_URL_ENV}=...), replacing a line that already sets it, created with mode 600 when missing. Neither value is ever returned. It must be named .env or .env.<name>, inside the project this server runs in or ~/.config/everfur, ignored by git, and not a symlink.`),
@@ -6875,8 +6967,7 @@ function stripUndefined(env) {
   return out;
 }
 function bodyInvalidErrors(body) {
-  const detail = typeof body === "object" && body !== null ? body["detail"] ?? body : body;
-  return validationErrors(detail).map((item) => `${item.loc}: ${item.msg}`);
+  return validationErrors(body).map((item) => `${item.loc}: ${item.msg}`);
 }
 function doorTokenOf(urlPath) {
   if (typeof urlPath !== "string") return null;
@@ -6897,7 +6988,7 @@ async function createEndpoint(args, context, ports) {
   if (args.confirm !== true) {
     return refusal(
       "CLAIMS_INBOUND_CREATE_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED",
-      "create_endpoint needs confirm: true, set only when a person has read the signing config and asked for the sandbox endpoint to be created. It is a one-time action: the URL and secret are shown once, and no route deletes a sandbox endpoint. Nothing was created.",
+      "create_endpoint needs confirm: true, set only when a person has read the signing config and asked for the sandbox endpoint to be created. The URL and secret are shown once, and a tenant has one endpoint (delete_endpoint removes it). Nothing was created.",
       { action, arguments: ["confirm"] }
     );
   }
@@ -6913,7 +7004,7 @@ async function createEndpoint(args, context, ports) {
   const gate = await humanGate(context, ports, {
     action: "create_endpoint",
     subject: JSON.stringify([signing, file]),
-    summary: `Create the sandbox inbound claims endpoint, once, with ${describeSigning(signing)}, and write its inbound URL and first secret to ${file}. No route deletes it.`,
+    summary: `Create the sandbox inbound claims endpoint with ${describeSigning(signing)}, and write its inbound URL and first secret to ${file}.`,
     code: args.confirmation_code
   }, "Nothing was created.");
   if (gate !== null) return gate;
@@ -6941,28 +7032,31 @@ async function createEndpoint(args, context, ports) {
     }
     return inboundFailure(answer, action, CREATE_404);
   }
-  if (answer.status === 409 && bodyCode(answer.value) === "event_time_mapping_required") {
+  const refusedCode = answer.status >= 400 ? bodyCode(answer.value) : null;
+  if (refusedCode === "event_time_mapping_required") {
     return refusal(
       "CLAIMS_MAPPING_INVALID",
       "The signing config signs no time (a body-only signature or a secret header), and the active mapping names no event_time, so the API refused it (event_time_mapping_required). Nothing was created. Sign over a timestamp (hmac with signed_payload timestamp_body), or add event_time to the mapping and activate it first.",
       { action, status: 409, code: "event_time_mapping_required", request_id: answer.requestId }
     );
   }
-  if (answer.status === 409) {
+  if (refusedCode === "endpoint_exists") {
     return refusal(
       "CLAIMS_INBOUND_ENDPOINT_EXISTS",
-      `This sandbox tenant already has an inbound endpoint (endpoint_exists), and it has one at most. Nothing was created. Its inbound URL was shown once, when it was created: set ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} from where it was saved. For a new secret, call ${SETUP3} with rotate_secret: true and secret_env_file. No route deletes a sandbox endpoint.`,
-      { action, status: 409, code: bodyCode(answer.value), request_id: answer.requestId }
+      `This sandbox tenant already has an inbound endpoint (endpoint_exists), and it has one at most. Nothing was created. Its inbound URL was shown once, when it was created: set ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} from where it was saved. For a new secret, call ${SETUP3} with rotate_secret: true and secret_env_file; to start over, delete_endpoint: true (a person confirms) and create again.`,
+      { action, status: 409, code: "endpoint_exists", request_id: answer.requestId }
     );
   }
-  if (answer.status === 422) {
-    return refusal("CLAIMS_ARGUMENTS_INVALID", "The API refused the signing config (body_invalid). Nothing was created.", {
+  if (refusedCode === "body_invalid" || refusedCode === "signing_mode_sandbox_only") {
+    return refusal("CLAIMS_ARGUMENTS_INVALID", refusedCode === "body_invalid" ? "The API refused the signing config (body_invalid). Nothing was created." : "The API refused the signing config (signing_mode_sandbox_only): this tenant is not a sandbox tenant, so it signs only with hmac and signed_payload timestamp_body. Nothing was created.", {
       action,
       arguments: ["signing"],
+      code: refusedCode,
       problems: bodyInvalidErrors(answer.value),
       request_id: answer.requestId
     });
   }
+  if (answer.status === 409 || answer.status === 422) return unexpectedRefusal(answer, action, "Nothing was created.");
   const created = typeof answer.value === "object" && answer.value !== null ? answer.value : {};
   const token = doorTokenOf(created["url_path"]);
   const secret = typeof created["secret"] === "string" && SECRET_SHAPE.test(created["secret"]) ? created["secret"] : null;
@@ -6976,7 +7070,7 @@ async function createEndpoint(args, context, ports) {
     const why = token === null || secret === null ? "came back in an unexpected shape and" : `could not be written to secret_env_file (${failure?.why ?? "unknown"}), and`;
     return refusal(
       "CLAIMS_INBOUND_CREDENTIALS_NOT_WRITTEN",
-      `The sandbox inbound endpoint now exists, but ${lost} ${why} the API shows them only once. ` + (secretWritten ? "" : "The secret is lost: rotate_secret: true with a writable secret_env_file recovers a new one. ") + (urlWritten ? "" : "The inbound URL is lost and no route shows it again: rotate_token: true with a writable secret_env_file gives a new one. ") + "No route deletes a sandbox endpoint, and creating again answers 409.",
+      `The sandbox inbound endpoint now exists, but ${lost} ${why} the API shows them only once. ` + (secretWritten ? "" : "The secret is lost: rotate_secret: true with a writable secret_env_file recovers a new one. ") + (urlWritten ? "" : "The inbound URL is lost and no route shows it again: rotate_token: true with a writable secret_env_file gives a new one. ") + "Creating again answers 409 while this endpoint exists; delete_endpoint removes it first.",
       { action, written_to: file, url_written: urlWritten, secret_written: secretWritten, ...failure === void 0 ? {} : { why: failure.why }, request_id: answer.requestId }
     );
   }
@@ -6997,7 +7091,7 @@ async function createEndpoint(args, context, ports) {
       steps: [
         ...signingSteps(finalSigning),
         `The inbound URL and secret were written to ${file}; set the same two in the claims system's config. Neither is shown again.`,
-        "Changing the signing config itself (the header names, the prefix, the encoding) is a setting Everfur holds."
+        `To change the signing config (the header names, the prefix, the encoding), call ${SETUP3} with set_signing: true and the new signing; on a live endpoint Everfur changes it.`
       ],
       needs_event_time: needsEventTime(finalSigning),
       local: localState(context, file, scope),
@@ -7012,15 +7106,16 @@ async function createEndpoint(args, context, ports) {
 }
 async function claimsInboundSigningSetupTool(args, context, ports = {}) {
   if (isHosted(context)) return notHosted(SETUP3, "it reads the sandbox endpoint with the sandbox tenant's secret key from a local shell only.");
-  const actions = ["create_endpoint", "rotate_secret", "rotate_token"].filter((name) => args[name] === true);
+  const actions = ["create_endpoint", "rotate_secret", "rotate_token", "set_signing", "delete_endpoint"].filter((name) => args[name] === true);
   if (actions.length > 1) {
     return refusal(
       "CLAIMS_ARGUMENTS_INVALID",
-      `Pass one of create_endpoint, rotate_secret and rotate_token, not ${actions.join(" and ")}: a new endpoint already comes with its first URL and secret, and each rotation is its own confirmed action. Nothing was done.`,
+      `Pass one of create_endpoint, rotate_secret, rotate_token, set_signing and delete_endpoint, not ${actions.join(" and ")}: each is its own confirmed action. Nothing was done.`,
       { arguments: [...actions] }
     );
   }
   if (args.create_endpoint === true) return createEndpoint(args, context, ports);
+  if (args.set_signing === true || args.delete_endpoint === true) return changeEndpoint(args, context, ports);
   const scope = localScope(context.env, context.cwd);
   const rotation = args.rotate_secret === true ? { name: "rotate_secret", envVar: INBOUND_SECRET_ENV, what: "the new secret", value: "secret" } : args.rotate_token === true ? { name: "rotate_token", envVar: INBOUND_URL_ENV, what: "the new inbound URL", value: "URL" } : null;
   if (rotation !== null) {
@@ -7049,7 +7144,7 @@ async function claimsInboundSigningSetupTool(args, context, ports = {}) {
     steps: [
       ...signingSteps(signing),
       `${URL_SHOWN_ONCE} Keep it in the claims system's config too.`,
-      "Changing the signing config itself (the header names, the prefix, the encoding) is a setting Everfur holds."
+      `To change the signing config (the header names, the prefix, the encoding), call ${SETUP3} with set_signing: true and the new signing; on a live endpoint Everfur changes it.`
     ],
     needs_event_time: needsEventTime(signing),
     local: localState(context, args.secret_env_file, scope)
@@ -7100,6 +7195,95 @@ async function claimsInboundSigningSetupTool(args, context, ports = {}) {
     }
   };
 }
+async function changeEndpoint(args, context, ports) {
+  const action = args.set_signing === true ? "set_signing" : "delete_endpoint";
+  const nothing = action === "set_signing" ? "Nothing was changed." : "Nothing was deleted.";
+  const missing = [action === "set_signing" && args.signing === void 0 ? "signing" : null, args.confirm !== true ? "confirm" : null].filter((name) => name !== null);
+  if (missing.length > 0) {
+    return refusal(
+      "CLAIMS_ARGUMENTS_INVALID",
+      `${action} needs ${missing.join(" and ")}: confirm: true is set only when a person has asked for it. ${nothing}`,
+      { action, arguments: missing }
+    );
+  }
+  const sandbox = sandboxClient(context, ports);
+  if (!isSandbox(sandbox)) return sandbox;
+  const read = await readEndpoint(sandbox, action);
+  if ("isError" in read) return read;
+  const signing = args.signing;
+  const gate = await humanGate(context, ports, action === "set_signing" ? {
+    action,
+    subject: JSON.stringify([read.endpoint.endpoint_id, signing]),
+    summary: `Change the sandbox inbound endpoint's signing to ${describeSigning(signing)}. Events signed the old way are refused (401) from then on; the URL and secret stay the same.`,
+    code: args.confirmation_code
+  } : {
+    action,
+    subject: JSON.stringify([read.endpoint.endpoint_id]),
+    summary: "Delete the sandbox inbound endpoint. Its URL answers 404 at once; the event log and mappings stay, and create_endpoint makes a new URL and secret.",
+    code: args.confirmation_code
+  }, nothing);
+  if (gate !== null) return gate;
+  const scope = localScope(context.env, context.cwd);
+  if (action === "delete_endpoint") {
+    const answer2 = await sandbox.client.request({ method: "DELETE", path: `${INBOUND_SANDBOX_ROUTE}/endpoint`, credentials: sandbox.credentials });
+    if (!answer2.ok) return inboundFailure(answer2, action, ENDPOINT_404);
+    return {
+      isError: false,
+      document: {
+        ok: true,
+        endpoint: { endpoint_id: read.endpoint.endpoint_id, deleted: true },
+        steps: [
+          `The sandbox inbound endpoint was deleted; its URL answers 404 now. ${INBOUND_URL_ENV} and ${INBOUND_SECRET_ENV} in local env files no longer work.`,
+          `The event log and the mappings stay. Create a new endpoint with ${SETUP3} (create_endpoint: true, signing, secret_env_file, confirm: true from a person).`
+        ],
+        local: localState(context, args.secret_env_file, scope)
+      }
+    };
+  }
+  const answer = await sandbox.client.request({
+    method: "PUT",
+    path: `${INBOUND_SANDBOX_ROUTE}/endpoint/signing`,
+    credentials: sandbox.credentials,
+    body: signing,
+    acceptStatuses: [409, 422]
+  });
+  if (!answer.ok) return inboundFailure(answer, action, ENDPOINT_404);
+  const refusedCode = answer.status >= 400 ? bodyCode(answer.value) : null;
+  if (refusedCode === "event_time_mapping_required") {
+    return refusal(
+      "CLAIMS_MAPPING_INVALID",
+      "The new signing signs no time (a body-only signature or a secret header), and the active mapping names no event_time, so the API refused it (event_time_mapping_required). Nothing was changed. Keep signed_payload timestamp_body, or add event_time to the mapping and activate it first.",
+      { action, status: answer.status, code: refusedCode, request_id: answer.requestId }
+    );
+  }
+  if (refusedCode === "body_invalid" || refusedCode === "signing_mode_sandbox_only") {
+    return refusal(
+      "CLAIMS_ARGUMENTS_INVALID",
+      `The API refused the signing config (${refusedCode}). Nothing was changed.`,
+      { action, arguments: ["signing"], code: refusedCode, problems: bodyInvalidErrors(answer.value), request_id: answer.requestId }
+    );
+  }
+  if (answer.status >= 400) return unexpectedRefusal(answer, action, nothing);
+  const view = ENDPOINT_VIEW.safeParse(answer.value);
+  const stored = view.success ? SIGNING_CONFIG.safeParse(view.data.signing) : null;
+  const finalSigning = stored !== null && stored.success ? stored.data : signing;
+  return {
+    isError: false,
+    document: {
+      ok: true,
+      endpoint: {
+        endpoint_id: read.endpoint.endpoint_id,
+        previous_secret_expires_at: view.success ? view.data.previous_secret_expires_at ?? null : null,
+        created_at: view.success ? view.data.created_at ?? null : null,
+        rotated_at: view.success ? view.data.rotated_at ?? null : null
+      },
+      signing: finalSigning,
+      steps: [...signingSteps(finalSigning), "The signing changed now: set the claims system to sign this way before it sends again. The URL and secret are unchanged."],
+      needs_event_time: needsEventTime(finalSigning),
+      local: localState(context, args.secret_env_file, scope)
+    }
+  };
+}
 async function rotateToken(args, context, ports, sandbox, endpointId, document, scope) {
   const file = args.secret_env_file;
   const gate = await humanGate(context, ports, {
@@ -7981,7 +8165,7 @@ function sandboxFailure(failure, action, capability) {
     if (failure.status === 404 && (failure.code === null || failure.code === "ResourceNotFoundException")) {
       return refusal(
         "CLAIMS_SANDBOX_NOT_ENABLED",
-        "The sandbox webhook routes answered 404: they are not switched on for this deployment or this tenant, or the endpoint_id names no endpoint of this tenant. Switching them on is a setting Everfur holds.",
+        "The sandbox webhook routes answered 404: outbound webhooks are not switched on for this deployment or for this tenant (its plan's webhooks feature), or the endpoint_id names no endpoint of this tenant. Switching them on is a setting Everfur holds. A receiver still in development on this machine is checked with everfur_verify_claims_receiver (allow_localhost: true) instead; test events go only to a public https URL.",
         details
       );
     }
@@ -10083,14 +10267,15 @@ a field mapping turns them into claims, documents and pet profiles. everfur_prop
 mapping from sample native events, offline, with the gaps and the personal data paths to scrub;
 everfur_save_claims_mapping saves it as the sandbox draft, and activates the draft only with confirm: true and the
 confirmation phrase typed back by a person who has read it, never on the agent's own initiative. Activating, creating
-the inbound endpoint, rotating its secret or its URL token and creating an outbound test endpoint each also need the person's own
+the inbound endpoint, rotating its secret or its URL token, changing its signing, deleting it and creating an outbound test endpoint each also need the person's own
 answer: the client asks them when it can; otherwise the tool writes a one-time code to a local file and answers with
 its path, and the person types the code back as confirmation_code. Never open that file yourself.
 everfur_claims_inbound_signing_setup explains the endpoint's signing as steps for the claims system and can rotate the
-sandbox secret, or the URL token after the URL leaks, into a local env file. The sandbox key can create the sandbox inbound endpoint once:
-everfur_claims_inbound_signing_setup with create_endpoint, signing, secret_env_file and confirm: true, set only when
+sandbox secret, or the URL token after the URL leaks, into a local env file. The sandbox key can create the sandbox inbound endpoint
+(one per tenant): everfur_claims_inbound_signing_setup with create_endpoint, signing, secret_env_file and confirm: true, set only when
 a person asks for it; its URL and first secret are shown once and are written to that file as
-EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_URL and EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_SECRET, never returned. Live inbound endpoints are set up by
+EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_URL and EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_SECRET, never returned. With confirm: true from a person, set_signing
+changes the sandbox endpoint's signing config and delete_endpoint deletes it (the event log and mappings stay). Live inbound endpoints are set up by
 Everfur, with their signing and the live mapping. everfur_send_claims_inbound_samples signs synthetic samples, posts them to the
 sandbox inbound URL and reports each event's status, reason code and fix; with read_event_log it sends nothing and
 reads the sandbox event log, for events the claims system itself sent. The tools that read the sandbox tenant's
@@ -10345,7 +10530,7 @@ function buildServer(context, ports = {}, options = {}) {
       "everfur_claims_inbound_signing_setup",
       {
         title: TOOL_ANNOTATIONS.everfur_claims_inbound_signing_setup.title,
-        description: "Read the sandbox inbound claims endpoint's signing config and explain, as plain steps, how the insurer's claims system must sign each event (HMAC-SHA256 over the timestamp and body or the body alone, hex or base64, the header names and prefix; or the secret in a header), plus whether the shared secret and inbound URL are set locally. With rotate_secret: true it rotates the sandbox secret and writes the new one to secret_env_file (mode 600); the secret is never returned. With rotate_token: true, after the inbound URL leaked, it rotates the URL token and writes the new URL to secret_env_file as EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_URL (the old URL answers 404 at once); the URL is never returned. With create_endpoint: true, signing and confirm: true (set only when a person asks; it is a one-time action) it creates the sandbox inbound endpoint and writes its URL and first secret, shown once, to secret_env_file as EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_URL and EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_SECRET (mode 600); neither is returned. Live inbound endpoints are set up by Everfur. Create and each rotation also need the person's own confirmation (the client asks them, or they type back a one-time code from a local file as confirmation_code). Sandbox key from a local shell only.",
+        description: "Read the sandbox inbound claims endpoint's signing config and explain, as plain steps, how the insurer's claims system must sign each event (HMAC-SHA256 over the timestamp and body or the body alone, hex or base64, the header names and prefix; or the secret in a header), plus whether the shared secret and inbound URL are set locally. With rotate_secret: true it rotates the sandbox secret and writes the new one to secret_env_file (mode 600); the secret is never returned. With rotate_token: true, after the inbound URL leaked, it rotates the URL token and writes the new URL to secret_env_file as EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_URL (the old URL answers 404 at once); the URL is never returned. With create_endpoint: true, signing and confirm: true (set only when a person asks; one endpoint per tenant) it creates the sandbox inbound endpoint and writes its URL and first secret, shown once, to secret_env_file as EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_URL and EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_SECRET (mode 600); neither is returned. With set_signing: true, signing and confirm: true it changes the sandbox endpoint's signing config (URL and secret unchanged); with delete_endpoint: true and confirm: true it deletes the sandbox endpoint (its URL answers 404 at once; the event log and mappings stay). Live inbound endpoints are set up by Everfur. Create, set_signing, delete and each rotation also need the person's own confirmation (the client asks them, or they type back a one-time code from a local file as confirmation_code). Sandbox key from a local shell only.",
         inputSchema: CLAIMS_INBOUND_SIGNING_SETUP_INPUT_SHAPE,
         outputSchema: CLAIMS_INBOUND_SIGNING_SETUP_OUTPUT_SHAPE,
         annotations: { ...TOOL_ANNOTATIONS.everfur_claims_inbound_signing_setup }

package/dist/{chunk-JURZYOMH.js → chunk-LH4AWYCB.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /*! @everfur/cli. Copyright (c) 2026 Strand Health Inc. dba Everfur. All rights reserved. Use is subject to the Everfur SDK License: https://docs.everfur.com/license */
-import { buildServer } from './chunk-FLW4ZANY.js';
+import { buildServer } from './chunk-G7CJK7Z5.js';
 import { createServer } from 'http';
 import { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';
 import { StreamableHTTPServerTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/streamableHttp.js';

package/dist/{chunk-VUXILRME.js → chunk-VSZ4RPKA.js}

@@ -5476,7 +5476,7 @@ function booleanAttribute(outcome, key) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var CLI_VERSION = "0.9.1";
+var CLI_VERSION = "0.9.2";
 var CLI_PUBLISHED_VERSION = "0.9.0";
 
 // src/commands/diagnose/reasons.ts
@@ -13973,8 +13973,8 @@ function planIntegration(input) {
 // src/registry/sdk/client/contract/contract.generated.ts
 var CONTRACT_SOURCE = Object.freeze({
   digestAlgorithm: "sha256",
-  digest: "f2c258aa21d5f24e8b1056db2114c3b4e5317c82119d86022fde295b059b4bfe",
-  generatedAt: "2026-10-31T06:47:06Z",
+  digest: "af9a9a3f89b48449238033ef3227df17ccfcc3b81308764a212d25b61a4994cf",
+  generatedAt: "2026-11-02T13:18:35Z",
   capabilitySchemaVersion: 1,
   errorSchemaVersion: 1
 });
@@ -14499,7 +14499,7 @@ var MANIFEST_default = {
   files: [
     {
       path: "client/contract/contract.generated.ts",
-      sha256: "dbfc4cc268c85c1c6177a4772a08cadd75c551f22dfe995f48b9ebdcc0df3731"
+      sha256: "453c2dc536c4e1198a747a184e0f8ac60409e53ed0ed1940ebb2304f51bb75d2"
     },
     {
       path: "client/errors/EverfurError.ts",
@@ -17233,7 +17233,7 @@ var MEANINGS = Object.freeze({
   },
   CLAIMS_SANDBOX_NOT_ENABLED: {
     tools: [CLAIMS_SANDBOX, ...CLAIMS_INBOUND],
-    meaning: "The sandbox route answered 404 with no code of its own: the sandbox webhook or claims-inbound routes are not switched on for this tenant or deployment, the endpoint_id names no endpoint of this tenant, or (inbound) the tenant has no claims portal or no inbound endpoint exists yet. The sandbox key can create the sandbox inbound endpoint once (everfur_claims_inbound_signing_setup, create_endpoint with confirm: true from a person); its inbound URL and first secret are shown once, at creation. Live inbound endpoints are set up by Everfur.",
+    meaning: "The sandbox route answered 404 with no code of its own: the sandbox webhook or claims-inbound routes are not switched on for this tenant or deployment, the endpoint_id names no endpoint of this tenant, or (inbound) the tenant has no claims portal or no inbound endpoint exists yet. The sandbox key can create the sandbox inbound endpoint (one per tenant) (everfur_claims_inbound_signing_setup, create_endpoint with confirm: true from a person); its inbound URL and first secret are shown once, at creation. Live inbound endpoints are set up by Everfur.",
     nextAction: "Check the endpoint_id with list_endpoints; when list_endpoints itself answers this, switching the routes on is a step Everfur holds. When an inbound route answers it and the routes are on, the sandbox endpoint may not exist yet: offer create_endpoint, and create it only when a person confirms."
   },
   CLAIMS_SANDBOX_CALL_FAILED: {
@@ -17293,13 +17293,13 @@ var MEANINGS = Object.freeze({
   },
   CLAIMS_INBOUND_CREATE_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED: {
     tools: [CLAIMS_SETUP],
-    meaning: "create_endpoint was called without confirm: true. Creating the sandbox inbound endpoint is a one-time action (its URL and secret are shown once, and no route deletes a sandbox endpoint), so a person decides it. Nothing was created.",
+    meaning: "create_endpoint was called without confirm: true. Creating the sandbox inbound endpoint shows its URL and secret once, and a tenant has one endpoint (delete_endpoint removes it), so a person decides it. Nothing was created.",
     nextAction: "Show the developer the signing config; call create_endpoint with confirm: true only when a person asks for it. Never confirm on your own."
   },
   CLAIMS_INBOUND_ENDPOINT_EXISTS: {
     tools: [CLAIMS_SETUP],
     meaning: "The create answered 409 endpoint_exists: this sandbox tenant already has its inbound endpoint, whose URL was shown once, at creation. Nothing was created.",
-    nextAction: "Tell the developer to set EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_URL from where they saved it, and offer rotate_secret for a new secret or rotate_token for a new URL."
+    nextAction: "Tell the developer to set EVERFUR_CLAIMS_INBOUND_URL from where they saved it, and offer rotate_secret for a new secret or rotate_token for a new URL; to start over, delete_endpoint (a person confirms) then create again."
   },
   CLAIMS_INBOUND_CREDENTIALS_NOT_WRITTEN: {
     tools: [CLAIMS_SETUP],

package/dist/{chunk-LALDS2WR.js → chunk-WL42DEHE.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /*! @everfur/cli. Copyright (c) 2026 Strand Health Inc. dba Everfur. All rights reserved. Use is subject to the Everfur SDK License: https://docs.everfur.com/license */
-import { VERIFY_IDENTITY_MODES, SURFACES, ENVIRONMENTS, BASE_URL_ENV_VAR, MIN_TIMEOUT_MS, MAX_TIMEOUT_MS, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS, ALL_CAPABILITIES, expandCapabilities, errorOutcome, describeFailure, failureDetails, countsAsNotOn, diagnoseVerdict, isJsonObject, succeed, CAPABILITY_QUESTION, CAPABILITIES_TREE, WEB_EMBEDDING_QUESTION, PLATFORM_TREE, loadDecisionSpace, fetchContract, contractUnavailableOutcome, loadDecisionSpaceFromContract, parseEnvironment, checkTenantMode, detectProject, planIntegration, fail, ExitCode, DOCS_KEY, resolveContractPath, validateContractFile, buildSupportBundle, renderSupportBundle, chooseWidgetAuth, DIAGNOSTICS_PATH, diagnoseFailure, parseDiagnostics, buildDiagnosisDocument, PARTNER_KEY, SESSION_TOKEN, resolveCredential, ADMIN_TOKEN, withPrefix, parseOrigin, parseLoaderUrl, parseSurfaces, parseIdentityMode, runVerification, PARTNER_SECRET_KEY, resolveOffline, resolveWithoutRegistry, knownCodes, loadErrorRegistryFromContract, loadErrorRegistry, resolveAfterRegistryMiss, registryAlsoIn, buildExplanationDocument, renderExplanation, alsoInLines, resolveEndpoint, isCorrelatableRequestId, EMPTY_REGISTRY, createApiClient, offlineDocument, renderOffline, IDENTITY_QUESTION, IDENTITY_TREE, BACKEND_LANGUAGE_QUESTION, SESSION_MINT_TREE, CREDENTIAL_SPECS } from './chunk-VUXILRME.js';
+import { VERIFY_IDENTITY_MODES, SURFACES, ENVIRONMENTS, BASE_URL_ENV_VAR, MIN_TIMEOUT_MS, MAX_TIMEOUT_MS, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS, ALL_CAPABILITIES, expandCapabilities, errorOutcome, describeFailure, failureDetails, countsAsNotOn, diagnoseVerdict, isJsonObject, succeed, CAPABILITY_QUESTION, CAPABILITIES_TREE, WEB_EMBEDDING_QUESTION, PLATFORM_TREE, loadDecisionSpace, fetchContract, contractUnavailableOutcome, loadDecisionSpaceFromContract, parseEnvironment, checkTenantMode, detectProject, planIntegration, fail, ExitCode, DOCS_KEY, resolveContractPath, validateContractFile, buildSupportBundle, renderSupportBundle, chooseWidgetAuth, DIAGNOSTICS_PATH, diagnoseFailure, parseDiagnostics, buildDiagnosisDocument, PARTNER_KEY, SESSION_TOKEN, resolveCredential, ADMIN_TOKEN, withPrefix, parseOrigin, parseLoaderUrl, parseSurfaces, parseIdentityMode, runVerification, PARTNER_SECRET_KEY, resolveOffline, resolveWithoutRegistry, knownCodes, loadErrorRegistryFromContract, loadErrorRegistry, resolveAfterRegistryMiss, registryAlsoIn, buildExplanationDocument, renderExplanation, alsoInLines, resolveEndpoint, isCorrelatableRequestId, EMPTY_REGISTRY, createApiClient, offlineDocument, renderOffline, IDENTITY_QUESTION, IDENTITY_TREE, BACKEND_LANGUAGE_QUESTION, SESSION_MINT_TREE, CREDENTIAL_SPECS } from './chunk-VSZ4RPKA.js';
 import { isAbsolute, resolve } from 'path';
 
 // src/cli/format.ts

package/dist/everfur-mcp-hosted.js

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /*! @everfur/cli. Copyright (c) 2026 Strand Health Inc. dba Everfur. All rights reserved. Use is subject to the Everfur SDK License: https://docs.everfur.com/license */
-import { loadHostedMcpConfig, startHostedMcpServer } from './chunk-FWEDPKKK.js';
-import './chunk-JURZYOMH.js';
-import './chunk-FLW4ZANY.js';
-import { CLI_VERSION } from './chunk-VUXILRME.js';
+import { loadHostedMcpConfig, startHostedMcpServer } from './chunk-5GXXNW3F.js';
+import './chunk-LH4AWYCB.js';
+import './chunk-G7CJK7Z5.js';
+import { CLI_VERSION } from './chunk-VSZ4RPKA.js';
 
 // src/bin/everfur-mcp-hosted.ts
 async function main() {

package/dist/everfur-mcp-http.js

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /*! @everfur/cli. Copyright (c) 2026 Strand Health Inc. dba Everfur. All rights reserved. Use is subject to the Everfur SDK License: https://docs.everfur.com/license */
-import { startRemoteMcpServer, loadRemoteMcpConfig } from './chunk-JURZYOMH.js';
-import './chunk-FLW4ZANY.js';
-import { CLI_VERSION } from './chunk-VUXILRME.js';
+import { startRemoteMcpServer, loadRemoteMcpConfig } from './chunk-LH4AWYCB.js';
+import './chunk-G7CJK7Z5.js';
+import { CLI_VERSION } from './chunk-VSZ4RPKA.js';
 
 // src/bin/everfur-mcp-http.ts
 async function main() {

package/dist/everfur-mcp.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /*! @everfur/cli. Copyright (c) 2026 Strand Health Inc. dba Everfur. All rights reserved. Use is subject to the Everfur SDK License: https://docs.everfur.com/license */
-import { runStdioServer } from './chunk-FLW4ZANY.js';
-import { CLI_VERSION } from './chunk-VUXILRME.js';
+import { runStdioServer } from './chunk-G7CJK7Z5.js';
+import { CLI_VERSION } from './chunk-VSZ4RPKA.js';
 
 // src/bin/everfur-mcp.ts
 if (process.argv.slice(2).includes("--version")) {

package/dist/everfur.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /*! @everfur/cli. Copyright (c) 2026 Strand Health Inc. dba Everfur. All rights reserved. Use is subject to the Everfur SDK License: https://docs.everfur.com/license */
-import { runCli } from './chunk-LALDS2WR.js';
-import { ExitCode, systemClock, fetchTransport, CLI_VERSION, nodeFileSystem, nodeContractCache } from './chunk-VUXILRME.js';
+import { runCli } from './chunk-WL42DEHE.js';
+import { ExitCode, systemClock, fetchTransport, CLI_VERSION, nodeFileSystem, nodeContractCache } from './chunk-VSZ4RPKA.js';
 
 // src/bin/everfur.ts
 async function main() {

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -3651,6 +3651,6 @@ declare function parseSuppliedFacts(capabilitiesRaw: string | null, identityRaw:
  * install, and a bundled artifact. `tests/unit/version.test.ts` asserts this constant equals
  * the package.json version, so the two cannot drift.
  */
-declare const CLI_VERSION = "0.9.1";
+declare const CLI_VERSION = "0.9.2";
 
 export { ADMIN_TOKEN, API_PREFIX, type ApiClient, type ApiFailure, type ApiResult, type ApiSuccess, BASE_URL_ENV_VAR, type BlockedCapability, type BlockedOutcome, CLI_VERSION, COMMANDS, CREDENTIAL_SPECS, type Capability, type CapabilityDiagnosis, type ClockPort, type Command, type CommandContext, type CommandOutcome, type ContractValidationOutcome, type Credential, type CredentialSpec, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS, type DecisionSpace, type DecisionSpaceProvenance, type DecisionTree, type DetectedDependency, type DetectedTheme, type Diagnosis, EMPTY_REGISTRY, ERRORS_DOCUMENT_KEY, type ErrorRegistry, type ErrorRegistryEntry, ExitCode, type FileSystemPort, type FormatOptions, type FormattedOutput, type HttpMethod, type HttpRequest, type HttpResponse, IDEMPOTENT_METHODS, type IdentityMode, MISSING_FACT_NAMES, type MissingFact, type MissingFactName, type Outcome, PARTNER_KEY, PARTNER_SECRET_KEY, PLAN_DOCUMENT_KIND, PLAN_SCHEMA_VERSION, type PackageManager, type PlanDocument, type PlanInput, type PlanPrinciple, type PlanStep, type PlanWarning, type PositionalSpec, type ProjectDetection, type ProjectType, REASON_CODES, REDACTED, type ReasonCode, type RegistryLoad, type RequestSpec, type ResolvedCredential, type ResolvedEndpoint, type RunOptions, SCHEMAS, SESSION_TOKEN, type SandboxCreateStatus, type SandboxCreation, type SchemaValidation, type SchemaViolation, type SessionMintLanguage, type StepResult, THEME_TOKEN_ORDER, type TerminalOutcome, type ThemeConfidence, type ThemeDetection, type ThemeEvidence, type ThemeSource, type ThemeToken, TransportError, type TransportPort, type TreeOption, type TreeQuestion, type Verification, type VerifyStep, type WalkResult, apiUrl, buildDecisionSpace, buildDiagnosisDocument, buildExplanationDocument, buildSandboxDocument, buildVerificationDocument, clampTimeout, createApiClient, createMemoryFileSystem, createRecordingClock, describeFailure, detectProject, detectTheme, detectThemeFromText, digestOfProjection, digestsEqual, editDistance, entryFromRow, ephemeralCredential, errorCodeOf, failureDetails, failureOutcome, fetchTransport, formatOutcome, isCorrelatableRequestId, isIdempotent, isKnownReasonCode, loadDecisionSpace, loadErrorRegistry, matchCommand, missingFactsFor, nextActionFor as nextActionForErrorCode, nextActionFor$1 as nextActionForReason, nextActionsFor, nodeFileSystem, parseCapabilities, parseDiagnostics, parseIdentityMode, parseSessionMintLanguage, parseSuppliedFacts, planIntegration, projectSandboxCreate, renderDiagnosis, renderExplanation, renderPlan, renderSandboxCreate, renderVerification, resolveContractPath, resolveCredential, resolveEndpoint, runCli, runVerification, suggestCodes, systemClock, validateContractFile, validateContractPublicEnvelope, validateDiagnosisDocument, validateErrorExplanationDocument, validatePlanDocument, validateSandboxCreateDocument, validateVerificationDocument, verifyDigest, walkSingle, walkTree, withPrefix };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /*! @everfur/cli. Copyright (c) 2026 Strand Health Inc. dba Everfur. All rights reserved. Use is subject to the Everfur SDK License: https://docs.everfur.com/license */
-export { COMMANDS, buildSandboxDocument, buildVerificationDocument, failureOutcome, formatOutcome, matchCommand, nextActionsFor, parseCapabilities, parseIdentityMode, parseSessionMintLanguage, parseSuppliedFacts, projectSandboxCreate, renderDiagnosis, renderPlan, renderSandboxCreate, renderVerification, runCli } from './chunk-LALDS2WR.js';
-export { ADMIN_TOKEN, API_PREFIX, BASE_URL_ENV_VAR, CLI_VERSION, CREDENTIAL_SPECS, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS, EMPTY_REGISTRY, ERRORS_DOCUMENT_KEY, ExitCode, IDEMPOTENT_METHODS, MISSING_FACT_NAMES, PARTNER_KEY, PARTNER_SECRET_KEY, PLAN_DOCUMENT_KIND, PLAN_SCHEMA_VERSION, REASON_CODES, REDACTED, SCHEMAS, SESSION_TOKEN, THEME_TOKEN_ORDER, TransportError, apiUrl, buildDecisionSpace, buildDiagnosisDocument, buildExplanationDocument, clampTimeout, createApiClient, createMemoryFileSystem, createRecordingClock, describeFailure, detectProject, detectTheme, detectThemeFromText, digestOfProjection, digestsEqual, editDistance, entryFromRow, ephemeralCredential, errorCodeOf, failureDetails, fetchTransport, isCorrelatableRequestId, isIdempotent, isKnownReasonCode, loadDecisionSpace, loadErrorRegistry, missingFactsFor, nextActionFor2 as nextActionForErrorCode, nextActionFor as nextActionForReason, nodeFileSystem, parseDiagnostics, planIntegration, renderExplanation, resolveContractPath, resolveCredential, resolveEndpoint, runVerification, suggestCodes, systemClock, validateContractFile, validateContractPublicEnvelope, validateDiagnosisDocument, validateErrorExplanationDocument, validatePlanDocument, validateSandboxCreateDocument, validateVerificationDocument, verifyDigest, walkSingle, walkTree, withPrefix } from './chunk-VUXILRME.js';
+export { COMMANDS, buildSandboxDocument, buildVerificationDocument, failureOutcome, formatOutcome, matchCommand, nextActionsFor, parseCapabilities, parseIdentityMode, parseSessionMintLanguage, parseSuppliedFacts, projectSandboxCreate, renderDiagnosis, renderPlan, renderSandboxCreate, renderVerification, runCli } from './chunk-WL42DEHE.js';
+export { ADMIN_TOKEN, API_PREFIX, BASE_URL_ENV_VAR, CLI_VERSION, CREDENTIAL_SPECS, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS, EMPTY_REGISTRY, ERRORS_DOCUMENT_KEY, ExitCode, IDEMPOTENT_METHODS, MISSING_FACT_NAMES, PARTNER_KEY, PARTNER_SECRET_KEY, PLAN_DOCUMENT_KIND, PLAN_SCHEMA_VERSION, REASON_CODES, REDACTED, SCHEMAS, SESSION_TOKEN, THEME_TOKEN_ORDER, TransportError, apiUrl, buildDecisionSpace, buildDiagnosisDocument, buildExplanationDocument, clampTimeout, createApiClient, createMemoryFileSystem, createRecordingClock, describeFailure, detectProject, detectTheme, detectThemeFromText, digestOfProjection, digestsEqual, editDistance, entryFromRow, ephemeralCredential, errorCodeOf, failureDetails, fetchTransport, isCorrelatableRequestId, isIdempotent, isKnownReasonCode, loadDecisionSpace, loadErrorRegistry, missingFactsFor, nextActionFor2 as nextActionForErrorCode, nextActionFor as nextActionForReason, nodeFileSystem, parseDiagnostics, planIntegration, renderExplanation, resolveContractPath, resolveCredential, resolveEndpoint, runVerification, suggestCodes, systemClock, validateContractFile, validateContractPublicEnvelope, validateDiagnosisDocument, validateErrorExplanationDocument, validatePlanDocument, validateSandboxCreateDocument, validateVerificationDocument, verifyDigest, walkSingle, walkTree, withPrefix } from './chunk-VSZ4RPKA.js';

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@everfur/cli",
-  "version": "0.9.1",
+  "version": "0.9.2",
   "description": "Everfur CLI: plan, verify, and diagnose an Everfur pet-health integration from the terminal.",
   "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md",
   "type": "module",