@event4u/agent-config 8.6.0 → 8.8.0

package/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
   },
   "metadata": {
     "description": "Bootstrap shim for the event4u agent-config suite. This plugin ships ONLY the dispatcher hooks plus one install-pointer skill — ALL content (skills, rules, commands) is installed via `npx -y @event4u/agent-config init`, which writes the file projection AND registers the same hooks in ~/.claude/settings.json. DEPRECATED as a content channel; kept so the marketplace listing stays discoverable and existing installs keep working hooks.",
-    "version": "8.6.0",
+    "version": "8.8.0",
     "keywords": [
       "agent-config",
       "skills",

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -989,6 +989,87 @@ our recommendation order, not its support status.
 > that forces a new era split (`# Era: 8.2.x`, etc.) — see
 > [`docs/contracts/CHANGELOG-conventions.md § Era splits`](docs/contracts/CHANGELOG-conventions.md).
 
+## [8.8.0](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/compare/8.7.0...8.8.0) (2026-07-09)
+
+### Features
+
+* **rules:** security & quality hardening governance layer ([2574ce8](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/2574ce8f243763e06e62ad82e58413d182964a50))
+* **orchestration:** token-savings report over orchestration telemetry ([60b90a2](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/60b90a253efe26810a349a930d8fd6fdf02a3d37))
+* **subagents:** default subagents.auto to `on` on subagent-capable hosts ([bc3eea5](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/bc3eea554e06cbcc9013145143fce93a1a1adb53))
+* **bus-factor:** CODEOWNERS + self-imposed-gate CONTRIBUTING section ([ec9b93e](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/ec9b93ebe94f33aecf6ddb00b72dbfb60b2e0c37))
+* **second-brain:** deterministic multi-session recall corpus + scorer ([5f09fff](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/5f09ffff2d4090ed6761f37d55a8bb0a73b99333))
+* **domain-soundness:** domain-truth fixture schema + validation-status ratchet ([bd67c4d](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/bd67c4dec9de9691eea2b1367807a4e190db5db8))
+* **evals:** staleness lint + wire the coverage ratchet into CI ([886bf25](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/886bf25fedcaface708ee3f8be17135d8be2e742))
+* **evals:** behavioural-eval schema + per-tier coverage metric + ratchet floor ([2e303f6](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/2e303f66d076355434ff720b6d81ac3f3021b22e))
+* **memory:** opt-in session-start index + FTS5/AST backlog ledger ([bb15b21](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/bb15b21fb334d7c44896b7ef4c340c0396f0c6c4))
+* **memory:** catalog discipline, history timeline anchor, chunk index flags ([3cce078](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/3cce0789f48966fe31e8fad1ad63ae2477c53259))
+* **memory:** index/detail split + memory_get batch fetch (Phase 1) ([36547c8](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/36547c88452c99eb02d7c2db61ce9556701db80d))
+* **memory:** Phase 0 replay substrate for the retrieval-economy gate ([6d05daf](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/6d05dafa35ae38b4c4d97cd17a155c1e4bbc801e))
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **rules:** apply council-adjudicated review fixes ([d6d818a](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/d6d818a8bfb79c6862488eb367f4f3e92f7d7aa6))
+* **rules:** satisfy skill-lint, schema, and proof-check gates ([ea551cc](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/ea551cc5c9efb21ab6453948f97848557d98ae1f))
+* **orchestration:** guard undefined argv in savings-report parseArgs ([cf2539e](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/cf2539e73ac7e7edbaee206bcd09e03032986618))
+* **mcp:** cast validated depth args to number for tsc ([cc5a8a4](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/cc5a8a4ac80ac245ec2b30fa4223d1888788e475))
+
+### Documentation
+
+* **orchestration:** document the savings report + the no-percentage limit ([d29a5d1](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/d29a5d10411c3507d6fb035ac44959ee2a738435))
+* **adoption:** link the deployed docs site + surface the 30-second wedge ([eb74680](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/eb74680bec665c422e226ac8c5e8458c8279539e))
+* **adr:** ADR-117 flip subagents.auto default to on; amend ADR-105, supersede verdict ([0b5879c](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/0b5879c3f25014c54779e959e16282ac66d4ae4d))
+* **bus-factor:** bind the honest bus-factor to CLAIMS ([6bbbda4](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/6bbbda4d841f084c27c5a8f34bd10171429bc684))
+* **bus-factor:** inheritable release runbook + succession doc ([7d05577](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/7d05577f32c154332fb8bdf90833e8e7acf7f704))
+* **second-brain:** honest scope vs human-PKM + unproven-lift CLAIMS gate ([b9dc934](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/b9dc9347661237c24cdadd5ca454ed07acbf9409))
+* **domain-soundness:** label the domains unvalidated + gate the provenance claim ([7221662](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/72216625a559818196441349501af3b65c4be3ce))
+* **evals:** publish the honest coverage baseline + label the long tail ([299a7fe](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/299a7fe74360a8df5b7d46c026be65b501685ff0))
+* **memory:** Phase 1b honest null — default flip falsified at current scale ([938aab2](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/938aab2f5d6dcf43fd82738025fe309d5cb7ad91))
+
+### CI
+
+* **second-brain:** wire the recall-scorer dry-run into ci + ci-strict ([7da6d01](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/7da6d010f40793e31a9b3f891a5e08aa2afe184c))
+* **domain-soundness:** wire the validation-status ratchet into ci + ci-strict ([7ae10c2](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/7ae10c2cd4d36e65db3a52c8c68b824200c3f9c6))
+
+### Chores
+
+* **generated:** regenerate counts, router, and pack manifest ([f141060](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/f141060e9da2f4f0a97a257d2786dd42fdf2ee0f))
+* **roadmap:** adoption Phase-0 site-link quick-win landed; rest positioning/human-gated ([de27276](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/de27276b06b3969a8ea8a22ed5327385aa3ff582))
+* **roadmap:** bus-factor inheritability slice landed; gate + admin deferred ([8bf79f5](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/8bf79f5dd3e9dcd940acce7c56eaad978d2525f7))
+* **roadmap:** second-brain-delta-proof P1 rig + P3 gate landed; P2 run deferred ([e01ec9e](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/e01ec9e9691fa5d19390fa3b187bafbef3e34618))
+* **roadmap:** domain-soundness P1/P3-gate/P4-labeling landed; P2 open on domain competence ([9a786d4](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/9a786d4cb2b0dc469c3b2967e8bc360e9877ec79))
+* **roadmap:** skill-eval-coverage P1/P3/P4 landed; P2 open on human gate ([a4c526d](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/a4c526d43a459bb86d78dcf2d07e3dc2d44b6828))
+
+Tests: 7027 (+78 since 8.7.0)
+
+## [8.7.0](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/compare/8.6.0...8.7.0) (2026-07-08)
+
+### Features
+
+* **settings:** validate + surface projection.rule_workspaces/rule_packs ([a27bbf5](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/a27bbf53c7fca206176ed6ddd38b1ec5ee11e357))
+* **install:** consumer Cursor/Windsurf get host-native rule surfaces ([8b68ff5](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/8b68ff58e9c240e41acce1f25faa51bc47f3564b))
+* **install:** consumer rule scoping reaches both install pipelines ([88248e4](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/88248e4d39bd056db133021acc0cc2b0782e78cc))
+* **ci:** trigger-eval presence ratchet with shrink-only grandfather allowlist ([d8f0c0d](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/d8f0c0dd04b3388205becf2cce30c6e0ea09197b))
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **ci:** install repo-root deps in the MCP deploy workflow ([9183c4e](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/9183c4e358e76b344058eb01d7f945f246a44828))
+
+### Documentation
+
+* add frontier quality roadmaps ([bfa9315](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/bfa93157848bf13020a6cb3dcd06381c013fb035))
+* **skills:** skill-writing names the CI-enforced trigger-eval presence gate ([464722e](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/464722efe83243e3ae480411d59850dac92ca1ac))
+
+### Chores
+
+* **roadmaps:** regenerate progress dashboard ([a8f4178](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/a8f4178a84ef8c66408afe3d5af195ce19ccf5d0))
+* **gitignore:** ignore Codex CLI interop output (.agents/, .codex/) ([8756d52](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/8756d5226e8760c72d6205e98b9822620d303418))
+* **dist:** rebuild install bundle after settings-schema extension ([44818d4](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/44818d4c8ad69ec545e99820e3292f0346bb2f20))
+* **roadmap:** close Phase 1b with pinned consumer-install evidence ([3a2455f](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/3a2455f236279390eb5a8cfe986e6b911493391c))
+* **condense:** refresh stale hash for commands/upstream-contribute ([c668370](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/c668370663bf7272932c33b5a7874dca4b08a9db))
+* **roadmaps:** composition-ratchet roadmap executed + archived; adoption roadmap sequenced next ([1bde2ea](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/commit/1bde2ea00478bd1e46c4e9596c8c0cd5962b9ee1))
+
+Tests: 6949 (+6 since 8.6.0)
+
 ## [8.6.0](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/compare/8.5.0...8.6.0) (2026-07-08)
 
 ### Features

package/CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -93,6 +93,25 @@ task lint-skills      # ./scripts-run src/scripts/skill_linter --all
 - Open the PR against `main` with a short description of the change,
   motivation, and any notes for reviewers.
 
+## Reviewability and the self-imposed gate
+
+This is a governance standard, so the maintainer holds themselves to the same
+gate as any contributor — the point is that even a solo merge goes **through**
+the review floor, not around it.
+
+- [`.github/CODEOWNERS`](.github/CODEOWNERS) routes review on the sensitive
+  surfaces (kernel rules, router compiler, install, hooks, claims/proof
+  generators, release pipeline, schemas). Branch protection is configured to
+  require Code-Owner review on those paths (maintainer, in GitHub → Settings →
+  Rules; source of truth: [`docs/contracts/branch-protection-policy.md`](docs/contracts/branch-protection-policy.md)).
+- **Honest bound:** an AI adversarial-review / security gate (when enabled)
+  raises the floor and catches regressions and claim-drift, but it is **not**
+  independent human review. The bus-factor is tracked truthfully in
+  [`docs/succession.md`](docs/succession.md) — a bus-factor of 1 stated plainly
+  beats one implied to be more.
+- A realistic second-reviewer on-ramp starts small (docs/claims or a single
+  pack), never "co-maintain the kernel on day one".
+
 ## Adding or editing skills, rules, and commands
 
 - Skills and rules live in `src/skills/` and `src/rules/`; commands in
@@ -276,6 +295,12 @@ which never reach a consumer.
 
 ### Release process
 
+> **Inheritable runbook:** the exact, reproducible steps a second maintainer
+> can follow cold — both entry points, the manual approval checkpoint, and
+> recovery — live in [`docs/release-runbook.md`](docs/release-runbook.md), with
+> the secret/operator-gated dependencies in [`docs/succession.md`](docs/succession.md).
+> The summary below is orientation; the runbook is the source of truth.
+
 Releases are driven by a single command that owns the entire pipeline from
 version bump to npm publish:
 

package/README.md

@@ -4,19 +4,21 @@
 
 [![Smoke](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/actions/workflows/smoke.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/actions/workflows/smoke.yml) [![Public install smoke (3 OS × 2 Node)](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/actions/workflows/smoke-public-install.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/event4u-app/agent-config/actions/workflows/smoke-public-install.yml) [![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@event4u/agent-config?style=flat-square&label=npm&color=orange)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@event4u/agent-config) [![agent-config MCP server](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/event4u-app/agent-config/badges/score.svg)](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/event4u-app/agent-config)
 
-[![Skills](https://img.shields.io/badge/Skills-264-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/skills/) [![Rules](https://img.shields.io/badge/Rules-95-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/rules/) [![Commands](https://img.shields.io/badge/Commands-172-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/commands/) [![Guidelines](https://img.shields.io/badge/Guidelines-87-orange?style=flat-square)](docs/guidelines/) [![Personas](https://img.shields.io/badge/Personas-29-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/personas/) [![Advisors](https://img.shields.io/badge/Advisors-5-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/personas/advisors/)
+[![Skills](https://img.shields.io/badge/Skills-267-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/skills/) [![Rules](https://img.shields.io/badge/Rules-100-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/rules/) [![Commands](https://img.shields.io/badge/Commands-172-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/commands/) [![Guidelines](https://img.shields.io/badge/Guidelines-87-orange?style=flat-square)](docs/guidelines/) [![Personas](https://img.shields.io/badge/Personas-29-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/personas/) [![Advisors](https://img.shields.io/badge/Advisors-5-orange?style=flat-square)](dist/agent-src/personas/advisors/)
 
 > **Choose your experience — developer · founder · content · agency · finance · ops. Add packs. Get a focused command set, not a 500-artefact dump.** Bring your own AI provider.
 
+**Try it in 30 seconds** — drop one read-only subagent into any repo and watch it gate "done": `@production-validator check this branch is actually done`. No wizard, no lock-in, nothing else installed — the [30-second wedge ↓](#quickstart) is the whole first step. Full docs: **[event4u-app.github.io/agent-config](https://event4u-app.github.io/agent-config)**.
+
 **Every public claim in this README is machine-checked — [verify it yourself](docs/proof.md).** In a market that runs on unbacked headline numbers, this one binds each claim to resolvable evidence or fails its own build.
 
-**264 skills, 172 commands, 95 governed rules** — plus a capability router that loads the right skill on intent, and multi-agent orchestration with consensus review. The whole layer is compiled into 7+ host agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Augment, Cline, Windsurf, Copilot, Gemini) with **zero runtime daemon**.<!-- claim:no-runtime-daemon --> Six role-shaped entry paths sit on top, so any host becomes a reliable team member — without locking you to a single model or vendor.
+**267 skills, 172 commands, 100 governed rules** — plus a capability router that loads the right skill on intent, and multi-agent orchestration with consensus review. The whole layer is compiled into 7+ host agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Augment, Cline, Windsurf, Copilot, Gemini) with **zero runtime daemon**.<!-- claim:no-runtime-daemon --> Six role-shaped entry paths sit on top, so any host becomes a reliable team member — without locking you to a single model or vendor.
 
 ### What's different
 
 It is both deep **and** disciplined — and honest about what it deliberately is not:
 
-- **Depth that routes itself** — 264 skills + 172 commands, with a capability router that loads the right one on intent, not a 500-artefact context dump.
+- **Depth that routes itself** — 267 skills + 172 commands, with a capability router that loads the right one on intent, not a 500-artefact context dump.
 - **Governance on every host** — rules compiled into each tool's native format at projection time; deterministic runtime hooks added on hook-capable hosts. This config-space, host-agnostic governance is the moat ([the governance advantage](docs/governance-advantage.md) · [enforcement by host](docs/enforcement-by-host.md)).
 - **Surgical uninstall** — removes only its own keys from a shared host config (matched by JSON-pointer + SHA-256), never a neighbour tool's entries.<!-- claim:surgical-uninstall -->
 - **Pack-scoped install** — writes the active pack only, not a 500-artefact dump.
@@ -118,7 +120,8 @@ is generated from source: a claim→evidence table (every public claim binds to
 resolvable pointer, or CI fails), honest-null benchmarks *including the runs where
 the package changed nothing*, and a "verify it yourself" block you run on a fresh
 checkout. The proof page fails CI if it drifts from its sources — reproducibility
-is the proof.
+is the proof. Browse it on the deployed docs site:
+[event4u-app.github.io/agent-config](https://event4u-app.github.io/agent-config).
 
 Audit-disciplined by construction — every memory consult, decision
 key, and hook concern lands in `agents/runtime/state/` so you can replay it.

package/dist/agent-src/contexts/execution/auto-orchestration-activation.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ whether dispatch is physically possible on the host).
 | Key | Default | Purpose |
 |---|---|---|
 | `subagents.enabled` | `true` | Global master switch. `false` = the whole layer is off — the canonical kill-switch. No auto-dispatch, no routing, everything runs in-session. |
-| `subagents.auto` | `ask` | Auto-dispatch mode: `off` \| `ask` \| `on`. |
+| `subagents.auto` | `on` | Auto-dispatch mode: `off` \| `ask` \| `on`. Default `on` on subagent-capable hosts (flipped from `ask` 2026-07-09, ADR-117), `off` elsewhere. |
 | `subagents.downshift` | `true` | Route delegable sub-tasks to the lowest-capable tier (Phase 2). |
 | `subagents.quota_arbitrage` | `true` | Prefer a separate-quota-pool model where the host manifest allows it (Phase 2 bonus). |
 | `subagents.model_map` | `{}` | Optional per-tier model override for downshift routing. |

package/dist/agent-src/contexts/execution/orchestration-benchmark-gate.md

@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
-# Orchestration Benchmark & Default-Flip Gate (Phase 6)
-
-The falsification gate the whole auto-orchestration roadmap is built around.
-Reaching the user's "default `on`" is a **measured milestone**, not an
-assumption: the shipped default for `subagents.auto` flips toward `on` only
-when a real benchmark proves a net win at held quality.
+# Orchestration Benchmark & Demotion Gate (Phase 6 → telemetry-demotion)
+
+Originally the falsification gate the auto-orchestration roadmap was built
+around: shipped default for `subagents.auto` would flip toward `on` only on a
+benchmark proving a net win at held quality.
+
+**As of 2026-07-09 the shipped default IS `on`** on subagent-capable hosts
+(ADR-117; [`orchestration-default-flip-verdict`](../../../../agents/settings/contexts/orchestration-default-flip-verdict.md)
+§ 2026-07-09). Flipped on a **bounded-downside re-evaluation**, not a passed
+benchmark: rigorous paired bench:ab not producible here (no runtime executing
+model `Task`/`Agent` calls), win-validation deadlocked (telemetry needs `on`,
+`on` gated on telemetry). Re-eval broke the deadlock — downside of `on` is
+structurally small (delegable slices cost-routed to cheapest tier,
+classification fires only on real structural signals, every return verified) →
+`on` gathers realized telemetry responsibly. This gate now governs
+**demotion**: measured regression flips default back to `ask`.
 
 ## Measurement — pin the method
 
@@ -30,18 +40,20 @@ HONEST-NULL EXIT: no win, or quality regressed → KEEP the conservative default
 
 `gateVerdict()` encodes pass = `net_win && quality_held`.
 
-## Default flip — one line, host-gated
+## Default state + demotion — host-gated
 
-On a **passing** gate, the shipped default for `subagents.auto` becomes `on`
-**only** on hosts whose capability manifest reports `subagent_spawn: true`
-(`off` elsewhere). `resolveShippedDefault()` encodes this. The flip itself is a
-one-line edit to the `subagents.auto` default in
-`src/config/agent-settings.template.yml` — no code change, host-gated by the
-manifest at runtime.
+Shipped default for `subagents.auto` is `on` on hosts whose manifest reports
+`subagent_spawn: true` (`off` elsewhere) — set directly in
+`src/config/agent-settings.template.yml`. `resolveShippedDefault()` remains the
+host-gated resolver, now serving **demotion**: fed a `fail` verdict from
+accumulated real-world orchestration telemetry, resolves back to `ask`
+(conservative). A `pass` keeps `on`. Demotion path is a one-line edit,
+host-gated by the manifest at runtime.
 
-Until the gate passes, the shipped default stays `ask` (conservative). This is
-the reconciliation of the user's "default on" goal with the council's
-"prove-first": `on` is the destination, reached by evidence, not assumed.
+The 2026-07-09 flip reconciles the user's "default on" goal with the council's
+"prove-first": rather than wait on a benchmark that cannot be produced here,
+`on` ships because its downside is bounded and reversible, and realized
+telemetry is now free to accrue and drive demotion if it regresses.
 
 ## Reproducibility
 

package/dist/agent-src/contexts/execution/orchestration-telemetry.md

@@ -87,6 +87,21 @@ capture path (decided 2026-06-30, maintainer decision; see
    response length (chars / 4 ≈ tokens). Set `token_delta_provenance:
    "estimated"`. Lossy; measured always preferred.
 
+## Savings report
+
+Aggregate accumulated telemetry into a token-savings report:
+
+```bash
+./scripts-run src/scripts/orchestration_savings_report [--dir <path>] [--format text|json]
+```
+
+Sums `token_delta` across dispatches (negative = net saved); splits by
+provenance (measured vs estimated), `tier_chosen`, `task_class`. Reports
+**ABSOLUTE net tokens saved, never a percentage**: telemetry records net delta,
+not the absolute in-session baseline → "% of session saved" not derivable. A
+percentage needs an additive absolute-baseline field (deferred follow-up).
+Reader: [`src/scripts/_lib/orchestration_savings.ts`](../../../../src/scripts/_lib/orchestration_savings.ts).
+
 ## Related
 
 - [`audit-log-v1`](../../../../docs/contracts/audit-log-v1.md) — the frozen

package/dist/agent-src/rules/active-remediation.md

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+---
+type: "auto"
+tier: "2b"
+alwaysApply: false
+description: "Spotted an issue while working (security gap, missing test, bad code, duplication, stale idiom) — never ignore; fix small+aligned inline, ask on bigger, propose a follow-up PR for many"
+triggers:
+  - intent: "spotted an unrelated issue while working"
+  - intent: "found legacy or duplicated code"
+  - keyword: "refactor"
+  - keyword: "duplicate"
+  - keyword: "legacy"
+  - keyword: "deprecated"
+  - keyword: "modernize"
+  - keyword: "upgrade"
+  - keyword: "cleanup"
+  - keyword: "technical debt"
+workspaces: [engineering]
+packs: [engineering-base]
+---
+
+# Active Remediation
+
+The user doesn't see the code at the spot you're editing — you do. So this package guides the agent to **actively improve** what it touches: don't accept legacy, debt, security gaps, or duplication as given. But active improvement is bounded — never the scope creep `minimal-safe-diff` exists to stop. The rule is a **ladder**: act by size and alignment, and **never silently ignore** a real issue.
+
+## The Iron Law
+
+```
+NEVER IGNORE A REAL ISSUE YOU SPOT — AT MINIMUM, NOTE IT.
+SMALL + TASK-ALIGNED → FIX IT NOW, IN THE SAME CHANGE, WITH ITS TEST.
+BIGGER OR DIVERGENT → NOTE IT, FINISH THE TASK, THEN ASK — NEVER MID-FLOW.
+TOO MANY → PROPOSE ONE OR MORE SEPARATE FOLLOW-UP PRs THE USER REVIEWS.
+A LIVE SECURITY / DATA-EXPOSURE GAP IS NEVER MERELY "NOTED FOR LATER".
+```
+
+## What to remediate
+
+Security gaps (broken access control, injection, secrets, missing authz — see `broken-access-control`) · missing/weak test coverage · bad code (dead code, silent error-swallow, unguarded edge cases) · **duplication** (same/near-same logic repeated instead of one method/abstraction) · **stale version-idioms** (code for an older language/framework version than the project runs).
+
+## The ladder — classify, then act
+
+### Fix now (autonomous, inline) — a bounded amendment to `minimal-safe-diff`
+
+Allowed **only** when ALL hold — the testable "small + task-aligned" definition:
+- **Same request path / module** as the current task (not an unrelated feature).
+- **≤ ~10 changed lines** in one production file plus its test file — no wider cross-file ripple.
+- **No public-API / response-shape change**, no new parameter.
+- **No dependency bump, no migration, no data change.**
+- **Its verification ships in the same commit** — the security fix's negative test, the correctness fix's case.
+
+Under those constraints the fix is auditable in the same diff and is *not* scope creep — it corrects a boundary the agent touched. Anything outside them → **note + ask**, never auto. (`minimal-safe-diff` still governs the rest: no reformatting, no opportunistic refactor, no drive-by rename.)
+
+### Note + ask (batched)
+
+Bigger, or diverges from the task → do **not** refactor inline, do **not** interrupt the flow. Note the site (file:line + issue). Surface the batch as **one** numbered-options prompt (`user-interaction`, one recommendation line) **after the task is delivered** — or mid-work only when the flow makes it natural. Each option carries a real trade-off (`no-cheap-questions`). Refactor only on an explicit yes, as a separate scoped change (`scope-control`, `downstream-changes`).
+
+### Propose a follow-up PR (many spots)
+
+Too many to fold in without blowing the current diff's scope → propose **one or more separate follow-up PRs** (or a roadmap under `agents/roadmaps/`, using the shared-prefix convention) so the user reviews before merge. Creating the PR/roadmap is **permission-gated** — propose, get a yes, then create (`scope-control`, `commit-policy`).
+
+## Version-gated modernization
+
+Update stale idioms to the version the project **actually runs** — only when that version is **verified**:
+- **Establish the version first** from the manifest constraint (`composer.json` `require`, `package.json` `engines`, `.tool-versions`, lockfile) — use the **lowest** bound; on an ambiguous/monorepo range, ask once. **Unknown version → do not touch** (must fit the project structure — the `source-discovery` gate).
+- **Syntax-only, behavior-preserving idioms** (e.g. `array()` → `[]`, `isset($x)?$x:$d` → `$x ?? $d`, concat → template) provably equivalent → treat as a small fix (auto per the ladder).
+- **Behavioral changes** (`readonly`/typed properties, new semantics) and **any dependency/version bump** → **ask only**, never auto (a version bump stays under `minimal-safe-diff`'s no-dependency-bump prohibition; a pure syntax idiom is categorically different).
+
+## Live-security carve-out (priority)
+
+A **live cross-user / cross-tenant data exposure** (`broken-access-control`) is not "note for later": a potential GDPR-notifiable breach (Art. 33, 72 h from discovery). Meets the fix-now bar → fix now with its negative test. Otherwise → **stop and surface it immediately** (a safety surface, visible even under an autonomous mandate — like the `no-pr-progress-comments` safety carve-out). Never defer silently, never look away.
+
+## Guardrails — don't become a nagging machine
+
+- Subordinate to `no-cheap-questions` (self-check items 3 & 14 — real trade-off, not a disguised continuation/commit ask), `autonomous-execution` (the end-of-session batch must not read as "shall I continue?"), `user-interaction`, `ask-when-uncertain` (one batched prompt = one question).
+- Threshold to surface at all: a **real, nameable** improvement with concrete benefit. Cosmetic nitpicks with no trade-off → drop silently. The live-security carve-out is the only case that interrupts or overrides autonomy.
+
+## When it fires
+
+While implementing/modifying code you pass an issue outside the literal task. Also on explicit "clean this up / modernize / dedupe".
+
+## When NOT to fire
+
+- No issue spotted. Prose/docs-only. User fenced the scope ("just this one line").
+- The issue is the task itself — then it's just the task (no ladder needed).
+
+## See also
+
+- [`minimal-safe-diff`](minimal-safe-diff.md) — the carve-out above is bounded by it; everything outside the five conditions stays note+ask.
+- [`broken-access-control`](broken-access-control.md) — the security category + the live-exposure carve-out.
+- [`prefer-enums-over-literals`](prefer-enums-over-literals.md) — an instance of this ladder (enum literals).
+- [`source-discovery-gate`](source-discovery-gate.md) — establishing the verified project version before modernizing.
+- [`scope-control`](scope-control.md), [`commit-policy`](commit-policy.md) — PR/commit creation stays permission-gated.
+- [`improve-before-implement`](improve-before-implement.md) — the pre-work challenge (before); this is the during/after remediation.

package/dist/agent-src/rules/broken-access-control.md

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+---
+type: "auto"
+tier: "2a"
+alwaysApply: false
+description: "Endpoint/query returning user or tenant data — authenticated ≠ authorized; enforce a server-derived ownership/tenant/role check + the three negative tests (401/non-owner/cross-tenant)"
+triggers:
+  - intent: "returning user or tenant data"
+  - intent: "adding an endpoint that reads a record by id"
+  - keyword: "endpoint"
+  - keyword: "route"
+  - keyword: "authorization"
+  - keyword: "tenant"
+  - keyword: "IDOR"
+  - keyword: "session"
+  - keyword: "login"
+  - keyword: "controller"
+  - keyword: "findById"
+routes_to:
+  - "skill:authz-review"
+  - "skill:threat-modeling"
+  - "skill:multi-tenancy"
+workspaces: [engineering]
+packs: [engineering-base]
+---
+
+# Broken Access Control
+
+The most common — and most damaging — failure in real systems and AI-written code: log in as one user, see another user's data. **Authenticated ≠ authorized.** The login check passes so the endpoint *feels* protected; the per-object ownership/tenant check is a separate line devs and AI omit — especially when the object id comes from the request. OWASP Web #1 (A01:2021) and API #1 (BOLA/IDOR), trivially scriptable, and a recurring real-world breach class — e.g. First American Financial (885M documents exposed via sequential ids with no ownership check).
+
+## The Iron Law
+
+```
+AUTHENTICATED IS NOT AUTHORIZED. EVERY REQUEST-SUPPLIED ID/FILTER GETS A
+SERVER-DERIVED OWNERSHIP/TENANT CHECK BEFORE ANY DATA IS RETURNED.
+NO DATA-RETURNING ENDPOINT IS DONE WITHOUT THREE NEGATIVE TESTS:
+UNAUTHENTICATED → 401 · NOT-OWNER → 403/404 · CROSS-TENANT → 403/404 (404 HIDES EXISTENCE).
+ROLE DECIDES WHICH FIELDS — THE SERVER STRIPS THEM. THE FRONTEND HIDING A FIELD IS NOT PROTECTION.
+A LIVE CROSS-USER EXPOSURE IS A NOTIFIABLE BREACH — NEVER SILENTLY PATCH IT.
+```
+
+## Non-optional controls (every data-returning surface)
+
+- **Server-derived principal.** Ownership/tenant derived from the session/token, **never** from a request header/param/body the caller controls. A matching id in the request is not authorization.
+- **Ownership/tenant check on every request id** before returning data. `findById(params.id)` with no `where owner/tenant = currentPrincipal` is the canonical bug.
+- **Tenant-scoped by construction.** Every query on a tenant table carries the tenant predicate; prefer a base scope that injects it so a forgotten clause can't leak. (DSGVO: Mandantentrennung / Trennungskontrolle is a required TOM — a missing `tenant_id` filter is a compliance failure, not just a bug.)
+- **Response minimization.** Return only entitled fields — no `SELECT *` / full-object serialization leaking PII "because the model has it" (Art. 25(2)).
+- **Property-level authz (BOPLA / mass assignment).** Reject `role` / `user_id` / `tenant_id` / `is_admin` from the request body; explicit field allow-list, never whole-body binding.
+- **Role/field-level output filtering (vertical BOPLA).** *Which* fields a principal receives depends on role + business rules — a driver role must not receive `price`; an office role must not receive the boss's `offer`. Serialize via a **role-scoped output DTO**, never the raw model / `to_json()`; sensitive fields (`price`/`cost`/`margin`/`salary`/`discount`/`offer`/internal notes) default-deny per role.
+- **No guessable public ids** on sensitive resources — UUID/ULID, not sequential integers (turns one bug into full-DB enumeration).
+
+## The three negative tests — the completion gate
+
+A protected endpoint is **not complete** until these exist and pass (happy-path 200 alone is the tautology this rule stops):
+
+1. **unauthenticated → 401** (no token).
+2. **authenticated but not the owner → 403/404** (user A requests user B's object with A's token).
+3. **cross-tenant → 403/404** (a principal in tenant A requests tenant B's resource; prefer 404 on sensitive resources — a hard 403 confirms the id exists in another tenant).
+
+Small + task-aligned gap in code you touched → add the check **and** its negative test in the same commit (auto-fix boundary in `active-remediation`). Bigger → surface it.
+
+## Role-based field-level access — both directions (vertical BOPLA + BFLA)
+
+Object-ownership (above) is *horizontal* (may this principal touch this record). This is *vertical*: which **fields** and which **functions** a role may reach — the maintainer's case (driver ≠ price, office worker ≠ boss's offer). Depends on role + business rules, and **the server is the only boundary** — the frontend hiding a field does not protect it: the raw JSON on the wire is readable via `curl`/DevTools/a proxy (3Fun leak: a privacy toggle filtered only in the app; the server returned every user's location to a direct query).
+
+- **Read side (CWE-213 / Excessive Data Exposure).** Build the response from a **role-scoped output DTO** — never serialize the ORM model directly. Sensitive fields default-deny per role. A client `?fields=` selection is ergonomics, not authorization — intersect it server-side with the role's read-allowlist.
+- **Write side (CWE-915).** Bind input through a **role-scoped write-allowlist** — never the raw body. Read-allowed ≠ write-allowed: a role may *see* `status` but not *set* `status:"approved"`; two independent sets.
+- **Function level (BFLA, OWASP API #5).** A role must not reach a function/verb reserved for a higher role. Gate **every mutating verb** (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE), deny-by-default — not just the GET you were asked about. The admin button being hidden is not a control.
+- **Nested / GraphQL.** Field-level checks propagate to nested selections; a low-role token selecting a restricted field gets null/error, not data.
+- **Negative tests, per (role × sensitive field), both directions:** lower-role token → the field is **absent from the raw response body** (assert the body, not the UI); lower-role setting it on input → rejected/ignored, **verified by re-reading the persisted record**; every privileged verb → 403 for lower roles (403/404 on sensitive object reads).
+
+## Defense-in-depth (so one miss can't leak)
+
+Stack ≥2 independent layers on sensitive data — query-level ownership scoping, a centralized default-deny policy layer (a route with no policy is denied, not silently open), and DB row-level security as the backstop for a forgotten `WHERE tenant_id`. The RLS / policy-layer configuration, the per-role authz matrix, and the audit greps live once in [`authz-review`](../skills/authz-review/SKILL.md).
+
+## GDPR / DSGVO — data protection by design
+
+A cross-user leak violates **Art. 5(1)(f)** (integrity & confidentiality — a principle → higher fine tier), **Art. 25** (by design/default: default-deny + least privilege + response minimization), and **Art. 32** — which also **mandates a process for regularly testing effectiveness** of these controls (untested authz is a direct Art. 32 gap; hence the three negative tests are non-optional). A discovered live exposure is a **notifiable breach** (Art. 33, 72 h from discovery) — surface as "notify + remediate", never a silent patch. Data-protection context, not legal advice → `privacy-review`, `domain-safety-pii`.
+
+## Backstop greps (authoring-time)
+
+```bash
+# Record fetched by request id with no owner/tenant predicate nearby (high-noise — a hit means read the line, not auto-fix)
+rg -n '(findById|find|findOne|get)\(\s*(req\.|request\.|params\.|\$request|\$id)'
+# Client-supplied tenant/user hint used as the scope (should come from the session)
+rg -n '(tenant|tenantId|user_id|userId)\s*=\s*(req|request|params|headers|query)\.'
+```
+
+The full authoring-time grep set (mass-assignment, raw-serialization, secrets) lives once in [`ai-code-blindspots`](../skills/ai-code-blindspots/SKILL.md).
+
+A hit means read that line — is the ownership/tenant check present? Some are safe (already scoped); none should ship unchecked.
+
+## When it fires
+
+Writing/modifying any endpoint, route, query, or serializer returning user- or tenant-owned data, or any auth/session/login/tenant path.
+
+## When NOT to fire
+
+- Public, non-user-specific data with no principal concept (public docs page, health check with no data).
+- Prose/docs/config-only edits.
+
+## See also
+
+- [`authz-review`](../skills/authz-review/SKILL.md) — the 6-stage per-entrypoint chain, defense-in-depth, authz matrix, negative-test contract.
+- [`security-sensitive-stop`](security-sensitive-stop.md) — threat-model BEFORE editing an auth/tenant path (fires first).
+- [`active-remediation`](active-remediation.md) — the fix-now/ask/follow-up ladder + the live-exposure safety carve-out.
+- [`threat-modeling`](../skills/threat-modeling/SKILL.md), [`multi-tenancy`](../skills/multi-tenancy/SKILL.md), [`ai-code-blindspots`](../skills/ai-code-blindspots/SKILL.md), [`privacy-review`](../skills/privacy-review/SKILL.md).

package/dist/agent-src/rules/communication-through-line.md

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+type: "auto"
+tier: "2b"
+alwaysApply: false
+description: "Multi-step or continuation replies carry a red thread — state the goal once, tie each turn back to it, name what changed since last turn, close the loop with one end-summary"
+triggers:
+  - intent: "producing a multi-step or continuation reply"
+  - intent: "reporting progress on ongoing work"
+workspaces: [agent-config-maintainer, construction, engineering, finance, founder, gtm, legal-review-prep, ops, product, small-business]
+packs: [engineering-base]
+---
+
+# Communication Through-Line
+
+The user follows the work through your replies. A multi-step task whose replies jump between sub-topics with no visible thread forces the user to re-derive where things stand every turn. Give the work a **red thread**: a followable narrative from goal to result. Session-spanning coherence — distinct from single-reply brevity (`direct-answers`) and option formatting (`user-interaction`), which it never overrides.
+
+## The Iron Law
+
+```
+STATE THE GOAL ONCE. TIE EACH TURN BACK TO IT. NAME WHAT CHANGED SINCE THE LAST TURN.
+CLOSE THE LOOP WITH ONE END-SUMMARY. NEVER MAKE THE USER RE-DERIVE WHERE THINGS STAND.
+```
+
+## Checkable behaviors
+
+- **Anchor once.** At the start of a multi-step task, state the goal/plan in one line (not re-stated every turn).
+- **Each turn locates itself.** A mid-task reply says, in a few words, where it sits in the plan ("step 3/5", "now the downstream wiring") — so the user never scrolls up to orient.
+- **Name the delta.** On a continuation, say what changed since the last turn (what landed, what's next) rather than restating everything.
+- **Close the loop.** A work reply ends with ONE end-summary mapping back to the stated goal — reached or not, what remains. (Same single end-summary `direct-answers` requires; do not add a second.)
+- **Signal pivots.** If the work changes direction (new sub-task, interrupt, blocker), say so explicitly — a silent topic switch breaks the thread.
+
+## When NOT to over-apply
+
+- A one-shot answer or trivial reply needs no plan-anchor or end-summary (`direct-answers` brevity wins).
+- Don't narrate for its own sake — the thread is orientation, not play-by-play (respect `personal.play_by_play`).
+- Never let the through-line inflate a reply past what the task needs; brevity and the one-recommendation rule win on conflict.
+
+## See also
+
+- [`direct-answers`](direct-answers.md) — brevity + the single end-summary this closes the loop with.
+- [`user-interaction`](user-interaction.md) — the one-recommendation format; through-line never adds a competing summary.
+- [`language-and-tone`](language-and-tone.md) — the thread is in the user's language.

package/dist/agent-src/rules/decision-revisit-gate.md

@@ -45,6 +45,14 @@ ceiling on what the package may ever become.
   `telegraph-speak`, thin-projector trimming) that rejects a change on
   cost grounds alone.
 - An ADR whose decision is being cited as a blocker for the current change.
+- A **hard structural cap** (kernel size, per-domain persona cap, rich-skill
+  ratio). A change that genuinely *qualifies* to cross the cap — e.g. a new
+  rule that truly meets the kernel-membership inclusion criteria — triggers a
+  **cap-raise proposal + maintainer/council approval**, never a silent
+  downgrade of the rule to fit the old number (e.g. demoting a must-always-fire
+  rule to `auto` just because the kernel says 9). Fitting the cap is not a
+  reason to weaken a qualifying rule; but a rule that does **not** meet the
+  criteria stays out — the cap is not the reason, the criteria are.
 
 ## What to do when it fires
 

package/dist/agent-src/rules/minimal-safe-diff.md

@@ -98,4 +98,21 @@ After the incident, open a **follow-up PR** for any scope that was
 intentionally deferred and reference the break-glass commit in its
 description.
 
-See also: `scope-control` · `downstream-changes` · `think-before-action` · `preservation-guard` · `verify-before-complete`.
+## Bounded remediation carve-out
+
+The default stands: no drive-by edits, no opportunistic refactors. The one
+bounded exception — a **small, task-aligned security/correctness fix in code
+the current task already touches** — is governed by
+[`active-remediation`](active-remediation.md). Permitted inline **only** when
+ALL hold: same request path / module, ≤ ~10 changed lines in one production file (plus its test file),
+no public-API / response-shape change, no dependency bump or migration, and
+its verification (e.g. the negative test) ships in the same commit. Anything
+outside those five conditions is **not** this carve-out — it is note + ask per
+`active-remediation`. This never licenses reformatting, renames, dependency
+bumps, or version upgrades (a syntax-idiom modernization is allowed only under
+`active-remediation`'s version-gated, behavior-preserving clause; a
+dependency/version bump stays ask-only). The sole case that may interrupt is a
+**live cross-user/tenant data exposure** ([`broken-access-control`](broken-access-control.md)) —
+fix-now-if-small, else stop and surface; never defer it silently.
+
+See also: `scope-control` · `downstream-changes` · `think-before-action` · `preservation-guard` · `verify-before-complete` · [`active-remediation`](active-remediation.md) · [`broken-access-control`](broken-access-control.md).