@ethernity-cloud/sdk-js 1.5.16 → 1.5.17

package/nodenithy/build/securelock/src/ecld_state.js

@@ -1,780 +1,815 @@
-// Enclave State Registry (ESR) — in-enclave state API (Nodenithy).
-//
-// Gives payload code durable, encrypted state across tasks:
-//
-//     const { StateRegistry } = require('./ecld_state');
-//     const state = new StateRegistry();
-//     await state.commit('my-key', (s) => ({ ...s, n: (s.n || 0) + 1 }));
-//
-// State is encrypted inside the enclave, stored as an IPFS object, and only a
-// POINTER (the CID) plus a version goes on-chain. The registry keeps one entry
-// per (enclave, key) with monotonic versions and optimistic concurrency.
-//
-// ## Why the enclave computes the CID itself
-//
-// The node is untrusted. If it told the enclave which CID to commit, a
-// malicious operator could pin the enclave's blob but return the CID of
-// DIFFERENT content; the enclave would sign that onto the chain, and clients
-// would fetch attacker-chosen state believing the enclave authored it.
-//
-// A CID is a hash of the content, so the enclave derives it from the bytes it
-// just encrypted (CIDv1/raw = base32(0x01 0x55 0x12 0x20 || sha256(content)))
-// and commits that. The node pins and verifies but never chooses. It also means
-// the enclave never waits on the node: it writes the blob, writes the CID,
-// commits, and moves on.
-//
-// ## Encryption
-//
-// State is encrypted with a key derived from the enclave identity under a
-// SECOND domain separator (distinct from the ESR wallet's), so the state key
-// cannot collide with the wallet key. State therefore inherits exactly the
-// identity's security: enclave-only on mainnet, reproducible on testnet — which
-// is the accepted testnet posture (functional testing, not secrecy).
-//
-// SECURITY: the state key and the wallet key never leave this module. Only the
-// address and the CID are ever emitted.
-const crypto = require('crypto');
-const { ethers } = require('ethers');
-const esr_wallet = require('./esr_wallet');
-
-const DOMAIN_SEP_STATE = 'ethernity-cloud/esr-encryption/v1';
-
-// AES-GCM parameters, pinned explicitly so the blob layout never depends on a
-// library default: nonce(12) || tag(16) || ciphertext.
-const NONCE_LEN = 12;
-const TAG_LEN = 16;
-
-let _identityPriv = null;
-let _swift = null;
-let _bucket = null;
-let _contractAddress = null;
-let _provider = null;
-
-// LOCAL TESTING ONLY (esr_local). In the real enclave these stay null: the node
-// applies commitFor on-chain and _contract() builds a real ethers.Contract. The
-// local ESR emulator overrides the "contract" with an in-memory object and
-// applies commits itself, so ecld-test runs state-using backends with no chain.
-let _contractOverride = null;
-let _localCommitApply = null;
-
-function setContractOverride(obj) { _contractOverride = obj; }
-function setLocalCommitApply(fn) { _localCommitApply = fn; }
-
-/**
- * Wire the registry to the enclave's identity, storage and chain access.
- * Called by securelock at task start; payload code never calls this.
- */
-function configure({ identityPriv, swiftStreamService, bucket, contractAddress, provider, caller = null }) {
-  _identityPriv = identityPriv;
-  _swift = swiftStreamService;
-  _bucket = bucket;
-  _contractAddress = contractAddress;
-  _provider = provider;
-  _esrLedger = [];
-  _taskNonces = {};
-  _taskLedger = {};
-  _taskCaller = normAddr(caller);
-}
-
-// The authenticated task caller: the wallet that placed the DO request, read
-// from the PoX contract by the TRUSTEDZONE and forwarded over its signed
-// handoff (caller.securelock + .sig, verified by securelock before configure).
-// null when the trustedzone did not supply one -- anonymity is never a
-// privilege: null cannot claim ownership or touch owned state.
-let _taskCaller = null;
-
-function taskCaller() {
-  return _taskCaller;
-}
-
-function normAddr(addr) {
-  return typeof addr === 'string' && addr ? addr.toLowerCase() : null;
-}
-
-/**
- * State container + ACL. Stored blobs are either legacy (raw state --
- * "unowned") or an owned container:
- *   { _ecld_state: 1, acl: {...}, data: <state> }
- * acl = { owner, read: [], write: [], public_read: false }. Enforcement
- * happens HERE, inside the enclave, against the trustedzone-attested caller.
- */
-const CONTAINER_MARK = '_ecld_state';
-
-class StatePermissionError extends Error {}
-
-// A commit's idempotency nonce was already used: the dApp supplied `nonce` on
-// commit() and it is not greater than the last accepted nonce for the key --
-// a duplicate (or out-of-order) submission. The state was NOT changed.
-class StateNonceError extends Error {}
-
-function unwrapStored(stored) {
-  if (stored && typeof stored === 'object' && stored[CONTAINER_MARK] === 1) {
-    return [stored.acl || null, stored.data];
-  }
-  return [null, stored];
-}
-
-function wrapStored(acl, data, committedBy = null, nonce = null) {
-  // For owned state, bind the authoring caller (committedBy) INTO the blob, so
-  // it lands in the CID -- the field the securelock signs -- making the caller
-  // cryptographically bound to the commit, not merely a re-stampable sidecar.
-  // Unowned state keeps the bare shape (no ACL, no binding) -- unless a nonce
-  // must be carried, which forces the container shape.
-  //
-  // `nonce` is a REPORTING COPY of the registry's stored idempotency nonce as
-  // of this commit. The on-chain value (getNonce) is always the primary; the
-  // blob copy exists so the signed CID cryptographically commits to the nonce
-  // the enclave intended, and reads verify the two match (_readContainer).
-  if (!acl && nonce == null) return data;
-  const container = { [CONTAINER_MARK]: 1, acl: acl || null, data };
-  if (committedBy) container.committedBy = committedBy;
-  if (nonce != null) container.nonce = Math.trunc(nonce);
-  return container;
-}
-
-/**
- * Post-payload: re-assert the trusted caller across the ESR ledger. Called by
- * the securelock after the payload returns, with the attested caller captured
- * before execution (outside the payload's reach). Overwrites callerUsed (and
- * re-fixes enclave to the real signer) in every owned entry and RE-STAGES the
- * ledger, so a forged callerUsed cannot reach the trustedzone. Returns true if
- * any entry's callerUsed differed from the trusted value (tamper detected).
- * Defence in depth -- the trustedzone and the CID-bound caller are the sound
- * layers; this runs in the same process the payload subverted.
- */
-async function restampLedgerCaller(trustedCaller) {
-  const trusted = normAddr(trustedCaller);
-  if (!_esrLedger.length) return false;
-  let tampered = false;
-  let signerAddr = null;
-  try {
-    signerAddr = await new StateRegistry()._signer().getAddress();
-  } catch (e) { signerAddr = null; }
-  for (const entry of _esrLedger) {
-    if (!entry.owned) continue;
-    if (normAddr(entry.callerUsed) !== trusted) tampered = true;
-    entry.callerUsed = trusted || '';
-    if (signerAddr) entry.enclave = signerAddr;
-  }
-  try {
-    await _swift.putFileContent(
-      _bucket, 'esr.authorizations.json', '',
-      Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(_esrLedger), 'utf8'));
-  } catch (e) { /* best-effort restage; trustedzone still adjudicates */ }
-  return tampered;
-}
-
-function aclMembers(acl, field) {
-  return new Set((acl[field] || []).map(normAddr).filter(Boolean));
-}
-
-function canRead(acl) {
-  if (!acl || acl.public_read) return true;
-  const c = _taskCaller;
-  if (!c) return false;
-  return c === normAddr(acl.owner) || aclMembers(acl, 'read').has(c) || aclMembers(acl, 'write').has(c);
-}
-
-function canWrite(acl) {
-  if (!acl) return true;                 // unowned: writable; claimed when a caller exists
-  const c = _taskCaller;
-  if (!c) return false;
-  return c === normAddr(acl.owner) || aclMembers(acl, 'write').has(c);
-}
-
-function newAcl(owner) {
-  return { owner, read: [], write: [], public_read: false };
-}
-
-// Task-scoped ledger of every state key this execution touched, recorded by
-// get()/commit(). ecldResult() snapshots it to attach fresh state to the task
-// result, so callers (and the runner's state cache) get current state in the
-// same result -- no separate read task needed. Reset per task in configure().
-let _taskLedger = {};
-
-function ledgerRecord(key, version, cid, state) {
-  _taskLedger[key] = { key, version: Number(version), cid, state };
-}
-
-/**
- * The `esr` attachment for ecldResult: wallet + entries. Synchronous by
- * design (the securelock consumes results synchronously): entries come from
- * the in-memory ledger of keys this task already touched. To attach a key the
- * task did not touch, use the async esrFetch() helper, which awaits the reads
- * (populating the ledger) before building the result.
- */
-function ledgerSnapshot(includeState = true, keys = null) {
-  const reg = new StateRegistry();
-  const wanted = keys ? keys : Object.keys(_taskLedger);
-  const entries = [];
-  for (const k of wanted) {
-    const e = _taskLedger[k];
-    if (!e) continue;
-    const entry = { ...e };
-    if (!includeState) delete entry.state;
-    entries.push(entry);
-  }
-  return { wallet: reg.walletAddress, entries };
-}
-
-function keccak256(buf) {
-  return Buffer.from(ethers.utils.keccak256(buf).slice(2), 'hex');
-}
-
-/**
- * AES key for state, derived under its own domain separator. A separate
- * separator from the wallet's means the two keys are provably unrelated:
- * compromising one does not yield the other.
- */
-function stateKey() {
-  if (!_identityPriv) {
-    throw new Error('StateRegistry is not configured (no enclave identity)');
-  }
-  const material = Buffer.isBuffer(_identityPriv)
-    ? _identityPriv
-    : Buffer.from(String(_identityPriv), 'utf8');
-  return keccak256(Buffer.concat([Buffer.from(DOMAIN_SEP_STATE, 'utf8'), material]));
-}
-
-/**
- * CIDv1/raw/sha2-256 for `content`, computed without touching IPFS.
- * Matches `ipfs add --cid-version=1 --raw-leaves`, which is what lets the
- * enclave commit a CID it derived itself rather than one a node handed it.
- */
-function cidv1Raw(content) {
-  const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(content).digest();
-  const raw = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x01, 0x55, 0x12, 0x20]), digest]);
-  return 'b' + base32Encode(raw).toLowerCase().replace(/=+$/, '');
-}
-
-// RFC4648 base32, no padding stripped here (the caller strips it).
-function base32Encode(buf) {
-  const A = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567';
-  let bits = 0;
-  let value = 0;
-  let out = '';
-  for (const byte of buf) {
-    value = (value << 8) | byte;
-    bits += 8;
-    while (bits >= 5) {
-      out += A[(value >>> (bits - 5)) & 31];
-      bits -= 5;
-    }
-  }
-  if (bits > 0) out += A[(value << (5 - bits)) & 31];
-  return out;
-}
-
-/**
- * True only for values shaped like an IPFS CID.
- *
- * The contract accepts any non-empty string as the pointer, so a buggy writer
- * can commit something that is not a CID (the live registry holds one 0x…
- * digest). That is a defect in the writer, not a supported format: such an
- * entry is rejected rather than fetched, because passing it on means an error
- * at best and a retry-loop at worst.
- */
-function looksLikeCID(value) {
-  const cid = (value || '').trim();
-  if (!cid || cid.startsWith('0x')) return false;
-  if (cid.startsWith('Qm') && cid.length === 46) return true;
-  if (cid.startsWith('b') && cid.length >= 46 && cid === cid.toLowerCase()) return true;
-  return false;
-}
-
-function encrypt(plaintext) {
-  const nonce = crypto.randomBytes(NONCE_LEN);
-  const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', stateKey(), nonce, {
-    authTagLength: TAG_LEN
-  });
-  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
-  return Buffer.concat([nonce, cipher.getAuthTag(), ct]);
-}
-
-function decrypt(blob) {
-  if (blob.length < NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN) {
-    throw new Error('state blob is too short to be valid');
-  }
-  const nonce = blob.subarray(0, NONCE_LEN);
-  const tag = blob.subarray(NONCE_LEN, NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN);
-  const ct = blob.subarray(NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN);
-  const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', stateKey(), nonce, {
-    authTagLength: TAG_LEN
-  });
-  decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
-  return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ct), decipher.final()]);
-}
-
-/** The bytes32 the contract is keyed by: keccak256(key). */
-function keyHash(key) {
-  return ethers.utils.id(key);
-}
-
-const ESR_ABI = [
-  'function commit(bytes32 key, string newCID, uint256 expectedVersion, uint256 nonce)',
-  'function commitFor(address enclave, bytes32 key, string newCID, uint256 expectedVersion, uint256 relayNonce, uint256 nonce, bytes signature)',
-  'function commitDigest(address enclave, bytes32 key, string newCID, uint256 expectedVersion, uint256 relayNonce, uint256 nonce) view returns (bytes32)',
-  'function relayNonce(address enclave) view returns (uint256)',
-  'function getState(address enclave, bytes32 key) view returns (string cid, uint256 version, uint64 updatedAt)',
-  'function getVersion(address enclave, bytes32 key) view returns (uint256)',
-  'function getNonce(address enclave, bytes32 key) view returns (uint256)',
-  'function exists(address enclave, bytes32 key) view returns (bool)'
-];
-
-// Order-wide ledger of signed authorizations. ESR commits do NOT pay their own
-// gas (see contracts/esr/RELAY-DESIGN.md): the enclave only SIGNS each commit
-// (commitFor); the NODE relays it and pays, and does all gas accounting. The
-// securelock does no gas math -- nothing it could claim about cost is trusted.
-let _esrLedger = [];
-
-// Per-task memo of the last idempotency nonce ACCEPTED per key, so a
-// getNonce() right after a commit in the SAME task returns the fresh value
-// even before the node's relay lands on-chain.
-let _taskNonces = {};
-
-class StateRegistry {
-  constructor() {
-    if (!_contractAddress) {
-      throw new Error(
-        'ESR is not enabled for this enclave. Enable it (ECLD_ESR_ENABLE) and ' +
-          'rebuild, so the registry address is baked into the image.'
-      );
-    }
-    this._priv = null;
-  }
-
-  /** The enclave's on-chain address — safe to publish and to fund. */
-  get walletAddress() {
-    return esr_wallet.deriveWalletAddress(_identityPriv);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Alias of walletAddress — the ENCLAVE's own on-chain address (its identity,
-   * and the namespace all its state keys live under). Preferred name in new
-   * code; walletAddress remains for compatibility.
-   */
-  get enclaveAddress() {
-    return this.walletAddress;
-  }
-
-  _signer() {
-    // Reuse esr_wallet's derivation rather than repeating it here: two copies
-    // would eventually disagree, and the address a client funds would stop
-    // matching the key that signs. The key stays inside this method.
-    if (this._priv === null) {
-      this._priv = esr_wallet._deriveWalletPrivateKey(_identityPriv);
-    }
-    return new ethers.Wallet(this._priv, _provider);
-  }
-
-  _contract(signerOrProvider) {
-    // Local emulator: use the in-memory contract object instead of a real one.
-    if (_contractOverride) return _contractOverride;
-    return new ethers.Contract(_contractAddress, ESR_ABI, signerOrProvider || _provider);
-  }
-
-  /** Current on-chain version for `key`; 0 when never committed. */
-  async getVersion(key) {
-    const v = await this._contract().getVersion(this.walletAddress, keyHash(key));
-    return Number(v);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Decrypted state for `key`, or `fallback` ({} by default) when absent.
-   *
-   * Throws on a pointer that is not a CID: treating a broken pointer as "no
-   * state" would let the next commit overwrite data that is still recoverable.
-   */
-  async get(key, fallback = {}) {
-    const [acl, data, version, cid] = await this._readContainer(key, fallback);
-    if (!canRead(acl)) {
-      throw new StatePermissionError(
-        `caller ${_taskCaller || '<anonymous>'} has no read permission on ` +
-          `state key '${key}' (owner: ${acl.owner})`
-      );
-    }
-    ledgerRecord(key, version || 0, cid, data);
-    return data;
-  }
-
-  /** [acl, data, version, cid] for `key`; NO permission check here. */
-  async _readContainer(key, fallback = {}) {
-    const [cid, version] = await this._contract().getState(this.walletAddress, keyHash(key));
-    if (!version || !cid) {
-      return [null, fallback, 0, null];
-    }
-    if (!looksLikeCID(cid)) {
-      throw new Error(
-        `ESR entry for '${key}' holds a pointer that is not a CID (${cid.slice(0, 32)}…). ` +
-          'The committing code is writing a non-CID value.'
-      );
-    }
-    const blob = await this._fetch(key, cid);
-    const stored = JSON.parse(decrypt(blob).toString('utf8'));
-    const [acl, data] = unwrapStored(stored);
-    if (stored && typeof stored === 'object' && stored[CONTAINER_MARK] === 1
-        && stored.nonce != null) {
-      // The blob carries a REPORTING COPY of the idempotency nonce; the chain
-      // is primary. Both were written by the same commit (the CID the chain
-      // points at IS this blob), so they must agree -- a mismatch means the
-      // registry entry and the state object have been tampered with or torn
-      // apart. Compare against the RAW chain value (not the task memo): the
-      // blob we fetched is the chain's cid.
-      const chainNonce = Number(await this._contract().getNonce(this.walletAddress, keyHash(key)));
-      const blobNonce = Math.trunc(Number(stored.nonce));
-      if (blobNonce !== chainNonce) {
-        throw new Error(
-          `ESR nonce mismatch for '${key}': the state object reports nonce ` +
-            `${blobNonce} but the registry records ${chainNonce} -- refusing ` +
-            'to use this state'
-        );
-      }
-    }
-    return [acl, data, Number(version), cid];
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * The last accepted idempotency nonce for `key` (0 if none was ever used).
-   * A dApp that wants duplicate suppression reads this and passes
-   * getNonce(key) + 1 to commit(..., { nonce }) -- the contract accepts
-   * EXACTLY the next value in sequence, nothing else.
-   *
-   * The nonce is PUBLIC data: the registry records it on-chain next to the
-   * version, and anyone can read it with a free eth_call (getNonce) -- so no
-   * read-ACL applies here, and web3 clients see the same value via the
-   * runner's esrNonce.
-   *
-   * Reads the chain (authoritative, post-relay), merged with this task's
-   * own accepted commits so `commit(..., { nonce: N }); getNonce()` returns N
-   * even before the node's relay lands.
-   */
-  async getNonce(key) {
-    const chain = Number(await this._contract().getNonce(this.walletAddress, keyHash(key)));
-    return Math.max(chain || 0, Number(_taskNonces[key] || 0));
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Read-modify-write `key` under optimistic concurrency.
-   *
-   * `mutate` receives the current state and returns the new state. If another
-   * commit lands in between, the contract rejects ours and we re-read and
-   * retry, so concurrent tasks cannot silently lose updates.
-   */
-  async commit(key, mutate, opts = 3) {
-    // Back-compat: the third arg used to be `attempts` (a number); it may now
-    // also be { attempts, nonce }. The per-key nonce sequence advances by
-    // exactly 1 on EVERY commit (1, 2, 3, ... -- no gaps, no reuse; see
-    // getNonce).
-    //   - Omitted: the SDK takes the next value in sequence automatically.
-    //     Always succeeds (subject to permissions/versioning) but carries NO
-    //     exactly-once guarantee -- a resubmitted task picks a fresh number.
-    //   - Explicit: must be EXACTLY the last accepted nonce + 1, pinned by
-    //     the CLIENT before submitting. Anything else throws StateNonceError
-    //     (task code 36) and the state is NOT changed.
-    const { attempts = 3, nonce = null } =
-      typeof opts === 'number' ? { attempts: opts } : (opts || {});
-    const transform = async (acl, data) => {
-      if (!canWrite(acl)) {
-        throw new StatePermissionError(
-          `caller ${_taskCaller || '<anonymous>'} has no write permission on ` +
-            `state key '${key}' (owner: ${acl.owner})`
-        );
-      }
-      let nextAcl = acl;
-      if (!nextAcl && _taskCaller) nextAcl = newAcl(_taskCaller); // first-writer-owns
-      return [nextAcl, await mutate(data)];
-    };
-    const [, newData] = await this._commitTransform(key, transform, attempts, nonce);
-    return newData;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Optimistic-concurrency commit of transform(acl, data, version) ->
-   * [newAcl, newData]. The stored blob is the wrapped container (or the bare
-   * data while unowned). On a version race we re-read and retry, so
-   * concurrent tasks cannot silently lose updates.
-   */
-  async _commitTransform(key, transform, attempts = 3, nonce = null) {
-    let lastError = null;
-    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < attempts; attempt += 1) {
-      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
-      const [acl, data, currentVersion] = await this._readContainer(key);
-      // The nonce check re-runs on every retry against the freshest visible
-      // nonce (chain merged with this task's own accepted commits), so a
-      // duplicate fails in-enclave with task code 36 instead of as a failed
-      // relay. The contract re-enforces the same rule on-chain either way.
-      let finalNonce;
-      if (nonce != null) {
-        finalNonce = Math.trunc(nonce);
-        if (finalNonce === 0) {
-          throw new StateNonceError(
-            `nonce=0 is reserved for 'not set' (the registry then assigns the ` +
-              `next value itself) -- omit the nonce on commit('${key}', ...) ` +
-              'instead of passing 0. Pinned nonces start at 1: use getNonce() + 1.'
-          );
-        }
-        // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
-        const storedNonce = await this.getNonce(key);
-        if (finalNonce !== storedNonce + 1) {
-          throw new StateNonceError(
-            `nonce ${finalNonce} is out of sequence for state key '${key}' (last accepted: ` +
-              `${storedNonce}, expected: ${storedNonce + 1}); commit suppressed, ` +
-              'state unchanged'
-          );
-        }
-      } else {
-        // No explicit nonce: the CONTRACT assigns the next value in sequence
-        // itself (wire nonce 0 = "omitted"); this predicted value feeds the
-        // blob's reporting copy and the task memo. The sequence advances on
-        // EVERY commit; only an EXPLICIT nonce carries the exactly-once
-        // guarantee (an omitted one is auto-assigned a fresh number, so it
-        // cannot deduplicate -- by design).
-        // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
-        finalNonce = (await this.getNonce(key)) + 1;
-      }
-      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
-      const [nextAcl, newData] = await transform(acl, data, currentVersion);
-      // The blob carries a REPORTING COPY of the nonce the registry will
-      // store for this key after this commit. Chain stays primary; reads
-      // verify the two match.
-      // Bind the authoring caller into the blob (hence the CID/signature) for
-      // owned state.
-      const stored = wrapStored(nextAcl, newData, nextAcl ? _taskCaller : null, finalNonce);
-
-      const blob = encrypt(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(stored), 'utf8'));
-      // Compute the CID from OUR bytes — never accept one from the node.
-      const cid = cidv1Raw(blob);
-
-      // Hand the blob and the CID to the node for pinning. It verifies the CID
-      // matches; it does not get to choose it. Fire-and-forget.
-      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
-      await this._publish(key, blob, cid);
-
-      try {
-        // Wire value: the pinned nonce, or 0 = "omitted" -- the contract
-        // then assigns the next value atomically on-chain.
-        // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
-        await this._sendCommit(keyHash(key), cid, currentVersion,
-          nextAcl ? normAddr(nextAcl.owner) : null,
-          nonce != null ? Math.trunc(nonce) : 0);
-        // Record the POST-commit values (the DATA -- the ACL never leaves in
-        // results): this is what the chain shows once the relay lands.
-        ledgerRecord(key, currentVersion + 1, cid, newData);
-        _taskNonces[key] = finalNonce;
-        return [nextAcl, newData];
-      } catch (e) {
-        const msg = String(e && e.message ? e.message : e);
-        if (/VersionMismatch/i.test(msg) || /version/i.test(msg)) {
-          lastError = e;
-          // eslint-disable-next-line no-continue
-          continue;
-        }
-        throw e;
-      }
-    }
-    throw new Error(`ESR commit failed after ${attempts} attempts: ${lastError}`);
-  }
-
-  async _publish(key, blob, cid) {
-    await _swift.putFileContent(_bucket, `state.${key}.enc`, '', blob);
-    await _swift.putFileContent(_bucket, `state.${key}.cid`, '', cid);
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Read a state object back, verifying it against the on-chain CID.
-   *
-   * The enclave cannot reach IPFS (the Kubo API binds loopback on the host), so
-   * the node stages state objects in the bucket. That makes the node the
-   * delivery path but not a trusted one: content is checked against the CID the
-   * chain records, so a substituted blob is rejected rather than decrypted.
-   */
-  async _fetch(key, cid) {
-    for (const name of [`state.${key}.enc`, `state.${cid}.enc`]) {
-      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
-      const data = await _swift.getFileContentBytes(_bucket, name).catch(() => null);
-      if (data && data.length) {
-        const buf = Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data : Buffer.from(data);
-        if (cidv1Raw(buf) !== cid) {
-          throw new Error(
-            `State object ${name} does not match the committed CID ${cid} — refusing to use it`
-          );
-        }
-        return buf;
-      }
-    }
-    throw new Error(`Could not read state object for '${key}' (${cid})`);
-  }
-
-  async _sendCommit(keyHashHex, cid, expectedVersion, ownerAddr = null, nonce = 0) {
-    // The enclave never pays gas and does NO gas math: it SIGNS the commit
-    // (commitFor) and stages the signed authorization for the node, which
-    // relays it and pays. The trustedzone independently re-prices the whole
-    // ledger and adjudicates. Nothing the securelock could claim about cost is
-    // trusted, so it claims nothing.
-    const signer = this._signer();
-    const enclave = await signer.getAddress();
-    const contract = this._contract();
-
-    const relayNonce = await contract.relayNonce(enclave);
-    // The idempotency nonce is signature-bound: it is part of the digest the
-    // enclave signs, so the relaying node cannot alter or strip it.
-    const digest = await contract.commitDigest(
-      enclave, keyHashHex, cid, expectedVersion, relayNonce, Math.trunc(nonce || 0));
-    // Sign the raw 32-byte digest as an eth_sign message (matches the
-    // contract's "\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32" recovery).
-    const signature = await signer.signMessage(ethers.utils.arrayify(digest));
-
-    const auth = {
-      enclave,
-      keyHash: keyHashHex,
-      cid,
-      expectedVersion: Number(expectedVersion),
-      relayNonce: Number(relayNonce),
-      // PUBLIC idempotency nonce (0 = no guard): recorded on-chain by
-      // commitFor, enforced strictly increasing per (enclave, key).
-      nonce: Math.trunc(nonce || 0),
-      signature,
-      // IMPERSONATION GUARD: the trustedzone requires callerUsed to equal the
-      // DO owner it reads from the PoX contract, so a payload that forged the
-      // in-enclave caller to impersonate another user is rejected outside the
-      // payload's process. It does NOT verify the caller was a permitted
-      // writer (it cannot read the encrypted ACL). Unowned commits carry no
-      // constraint.
-      callerUsed: _taskCaller || '',
-      owned: Boolean(ownerAddr)
-    };
-
-    _esrLedger.push(auth);
-    await _swift.putFileContent(
-      _bucket, 'esr.authorizations.json', '',
-      Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(_esrLedger), 'utf8'));
-    await _swift.putFileContent(
-      _bucket, `esr.commit.${Number(relayNonce)}.json`, '',
-      Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(auth), 'utf8'));
-
-    // LOCAL TESTING: with no node to relay commitFor, apply the commit to the
-    // in-memory registry now so getState/getVersion reflect it. No-op in the
-    // real enclave (hook is null) -- there the node applies it on-chain.
-    if (_localCommitApply) {
-      await _localCommitApply(enclave, keyHashHex, cid, Number(expectedVersion),
-        Math.trunc(nonce || 0));
-    }
-
-    return { relayed: true, relayNonce: Number(relayNonce) };
-  }
-}
-
-/** Owner-only ACL mutation; an unowned key is claimed first (owner = caller). */
-async function ownerOp(key, mutator) {
-  if (!_taskCaller) {
-    throw new StatePermissionError(
-      'state management requires an authenticated caller (the trustedzone supplied none)'
-    );
-  }
-  const reg = new StateRegistry();
-  const transform = async (acl, data) => {
-    let nextAcl = acl || newAcl(_taskCaller);
-    if (normAddr(nextAcl.owner) !== _taskCaller) {
-      throw new StatePermissionError(
-        `caller ${_taskCaller} is not the owner of state key '${key}' (owner: ${nextAcl.owner})`
-      );
-    }
-    nextAcl = mutator({ ...nextAcl });
-    return [nextAcl, data];
-  };
-  const [acl] = await reg._commitTransform(key, transform);
-  return { ...acl };
-}
-
-function assertLevel(level) {
-  if (level !== 'read' && level !== 'write') throw new Error("level must be 'read' or 'write'");
-}
-
-async function esrGrant(key, address, level = 'read') {
-  assertLevel(level);
-  const addr = normAddr(address);
-  if (!addr) throw new Error('a grantee address is required');
-  return ownerOp(key, (acl) => {
-    const members = new Set((acl[level] || []).map(normAddr).filter(Boolean));
-    members.add(addr);
-    acl[level] = [...members].sort();
-    return acl;
-  });
-}
-
-async function esrRevoke(key, address, level = 'read') {
-  assertLevel(level);
-  const addr = normAddr(address);
-  return ownerOp(key, (acl) => {
-    acl[level] = (acl[level] || []).map(normAddr).filter((a) => a && a !== addr).sort();
-    return acl;
-  });
-}
-
-async function esrSetPublicRead(key, enabled = true) {
-  return ownerOp(key, (acl) => {
-    acl.public_read = Boolean(enabled);
-    return acl;
-  });
-}
-
-async function esrTransfer(key, newOwner) {
-  const addr = normAddr(newOwner);
-  if (!addr) throw new Error('a new owner address is required');
-  return ownerOp(key, (acl) => {
-    acl.owner = addr;
-    return acl;
-  });
-}
-
-/** Owner address of `key`, or null while unowned. Exposes nothing else. */
-async function esrOwner(key) {
-  const [acl] = await new StateRegistry()._readContainer(key);
-  return acl ? acl.owner : null;
-}
-
-/** Owner-only: the full ACL of `key`. */
-async function esrAcl(key) {
-  const [acl] = await new StateRegistry()._readContainer(key);
-  if (!acl) return null;
-  if (!_taskCaller || normAddr(acl.owner) !== _taskCaller) {
-    throw new StatePermissionError(
-      `caller ${_taskCaller || '<anonymous>'} is not the owner of state key '${key}'`
-    );
-  }
-  return { ...acl };
-}
-
-function setTaskCaller(caller) { _taskCaller = normAddr(caller); }
-
-/**
- * The last accepted idempotency nonce for `key` (0 if none). See
- * StateRegistry.getNonce / commit(key, mutate, { nonce }).
- */
-async function esrNonce(key) {
-  return new StateRegistry().getNonce(key);
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  StateRegistry,
-  configure,
-  cidv1Raw,
-  looksLikeCID,
-  ledgerSnapshot,
-  taskCaller,
-  setTaskCaller,
-  restampLedgerCaller,
-  StatePermissionError,
-  StateNonceError,
-  esrGrant,
-  esrRevoke,
-  esrSetPublicRead,
-  esrTransfer,
-  esrOwner,
-  esrAcl,
-  esrNonce,
-  // local-testing hooks (esr_local only)
-  setContractOverride,
-  setLocalCommitApply,
-  normAddr
-};
+// Enclave State Registry (ESR) — in-enclave state API (Nodenithy).
+//
+// Gives payload code durable, encrypted state across tasks:
+//
+//     const { StateRegistry } = require('./ecld_state');
+//     const state = new StateRegistry();
+//     await state.commit('my-key', (s) => ({ ...s, n: (s.n || 0) + 1 }));
+//
+// State is encrypted inside the enclave, stored as an IPFS object, and only a
+// POINTER (the CID) plus a version goes on-chain. The registry keeps one entry
+// per (enclave, key) with monotonic versions and optimistic concurrency.
+//
+// ## Why the enclave computes the CID itself
+//
+// The node is untrusted. If it told the enclave which CID to commit, a
+// malicious operator could pin the enclave's blob but return the CID of
+// DIFFERENT content; the enclave would sign that onto the chain, and clients
+// would fetch attacker-chosen state believing the enclave authored it.
+//
+// A CID is a hash of the content, so the enclave derives it from the bytes it
+// just encrypted (CIDv1/raw = base32(0x01 0x55 0x12 0x20 || sha256(content)))
+// and commits that. The node pins and verifies but never chooses. It also means
+// the enclave never waits on the node: it writes the blob, writes the CID,
+// commits, and moves on.
+//
+// ## Encryption
+//
+// State is encrypted with a key derived from the enclave identity under a
+// SECOND domain separator (distinct from the ESR wallet's), so the state key
+// cannot collide with the wallet key. State therefore inherits exactly the
+// identity's security: enclave-only on mainnet, reproducible on testnet — which
+// is the accepted testnet posture (functional testing, not secrecy).
+//
+// SECURITY: the state key and the wallet key never leave this module. Only the
+// address and the CID are ever emitted.
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { ethers } = require('ethers');
+const esr_wallet = require('./esr_wallet');
+
+const DOMAIN_SEP_STATE = 'ethernity-cloud/esr-encryption/v1';
+
+// AES-GCM parameters, pinned explicitly so the blob layout never depends on a
+// library default: nonce(12) || tag(16) || ciphertext.
+const NONCE_LEN = 12;
+const TAG_LEN = 16;
+
+let _identityPriv = null;
+let _swift = null;
+let _bucket = null;
+let _contractAddress = null;
+let _provider = null;
+
+// LOCAL TESTING ONLY (esr_local). In the real enclave these stay null: the node
+// applies commitFor on-chain and _contract() builds a real ethers.Contract. The
+// local ESR emulator overrides the "contract" with an in-memory object and
+// applies commits itself, so ecld-test runs state-using backends with no chain.
+let _contractOverride = null;
+let _localCommitApply = null;
+
+function setContractOverride(obj) { _contractOverride = obj; }
+function setLocalCommitApply(fn) { _localCommitApply = fn; }
+
+/**
+ * Wire the registry to the enclave's identity, storage and chain access.
+ * Called by securelock at task start; payload code never calls this.
+ */
+function configure({ identityPriv, swiftStreamService, bucket, contractAddress, provider, caller = null }) {
+  _identityPriv = identityPriv;
+  _swift = swiftStreamService;
+  _bucket = bucket;
+  _contractAddress = contractAddress;
+  _provider = provider;
+  _esrLedger = [];
+  _taskNonces = {};
+  _taskRelayNonces = {};
+  _taskLedger = {};
+  _taskCaller = normAddr(caller);
+}
+
+// The authenticated task caller: the wallet that placed the DO request, read
+// from the PoX contract by the TRUSTEDZONE and forwarded over its signed
+// handoff (caller.securelock + .sig, verified by securelock before configure).
+// null when the trustedzone did not supply one -- anonymity is never a
+// privilege: null cannot claim ownership or touch owned state.
+let _taskCaller = null;
+
+function taskCaller() {
+  return _taskCaller;
+}
+
+function normAddr(addr) {
+  return typeof addr === 'string' && addr ? addr.toLowerCase() : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * State container + ACL. Stored blobs are either legacy (raw state --
+ * "unowned") or an owned container:
+ *   { _ecld_state: 1, acl: {...}, data: <state> }
+ * acl = { owner, read: [], write: [], public_read: false }. Enforcement
+ * happens HERE, inside the enclave, against the trustedzone-attested caller.
+ */
+const CONTAINER_MARK = '_ecld_state';
+
+class StatePermissionError extends Error {}
+
+// A commit's idempotency nonce was already used: the dApp supplied `nonce` on
+// commit() and it is not greater than the last accepted nonce for the key --
+// a duplicate (or out-of-order) submission. The state was NOT changed.
+class StateNonceError extends Error {}
+
+// Per-run cap on state commits: bounds the number of relayed transactions the
+// node must track/pay and the size of the adjudicated ledger bound into the
+// result transaction. 256 so the on-chain count fits ONE BYTE (bias-1:
+// 0x00 = 1 commit ... 0xFF = 256; an all-zero root means no commits at all).
+// The over-limit commit is NOT applied; earlier commits stand. Surfaces as
+// task code 38 (ESR_COMMIT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED).
+const MAX_COMMITS_PER_TASK = 256;
+
+class StateLimitError extends Error {}
+
+function unwrapStored(stored) {
+  if (stored && typeof stored === 'object' && stored[CONTAINER_MARK] === 1) {
+    return [stored.acl || null, stored.data];
+  }
+  return [null, stored];
+}
+
+function wrapStored(acl, data, committedBy = null, nonce = null) {
+  // For owned state, bind the authoring caller (committedBy) INTO the blob, so
+  // it lands in the CID -- the field the securelock signs -- making the caller
+  // cryptographically bound to the commit, not merely a re-stampable sidecar.
+  // Unowned state keeps the bare shape (no ACL, no binding) -- unless a nonce
+  // must be carried, which forces the container shape.
+  //
+  // `nonce` is a REPORTING COPY of the registry's stored idempotency nonce as
+  // of this commit. The on-chain value (getNonce) is always the primary; the
+  // blob copy exists so the signed CID cryptographically commits to the nonce
+  // the enclave intended, and reads verify the two match (_readContainer).
+  if (!acl && nonce == null) return data;
+  const container = { [CONTAINER_MARK]: 1, acl: acl || null, data };
+  if (committedBy) container.committedBy = committedBy;
+  if (nonce != null) container.nonce = Math.trunc(nonce);
+  return container;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Post-payload: re-assert the trusted caller across the ESR ledger. Called by
+ * the securelock after the payload returns, with the attested caller captured
+ * before execution (outside the payload's reach). Overwrites callerUsed (and
+ * re-fixes enclave to the real signer) in every owned entry and RE-STAGES the
+ * ledger, so a forged callerUsed cannot reach the trustedzone. Returns true if
+ * any entry's callerUsed differed from the trusted value (tamper detected).
+ * Defence in depth -- the trustedzone and the CID-bound caller are the sound
+ * layers; this runs in the same process the payload subverted.
+ */
+async function restampLedgerCaller(trustedCaller) {
+  const trusted = normAddr(trustedCaller);
+  if (!_esrLedger.length) return false;
+  let tampered = false;
+  let signerAddr = null;
+  try {
+    signerAddr = await new StateRegistry()._signer().getAddress();
+  } catch (e) { signerAddr = null; }
+  for (const entry of _esrLedger) {
+    if (!entry.owned) continue;
+    if (normAddr(entry.callerUsed) !== trusted) tampered = true;
+    entry.callerUsed = trusted || '';
+    if (signerAddr) entry.enclave = signerAddr;
+  }
+  try {
+    await _swift.putFileContent(
+      _bucket, 'esr.authorizations.json', '',
+      Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(_esrLedger), 'utf8'));
+  } catch (e) { /* best-effort restage; trustedzone still adjudicates */ }
+  return tampered;
+}
+
+function aclMembers(acl, field) {
+  return new Set((acl[field] || []).map(normAddr).filter(Boolean));
+}
+
+function canRead(acl) {
+  if (!acl || acl.public_read) return true;
+  const c = _taskCaller;
+  if (!c) return false;
+  return c === normAddr(acl.owner) || aclMembers(acl, 'read').has(c) || aclMembers(acl, 'write').has(c);
+}
+
+function canWrite(acl) {
+  if (!acl) return true;                 // unowned: writable; claimed when a caller exists
+  const c = _taskCaller;
+  if (!c) return false;
+  return c === normAddr(acl.owner) || aclMembers(acl, 'write').has(c);
+}
+
+function newAcl(owner) {
+  return { owner, read: [], write: [], public_read: false };
+}
+
+// Task-scoped ledger of every state key this execution touched, recorded by
+// get()/commit(). ecldResult() snapshots it to attach fresh state to the task
+// result, so callers (and the runner's state cache) get current state in the
+// same result -- no separate read task needed. Reset per task in configure().
+let _taskLedger = {};
+
+function ledgerRecord(key, version, cid, state) {
+  _taskLedger[key] = { key, version: Number(version), cid, state };
+}
+
+/**
+ * The `esr` attachment for ecldResult: wallet + entries. Synchronous by
+ * design (the securelock consumes results synchronously): entries come from
+ * the in-memory ledger of keys this task already touched. To attach a key the
+ * task did not touch, use the async esrFetch() helper, which awaits the reads
+ * (populating the ledger) before building the result.
+ */
+function ledgerSnapshot(includeState = true, keys = null) {
+  const reg = new StateRegistry();
+  const wanted = keys ? keys : Object.keys(_taskLedger);
+  const entries = [];
+  for (const k of wanted) {
+    const e = _taskLedger[k];
+    if (!e) continue;
+    const entry = { ...e };
+    if (!includeState) delete entry.state;
+    entries.push(entry);
+  }
+  return { wallet: reg.walletAddress, entries };
+}
+
+function keccak256(buf) {
+  return Buffer.from(ethers.utils.keccak256(buf).slice(2), 'hex');
+}
+
+/**
+ * AES key for state, derived under its own domain separator. A separate
+ * separator from the wallet's means the two keys are provably unrelated:
+ * compromising one does not yield the other.
+ */
+function stateKey() {
+  if (!_identityPriv) {
+    throw new Error('StateRegistry is not configured (no enclave identity)');
+  }
+  const material = Buffer.isBuffer(_identityPriv)
+    ? _identityPriv
+    : Buffer.from(String(_identityPriv), 'utf8');
+  return keccak256(Buffer.concat([Buffer.from(DOMAIN_SEP_STATE, 'utf8'), material]));
+}
+
+/**
+ * CIDv1/raw/sha2-256 for `content`, computed without touching IPFS.
+ * Matches `ipfs add --cid-version=1 --raw-leaves`, which is what lets the
+ * enclave commit a CID it derived itself rather than one a node handed it.
+ */
+function cidv1Raw(content) {
+  const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(content).digest();
+  const raw = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x01, 0x55, 0x12, 0x20]), digest]);
+  return 'b' + base32Encode(raw).toLowerCase().replace(/=+$/, '');
+}
+
+// RFC4648 base32, no padding stripped here (the caller strips it).
+function base32Encode(buf) {
+  const A = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567';
+  let bits = 0;
+  let value = 0;
+  let out = '';
+  for (const byte of buf) {
+    value = (value << 8) | byte;
+    bits += 8;
+    while (bits >= 5) {
+      out += A[(value >>> (bits - 5)) & 31];
+      bits -= 5;
+    }
+  }
+  if (bits > 0) out += A[(value << (5 - bits)) & 31];
+  return out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * True only for values shaped like an IPFS CID.
+ *
+ * The contract accepts any non-empty string as the pointer, so a buggy writer
+ * can commit something that is not a CID (the live registry holds one 0x…
+ * digest). That is a defect in the writer, not a supported format: such an
+ * entry is rejected rather than fetched, because passing it on means an error
+ * at best and a retry-loop at worst.
+ */
+function looksLikeCID(value) {
+  const cid = (value || '').trim();
+  if (!cid || cid.startsWith('0x')) return false;
+  if (cid.startsWith('Qm') && cid.length === 46) return true;
+  if (cid.startsWith('b') && cid.length >= 46 && cid === cid.toLowerCase()) return true;
+  return false;
+}
+
+function encrypt(plaintext) {
+  const nonce = crypto.randomBytes(NONCE_LEN);
+  const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', stateKey(), nonce, {
+    authTagLength: TAG_LEN
+  });
+  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
+  return Buffer.concat([nonce, cipher.getAuthTag(), ct]);
+}
+
+function decrypt(blob) {
+  if (blob.length < NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN) {
+    throw new Error('state blob is too short to be valid');
+  }
+  const nonce = blob.subarray(0, NONCE_LEN);
+  const tag = blob.subarray(NONCE_LEN, NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN);
+  const ct = blob.subarray(NONCE_LEN + TAG_LEN);
+  const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', stateKey(), nonce, {
+    authTagLength: TAG_LEN
+  });
+  decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+  return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ct), decipher.final()]);
+}
+
+/** The bytes32 the contract is keyed by: keccak256(key). */
+function keyHash(key) {
+  return ethers.utils.id(key);
+}
+
+const ESR_ABI = [
+  'function commit(bytes32 key, string newCID, uint256 expectedVersion, uint256 nonce)',
+  'function commitFor(address enclave, bytes32 key, string newCID, uint256 expectedVersion, uint256 relayNonce, uint256 nonce, bytes signature)',
+  'function commitDigest(address enclave, bytes32 key, string newCID, uint256 expectedVersion, uint256 relayNonce, uint256 nonce) view returns (bytes32)',
+  'function relayNonce(address enclave, bytes32 key) view returns (uint256)',
+  'function getState(address enclave, bytes32 key) view returns (string cid, uint256 version, uint64 updatedAt)',
+  'function getVersion(address enclave, bytes32 key) view returns (uint256)',
+  'function getNonce(address enclave, bytes32 key) view returns (uint256)',
+  'function exists(address enclave, bytes32 key) view returns (bool)'
+];
+
+// Order-wide ledger of signed authorizations. ESR commits do NOT pay their own
+// gas (see contracts/esr/RELAY-DESIGN.md): the enclave only SIGNS each commit
+// (commitFor); the NODE relays it and pays, and does all gas accounting. The
+// securelock does no gas math -- nothing it could claim about cost is trusted.
+let _esrLedger = [];
+
+// Per-task memo of the last idempotency nonce ACCEPTED per key, so a
+// getNonce() right after a commit in the SAME task returns the fresh value
+// even before the node's relay lands on-chain.
+let _taskNonces = {};
+
+// Per-task memo of the NEXT relay nonce per key hash, so multiple commits to
+// the same key within one task sign sequential relay nonces even while the
+// node is still relaying the earlier ones.
+let _taskRelayNonces = {};
+
+class StateRegistry {
+  constructor() {
+    if (!_contractAddress) {
+      throw new Error(
+        'ESR is not enabled for this enclave. Enable it (ECLD_ESR_ENABLE) and ' +
+          'rebuild, so the registry address is baked into the image.'
+      );
+    }
+    this._priv = null;
+  }
+
+  /** The enclave's on-chain address — safe to publish and to fund. */
+  get walletAddress() {
+    return esr_wallet.deriveWalletAddress(_identityPriv);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Alias of walletAddress — the ENCLAVE's own on-chain address (its identity,
+   * and the namespace all its state keys live under). Preferred name in new
+   * code; walletAddress remains for compatibility.
+   */
+  get enclaveAddress() {
+    return this.walletAddress;
+  }
+
+  _signer() {
+    // Reuse esr_wallet's derivation rather than repeating it here: two copies
+    // would eventually disagree, and the address a client funds would stop
+    // matching the key that signs. The key stays inside this method.
+    if (this._priv === null) {
+      this._priv = esr_wallet._deriveWalletPrivateKey(_identityPriv);
+    }
+    return new ethers.Wallet(this._priv, _provider);
+  }
+
+  _contract(signerOrProvider) {
+    // Local emulator: use the in-memory contract object instead of a real one.
+    if (_contractOverride) return _contractOverride;
+    return new ethers.Contract(_contractAddress, ESR_ABI, signerOrProvider || _provider);
+  }
+
+  /** Current on-chain version for `key`; 0 when never committed. */
+  async getVersion(key) {
+    const v = await this._contract().getVersion(this.walletAddress, keyHash(key));
+    return Number(v);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Decrypted state for `key`, or `fallback` ({} by default) when absent.
+   *
+   * Throws on a pointer that is not a CID: treating a broken pointer as "no
+   * state" would let the next commit overwrite data that is still recoverable.
+   */
+  async get(key, fallback = {}) {
+    const [acl, data, version, cid] = await this._readContainer(key, fallback);
+    if (!canRead(acl)) {
+      throw new StatePermissionError(
+        `caller ${_taskCaller || '<anonymous>'} has no read permission on ` +
+          `state key '${key}' (owner: ${acl.owner})`
+      );
+    }
+    ledgerRecord(key, version || 0, cid, data);
+    return data;
+  }
+
+  /** [acl, data, version, cid] for `key`; NO permission check here. */
+  async _readContainer(key, fallback = {}) {
+    const [cid, version] = await this._contract().getState(this.walletAddress, keyHash(key));
+    if (!version || !cid) {
+      return [null, fallback, 0, null];
+    }
+    if (!looksLikeCID(cid)) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `ESR entry for '${key}' holds a pointer that is not a CID (${cid.slice(0, 32)}…). ` +
+          'The committing code is writing a non-CID value.'
+      );
+    }
+    const blob = await this._fetch(key, cid);
+    const stored = JSON.parse(decrypt(blob).toString('utf8'));
+    const [acl, data] = unwrapStored(stored);
+    if (stored && typeof stored === 'object' && stored[CONTAINER_MARK] === 1
+        && stored.nonce != null) {
+      // The blob carries a REPORTING COPY of the idempotency nonce; the chain
+      // is primary. Both were written by the same commit (the CID the chain
+      // points at IS this blob), so they must agree -- a mismatch means the
+      // registry entry and the state object have been tampered with or torn
+      // apart. Compare against the RAW chain value (not the task memo): the
+      // blob we fetched is the chain's cid.
+      const chainNonce = Number(await this._contract().getNonce(this.walletAddress, keyHash(key)));
+      const blobNonce = Math.trunc(Number(stored.nonce));
+      if (blobNonce !== chainNonce) {
+        throw new Error(
+          `ESR nonce mismatch for '${key}': the state object reports nonce ` +
+            `${blobNonce} but the registry records ${chainNonce} -- refusing ` +
+            'to use this state'
+        );
+      }
+    }
+    return [acl, data, Number(version), cid];
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The last accepted idempotency nonce for `key` (0 if none was ever used).
+   * A dApp that wants duplicate suppression reads this and passes
+   * getNonce(key) + 1 to commit(..., { nonce }) -- the contract accepts
+   * EXACTLY the next value in sequence, nothing else.
+   *
+   * The nonce is PUBLIC data: the registry records it on-chain next to the
+   * version, and anyone can read it with a free eth_call (getNonce) -- so no
+   * read-ACL applies here, and web3 clients see the same value via the
+   * runner's esrNonce.
+   *
+   * Reads the chain (authoritative, post-relay), merged with this task's
+   * own accepted commits so `commit(..., { nonce: N }); getNonce()` returns N
+   * even before the node's relay lands.
+   */
+  async getNonce(key) {
+    const chain = Number(await this._contract().getNonce(this.walletAddress, keyHash(key)));
+    return Math.max(chain || 0, Number(_taskNonces[key] || 0));
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Read-modify-write `key` under optimistic concurrency.
+   *
+   * `mutate` receives the current state and returns the new state. If another
+   * commit lands in between, the contract rejects ours and we re-read and
+   * retry, so concurrent tasks cannot silently lose updates.
+   */
+  async commit(key, mutate, opts = 3) {
+    // Back-compat: the third arg used to be `attempts` (a number); it may now
+    // also be { attempts, nonce }. The per-key nonce sequence advances by
+    // exactly 1 on EVERY commit (1, 2, 3, ... -- no gaps, no reuse; see
+    // getNonce).
+    //   - Omitted: the SDK takes the next value in sequence automatically.
+    //     Always succeeds (subject to permissions/versioning) but carries NO
+    //     exactly-once guarantee -- a resubmitted task picks a fresh number.
+    //   - Explicit: must be EXACTLY the last accepted nonce + 1, pinned by
+    //     the CLIENT before submitting. Anything else throws StateNonceError
+    //     (task code 36) and the state is NOT changed.
+    const { attempts = 3, nonce = null } =
+      typeof opts === 'number' ? { attempts: opts } : (opts || {});
+    const transform = async (acl, data) => {
+      if (!canWrite(acl)) {
+        throw new StatePermissionError(
+          `caller ${_taskCaller || '<anonymous>'} has no write permission on ` +
+            `state key '${key}' (owner: ${acl.owner})`
+        );
+      }
+      let nextAcl = acl;
+      if (!nextAcl && _taskCaller) nextAcl = newAcl(_taskCaller); // first-writer-owns
+      return [nextAcl, await mutate(data)];
+    };
+    const [, newData] = await this._commitTransform(key, transform, attempts, nonce);
+    return newData;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Optimistic-concurrency commit of transform(acl, data, version) ->
+   * [newAcl, newData]. The stored blob is the wrapped container (or the bare
+   * data while unowned). On a version race we re-read and retry, so
+   * concurrent tasks cannot silently lose updates.
+   */
+  async _commitTransform(key, transform, attempts = 3, nonce = null) {
+    if (_esrLedger.length >= MAX_COMMITS_PER_TASK) {
+      throw new StateLimitError(
+        `this task already made ${_esrLedger.length} state commits -- the ` +
+          `per-run limit is ${MAX_COMMITS_PER_TASK}. Batch your writes (one ` +
+          'commit can update a whole object) or split the work across tasks.'
+      );
+    }
+    let lastError = null;
+    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < attempts; attempt += 1) {
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+      const [acl, data, currentVersion] = await this._readContainer(key);
+      // The nonce check re-runs on every retry against the freshest visible
+      // nonce (chain merged with this task's own accepted commits), so a
+      // duplicate fails in-enclave with task code 36 instead of as a failed
+      // relay. The contract re-enforces the same rule on-chain either way.
+      let finalNonce;
+      if (nonce != null) {
+        finalNonce = Math.trunc(nonce);
+        if (finalNonce === 0) {
+          throw new StateNonceError(
+            `nonce=0 is reserved for 'not set' (the registry then assigns the ` +
+              `next value itself) -- omit the nonce on commit('${key}', ...) ` +
+              'instead of passing 0. Pinned nonces start at 1: use getNonce() + 1.'
+          );
+        }
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+        const storedNonce = await this.getNonce(key);
+        if (finalNonce !== storedNonce + 1) {
+          throw new StateNonceError(
+            `nonce ${finalNonce} is out of sequence for state key '${key}' (last accepted: ` +
+              `${storedNonce}, expected: ${storedNonce + 1}); commit suppressed, ` +
+              'state unchanged'
+          );
+        }
+      } else {
+        // No explicit nonce: the CONTRACT assigns the next value in sequence
+        // itself (wire nonce 0 = "omitted"); this predicted value feeds the
+        // blob's reporting copy and the task memo. The sequence advances on
+        // EVERY commit; only an EXPLICIT nonce carries the exactly-once
+        // guarantee (an omitted one is auto-assigned a fresh number, so it
+        // cannot deduplicate -- by design).
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+        finalNonce = (await this.getNonce(key)) + 1;
+      }
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+      const [nextAcl, newData] = await transform(acl, data, currentVersion);
+      // The blob carries a REPORTING COPY of the nonce the registry will
+      // store for this key after this commit. Chain stays primary; reads
+      // verify the two match.
+      // Bind the authoring caller into the blob (hence the CID/signature) for
+      // owned state.
+      const stored = wrapStored(nextAcl, newData, nextAcl ? _taskCaller : null, finalNonce);
+
+      const blob = encrypt(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(stored), 'utf8'));
+      // Compute the CID from OUR bytes — never accept one from the node.
+      const cid = cidv1Raw(blob);
+
+      // Hand the blob and the CID to the node for pinning. It verifies the CID
+      // matches; it does not get to choose it. Fire-and-forget.
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+      await this._publish(key, blob, cid);
+
+      try {
+        // Wire value: the pinned nonce, or 0 = "omitted" -- the contract
+        // then assigns the next value atomically on-chain.
+        // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+        await this._sendCommit(keyHash(key), cid, currentVersion,
+          nextAcl ? normAddr(nextAcl.owner) : null,
+          nonce != null ? Math.trunc(nonce) : 0);
+        // Record the POST-commit values (the DATA -- the ACL never leaves in
+        // results): this is what the chain shows once the relay lands.
+        ledgerRecord(key, currentVersion + 1, cid, newData);
+        _taskNonces[key] = finalNonce;
+        return [nextAcl, newData];
+      } catch (e) {
+        const msg = String(e && e.message ? e.message : e);
+        if (/VersionMismatch/i.test(msg) || /version/i.test(msg)) {
+          lastError = e;
+          // eslint-disable-next-line no-continue
+          continue;
+        }
+        throw e;
+      }
+    }
+    throw new Error(`ESR commit failed after ${attempts} attempts: ${lastError}`);
+  }
+
+  async _publish(key, blob, cid) {
+    await _swift.putFileContent(_bucket, `state.${key}.enc`, '', blob);
+    await _swift.putFileContent(_bucket, `state.${key}.cid`, '', cid);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Read a state object back, verifying it against the on-chain CID.
+   *
+   * The enclave cannot reach IPFS (the Kubo API binds loopback on the host), so
+   * the node stages state objects in the bucket. That makes the node the
+   * delivery path but not a trusted one: content is checked against the CID the
+   * chain records, so a substituted blob is rejected rather than decrypted.
+   */
+  async _fetch(key, cid) {
+    for (const name of [`state.${key}.enc`, `state.${cid}.enc`]) {
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-await-in-loop
+      const data = await _swift.getFileContentBytes(_bucket, name).catch(() => null);
+      if (data && data.length) {
+        const buf = Buffer.isBuffer(data) ? data : Buffer.from(data);
+        if (cidv1Raw(buf) !== cid) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `State object ${name} does not match the committed CID ${cid} — refusing to use it`
+          );
+        }
+        return buf;
+      }
+    }
+    throw new Error(`Could not read state object for '${key}' (${cid})`);
+  }
+
+  async _sendCommit(keyHashHex, cid, expectedVersion, ownerAddr = null, nonce = 0) {
+    // The enclave never pays gas and does NO gas math: it SIGNS the commit
+    // (commitFor) and stages the signed authorization for the node, which
+    // relays it and pays. The trustedzone independently re-prices the whole
+    // ledger and adjudicates. Nothing the securelock could claim about cost is
+    // trusted, so it claims nothing.
+    const signer = this._signer();
+    const enclave = await signer.getAddress();
+    const contract = this._contract();
+
+    // Relay nonce is PER (enclave, key): same-key commits are strictly
+    // serialized network-wide, different keys relay in parallel. Merge the
+    // chain value with this task's own staged commits so a second commit to
+    // the same key in ONE task signs the next number even before (or while)
+    // the node relays the first.
+    const khHex = String(keyHashHex).toLowerCase();
+    const chainRn = Number(await contract.relayNonce(enclave, keyHashHex));
+    const relayNonce = Math.max(chainRn, Number(_taskRelayNonces[khHex] || 0));
+    // The idempotency nonce is signature-bound: it is part of the digest the
+    // enclave signs, so the relaying node cannot alter or strip it.
+    const digest = await contract.commitDigest(
+      enclave, keyHashHex, cid, expectedVersion, relayNonce, Math.trunc(nonce || 0));
+    // Sign the raw 32-byte digest as an eth_sign message (matches the
+    // contract's "\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n32" recovery).
+    const signature = await signer.signMessage(ethers.utils.arrayify(digest));
+
+    const auth = {
+      enclave,
+      keyHash: keyHashHex,
+      cid,
+      expectedVersion: Number(expectedVersion),
+      relayNonce: Number(relayNonce),
+      // PUBLIC idempotency nonce (0 = no guard): recorded on-chain by
+      // commitFor, enforced strictly increasing per (enclave, key).
+      nonce: Math.trunc(nonce || 0),
+      signature,
+      // IMPERSONATION GUARD: the trustedzone requires callerUsed to equal the
+      // DO owner it reads from the PoX contract, so a payload that forged the
+      // in-enclave caller to impersonate another user is rejected outside the
+      // payload's process. It does NOT verify the caller was a permitted
+      // writer (it cannot read the encrypted ACL). Unowned commits carry no
+      // constraint.
+      callerUsed: _taskCaller || '',
+      owned: Boolean(ownerAddr)
+    };
+
+    _esrLedger.push(auth);
+    await _swift.putFileContent(
+      _bucket, 'esr.authorizations.json', '',
+      Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(_esrLedger), 'utf8'));
+    // The staged filename carries the key prefix so commits to different keys
+    // within one task never collide, and the per-key relay order is explicit.
+    const kh16 = khHex.replace(/^0x/, '').slice(0, 16);
+    await _swift.putFileContent(
+      _bucket, `esr.commit.${kh16}.${Number(relayNonce)}.json`, '',
+      Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(auth), 'utf8'));
+    _taskRelayNonces[khHex] = Number(relayNonce) + 1;
+
+    // LOCAL TESTING: with no node to relay commitFor, apply the commit to the
+    // in-memory registry now so getState/getVersion reflect it. No-op in the
+    // real enclave (hook is null) -- there the node applies it on-chain.
+    if (_localCommitApply) {
+      await _localCommitApply(enclave, keyHashHex, cid, Number(expectedVersion),
+        Math.trunc(nonce || 0));
+    }
+
+    return { relayed: true, relayNonce: Number(relayNonce) };
+  }
+}
+
+/** Owner-only ACL mutation; an unowned key is claimed first (owner = caller). */
+async function ownerOp(key, mutator) {
+  if (!_taskCaller) {
+    throw new StatePermissionError(
+      'state management requires an authenticated caller (the trustedzone supplied none)'
+    );
+  }
+  const reg = new StateRegistry();
+  const transform = async (acl, data) => {
+    let nextAcl = acl || newAcl(_taskCaller);
+    if (normAddr(nextAcl.owner) !== _taskCaller) {
+      throw new StatePermissionError(
+        `caller ${_taskCaller} is not the owner of state key '${key}' (owner: ${nextAcl.owner})`
+      );
+    }
+    nextAcl = mutator({ ...nextAcl });
+    return [nextAcl, data];
+  };
+  const [acl] = await reg._commitTransform(key, transform);
+  return { ...acl };
+}
+
+function assertLevel(level) {
+  if (level !== 'read' && level !== 'write') throw new Error("level must be 'read' or 'write'");
+}
+
+async function esrGrant(key, address, level = 'read') {
+  assertLevel(level);
+  const addr = normAddr(address);
+  if (!addr) throw new Error('a grantee address is required');
+  return ownerOp(key, (acl) => {
+    const members = new Set((acl[level] || []).map(normAddr).filter(Boolean));
+    members.add(addr);
+    acl[level] = [...members].sort();
+    return acl;
+  });
+}
+
+async function esrRevoke(key, address, level = 'read') {
+  assertLevel(level);
+  const addr = normAddr(address);
+  return ownerOp(key, (acl) => {
+    acl[level] = (acl[level] || []).map(normAddr).filter((a) => a && a !== addr).sort();
+    return acl;
+  });
+}
+
+async function esrSetPublicRead(key, enabled = true) {
+  return ownerOp(key, (acl) => {
+    acl.public_read = Boolean(enabled);
+    return acl;
+  });
+}
+
+async function esrTransfer(key, newOwner) {
+  const addr = normAddr(newOwner);
+  if (!addr) throw new Error('a new owner address is required');
+  return ownerOp(key, (acl) => {
+    acl.owner = addr;
+    return acl;
+  });
+}
+
+/** Owner address of `key`, or null while unowned. Exposes nothing else. */
+async function esrOwner(key) {
+  const [acl] = await new StateRegistry()._readContainer(key);
+  return acl ? acl.owner : null;
+}
+
+/** Owner-only: the full ACL of `key`. */
+async function esrAcl(key) {
+  const [acl] = await new StateRegistry()._readContainer(key);
+  if (!acl) return null;
+  if (!_taskCaller || normAddr(acl.owner) !== _taskCaller) {
+    throw new StatePermissionError(
+      `caller ${_taskCaller || '<anonymous>'} is not the owner of state key '${key}'`
+    );
+  }
+  return { ...acl };
+}
+
+function setTaskCaller(caller) { _taskCaller = normAddr(caller); }
+
+/**
+ * The last accepted idempotency nonce for `key` (0 if none). See
+ * StateRegistry.getNonce / commit(key, mutate, { nonce }).
+ */
+async function esrNonce(key) {
+  return new StateRegistry().getNonce(key);
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  StateRegistry,
+  configure,
+  cidv1Raw,
+  looksLikeCID,
+  ledgerSnapshot,
+  taskCaller,
+  setTaskCaller,
+  restampLedgerCaller,
+  StatePermissionError,
+  StateNonceError,
+  StateLimitError,
+  esrGrant,
+  esrRevoke,
+  esrSetPublicRead,
+  esrTransfer,
+  esrOwner,
+  esrAcl,
+  esrNonce,
+  // local-testing hooks (esr_local only)
+  setContractOverride,
+  setLocalCommitApply,
+  normAddr
+};