@estebanforge/pi-antigravity-bridge 1.9.2 → 1.10.0

package/src/acp/auth.ts

@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-import { AcpConnection } from "./connection.js";
-import { hasAcpToken, writeAcpAuthVerified } from "./setup.js";
-
-// Explicit sign-in (/agy auth): spawn a short-lived server, send
-// `authenticate` (the RPC that fires the loopback listener + browser OAuth
-// flow), and wait for the token to land in the shared acp_token.json. A
-// dedicated process keeps the minutes-scale login ritual away from live
-// turns; the next driver connection picks the token up. The real server
-// blocks until the browser round-trip completes; the observed window is
-// minutes-scale (one flow timed out at ~8.5 minutes), so the timeout is
-// generous.
-//
-// Token-absent after an OK reply is NOT always a failure: server 1.1.1 can
-// authenticate from legacy ~/.gemini credential artifacts and never writes
-// acp_token.json (observed on darwin/arm64 2026-10-13). A live session/new
-// probe separates that from a hollow accept: probe success = signed in
-// (recorded in the bridge-side verified marker), probe failure = the server
-// holds no usable credentials.
-
-export const AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10 * 60_000;
-
-export interface AcpAuthOptions {
-	bin: string;
-	binArgs?: string[];
-	cwd?: string;
-	extraEnv?: Record<string, string>;
-	authUrlFile?: string;
-	/** Directory holding acp_token.json. Default: ~/.gemini/antigravity-acp.
-	 *  Tests point this at a fixture dir; production callers use the default. */
-	tokenDir?: string;
-	/** The server is expected to have written acp_token.json by the time
-	 *  authenticate replies, but write-after-reply is unverified; after a
-	 *  successful reply the run polls for the token up to this long before
-	 *  SIGTERM, so a laggard write is never killed mid-flight. A token that
-	 *  never appears is verified through a live session probe instead of
-	 *  failing outright. */
-	tokenGraceMs?: number;
-	/** Bridge-side verified-sign-in marker. Written on every verified
-	 *  success (token file or live session probe). Default is the real
-	 *  bridge path; tests point this at a fixture. */
-	authVerifiedFile?: string;
-	timeoutMs?: number;
-	log?: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => void;
-}
-
-export interface AcpAuthResult {
-	ok: boolean;
-	/** Present when verified through the session probe: the server
-	 *  authenticated from existing credentials without writing a local
-	 *  token file. Absent on the normal token-file path and on failure. */
-	note?: string;
-	/** Failure reason (spawn, timeout, -32000 family, concurrent run). Absent when ok. */
-	error?: string;
-}
-
-/** Live credential probe for the token-absent branch: a server with usable
- *  credentials answers session/new; a hollow accept starts (or wants) a
- *  browser flow and the request times out or errors. Closes the probe
- *  session; the caller kills the connection either way. */
-async function probeUsableCredentials(conn: AcpConnection, cwd?: string): Promise<boolean> {
-	try {
-		const s = await conn.newSession(cwd ?? process.cwd());
-		await conn.closeSession(s.sessionId).catch(() => {});
-		return true;
-	} catch {
-		return false;
-	}
-}
-
-let authInFlight: Promise<AcpAuthResult> | null = null;
-
-export function runAcpAuth(opts: AcpAuthOptions): Promise<AcpAuthResult> {
-	const conn = new AcpConnection({
-		bin: opts.bin,
-		binArgs: opts.binArgs,
-		cwd: opts.cwd ?? process.cwd(),
-		extraEnv: opts.extraEnv,
-		authUrlFile: opts.authUrlFile,
-		log: opts.log ?? (() => {}),
-		onUpdate: () => {},
-		onExit: () => {},
-	});
-	const sleep = (ms: number): Promise<void> => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
-	const grace = opts.tokenGraceMs ?? 5_000;
-	const run = async (): Promise<AcpAuthResult> => {
-		try {
-			await conn.start();
-			await conn.request("authenticate", { methodId: "oauth-personal" }, opts.timeoutMs ?? AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS);
-			const deadline = Date.now() + grace;
-			while (!hasAcpToken(opts.tokenDir) && Date.now() < deadline) await sleep(200);
-			if (!hasAcpToken(opts.tokenDir)) {
-				// authenticate replied but no token file: either the server
-				// authenticated from artifacts outside antigravity-acp, or the
-				// reply is hollow. A live session/new separates the two.
-				if (!(await probeUsableCredentials(conn, opts.cwd))) {
-					return {
-						ok: false,
-						error: `the server accepted the sign-in but holds no usable credentials (session probe failed; token file absent in ${opts.tokenDir ?? "~/.gemini/antigravity-acp"}). Finish the Google sign-in if a browser opened, then retry /agy auth.`,
-					};
-				}
-				writeAcpAuthVerified(opts.authVerifiedFile);
-				return { ok: true, note: "the server authenticated from existing credentials; no browser sign-in was needed" };
-			}
-			writeAcpAuthVerified(opts.authVerifiedFile);
-			return { ok: true };
-		} catch (err) {
-			return { ok: false, error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) };
-		} finally {
-			conn.kill();
-		}
-	};
-	// One sign-in at a time: two concurrent runs would race the OAuth loopback
-	// and the token write. A second invocation fails fast instead.
-	if (authInFlight) return Promise.resolve({ ok: false, error: "a sign-in is already running; wait for it to finish" });
-	authInFlight = run();
-	return authInFlight.finally(() => {
-		authInFlight = null;
-	});
-}

package/src/acp/browser-capture.ts

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-import fs from "node:fs";
-import os from "node:os";
-import path from "node:path";
-
-// The ACP server hands the Google OAuth URL ONLY to the browser-open call:
-// nothing on stdout or stderr, headless or not (verified per
-// docs/ACP-PROTOCOL-REFERENCE.md). The capture makes the URL visible:
-// BROWSER points at a wrapper that appends the URL to a record file and then
-// execs the real opener, and the connection watches the record file to log
-// "auth-url". Local users keep the automatic browser open; over SSH the user
-// copies the URL and forwards the redirect port.
-
-export interface AuthUrlCapture {
-	/** Spawn env for the ACP server (BROWSER -> wrapper script). */
-	browserEnv: Record<string, string>;
-	/** Record file the connection watches. */
-	file: string;
-	/** Most recent URL in the record file, or null. */
-	lastUrl(): string | null;
-}
-
-/** First existing executable named `name` on `env.PATH`, or null. */
-export function findOnPath(name: string, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string | null {
-	for (const dir of (env.PATH ?? "").split(path.delimiter)) {
-		if (!dir) continue;
-		const candidate = path.join(dir, name);
-		try {
-			const st = fs.statSync(candidate);
-			if (st.isFile() && (st.mode & 0o111) !== 0) return candidate;
-		} catch {
-			/* not here */
-		}
-	}
-	return null;
-}
-
-/** Last http(s) line of `file`, or null (absent/unreadable counts as empty). */
-export function readLastUrl(file: string): string | null {
-	try {
-		const lines = fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8").split("\n").filter((l) => /^https?:\/\//.test(l));
-		return lines.at(-1) ?? null;
-	} catch {
-		return null;
-	}
-}
-
-/** Port of the OAuth loopback redirect (redirect_uri param), or null. */
-export function parseAuthPort(url: string): number | null {
-	try {
-		const redirect = new URL(url).searchParams.get("redirect_uri");
-		if (!redirect) return null;
-		const port = new URL(redirect).port;
-		return port ? Number(port) : null;
-	} catch {
-		return null;
-	}
-}
-
-const shQuote = (s: string): string => `'${s.replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'`;
-
-/** Create the capture (record file + wrapper script) and return the spawn
- *  env. Idempotent: the wrapper is rewritten only when content changes. The
- *  opener to forward to is resolved once, at write time: an existing BROWSER
- *  wins, then xdg-open, then macOS open; with none available the wrapper
- *  records the URL and exits (headless: capture without an opener). The
- *  forward word-splits the BROWSER value, so flag forms (`open -a Chrome`)
- *  work; a BROWSER path containing spaces does not (rare, and BROWSER lists
- *  are not honored either - the first entry is what chains). Windows browser
- *  resolution differs; no capture there. */
-export function setupAuthUrlCapture(dataDir = path.join(os.homedir(), ".pi", "agent", "antigravity-bridge"), env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): AuthUrlCapture | null {
-	if (process.platform === "win32") return null;
-	const file = path.join(dataDir, "acp-auth-urls.log");
-	const wrapper = path.join(dataDir, "acp-browser-wrapper.sh");
-	try {
-		fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
-		// Truncate: the file mirrors the current login attempt only. OAuth
-		// URLs carry state + PKCE challenges, so keep the record private.
-		fs.writeFileSync(file, "", { mode: 0o600 });
-		const opener = env.BROWSER?.trim() || findOnPath("xdg-open", env) || findOnPath("open", env) || "";
-		const body = [
-			"#!/usr/bin/env sh",
-			"# Antigravity bridge: records the Google OAuth URL the ACP server hands",
-			"# to the browser, then forwards to the real opener. The bridge watches",
-			"# the record file and shows the URL in pi (copy it when logging in over",
-			"# SSH; forward the redirect port first).",
-			`printf '%s\\n' "$@" >> ${shQuote(file)}`,
-			`REAL=${shQuote(opener)}`,
-			'if [ -n "$REAL" ]; then set -f; exec $REAL "$@"; fi',
-			"",
-		].join("\n");
-		const write = (p: string, content: string, mode: number): void => {
-			try {
-				if (fs.readFileSync(p, "utf8") === content) return;
-			} catch {
-				/* new file */
-			}
-			fs.writeFileSync(p, content, { mode });
-		};
-		write(wrapper, body, 0o755);
-		return { browserEnv: { BROWSER: wrapper }, file, lastUrl: () => readLastUrl(file) };
-	} catch {
-		return null; // capture is best effort; login still works without it
-	}
-}