@estebanforge/pi-antigravity-bridge 1.7.4 → 1.7.6

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,19 @@
 
 All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 
+## [1.7.6] - 2026-09-28
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Plan-mode delegations enforce read-only instead of promising it.** The old design withheld the skip flag and relied on a prompt asking nicely; the field disagreed once — a plan delegation with the flag re-injected through the environment still edited files, because a prompt guard is a request, not a wall. Plan-mode runs now stage a temporary agy agent under `~/.gemini/config/agents/pi-bridge-ask-*` whose `tools:` list carries only `view_file` and `run_command`: with no file-editing tool in the toolset the model cannot emit an edit call at all (probed on agy 1.2.12 with and without `--dangerously-skip-permissions` — the restricted toolset reports "none" for edits both ways). The staged agent's `commandExecutionPolicy: auto` is what keeps reviews useful: analysis commands (git, rg, test runners) run headless for every user, with no `permissions.allow` edits — the per-user-config approach was rejected as unshippable for a product. With the agent staged, the skip flag returns under the same `skipPermissions` knob (default on): its only real danger was auto-approving edit calls, and none exist to approve. The prompt guard switches to a mutation-forbidding text (read-only commands allowed), and the tool description now states the true residual plainly: file-editing tools are hard-blocked, arbitrary shell execution under the flag stays prompt-guarded alone. Staging failure degrades fail-closed — no agent, no flag, the stricter all-commands-forbidden guard, with an env-injected skip flag stripped from `AGY_EXTRA_ARGS` on that path only. Agent dirs are nonce-named, pid-marked, removed in the run's finally, and orphans swept at registration (the web-delegate sweep gained a prefix parameter so both doctrines share one implementation).
+- **Headless plan prompts say what they cannot do.** `agy -p` cannot answer permission prompts, and in plan mode a shell-command attempt is soft-denied: the run ends cleanly with nothing on stdout and the reason only on stderr. Plan prompts now append an explicit constraint — no shell commands, answer from the material in the prompt, state exactly what is missing — converting the silent death into a visible missing-content request (probed: the previously-fatal prompt shape now answers "Missing information: ..." in about ten seconds). With the staged reviewer agent above, this guard yields to the mutation-forbidding variant; it remains the rule on the staging-failure fallback path.
+
+## [1.7.5] - 2026-09-25
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Exit 0 with no output is a failure, not a silent success.** A headless `agy -p` run can end cleanly with nothing on stdout when a delegated tool call hits a permission gate the headless run cannot prompt for. The plan-mode fix (withholding the skip flag in plan) makes the command gate the common case: the call is auto-denied, the reason goes only to stderr, agy exits 0, and the execute path fell through to success, returning just the conversation footer. The delegating model read that as "returned only a conversationId, zero output, no error" (silent-failure handoff, 2026-09-25). An empty answer now returns a loud failure note carrying the redacted stderr plus the remedy (allow-list the command under `permissions.allow` in the CLI settings, or rerun outside plan mode), the ask-end log marks the run warn with an `empty` flag so error-only default logging records what the chat saw, and a new `details.empty` marker flips the TUI result row to its error glyph instead of a green checkmark. Three new tests pin both stderr shapes and the glyph flip through the fake-binary stub.
+
 ## [1.7.4] - 2026-09-25
 
 ### Added

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@estebanforge/pi-antigravity-bridge",
-  "version": "1.7.4",
+  "version": "1.7.6",
   "description": "Gemini provider for Pi on the Antigravity ACP server (official Google ACP) or the stream-json agy CLI. antigravity/* models in Pi's /model picker, no-patch MCP bridge: agy runs Pi's tools. ToS safe to use.",
   "keywords": [
     "pi-package",

package/src/ask-tool.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 // nothing (see its defer guard). This module is the single source of truth.
 
 import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
+import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import * as fs from "node:fs";
 import * as path from "node:path";
 import type { ExtensionAPI } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent";
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ import { loadConfig, type AgyMode, type ThinkingTier } from "./config.js";
 import { redactText } from "./redact.js";
 import { acquireBridgeSuppression } from "./mcp-registration.js";
 import { AGY_EFFORT_ORDER, spawnAgyModelsRaw, toAgyEffort } from "./models.js";
+import { sweepStaleWebAgents, webAgentsRoot } from "./web-tools.js";
 
 // --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -78,7 +80,7 @@ TWO MODES (you choose):
 - **Continued conversation**: pass the conversationId returned in the PREVIOUS call's details (details.conversationId). agy resumes that conversation with full context intact.
 
 EXECUTION MODES (param: mode):
-- **plan**: agy reviews and plans without writing. Use for cross-review and read-only tasks. Enforced: plan runs never receive the skip-permissions flag, so a write or command attempt ends the run quickly with a "confirm plan" message instead of executing.
+- **plan**: agy reviews and plans without writing. Use for cross-review and read-only tasks. Enforced: plan runs execute in a temporary restricted agent whose toolset has NO file-editing tools (hard block); the reviewer may still execute arbitrary shell commands, kept read-only by the prompt guard alone. Inline the material to review - a plan run cannot fetch it.
 - **accept-edits** (default): agy applies edits directly inside the workspace.
 
 COMPACT OUTPUT (param: digest): when true, the prompt is prefixed to request compact digests instead of full file contents. Defaults on for plan, off for accept-edits.
@@ -270,6 +272,109 @@ function extraArgs(): string[] {
 	return raw ? raw.split(/\s+/).filter((s) => s.length > 0) : [];
 }
 
+// --- Prompt assembly -------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** Guard for plan runs backed by the restricted reviewer agent. Difference
+ *  to PLAN_HEADLESS_GUARD: commands are the analysis capability here (the
+ *  agent's commandExecutionPolicy auto-approves them headless, probed
+ *  2026-09-28), so the guard forbids FILE MUTATION - by tool or by shell -
+ *  and keeps the answer-from-material discipline. */
+export const AGENT_REVIEW_GUARD = [
+	"",
+	"--- Review constraints ---",
+	"- Read-only review. Do not create, modify, or delete any files, including through shell commands (no redirects, tee, rm, mv, git commit).",
+	"- Read-only commands (git log, git diff, git show, rg, ls, cat, test runners) are allowed for analysis.",
+	"- Work from the material provided in this prompt; if information you need is missing, state exactly what is missing in your answer.",
+].join("\n");
+
+/** Appended to every headless plan-mode prompt. `agy -p` cannot answer
+ *  permission prompts: in plan mode a run_command attempt is soft-denied and
+ *  the turn ends AT the denial (exit 0, empty stdout, notice only on stderr -
+ *  the empty-output branch in execute). Probed 2026-09-28 on agy 1.2.12:
+ *  allow rules ARE consulted (a verbatim allow-listed `git log` runs), but
+ *  --sandbox does NOT relax the command gate, so the only input every user
+ *  is guaranteed is the prompt itself. The guard steers the model to answer
+ *  from that material. accept-edits runs keep their tools and never get it. */
+export const PLAN_HEADLESS_GUARD = [
+	"",
+	"--- Headless session constraints ---",
+	"- Do not run shell commands. Command execution is denied in this session, and any attempt ends the session immediately with no answer.",
+	"- Work only from the material provided in this prompt.",
+	"- If information you need is missing, state exactly what is missing in your answer instead of trying to fetch it.",
+].join("\n");
+
+/** Assemble the prompt sent to agy: digest marker first (existing behavior),
+ *  then the caller's prompt, then the plan-mode guard last - the position
+ *  the model reads with the most recency. No user-config mutation: this is
+ *  the only plan-mode lever the tool itself owns. */
+export function buildFinalPrompt(
+	prompt: string,
+	mode: AgyMode,
+	digest: boolean,
+	/** True when the restricted reviewer agent is staged: its empty edit
+	 *  toolset is the hard block, so the prompt may ALLOW read-only commands. */
+	agentEnforced = false,
+): string {
+	let out = digest ? `(Use compact digests, not full file contents.)\n${prompt}` : prompt;
+	if (mode === "plan") out += agentEnforced ? AGENT_REVIEW_GUARD : PLAN_HEADLESS_GUARD;
+	return out;
+}
+
+// --- Plan-mode reviewer agent ----------------------------------------------
+
+/** Temp agent dirs share the ~/.gemini/config/agents discovery root with the
+ *  web delegates; AGY_AGENTS_ROOT overrides for tests and sandboxes. */
+export function askAgentsRoot(): string {
+	return process.env.AGY_AGENTS_ROOT ?? webAgentsRoot();
+}
+
+const ASK_AGENT_PREFIX = "pi-bridge-ask-";
+const ASK_AGENT_TOOLS = ["view_file", "run_command"];
+
+/** agent.md for the plan-mode reviewer. The tools list is the ENFORCEMENT:
+ *  with no file-editing tool present the model cannot emit an edit call at
+ *  all (probed 2026-09-28 on agy 1.2.12: the toolset reports "none" for
+ *  edits, with and without the skip flag). commandExecutionPolicy auto is
+ *  what lets read commands run headless with no user allow rules. Never add
+ *  a write-capable tool here. */
+export function reviewerAgentMd(name: string): string {
+	return [
+		"---",
+		`name: ${name}`,
+		"description: Temporary Pi plan-mode reviewer",
+		"mainAgent: true",
+		"subagent: false",
+		"model: inherit",
+		"excludeDefaultComponents: true",
+		"inheritCustomizations: false",
+		"inheritMcp: false",
+		"commandExecutionPolicy: auto",
+		"tools:",
+		...ASK_AGENT_TOOLS.map((t) => `  - ${t}`),
+		"skills: []",
+		"rules: []",
+		"agents: []",
+		"mcpServers: []",
+		"---",
+		"",
+		"You are a strict read-only code reviewer. Review, analyze, and plan; never modify anything.",
+		"",
+	].join("\n");
+}
+
+/** Stage one unique reviewer agent (agent.md + pid marker) under root. Same
+ *  hygiene doctrine as the web delegates: nonce-named, cleaned in finally,
+ *  orphans swept by pid marker at registration. */
+export function stageReviewerAgent(root: string): { name: string; dir: string } {
+	fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
+	const name = `${ASK_AGENT_PREFIX}${process.pid}-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${randomBytes(4).toString("hex")}`;
+	const dir = path.join(root, name);
+	fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+	fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, "agent.md"), reviewerAgentMd(name), { mode: 0o600 });
+	fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, ".pid"), `${process.pid}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
+	return { name, dir };
+}
+
 const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise<void>((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
 
 // --- Registration ----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -284,6 +389,13 @@ export async function registerAskAntigravityTool(
 	 *  verbose tier; info/warn/error always land. */
 	log?: (event: string, data?: unknown, level?: "debug" | "info" | "warn" | "error") => void,
 ): Promise<void> {
+	// Orphan sweep for the plan-mode reviewer agents (SIGKILL can skip the
+	// run's finally): same pid-marker doctrine as the web delegates.
+	try {
+		sweepStaleWebAgents(askAgentsRoot(), Date.now(), ASK_AGENT_PREFIX);
+	} catch {
+		// a sweep failure must never block registration
+	}
 	pi.registerTool({
 		name: "AskAntigravity",
 		label: "Ask Antigravity",
@@ -390,7 +502,8 @@ export async function registerAskAntigravityTool(
 			}
 
 			const body = result.content[0]?.type === "text" ? result.content[0].text : "";
-			const errored = d?.exitCode !== 0 || !!d?.aborted || !!d?.timedOut;
+			const errored =
+		d?.exitCode !== 0 || !!d?.aborted || !!d?.timedOut || !!d?.empty;
 
 			let text = errored
 				? theme.fg("error", "✗ AskAntigravity error")
@@ -493,11 +606,27 @@ export async function registerAskAntigravityTool(
 			const snapshot = isContinuation ? null : snapshotConversations();
 
 			const mode: AgyMode = (params.mode as AgyMode | undefined) ?? "accept-edits";
+			// Plan runs stage a restricted reviewer agent: its tools list has NO
+			// file-editing tool, which is the hard edit block (the prompt guard
+			// alone was observed failing once - a sub-agent still edited files).
+			// Staging failure degrades to the legacy fallback: no agent, no skip
+			// flag, the stricter command-forbidding guard.
+			let reviewerAgent: { name: string; dir: string } | null = null;
+			if (mode === "plan") {
+				try {
+					reviewerAgent = stageReviewerAgent(askAgentsRoot());
+				} catch {
+					reviewerAgent = null;
+				}
+			}
 			const useDigest: boolean =
 				typeof params.digest === "boolean" ? params.digest : mode === "plan";
-			const finalPrompt: string = useDigest
-				? `(Use compact digests, not full file contents.)\n${params.prompt}`
-				: params.prompt;
+			const finalPrompt: string = buildFinalPrompt(
+				params.prompt,
+				mode,
+				useDigest,
+				reviewerAgent !== null,
+			);
 
 			// Opt-in full-context export (isolated stays the default).
 			let contextFile: string | null = null;
@@ -528,22 +657,31 @@ export async function registerAskAntigravityTool(
 				{ model: resolved.model, thinking: resolved.effort ?? config.defaultThinking, mode, digest: useDigest, continue: isContinuation, timeoutMin },
 				"info",
 			);
-			const extra = extraArgs();
+			const extraRaw = extraArgs();
+			// Fail-closed on the fallback path: AGY_EXTRA_ARGS lands before the
+			// mode flags, so an env-injected skip flag would re-arm what the
+			// plan-mode rule strips. Only the enforced agent makes the flag safe.
+			const extra =
+				mode === "plan" && !reviewerAgent
+					? extraRaw.filter((a) => a !== "--dangerously-skip-permissions")
+					: extraRaw;
 			if (extra.length) args.push(...extra);
 			if (resolved.model) args.push("--model", resolved.model);
 			if (resolved.effort) args.push("--effort", resolved.effort);
 			args.push("--mode", mode);
-			// Honor the shared permissions setting (same knob as the provider). Non-
-			// interactive -p can't answer a permission prompt, so when this is off
-			// any run_command will hang - but the setting must mean what it says.
-			// Plan mode never gets the flag even when the knob is on: the flag
-			// auto-approves ALL permission requests including plan mode's own
-			// approval gate, which would silently turn "review-only" into full
-			// write access inside --add-dir (probed 2026-09-25: with the flag a
-			// plan run wrote files; without it, file and command attempts end
-			// exit 0 in ~20-30s with a "confirm plan" message - fail-visible,
-			// never a hang). Omitting it is what makes "plan = review-only" true.
-			if (mode !== "plan" && config.skipPermissions !== false) {
+			if (reviewerAgent) args.push("--agent", reviewerAgent.name);
+			// Honor the shared permissions setting (same knob as the provider).
+			// accept-edits: the flag keeps commands from hanging on an
+			// unanswerable prompt in -p mode. Plan runs WITH the reviewer agent:
+			// the flag is safe again because the agent's toolset has no
+			// file-editing tool - the 2026-09-25 write incident rode edit tools
+			// that existed then; probed 2026-09-28 the restricted toolset reports
+			// "none" for edits even with the flag, and plan discipline turned a
+			// create-a-file request into a proposed plan instead of a write. The
+			// flag is what lets analysis commands (builds, test runners) run for
+			// users without allow rules. Plan fallback (staging failed): strict
+			// legacy behavior, no flag - the prompt guard is all that is left.
+			if (config.skipPermissions !== false && (mode !== "plan" || reviewerAgent !== null)) {
 				args.push("--dangerously-skip-permissions");
 			}
 			if (isContinuation) args.push("--conversation", rawConvId as string);
@@ -710,10 +848,11 @@ export async function registerAskAntigravityTool(
 				details.aborted = outcome.aborted;
 				details.timedOut = outcome.timedOut;
 				details.durationMs = Date.now() - start;
+				const text = out.trim();
 				log?.(
 					"ask-end",
-					{ exitCode: outcome.exitCode, aborted: outcome.aborted, timedOut: outcome.timedOut, durationMs: details.durationMs, conversationId: details.conversationId },
-					outcome.exitCode !== 0 || outcome.aborted || outcome.timedOut ? "warn" : "info",
+					{ exitCode: outcome.exitCode, aborted: outcome.aborted, timedOut: outcome.timedOut, empty: !text, durationMs: details.durationMs, conversationId: details.conversationId },
+					outcome.exitCode !== 0 || outcome.aborted || outcome.timedOut || !text ? "warn" : "info",
 				);
 
 				if (!isContinuation && !details.conversationId && snapshot) {
@@ -727,8 +866,6 @@ export async function registerAskAntigravityTool(
 					}
 				}
 
-				const text = out.trim();
-
 				if (outcome.aborted) {
 					return {
 						content: [
@@ -763,6 +900,25 @@ export async function registerAskAntigravityTool(
 					};
 				}
 
+				// Exit 0 with nothing on stdout is still a failure for the
+				// delegator: headless agy auto-denies a permission-gated tool call
+				// (e.g. the command gate in plan mode), prints the reason only to
+				// stderr, and ends cleanly. Falling through to the success path here
+				// returned just the conversation footer, which read as an empty
+				// success (silent-failure bug found 2026-09-25).
+				if (!text) {
+					details.empty = true;
+					const stderr = redactText(details.stderr.trim());
+					const note = [
+						"agy exited cleanly but produced no output.",
+						stderr ? `stderr: ${stderr}` : null,
+						"Common cause: a tool call needed a permission that headless mode cannot prompt for (typically the command gate in plan mode), so it was auto-denied and the turn ended with no answer. Recovery: retry in plan mode with all needed content inlined in the prompt - plan runs cannot fetch it, commands are denied. Or rerun outside plan mode with skipPermissions, or add your own permissions.allow rules in ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/settings.json.",
+					]
+						.filter(Boolean)
+						.join(" ");
+					return { content: [{ type: "text", text: note }], details };
+				}
+
 				onUpdate?.({ content: [{ type: "text", text: "" }], details: { ...details } });
 				const footer = details.conversationId
 					? `\n\n[agy conversationId: ${details.conversationId} - pass as conversationId to continue this conversation]`
@@ -784,6 +940,11 @@ export async function registerAskAntigravityTool(
 						fs.unlinkSync(contextFile);
 					} catch {}
 				}
+				if (reviewerAgent) {
+					try {
+						fs.rmSync(reviewerAgent.dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+					} catch {}
+				}
 			}
 		},
 	});
@@ -866,6 +1027,9 @@ interface AgyDetails {
 	exitCode: number;
 	aborted: boolean;
 	timedOut: boolean;
+	// Exit 0 with no answer on stdout (the empty-output failure branch).
+	// renderResult flips to the error glyph on it.
+	empty?: boolean;
 	durationMs: number;
 	stderr: string;
 }

package/src/web-tools.ts

@@ -37,10 +37,15 @@ export function webAgentsRoot(): string {
 	return path.join(os.homedir(), ".gemini", "config", "agents");
 }
 
-/** Remove leftover pi-bridge-web-* agent dirs: dead-pid markers always, and
- *  marker-less dirs only after a grace period (a live sibling process may be
- *  between mkdir and its pid write). Never touches foreign agent dirs. */
-export function sweepStaleWebAgents(root: string = webAgentsRoot(), now = Date.now()): void {
+/** Remove leftover pi-bridge agent dirs matching `prefix`: dead-pid markers
+ *  always, and marker-less dirs only after a grace period (a live sibling
+ *  process may be between mkdir and its pid write). Never touches foreign
+ *  agent dirs. The ask-tool reuses this for its reviewer agents. */
+export function sweepStaleWebAgents(
+	root: string = webAgentsRoot(),
+	now = Date.now(),
+	prefix: string = WEB_AGENT_PREFIX,
+): void {
 	let entries: string[];
 	try {
 		entries = readdirSync(root);
@@ -48,7 +53,7 @@ export function sweepStaleWebAgents(root: string = webAgentsRoot(), now = Date.n
 		return; // no agents dir yet: nothing to sweep
 	}
 	for (const entry of entries) {
-		if (!entry.startsWith(WEB_AGENT_PREFIX)) continue;
+		if (!entry.startsWith(prefix)) continue;
 		try {
 			if (isStaleWebAgentDir(path.join(root, entry), now)) {
 				rmSync(path.join(root, entry), { recursive: true, force: true });