@engramx/idl 0.16.0-rc.17 → 0.16.0-rc.19

package/dist/engram.did

@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ type TokenAmount =
    Ckusdt: nat;
    Icp: nat;
  };
+type TimersWake = 
+ record {
+   gap: int;
+   needed: nat;
+ };
 type TimerHealth = 
  record {
    alertTimerArmed: bool;
@@ -248,407 +253,412 @@ type ResyncReport =
 type Result_9 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: SignedTransaction;
+   Ok: vec Seat;
  };
-type Result_82 = 
+type Result_83 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
    Ok: AgentRecord;
  };
-type Result_81 = 
+type Result_82 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
    Ok: record {activatesAtNs: int;};
  };
-type Result_80 = 
+type Result_81 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
    Ok: Eip712Registration;
  };
+type Result_80 = 
+ variant {
+   Err: Error;
+   Ok: CondenseResult;
+ };
 type Result_8 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: vec Seat;
+   Ok: RailHealth;
  };
 type Result_79 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: CondenseResult;
+   Ok: MemoryRangeExport;
  };
-type Result_78 = 
+type Result_77 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: MemoryRangeExport;
+   Ok: Page_25;
  };
 type Result_76 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_25;
+   Ok: AgentWriteReview;
  };
 type Result_75 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: AgentWriteReview;
+   Ok: BackupMetadata;
  };
 type Result_74 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: BackupMetadata;
+   Ok: BackupRetention;
  };
 type Result_73 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: BackupRetention;
+   Ok: vec BirthRecord;
  };
 type Result_72 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: vec BirthRecord;
+   Ok: Brakes;
  };
 type Result_71 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Brakes;
+   Ok: ChildAllowanceRow;
  };
 type Result_70 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: ChildAllowanceRow;
+   Ok: ChildOpening;
  };
 type Result_7 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: RailHealth;
+   Ok: SignatureCounts;
  };
 type Result_69 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: ChildOpening;
+   Ok: blob;
  };
 type Result_68 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: blob;
+   Ok: EvmAddresses;
  };
 type Result_67 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: EvmAddresses;
+   Ok: AlertStatus;
  };
 type Result_66 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: AlertStatus;
+   Ok: MemoryHistory;
  };
 type Result_65 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: MemoryHistory;
+   Ok: MemoryRetentionPolicy;
  };
 type Result_64 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: MemoryRetentionPolicy;
+   Ok: OwnerConsole;
  };
 type Result_63 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: OwnerConsole;
+   Ok: record {paths: vec text;};
  };
 type Result_62 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: record {paths: vec text;};
+   Ok: SigningFloorStatus;
  };
 type Result_61 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: SigningFloorStatus;
+   Ok: SpendCeiling;
  };
 type Result_60 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: SpendCeiling;
+   Ok: SpendingPolicy;
  };
 type Result_6 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: SignatureCounts;
+   Ok: record {returned: nat;};
  };
 type Result_59 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: SpendingPolicy;
+   Ok: StorageReport;
  };
 type Result_58 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: StorageReport;
+   Ok: WalletBalances;
  };
 type Result_57 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: WalletBalances;
+   Ok: WorldIdConfig;
  };
 type Result_56 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: WorldIdConfig;
+   Ok: WorldIdRpContext;
  };
 type Result_55 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: WorldIdRpContext;
+   Ok: opt text;
  };
 type Result_54 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: opt text;
+   Ok: bool;
  };
 type Result_53 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: bool;
+   Ok: text;
  };
 type Result_52 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: text;
+   Ok: Page_24;
  };
 type Result_51 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_24;
+   Ok: AgentSpendToday;
  };
 type Result_50 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: AgentSpendToday;
+   Ok: Page_22;
  };
 type Result_5 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: record {returned: nat;};
+   Ok: Eip712SignatureOut;
  };
 type Result_49 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_22;
+   Ok: Page_21;
  };
 type Result_48 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_21;
+   Ok: RecordPage;
  };
 type Result_47 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: RecordPage;
+   Ok: Page_20;
  };
 type Result_46 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_20;
+   Ok: Page_19;
  };
 type Result_45 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_19;
+   Ok: CheckpointPage;
  };
 type Result_44 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: CheckpointPage;
+   Ok: Page_17;
  };
 type Result_43 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_17;
+   Ok: Page_16;
  };
 type Result_42 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_16;
+   Ok: Page_15;
  };
 type Result_41 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_15;
+   Ok: Page_14;
  };
 type Result_40 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_14;
+   Ok: Page_13;
  };
 type Result_4 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Eip712SignatureOut;
+   Ok: X402SignOutcome;
  };
 type Result_39 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_13;
+   Ok: Page_12;
  };
 type Result_38 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_12;
+   Ok: ReceiptPage;
  };
 type Result_37 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: ReceiptPage;
+   Ok: Page_10;
  };
 type Result_36 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_10;
+   Ok: LogPage;
  };
 type Result_35 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: LogPage;
+   Ok: Page_8;
  };
 type Result_34 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_8;
+   Ok: Page_7;
  };
 type Result_33 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_7;
+   Ok: Page_6;
  };
 type Result_32 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_6;
+   Ok: PaymentSignatureCounts;
  };
 type Result_31 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: PaymentSignatureCounts;
+   Ok: Page_4;
  };
 type Result_30 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_4;
+   Ok: Page_3;
  };
 type Result_3 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: X402SignOutcome;
+   Ok: ControlHandover;
  };
 type Result_29 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_3;
+   Ok: Page_2;
  };
 type Result_28 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_2;
+   Ok: Page_1;
  };
 type Result_27 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page_1;
+   Ok: Page;
  };
 type Result_26 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Page;
+   Ok: AgentGrant;
  };
 type Result_25 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: AgentGrant;
+   Ok: principal;
  };
 type Result_24 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: principal;
+   Ok: EngramSessionState;
  };
 type Result_23 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: EngramSessionState;
+   Ok: Pairing;
  };
 type Result_22 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Pairing;
+   Ok: CondensePreview;
  };
 type Result_21 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: CondensePreview;
+   Ok: RetentionPreview;
  };
 type Result_20 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: RetentionPreview;
+   Ok: vec BatchReadItem;
  };
 type Result_2 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: ControlHandover;
+   Ok;
  };
 type Result_19 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: vec BatchReadItem;
+   Ok: MemoryByteChunk;
  };
 type Result_18 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: MemoryByteChunk;
+   Ok: EngramEscrowRecovery;
  };
 type Result_17 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: EngramEscrowRecovery;
+   Ok: GuardianRecord;
  };
 type Result_16 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: GuardianRecord;
+   Ok: ResetReport;
  };
 type Result_15 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: ResetReport;
+   Ok: ResyncReport;
  };
 type Result_14 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: ResyncReport;
+   Ok: nat;
  };
 type Result_13 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: nat;
+   Ok: SessionContext;
  };
 type Result_12 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: SessionContext;
+   Ok: MemoryFile;
  };
 type Result_11 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: MemoryFile;
+   Ok: BackupRetentionReport;
  };
 type Result_10 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: BackupRetentionReport;
+   Ok: SignedTransaction;
  };
 type Result_1 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok;
+   Ok: TimersWake;
  };
 type Result = 
  variant {
@@ -1308,7 +1318,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// nomination names. That check compares the caller inside the module, where
    /// test/key-replacement.test.mo runs it; this body names no roster gate, because the caller holds
    /// no role here until the move.
-   acceptAgentKeyNomination: (agentKey: principal) -> (Result_82);
+   acceptAgentKeyNomination: (agentKey: principal) -> (Result_83);
    /// Consensus transform for the alert webhook outcall: collapse the response to status-only so
    /// replicas agree regardless of response headers/body (we only care that the POST landed 2xx).
    /// 
@@ -1338,7 +1348,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// and works while frozen; a value is 1–128 characters (an address, or a venue value such as an
    /// account name). The action must be registered: a destination list belongs to an action, and a
    /// list for no action would be a value nothing checks. The caller is the owner's app.
-   addEip712Destination: (typeId: blob, value: text) -> (Result_81);
+   addEip712Destination: (typeId: blob, value: text) -> (Result_82);
    /// Register a typed-data shape as signable. Owner-only, freeze-gated (a registration is a grant
    /// of FUTURE authority — a frozen engram must not be able to widen what it can sign), and the
    /// shape is IMMUTABLE: any change mints a new typeId.
@@ -1378,7 +1388,7 @@ type Engram =
                   };
       primaryType: text;
       verifyingContract: text;
-    }) -> (Result_80);
+    }) -> (Result_81);
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L1⟩ THE ROLE-CONFLICT ARM, and why three refusals here are not the same refusal.
    /// 
    /// This method had five distinct ways to say no through one `text`, and a caller could only tell
@@ -1388,7 +1398,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// permitted but this engram's state says no — the principal already holds an incompatible role,
    /// or the roster is full. Only the last is worth an agent's time to resolve.
    addGuardian: (guardianPrincipal: principal, name: text, permissions:
-    GuardianPermissions) -> (Result_1);
+    GuardianPermissions) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer b⟩ OWNER-ONLY: put a note on any entry of this
    /// engram's record — words, nothing else. Appends a chained `record.note` entry
    /// (`about=<id> note=<words>`) and keeps the note for `listRecordNotes`; answers the new entry's
@@ -1397,7 +1407,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// refused by `requireOwner`'s own words. Empty words, words over `RecordWords.WORDS_MAX` or
    /// holding a line break are `#Invalid`; an id past the head is `#NotFound`; nothing is recorded
    /// on any refusal.
-   addRecordNote: (about: nat, note: text) -> (Result_13);
+   addRecordNote: (about: nat, note: text) -> (Result_14);
    /// Returns the write RECEIPT, not just the version.
    /// 
    /// The receipt was always computed and then thrown away: MemoryRouter hands back
@@ -1429,7 +1439,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Gated on requireWritesNotPaused — unlike the export. This one destroys retained entries, which
    /// is exactly what a guardian pause exists to hold. No action alert is raised: the operation is
    /// owner-initiated, owner-only, and already chained into the audit log.
-   applyCondense: (toSeq: nat) -> (Result_79);
+   applyCondense: (toSeq: nat) -> (Result_80);
    /// Owner-only: activate a guardian who has registered against an invite.
    /// 
    /// Until this call the guardian is `#Pending` and can do NOTHING — registering is a claim, this
@@ -1438,7 +1448,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// `#Conflict("Guardian is already active")` when there is nothing to do — the refusal says the
    /// state the caller asked for is the state that holds, rather than pretending it acted.
-   approveGuardian: (guardianPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   approveGuardian: (guardianPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// Owner-only: approve one pending over-limit request, letting the agent retry the operation
    /// its policy refused.
    /// 
@@ -1459,11 +1469,11 @@ type Engram =
    /// Refuses `#NotFound` for an unknown id, and `#Conflict` NAMING THE STATUS when the request is
    /// no longer pending — already approved, denied or expired. The status is in the message because
    /// "not pending" is the one refusal here an owner acts on differently depending on which it is.
-   approveRequest: (requestId: text) -> (Result_1);
+   approveRequest: (requestId: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// Discard a backup started by `backupInit` and never finalized. The way out of a failed upload,
    /// and the reason a stalled one need not occupy space indefinitely. Same gate as the rest of the
    /// write half: owner, or an agent holding `canAppendMemory`.
-   backupAbort: (backupId: text) -> (Result_1);
+   backupAbort: (backupId: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// Close a backup started by `backupInit` and mark it usable.
    /// 
    /// ⚠ ONLY THE CREATOR MAY FINALIZE — `#Refused("Not the creator of this backup")`. An agent
@@ -1476,7 +1486,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// It does NOT verify the `sha256` declared at init; see that method for what the digest is and
    /// is not.
-   backupFinalize: (backupId: text) -> (Result_1);
+   backupFinalize: (backupId: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// Begin a chunked backup upload. Returns the `backupId` every later call in the sequence needs.
    /// 
    /// **THE SEQUENCE**, which no individual signature here conveys:
@@ -1500,24 +1510,24 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// The write half also refuses while writes are PAUSED.
    backupInit: (dbType: text, backupType: BackupType, parentBackupId:
-    opt text, sha256: text, backupLabel: opt text) -> (Result_52);
+    opt text, sha256: text, backupLabel: opt text) -> (Result_53);
    /// Read one chunk of a finalized backup, by index.
    /// 
    /// ⚠ GATED ON `read_backup`, which is NOT the permission the upload half uses — that one is
    /// `canAppendMemory`. Holding one says nothing about the other, deliberately: taking a backup and
    /// carrying it away are different authorities.
-   backupPullChunk: (backupId: text, chunkIndex: nat) -> (Result_68) query;
+   backupPullChunk: (backupId: text, chunkIndex: nat) -> (Result_69) query;
    backupPushChunk: (backupId: text, chunkIndex: nat, data: blob) ->
-    (Result_1);
+    (Result_2);
    /// The OWNER cancels an agent's pending key nomination; the agent keeps its current key. Refused
    /// by name when the agent is unknown or has nothing pending — never a silent success.
-   cancelAgentKeyNomination: (agentKey: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   cancelAgentKeyNomination: (agentKey: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// Close a session the caller paid for: settle what was consumed, refund the remainder.
    /// 
    /// PAYER-ONLY, enforced inside the gateway. This is the exit that did not exist — `endSession`
    /// and `forceCloseSession` were on the MARKET, which is withheld, and whose escrow subaccount is
    /// under a different principal entirely, so its close could never have reached these funds.
-   closeSession: (sessionId: text) -> (Result_1);
+   closeSession: (sessionId: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// Convert the engram's OWN earned ckUSDC/ckUSDT into its OWN cycles, via the cashier — the
    /// engram-self top-up path. Owner-only; per-call cap + cooldown (irreversible); NOT freeze-gated
    /// (infrastructure funding). Flow: read the engram's deposit address on the cashier, move the
@@ -1539,7 +1549,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// ⟨2026-10-02⟩ The second parameter is NAMED `amountE6` now, as the census row above rules the
    /// pair — e6 base units of the token named first. A name only: Candid passes arguments by
    /// position, so nothing on the wire moved.
-   convertEarningsToCycles: (token: text, amountE6: nat) -> (Result_13);
+   convertEarningsToCycles: (token: text, amountE6: nat) -> (Result_14);
    /// Owner-only: mint a single-use invite code an agent redeems with `pairAgent`.
    /// 
    /// ⚠ READ THIS BEFORE INVITING SOMEONE BACK. Pairing is ONE-SHOT PER PRINCIPAL on
@@ -1558,7 +1568,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// A principal that is already a GUARDIAN cannot become an agent — a guardian is an
    /// independent check on agents, so one wallet must not hold both.
    createAgentInvite: (name: text, permissions: AgentPermissions) ->
-    (Result_52);
+    (Result_53);
    /// Owner-only: mint an invite for a GUARDIAN — an independent check on agents, not a
    /// co-owner and not a recovery agent.
    /// 
@@ -1581,7 +1591,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// So an invite that fails to redeem for that reason is not a bad code. The rule exists because
    /// a check must be independent of the thing it checks.
    createGuardianInvite: (name: text, permissions: GuardianPermissions) ->
-    (Result_52);
+    (Result_53);
    /// OWNER-ONLY deletion of a stored backup.
    /// 
    /// ⚠ NOT THE SAME GATE AS THE REST OF THE FAMILY, and the asymmetry is deliberate: `backupInit`,
@@ -1592,7 +1602,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// `backupAbort` is the agent's way out of a failed UPLOAD; it discards something never
    /// finalized. This removes a finished backup, which is a different act on a different object.
-   deleteBackup: (backupId: text) -> (Result_1);
+   deleteBackup: (backupId: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨0.16.0, census §10 item 16⟩ RETURNS A REAL RECEIPT, not `R<()>`. The receipt was already
    /// being computed and written into the audit line — `receiptSuffix(r)` — and then discarded, so
    /// a caller could not cite the seq its own delete produced and had to go looking for it in a log
@@ -1608,7 +1618,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Terminal: a denied request cannot be approved afterwards. Like `approveRequest` it refuses
    /// `#NotFound` for an unknown id and `#Conflict` when the request is no longer pending, and it
    /// does not change the policy — the next request over the same limit will be raised again.
-   denyRequest: (requestId: text, reason: text) -> (Result_1);
+   denyRequest: (requestId: text, reason: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer c⟩ A NEW GUARDIAN POWER, words only: an ACTIVE
    /// guardian disputes an agent's write. It never moves money, stops anything or changes a grant.
    /// Appends a chained `record.dispute` entry (`about=<id> reason=<words>`) and keeps the dispute
@@ -1624,7 +1634,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// WHAT: an entry the owner's review would show (`qualifiesForReview` — an agent's append or
    /// revision, or a paid session's append) that succeeded, still held in full by the ring.
    /// One dispute per guardian per write (`#Conflict`, the first stands).
-   disputeAgentWrite: (about: nat, reason: text) -> (Result_13);
+   disputeAgentWrite: (about: nat, reason: text) -> (Result_14);
    /// Record that log entries [fromSeq, toSeq] were served, and return the root that proves it.
    /// 
    /// This is the receipt ledgerfs Q2 requires before any of those entries may be condensed away.
@@ -1638,7 +1648,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// situation rather than a safety measure. It IS gated on requireMemoryAttached: a store that
    /// failed its integrity check must not attest anything it cannot vouch for.
    exportMemoryRange: (fromSeq: nat, toSeq: nat, authorFilter:
-    opt principal) -> (Result_78);
+    opt principal) -> (Result_79);
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L2.2 — renamed from `guardianFreezePayments`⟩ The prefix LIED about who may call it.
    /// The gate is `requireOwnerOrGuardian`, and an owner freezing their own payments is the ordinary
    /// case — the guardian is the exceptional one. A name that says otherwise sends an owner looking
@@ -1670,7 +1680,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// ⚠ The three exclusions are a reading of intent, not a ruling: no declaration stated the scope
    /// before this one. If any of them is wrong, this comment is where the argument should happen.
-   freezePayments: () -> (Result_1);
+   freezePayments: () -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer d⟩ `freezePayments` with a reason the strip and the
    /// guardian page show ("Sam froze payments: 'a payment I didn't expect'"). A NEW method, not an
    /// argument on `freezePayments`: a shipped argument tuple is frozen. Same callers, same grant, same
@@ -1678,9 +1688,9 @@ type Engram =
    /// pending guardian and the anonymous caller are refused by `requireOwnerOrGuardian`'s own words.
    /// An empty reason is no reason; a reason too long or holding a line break is `#Invalid` and the
    /// brake is NOT pulled — the caller pulls it with `freezePayments`, or shortens the words.
-   freezePaymentsWithReason: (reason: text) -> (Result_1);
+   freezePaymentsWithReason: (reason: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// Delivery status + config readback. Owner-only (the URL is a secret).
-   getActionAlertStatus: () -> (Result_66) query;
+   getActionAlertStatus: () -> (Result_67) query;
    /// Agents need to know what they may revise, so they can read it too. Whole-value config, same
    /// carve-out as getProtectedPaths — and kept a SEPARATE method from it deliberately (L2.2): a
    /// protected path and a revisable path are opposite grants, and one accessor for both would be a
@@ -1688,7 +1698,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// Refusal reason preserved from the trap: a grant is a power, and its absence and its
    /// concealment are different facts.
-   getAgentRevisablePaths: () -> (Result_62) query;
+   getAgentRevisablePaths: () -> (Result_63) query;
    /// OWNER-ONLY: every engagement's seat weeks on this engram, with the agent's root — the day it
    /// paired, the days of its first and last payment signature, a 64-week map whose bit 0 is the week
    /// of the last one, and how many were produced. Never an amount, a recipient or a nonce.
@@ -1699,7 +1709,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// order. Anyone else is refused by name (`#Refused getAgentSeatWeeks: …`), never answered with an
    /// empty page. Paged; `total` is every engagement ever paired here (a reset keeps the rows).
    /// Two rows can name one root: an agent paired again after it left is a second engagement.
-   getAgentSeatWeeks: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_76) query;
+   getAgentSeatWeeks: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_77) query;
    /// Owner: everything written into this engram by someone other than the owner since the last
    /// markAgentWritesReviewed() — agent appends/revisions AND paid-session appends (see
    /// qualifiesForReview for why those two families are recognised differently).
@@ -1707,7 +1717,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// them — the UI must page (markAgentWritesReviewed(?lastShownId)) and must NOT present 200
    /// as a total. `earliest` discloses ring eviction — if cursor < earliest, entries between them
    /// aged out of the ring (the CHAIN still proves total count; this view can't show their bodies).
-   getAgentWriteReview: () -> (Result_75) query;
+   getAgentWriteReview: () -> (Result_76) query;
    /// Why anchoring is or is not advancing. PUBLIC: ungated on purpose — detecting a stalled
    /// engram is the point, a gated read would fail-to-empty and hand a third party fabricated zeros,
    /// and none of these fields is a secret — `total` is already public via getCertifiedAuditHead.
@@ -1726,7 +1736,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// below serves the same head WITH the subnet certificate for a caller that needs to verify it
    /// was signed rather than asserted.
    getAuditHead: () -> (AuditHead) query;
-   getBackupMetadata: (backupId: text) -> (Result_74) query;
+   getBackupMetadata: (backupId: text) -> (Result_75) query;
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer m: a backup-retention getter⟩ How many backups of
    /// `dbType` each creator keeps, and whether that is the default — the read `setBackupRetention`
    /// lacked, so "Keeps your newest 3" showed only on the phone that last set it.
@@ -1737,7 +1747,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// denied"), a revoked or resigned agent, a guardian (guardians take no backups), a stranger and
    /// the anonymous caller. A kind the setter would refuse is `#Invalid` here too
    /// (`Backup.getRetention`). Records nothing (a query).
-   getBackupRetention: (dbType: text) -> (Result_73) query;
+   getBackupRetention: (dbType: text) -> (Result_74) query;
    /// The cashier this engram recognises as its rent biller — `null` until the registry pushes one.
    /// 
    /// PUBLIC: a payer about to send money needs to know which cashier this engram will accept credit
@@ -1752,7 +1762,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// from, which is the owner's to disclose, not the registry's. The certified half is at the registry
    /// (`getCertifiedBirth`, public, revealing only whether a fingerprint is present); the client's
    /// `verifyBirthChain` checks both. Refused to anyone else by the combinator (`#ownerOnly`).
-   getBirthChain: () -> (Result_72) query;
+   getBirthChain: () -> (Result_73) query;
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer d⟩ Each brake: on or off, and while on, who pulled it
    /// LAST (their key and whether as owner or guardian), since when, and the reason they gave — the
    /// same person and time as the newest brake entry on the record (`RecordWords.BrakePull`). For the
@@ -1761,7 +1771,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// — an agent learns a brake is on from the refusal of what it tried, and needs no more). `pull`
    /// is null for a brake that is off, and for one carried on across the upgrade that added this
    /// read (who pulled it was not recorded then) — never a guessed pull.
-   getBrakes: () -> (Result_71) query;
+   getBrakes: () -> (Result_72) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L9/L10 — census row⟩ `Wire.CertifiedAuditHead`, not an anonymous record. The
    /// registry, market and cashier already served the shared type; the engram — the canister that
    /// IS the evidence product — was the one chain still answering in a shape of its own, missing
@@ -1784,11 +1794,11 @@ type Engram =
    /// query's state writes are discarded when it returns, and the `denied` call first written here
    /// recorded nothing while reading as if it did. The refusal is loud in the reply instead. WHAT
    /// WOULD MAKE THIS WRONG: a reason to record who asked — then this becomes an update that says so.
-   getChildAllowance: (agentPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_70) query;
+   getChildAllowance: (agentPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_71) query;
    /// Owner-only, Billing-class: what opening an engram costs this engram, the balance below which an
    /// agent's request is refused, the balance now, and every agent's allowance. The console's cost
    /// sentence reads it. Cycles are owner-class information, as on the owner's console read.
-   getChildOpening: () -> (Result_69) query;
+   getChildOpening: () -> (Result_70) query;
    /// Derive the shared memory-encryption key, encrypted under the caller's transport
    /// public key. Gated to owner + read-agents (the same principals allowed to read
    /// memory). The client decrypts it locally with its transport secret key.
@@ -1813,7 +1823,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// cost. Stated here because L7 requires the reason be readable from the interface rather than
    /// inferred by opening the body — which is exactly what had to happen to write this line.
    getEncryptedMemoryKey: (epoch: opt nat, transportPublicKey: blob) ->
-    (Result_68);
+    (Result_69);
    /// ⟨0.16.0, owner ruling 2026-08-20 — option (a)⟩ `x402Support` REPORTS THE RAIL, not a constant.
    /// 
    /// The card's config hardcodes `x402Support = true`, answering a buyer's question with a fact
@@ -1908,7 +1918,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// It refuses rather than half-answers: if either address cannot be derived the reply is
    /// `#Err`, never a record carrying an empty string (ic402's `getEvmAddress` answers `""` on a
    /// failed derivation — that is fail-to-empty on a money surface, and it stops here).
-   getEvmAddress: () -> (Result_67);
+   getEvmAddress: () -> (Result_68);
    /// The owner's OWN EVM address, if they registered one — distinct from `getEvmAddress`, which is
    /// the address this canister derives for itself.
    /// 
@@ -1923,7 +1933,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// the management canister's `ecdsa_public_key`. A query cannot await, so the round-trip is the
    /// cost — stated here because L7 requires the reason be readable from the interface rather than
    /// inferred by opening the body.
-   getEvmSignerAddress: () -> (Result_52);
+   getEvmSignerAddress: () -> (Result_53);
    /// PUBLIC: where this chain begins, for the stranger deciding whether to trust it.
    /// 
    /// The fourth of the four evidence methods (`getAuditHead`, `getCertifiedAuditHead`,
@@ -1932,7 +1942,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// cannot verify it, and nothing here identifies anybody.
    getGenesisNote: () -> (GenesisNote) query;
    /// A guardian's own channel status (their URL is their secret — each guardian sees only theirs).
-   getGuardianAlertStatus: () -> (Result_66) query;
+   getGuardianAlertStatus: () -> (Result_67) query;
    /// The market this engram will accept signing requests from — `null` until the registry pushes
    /// one at spawn, which is why `requireMarket` refuses fleet-wide today.
    /// 
@@ -1962,7 +1972,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// never renumbered: the next page starts at the last version returned plus one. Defaults
    /// return the whole history of any file a pre-FD engram could have held.
    getMemoryHistory: (path: text, start: opt nat, max: opt nat) ->
-    (Result_65) query;
+    (Result_66) query;
    /// PUBLIC: the epoch alone, and deliberately nothing else (rotation study D4). A `rotatedAt[]`
    /// history would be a public, fleet-enumerable feed of when each owner terminated a trust
    /// relationship — readable by, among others, the party just terminated.
@@ -2003,7 +2013,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Refusal reasons of both merge: an empty policy reads as "nothing is capped, every version kept
    /// forever" — a claim about what this engram will DESTROY — and an empty guard list reads as
    /// "nothing is held back".
-   getMemoryRetentionPolicy: () -> (Result_64) query;
+   getMemoryRetentionPolicy: () -> (Result_65) query;
    /// The metrics reader this engram answers — `null` until the spawning registry names one.
    /// 
    /// PUBLIC: an owner deciding whether to switch the read off needs to know who it is, and anyone
@@ -2016,7 +2026,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// see: the only row it can ever return is the caller's own, so "you are not a guardian here" is
    /// a fact about the caller, told to the caller. There is nothing to leak by omission — which is
    /// the test the #NotFound arm sets.
-   getMyGuardianStatus: () -> (Result_16) query;
+   getMyGuardianStatus: () -> (Result_17) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0, NEW⟩ The gated half of the status() split.
    /// 
    /// Every field is bare — no masking, no `authorized` discriminator — because reaching this record
@@ -2026,7 +2036,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// was `nat`, then widened to `opt nat` so a refusal could be `null`, which broke every published
    /// client (rule 4) and bought a masked answer nobody had asked for — the census could not even
    /// find a consumer that read the masked `0`. Behind a gate there is nobody to mask it from.
-   getOwnerConsole: () -> (Result_63) query;
+   getOwnerConsole: () -> (Result_64) query;
    /// Owner + agents only (agents need it to avoid writing protected paths).
    /// 
    /// A NAMED RECORD, not a Page: the setter replaces this list wholesale, so there is no window to
@@ -2038,7 +2048,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// path on this engram is protected", and an agent consults this list precisely to avoid
    /// writing one — so a fabricated empty here does not merely misinform, it invites the write the
    /// list exists to prevent.
-   getProtectedPaths: () -> (Result_62) query;
+   getProtectedPaths: () -> (Result_63) query;
    /// Whether the metrics reader's read is answered — `true` from birth.
    /// 
    /// PUBLIC: the promise that an owner can switch this read off can be checked only if the switch
@@ -2047,7 +2057,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Owner-only, Billing-class: the signing floor, the balance, one signature's price, and how many
    /// payment signatures the balance carries above the floor before `signX402Payment` is refused by
    /// name. The same numbers the check uses, so Billing can say only what the engram enforces.
-   getSigningFloor: () -> (Result_61) query;
+   getSigningFloor: () -> (Result_62) query;
    /// The registry that spawned this engram, if it recorded one.
    /// 
    /// PUBLIC: it is the provenance claim. An engram asserting it is part of a fleet, under that
@@ -2064,7 +2074,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// configuration, and the engram-wide total would also tell one agent how much the others spent.
    /// A refusal names this method (`Gated.gatedResult`) rather than answering null/0 — a ceiling of
    /// "none" and a spend of 0 are both real answers, so a fabricated one would be read as fact.
-   getSpendCeiling: () -> (Result_60) query;
+   getSpendCeiling: () -> (Result_61) query;
    /// Read the caps in force for a caller.
    /// 
    /// OWNER-ONLY, and this is where it diverges from the market's inbound twin, which is public.
@@ -2072,8 +2082,8 @@ type Engram =
    /// Here the engram serves no 402s at all: these caps are the owner's private custody
    /// configuration, and publishing them would tell any caller exactly how large a signing request
    /// can be before it needs an approval nobody is watching for.
-   getSpendPolicy: (caller: opt principal) -> (Result_59) query;
-   getStorageStats: () -> (Result_58) query;
+   getSpendPolicy: (caller: opt principal) -> (Result_60) query;
+   getStorageStats: () -> (Result_59) query;
    /// Timer arm-state. PUBLIC and deliberately so: these timers are self-arming to save cycles,
    /// and an optimisation nobody can verify is an optimisation nobody should trust. Cheap to read,
    /// leaks nothing (booleans about our own scheduling).
@@ -2110,6 +2120,10 @@ type Engram =
    /// PUBLIC: the same standing as the two liveness reads above. Booleans and timestamps about this
    /// canister's own timers — nothing about content, callers or money — and a liveness signal only
    /// its owner can read cannot tell a third party that the engram is still running.
+   /// ⟨2026-10-28, the owner's ruling "1"⟩ The three ic402 flags read FALSE WHILE THE TIMERS ARE PAUSED.
+   /// The pause's id sweep cancels ic402's sweeps, but ic402 keeps their stale ids, so its own
+   /// "armed" reads would answer true for a timer that no longer exists (a fabricated answer,
+   /// ADR-0002). `alertTimerArmed` needs no guard: the sweep nulls `alertTimerId` itself.
    getTimerHealth: () -> (TimerHealth) query;
    /// PUBLIC: a cap identifies no user, and a caller deserves to know the rule before it stops them.
    /// 
@@ -2144,12 +2158,12 @@ type Engram =
    /// ⟨L7⟩ MARKER ADDED 2026-08-23, reasoning above UNCHANGED — this block already said "Stays an
    /// UPDATE, marked per L7: it awaits three ICRC-1 ledgers". It was marked in prose and invisible
    /// to any gate; the glyph is what `scripts/check-update-for-read.mjs` matches.
-   getWalletBalances: () -> (Result_57);
+   getWalletBalances: () -> (Result_58);
    /// Refusal reason preserved, and it is the clearest case of why a masked read is worse than no
    /// read: three empty strings with `configured = false` is a VALID-LOOKING answer meaning "this
    /// engram has no World ID configuration" — handed to a caller who merely lacks a grant. The
    /// fabrication is indistinguishable from the truth by construction.
-   getWorldIdConfig: () -> (Result_56) query;
+   getWorldIdConfig: () -> (Result_57) query;
    /// ⟨L7⟩ UPDATE, NOT QUERY: this awaits THREE system calls — `raw_rand()` for the nonce,
    /// `Call.signWithEcdsa` for the signature, and `worldIdRpPublicKey()` for the derived key. A
    /// query can do none of them.
@@ -2158,7 +2172,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Valid iff the derived signer address (getWorldIdRpSignerAddress) is registered for this rp_id in
    /// the World Developer Portal. Short-lived (300s TTL, idkit-server's default) and single-purpose —
    /// it authorizes opening one verification request, nothing else.
-   getWorldIdRpContext: () -> (Result_55);
+   getWorldIdRpContext: () -> (Result_56);
    /// Owner-only: the EVM address derived from the engram's dedicated World ID RP signing key (the
    /// "worldid-rp" tECDSA path). Register THIS address as the rp_id's signer in the World Developer
    /// Portal — the engram never holds or exports a private key (only threshold shares exist, on the
@@ -2168,7 +2182,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// awaits `worldIdRpPublicKey()` (management `ecdsa_public_key`), and it calls `denied()` on
    /// refusal — a state write, which a query cannot perform. So even if the key were cached this
    /// could not become a query without silently retiring its denial record (ADR-0002's class).
-   getWorldIdRpSignerAddress: () -> (Result_52);
+   getWorldIdRpSignerAddress: () -> (Result_53);
    /// The verified IDKitResult, verbatim, as World's /api/v4/verify accepted it — the re-checkable
    /// artifact behind verifiedHuman. Role-gated because it carries the NULLIFIER.
    /// `Result<opt Text>` — and the double wrapper is the entire point, not redundancy.
@@ -2187,13 +2201,13 @@ type Engram =
    /// `///`, so the dead name was PUBLISHED in engram.did and pointed every client at a method the
    /// canister does not serve. The tombstones below and at `about()` are historical and correct as
    /// written; this one was present tense, which is the difference that matters.⟩
-   getWorldIdVerification: () -> (Result_54) query;
+   getWorldIdVerification: () -> (Result_55) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L1⟩ THE EMERGENCY FAMILY. Every refusal below is `#Refused` or `#NotFound`, and the
    /// absence of a `#Conflict` here is the point: these are the calls someone makes while something
    /// is going wrong, and the only two answers that help are "you may not do this" and "there is
    /// nothing by that name". A missing PERMISSION is `#Refused` rather than `#Conflict` — the
    /// guardian's standing is what fell short, and no change to engram state would let them through.
-   guardianRevokeAgent: (agentPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   guardianRevokeAgent: (agentPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// The HTTP surface: canister-info JSON, OAuth discovery documents, and the MCP route's query
    /// half. See the `http_request_update` twin below for what upgrades and why.
    /// 
@@ -2262,7 +2276,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// Owner-gated because it reports on custody posture, and answered as a Result so that a
    /// wrong-identity caller gets a refusal rather than a bare `false` that reads as "no address yet".
-   isEvmAddressCached: () -> (Result_53) query;
+   isEvmAddressCached: () -> (Result_54) query;
    /// Issue an OAuth authorization code. Called by an OAuth client's sign-in bridge
    /// (an `/auth/connector`-style route) after II authentication. The client then
    /// redirects the user's browser to `redirectUri` with `?code=<this>` so the
@@ -2270,7 +2284,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// Owner-only: only the engram owner can authorize a Connector install.
    issueAuthCode: (redirectUri: text, scope: text, codeChallenge: text,
-    clientId: opt text) -> (Result_52);
+    clientId: opt text) -> (Result_53);
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ `getCycleSnapshotSource` DELETED — folded into `CycleSnapshot.source`, one label per
    /// ROW. A single label for a whole ring misattributes every row recorded under the other source,
    /// and the source flips by design (self-call first, balance on fallback). Its documentation of
@@ -2284,7 +2298,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Refusal reason preserved, and it is the sharpest of this family: a masked `[]` reads as a
    /// DORMANT engram and corrupts retention math — a fabricated empty here does not just misinform a
    /// reader, it feeds a wrong number into a decision about destroying data.
-   listActivitySnapshots: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_51) query;
+   listActivitySnapshots: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_52) query;
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, round 11 item l — the owner's answer "round 11: a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l,
    /// m."⟩ OWNER-ONLY: what each agent has spent today, beside the daily limit in force for it, so the
    /// agent rows can say "$0.50 of $5.00 today" where they said a count of payments. Read from the
@@ -2301,7 +2315,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// because the payment path keeps no figure then (`SpendCeiling.AgentSpendRow` says why).
    /// WHAT WOULD MAKE THIS WRONG: `x402SignFor` keeping the per-caller total by something other than
    /// the calling key, or under another day boundary.
-   listAgentSpendToday: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_50) query;
+   listAgentSpendToday: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_51) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ THE PAGE EXEMPLAR. Trap → `#Refused`, bare array → `Result<Page<T>>` (L1 + L3).
    /// 
    /// The refusal prose that used to be `gatedTrap`'s `whyNotEmpty` argument is not lost — it is why
@@ -2316,7 +2330,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// `withheld` is 0: this roster is owner-only in whole, so there is no partial-visibility case.
    /// A method that filters rows by caller sets it — see L1's row-level honesty rule.
-   listAgents: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_49) query;
+   listAgents: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_50) query;
    /// The GUARDIAN-audience projection of the agent roster — three fields, not the full record.
    /// 
    /// Two audiences, two methods (L1/L8), rather than one method masking fields by caller: a
@@ -2328,7 +2342,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Refusal reason preserved: `[]` reads as "this engram has no agents", and this is the list a
    /// guardian consults BEFORE REVOKING ONE. A fabricated empty here does not merely misinform —
    /// it tells someone acting under emergency powers that there is nothing to act on.
-   listAgentsForGuardian: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_48) query;
+   listAgentsForGuardian: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_49) query;
    /// Owner-only: rows carry caller, amount, operation and free-text rationale. The SDK omits it.
    /// 
    /// The optional leading filter SURVIVES the L3 reshape — ratified (census tier-2 #8) rather than
@@ -2341,7 +2355,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// Refusal reason preserved: `[]` reads as "nothing is awaiting the owner's decision".
    listApprovalRequests: (statusFilter: opt ApprovalStatus, start: nat,
-    limit: nat) -> (Result_34) query;
+    limit: nat) -> (Result_35) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ `total` IS THE HEAD COUNTER, and on this method that is the entire point.
    /// 
    /// The audit log is a bounded RING: it trims its tail, so "rows you can read" and "entries that
@@ -2375,7 +2389,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// where this record switched to the hash-first rule. A sealed row costs one SHA-256 of its body
    /// at read time; nothing new is stored. WHAT WOULD MAKE THIS WRONG: a sealed row carrying any part
    /// of a body, or a stranger reaching `items` (test/record-view.test.mo pins both).
-   listAuditEntries: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_47) query;
+   listAuditEntries: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_48) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L1 + L3 — census-ruled⟩ THE TWO-MECHANISM EXCEPTION DISSOLVES.
    /// 
    /// This method used to answer THREE ways to one question: a list, an `#Err` text, and a trap,
@@ -2399,7 +2413,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// `dbTypeFilter` DIES on the wire (census). The capability does not: `EngramClient.listBackups`
    /// keeps its optional filter and applies it to the page, so no caller loses the ability to ask
    /// "backups of this database" — it stops being a thing the canister has to page around.
-   listBackups: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_46) query;
+   listBackups: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_47) query;
    /// List all bearer tokens — Active, Revoked, and Expired. Owner uses this in
    /// the dashboard to show installed Connectors (claude.ai, Claude Desktop, etc.).
    /// Refusal reason preserved from the trap: `[]` reads as "no connector is installed on this
@@ -2409,7 +2423,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// `bearerTokenStore.list()` already resolves each token's status at read time (a token that
    /// merely stopped being used is reported `#Expired`, not a stale `#Active`), so the page carries
    /// the same honesty the store gained on 2026-08-17.
-   listBearerTokens: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_45) query;
+   listBearerTokens: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_46) query;
    /// The condense checkpoints in the retained log at or above `startSeq`, oldest first.
    /// 
    /// ⟨0.16.0, NEW⟩ The other half of the split above. A checkpoint is the only surviving record of a
@@ -2419,18 +2433,18 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// Owner-only like every other archive surface, and for the same structural reason: these rows
    /// carry the chain positions and roots of entries whose paths were inside the hash preimage.
-   listCondenseCheckpoints: (startSeq: nat, max: nat) -> (Result_44) query;
+   listCondenseCheckpoints: (startSeq: nat, max: nat) -> (Result_45) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ `metrics()` DELETED — absorbed by `about()`.
    /// 
    /// Two public projections of one canister (L2.2): `metrics()` and `status()` both answered "what
    /// is this engram like" and disagreed on which counters they carried, so a consumer had to fetch
    /// both and know which one owned each field. Every field here survives on `about()`, day-flooring
    /// included.
-   listCycleSnapshots: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_43) query;
+   listCycleSnapshots: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_44) query;
    /// Same `withheld` treatment as listMemoryFiles — the tombstone listing filtered reserved paths
    /// for non-owners just as silently, and a caller could not tell a filtered tombstone list from a
    /// complete one. Counted before slicing, so policy-hidden rows never blur into paging.
-   listDeletedMemoryFiles: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_42) query;
+   listDeletedMemoryFiles: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_43) query;
    /// Stays on the engram under B1 (hybrid): withdrawal custody does not leave.
    /// 
    /// NAMED item, not a `(Text, Int)` tuple. The Int is an activation time, and a bare Int beside a
@@ -2445,7 +2459,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// The item's field is `value`, not `address`: a list may hold a venue value that is no address.
    /// Readable by the owner, an active agent or an active guardian, as the old list was.
    listEip712Destinations: (typeId: blob, start: nat, limit: nat) ->
-    (Result_41) query;
+    (Result_42) query;
    /// The registered shapes — E3: encodeTypeString is the display artifact, verbatim.
    /// Stays on the engram under B1 (hybrid): EIP-712 signing is custody, and custody does not leave.
    /// 
@@ -2456,20 +2470,20 @@ type Engram =
    /// ⟨2026-10-14, the owner's ruling 3A⟩ Each row carries its per-field rules (`fieldRules`), joined in
    /// from `eip712FieldRules` — they are part of what the type authorises, so a reader of the list must
    /// not have to make a second call to learn them. The row type is `Eip712TypeView`.
-   listEip712Types: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_40) query;
+   listEip712Types: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_41) query;
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, round 11 c⟩ Guardians' disputes, oldest first. Same visibility as
    /// `listRepudiations` and `listRecordNotes`: the owner and ACTIVE guardians read the rows; an
    /// agent gets an empty page whose `withheld` counts them (ruling 16 B holds — a dispute is the
    /// guardian's entry, not the agent's); a stranger, a pending guardian and the anonymous caller are
    /// refused.
-   listGuardianDisputes: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_39) query;
+   listGuardianDisputes: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_40) query;
    /// Accessible by owner and guardians.
    /// 
    /// Refusal reason carried over from the trap, because it is the sharpest example of why this
    /// surface may not fail soft: `[]` reads as "this engram has nobody who can freeze payments or
    /// pause writes" — a claim about who can STOP it. A caller who cannot tell that from "you may not
    /// see the roster" has been told the engram is unguarded when it may be fully guarded.
-   listGuardians: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_38) query;
+   listGuardians: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_39) query;
    /// The export receipts in the retained log at or above `startSeq`, oldest first.
    /// 
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L3⟩ ONE LIST, ONE QUESTION. This method used to return receipts AND checkpoints
@@ -2485,7 +2499,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// Read `MemoryRouter.ReceiptPage` before reading `page.total` as a receipt count. It is not one;
    /// it is the chain's length, and the declaration says why.
-   listMemoryExportReceipts: (startSeq: nat, max: nat) -> (Result_37) query;
+   listMemoryExportReceipts: (startSeq: nat, max: nat) -> (Result_38) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ THE `withheld` EXEMPLAR — L1 names this exact method as the defect it fixes.
    /// 
    /// A non-owner's answer silently dropped every `config/` and `secrets/` row. Not "refused the
@@ -2510,7 +2524,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// the rows of THIS page (`MemoryRouter.info`), after the slice, so the cost is one lookup per
    /// row served, never one per file stored. A WIDENED REPLY: a reader that decodes the row by
    /// position rather than by field name breaks — none in this repository does.
-   listMemoryFiles: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_36) query;
+   listMemoryFiles: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_37) query;
    /// One page of the memory log, seq-ordered, optionally narrowed to one author.
    /// 
    /// THE WINDOW IS THE CURSOR, and the page now states it. The window is
@@ -2536,7 +2550,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// with the disclosures that make the page verifiable — the hidden-bound defect the census itself
    /// names on previewCondense's row.
    listMemoryLog: (startSeq: nat, max: nat, authorFilter: opt principal) ->
-    (Result_35) query;
+    (Result_36) query;
    /// The caller's OWN spend-approval requests. ⟨0.16.0, L1 + L3 — fixed 2026-08-18⟩
    /// 
    /// Two defects in seven lines, and the first is the one this release exists to remove:
@@ -2553,7 +2567,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// to see, so `total` over their own rows is the honest count and nothing is hidden FROM them.
    /// (The unbounded MAP is filed separately — pruning an approval record destroys evidence of what
    /// was asked, which is a retention ruling rather than a shape fix.)
-   listMyApprovalRequests: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_34) query;
+   listMyApprovalRequests: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_35) query;
    /// The payer's own sessions, live ones first. PAYER-SCOPED: a caller sees only their own, which
    /// is why this needs no role — a session id is not a secret from the person who paid for it.
    /// 
@@ -2562,7 +2576,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// It took no arguments, and a cursor added after the freeze is an argument-list change every
    /// client would break on — the market paged its own pending withdrawals before its cut for the
    /// same reason. The order is the order sessions were opened.
-   listMySessions: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_33) query;
+   listMySessions: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_34) query;
    /// 
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L3⟩ Paged and enveloped like every other `list*`, and the envelope here is uniformity
    /// rather than gating: this method cannot refuse anybody, so `#Err` is unreachable on it. That is
@@ -2575,7 +2589,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// asked by strangers. `verifyEngramActiveOwner` on the registry answers only about the owner
    /// IT recorded, so this chain is what a caller composes with when currency matters — which it
    /// cannot do if it needs a role here.
-   listOwnershipTransfers: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_32) query;
+   listOwnershipTransfers: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_33) query;
    /// ⟨2026-09-29, the platform's question from the build review⟩ OWNER-ONLY: how many payment
    /// signatures each agent has obtained today, and the daily limit (200, `PaymentSignCap`). The
    /// owner's console stated the rule and showed no number, because nothing served one; a number it
@@ -2591,7 +2605,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// marketplace's one shared count today is in the reply's `marketplace` field, with the limit this
    /// engram enforces for it — beside the agents, never a row among them
    /// (`PaymentSignCap.marketplaceRow`). Null when no marketplace is set.
-   listPaymentSignatureCounts: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_31) query;
+   listPaymentSignatureCounts: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_32) query;
    /// Agent records removed by a reset. Each row is a NAMED record with the fields `principal`,
    /// `name`, `registeredAt` and `purgedAt` — read them BY NAME, never by position.
    /// ⟨2026-09-29, the vocabulary ruling: pairing is the one verb that admits an agent⟩ The field
@@ -2631,7 +2645,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// `invite` its enrolment named, and `ended` — why and on what day its engagement ended (its own
    /// earlier ending, or the reset) — the facts `resyncAgentEdges` re-sends. The stored rows are
    /// served as they are.
-   listPurgedAgents: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_30) query;
+   listPurgedAgents: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_31) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ ONE ACCESSOR, folding `readReadLog` and `getDenialLog` — and the fold only became
    /// safe because of a change made earlier in this same leg.
    /// 
@@ -2693,13 +2707,13 @@ type Engram =
    /// on the chained record — the same `RecordView` filter, and `withheld` counts what it removed
    /// together with what `successFilter` removed. WHAT WOULD MAKE THIS WRONG: see `listAuditEntries`.
    listReadLog: (successFilter: opt bool, start: nat, limit: nat) ->
-    (Result_29) query;
+    (Result_30) query;
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, round 11 b⟩ The owner's notes, oldest first. Same visibility as
    /// `listRepudiations`, for the same reason: the owner and ACTIVE guardians read the rows; an agent
    /// reads only the entries it caused (follow-up 16 B), and every note is the owner's, so an agent
    /// gets an empty page whose `withheld` counts the notes in its window — never "there are none". A
    /// stranger, a pending guardian and the anonymous caller are refused.
-   listRecordNotes: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_28) query;
+   listRecordNotes: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_29) query;
    /// Same visibility as listAuditEntries: the owner, this engram's agents, and ACTIVE guardians
    /// see disputes. An unauthorized read REFUSES — it does not return an empty list, because an
    /// empty list reads as "no disputes have been filed", which is a claim, not an absence of one.
@@ -2714,7 +2728,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// window — which says disputes exist without showing them, never "none have been filed". WHAT
    /// WOULD MAKE THIS WRONG: a ruling that an agent may see the disputes of its own writes; this would
    /// then have to look up each disputed version's writer, which it does not do today.
-   listRepudiations: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_27) query;
+   listRepudiations: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_28) query;
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer f⟩ OWNER-ONLY: the sign-ins, each with the name its app
    /// registered. The same tokens, in the same order and paged the same way, as `listBearerTokens`,
    /// each beside `clientName` — the RFC 7591 `client_name` the app registered when the token was
@@ -2723,7 +2737,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// apps apart. A NEW method rather than a field on `BearerToken`: that record is stored (M0170)
    /// and `listBearerTokens`' reply is shipped (never widened). An agent, a guardian, a stranger and
    /// the anonymous caller are refused, by `listBearerTokens`' own gate and for its reason.
-   listSignIns: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_26) query;
+   listSignIns: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_27) query;
    /// Owner: advance the review cursor — "I have seen everything up to and including uptoAuditId"
    /// (null = everything at the current head). Bounded so the attestation can never cover entries
    /// the console did not render; clamped monotonic (the cursor never moves backward) and to the
@@ -2733,7 +2747,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// (every family qualifiesForReview admits is written to auditLogger, so they share that space),
    /// and this never inspects an operation or a role. Widening what the review shows therefore
    /// changes only which ids the console can pass here — it cannot desynchronise the cursor.
-   markAgentWritesReviewed: (uptoAuditId: opt nat) -> (Result_13);
+   markAgentWritesReviewed: (uptoAuditId: opt nat) -> (Result_14);
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer g⟩ AN AGENT READS ITS OWN GRANT — to the calling key
    /// only (`People.AgentGrant`): what it may read, where it may write, its rate, and the payment
    /// limits enforced against that key. It reveals nothing a refusal does not already say, and lets
@@ -2744,13 +2758,13 @@ type Engram =
    /// owner by name (`People.OWNER_HAS_NO_GRANT`), a revoked or resigned agent ("Agent is revoked" /
    /// "Agent has resigned" — an ended agent may do nothing, and its old grant would read as powers),
    /// a guardian and a stranger ("Not authorized"), the anonymous caller. A query: it writes nothing.
-   myGrant: () -> (Result_25) query;
+   myGrant: () -> (Result_26) query;
    /// The AGENT's current key nominates the key that will replace it. Nothing moves yet: the new
    /// key must accept, by its own call, within 24 hours (`acceptAgentKeyNomination`). One pending
    /// nomination per agent — a new one replaces the earlier one, and the record says which. Refused,
    /// with nothing changed, for a caller that is not an active agent here and for a key that could
    /// not hold the record (`KeyReplacement.nomineeRefusal`).
-   nominateAgentKey: (newKey: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   nominateAgentKey: (newKey: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// An AGENT paired here asks this engram to open an engram of its own. This engram attaches 1.3 T of
    /// its own cycles to the registry's `sysSpawnChild`; the agent's lasting key owns what is opened, and
    /// the engram is recorded as opened through this one. Answers the new engram's canister id.
@@ -2779,15 +2793,15 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// WHAT WOULD MAKE THIS WRONG: an await added between `ChildAllowance.take` and the registry call; the
    /// registry's `CHILD_MIN_ATTACHED_CYCLES` moving without `CHILD_ATTACH_CYCLES`.
-   openChildEngram: () -> (Result_24);
-   openSession: (config: SessionConfig, sig: PaymentSignature) -> (Result_23);
+   openChildEngram: () -> (Result_25);
+   openSession: (config: SessionConfig, sig: PaymentSignature) -> (Result_24);
    /// Withdraw tokens to the owner's principal. This is the ONLY way to
    /// move tokens out of the engram to an external address, and the
    /// destination is always hardcoded to the owner.
    /// NOT freeze-gated: the owner always controls their own funds.
    /// Guardian freeze only blocks agent/public operations.
    ownerWithdraw: (amount: TokenAmount, ownerAuth: opt ActionAuth) ->
-    (Result_13);
+    (Result_14);
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ `payRentFromEarnings` DELETED — ruled TWICE (B1 and B2), and it was the single
    /// clearest violation of the OSS/platform split in this repo.
    /// 
@@ -2845,13 +2859,13 @@ type Engram =
    pairAgent: (arg: record {
                       code: text;
                       enrolment: Enrolment;
-                    }) -> (Result_22);
+                    }) -> (Result_23);
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L2.2 — renamed from `guardianPauseWrites`⟩ Same correction as freezePayments above:
    /// owner-or-guardian, and `resumeWrites` never carried the prefix either.
-   pauseWrites: () -> (Result_1);
+   pauseWrites: () -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer d⟩ `pauseWrites` with a reason; everything said of
    /// `freezePaymentsWithReason` holds, with `canPauseWrites` as the guardian's grant.
-   pauseWritesWithReason: (reason: text) -> (Result_1);
+   pauseWritesWithReason: (reason: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// What condensing through `toSeq` would do, and whether it is unlocked. COMMITS NOTHING — it is
    /// a query, so it structurally cannot; a preview that wrote would be its own trap.
    /// 
@@ -2870,7 +2884,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// `unlocked` is the export-receipt gate ONLY. It is not a promise the condense will land: the
    /// history-budget delta is checked at commit time and can still refuse a short prefix.
-   previewCondense: (toSeq: nat) -> (Result_21) query;
+   previewCondense: (toSeq: nat) -> (Result_22) query;
    /// A quote for a session this caller has not opened and is not committed to — the intent a
    /// buyer signs against. Pure dry run, no state, no funds.
    /// 
@@ -2918,7 +2932,7 @@ type Engram =
    previewRetention: (entries: vec record {
                                      text;
                                      RetentionClassSpec;
-                                   }) -> (Result_20) query;
+                                   }) -> (Result_21) query;
    /// Read one memory file at its current version.
    /// 
    /// Gated on the `read_memory` permission, so an agent holding that grant reaches it — unlike
@@ -2933,7 +2947,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// counter here could never persist; read counting lives on the update path
    /// (`sessionReadContext` and the MCP reads). A caller measuring engram usage from this method
    /// will measure nothing.
-   readMemory: (path: text) -> (Result_11) query;
+   readMemory: (path: text) -> (Result_12) query;
    /// Read many paths in one call. Per-path Results are KEPT — partial success is the point, and
    /// one unreadable path must not fail the other nine.
    /// 
@@ -2949,7 +2963,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Both are now what they are: a single `#Err` for the whole call. `#Ok` still carries a row per
    /// path, each with its own Result — a refused RESERVED path sits beside a readable one, which is
    /// a genuine per-path fact.
-   readMemoryBatch: (paths: vec text) -> (Result_19) query;
+   readMemoryBatch: (paths: vec text) -> (Result_20) query;
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ `getMemoryRetentionGuards` DELETED — folded into `getMemoryRetentionPolicy` above.
    /// It was the second L2.1 array-returning `get*`, and separating it from the policy it modifies
    /// was the defect described there. Its own docs are preserved at the fold site.
@@ -2960,7 +2974,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// see it cannot know whether it has the whole range, which is how silent truncation gets
    /// reintroduced. Loop while `more` is true, advancing by the bytes actually returned.
    readMemoryBytes: (path: text, offset: nat, len: nat, version: opt nat) ->
-    (Result_18) query;
+    (Result_19) query;
    /// The escrow exit for a session whose settle cannot pay.
    /// 
    /// PAYER-ONLY, enforced inside the gateway, and deliberately not owner-triggered: the payer's own
@@ -3023,7 +3037,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// was the block index alone, which read as the amount. If the session's record is removed before
    /// the amount can be read back — a session closed in the same moment as the recovery and cleaned up
    /// during its transfer — it answers `#Other` naming the block, never a guessed amount.
-   recoverEscrow: (sessionId: text, amountE6: nat) -> (Result_17);
+   recoverEscrow: (sessionId: text, amountE6: nat) -> (Result_18);
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L1⟩ A REDEMPTION PATH, where the arm choice is a disclosure decision.
    /// 
    /// Four of these refusals are about the CODE and one is about the caller. The code arms restate
@@ -3037,16 +3051,16 @@ type Engram =
    /// rather than `()`. The new guardian learns, in the same reply, the name and permissions the
    /// owner's invite gave them and that they cannot act until approved; before, that took a second
    /// read they had no reason to know to make.
-   registerGuardian: (code: text) -> (Result_16);
+   registerGuardian: (code: text) -> (Result_17);
    /// Remove a per-caller override so that caller reverts to — and keeps TRACKING — the global caps.
    /// 
    /// It travels with its pair and is never dropped alone: without it the only way "back" from an
    /// override is to overwrite it with a frozen copy of the global policy, which then stops
    /// following later changes. That makes every override permanent in effect.
-   removeCallerSpendPolicy: (caller: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   removeCallerSpendPolicy: (caller: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨2026-10-14, 4A⟩ Remove a destination from one action's list. Instant, and NOT freeze-gated:
    /// removal TIGHTENS, and a frozen engram must still be able to shrink what it could sign to.
-   removeEip712Destination: (typeId: blob, value: text) -> (Result_1);
+   removeEip712Destination: (typeId: blob, value: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// De-register a type that has NEVER SIGNED. Exists because of a hazard the first external
    /// validation found within hours (consumer report, 2026-08-06): a bare-name #standard registration —
    /// cheap, no watcher preconditions — permanently blocked the guarded namespaced registration
@@ -3058,7 +3072,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// frozen engram must still be able to shrink what it could sign.
    /// ⟨2026-10-14⟩ `removeEvmWithdrawDestination` is now `removeEip712Destination` (ruling 4A); same
    /// reasoning. Removing a type now also drops its rules and its own destination list.
-   removeEip712Type: (typeId: blob) -> (Result_1);
+   removeEip712Type: (typeId: blob) -> (Result_2);
    /// Owner-only: remove a guardian from the roster.
    /// 
    /// Unlike revoking an agent this is NOT terminal for the principal — the guardian roster does
@@ -3067,7 +3081,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// `#NotFound` rather than `#Refused` when there is no such guardian: only the owner reaches this
    /// line, so the roster is theirs and its contents are not a secret being withheld from them.
-   removeGuardian: (guardianPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   removeGuardian: (guardianPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer a⟩ OWNER-ONLY: give an agent a new name. A name was
    /// fixed at the invite, and two agents both called "agent" is how the 2026-10-20 session started.
    /// Only the VALUE of the stored `AgentRecord.name` changes — no new state, no reshaped record —
@@ -3078,12 +3092,12 @@ type Engram =
    /// line break is `#Invalid` (`People.nameRefusal`); an unknown key is `#NotFound`; the agent's
    /// current name is `#Conflict`. Nothing changes on any refusal. Not alerted: the owner is the one
    /// renaming (`ActionAlerts.classify` answers null for `agent.rename`).
-   renameAgent: (agentPrincipal: principal, name: text) -> (Result_1);
+   renameAgent: (agentPrincipal: principal, name: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// Owner disavows a specific memory write, in the open. Marks — never deletes: the content and
    /// the original audit entry stay exactly where they were; this appends a chained
    /// `memory.repudiate` entry and lists the (path, version) so readers can see the dispute.
    repudiateMemoryWrite: (path: text, version: nat, reason: text) ->
-    (Result_13);
+    (Result_14);
    /// ⚠ OWNER-ONLY BULK RESET. Destructive, and wider than its name suggests.
    /// 
    /// It severs EVERY grant surface that can outlive a role — agents, guardians, invites and
@@ -3111,7 +3125,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// NOT unbounded. It caps at MAX_ENTRIES and trims its oldest tenth on overflow, so on any engram
    /// long-lived enough for the rent model to apply, the reset entry is not guaranteed to still be
    /// there. `agentPurgeLog` is the evidence that does not age out — which is why it exists.
-   resetEngram: () -> (Result_15);
+   resetEngram: () -> (Result_16);
    /// ⟨2026-09-28, owner decision: an agent can resign from an engram, and the resignation is
    /// recorded⟩ The AGENT ends its own engagement with this engram.
    /// 
@@ -3130,11 +3144,11 @@ type Engram =
    /// The roster change and its chained audit line commit BEFORE the registry is told, so a registry
    /// that is down cannot leave the agent half-resigned; a missed notice is logged by
    /// `notifyRegistryAgentEdge`. WHAT WOULD MAKE THIS WRONG: a second path that sets `#Resigned`.
-   resignAgent: () -> (Result_1);
+   resignAgent: () -> (Result_2);
    /// OWNER-ONLY release of the write pause, with the same one-way shape as `unfreezePayments`: a
    /// guardian holding `canPauseWrites` can stop writes without the owner and cannot restart them,
    /// and the owner can always restart them. A tripwire rather than a lock.
-   resumeWrites: () -> (Result_1);
+   resumeWrites: () -> (Result_2);
    /// Self-heal: re-send every ACTIVE agent's start to the spawning registry (idempotent — the
    /// registry mints no duplicate for an open engagement), for when a notice was missed. Owner-only.
    /// Returns how many the registry ACKNOWLEDGED. ⟨2026-09-28: it used to count sends that did not
@@ -3157,11 +3171,11 @@ type Engram =
    /// all that is left to send is the ending, and the registry has nothing to end. The report lists
    /// each such engagement under `cannotBeRecorded` (key, root, invite, and how and when it ended),
    /// apart from `notRecorded`, so the owner sees them rather than silence.
-   resyncAgentEdges: () -> (Result_14);
+   resyncAgentEdges: () -> (Result_15);
    /// Return to managed custody: the engram adds the registry back as a controller ALONGSIDE the
    /// owner — it does not remove the owner. The inverse of `claimSovereignty`, and the reason
    /// sovereignty is not a one-way door.
-   returnToManaged: () -> (Result_1);
+   returnToManaged: () -> (Result_2);
    /// Replace the whole content of an EXISTING file.
    /// 
    /// This is the one thing agents could never do before: every agent write was an append,
@@ -3194,7 +3208,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// human means a different wallet.
    /// 
    /// To narrow what an agent may do rather than end its access, use `setAgentPermissions`.
-   revokeAgent: (agentPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   revokeAgent: (agentPrincipal: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// Owner-only panic button: revoke EVERY active agent at once. Returns how many were revoked.
    /// 
    /// ⚠ IT REVOKES ONLY AGENTS. Invites and connector bearer tokens are separate surfaces with
@@ -3211,7 +3225,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// written, and only then does it await one notification per revoked agent. So a notification
    /// that fails leaves the agents revoked here regardless — a partial notify is not a partial
    /// revocation, which is the direction that matters for a panic button.
-   revokeAllAgents: () -> (Result_13);
+   revokeAllAgents: () -> (Result_14);
    /// Owner-only panic button: revoke every connector bearer token at once. Returns how many.
    /// 
    /// The THIRD independent surface — hosted connectors authenticate with bearer tokens, not with
@@ -3220,7 +3234,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// holding a live session.
    /// 
    /// Tokens are re-issuable: revoking them is not permanent the way revoking an agent is.
-   revokeAllBearerTokens: () -> (Result_13);
+   revokeAllBearerTokens: () -> (Result_14);
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ `removeAllGuardians` DELETED — test-only (L6), and verified NOT part of KILL-SWITCH's
    /// mass-revoke set. The destructive phase-07 suite iterates `removeGuardian` instead, so nothing
    /// loses a capability: what dies is a bulk spelling no runbook ever invoked.
@@ -3232,10 +3246,10 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// Unlike revoking an agent, this costs nothing permanently — an invite is a one-time code,
    /// so voiding it and minting a fresh one is the ordinary path.
-   revokeAllInvites: () -> (Result_13);
+   revokeAllInvites: () -> (Result_14);
    /// Revoke a bearer token by its public tokenId. Idempotent.
    /// Subsequent /mcp requests using this token will be rejected.
-   revokeBearerToken: (tokenId: text) -> (Result_1);
+   revokeBearerToken: (tokenId: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨0.16.0, census §10 item 16⟩ RETURNS A REAL RECEIPT, not `R<()>` — same reason as the delete
    /// above, and sharper here: a rollback WRITES A NEW VERSION, so the caller's next question is
    /// always "which version am I on now". `r.version` was already read for the audit line.
@@ -3258,7 +3272,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// `#Conflict` rather than `#Refused` for a `#Revoked` or `#Resigned` record: the caller IS the
    /// agent on that record, so its standing is not the problem — the record's state is. An
    /// agent reading `#Refused` would go looking for a permission that was never missing.
-   rotateAgentKeyHash: (newPublicKeyHash: text) -> (Result_1);
+   rotateAgentKeyHash: (newPublicKeyHash: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// Append to a memory file against a PAID x402 session voucher — the write half of the paid rail,
    /// authorized by the voucher rather than by a role.
    /// ⟨2026-09-30, ic402 2.17.0⟩ Authorized by the payer's own call with the voucher: only the
@@ -3302,7 +3316,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// ⚠ RAW STORED BYTES, like `readMemoryBatch`. On a Private (encrypted) engram the content is
    /// CIPHERTEXT; the key-holding SDK decrypts it. A caller without the key gets bytes it cannot
    /// read, not an error.
-   sessionReadContext: (clientLabel: text) -> (Result_12);
+   sessionReadContext: (clientLabel: text) -> (Result_13);
    /// Read one memory file against a PAID x402 session voucher. No role, no invite — the voucher is
    /// the authorization, which is what makes this the engram's one rail a stranger can pay to use.
    /// 
@@ -3332,14 +3346,14 @@ type Engram =
    ///     session must not be the side door: without this guard a stranger holding a fraction-of-a-
    ///     cent voucher could read `secrets/*`.
    ///   · Payments are frozen on this engram.
-   sessionReadMemory: (voucher: Voucher, path: text) -> (Result_11);
+   sessionReadMemory: (voucher: Voucher, path: text) -> (Result_12);
    /// Configure action alerts: an https webhook that receives new chained-audit entries matching the
    /// enabled event classes (money / approvals / guardian / agentWrites), batched, at most one
    /// POST per minute. Owner-only. Payloads carry audit METADATA (operation, caller, role, bounded
    /// details) — never memory file contents. Setting a URL (re)arms delivery FROM NOW: the cursor
    /// jumps to the current end of the log so history is not replayed. Passing url = null disables.
    /// The URL itself is never written to the audit log (webhook URLs often embed secret tokens).
-   setActionAlertConfig: (cfg: AlertConfig) -> (Result_1);
+   setActionAlertConfig: (cfg: AlertConfig) -> (Result_2);
    /// Owner-only: replace an existing agent's permission set. The way to NARROW what an agent
    /// may do without ending their access — `revokeAgent` is terminal for that principal, this is
    /// not.
@@ -3355,7 +3369,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// forward is to grant read to your own agents instead, or to switch to Connected mode first —
    /// both of which the message says.
    setAgentPermissions: (agentPrincipal: principal, permissions:
-    AgentPermissions) -> (Result_1);
+    AgentPermissions) -> (Result_2);
    /// Paths an agent holding a grant may REVISE rather than only append to.
    /// 
    /// Matching is EXACT, except that an entry ending in "/" grants everything beneath it. A grant
@@ -3363,7 +3377,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// real use case is rotating dated files under a prefix, and per-file grants would be unusable
    /// for that. What a bare prefix would do — "MEMORY.md" also matching "MEMORY.md.bak" — is the
    /// kind of accident a permission surface must not have.
-   setAgentRevisablePaths: (paths: vec text) -> (Result_1);
+   setAgentRevisablePaths: (paths: vec text) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨0.16.0 — census row⟩ Returns the APPLIED config, which is how this closes the
    /// setter-without-a-getter gap without adding a method: the write is the read.
    /// 
@@ -3378,10 +3392,10 @@ type Engram =
    /// own, and this setter applies the number to every creator's set, so `prunedBackups` counts
    /// across all of them. "The write is the read" above went stale for a second phone, which never
    /// made the write: `getBackupRetention` is the read.
-   setBackupRetention: (dbType: text, maxBackups: nat) -> (Result_10);
+   setBackupRetention: (dbType: text, maxBackups: nat) -> (Result_11);
    /// Override the caps for ONE caller — an agent this owner trusts more, or less, than the rest.
    setCallerSpendPolicy: (caller: principal, policy: SpendingPolicy) ->
-    (Result_1);
+    (Result_2);
    /// Owner-only: set how many engrams `agentPrincipal`'s agent may open of its own through this
    /// engram. Kept by the agent's lasting key, so it carries over a key replacement. Any count is
    /// accepted; the registry lets a lasting key open one engram through a parent, ever, so 1 or more
@@ -3392,7 +3406,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// back. The change is written to the record under `agent.childAllowance.set`, which is in the
    /// alerts' money class (`ActionAlerts.classify`), so an owner or guardian with an alert channel
    /// hears of it.
-   setChildAllowance: (agentPrincipal: principal, allowed: nat) -> (Result_1);
+   setChildAllowance: (agentPrincipal: principal, allowed: nat) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ `getEncryptedMemoryKeyForEpoch` DELETED — folded into `getEncryptedMemoryKey`'s epoch
    /// argument — see that method for the fold and the `null`-means-CURRENT rule.
    /// Owner-only: turn client-side memory encryption (Private mode) on or off for FUTURE writes.
@@ -3415,7 +3429,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// Private mode also closes the paid read rail by construction: a paid session holds no key, so
    /// `sessionReadMemory` refuses on an encrypted engram whatever `setPaidMemoryReadEnabled` says.
-   setEncryptionEnabled: (enabled: bool) -> (Result_1);
+   setEncryptionEnabled: (enabled: bool) -> (Result_2);
    /// Register the owner's EVM address for withdrawals.
    /// 
    /// First set: immediate — no guardian needed.
@@ -3426,12 +3440,12 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// The guardian doesn't approve the change — the owner is sovereign.
    /// The guardian's existence is the gate, not their active consent.
-   setEvmOwnerAddress: (evmAddress: text) -> (Result_1);
+   setEvmOwnerAddress: (evmAddress: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// A guardian arms their OWN webhook over the guarded engram's audit stream (same event
    /// classes and payload as the owner channel — audit metadata, never memory file contents;
    /// the guardian honesty rail: integrity, not content). Active guardians only. Arming starts
    /// from NOW (no history replay); url = null disarms and frees the slot.
-   setGuardianAlertConfig: (cfg: AlertConfig) -> (Result_1);
+   setGuardianAlertConfig: (cfg: AlertConfig) -> (Result_2);
    /// Per-prefix retention policy. The longest rule that covers a path wins; anything uncovered
    /// keeps everything.
    /// 
@@ -3449,7 +3463,7 @@ type Engram =
     vec record {
           text;
           RetentionClassSpec;
-        }) -> (Result_1);
+        }) -> (Result_2);
    /// Owner-only: open or close the monetized read rail. When disabled (the default), sessionReadMemory
    /// fails closed for every voucher-bearer — selling the owner's memory is opt-in, not the default.
    /// 
@@ -3460,26 +3474,26 @@ type Engram =
    /// 
    /// `getEngramCard`'s `x402Support` reports THIS flag, so a buyer can read the rail's state before
    /// paying rather than discovering it in a refusal.
-   setPaidMemoryReadEnabled: (enabled: bool) -> (Result_1);
+   setPaidMemoryReadEnabled: (enabled: bool) -> (Result_2);
    /// Open or close the paid-memory WRITE rail (RB4). Owner-only, like its read twin.
    /// 
    /// Kept as a SEPARATE flag rather than widening `setPaidMemoryReadEnabled` into one switch: an
    /// owner selling read access has not thereby agreed to sell write access, and a single flag makes
    /// the larger permission ride in on the smaller one. Two flags is the shape that lets an owner
    /// say yes to one and no to the other, which is the common case.
-   setPaidMemoryWriteEnabled: (enabled: bool) -> (Result_1);
+   setPaidMemoryWriteEnabled: (enabled: bool) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨0.16.0, L1⟩ Every validation refusal here is `#Invalid` and the cap is `#Conflict`, and the
    /// split is worth stating once for the whole whole-value-config family below: a malformed path is
    /// the CALLER'S to fix and retrying with a corrected list works, while "max 20" is a property of
    /// this engram that no argument gets around. A caller that cannot tell those apart either edits
    /// forever or gives up on a request that was one character from valid.
-   setProtectedPaths: (paths: vec text) -> (Result_1);
+   setProtectedPaths: (paths: vec text) -> (Result_2);
    /// OWNER-ONLY: switch the metrics reader's read of the seat weeks off (`false`) or back on (`true`).
    /// On from birth, by the owner's ruling of 2026-10-02. Off, `sysGetAgentSeatWeeks` refuses the
    /// reader by name, naming this switch; the rows are still kept and the owner still reads them. Each
    /// call is a chained record entry (`metrics.setSeatWeeksReadEnabled`, the new and the old value), so
    /// when the read was on or off is part of the record. Anyone else is refused by name.
-   setSeatWeeksReadEnabled: (enabled: bool) -> (Result_1);
+   setSeatWeeksReadEnabled: (enabled: bool) -> (Result_2);
    /// Set the most this engram may spend per day ACROSS EVERY CALLER — five agents, the owner and the
    /// marketplace together. `null` removes the ceiling. ⟨2026-09-28⟩
    /// ⟨CORRECTED 2026-09-29, review finding X-8: "spend" was too wide. The ceiling covers the x402
@@ -3521,7 +3535,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// The record entry `spend.setCeiling` carries the new AND the previous value, so a widening is
    /// distinguishable from a tightening afterwards — the reason `spend.setPolicy` records its limits.
    /// Not blocked by a payments freeze, like `setSpendPolicy`: setting a limit moves no money.
-   setSpendCeiling: (maxPerDay: opt nat) -> (Result_1);
+   setSpendCeiling: (maxPerDay: opt nat) -> (Result_2);
    /// Set this engram's spending caps.
    /// 
    /// The audit row records the LIMITS, not merely that a change happened, so a WIDENING is
@@ -3531,7 +3545,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Raising a cap RESOLVES pending approval requests it now covers — that is the second half of
    /// the escalation an agent starts when it hits a limit, and without it the queue is a place
    /// requests go to expire.
-   setSpendPolicy: (policy: SpendingPolicy) -> (Result_1);
+   setSpendPolicy: (policy: SpendingPolicy) -> (Result_2);
    /// Owner-only: set YOUR OWN safety rails on the funding path — a per-top-up ckUSDC ceiling and a
    /// minimum gap between top-ups. Read them back with `getTopUpLimits`.
    /// 
@@ -3555,12 +3569,12 @@ type Engram =
     record {
       cooldownSeconds: nat;
       maxCkusdcE6s: nat;
-    }) -> (Result_1);
+    }) -> (Result_2);
    /// Owner sets the World ID app_id + action + rp_id from their World Developer Portal (rp_id appears
    /// after "Enable World ID 4.0" on a production app). The action MUST be configured there with
    /// max_verifications = Unlimited (idempotent /verify → survives IC consensus). After setting this,
    /// register getWorldIdRpSignerAddress() as the rp_id's signer address in the Portal.
-   setWorldIdConfig: (appId: text, action: text, rpId: text) -> (Result_1);
+   setWorldIdConfig: (appId: text, action: text, rpId: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// Submit a verified-human proof: the IDKitResult from the frontend's World ID flow, forwarded
    /// VERBATIM (compact JSON, as JSON.stringify emits) to World's /api/v4/verify/{rp_id} over an HTTPS
    /// outcall (never trust the client). The v4 endpoint verifies both 4.0 proofs and legacy 3.0 proofs,
@@ -3569,7 +3583,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// store to the payload the verifier actually accepted. Only proof_of_human credentials are accepted
    /// (selfie is farmable, passport/mnc are document identity — a different tier). Sets worldIdVerified
    /// and stores the result ONLY on a real verification success — never self-asserted.
-   setWorldIdProof: (resultJson: text, nullifier: text) -> (Result_1);
+   setWorldIdProof: (resultJson: text, nullifier: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// Sign a registered type. ONE call, owner-only, freeze-gated — the delay lives on registration
    /// (D2), never here: an emergency withdrawal must not need two owner round-trips.
    /// 
@@ -3579,7 +3593,7 @@ type Engram =
    signEip712: (typeId: blob, values: vec record {
                                             text;
                                             Eip712Value;
-                                          }) -> (Result_4);
+                                          }) -> (Result_5);
    /// Sign the engram's own ERC-8004 registration tx for client-side broadcast: the engram signs, the client
    /// broadcasts and keeps the resulting registration id.
    /// 
@@ -3614,7 +3628,7 @@ type Engram =
       maxFeePerGas: nat;
       maxPriorityFeePerGas: nat;
       nonce: nat;
-    }) -> (Result_9);
+    }) -> (Result_10);
    /// Sign an EIP-3009 authorization for x402 payment. Agent-accessible.
    /// Client probes the URL, extracts chain/token/recipient/amount from the 402, and calls this.
    /// Canister signs → returns header → client retries with header.
@@ -3645,7 +3659,7 @@ type Engram =
       tokenAddress: text;
       tokenName: text;
       tokenVersion: text;
-    }) -> (Result_3);
+    }) -> (Result_4);
    /// ⟨2026-10-21, the owner's round-11 answer e⟩ A GUARDIAN STEPS DOWN: the caller ends their own
    /// guardianship of this engram. It removes a power from the one who holds it and grants none.
    /// Before, only the owner could remove a guardian, so one who wanted out could only stop watching
@@ -3665,7 +3679,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// WHAT IT LEAVES: a brake this guardian pulled stays on — lifting one is the owner's; their
    /// disputes stay on the record. Like `removeGuardian`, it is not terminal: the owner may invite
    /// the same person again.
-   stepDownAsGuardian: () -> (Result_1);
+   stepDownAsGuardian: () -> (Result_2);
    /// OWNER force-close, for a session the payer abandoned.
    /// 
    /// ⟨R1b, ruled 2026-08-26: owner-gated, NO guardian.⟩ It moves someone else's money, and only ever
@@ -3685,7 +3699,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// stays false here until it is renamed too. Left for the owner: the rename is free until the cut
    /// and a break after it, and it also moves `packages/client/README.md` and
    /// `docs/AGENT-ONBOARDING.md`, which name it.
-   sysForceCloseSession: (sessionId: text) -> (Result_1);
+   sysForceCloseSession: (sessionId: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// The metrics reader the registry designated reads every engagement's seat weeks, in one call.
    /// 
    /// CALLER: the metrics reader the spawning registry named on this engram (`metricsReaderId`), and
@@ -3702,7 +3716,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// owner can see every time the reader read. A refusal is `#Refused` naming this method and the
    /// class (`SeatWeeks.readRefusal`), never an empty list: an empty list is a real answer ("no agent
    /// has paired here"), and a fabricated one would be counted as one.
-   sysGetAgentSeatWeeks: () -> (Result_8);
+   sysGetAgentSeatWeeks: () -> (Result_9);
    /// The metrics reader the registry designated reads this engram's paid-rail health, in one call:
    /// the balance and the line it must stay above, the memory that line is computed from, the sessions
    /// by state, the escrow open sessions hold, the vouchers spent and the refused ones
@@ -3724,7 +3738,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// (`RailHealth.readRefusal`), never a zero balance: a made-up zero would read as an engram about
    /// to freeze. Called by another canister, a query runs replicated and this engram pays for it —
    /// a few million cycles an hour, the cost of being watched.
-   sysGetRailHealth: () -> (Result_7) query;
+   sysGetRailHealth: () -> (Result_8) query;
    /// The cashier reads how many signatures this engram has produced, per caller and in total.
    /// ⟨2026-09-28⟩ The owner's decision of that date: a running counter on the engram, exported to
    /// the cashier — and to nobody else (`AccessControl.requireCashierForSignatureCounts`).
@@ -3747,7 +3761,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// bills from this: the number comes from a canister its owner controls and can reinstall, so bill
    /// only engrams the registry confirms run published code, and read a lower count than last time as
    /// a reinstall — the reasoning is at `signaturesByCaller`.
-   sysGetSignatureCounts: () -> (Result_6);
+   sysGetSignatureCounts: () -> (Result_7);
    /// Note a restart the registry just made: what this engram owes for it, the floor a repayment may
    /// not go under, and until when to keep its timers quiet.
    /// 
@@ -3760,7 +3774,7 @@ type Engram =
       keepCycles: nat;
       loan: nat;
       quietUntilNs: int;
-    }) -> (Result_1);
+    }) -> (Result_2);
    /// Rent lifecycle notice — how the OWNER (not the agent) learns their subscription lapsed. D6
    /// shipped the handoff but every alarm it added talks to the operating service's watchdog; the
    /// doc named the debt plainly: "an owner learns of their own lapse only by looking." This closes
@@ -3771,7 +3785,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// Gated exactly like sysRecordFeeEvent (spawnedBy or cashierId): the sweep is the only thing that
    /// OBSERVES the transition, so it is the only thing that can report it. The state whitelist is
    /// closed — this is a lifecycle feed, not a free-text push surface into the owner's audit chain.
-   sysNotifyRentLifecycle: (state: text, detail: text) -> (Result_1);
+   sysNotifyRentLifecycle: (state: text, detail: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ `getWalletActivation()` DELETED — folded to `about().walletActivatedAtNs`, with its
    /// custody-posture rationale carried onto the field. "Can this thing hold money" is a question a
    /// counterparty is entitled to ask before dealing with an engram, which is why it stays public.
@@ -3803,7 +3817,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// The audit line records this engram as the subject, and `surface=endpoint-listed` is what names
    /// the origin: only the configured market can pass that value, so the line cannot be produced by
    /// any other caller.
-   sysNotifyWalletActivity: (surface: text) -> (Result_1);
+   sysNotifyWalletActivity: (surface: text) -> (Result_2);
    /// The rent RECEIPT seam (B2): the cashier tells this engram that money moved on its behalf, and
    /// the engram appends a `fee.recorded` line to its own audit chain. It computes nothing.
    /// 
@@ -3838,7 +3852,7 @@ type Engram =
       cycles: nat;
       paidThroughNs: opt int;
       scheduleVersion: opt text;
-    }) -> (Result_1);
+    }) -> (Result_2);
    /// Give back what a paid security update advanced this engram and the install did not use.
    /// 
    /// CALLER: the registry that spawned this engram, right after it installed a security update it
@@ -3846,6 +3860,9 @@ type Engram =
    /// above its balance before the update, and what sits above its 30-day reserve plus send headroom
    /// (`RestartRepay.giveBack`) — attached to the registry's `sysRepayUpgradeAdvance`, which accepts no
    /// more than it advanced. The registry writes off what is not returned; nothing is owed after.
+   /// ⟨CORRECTED 2026-10-28, beside "its 30-day reserve" above — the owner's ruling "1"⟩ The reserve is
+   /// this engram's freezing reserve at its own setting (`freezeReservation` = `lineEstimate`), not a
+   /// 30-day figure: about 430B more at a ~305-day setting.
    /// ⟨2026-10-26, the owner's review choice 1B: "take back only what we added; anything left over goes
    /// to the 90-day write-off"⟩ The registry now names the ONE advance it is asking for (`advanceId`,
    /// the one its deposit for this install put on its ledger) and `advance` is that advance's amount
@@ -3860,7 +3877,7 @@ type Engram =
       advance: nat;
       advanceId: nat;
       balanceBefore: nat;
-    }) -> (Result_5);
+    }) -> (Result_6);
    /// Point this engram at the biller that converts its tokens → cycles. Settable, not hardcoded:
    /// coupling is by principal id, so the same wasm runs against any deployment's biller.
    /// 
@@ -3876,7 +3893,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// `convertEarningsToCycles` fails closed against a null biller, and with the owner leg gone
    /// nobody but the spawning registry can fix it. That refusal therefore names the real remedy
    /// rather than telling an owner to run a call they can no longer make.
-   sysSetBillerId: (id: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   sysSetBillerId: (id: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// Give this engram its BIRTH CHAIN: its ancestors' birth records and its own, root first, its own
    /// last ⟨2026-10-26, the owner's lineage rulings L2C-lite and L3A⟩.
    /// 
@@ -3891,7 +3908,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// a push whose reply was lost); a different one is refused `#Conflict`. THE ENGRAM DOES NOT HASH:
    /// it checks only that the chain ends with its own record. The fingerprints are the registry's to
    /// certify and the client's `verifyBirthChain` to check.
-   sysSetBirthChain: (chain: vec BirthRecord) -> (Result_1);
+   sysSetBirthChain: (chain: vec BirthRecord) -> (Result_2);
    /// Point this engram at the commerce satellite allowed to ask it for signatures. ⟨0.16.0, B1⟩
    /// 
    /// SAME AUTHORITY AS `sysSetBillerId`, and for a stronger reason. That one routes money; this one
@@ -3903,7 +3920,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// never be sold through the market, and no owner action fixes it. Both `sysSign*` methods refuse
    /// against a null pointer and their refusals name the registry as the remedy rather than telling
    /// an owner to run a call they cannot make.
-   sysSetMarketId: (id: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   sysSetMarketId: (id: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// Name the metrics reader allowed to read this engram's seat weeks (`sysGetAgentSeatWeeks`).
    /// ⟨2026-10-02, the owner's ruling of that day⟩
    /// 
@@ -3923,7 +3940,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// SET ONCE. The same reader again answers `#Ok` and changes nothing; another is refused `#Conflict`
    /// (`AccessControl.setOnce` says why). Still never cleared. The chained record entry
    /// (`metrics.sysSetMetricsReaderId`) is the evidence of when the read was granted, and to whom.
-   sysSetMetricsReaderId: (reader: principal) -> (Result_1);
+   sysSetMetricsReaderId: (reader: principal) -> (Result_2);
    /// The market asks this engram to sign a registered type — B1's seam, settlement leg. ⟨0.16.0⟩
    /// 
    /// THE ENGRAM DOES NOT TRUST THE MARKET WITH ANYTHING BEYOND "ask". Every control that bounds
@@ -3940,7 +3957,7 @@ type Engram =
    sysSignEip712: (typeId: blob, values: vec record {
                                                text;
                                                Eip712Value;
-                                             }) -> (Result_4);
+                                             }) -> (Result_5);
    /// The market asks this engram to sign an x402 payment — B1's seam, the paid-request leg. ⟨0.16.0⟩
    /// 
    /// THE MARKET SUPPLIES THE REQUEST; THE ENGRAM SUPPLIES THE POLICY. Every control below the caller
@@ -3957,14 +3974,14 @@ type Engram =
    /// for ALL market traffic; per-seller limits are not expressible in the store it reads.
    sysSignX402Payment: (chainId: nat, tokenAddress: text, recipient: 
     text, amount: nat, tokenName: text, tokenVersion: text, rationale:
-    opt text, approvalId: opt text) -> (Result_3);
+    opt text, approvalId: opt text) -> (Result_4);
    /// Write an `alerts.test` entry into the audit log; the drain timer delivers it to the webhook
    /// within ~60s. Owner-only; requires a configured URL so the test can actually go somewhere.
-   testActionAlert: () -> (Result_1);
+   testActionAlert: () -> (Result_2);
    /// Guardian test alert — an audited guardian action (`alerts.test`, role Guardian) that every
    /// armed channel (owner + guardians) receives within ~60s. Requires the caller's own channel
    /// to be armed so the test has somewhere to land for them.
-   testGuardianAlert: () -> (Result_1);
+   testGuardianAlert: () -> (Result_2);
    /// RENAMED from `init` (L2.4). This is the OWNERSHIP-TRANSFER method — the most consequential
    /// owner-facing operation on the canister — and it was named for first-time setup, colliding with
    /// the actor's own `service : (initArgs)`. A reader scanning for "how does ownership move" found
@@ -4002,7 +4019,7 @@ type Engram =
    /// control to the same owner again and reports it, and it writes NO entry to
    /// `listOwnershipTransfers` (until this day it wrote one from the owner to themselves, a hand-on
    /// that did not happen). The record entry says it was a report. `ControlHandover.isReport`.
-   transferOwnership: (newOwner: principal) -> (Result_2);
+   transferOwnership: (newOwner: principal) -> (Result_3);
    /// OWNER-ONLY release of the payment freeze — and the asymmetry with `freezePayments` is the
    /// governance design, not an oversight.
    /// 
@@ -4014,7 +4031,18 @@ type Engram =
    ///     unilaterally.
    /// So a guardian's freeze is a TRIPWIRE, not a lock — it buys the time it takes the owner to
    /// look, and no more.
-   unfreezePayments: () -> (Result_1);
+   unfreezePayments: () -> (Result_2);
+   /// Wake this engram's timers after it paused them to save compute near its freezing line. Owner
+   /// only. Refused, by name, below the room the hourly check-in needs; then nothing is armed.
+   /// 
+   /// CALLER: the engram's owner, from the owner's app (its status line and its compute page), and
+   /// nobody else (ADR-0020). ⟨2026-10-28, the owner's ruling "1": "it wakes on the next payment, agent
+   /// request or your Wake"⟩ The automatic doors (the biller's receipt, Convert, an agent's MCP request)
+   /// wake it when compute lands with room; this is the owner's door, for compute that arrived with no
+   /// receipt (a bare top-up). It always reads the engram's own balance (no rate limit, no free filter),
+   /// so a refusal states what the engram measured. Both figures in a refusal are its own READING above
+   /// its line, which runs ~82B below the true figure, so the engram never calls it the gap.
+   wakeTimers: () -> (Result_1);
    /// Consensus transform for the World ID /verify outcall. Replicas each call independently, so the raw
    /// response (timestamps, `uses`, request-id headers) is non-deterministic. Collapse it to a single
    /// canonical byte — "1" iff HTTP 200 AND the body asserts success — with no headers, so every replica
@@ -4374,6 +4402,8 @@ type AnchorPushStatus =
    okTotal: nat;
    skipCursor: nat;
    timerTickAtNs: opt int;
+   timersPauseReason: opt text;
+   timersPausedAtNs: opt int;
  };
 type AlertStatus = 
  record {
@@ -4521,6 +4551,7 @@ type About =
    paidMemoryReadEnabled: bool;
    paidMemoryWriteEnabled: bool;
    paymentsFrozen: bool;
+   timersPausedSinceDayNs: opt int;
    totalBackupSize: nat;
    totalMemoryReads: nat;
    totalMemoryWrites: nat;