@engramx/idl 0.16.0-rc.13 → 0.16.0-rc.14

package/dist/market.did

@@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ type SellerStatus =
    expiresAtNs: int;
    verifiedAtNs: int;
  };
+type SealedEntry = 
+ record {
+   digest: blob;
+   entryHash: blob;
+   id: nat;
+ };
 type RoleGrant = 
  record {
    holder: principal;
@@ -204,6 +210,11 @@ type Result_3 =
    Err: Error;
    Ok: EscrowRecovery;
  };
+type Result_20 = 
+ variant {
+   Err: Error;
+   Ok: X402Endpoint;
+ };
 type Result_2 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
@@ -212,47 +223,47 @@ type Result_2 =
 type Result_19 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: X402Endpoint;
+   Ok: ServiceRequestResponse;
  };
 type Result_18 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: ServiceRequestResponse;
+   Ok: ContentResponse;
  };
 type Result_17 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: ContentResponse;
+   Ok: opt text;
  };
 type Result_16 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: opt text;
+   Ok: Job;
  };
 type Result_15 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: Job;
+   Ok: blob;
  };
 type Result_14 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: blob;
+   Ok: JobStatus;
  };
 type Result_13 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: JobStatus;
+   Ok: RevenueSummary;
  };
 type Result_12 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: RevenueSummary;
+   Ok: SellerStatus;
  };
 type Result_11 = 
  variant {
    Err: Error;
-   Ok: SellerStatus;
+   Ok: RecordPage;
  };
 type Result_10 = 
  variant {
@@ -269,6 +280,14 @@ type Result =
    Err: Error;
    Ok: nat;
  };
+type RecordPage = 
+ record {
+   hashFirstFrom: nat;
+   items: vec AuditEntry;
+   ringFloor: nat;
+   sealed: vec SealedEntry;
+   total: nat;
+ };
 type QuotedRequirement = 
  record {
    amount: nat;
@@ -663,7 +682,7 @@ service : {
   /// Born disabled deliberately: a listing that went live at creation would be sellable before its
   /// price was set, and `price` starts at 0 with `suggestedPrice` as the fallback.
   createEndpoint: (name: text, description: text, contentId: text,
-   suggestedPriceE6: nat) -> (Result_19);
+   suggestedPriceE6: nat) -> (Result_20);
   /// Submit a paid service request. Returns a job id, or the price.
   /// 
   /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ TWO GATES FROM THE ENGRAM DO NOT TRAVEL, and both for the same reason: they were the
@@ -678,7 +697,7 @@ service : {
   /// 
   /// What DOES gate here is the market's freeze, and the service's own existence and pricing mode.
   createJob: (serviceId: text, params: blob, paymentSig:
-   opt PaymentSignature) -> (Result_18);
+   opt PaymentSignature) -> (Result_19);
   /// Delete content.
   /// 
   /// ⚠ THE QUOTA IS NOT REFUNDED, and this is the honest part of the design rather than a
@@ -767,7 +786,7 @@ service : {
   /// before the nonce lock or any ledger call, and the refusal reaches the buyer as #Refused with
   /// ic402's text naming both principals. Pay as the principal that approved the allowance.
   getContent: (contentId: text, paymentSig: opt PaymentSignature) ->
-   (Result_17);
+   (Result_18);
   /// ⟨0.16.0⟩ THE `getChunk` FIX, and it is the sharpest single case in the corpus.
   /// 
   /// The engram's version was:
@@ -792,13 +811,13 @@ service : {
   /// list they scan holds authorization helpers only — so a refusal fabricated behind a payment
   /// check was out of scope by construction rather than by ruling. L11 adds payment gates to that
   /// list; this method is why.
-  getContentChunk: (grant: AccessGrant, index: nat) -> (Result_14) query;
+  getContentChunk: (grant: AccessGrant, index: nat) -> (Result_15) query;
   /// A seller's payout address — THEIRS, or the admin's to read.
   /// 
   /// The engram made this owner-only and TRAPPED at everyone else. Here the answer is a refusal a
   /// caller can read, and `#Ok(null)` genuinely means "this seller has set no payout address" —
   /// distinguishable from "you may not ask", which is the whole point of the envelope.
-  getEvmSellerPayout: (seller: principal) -> (Result_16) query;
+  getEvmSellerPayout: (seller: principal) -> (Result_17) query;
   /// PUBLIC: what this canister's chains continue, or that they continue nothing. A fresh chain
   /// beside a published predecessor head is auditable; a fresh chain with no statement is
   /// indistinguishable from a wipe.
@@ -811,7 +830,7 @@ service : {
   /// collapsed "unknown jobId" and "not authorized", and the product rendered the wrong conclusion
   /// from it — the marketplace UI printed "Job not found (or not yet visible)" at a caller who was
   /// merely unauthorized. Job existence is not the secret: `getJobCounts()` is ungated.
-  getJob: (jobId: text) -> (Result_15) query;
+  getJob: (jobId: text) -> (Result_16) query;
   /// PUBLIC: aggregate counts that identify nobody — and already public on the engram, which is
   /// what made `listJobs`' existence-leak justification false.
   getJobCounts: () -> (JobCounts) query;
@@ -824,7 +843,7 @@ service : {
   /// 
   /// Three outcomes, three answers now. And `Payer` (above) removes the root cause rather than
   /// only labelling it.
-  getJobResult: (jobId: text) -> (Result_14) query;
+  getJobResult: (jobId: text) -> (Result_15) query;
   /// Terminal money settlement — the seller gets paid. Honours the freeze exactly like every
   /// other settle path; a settlement that ignored the freeze would make the freeze a suggestion.
   /// PUBLIC: a job's state, and nothing else about it.
@@ -839,7 +858,7 @@ service : {
   /// 
   /// The engram returned `?EngramJobStatus`, conflating "no such job" with a null-ish answer. Here
   /// a missing job is `#NotFound`, which is a fact rather than an absence a caller has to interpret.
-  getJobStatus: (jobId: text) -> (Result_13) query;
+  getJobStatus: (jobId: text) -> (Result_14) query;
   /// PUBLIC: the market's spend limits, with the caller rosters REDACTED.
   /// 
   /// The limits themselves are already public — they are advertised inside every 402 challenge, so
@@ -862,7 +881,7 @@ service : {
   /// Anonymous is refused rather than answered with zeroes. A zero here is a real business fact —
   /// "you have sold nothing" — and returning it to a caller who simply has no identity is the
   /// fabricated-empty defect wearing a number instead of a list.
-  getRevenueSummary: () -> (Result_12) query;
+  getRevenueSummary: () -> (Result_13) query;
   /// PUBLIC: what a buyer can learn about a seller, and the whole of it.
   /// 
   /// The ENGRAM ID is the point of this read. This market runs no reputation system and issues no
@@ -873,7 +892,7 @@ service : {
   /// 
   /// `verified` is about ownership at a moment in time and nothing else. It is not an endorsement,
   /// and the field name is the strongest claim it makes.
-  getSellerStatus: (seller: principal) -> (Result_11) query;
+  getSellerStatus: (seller: principal) -> (Result_12) query;
   /// PUBLIC: aggregate session counts. Identifies nobody, and the same reasoning as getJobCounts —
   /// which is also what made `listJobs`' old "no existence leak" defence false.
   getSessionCounts: () -> (SessionCounts) query;
@@ -952,7 +971,13 @@ service : {
   isTradeFrozen: () -> (bool) query;
   /// `total` is the head counter, not the row count: this is a bounded ring, so a page that
   /// reported only what it returned would make a trimmed log look complete.
-  listAuditEntries: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_9) query;
+  /// 
+  /// ⟨2026-10-15, the owner's ruling 6B of 2026-10-14⟩ The reply is the shared `Wire.RecordPage`, so
+  /// one checker reads every chain. A viewer sees every entry, so `sealed` is always empty here;
+  /// `ringFloor` says where the ring starts and `hashFirstFrom` where this record switched to the
+  /// hash-first rule. The gate is unchanged (hash-only rows for strangers were ruled for the
+  /// engram's record).
+  listAuditEntries: (start: nat, limit: nat) -> (Result_11) query;
   /// Admin AND the enrolled viewers themselves — L8's roster rule. A viewer who cannot see the
   /// roster cannot tell whether their own enrolment survived a rotation.
   listAuditViewers: () -> (Result_10) query;

package/dist/market.idl.d.ts

@@ -244,19 +244,27 @@ export interface QuotedRequirement {
   tokenName: [] | [string];
   amount: bigint;
 }
+export interface RecordPage {
+  ringFloor: bigint;
+  total: bigint;
+  sealed: Array<SealedEntry>;
+  items: Array<AuditEntry>;
+  hashFirstFrom: bigint;
+}
 export type Result = { Ok: bigint } | { Err: Error };
 export type Result_1 = { Ok: null } | { Err: Error };
 export type Result_10 = { Ok: Page_7 } | { Err: Error };
-export type Result_11 = { Ok: SellerStatus } | { Err: Error };
-export type Result_12 = { Ok: RevenueSummary } | { Err: Error };
-export type Result_13 = { Ok: JobStatus } | { Err: Error };
-export type Result_14 = { Ok: Uint8Array | number[] } | { Err: Error };
-export type Result_15 = { Ok: Job } | { Err: Error };
-export type Result_16 = { Ok: [] | [string] } | { Err: Error };
-export type Result_17 = { Ok: ContentResponse } | { Err: Error };
-export type Result_18 = { Ok: ServiceRequestResponse } | { Err: Error };
-export type Result_19 = { Ok: X402Endpoint } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_11 = { Ok: RecordPage } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_12 = { Ok: SellerStatus } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_13 = { Ok: RevenueSummary } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_14 = { Ok: JobStatus } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_15 = { Ok: Uint8Array | number[] } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_16 = { Ok: Job } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_17 = { Ok: [] | [string] } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_18 = { Ok: ContentResponse } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_19 = { Ok: ServiceRequestResponse } | { Err: Error };
 export type Result_2 = { Ok: string } | { Err: Error };
+export type Result_20 = { Ok: X402Endpoint } | { Err: Error };
 export type Result_3 = { Ok: EscrowRecovery } | { Err: Error };
 export type Result_4 = { Ok: PaymentQuote } | { Err: Error };
 export type Result_5 = { Ok: SessionState } | { Err: Error };
@@ -295,6 +303,11 @@ export interface RoleGrant {
   role: { Root: null } | { WasmAdmin: null } | { Admin: null } | { Other: string };
   holder: Principal;
 }
+export interface SealedEntry {
+  id: bigint;
+  entryHash: Uint8Array | number[];
+  digest: Uint8Array | number[];
+}
 export interface SellerStatus {
   expiresAtNs: bigint;
   verifiedAtNs: bigint;
@@ -484,7 +497,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * / Born disabled deliberately: a listing that went live at creation would be sellable before its
    * / price was set, and `price` starts at 0 with `suggestedPrice` as the fallback.
    */
-  createEndpoint: ActorMethod<[string, string, string, bigint], Result_19>;
+  createEndpoint: ActorMethod<[string, string, string, bigint], Result_20>;
   /**
    * / Submit a paid service request. Returns a job id, or the price.
    * /
@@ -500,7 +513,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * /
    * / What DOES gate here is the market's freeze, and the service's own existence and pricing mode.
    */
-  createJob: ActorMethod<[string, Uint8Array | number[], [] | [PaymentSignature]], Result_18>;
+  createJob: ActorMethod<[string, Uint8Array | number[], [] | [PaymentSignature]], Result_19>;
   /**
    * / Delete content.
    * /
@@ -609,7 +622,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * / before the nonce lock or any ledger call, and the refusal reaches the buyer as #Refused with
    * / ic402's text naming both principals. Pay as the principal that approved the allowance.
    */
-  getContent: ActorMethod<[string, [] | [PaymentSignature]], Result_17>;
+  getContent: ActorMethod<[string, [] | [PaymentSignature]], Result_18>;
   /**
    * / ⟨0.16.0⟩ THE `getChunk` FIX, and it is the sharpest single case in the corpus.
    * /
@@ -636,7 +649,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * / check was out of scope by construction rather than by ruling. L11 adds payment gates to that
    * / list; this method is why.
    */
-  getContentChunk: ActorMethod<[AccessGrant, bigint], Result_14>;
+  getContentChunk: ActorMethod<[AccessGrant, bigint], Result_15>;
   /**
    * / A seller's payout address — THEIRS, or the admin's to read.
    * /
@@ -644,7 +657,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * / caller can read, and `#Ok(null)` genuinely means "this seller has set no payout address" —
    * / distinguishable from "you may not ask", which is the whole point of the envelope.
    */
-  getEvmSellerPayout: ActorMethod<[Principal], Result_16>;
+  getEvmSellerPayout: ActorMethod<[Principal], Result_17>;
   /**
    * / PUBLIC: what this canister's chains continue, or that they continue nothing. A fresh chain
    * / beside a published predecessor head is auditable; a fresh chain with no statement is
@@ -661,7 +674,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * / from it — the marketplace UI printed "Job not found (or not yet visible)" at a caller who was
    * / merely unauthorized. Job existence is not the secret: `getJobCounts()` is ungated.
    */
-  getJob: ActorMethod<[string], Result_15>;
+  getJob: ActorMethod<[string], Result_16>;
   /**
    * / PUBLIC: aggregate counts that identify nobody — and already public on the engram, which is
    * / what made `listJobs`' existence-leak justification false.
@@ -678,7 +691,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * / Three outcomes, three answers now. And `Payer` (above) removes the root cause rather than
    * / only labelling it.
    */
-  getJobResult: ActorMethod<[string], Result_14>;
+  getJobResult: ActorMethod<[string], Result_15>;
   /**
    * / Terminal money settlement — the seller gets paid. Honours the freeze exactly like every
    * / other settle path; a settlement that ignored the freeze would make the freeze a suggestion.
@@ -695,7 +708,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * / The engram returned `?EngramJobStatus`, conflating "no such job" with a null-ish answer. Here
    * / a missing job is `#NotFound`, which is a fact rather than an absence a caller has to interpret.
    */
-  getJobStatus: ActorMethod<[string], Result_13>;
+  getJobStatus: ActorMethod<[string], Result_14>;
   /**
    * / PUBLIC: the market's spend limits, with the caller rosters REDACTED.
    * /
@@ -722,7 +735,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * / "you have sold nothing" — and returning it to a caller who simply has no identity is the
    * / fabricated-empty defect wearing a number instead of a list.
    */
-  getRevenueSummary: ActorMethod<[], Result_12>;
+  getRevenueSummary: ActorMethod<[], Result_13>;
   /**
    * / PUBLIC: what a buyer can learn about a seller, and the whole of it.
    * /
@@ -735,7 +748,7 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
    * / `verified` is about ownership at a moment in time and nothing else. It is not an endorsement,
    * / and the field name is the strongest claim it makes.
    */
-  getSellerStatus: ActorMethod<[Principal], Result_11>;
+  getSellerStatus: ActorMethod<[Principal], Result_12>;
   /**
    * / PUBLIC: aggregate session counts. Identifies nobody, and the same reasoning as getJobCounts —
    * / which is also what made `listJobs`' old "no existence leak" defence false.
@@ -822,8 +835,14 @@ export interface _SERVICE {
   /**
    * / `total` is the head counter, not the row count: this is a bounded ring, so a page that
    * / reported only what it returned would make a trimmed log look complete.
+   * /
+   * / ⟨2026-10-15, the owner's ruling 6B of 2026-10-14⟩ The reply is the shared `Wire.RecordPage`, so
+   * / one checker reads every chain. A viewer sees every entry, so `sealed` is always empty here;
+   * / `ringFloor` says where the ring starts and `hashFirstFrom` where this record switched to the
+   * / hash-first rule. The gate is unchanged (hash-only rows for strangers were ruled for the
+   * / engram's record).
    */
-  listAuditEntries: ActorMethod<[bigint, bigint], Result_9>;
+  listAuditEntries: ActorMethod<[bigint, bigint], Result_11>;
   /**
    * / Admin AND the enrolled viewers themselves — L8's roster rule. A viewer who cannot see the
    * / roster cannot tell whether their own enrolment survived a rotation.

package/dist/market.idl.js

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     suggestedPrice: IDL.Nat,
     enabledAtNs: IDL.Opt(IDL.Int),
   });
-  const Result_19 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: X402Endpoint, Err: Error });
+  const Result_20 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: X402Endpoint, Err: Error });
   const Eip3009Authorization = IDL.Record({
     r: IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8),
     s: IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8),
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     Accepted: IDL.Record({ jobId: IDL.Text }),
     PaymentRequired: IDL.Vec(PaymentRequirement),
   });
-  const Result_18 = IDL.Variant({
+  const Result_19 = IDL.Variant({
     Ok: ServiceRequestResponse,
     Err: Error,
   });
@@ -126,9 +126,9 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     Delivered: ContentDelivery,
     PaymentRequired: IDL.Vec(PaymentRequirement),
   });
-  const Result_17 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: ContentResponse, Err: Error });
-  const Result_14 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8), Err: Error });
-  const Result_16 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: IDL.Opt(IDL.Text), Err: Error });
+  const Result_18 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: ContentResponse, Err: Error });
+  const Result_15 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8), Err: Error });
+  const Result_17 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: IDL.Opt(IDL.Text), Err: Error });
   const GenesisNote = IDL.Record({
     predecessorSize: IDL.Opt(IDL.Nat),
     predecessorHeadHash: IDL.Opt(IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8)),
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     amount: IDL.Nat,
     params: IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8),
   });
-  const Result_15 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: Job, Err: Error });
+  const Result_16 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: Job, Err: Error });
   const JobCounts = IDL.Record({
     total: IDL.Nat,
     active: IDL.Nat,
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     settling: IDL.Nat,
     parked: IDL.Nat,
   });
-  const Result_13 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: JobStatus, Err: Error });
+  const Result_14 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: JobStatus, Err: Error });
   const SpendingPolicy = IDL.Record({
     maxSessionDeposit: IDL.Opt(IDL.Nat),
     blockedCallers: IDL.Opt(IDL.Vec(IDL.Principal)),
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     contentPurchases: IDL.Nat,
     unresolvedWithdrawals: IDL.Nat,
   });
-  const Result_12 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: RevenueSummary, Err: Error });
+  const Result_13 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: RevenueSummary, Err: Error });
   const SellerStatus = IDL.Record({
     expiresAtNs: IDL.Int,
     verifiedAtNs: IDL.Int,
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     engramId: IDL.Principal,
     byteQuota: IDL.Nat,
   });
-  const Result_11 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: SellerStatus, Err: Error });
+  const Result_12 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: SellerStatus, Err: Error });
   const SessionCounts = IDL.Record({
     closed: IDL.Nat,
     total: IDL.Nat,
@@ -246,6 +246,11 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     upgrade: IDL.Opt(IDL.Bool),
     status_code: IDL.Nat16,
   });
+  const SealedEntry = IDL.Record({
+    id: IDL.Nat,
+    entryHash: IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8),
+    digest: IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8),
+  });
   const Role = IDL.Variant({
     Anonymous: IDL.Null,
     Viewer: IDL.Null,
@@ -270,12 +275,14 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     success: IDL.Bool,
     timestampNs: IDL.Int,
   });
-  const Page_5 = IDL.Record({
+  const RecordPage = IDL.Record({
+    ringFloor: IDL.Nat,
     total: IDL.Nat,
-    withheld: IDL.Nat,
+    sealed: IDL.Vec(SealedEntry),
     items: IDL.Vec(AuditEntry),
+    hashFirstFrom: IDL.Nat,
   });
-  const Result_9 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: Page_5, Err: Error });
+  const Result_11 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: RecordPage, Err: Error });
   const Page_7 = IDL.Record({
     total: IDL.Nat,
     withheld: IDL.Nat,
@@ -294,6 +301,12 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     withheld: IDL.Nat,
     items: IDL.Vec(ContentEntry),
   });
+  const Page_5 = IDL.Record({
+    total: IDL.Nat,
+    withheld: IDL.Nat,
+    items: IDL.Vec(AuditEntry),
+  });
+  const Result_9 = IDL.Variant({ Ok: Page_5, Err: Error });
   const Payer = IDL.Variant({ Evm: IDL.Text, Icp: IDL.Principal });
   const PurchaseRecord = IDL.Record({
     id: IDL.Text,
@@ -441,8 +454,8 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     anchorNow: IDL.Func([], [Result_1], []),
     claimJob: IDL.Func([IDL.Text], [Result_1], []),
     confirmJob: IDL.Func([IDL.Text, IDL.Opt(IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8))], [Result_1], []),
-    createEndpoint: IDL.Func([IDL.Text, IDL.Text, IDL.Text, IDL.Nat], [Result_19], []),
-    createJob: IDL.Func([IDL.Text, IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8), IDL.Opt(PaymentSignature)], [Result_18], []),
+    createEndpoint: IDL.Func([IDL.Text, IDL.Text, IDL.Text, IDL.Nat], [Result_20], []),
+    createJob: IDL.Func([IDL.Text, IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8), IDL.Opt(PaymentSignature)], [Result_19], []),
     deleteContent: IDL.Func([IDL.Text], [Result_1], []),
     deleteEndpoint: IDL.Func([IDL.Text], [Result_1], []),
     disputeJob: IDL.Func([IDL.Text, IDL.Text, IDL.Opt(IDL.Vec(IDL.Nat8))], [Result_1], []),
@@ -453,17 +466,17 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
     getAuditHead: IDL.Func([], [AuditHead], ['query']),
     getBuyerActionMessage: IDL.Func([IDL.Text, IDL.Text], [IDL.Text], ['query']),
     getCertifiedAuditHead: IDL.Func([], [CertifiedAuditHead], ['query']),
-    getContent: IDL.Func([IDL.Text, IDL.Opt(PaymentSignature)], [Result_17], []),
-    getContentChunk: IDL.Func([AccessGrant, IDL.Nat], [Result_14], ['query']),
-    getEvmSellerPayout: IDL.Func([IDL.Principal], [Result_16], ['query']),
+    getContent: IDL.Func([IDL.Text, IDL.Opt(PaymentSignature)], [Result_18], []),
+    getContentChunk: IDL.Func([AccessGrant, IDL.Nat], [Result_15], ['query']),
+    getEvmSellerPayout: IDL.Func([IDL.Principal], [Result_17], ['query']),
     getGenesisNote: IDL.Func([], [GenesisNote], ['query']),
-    getJob: IDL.Func([IDL.Text], [Result_15], ['query']),
+    getJob: IDL.Func([IDL.Text], [Result_16], ['query']),
     getJobCounts: IDL.Func([], [JobCounts], ['query']),
-    getJobResult: IDL.Func([IDL.Text], [Result_14], ['query']),
-    getJobStatus: IDL.Func([IDL.Text], [Result_13], ['query']),
+    getJobResult: IDL.Func([IDL.Text], [Result_15], ['query']),
+    getJobStatus: IDL.Func([IDL.Text], [Result_14], ['query']),
     getPaymentPolicy: IDL.Func([], [SpendingPolicy], ['query']),
-    getRevenueSummary: IDL.Func([], [Result_12], ['query']),
-    getSellerStatus: IDL.Func([IDL.Principal], [Result_11], ['query']),
+    getRevenueSummary: IDL.Func([], [Result_13], ['query']),
+    getSellerStatus: IDL.Func([IDL.Principal], [Result_12], ['query']),
     getSessionCounts: IDL.Func([], [SessionCounts], ['query']),
     http_request: IDL.Func([HttpRequest], [HttpResponse], ['query']),
     http_request_update: IDL.Func([HttpRequest], [HttpResponse], []),
@@ -495,7 +508,7 @@ export const idlFactory = ({ IDL }) => {
       ['query'],
     ),
     isTradeFrozen: IDL.Func([], [IDL.Bool], ['query']),
-    listAuditEntries: IDL.Func([IDL.Nat, IDL.Nat], [Result_9], ['query']),
+    listAuditEntries: IDL.Func([IDL.Nat, IDL.Nat], [Result_11], ['query']),
     listAuditViewers: IDL.Func([], [Result_10], ['query']),
     listContent: IDL.Func([IDL.Nat, IDL.Nat], [Page_6], ['query']),
     listDenialEntries: IDL.Func([IDL.Nat, IDL.Nat], [Result_9], ['query']),