@enderfga/claw-orchestrator 5.1.0 → 6.0.1

package/dist/src/kernel/store.js

@@ -0,0 +1,838 @@
+/**
+ * Durable run store.
+ *
+ * Layout, one directory per run under `~/.claw-orchestrator/wf/<runId>/`:
+ *
+ *   spec.json      the WorkflowSpec, written once at creation, never mutated
+ *   run.json       the mutable checkpoint, rewritten atomically on every transition
+ *   events.jsonl   append-only audit + stream source
+ *   nodes/<id>/    per-node artifacts
+ *   evidence/<id>/ evidence bundles (see verify/evidence.ts)
+ *
+ * Splitting the immutable spec from the mutable checkpoint is what carries crash
+ * recovery: if `run.json` is missing or half-written, the state is rebuilt by
+ * replaying `events.jsonl` against `spec.json`. The atomic rewrite makes that
+ * path rare; the replay makes it usually survivable.
+ *
+ * The checkpoint and the events it describes are written by the same
+ * transaction, so they cannot disagree: a commit that reports `committed` has
+ * both, and one that does not has neither. That was not always true — the event
+ * append used to swallow its own errors while the replay treated the same log as
+ * authoritative, which is a contradiction sitting in the recovery path. The
+ * replay is now a plain fallback for a lost `run.json`; a run that lost both it
+ * and the log is unrecoverable, and `loadRun` returns undefined rather than
+ * inventing a state.
+ *
+ * There is exactly one way to write to a run — `commit()` — and it is not
+ * optional: the checkpoint writer and the event appender are module-private, and
+ * a batch is published by a single atomic directory rename rather than by a
+ * sequence of writes that can each fail on their own. `atomicWriteJson` replaces
+ * four near-identical implementations that had grown across the codebase
+ * (`session-manager.ts` sync + async variants, `ultraapp/store.ts`,
+ * `ultraapp/patcher.ts`); the tmp-name shape is kept from the ultraapp one,
+ * whose comment records the CI bug it fixed: a reader catching a plain
+ * `writeFile` mid-flight and parsing a truncated object.
+ */
+import crypto from 'node:crypto';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { withFileLock } from './file-lock.js';
+export function wfDir() {
+    return process.env.CLAWO_WF_DIR || path.join(os.homedir(), '.claw-orchestrator', 'wf');
+}
+/**
+ * A run id is a single path segment: letters, digits, dot, dash, underscore.
+ *
+ * It has to be enforced, not merely expected. A run id can be supplied by the
+ * caller — including through a tool call, which means through an agent — and
+ * every path in this module is derived from it by `path.join`. `../escaped`
+ * resolves outside the store, and `deleteRunDir` is a recursive `rmSync`, so an
+ * unvalidated id turns a delete into arbitrary directory removal. A leading dot
+ * is refused too, so no id can produce `.` or `..` by itself.
+ */
+const VALID_RUN_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$/;
+export function isValidRunId(runId) {
+    return typeof runId === 'string' && VALID_RUN_ID.test(runId);
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve a run's directory. Throws on an invalid id rather than returning a
+ * path, because this is the chokepoint every other path derives from — checking
+ * here means no caller can forget to.
+ */
+export function runDir(runId) {
+    if (!isValidRunId(runId)) {
+        throw new Error(`Invalid run id ${JSON.stringify(runId)}: must match ${VALID_RUN_ID.source} (a single path segment)`);
+    }
+    const dir = path.join(wfDir(), runId);
+    // Belt to the regex's braces: if any future change to the pattern lets a
+    // separator through, this still refuses to hand back a path outside the root.
+    const root = wfDir();
+    if (path.dirname(dir) !== root) {
+        throw new Error(`Invalid run id ${JSON.stringify(runId)}: resolves outside the run store`);
+    }
+    return dir;
+}
+export function nodeDir(runId, nodeId) {
+    return path.join(runDir(runId), 'nodes', nodeId.replace(/[^\w.-]/g, '_'));
+}
+// ─── Shared write primitives ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Write JSON so a concurrent reader sees either the old file or the new one, never a partial. */
+export function atomicWriteJson(file, value) {
+    const tmp = `${file}.tmp.${process.pid}.${crypto.randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`;
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+    try {
+        fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(value, null, 2));
+        fs.renameSync(tmp, file);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        try {
+            fs.unlinkSync(tmp);
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Nothing to clean up.
+        }
+        throw err;
+    }
+}
+function readJson(file) {
+    try {
+        return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8'));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+}
+// ─── Run lifecycle ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export function runExists(runId) {
+    try {
+        return fs.existsSync(path.join(runDir(runId), 'spec.json'));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Keys whose values never reach disk.
+ *
+ * `customEngine` carries a `CustomEngineConfig`, whose `env` is explicitly for
+ * environment variables — API tokens included. An autoloop started with a custom
+ * engine wrote its whole options object into the node spec, and `spec.json`
+ * ended up holding the token in plain text.
+ *
+ * The real fix is to route them through `StartOptions.secrets`, which stays in
+ * memory. This is the second line: even a spec that should not contain one is
+ * scrubbed on the way out, so a future field cannot leak by omission.
+ */
+const NEVER_PERSIST = new Set(['customengine', 'plannercustomengine', 'codercustomengine', 'reviewercustomengine']);
+export function sanitizeForDisk(value) {
+    if (Array.isArray(value))
+        return value.map((v) => sanitizeForDisk(v));
+    if (!value || typeof value !== 'object')
+        return value;
+    const out = {};
+    for (const [key, v] of Object.entries(value)) {
+        if (NEVER_PERSIST.has(key.toLowerCase()))
+            continue;
+        out[key] = sanitizeForDisk(v);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+export function loadSpec(runId) {
+    // Lookups treat an invalid id as "no such run" rather than throwing: a query
+    // for a nonsense id has an answer, and it is "nothing".
+    if (!isValidRunId(runId))
+        return undefined;
+    return readJson(path.join(runDir(runId), 'spec.json'));
+}
+export function readEvents(runId, limit) {
+    if (!isValidRunId(runId))
+        return [];
+    // A published transaction is authoritative even before its files have been
+    // applied. Returning the old log while `.tx` is still present would expose a
+    // state from before a commit that already succeeded.
+    if (!recoverPending(runId)) {
+        throw new Error(`Run '${runId}' has a committed transaction that could not be applied`);
+    }
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(runDir(runId), 'events.jsonl'), 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+    const out = [];
+    for (const line of raw.split('\n')) {
+        const t = line.trim();
+        if (!t)
+            continue;
+        try {
+            out.push(JSON.parse(t));
+        }
+        catch {
+            // One corrupt line must not make the stream unreadable.
+        }
+    }
+    return limit && limit > 0 ? out.slice(-limit) : out;
+}
+/**
+ * Rebuild a run's state from its spec plus its event log. Used when `run.json`
+ * is absent or unparseable — the belt to the atomic rewrite's braces.
+ */
+export function replayRun(runId, spec) {
+    const events = readEvents(runId);
+    if (events.length === 0)
+        return undefined;
+    const nodes = {};
+    for (const n of spec.nodes) {
+        nodes[n.id] = { id: n.id, kind: n.kind, state: 'pending', attempts: 0, visits: 0 };
+    }
+    const created = events.find((e) => e.type === 'run_created');
+    const record = {
+        runId,
+        workflow: spec.name,
+        spec,
+        state: 'pending',
+        outcome: 'unverified',
+        cwd: spec.cwd || process.cwd(),
+        createdAt: created?.ts ?? events[0].ts,
+        updatedAt: events[events.length - 1].ts,
+        nodes,
+    };
+    for (const e of events) {
+        switch (e.type) {
+            case 'run_state':
+                record.state = e.state;
+                if (e.outcome)
+                    record.outcome = e.outcome;
+                if (e.error)
+                    record.error = e.error;
+                break;
+            case 'node_state': {
+                const n = (nodes[e.node] ??= { id: e.node, kind: 'agent', state: 'pending', attempts: 0, visits: 0 });
+                n.state = e.state;
+                if (e.attempt !== undefined)
+                    n.attempts = e.attempt;
+                if (e.state === 'running') {
+                    n.visits++;
+                    n.startedAt = e.ts;
+                }
+                if (e.state === 'succeeded' || e.state === 'failed' || e.state === 'skipped')
+                    n.endedAt = e.ts;
+                if (e.error)
+                    n.error = e.error;
+                record.currentNode = e.node;
+                break;
+            }
+            case 'node_output': {
+                const n = nodes[e.node];
+                if (n)
+                    n.output = e.text;
+                break;
+            }
+            case 'evidence': {
+                const n = nodes[e.node];
+                if (n)
+                    n.evidenceId = e.evidenceId;
+                record.evidenceId = e.evidenceId;
+                break;
+            }
+            default:
+                break;
+        }
+        record.updatedAt = e.ts;
+    }
+    // A run whose process died mid-flight left no terminal event. Say so rather
+    // than reporting the stale `running` it was last seen in.
+    if (record.state === 'running' || record.state === 'verifying') {
+        record.error = record.error ?? 'process ended before the run reached a terminal state';
+    }
+    return record;
+}
+/** Load a run, preferring the checkpoint and falling back to an event replay. */
+export function loadRun(runId) {
+    const spec = loadSpec(runId);
+    if (!spec)
+        return undefined;
+    // A transaction the last owner committed but died before applying is finished
+    // here, so a reader never sees the state from before a committed change.
+    if (!recoverPending(runId)) {
+        throw new Error(`Run '${runId}' has a committed transaction that could not be applied`);
+    }
+    const checkpoint = readJson(path.join(runDir(runId), 'run.json'));
+    if (checkpoint && checkpoint.runId === runId && checkpoint.nodes) {
+        checkpoint.spec = checkpoint.spec ?? spec;
+        return checkpoint;
+    }
+    return replayRun(runId, spec);
+}
+export function listRunIds() {
+    try {
+        return fs
+            .readdirSync(wfDir(), { withFileTypes: true })
+            .filter((d) => d.isDirectory())
+            .map((d) => d.name)
+            .filter(isValidRunId);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Remove a run's directory. Only ever called from an explicit user delete —
+ * nothing in the kernel prunes runs on its own, for the same reason the ledger
+ * does not: deleting someone's history is not ours to decide.
+ */
+export function deleteRunDir(runId, logger) {
+    // Validate before the try, so a bad id surfaces as an error instead of being
+    // swallowed alongside genuine I/O failures. This is a recursive rmSync — the
+    // one call in this module where a bad id is not merely wrong but destructive.
+    const dir = runDir(runId);
+    try {
+        fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        logger?.warn?.(`[kernel-store] delete failed for ${runId}: ${err.message}`);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Full text a node produced, preferring the artifact file over the record's
+ * preview. `NodeRecord.output` is capped so a checkpoint stays small, but the
+ * whole point of some nodes is their text — an ultraplan whose plan is silently
+ * cut at 4 kB has lost the deliverable.
+ */
+export function readNodeOutput(runId, nodeId) {
+    try {
+        return fs.readFileSync(path.join(nodeDir(runId, nodeId), 'output.txt'), 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return loadRun(runId)?.nodes[nodeId]?.output;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Where a node artifact will live, without writing it.
+ *
+ * Pure, because the checkpoint that references an artifact and the artifact
+ * itself are written in the same {@link commit}: the caller needs the path
+ * before the write, to put it in the record it is committing.
+ */
+export function nodeArtifactPath(runId, nodeId, name) {
+    const file = path.join(nodeDir(runId, nodeId), name.replace(/[^\w.-]/g, '_'));
+    return path.relative(runDir(runId), file);
+}
+// ─── Ownership and the storage transaction ──────────────────────────────────
+//
+// A run has one owner at a time, every durable change it makes is checked
+// against a capability only that owner holds, and each change lands in full or
+// not at all. Each of those three was added after the previous two turned out to
+// be decoration without it.
+//
+// The capability is a `RunGuard`, naming four things, all checked on every
+// write:
+//
+//   incarnationId  which *creation* of this run id this is
+//   ownerId        which RunKernel instance (never the pid — see `RunLease`)
+//   acquisitionId  which claim by that owner
+//   fence          monotonic within the incarnation, for ordering and logs
+//
+// `incarnationId` exists because a run id is reusable. Delete a run and start
+// another with the same id and the directory — fence counter included — is
+// gone, so the new run's first fence is 1 again and a stale attempt still
+// holding `{ownerId, fence: 1}` from the old run became valid a second time.
+// That is a textbook ABA, and not hypothetical: an abandoned timed-out attempt
+// outlives its run by construction.
+//
+// Two distinctions this module is careful about, because collapsing either one
+// caused a real failure:
+//
+//   *Not the owner* is permanent; *could not take the lock* is transient. They
+//   are separate outcomes (`superseded` vs `blocked`), and a caller that treats
+//   a millisecond of contention as a loss stops forever while still holding its
+//   lease — so nothing can take the run over either.
+//
+//   *Committed* means the whole batch is durable, not that most of it was
+//   attempted. A batch is staged in a scratch directory and published by a
+//   single atomic directory rename; the rename is the commit point, and what
+//   follows is replayable application of an already-committed transaction.
+export const LEASE_TTL_MS = 60_000;
+/** How often a live owner refreshes its claim, independently of any work it is doing. */
+export const LEASE_HEARTBEAT_MS = 15_000;
+/** Staged, not yet committed. Removed on the next lock; never read. */
+const TX_STAGING = '.tx.staging';
+/** Committed and awaiting application. Its presence IS the commit. */
+const TX_COMMITTED = '.tx';
+function leaseFile(runId) {
+    return path.join(runDir(runId), 'lease.json');
+}
+function lockFile(runId) {
+    return path.join(runDir(runId), 'lease.lock');
+}
+function incarnationFile(runId) {
+    return path.join(runDir(runId), 'incarnation.json');
+}
+function eventsFile(runId) {
+    return path.join(runDir(runId), 'events.jsonl');
+}
+function fileSize(file) {
+    try {
+        return fs.statSync(file).size;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return 0;
+    }
+}
+function readIncarnation(runId) {
+    const raw = readJson(incarnationFile(runId));
+    return raw && typeof raw.incarnationId === 'string' && raw.incarnationId ? raw : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * The run's incarnation, minting one if the directory predates this field.
+ *
+ * Only ever called inside the lock. A directory with no incarnation is a run
+ * from an older layout; giving it one now is correct, because whatever guards
+ * existed before this file did are already unusable.
+ */
+function ensureIncarnationLocked(runId) {
+    const existing = readIncarnation(runId);
+    if (existing)
+        return existing;
+    const fresh = { incarnationId: crypto.randomUUID(), nextFence: 0 };
+    atomicWriteJson(incarnationFile(runId), fresh);
+    return fresh;
+}
+function processAlive(pid) {
+    try {
+        process.kill(pid, 0);
+        return true;
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        // EPERM means it exists and belongs to someone else.
+        return err.code === 'EPERM';
+    }
+}
+export function readLease(runId) {
+    if (!isValidRunId(runId))
+        return undefined;
+    return readJson(leaseFile(runId));
+}
+/**
+ * True when a lease no longer represents a live owner.
+ *
+ * On the same host the pid is the authority and the heartbeat is not consulted:
+ * a process running one long node makes no checkpoints, and judging it dead for
+ * that reason is how two owners end up running the same work. The heartbeat is
+ * the fallback for a holder we cannot ask about — another machine, or a pid
+ * whose meaning we cannot trust across hosts.
+ */
+export function leaseIsStale(lease, now = Date.now()) {
+    if (!lease)
+        return true;
+    if (lease.host === os.hostname())
+        return !processAlive(lease.pid);
+    const age = now - Date.parse(lease.renewedAt);
+    return Number.isNaN(age) || age > LEASE_TTL_MS;
+}
+/**
+ * Apply a committed transaction. Idempotent, and safe to re-run after a crash.
+ *
+ * Caller holds the lock.
+ */
+function applyTxLocked(runId, logger) {
+    const dir = runDir(runId);
+    const tx = path.join(dir, TX_COMMITTED);
+    const manifest = readJson(path.join(tx, 'manifest.json'));
+    if (!manifest) {
+        // No manifest means the rename landed a half-written staging directory,
+        // which cannot happen — but if it somehow did, it is not a commitment.
+        fs.rmSync(tx, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        return;
+    }
+    // Written after the last data step and before cleanup, so a failure while
+    // removing the directory leaves something that says "the data is in, only the
+    // tidying is left". Without it, a half-removed transaction directory looks
+    // exactly like a corrupt one, and re-applying would either throw forever or
+    // have to guess.
+    const appliedMarker = path.join(tx, 'applied');
+    if (fs.existsSync(appliedMarker)) {
+        fs.rmSync(tx, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        return;
+    }
+    for (const rel of manifest.artifacts) {
+        const from = path.join(tx, 'files', rel);
+        const to = path.join(dir, rel);
+        try {
+            fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(to), { recursive: true });
+            fs.renameSync(from, to);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // ENOENT means a previous application already moved it.
+            if (err.code !== 'ENOENT')
+                throw err;
+        }
+    }
+    if (manifest.hasEvents) {
+        const events = eventsFile(runId);
+        try {
+            fs.truncateSync(events, manifest.eventsOffset);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            if (err.code !== 'ENOENT')
+                throw err;
+        }
+        fs.appendFileSync(events, fs.readFileSync(path.join(tx, 'events.jsonl')));
+    }
+    if (manifest.hasRecord) {
+        try {
+            fs.renameSync(path.join(tx, 'run.json'), path.join(dir, 'run.json'));
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            if (err.code !== 'ENOENT')
+                throw err;
+        }
+    }
+    fs.writeFileSync(appliedMarker, '');
+    fs.rmSync(tx, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    logger?.debug?.(`[kernel-store] ${runId}: applied a pending transaction`);
+}
+/** Stage a batch and publish it with one atomic rename. Caller holds the lock. */
+function stageLocked(runId, batch) {
+    const dir = runDir(runId);
+    const staging = path.join(dir, TX_STAGING);
+    fs.rmSync(staging, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    fs.mkdirSync(staging, { recursive: true });
+    const manifest = {
+        eventsOffset: fileSize(eventsFile(runId)),
+        hasRecord: Boolean(batch.record),
+        hasEvents: Boolean(batch.events?.length),
+        artifacts: [],
+    };
+    for (const artifact of batch.artifacts ?? []) {
+        const rel = nodeArtifactPath(runId, artifact.nodeId, artifact.name);
+        const dest = path.join(staging, 'files', rel);
+        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(dest), { recursive: true });
+        fs.writeFileSync(dest, artifact.body);
+        manifest.artifacts.push(rel);
+    }
+    if (batch.record) {
+        // The checkpoint embeds the spec, so it gets the same scrub.
+        fs.writeFileSync(path.join(staging, 'run.json'), JSON.stringify(sanitizeForDisk(batch.record), null, 2));
+    }
+    if (batch.events?.length) {
+        fs.writeFileSync(path.join(staging, 'events.jsonl'), batch.events.map((e) => JSON.stringify(e)).join('\n') + '\n');
+    }
+    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(staging, 'manifest.json'), JSON.stringify(manifest));
+    // THE COMMIT POINT. Renaming a directory is atomic, so the transaction is
+    // either wholly present or wholly absent — never a checkpoint whose events
+    // were silently dropped, or an artifact left behind by a write that failed
+    // afterwards. Both of those were real: the event append swallowed its own
+    // errors, and artifacts were written before the checkpoint they belonged to.
+    fs.renameSync(staging, path.join(dir, TX_COMMITTED));
+}
+/** Finish any transaction that was committed but not yet applied. Caller holds the lock. */
+function recoverPendingLocked(runId, logger) {
+    const dir = runDir(runId);
+    try {
+        // Staging that outlived its process was never committed.
+        fs.rmSync(path.join(dir, TX_STAGING), { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Debris; the next attempt overwrites it.
+    }
+    if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(dir, TX_COMMITTED)))
+        return;
+    try {
+        applyTxLocked(runId, logger);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        logger?.warn?.(`[kernel-store] ${runId}: could not apply a pending transaction: ${err.message}`);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Run `fn` inside the run's lock, with any pending transaction applied first.
+ *
+ * Everything that inspects or changes ownership goes through here, so a check
+ * and the write that depends on it cannot be separated by another process — and
+ * so no caller can observe a run mid-transaction.
+ */
+function withRunLock(runId, fn, logger) {
+    return withFileLock(lockFile(runId), () => {
+        recoverPendingLocked(runId, logger);
+        return fn();
+    }, 
+    // Never `createParent`: a run directory that has been deleted must stay
+    // deleted. Recreating it to hold a lock left an empty directory behind, and
+    // the id then looked taken by a run that no longer existed.
+    { staleMs: LEASE_TTL_MS });
+}
+/** Whether the run directory is still there at all. A gone run is not contention. */
+function runDirExists(runId) {
+    try {
+        return fs.existsSync(runDir(runId));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/** Apply anything a crashed owner committed but did not finish writing. */
+export function recoverPending(runId, logger) {
+    // Nothing to apply is not the same as something stuck: an id that cannot name
+    // a run has no pending transaction, and readers must not be told otherwise.
+    if (!isValidRunId(runId))
+        return true;
+    try {
+        if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(runDir(runId), TX_COMMITTED)))
+            return true;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // A transaction is applied by whoever holds the lock, so finding the lock busy
+    // means someone is very likely applying it right now. Retry before concluding
+    // anything: reporting "cannot be applied" for a moment of contention would
+    // turn a healthy commit into a read error, which is the same conflation this
+    // module exists to avoid.
+    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt++) {
+        const locked = withRunLock(runId, () => undefined, logger);
+        if (locked.ok)
+            break;
+        if (!fs.existsSync(path.join(runDir(runId), TX_COMMITTED)))
+            return true;
+    }
+    // `recoverPendingLocked` deliberately leaves a committed transaction in
+    // place when application fails. Its continued presence means returning the
+    // old checkpoint or event log would be a lie.
+    return !fs.existsSync(path.join(runDir(runId), TX_COMMITTED));
+}
+// ─── Claiming ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+function acquireLocked(runId, ownerId) {
+    const incarnation = ensureIncarnationLocked(runId);
+    const existing = readLease(runId);
+    if (existing && existing.ownerId !== ownerId && !leaseIsStale(existing)) {
+        throw new Error(`Run '${runId}' is owned by ${existing.ownerId} (pid ${existing.pid} on ${existing.host}, ` +
+            `last seen ${existing.renewedAt}) — only one owner may run it at a time`);
+    }
+    const fence = incarnation.nextFence + 1;
+    atomicWriteJson(incarnationFile(runId), { ...incarnation, nextFence: fence });
+    const now = new Date().toISOString();
+    const lease = {
+        runId,
+        incarnationId: incarnation.incarnationId,
+        ownerId,
+        acquisitionId: crypto.randomUUID(),
+        fence,
+        pid: process.pid,
+        host: os.hostname(),
+        acquiredAt: existing?.ownerId === ownerId ? existing.acquiredAt : now,
+        renewedAt: now,
+    };
+    atomicWriteJson(leaseFile(runId), lease);
+    return { runId, incarnationId: lease.incarnationId, ownerId, acquisitionId: lease.acquisitionId, fence };
+}
+/**
+ * Create a run and claim it, atomically.
+ *
+ * The non-recursive `mkdir` IS the claim: it fails with EEXIST for everyone but
+ * the first caller, so exactly one process can create a given run id. The
+ * previous version asked `runExists()` and then created with
+ * `{ recursive: true }`, which is a check-then-write race and lost it routinely
+ * — two processes creating the same id 80 times had both "succeed" 76 times,
+ * leaving one workflow executing while the other's `spec.json` sat on disk, and
+ * a lease belonging to an incarnation that had already been overwritten.
+ */
+export function createAndAcquire(runId, spec, ownerId) {
+    const dir = runDir(runId);
+    fs.mkdirSync(wfDir(), { recursive: true });
+    try {
+        fs.mkdirSync(dir);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err.code === 'EEXIST') {
+            throw new Error(`Run '${runId}' already exists — pick another id, or resume it instead of starting over`);
+        }
+        throw err;
+    }
+    // Nobody else can be inside a directory that did not exist a moment ago, so
+    // this lock is uncontended by construction; taking it anyway keeps every
+    // write to the run under the same discipline.
+    const locked = withRunLock(runId, () => {
+        atomicWriteJson(incarnationFile(runId), { incarnationId: crypto.randomUUID(), nextFence: 0 });
+        atomicWriteJson(path.join(dir, 'spec.json'), sanitizeForDisk(spec));
+        return acquireLocked(runId, ownerId);
+    });
+    if (!locked.ok) {
+        fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        throw new Error(`Run '${runId}' could not be created: ${locked.error}`);
+    }
+    return locked.value;
+}
+/**
+ * Claim an existing run and receive the capability to write to it.
+ *
+ * Refused when someone else's claim is still live. Allowed for the same owner —
+ * but the guard it returns is a NEW one, and the previous guard is dead from
+ * that moment: re-acquiring is a fresh claim, not a renewal of the old one, so
+ * anything still holding the old guard stops being able to write.
+ */
+export function acquireLease(runId, ownerId) {
+    if (!runDirExists(runId))
+        throw new Error(`Run '${runId}' not found`);
+    const locked = withRunLock(runId, () => acquireLocked(runId, ownerId));
+    if (!locked.ok) {
+        throw new Error(`Run '${runId}' could not be claimed right now: ${locked.error}`);
+    }
+    return locked.value;
+}
+/** Whether the on-disk lease still answers to this guard. Caller must hold the lock. */
+function guardIsCurrentLocked(guard) {
+    const incarnation = readIncarnation(guard.runId);
+    if (!incarnation || incarnation.incarnationId !== guard.incarnationId)
+        return false;
+    const lease = readLease(guard.runId);
+    return Boolean(lease &&
+        lease.incarnationId === guard.incarnationId &&
+        lease.ownerId === guard.ownerId &&
+        lease.acquisitionId === guard.acquisitionId &&
+        lease.fence === guard.fence);
+}
+/** Heartbeat. Best-effort: losing a renewal must not break the run. */
+export function renewLease(guard) {
+    if (!runDirExists(guard.runId))
+        return;
+    withRunLock(guard.runId, () => {
+        if (!guardIsCurrentLocked(guard))
+            return;
+        const existing = readLease(guard.runId);
+        try {
+            atomicWriteJson(leaseFile(guard.runId), { ...existing, renewedAt: new Date().toISOString() });
+        }
+        catch {
+            // The next renewal will try again.
+        }
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * The one way to change anything durable about a run.
+ *
+ * The guard is verified and the transaction is published inside a single
+ * critical section, so a holder that has been superseded cannot land a write
+ * between the check and the change.
+ *
+ * Callers pass a record they have already produced by copying and mutating,
+ * never the record they are still using: `commit` persists what it is given, and
+ * the caller adopts it only on `committed`. That is what keeps a refused write
+ * from leaving a run *in memory* claiming a state the disk rejected.
+ */
+export function commit(guard, batch, logger) {
+    // A deleted run is not contention, and must not be reported as something to
+    // retry: there is nothing left to write to, ever.
+    if (!runDirExists(guard.runId)) {
+        return { outcome: 'superseded', reason: `run '${guard.runId}' no longer exists` };
+    }
+    const locked = withRunLock(guard.runId, () => {
+        if (!guardIsCurrentLocked(guard)) {
+            const current = readLease(guard.runId);
+            return {
+                outcome: 'superseded',
+                reason: current
+                    ? `run is now held by ${current.ownerId} at fence ${current.fence}`
+                    : `run '${guard.runId}' no longer exists, or its claim was released`,
+            };
+        }
+        try {
+            stageLocked(guard.runId, batch);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            try {
+                fs.rmSync(path.join(runDir(guard.runId), TX_STAGING), { recursive: true, force: true });
+            }
+            catch {
+                // Debris only; nothing was published.
+            }
+            return { outcome: 'blocked', reason: `could not stage the change: ${err.message}` };
+        }
+        // Past the commit point. Application is replayable, so a failure here is a
+        // delay, not a loss — and reporting it as "not committed" would be wrong.
+        try {
+            applyTxLocked(guard.runId, logger);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            logger?.warn?.(`[kernel-store] ${guard.runId}: change is committed but not yet applied ` +
+                `(${err.message}); it will be applied on the next lock`);
+        }
+        try {
+            const lease = readLease(guard.runId);
+            atomicWriteJson(leaseFile(guard.runId), { ...lease, renewedAt: new Date().toISOString() });
+        }
+        catch {
+            // The heartbeat is not part of the commitment.
+        }
+        return { outcome: 'committed' };
+    }, logger);
+    return locked.ok ? locked.value : { outcome: 'blocked', reason: locked.error };
+}
+/**
+ * Release the claim. The incarnation file is deliberately NOT removed — the
+ * fence must keep increasing for as long as this creation of the run exists.
+ *
+ * `blocked` is not `not-ours`: an owner that is standing down and cannot take
+ * the lock still has to hand the run back, so the caller retries rather than
+ * leaving a lease behind that no one can take over.
+ */
+export function releaseLease(guard) {
+    if (!runDirExists(guard.runId))
+        return 'not-ours';
+    const locked = withRunLock(guard.runId, () => {
+        if (!guardIsCurrentLocked(guard))
+            return 'not-ours';
+        fs.rmSync(leaseFile(guard.runId), { force: true });
+        return 'released';
+    });
+    return locked.ok ? locked.value : 'blocked';
+}
+export function summarize(record) {
+    return {
+        runId: record.runId,
+        workflow: record.workflow,
+        state: record.state,
+        outcome: record.outcome,
+        cwd: record.cwd,
+        createdAt: record.createdAt,
+        updatedAt: record.updatedAt,
+        endedAt: record.endedAt,
+        currentNode: record.currentNode,
+        evidenceId: record.evidenceId,
+        error: record.error,
+        costUsd: record.costUsd,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Every run on this machine, newest first — the cross-process listing the three
+ * mode-specific enumerations each did differently (council regex-scraped its own
+ * markdown transcripts, autoloop read a JSONL registry, ultraapp walked a store
+ * directory). No separate index file is needed here because every run lives
+ * under one root, so the directory *is* the index.
+ */
+export function listRuns(query = {}) {
+    const out = [];
+    for (const runId of listRunIds()) {
+        let record;
+        try {
+            record = loadRun(runId);
+        }
+        catch {
+            // One run whose committed transaction cannot currently be applied must
+            // not make every other run disappear from the listing.
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!record)
+            continue;
+        if (query.workflow && record.workflow !== query.workflow)
+            continue;
+        if (query.state && record.state !== query.state)
+            continue;
+        out.push(summarize(record));
+    }
+    out.sort((a, b) => (a.createdAt < b.createdAt ? 1 : a.createdAt > b.createdAt ? -1 : 0));
+    return query.limit && query.limit > 0 ? out.slice(0, query.limit) : out;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=store.js.map