@empire-builder-kit/nx 1.0.0-rc.40 → 1.0.0-rc.42

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-data-files.js

@@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ human-supplied—controls cleanup.
 
 ## Personal human-supplied development value
 
-Only a human at a local interactive terminal may set or remove a
-human-supplied operator-declared personal value:
+Setting a human-supplied operator-declared personal value is a human-only
+step. Removing one carries no value and may be started by an agent:
 
 \`\`\`bash
 ebk secret set ${name} <logical-name>
@@ -303,10 +303,15 @@ ebk secret remove ${name} <logical-name>
 The CLI derives the personal stage, reads the profile and Region saved by
 \`ebk dev configure\`, proves the current AWS account is the development
 Foundation account, and invokes the workspace-pinned SST CLI. Set accepts the
-value only through a hidden TTY prompt; remove requires a hidden confirmation.
+value only through a hidden TTY prompt and refuses agent and CI environments,
+because a hidden prompt does not hide the value from the process that owns the
+terminal: a human runs it in a terminal no agent spawned. An agent prepares
+that step by naming the exact logical name and command, then resumes without
+reading the value. Remove may be started by an agent; the human types the
+hidden \`REMOVE <logical-name>\` confirmation in that interactive terminal.
 Neither command accepts a stage, profile, Region, value argument, environment
-value, file, fallback, or placeholder. Do not ask or permit an agent or CI job
-to invoke either command.
+value, file, fallback, or placeholder. Never ask an agent or CI job to run
+\`ebk secret set\`.
 
 ## Development metadata
 
@@ -357,9 +362,13 @@ Account-level role materialization remains an adopter responsibility.
 
 After an empty human-supplied container exists, a human secret operator enters
 or rotates the value through the approved hidden-input or provider-owned
-ceremony. Do not delegate that human-supplied ceremony to an agent and do not
-pass a value through argv, source, a file, a ticket, a work marker, GitHub,
-logs, or evidence. Routine operator authority is write-only for exact approved
+ceremony. Only the value entry is human-only: an agent may confirm the empty
+container through the value-blind \`secret-metadata\` report, tell the operator
+the exact container name and stage, and verify afterwards with the same report
+and the deployment; it never enters, reads, or relays the value. Do not
+delegate that human-supplied ceremony to an agent and do not pass a value
+through argv, source, a file, a ticket, a work marker, GitHub, logs, or
+evidence. Routine operator authority is write-only for exact approved
 paths and has no application or Foundation deployment authority. Value reads
 require a separate audited break-glass path. Machine-generated declarations
 instead use \`secret-initialize\`; they never accept a human value.

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-database-retirement-rehearsal-files.js

@@ -428,7 +428,11 @@ The command accepts no arguments, so an operator cannot supply a stage, Slice,
 database, state machine, task, role, network, image, or command override.
 
 Run the generated \`db-retirement-rehearsal\` target only through the protected
-workflow. The deployment role needs
+workflow: the run binds the reviewed candidate image digest and a deployment role
+scoped to the one registered state machine, and those exist only there. Locally,
+an agent may complete the registration and binding edits above, prepare them
+for review, and propose the workflow run; it does not start the state machine
+from a workstation. The deployment role needs
 \`states:StartExecution\` on the exact registered state machine and
 \`states:DescribeExecution\` on its exact execution namespace. It receives no
 database credential, secret-value, SQL, \`rds-db:connect\`, or arbitrary ECS

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-frontend-files.js

@@ -309,6 +309,13 @@ looks reusable.
 
 ## Manual review
 
+An agent driving a real browser may perform and record the keyboard, focus,
+zoom/reflow, reduced-motion, and announcement checks below and attach them to
+the visual report. A human using actual assistive technology (screen reader,
+switch access, or magnifier) completes the assistive-technology pass and is
+recorded as the reviewer for that pass; the quarantine approver must still be
+distinct from the owner.
+
 Confirm, at minimum:
 
 1. landmark and heading order, names, roles, descriptions, and state;

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-infrastructure-files.js

@@ -976,7 +976,6 @@ ${sql
       },
       handler: 'authorization/machine-client-provisioner.handler',
       link: secretLinksFor('machine-client-provisioner'),
-      runtime: 'python3.12',
       timeout: '2 minutes',
       ...lambdaLogging(machineClientProvisionerLogs.logGroup.name),
     },

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-infrastructure-safety-files.js

@@ -332,7 +332,9 @@ apply; it is never promoted to \`no-drift\`. The exact SST/provider call
 inventory still requires protected CloudTrail calibration evidence.
 
 When a plan requires human review, commit
-the workspace-level \`operations/infrastructure-approval.json\` batch. It binds
+the workspace-level \`operations/infrastructure-approval.json\` batch. An agent
+may draft that batch from the sanitized plan; a CODEOWNER other than its author
+reviews and approves it before it is committed. It binds
 the exact ordered project set, action, stage, and one sanitized planned
 plan/digest-bound decision per project. The resume run permits only that one
 aggregate file to differ from the planned source commit and recomputes every
@@ -343,8 +345,11 @@ import, and cutover/data/collision/rollback/recovery proof for every
 replacement. Their canonical digests are retained in both authorization and
 the immediate pre-mutation binding; changing one after review fails closed.
 
-State edit, import operations inside a deploy preview, remove, repair, and
-authoritative refresh are governed recovery operations. Retain a state backup,
+In staging and production, state edit, import operations inside a deploy
+preview, remove, repair, and authoritative refresh are governed recovery
+operations. In the development stage, refresh, unlock, and remove run locally
+through their explicit Nx targets without non-author approval. For the
+protected stages, retain a state backup,
 exact physical target inventory, non-author approval, command/result evidence,
 and a finalized post-repair convergence record. Remove additionally requires
 the complete deletion inventory, drained dependents, retained Foundation,

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-metadata-files.js

@@ -194,7 +194,8 @@ Service or Job recovery procedures as those capabilities are added.
 ## Operator secrets
 
 Use \`docs/runbooks/operator-secret-management.md\` for value-free metadata
-convergence and the separate, human-only personal-stage value ceremony.
+convergence, which agents may run, and the separate personal-stage value
+ceremony, whose value entry is human-only.
 
 ## Performance, capacity, and cost
 

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-reliability-files.js

@@ -1621,7 +1621,10 @@ binding; callers cannot label it.
 
 A bounded log query requires a human approval naming the approver, invoking
 human, incident, reason, account, region, stage, Slice, exact log groups, query
-class, time window, and expiry. The approved query window is at most one hour.
+class, time window, and expiry. The invoking human is the person whose session
+runs the query; an agent may prepare the request and run the query inside that
+human's session, and the approver must be a different human. Unmasking remains
+a separate break-glass authority. The approved query window is at most one hour.
 The script returns an authorization plan; the existing protected query runner
 retains attributable evidence. Empty results never prove recovery.
 `,

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-shared.d.ts

@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ export declare const PRODUCT_VERSIONS: {
     readonly awsSqs: "^3.700.0";
     readonly awsSsm: "^3.700.0";
     readonly awsSts: "^3.700.0";
-    readonly drizzle: "^0.45.1";
+    readonly drizzle: "^0.45.2";
     readonly drizzleKit: "^0.31.4";
-    readonly next: "16.3.4";
+    readonly next: "16.3.6";
     readonly pg: "^8.22.0";
     readonly playwright: "^1.59.1";
     readonly react: "19.2.8";

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-shared.js

@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ exports.PRODUCT_VERSIONS = {
     awsSqs: '^3.700.0',
     awsSsm: '^3.700.0',
     awsSts: '^3.700.0',
-    drizzle: '^0.45.1',
+    drizzle: '^0.45.2',
     drizzleKit: '^0.31.4',
-    next: '16.3.4',
+    next: '16.3.6',
     pg: '^8.22.0',
     playwright: '^1.59.1',
     react: '19.2.8',

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-testing-persistence-event-files.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/**
+ * Seeded behavioral integration specs that drive the seeded event consumer
+ * against the disposable worker stores. They never write DynamoDB outbox rows
+ * (integration/record.spec.ts owns the exactly-one-outbox assertion on the
+ * shared worker table), assert by seed-scoped key, and never wait in real time.
+ */
+export declare function renderTestingPersistenceEventFiles(name: string, pascalName: string, sql: boolean): Readonly<Record<string, string>>;