@empire-builder-kit/nx 1.0.0-rc.40 → 1.0.0-rc.41

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan-testing-persistence-files.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.renderTestingPersistenceFiles = renderTestingPersistenceFiles;
+const built_in_plan_testing_persistence_event_files_js_1 = require("./built-in-plan-testing-persistence-event-files.js");
 /** Disposable integration resources are independent of fleet or deployed data. */
 function renderTestingPersistenceFiles(name, pascalName, sql) {
     const labels = `    labels:
@@ -173,6 +174,7 @@ describe('${name} optional SQL migrations', () => {
 `,
             }
             : {}),
+        ...(0, built_in_plan_testing_persistence_event_files_js_1.renderTestingPersistenceEventFiles)(name, pascalName, sql),
     };
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=built-in-plan-testing-persistence-files.js.map

package/src/generators/slice/built-in-plan.js

@@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ function classifyPaths(files, sql) {
         'api/generated/contract.json',
         'api/generated/openapi.json',
         'authorization/machine-authorization-proof.ts',
-        'authorization/machine-client-provisioner.py',
+        'authorization/machine-client-provisioner.spec.ts',
+        'authorization/machine-client-provisioner.ts',
         'authorization/runtime.ts',
         'authorization/record-store.ts',
         'authorization/groups.mjs',
@@ -250,6 +251,7 @@ function classifyPaths(files, sql) {
         'testing/quarantine-runtime.mjs',
         'testing/strict-json-reporter.mjs',
         'testing/local-key-value.ts',
+        'testing/local-sql.ts',
         'e2e/frontend-accessibility.spec.ts',
     ]);
     for (const path of built_in_plan_performance_files_js_1.PRODUCT_PERFORMANCE_SEEDED_PATHS)

package/src/generators/workload/frozen-container.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export declare const WORKLOAD_CONTAINER_NODE_IMAGE: "node:22-alpine@sha256:16e22a550f3863206a3f701448c45f7912c6896a62de43add43bb9c86130c3e2";
+export declare const WORKLOAD_CONTAINER_NODE_IMAGE: "node:22-alpine@sha256:0a7108bf6c7bf5de370ffb1a3ed6be93d405b43ff159f681a8d18c0e2bc2e402";
 export declare const WORKLOAD_CONTAINER_PNPM_VERSION: "11.20.0";
 export declare const WORKLOAD_CONTAINER_PNPM_DESCRIPTOR: "pnpm@11.20.0+sha512.9a6f330a95b66446ea088faf1521405a8a01f07fde7124cc9958dfed52d4bb436737e65b08f85f37b46fcba375092558ac51262b816844b22f63406ed166bfee";
 export declare const WORKLOAD_CONTAINER_PNPM_STORE = "/workspace/.ebk/cache/pnpm-store";

package/src/git-policy/github-bootstrap.d.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ export declare const EBK_PROTECTED_MAIN_RULESET_NAME: "EBK protected main (trunk
 export declare const EBK_STAGING_PROMOTION_PULL_ROLE_SECRET = "AWS_STAGING_PROMOTION_PULL_ROLE_ARN";
 export declare const EBK_PROTECTED_ENVIRONMENT_SECRETS: readonly ["AWS_ASYNC_RECOVERY_ROLE_ARN", "AWS_ECR_INSPECTOR_EVIDENCE_ROLE_ARN", "AWS_DEPLOY_ROLE_ARN", "AWS_STAGING_PROMOTION_PULL_ROLE_ARN"];
 export declare const EBK_PROTECTED_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES: readonly ["AWS_EXPECTED_ACCOUNT_ID", "AWS_REGION", "AWS_STAGING_PROMOTION_EXPECTED_ACCOUNT_ID", "AWS_STAGING_PROMOTION_REGION", "EBK_ALLOW_PRODUCTION_REMOVE", "EBK_FLEET_ORIGIN"];
+/**
+ * Non-secret stage environment variables an operator may set to request a
+ * machine credential generation or its retirement on a workflow deploy. They
+ * are never required, and a repository- or organization-scoped copy would
+ * silently apply to every stage, so only the stage environment may hold them.
+ */
+export declare const EBK_OPTIONAL_STAGE_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES: readonly ["EBK_MACHINE_CREDENTIAL_GENERATION", "EBK_MACHINE_RETIRE_PREVIOUS_GENERATION"];
 export declare const EBK_CODE_OWNER_PLACEHOLDER: "@REPLACE_WITH_GITHUB_CODE_OWNER";
 type GitHubEnvironmentStage = 'development' | 'production' | 'staging';
 type GitHubAuxiliaryEnvironment = 'async-recovery' | 'ecr-inspector';
@@ -25,6 +32,8 @@ export interface GitHubEnvironmentTopologyEntry {
     additionalBranches?: readonly ('develop' | 'main')[];
     branch: 'develop' | 'main';
     name: GitHubEnvironmentName;
+    /** Variables the environment may hold but never requires. */
+    optionalVariables?: readonly string[];
     requiredSecrets: readonly string[];
     requiredVariables: readonly string[];
     stage: GitHubEnvironmentStage;

package/src/git-policy/github-bootstrap.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.EBK_CODE_OWNER_PLACEHOLDER = exports.EBK_PROTECTED_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES = exports.EBK_PROTECTED_ENVIRONMENT_SECRETS = exports.EBK_STAGING_PROMOTION_PULL_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_PROTECTED_MAIN_RULESET_NAME = exports.EBK_RECORD_MAIN_TOKEN_SECRET = exports.EBK_PERFORMANCE_ORIGINS_VARIABLE = exports.EBK_PERFORMANCE_LOAD_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_PERFORMANCE_COST_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_PERFORMANCE_AGGREGATE_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_ASYNC_RECOVERY_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_ECR_INSPECTOR_EVIDENCE_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_RETIRED_DEPLOYMENT_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_REQUIRED_CHECKS = exports.EBK_PROTECTED_BRANCH_RULESET_NAME = void 0;
+exports.EBK_CODE_OWNER_PLACEHOLDER = exports.EBK_OPTIONAL_STAGE_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES = exports.EBK_PROTECTED_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES = exports.EBK_PROTECTED_ENVIRONMENT_SECRETS = exports.EBK_STAGING_PROMOTION_PULL_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_PROTECTED_MAIN_RULESET_NAME = exports.EBK_RECORD_MAIN_TOKEN_SECRET = exports.EBK_PERFORMANCE_ORIGINS_VARIABLE = exports.EBK_PERFORMANCE_LOAD_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_PERFORMANCE_COST_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_PERFORMANCE_AGGREGATE_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_ASYNC_RECOVERY_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_ECR_INSPECTOR_EVIDENCE_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_RETIRED_DEPLOYMENT_ROLE_SECRET = exports.EBK_REQUIRED_CHECKS = exports.EBK_PROTECTED_BRANCH_RULESET_NAME = void 0;
 exports.githubEnvironmentTopology = githubEnvironmentTopology;
 exports.runGitHubBootstrap = runGitHubBootstrap;
 const index_js_1 = require("../repository-policy/index.js");
@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@ exports.EBK_PROTECTED_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES = [
     'EBK_ALLOW_PRODUCTION_REMOVE',
     'EBK_FLEET_ORIGIN',
 ];
+/**
+ * Non-secret stage environment variables an operator may set to request a
+ * machine credential generation or its retirement on a workflow deploy. They
+ * are never required, and a repository- or organization-scoped copy would
+ * silently apply to every stage, so only the stage environment may hold them.
+ */
+exports.EBK_OPTIONAL_STAGE_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES = [
+    'EBK_MACHINE_CREDENTIAL_GENERATION',
+    'EBK_MACHINE_RETIRE_PREVIOUS_GENERATION',
+];
 const FORBIDDEN_NPM_TOKEN_NAMES = [
     'NODE_AUTH_TOKEN',
     'NPM_CONFIG_TOKEN',
@@ -62,6 +72,7 @@ function stageEnvironmentTopology(stage, deploymentProfile) {
     return Object.freeze({
         branch: production ? 'main' : 'develop',
         name: stage,
+        optionalVariables: exports.EBK_OPTIONAL_STAGE_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES,
         requiredSecrets: Object.freeze(production
             ? deploymentProfile === 'starter'
                 ? []
@@ -808,6 +819,7 @@ function evaluate(repository, state, inspectionBlockers, productionApprovalMode,
     }
     for (const variable of [
         ...exports.EBK_PROTECTED_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES,
+        ...exports.EBK_OPTIONAL_STAGE_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES,
         ...FORBIDDEN_NPM_TOKEN_NAMES,
     ]) {
         if (state.repositoryVariableNames.includes(variable)) {
@@ -880,8 +892,10 @@ function evaluate(repository, state, inspectionBlockers, productionApprovalMode,
                 blockers.push(`${environment} environment is missing required variable ${variable}; bootstrap never creates variable values.`);
             }
         }
+        const optionalVariables = topology.optionalVariables ?? [];
         for (const variable of current.variableNames) {
-            if (!requiredVariables.includes(variable)) {
+            if (!requiredVariables.includes(variable) &&
+                !optionalVariables.includes(variable)) {
                 blockers.push(`${environment} environment exposes ${variable} outside its exact capability boundary.`);
             }
         }

package/src/local-dev/fleet-inventory.js

@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@ function inventoryError(message) {
 function defaultPing(appData, security, fleetId) {
     return new fleet_client_js_1.FleetClient((0, runtime_paths_js_1.fleetRuntimePaths)(fleetId, appData), security).ping();
 }
+/**
+ * An ambiguous entry is never pruned, but any actor may inspect it read-only.
+ * The message names where it lives and the owner's recovery; it never prints
+ * an absolute path, which would carry the local account name.
+ */
+function inspectReadOnly(subject, location) {
+    return `${subject}; ebk will not prune it. Inspect ${location} in the per-user EBK application-data directory read-only (any actor may). If it is yours and no ebk dev process for it is running, remove that one entry or restore current-user-only ownership, then rerun ebk dev ps; if another user owns it, leave it for them.`;
+}
 function record(fleetId, classification, nextAction, state) {
     return {
         ...(state
@@ -51,7 +59,7 @@ async function inspectFleet(fleetId, options, effects, recoverRunnerCleanup = fa
     }
     catch {
         return {
-            inventory: record(fleetId, 'ambiguous', 'Inspect the malformed private state manually; do not prune.'),
+            inventory: record(fleetId, 'ambiguous', inspectReadOnly('Private Fleet state is malformed', `sessions/${fleetId}`)),
         };
     }
     if (!state || state.fleetId !== fleetId) {
@@ -197,7 +205,7 @@ async function inventoryFleets(options, effects = {}) {
             results.push({
                 classification: 'ambiguous',
                 fleetId: entry.name.slice(0, 128),
-                nextAction: 'Unsupported session entry; inspect manually and do not prune.',
+                nextAction: inspectReadOnly('Unsupported session entry', 'sessions/'),
                 selectedSlices: [],
             });
             continue;
@@ -259,7 +267,7 @@ async function inventorySliceClaims(options, effects = {}) {
     }
     catch {
         return [
-            ambiguousClaimEntry('slice-claims', 'Slice-claim directory is not current-user private; inspect manually and do not prune.'),
+            ambiguousClaimEntry('slice-claims', inspectReadOnly('Slice-claim directory is not current-user private', 'slice-claims/')),
         ];
     }
     let entries;
@@ -268,7 +276,7 @@ async function inventorySliceClaims(options, effects = {}) {
     }
     catch {
         return [
-            ambiguousClaimEntry('slice-claims', 'Slice-claim directory cannot be read safely; inspect manually and do not prune.'),
+            ambiguousClaimEntry('slice-claims', inspectReadOnly('Slice-claim directory cannot be read safely', 'slice-claims/')),
         ];
     }
     const inspectedFleets = new Map();
@@ -286,7 +294,7 @@ async function inventorySliceClaims(options, effects = {}) {
         if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$/.test(namespace.name) ||
             !namespace.isDirectory() ||
             namespace.isSymbolicLink()) {
-            results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(namespace.name, 'Unsupported Slice-claim namespace; inspect manually and do not prune.', /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$/.test(namespace.name)
+            results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(namespace.name, inspectReadOnly('Unsupported Slice-claim namespace', 'slice-claims/'), /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$/.test(namespace.name)
                 ? namespace.name
                 : undefined));
             continue;
@@ -304,13 +312,13 @@ async function inventorySliceClaims(options, effects = {}) {
                 });
         }
         catch {
-            results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(namespace.name, 'Slice-claim namespace cannot be read safely; inspect manually and do not prune.', namespace.name));
+            results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(namespace.name, inspectReadOnly('Slice-claim namespace cannot be read safely', 'slice-claims/'), namespace.name));
         }
     }
     for (const { entry, directory: claimDirectory, fleetId } of claims) {
         const match = SLICE_CLAIM_FILE_PATTERN.exec(entry.name);
         if (!match || !entry.isFile() || entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
-            results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(entry.name, 'Unsupported Slice-claim entry; inspect manually and do not prune.', fleetId));
+            results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(entry.name, inspectReadOnly('Unsupported Slice-claim entry', 'slice-claims/'), fleetId));
             continue;
         }
         const slice = match[1];
@@ -318,17 +326,17 @@ async function inventorySliceClaims(options, effects = {}) {
         try {
             const inspected = (0, slice_claim_js_1.inspectSliceClaim)(claimDirectory, slice, security);
             if (!inspected) {
-                results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(slice, 'Slice claim changed during inventory; inspect manually and do not prune.', fleetId));
+                results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(slice, 'Slice claim changed during inventory; ebk will not prune it. Rerun ebk dev ps; if the change persists, inspect slice-claims/ in the per-user EBK application-data directory read-only.', fleetId));
                 continue;
             }
             if (inspected.slice !== slice || inspected.fleetId !== fleetId) {
-                results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(slice, 'Slice-claim namespace, filename and record identity disagree; inspect manually and do not prune.', fleetId));
+                results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(slice, inspectReadOnly('Slice-claim namespace, filename and record identity disagree', 'slice-claims/'), fleetId));
                 continue;
             }
             claim = inspected;
         }
         catch {
-            results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(slice, 'Slice claim is malformed or not current-user private; inspect manually and do not prune.', fleetId));
+            results.push(ambiguousClaimEntry(slice, inspectReadOnly('Slice claim is malformed or not current-user private', 'slice-claims/'), fleetId));
             continue;
         }
         const ownerPaths = (0, runtime_paths_js_1.fleetRuntimePaths)(claim.fleetId, options.appData);

package/src/local-dev/fleet-launcher.js

@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ function recoverStartupOnlyRequest(prepared, processProbe, security) {
         startup = (0, fleet_startup_js_1.readFleetStartupRequest)(prepared.paths.startup, security);
     }
     catch {
-        return launchError('stale-state-ambiguous', 'Residual Fleet startup authority is malformed; inspect it manually and do not replace it.');
+        return launchError('stale-state-ambiguous', `Residual Fleet startup authority is malformed; ebk will not replace it. Inspect sessions/${prepared.request.fleetId} in the per-user EBK application-data directory read-only (any actor may). If it is yours and no ebk dev process for it is running, remove that startup file, then rerun the command.`);
     }
     if (startup.fleetId !== prepared.request.fleetId ||
         startup.appData !== prepared.request.appData ||
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ function recoverStartupOnlyRequest(prepared, processProbe, security) {
         sessionGeneration: startup.sessionGeneration,
     }).slice(0, 16)}.recover`;
     if ((0, node_fs_1.existsSync)(recoveryPath)) {
-        return launchError('stale-state-ambiguous', 'Residual Fleet startup has a prior recovery artifact; inspect it manually.');
+        return launchError('stale-state-ambiguous', `Residual Fleet startup has a prior recovery artifact; ebk will not replace it. Inspect the .recover file in sessions/${prepared.request.fleetId} of the per-user EBK application-data directory read-only (any actor may). If it is yours and no ebk dev process for it is running, remove that artifact, then rerun the command.`);
     }
     try {
         (0, node_fs_1.renameSync)(prepared.paths.startup, recoveryPath);

package/src/secrets/personal-command.d.ts

@@ -4,9 +4,17 @@ export interface HumanSecretCeremony {
     readonly [HUMAN_SECRET_CEREMONY]: true;
     actor: 'human';
     agentDelegated: boolean;
+    /** Name (never value) of the first agent or CI marker variable detected. */
+    detectedMarker?: string;
     interactive: boolean;
     stdinIsTty: boolean;
 }
+export type PersonalSecretOperation = 'remove' | 'set';
+interface HumanRequiredDetail {
+    detectedMarker?: string;
+    operation: PersonalSecretOperation;
+    reason: 'agent-or-ci' | 'capability' | 'terminal';
+}
 export interface HiddenSecretInputReader {
     readHidden(input: {
         logicalName: string;
@@ -49,7 +57,7 @@ export interface PersonalSecretCommandResult {
 }
 export declare class PersonalSecretCommandError extends Error {
     readonly code: 'personal-secret-account-invalid' | 'personal-secret-command-invalid' | 'personal-secret-confirmation-required' | 'personal-secret-hidden-input-failed' | 'personal-secret-human-required' | 'personal-secret-stage-invalid' | 'personal-secret-store-failed' | 'personal-secret-value-invalid';
-    constructor(code: PersonalSecretCommandError['code']);
+    constructor(code: PersonalSecretCommandError['code'], detail?: HumanRequiredDetail);
 }
 interface PersonalSecretEnvironment {
     accountId: string;
@@ -74,10 +82,18 @@ export interface RemovePersonalSecretInput extends PersonalSecretEnvironment {
  */
 export declare function issueHumanSecretCeremony(input: {
     agentDelegated: boolean;
+    detectedMarker?: string;
     interactive: boolean;
     stdinIsTty: boolean;
 }): HumanSecretCeremony;
-export declare function assertHumanSecretCeremony(ceremony: HumanSecretCeremony): void;
+/**
+ * `set` carries a human-supplied value, so it refuses every agent or CI
+ * marker: a real TTY proves nothing when an agent owns the terminal. `remove`
+ * carries no value and only targets the human's personal development stage,
+ * so an agent-delegated session may start it; it still needs a local
+ * interactive terminal where the human types the hidden confirmation.
+ */
+export declare function assertHumanSecretCeremony(ceremony: HumanSecretCeremony, operation: PersonalSecretOperation): void;
 export declare function setPersonalSstSecret(input: SetPersonalSecretInput): Promise<PersonalSecretCommandResult>;
 export declare function removePersonalSstSecret(input: RemovePersonalSecretInput): Promise<PersonalSecretCommandResult>;
 export {};

package/src/secrets/personal-command.js

@@ -8,10 +8,33 @@ exports.removePersonalSstSecret = removePersonalSstSecret;
 const stages_js_1 = require("../foundation/stages.js");
 const model_js_1 = require("./model.js");
 const HUMAN_SECRET_CEREMONY = Symbol('ebk.human-secret-ceremony');
+const markerNamePattern = /^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,63}$/;
+function humanRequiredMessage(detail) {
+    const code = '(personal-secret-human-required)';
+    if (detail.reason === 'agent-or-ci') {
+        return [
+            `ebk secret set must be run by a human in a terminal that no agent or CI job spawned ${code},`,
+            'because the hidden prompt does not hide the value from the process that owns this terminal.',
+            'Ask the human to open their own terminal and run the same command;',
+            'agents may use the value-blind secret-metadata and status targets instead.',
+            ...(detail.detectedMarker
+                ? [`Detected agent/CI marker: ${detail.detectedMarker}.`]
+                : []),
+        ].join(' ');
+    }
+    if (detail.reason === 'terminal') {
+        return detail.operation === 'set'
+            ? `ebk secret set needs a local interactive terminal for its hidden value prompt ${code}. Run it in a human-operated terminal that no agent or CI job spawned.`
+            : `ebk secret remove needs a local interactive terminal where the human types the hidden REMOVE <logical-name> confirmation ${code}. An agent may start it only in a terminal the human can type into.`;
+    }
+    return `Personal secret command failed ${code}.`;
+}
 class PersonalSecretCommandError extends Error {
     code;
-    constructor(code) {
-        super(`Personal secret command failed (${code}).`);
+    constructor(code, detail) {
+        super(code === 'personal-secret-human-required' && detail
+            ? humanRequiredMessage(detail)
+            : `Personal secret command failed (${code}).`);
         this.name = 'PersonalSecretCommandError';
         this.code = code;
     }
@@ -24,7 +47,7 @@ function rejectUnexpectedProperties(input, allowed) {
         throw new PersonalSecretCommandError('personal-secret-command-invalid');
     }
 }
-function validateEnvironment(input) {
+function validateEnvironment(input, operation) {
     try {
         (0, model_js_1.validateSecretMetadataDeclaration)(input.declaration);
     }
@@ -42,7 +65,7 @@ function validateEnvironment(input) {
         input.accountId !== input.developmentAccountId) {
         throw new PersonalSecretCommandError('personal-secret-account-invalid');
     }
-    assertHumanSecretCeremony(input.ceremony);
+    assertHumanSecretCeremony(input.ceremony, operation);
 }
 /**
  * Issues the in-process capability used by the CLI after it has inspected the
@@ -52,12 +75,19 @@ function validateEnvironment(input) {
 function issueHumanSecretCeremony(input) {
     if (typeof input.agentDelegated !== 'boolean' ||
         typeof input.interactive !== 'boolean' ||
-        typeof input.stdinIsTty !== 'boolean') {
+        typeof input.stdinIsTty !== 'boolean' ||
+        (input.detectedMarker !== undefined &&
+            (!input.agentDelegated ||
+                typeof input.detectedMarker !== 'string' ||
+                !markerNamePattern.test(input.detectedMarker)))) {
         throw new PersonalSecretCommandError('personal-secret-human-required');
     }
     const ceremony = {
         actor: 'human',
         agentDelegated: input.agentDelegated,
+        ...(input.detectedMarker === undefined
+            ? {}
+            : { detectedMarker: input.detectedMarker }),
         interactive: input.interactive,
         stdinIsTty: input.stdinIsTty,
     };
@@ -69,15 +99,39 @@ function issueHumanSecretCeremony(input) {
     });
     return Object.freeze(ceremony);
 }
-function assertHumanSecretCeremony(ceremony) {
+/**
+ * `set` carries a human-supplied value, so it refuses every agent or CI
+ * marker: a real TTY proves nothing when an agent owns the terminal. `remove`
+ * carries no value and only targets the human's personal development stage,
+ * so an agent-delegated session may start it; it still needs a local
+ * interactive terminal where the human types the hidden confirmation.
+ */
+function assertHumanSecretCeremony(ceremony, operation) {
     if (typeof ceremony !== 'object' ||
         ceremony === null ||
         ceremony[HUMAN_SECRET_CEREMONY] !== true ||
         ceremony.actor !== 'human' ||
-        ceremony.agentDelegated ||
-        !ceremony.interactive ||
-        !ceremony.stdinIsTty) {
-        throw new PersonalSecretCommandError('personal-secret-human-required');
+        (operation !== 'set' && operation !== 'remove')) {
+        throw new PersonalSecretCommandError('personal-secret-human-required', {
+            operation: operation === 'remove' ? 'remove' : 'set',
+            reason: 'capability',
+        });
+    }
+    if (operation === 'set' && ceremony.agentDelegated !== false) {
+        throw new PersonalSecretCommandError('personal-secret-human-required', {
+            ...(typeof ceremony.detectedMarker === 'string' &&
+                markerNamePattern.test(ceremony.detectedMarker)
+                ? { detectedMarker: ceremony.detectedMarker }
+                : {}),
+            operation,
+            reason: 'agent-or-ci',
+        });
+    }
+    if (ceremony.interactive !== true || ceremony.stdinIsTty !== true) {
+        throw new PersonalSecretCommandError('personal-secret-human-required', {
+            operation,
+            reason: 'terminal',
+        });
     }
 }
 async function setPersonalSstSecret(input) {
@@ -92,7 +146,7 @@ async function setPersonalSstSecret(input) {
         'store',
         'validator',
     ]);
-    validateEnvironment(input);
+    validateEnvironment(input, 'set');
     let bytes;
     try {
         bytes = await input.hiddenInput.readHidden({
@@ -163,7 +217,7 @@ async function removePersonalSstSecret(input) {
         'stage',
         'store',
     ]);
-    validateEnvironment(input);
+    validateEnvironment(input, 'remove');
     let confirmed;
     try {
         confirmed = await input.confirmation.confirm({

package/src/secrets/verification.js

@@ -87,7 +87,12 @@ async function collectSourceFiles(projectRoot, directory, declaredSecretNames) {
             ...(path === 'scripts/remove-personal-secrets.mjs'
                 ? { allowFrameworkPersonalSstRemove: true }
                 : {}),
-            ...(['jobs/bootstrap-database.mjs', 'jobs/retire-database.mjs'].includes(path)
+            ...([
+                'authorization/machine-client-provisioner.spec.ts',
+                'authorization/machine-client-provisioner.ts',
+                'jobs/bootstrap-database.mjs',
+                'jobs/retire-database.mjs',
+            ].includes(path)
                 ? { allowFrameworkSecretProviderClient: true }
                 : {}),
             ...(path === 'infra/personal-secrets.ts'