@elisym/sdk 0.10.2 → 0.10.4

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ interface Agent {
     /** Count of all rated feedback events targeting this agent (last 30 days). */
     totalRatingCount?: number;
     picture?: string;
+    banner?: string;
     name?: string;
     about?: string;
 }
@@ -380,18 +381,20 @@ declare class DiscoveryService {
      *
      * Ranking algorithm:
      * 1. Bucket each agent into 1-minute slots by `lastPaidJobAt` (newest
-     *    `payment-completed` feedback timestamp). Cold-start agents go into a
-     *    sentinel bucket below all populated buckets.
+     *    `payment-completed` feedback timestamp, gated by a matching kind:6xxx
+     *    result from the provider on the same job event). Cold-start agents go
+     *    into a sentinel bucket below all populated buckets.
      * 2. Within a bucket, sort by positive review rate descending.
      * 3. Tiebreak by raw `lastPaidJobAt`, then `lastSeen` (NIP-89 freshness).
      *
-     * NOTE: We trust the `payment-completed` feedback timestamp directly; we do
-     * not verify the embedded `tx` signature on-chain. Public Solana devnet RPC
-     * rate-limits trivially exceed what discovery needs (N agents * up-to-5
-     * candidates), and the resulting 429s blocked discovery entirely. This
-     * means a malicious customer can publish a fake `payment-completed` to lift
-     * an agent's ranking. Acceptable trade-off for devnet / MVP; tighten via
-     * recipient-tied checks when the network moves to mainnet with a paid RPC
+     * NOTE: We do not verify the `tx` signature on-chain - public Solana devnet
+     * RPC rate-limits trivially exceed what discovery needs (N agents * up-to-5
+     * candidates), and the resulting 429s blocked discovery entirely. As a
+     * lighter sybil mitigation we cross-check `payment-completed` feedback
+     * against a kind:6xxx result event authored by the provider on the same
+     * job: a customer can publish a fake `payment-completed`, but they cannot
+     * forge a result event signed by the provider. Tighten with recipient-tied
+     * on-chain checks when the network moves to mainnet with a paid RPC
      * provider.
      */
     fetchAgents(network?: Network, limit?: number): Promise<Agent[]>;

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ interface Agent {
     /** Count of all rated feedback events targeting this agent (last 30 days). */
     totalRatingCount?: number;
     picture?: string;
+    banner?: string;
     name?: string;
     about?: string;
 }
@@ -380,18 +381,20 @@ declare class DiscoveryService {
      *
      * Ranking algorithm:
      * 1. Bucket each agent into 1-minute slots by `lastPaidJobAt` (newest
-     *    `payment-completed` feedback timestamp). Cold-start agents go into a
-     *    sentinel bucket below all populated buckets.
+     *    `payment-completed` feedback timestamp, gated by a matching kind:6xxx
+     *    result from the provider on the same job event). Cold-start agents go
+     *    into a sentinel bucket below all populated buckets.
      * 2. Within a bucket, sort by positive review rate descending.
      * 3. Tiebreak by raw `lastPaidJobAt`, then `lastSeen` (NIP-89 freshness).
      *
-     * NOTE: We trust the `payment-completed` feedback timestamp directly; we do
-     * not verify the embedded `tx` signature on-chain. Public Solana devnet RPC
-     * rate-limits trivially exceed what discovery needs (N agents * up-to-5
-     * candidates), and the resulting 429s blocked discovery entirely. This
-     * means a malicious customer can publish a fake `payment-completed` to lift
-     * an agent's ranking. Acceptable trade-off for devnet / MVP; tighten via
-     * recipient-tied checks when the network moves to mainnet with a paid RPC
+     * NOTE: We do not verify the `tx` signature on-chain - public Solana devnet
+     * RPC rate-limits trivially exceed what discovery needs (N agents * up-to-5
+     * candidates), and the resulting 429s blocked discovery entirely. As a
+     * lighter sybil mitigation we cross-check `payment-completed` feedback
+     * against a kind:6xxx result event authored by the provider on the same
+     * job: a customer can publish a fake `payment-completed`, but they cannot
+     * forge a result event signed by the provider. Tighten with recipient-tied
+     * on-chain checks when the network moves to mainnet with a paid RPC
      * provider.
      */
     fetchAgents(network?: Network, limit?: number): Promise<Agent[]>;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1191,6 +1191,9 @@ var DiscoveryService = class {
         if (typeof meta.picture === "string") {
           agent.picture = meta.picture;
         }
+        if (typeof meta.banner === "string") {
+          agent.banner = meta.banner;
+        }
         if (typeof meta.name === "string") {
           agent.name = meta.name;
         }
@@ -1208,18 +1211,20 @@ var DiscoveryService = class {
    *
    * Ranking algorithm:
    * 1. Bucket each agent into 1-minute slots by `lastPaidJobAt` (newest
-   *    `payment-completed` feedback timestamp). Cold-start agents go into a
-   *    sentinel bucket below all populated buckets.
+   *    `payment-completed` feedback timestamp, gated by a matching kind:6xxx
+   *    result from the provider on the same job event). Cold-start agents go
+   *    into a sentinel bucket below all populated buckets.
    * 2. Within a bucket, sort by positive review rate descending.
    * 3. Tiebreak by raw `lastPaidJobAt`, then `lastSeen` (NIP-89 freshness).
    *
-   * NOTE: We trust the `payment-completed` feedback timestamp directly; we do
-   * not verify the embedded `tx` signature on-chain. Public Solana devnet RPC
-   * rate-limits trivially exceed what discovery needs (N agents * up-to-5
-   * candidates), and the resulting 429s blocked discovery entirely. This
-   * means a malicious customer can publish a fake `payment-completed` to lift
-   * an agent's ranking. Acceptable trade-off for devnet / MVP; tighten via
-   * recipient-tied checks when the network moves to mainnet with a paid RPC
+   * NOTE: We do not verify the `tx` signature on-chain - public Solana devnet
+   * RPC rate-limits trivially exceed what discovery needs (N agents * up-to-5
+   * candidates), and the resulting 429s blocked discovery entirely. As a
+   * lighter sybil mitigation we cross-check `payment-completed` feedback
+   * against a kind:6xxx result event authored by the provider on the same
+   * job: a customer can publish a fake `payment-completed`, but they cannot
+   * forge a result event signed by the provider. Tighten with recipient-tied
+   * on-chain checks when the network moves to mainnet with a paid RPC
    * provider.
    */
   async fetchAgents(network = "devnet", limit) {
@@ -1262,14 +1267,27 @@ var DiscoveryService = class {
       ),
       this.enrichWithMetadata(agents)
     ]);
+    const deliveredJobsByProvider = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
     for (const ev of resultEvents) {
       if (!verifyEvent(ev)) {
         continue;
       }
       const agent = agentMap.get(ev.pubkey);
-      if (agent && ev.created_at > agent.lastSeen) {
+      if (!agent) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (ev.created_at > agent.lastSeen) {
         agent.lastSeen = ev.created_at;
       }
+      const jobEventId = ev.tags.find((t) => t[0] === "e")?.[1];
+      if (jobEventId) {
+        let delivered = deliveredJobsByProvider.get(ev.pubkey);
+        if (!delivered) {
+          delivered = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+          deliveredJobsByProvider.set(ev.pubkey, delivered);
+        }
+        delivered.add(jobEventId);
+      }
     }
     for (const ev of feedbackEvents) {
       if (!verifyEvent(ev)) {
@@ -1296,7 +1314,9 @@ var DiscoveryService = class {
       const status = ev.tags.find((t) => t[0] === "status")?.[1];
       const txTag = ev.tags.find((t) => t[0] === "tx");
       const txSignature = txTag?.[1];
-      if (status === "payment-completed" && typeof txSignature === "string" && txSignature) {
+      const jobEventId = ev.tags.find((t) => t[0] === "e")?.[1];
+      const hasDeliveredResult = jobEventId !== void 0 && deliveredJobsByProvider.get(targetPubkey)?.has(jobEventId) === true;
+      if (status === "payment-completed" && typeof txSignature === "string" && txSignature && hasDeliveredResult) {
         if (!agent.lastPaidJobAt || ev.created_at > agent.lastPaidJobAt) {
           agent.lastPaidJobAt = ev.created_at;
           agent.lastPaidJobTx = txSignature;