@elinpf/dsh-ops-access 0.1.6 → 0.2.0

package/lib/types.d.ts

@@ -63,6 +63,40 @@ export interface AccessProvider {
      * in libcrypto at first use over exactly one missing newline).
      */
     normalizeTrailingNewline?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Reference fields: maps a field name to the KIND it points at (e.g. ssh's
+     * `cred` → an `ssh-cred` entry), letting many entries share one credential
+     * instead of each carrying a copy. At resolve time core expands each
+     * present reference against the SAME registry and tier: the referenced
+     * entry is validated through its own provider and its fields are merged
+     * UNDER the referring entry's (the referring entry wins conflicts, e.g. a
+     * per-host user override). One level only — a referenced entry's own
+     * reference fields are NOT expanded. The referenced profile is an
+     * implementation detail of the referring resolve: the broker is consulted
+     * once, on the referring kind/name, never on the reference. A missing or
+     * invalid reference fails the referring resolve with a pointer to both
+     * entries, and canResolve reports the same.
+     */
+    references?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Post-merge validator, run by core on the resolved fields AFTER reference
+     * expansion (and on the plain fields when the provider declares no
+     * references). Catches requirements that only hold on the merged shape —
+     * e.g. ssh needs a login user, which may come from the host entry OR from
+     * its referenced credential, so the entry schema cannot require it. Return
+     * an error message to fail the resolve, nothing to accept. Sync and
+     * structural only — same discipline as validateContent.
+     */
+    validateResolved?: (fields: Record<string, unknown>) => string | null | undefined;
+    /**
+     * Known limits of this kind's typical ro credential, in prose (e.g. "the
+     * view ClusterRole does not cover nodes/PVs — expect Forbidden"). Surfaced
+     * in the mention recall and help() so the agent learns the boundary BEFORE
+     * burning a call on a 403 it cannot fix — a mid-incident agent does not
+     * reliably infer a credential boundary from a bare Forbidden, and a
+     * compaction wipes the ones it learned the hard way (2026-09-10).
+     */
+    knownLimits?: string;
     /**
      * Capability probe (ticket 10): verify the credential's REAL
      * permissions against the claimed tier. Core runs it at save time,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@elinpf/dsh-ops-access",
-  "version": "0.1.6",
+  "version": "0.2.0",
   "description": "Ops access capability seam — owns the YAML credential registry and exposes ctx.opsAccess (resolve/list/register) to provider plugins.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "lib/index.js",