@eir-labs/coltrane 0.9.4 → 0.11.0

package/dist/src/venue_realizer.js

@@ -0,0 +1,889 @@
+// venue_realizer.ts — WHERE a room is realized, and WHAT it is realized on.
+//
+// This is the other half of Gap 2 (SPEC-worker-contract.md): a venue declares WHICH substrate it
+// needs, a deployment declares WHICH substrates it provides, and this module refuses the mismatch
+// rather than degrading silently. A venue that requires isolation, realized on a substrate that
+// cannot provide it, RUNS and believes it is isolated — a false guarantee is strictly worse than a
+// refusal, because a guarantee is exactly the thing a venue's author reasons against.
+//
+// The renderer is pinned from both directions: it EMITS only from a closed allowlist, so a forbidden
+// setting cannot appear from contract data; and it REFUSES input that smuggles a forbidden value
+// through an allowlisted FIELD, because an allowlist over field NAMES says nothing about what those
+// fields CONTAIN. Rendering a runtime configuration from contract data is code generation from data,
+// and if any part of the input is reachable by a gig, a permissive renderer is remote code execution
+// with extra steps.
+import { existsSync, writeFileSync, rmSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync } from "node:fs";
+import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { VenueSchema, DEVICE_CLASSES } from "./genome_schema.js";
+import { sha256Hex, canonStructuralJson } from "./canonical_form.js";
+import { prepareWorkspace } from "./workspace.js";
+export { DEVICE_CLASSES };
+// ── The refusals. Each NAMES the thing it refused, so a caller is not left to guess. ──────────────
+/** A substrate no available realizer provides is a REFUSAL, never a downgrade — the whole reason
+ *  this gap is written down. Names what was required and what this host can actually provide. */
+export class VenueSubstrateUnavailable extends Error {
+    required;
+    available;
+    constructor(required, available) {
+        super(`no available realizer provides substrate "${required}" — this host provides only ` +
+            `[${available.join(", ")}]; a missing substrate is a refusal, never a downgrade to a weaker realizer`);
+        this.name = "VenueSubstrateUnavailable";
+        this.required = required;
+        this.available = available;
+    }
+}
+/** A HOST cannot host this venue: a device class it does not provide, an architecture it is not.
+ *  Distinct from a substrate refusal — the fix is a different machine, not a different runtime. */
+export class VenueHostUnsuitable extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = "VenueHostUnsuitable";
+    }
+}
+/** A realization would exceed the venue's declared concurrency ceiling. */
+export class VenueConcurrencyRefused extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = "VenueConcurrencyRefused";
+    }
+}
+/** Input would render a setting the contract may not ask for. Carries `forbidden` so the refusal
+ *  names the value, and `field` so it names where it arrived — "invalid venue" sends the author back
+ *  to read the whole contract. */
+export class VenueRenderRefusal extends Error {
+    forbidden;
+    field;
+    constructor(args) {
+        super(args.message ??
+            `the renderer refuses a forbidden value "${args.forbidden}"` +
+                (args.field ? ` smuggled through the allowlisted field "${args.field}"` : ""));
+        this.name = "VenueRenderRefusal";
+        this.forbidden = args.forbidden;
+        this.field = args.field;
+    }
+}
+/** Gap 2's bidirectional probe, direction one: a tool the CONTRACT grants that the server does not
+ *  actually advertise. "Granted but unprovided" caught at realization instead of at first use. Carries
+ *  the bare tool and the server so the refusal names both — the remediation is to add the tool to the
+ *  server or drop the grant, which is a different fix from a server that is too wide. */
+export class VenueRealizationError extends Error {
+    state;
+    missingGrant;
+    serverSlug;
+    constructor(args) {
+        super(args.message ??
+            `venue realization failed in state ${args.state}: server "${args.serverSlug}" does not advertise ` +
+                `granted tool "${args.missingGrant}" — a tool the contract grants that the server cannot supply is ` +
+                `"granted but unprovided", refused here rather than discovered mid-run on a box nobody is watching`);
+        this.name = "VenueRealizationError";
+        this.state = args.state;
+        this.missingGrant = args.missingGrant;
+        this.serverSlug = args.serverSlug;
+    }
+}
+/** Gap 2's bidirectional probe, direction two: the server advertises MORE than the contract declared.
+ *  A ceiling the thing beneath it can quietly exceed is not a ceiling — the exact intersection R10
+ *  enforces at compose time. NON-OVERLAPPING fields with `VenueRealizationError` on purpose: the two
+ *  mismatches demand different remediation, and one merged error would make the direction ambiguous. */
+export class VenueContractViolation extends Error {
+    state;
+    extraTool;
+    serverSlug;
+    constructor(args) {
+        super(args.message ??
+            `venue contract violation in state ${args.state}: server "${args.serverSlug}" advertises ` +
+                `"${args.extraTool}", which the contract does not grant — a server wider than the contract is a ` +
+                `violation, not a bonus, for the same reason equipment.tools is a ceiling and never a floor`);
+        this.name = "VenueContractViolation";
+        this.state = args.state;
+        this.extraTool = args.extraTool;
+        this.serverSlug = args.serverSlug;
+    }
+}
+/** The CLOSED allowlist of contract fields the renderer may substitute. Exact, not a floor: a field
+ *  not on this list contributes nothing to the render whatever it is called, and widening the list
+ *  is a line someone changes on purpose. */
+export const COMPOSE_SUBSTITUTABLE_FIELDS = [
+    "credential_names",
+    "doors",
+    "installs",
+    "mcp_servers",
+    "slug",
+];
+// ── Identity: an environment is a function of the CONTRACT, so an unchanged contract rebuilds
+//    nothing. floorIdentity isolates the shared base so N venues cost floor + Σ(deltas). ──────────
+/** The identity of the environment built from a venue — a function of the parsed contract's content,
+ *  so the same contract is the same environment and a changed one is a different environment. */
+export function environmentIdentity(venue) {
+    const v = VenueSchema.parse(venue);
+    return `env-${sha256Hex(canonStructuralJson(v))}`;
+}
+/** The identity of the shared floor a venue composes over. Two venues declaring the same floor
+ *  resolve to the SAME floor identity — the precondition for sharing at all. */
+export function floorIdentity(venue) {
+    const v = VenueSchema.parse(venue);
+    return `floor-${sha256Hex(canonStructuralJson({ floor: v.floor ?? null }))}`;
+}
+// ── The renderer. Parsed input only; emits only from the closed allowlist; refuses a forbidden value
+//    smuggled through an allowlisted field. ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Runtime sockets are the one-line escape: a container that can reach the runtime's own socket can
+ *  start a second container with the host filesystem mounted. */
+const RUNTIME_SOCKET = /docker\.sock|containerd\.sock|podman\.sock|\/var\/run\/docker/i;
+/** The room image's engine root — `WORKDIR /app` in Dockerfile.room, where the compiled engine and
+ *  the base genome live. An absolute path under here is a path in the ROOM IMAGE's filesystem, NOT a
+ *  host path: naming a binary here names where it lives INSIDE the image the venue declared, which
+ *  the contract is entitled to do; it is not an arbitrary host path to mount or expose. */
+const ROOM_IMAGE_ROOT = "/app";
+/** A single value about to be emitted through an allowlisted field, checked for what an allowlist
+ *  over field NAMES cannot see. A runtime socket anywhere is refused in BOTH namespaces; an absolute
+ *  path is refused as a host path unless it is derived from the per-realization directory or, in the
+ *  room-image namespace, lives under the room image's engine root. */
+function assertValueRenderable(field, value, realizationDir, namespace = "host") {
+    if (RUNTIME_SOCKET.test(value)) {
+        throw new VenueRenderRefusal({
+            forbidden: value,
+            field,
+            message: `field "${field}" carries a container runtime socket path "${value}" — a runtime socket ` +
+                `inside the room is the end of the room, allowlisted field or not`,
+        });
+    }
+    if (value.startsWith("/")) {
+        // TWO NAMESPACES, AND THE CONFLATION FIXED AT ITS SITE. A path derived from the per-realization
+        // directory is always allowed — it is the room's own workspace. Beyond that:
+        //   host namespace  — an absolute path is a HOST path with exactly one meaning (see the host),
+        //                     whichever field it arrived in, and is refused. This is the protection the
+        //                     contract must not be able to defeat by naming an arbitrary mount source or
+        //                     exposure; the law that pins it is
+        //                     tests/spec_venue_realization_substrate.test.ts:540-556 ("refuses an
+        //                     absolute host path outside the realization directory"), left UNMODIFIED.
+        //   room-image ns   — a COMMAND token of a containerized server names WHERE A BINARY LIVES INSIDE
+        //                     the room image the venue declared. A path under the image's engine root
+        //                     (/app, Dockerfile.room WORKDIR) is representable: it is not a host path at
+        //                     all, so refusing it forced venues to ship a placeholder command nothing
+        //                     runs. Any OTHER absolute path — /etc, a mount source — is still a host path
+        //                     even in a command token, and still refused here.
+        //
+        // DIRECTION 1 (honour the declared command) chosen over Direction 2 (refuse a command for a
+        // containerized stdio server at authoring time): it leaves VenueSchema Rule 2 (a stdio server
+        // owes a command) unchanged, keeps the compose-service `command` source intact, and fixes the
+        // host/room-image conflation at the exact predicate where it lived rather than burying the root
+        // cause under a schema gate. The RUNTIME_SOCKET guard above still covers BOTH namespaces: a
+        // docker.sock inside a room still escapes the container, so it is refused even as a command token.
+        const underRealizationDir = value.startsWith(realizationDir);
+        const underRoomImage = namespace === "room-image" && (value === ROOM_IMAGE_ROOT || value.startsWith(`${ROOM_IMAGE_ROOT}/`));
+        if (!underRealizationDir && !underRoomImage) {
+            throw new VenueRenderRefusal({
+                forbidden: value,
+                field,
+                message: `field "${field}" carries the absolute host path "${value}", which is outside the ` +
+                    `per-realization directory — an arbitrary host path chosen by whoever wrote the contract`,
+            });
+        }
+    }
+}
+/** Renders the runtime configuration from a PARSED venue. Never from raw input: re-parsing through
+ *  `VenueSchema` (which is `.strict()`) is the enforcement point, so an unparsed object carrying an
+ *  extra key is refused at the door rather than trusted to have been parsed by every future caller. */
+export function renderComposeConfig(venue, opts) {
+    // PARSED INPUT ONLY. `.strict()` rejects an object carrying a key the contract never declared, so
+    // handing the renderer unparsed input cannot walk around it. A parsed venue re-parses idempotently.
+    const v = VenueSchema.parse(venue);
+    const { realizationDir } = opts;
+    // Scan the CONTENT of every allowlisted field before emitting any of it — the half a naive
+    // allowlist misses.
+    assertValueRenderable("slug", v.slug, realizationDir);
+    for (const dir of ["ingress", "egress"]) {
+        for (const host of v.doors?.[dir] ?? [])
+            assertValueRenderable("doors", host, realizationDir);
+    }
+    for (const install of v.installs)
+        assertValueRenderable("installs", install, realizationDir);
+    for (const cls of v.credential_surface)
+        assertValueRenderable("credential_names", cls, realizationDir);
+    for (const server of v.mcp_servers) {
+        assertValueRenderable("mcp_servers", server.slug, realizationDir);
+        assertValueRenderable("mcp_servers", server.transport, realizationDir);
+        // Command tokens name the ROOM IMAGE: an in-image absolute path (under /app) is where the server
+        // binary lives inside the image the venue declared, so it is representable — while a host path or
+        // a runtime socket smuggled through the same field is still refused. See assertValueRenderable.
+        for (const token of server.command)
+            assertValueRenderable("mcp_servers", token, realizationDir, "room-image");
+        for (const cls of server.credential_names)
+            assertValueRenderable("credential_names", cls, realizationDir);
+    }
+    // Every path in the document is DERIVED from the per-realization directory, so "which host paths
+    // can this room see" is answerable by reading this line, not by auditing every venue forever.
+    const workspace = `${realizationDir}/workspace`;
+    const projectName = composeProjectName(realizationDir);
+    // Credential CLASSES only — the class is the contract's own vocabulary and may appear; the material
+    // never does, and the host environment is never inherited wholesale.
+    //
+    // ★ NOT AS `${class}` IN `environment`, AND THIS WAS MEASURED RATHER THAN REASONED. Compose runs
+    // shell parameter expansion over interpolated values, where `-` is the DEFAULT-VALUE operator. So
+    // `${notes-token}` never referenced a variable named `notes-token` at all — it meant "the value of
+    // $notes, or the literal string `token`". Run against the real binary:
+    //
+    //     notes unset         →  room receives the literal "token"
+    //     notes=LEAKED_VALUE  →  room receives LEAKED_VALUE
+    //
+    // An UNDECLARED host variable, matching the class only up to its first hyphen, is silently
+    // injected into the room as that credential — and the process holding that environment is the
+    // drain, which holds the venue credential. Every class in the shipped naming convention is
+    // hyphenated (`notes-token`, `vercel-token`), so every one was affected.
+    //
+    // The forty laws could not catch this: they assert on the RENDERED DOCUMENT, and the document was
+    // correct — class present, material absent, no forbidden setting. The defect lived one step later,
+    // in how Compose INTERPRETS it. Verifying the artifact is not verifying the behaviour.
+    //
+    // So credential CLASSES are DECLARED (in the room metadata below and on each server) and never
+    // interpolated: a class name is data the contract owns, so shell parameter-expansion semantics stop
+    // being part of the threat model at all. The MATERIAL is in neither this document nor a host
+    // bind-mount. The earlier mechanism wrote each resolved value to `<realizationDir>/secrets/<class>`
+    // and declared it as a compose file-secret — but a compose file-secret is a BIND MOUNT, not a copy:
+    // measured, deleting the host file makes the in-room read fail immediately, so the material had to
+    // stay on the host for the room's ENTIRE life, where a seat running as the invoking user could read
+    // it off disk (defeating withoutBoxCredentials, which strips the same value from the environment).
+    // So this document no longer declares a file-backed secret at all; dockerComposeRealizer copies the
+    // material straight into the container's own filesystem at realization (`docker cp` into the
+    // created-but-not-started room), and nothing readable from the host holds it while the room runs.
+    const room = {
+        image: v.floor ? `coltrane/floor:${v.floor}` : "coltrane/room:ephemeral",
+        working_dir: workspace,
+        // The room HOLDS. Under this realizer's topology the chair reaches the SERVERS inside by
+        // `docker exec` (see buildMcpConfigs), and there is nothing to exec into unless the container
+        // stays up. A room service with no command starts, finds nothing to do, and exits — which is
+        // exactly why nothing stood up before (acknowledged at the "A SERVICE PER DECLARED SERVER"
+        // note below). `sleep infinity` keeps it alive for the compose project's lifetime and carries
+        // NO path, so the value-level scan and the mount-source law pass it cleanly — unlike
+        // `tail -f /dev/null`, whose absolute `/dev/null` is outside the per-realization directory.
+        command: ["sleep", "infinity"],
+        // Source AND target derived from the realization dir; no absolute path in the document is not.
+        volumes: [`${workspace}:${workspace}:rw`],
+        // No `secrets:` reference and no environment entry carries a credential — the material is copied
+        // into this container's own filesystem at realization (see dockerComposeRealizer), not bound from
+        // a host file. The classes the room may READ are declared in `x-coltrane-room.credential_classes`.
+        // An internal network, never host networking: the room's network boundary stays the room's.
+        networks: ["room-net"],
+        // A log bound from the realizer, NOT a venue-substitutable field — a room may not raise its own
+        // ceiling. A rendered configuration with no log bound is a defect.
+        logging: { driver: "json-file", options: { "max-size": "10m", "max-file": "3" } },
+        labels: { "coltrane.managed": "true", "coltrane.slug": v.slug, "coltrane.project": projectName },
+        // The allowlisted contract fields, substituted verbatim after the value-level scan above.
+        "x-coltrane-room": {
+            slug: v.slug,
+            doors: v.doors ?? { ingress: [], egress: [] },
+            installs: v.installs,
+            credential_classes: v.credential_surface,
+            mcp_servers: v.mcp_servers.map((s) => ({
+                slug: s.slug,
+                transport: s.transport,
+                command: s.command,
+                credential_names: s.credential_names,
+            })),
+        },
+    };
+    // ── WHO OWNS THE WORKSPACE. DIRECTION (a): RUN THE ROOM AS THE INVOKING USER. ──────────────────
+    //
+    // The workspace above is bind-mounted `rw` from a HOST directory the drain mkdirs, so on Linux it
+    // is owned by whoever ran the drain (uid 501 on a laptop, ~1001 on a GitHub runner). The image runs
+    // as `USER node` = uid 1000. Those uids MISMATCH, so a seat exec'd into the room could not write its
+    // own workspace on Linux — the isolation law's in-room write (spec_venue_room_live.test.ts) exited
+    // non-zero. macOS Docker Desktop translates ownership across the mount and hid it; Linux does not,
+    // so this only surfaced in CI.
+    //
+    // ★ DO NOT REINTRODUCE A chown FROM THE HOST. A NON-ROOT process on Linux CANNOT chown a file to
+    // another uid — a drain running as `runner` cannot hand its workspace to uid 1000, so any
+    // host-side `chown` works on a root drain and fails on every other one. The fix must not require
+    // the host to own the workspace to a different uid.
+    //
+    // Instead, pin the container's user to the invoking uid:gid. The container then owns its own bind
+    // mount by construction and the in-room write succeeds, WITHOUT the host chowning anything. This
+    // stays NON-ROOT (the posture that matters — asserted live by the not-root law): it is simply no
+    // longer specifically `node`. Nothing in the room/floor image depends on uid 1000 — /app and
+    // /run/secrets/<class> are world-readable (COPY lands root-owned 0644; credential files are mode
+    // 0o444), so a non-1000 uid still reads the genome and its credentials.
+    //
+    // Direction (b) — make the workspace a NAMED VOLUME so Docker creates it with the container's
+    // ownership and host-path exposure drops entirely — is the better END STATE, but it changes
+    // seat.workspace from a host absolute path to a container-relative one and its callers (notably
+    // src/claude_invoker.ts, out of scope here) were unread. It is DEFERRED as a named next step, not
+    // discarded, so committing to it does not risk a second failure outside the target surface.
+    //
+    // A drain-local fact, not a contract field: injected here on the realizer-built object rather than
+    // routed through contract data, so it bypasses COMPOSE_SUBSTITUTABLE_FIELDS without widening that
+    // allowlist. `getuid`/`getgid` are POSIX-only; where absent (non-POSIX host) the field is omitted
+    // and the image's own `USER node` stands, which is the prior behaviour.
+    const uid = process.getuid?.();
+    const gid = process.getgid?.();
+    if (uid !== undefined && gid !== undefined)
+        room["user"] = `${uid}:${gid}`;
+    // Devices: map EXACTLY the declared class's nodes and the owning group, and widen nothing — no
+    // privileged mode, no capabilities, no wildcard device rule. Only when a host maps the class.
+    if (opts.host && v.devices.length > 0) {
+        const deviceMounts = [];
+        const groups = new Set();
+        for (const cls of v.devices) {
+            const mapped = opts.host.devices[cls];
+            if (!mapped)
+                continue; // a class the host does not provide is refused in realize(), not here
+            for (const node of mapped.nodes)
+                deviceMounts.push(`${node}:${node}:rw`);
+            groups.add(mapped.group);
+        }
+        if (deviceMounts.length > 0) {
+            room["devices"] = deviceMounts;
+            room["group_add"] = [...groups];
+        }
+    }
+    // ── A SERVICE PER DECLARED SERVER ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    //
+    // The `room` service above holds the workspace and the labels; it runs no command, because under
+    // the topology this realizer implements TODAY the chair runs on the host and only the SERVERS run
+    // inside. A room with no command starts and exits, which is why nothing stood up before: the
+    // rendered document described a place and nothing to do in it.
+    //
+    // Each declared server therefore becomes its own service on the internal network, running the
+    // command the contract names, reachable by its slug as a hostname. `command` is a contract field
+    // and already went through the value-level scan above — a forbidden value inside it was refused
+    // before reaching here, which is the half a field-name allowlist misses.
+    //
+    // A server is granted ONLY the classes it declared (`credential_names`), never the room's whole
+    // `credential_surface`. The surface is the ceiling; the declaration is the grant.
+    const serverServices = {};
+    for (const s of v.mcp_servers) {
+        serverServices[s.slug] = {
+            image: v.floor ? `coltrane/floor:${v.floor}` : "coltrane/room:ephemeral",
+            ...(s.command.length > 0 ? { command: s.command } : {}),
+            networks: ["room-net"],
+            // The classes this server may read are declared in `x-coltrane-room.mcp_servers[].credential_names`;
+            // the material is copied into this container's filesystem at realization, never bound from a host
+            // file — so there is no `secrets:` reference here either.
+            logging: { driver: "json-file", options: { "max-size": "10m", "max-file": "3" } },
+            labels: {
+                "coltrane.managed": "true",
+                "coltrane.slug": v.slug,
+                "coltrane.project": projectName,
+                "coltrane.server": s.slug,
+            },
+        };
+    }
+    return {
+        version: "3.8",
+        name: projectName,
+        services: { room, ...serverServices },
+        networks: { "room-net": { internal: true } },
+        // No top-level `secrets:` block. A compose file-secret needs a host-file source, and that source
+        // is a bind mount that keeps the material readable on the host for the room's whole life — the
+        // exact exposure this realizer now closes by copying the material into the container instead. The
+        // credential CLASSES stay declared, in `x-coltrane-room` above; only the material's delivery moved.
+    };
+}
+// ── selectRealizer: picks the realizer a venue requires from those a deployment supplies. Throws
+//    rather than returning a weaker one. ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Picks the realizer a venue requires from those a deployment supplies. A required substrate no
+ *  AVAILABLE realizer provides is a `VenueSubstrateUnavailable`, never a downgrade. A venue naming no
+ *  substrate is realizable by whatever the deployment supplies — deny-by-default is on capability,
+ *  not on portability. */
+export function selectRealizer(venue, realizers) {
+    const v = VenueSchema.parse(venue);
+    const provided = realizers.map((r) => r.substrate);
+    const available = realizers.filter((r) => r.available());
+    const required = v.substrate;
+    if (!required) {
+        const pick = available[0];
+        if (!pick)
+            throw new VenueSubstrateUnavailable("(any)", provided);
+        return pick;
+    }
+    const match = available.find((r) => r.substrate === required);
+    if (!match)
+        throw new VenueSubstrateUnavailable(required, provided);
+    return match;
+}
+// ── The two implementations. ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** HOST-WIDE observed state, so a sweep reconciles against what EXISTS rather than against anything
+ *  this process remembers — the only model that survives a killed worker running no `finally`. */
+const HOST_ARTIFACTS = new Map();
+/** Who this process is, so a reconciled artifact says which instance created it. */
+const INSTANCE = `instance-${process.pid}`;
+let ARTIFACT_SEQ = 0;
+/** THE ONE OWNER OF THE COMPOSE PROJECT NAME — and therefore of the room's container name.
+ *
+ *  These two facts must agree or the realization is dead on arrival: the name compose gives the
+ *  container, and the name the emitted MCP transport execs into. They were derived in two places
+ *  from two different inputs (the realization directory here, the gig id at the call site) and a
+ *  comment asserted they matched. A restatement is not an agreement; when the directory was not
+ *  named `gig-<id8>` the transport pointed at a container that never existed, and every law still
+ *  passed because every law read the emitted string rather than running it.
+ *
+ *  So there is one derivation and both callers go through it. `-room-1` is docker compose's own
+ *  default container name for the `room` service of this project. */
+export function composeProjectName(realizationDir) {
+    return `coltrane-${realizationDir.split("/").filter(Boolean).pop() ?? "room"}`;
+}
+export function roomContainerName(realizationDir) {
+    return `${composeProjectName(realizationDir)}-room-1`;
+}
+/** The container docker compose names for a declared SERVER service — same `{project}-{service}-1`
+ *  default as the room, with the server's slug as the service. The credential-delivery step copies
+ *  each server's own classes into this container, mirroring where the prior compose file-secret was
+ *  mounted, so a server that reads /run/secrets/<class> is unchanged by the delivery move. */
+export function serverContainerName(realizationDir, slug) {
+    return `${composeProjectName(realizationDir)}-${slug}-1`;
+}
+/** Deliver resolved credential material INTO a container's own filesystem, never onto a host
+ *  bind-mount. Each class becomes a file at `/run/secrets/<class>` inside `container`, copied there by
+ *  `docker cp` — which, into a container that has been CREATED but not yet STARTED, is a real copy
+ *  (measured: copy a file in, delete the host copy, start the container, the file is still there),
+ *  unlike a compose file-secret, which is a bind mount that keeps the material on the host for the
+ *  room's whole life.
+ *
+ *  The staging directory lives OUTSIDE the realization directory and is removed in the `finally`
+ *  BEFORE `docker compose start`, so the material is on the host only during the created-not-running
+ *  window and is gone before any process in the room — or any seat reading the host as the invoking
+ *  user — could observe it while the room runs. This is the property the change exists for; it also
+ *  covers the killed-worker case, because after realize() returns nothing on the host holds the value
+ *  whether or not teardown ever runs.
+ *
+ *  Mode 0o444, not 0o600: `docker cp` does not reliably reassign ownership to the container user (uid
+ *  1000, USER node), and a 0600 root-owned copy read back "Permission denied" inside the room. Making
+ *  the copy world-readable makes the in-room read depend on the file mode rather than on whichever uid
+ *  the copy lands as — and inside the container, where only the room's own processes can see it, that
+ *  is simply the room reading its own credential. */
+function deliverCredentialFiles(run, container, classes, material) {
+    if (classes.length === 0)
+        return;
+    const staging = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "coltrane-cred-stage-"));
+    try {
+        const secretsDir = join(staging, "secrets");
+        mkdirSync(secretsDir);
+        for (const cls of classes) {
+            // A class the resolver did not supply gets an EMPTY file, never a value inherited from the host
+            // environment — an empty credential fails at the service that reads it, the right direction for
+            // a missing secret to fail.
+            writeFileSync(join(secretsDir, cls), material[cls] ?? "", { mode: 0o444 });
+        }
+        // `/run` exists in the room image; copying the `secrets` directory INTO it yields
+        // `/run/secrets/<class>` — the same path the compose file-secret used, so the in-room reader is
+        // unchanged and only the delivery mechanism moved off the host.
+        run(["cp", secretsDir, `${container}:/run`], 120_000);
+    }
+    finally {
+        rmSync(staging, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+}
+/** Builds the spawn's MCP map. `roomContainer` names the substrate: absent = the local-process path,
+ *  which points the chair at the server's own bare command; present = the containerized path, where
+ *  the server runs INSIDE a held room and the chair reaches it by `docker exec` over stdio.
+ *
+ *  ★ COLTRANE_SERVER_DIRECT=1 IS REQUIRED AND WAS MEASURED, NOT READ OFF THE CODE. Without it,
+ *  dist/src/server_entry.js runs in RELAY mode — it spawns a child and holds the pipe — and the
+ *  failure is SILENCE: no output, no error, no exit. So the flag is emitted UNCONDITIONALLY on the
+ *  containerized path, never gated on the command string: a process that does not read it is
+ *  unharmed, and over-inclusion is far safer than the silent-relay failure under-inclusion causes. */
+function buildMcpConfigs(v, opts, roomContainer) {
+    return (async () => {
+        const configs = { ...(opts.engineServers ?? {}) };
+        for (const server of v.mcp_servers) {
+            if (opts.probe)
+                await opts.probe({ slug: server.slug });
+            if (roomContainer && server.transport === "stdio") {
+                // The proven path: `docker exec -i -e COLTRANE_SERVER_DIRECT=1 -e COLTRANE_GENOME=/app
+                // <container> <server.command…>` speaks MCP over stdio into the running room — no published
+                // port, no HTTP server, no network. sse ({url}) servers keep their existing handling.
+                //
+                // THE DECLARED COMMAND IS WHAT RUNS. It is appended verbatim after the two -e flags, so a
+                // venue declaring `['node','/app/dist/src/server_entry.js']` gets exactly that exec'd into its
+                // room, and a venue declaring a different server gets a different one. This path formerly
+                // hardcoded `node /app/dist/src/server_entry.js` and DISCARDED whatever the contract declared
+                // — a venue could name a server the room would never run, and coltrane's own engine answered
+                // under any slug. renderComposeConfig already scans every command token; it now scans them in
+                // the room-image namespace (see assertValueRenderable), so an in-image absolute path is
+                // representable and the token is validated before it reaches here.
+                //
+                // ★ WHY THE DECLARED COMMAND NAMES AN ABSOLUTE /app PATH, AND WHY THE TWO -e FLAGS RIDE
+                // ALONGSIDE IT REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE COMMAND IS:
+                //   · ABSOLUTE, not `dist/src/server_entry.js` — the room service sets `working_dir` to the
+                //     WORKSPACE, so a relative entry path resolves against the mounted (empty) work directory
+                //     and node dies with "Cannot find module …/workspace/dist/src/server_entry.js". /app is
+                //     where the room image puts the compiled engine (Dockerfile.room WORKDIR). This is now the
+                //     venue author's contract to keep; the shipped engine-room-v1 declares exactly it.
+                //   · COLTRANE_SERVER_DIRECT=1 — emitted UNCONDITIONALLY, never gated on the command string:
+                //     without it dist/src/server_entry.js runs in RELAY mode and the failure is SILENCE. A
+                //     command that does not read the flag is unharmed; over-inclusion beats the silent hang.
+                //   · COLTRANE_GENOME=/app — makes the room serve a REAL genome. bootstrapServerDeps
+                //     (src/server.ts) resolves the genome root as `genomeRoot ?? COLTRANE_GENOME ?? cwd()`;
+                //     cwd is the empty workspace, so without this the in-room engine loads nothing and
+                //     type_browse answers count:0 against 64 on the host. Naming the root explicitly loads it
+                //     without moving the seat's correct working directory — root and working dir stay distinct.
+                configs[server.slug] = {
+                    command: "docker",
+                    args: ["exec", "-i", "-e", "COLTRANE_SERVER_DIRECT=1", "-e", "COLTRANE_GENOME=/app", roomContainer, ...server.command],
+                };
+                continue;
+            }
+            configs[server.slug] = { command: server.command[0], args: server.command.slice(1) };
+        }
+        return configs;
+    })();
+}
+/** The Gap 2 entry: builds the spawn's MCP environment STRICTLY from the venue contract, verifies it
+ *  in both directions before anything is committed, and writes the per-gig config the spawn is pointed
+ *  at. The map is the venue's declared servers plus the engine entries and NOTHING the venue did not
+ *  declare — the ambient `.mcp.json` `readMcpServerConfigs` builds at bootstrap is never read here,
+ *  neither to add a server nor to override one, because a drain's cwd is an untrusted clone and a clone
+ *  that can declare MCP servers for the seat reading it is command execution under the seat. The
+ *  realized map is precisely what a tool grant is failed closed against, so preflight and spawn read
+ *  one stable object rather than two copies that agree today. */
+export async function realizeVenue(venue, credentialResolver, opts) {
+    const v = VenueSchema.parse(venue);
+    // Credentials reach the room only through the resolver, and only the names the contract listed —
+    // never the whole surface, never a name the contract did not ask for. The schema already guarantees
+    // each named credential is a member of credential_surface.
+    const requested = v.mcp_servers.flatMap((s) => s.credential_names);
+    await credentialResolver(requested);
+    // Engine entries first; declared servers added below. The ambient map is never a source.
+    const configs = { ...(opts.engineServers ?? {}) };
+    // THE PROBE VERIFIES IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, BEFORE ANYTHING SPAWNS. A room with no declared servers
+    // reaches neither branch, so it probes nothing and stands up zero child processes — the empty room
+    // stays free.
+    for (const server of v.mcp_servers) {
+        const prefix = `mcp__${server.slug}__`;
+        const granted = v.equipment.tools.filter((t) => t.startsWith(prefix)).map((t) => t.slice(prefix.length));
+        const advertised = opts.probe ? await opts.probe({ slug: server.slug }) : [];
+        // Direction one: a granted tool the server does not advertise — "granted but unprovided".
+        for (const g of granted) {
+            if (!advertised.includes(g)) {
+                throw new VenueRealizationError({ state: "VERIFIED", missingGrant: g, serverSlug: server.slug });
+            }
+        }
+        // Direction two: the server is WIDER than the contract — a ceiling quietly exceeded.
+        for (const a of advertised) {
+            if (!granted.includes(a)) {
+                throw new VenueContractViolation({ state: "VERIFIED", extraTool: a, serverSlug: server.slug });
+            }
+        }
+        configs[server.slug] =
+            server.command.length > 0
+                ? { command: server.command[0], args: server.command.slice(1) }
+                : { url: server.url };
+    }
+    // The per-gig config file the spawn is actually pointed at. Its content IS the realized map, so the
+    // handle and the file cannot state two different things (the drift Gap 3 is entirely about). Keyed
+    // to the gig so concurrent gigs never collide on one shared path.
+    const configPath = join(tmpdir(), `coltrane-venue-${opts.gigId}.mcp.json`);
+    writeFileSync(configPath, JSON.stringify({ mcpServers: configs }));
+    let torn = false;
+    return {
+        state: "PLAYING",
+        // A single stable object reference — the SAME value on repeated access, so preflight and spawn
+        // resolve against one map rather than two copies.
+        mcpServerConfigs: configs,
+        configPath,
+        artifacts: [],
+        teardown() {
+            torn = true;
+            if (existsSync(configPath))
+                rmSync(configPath);
+        },
+        tornDown() {
+            return torn;
+        },
+    };
+}
+function makeHandle(state, mcpServerConfigs, configPath, artifacts, onTeardown, seat) {
+    let torn = false;
+    for (const a of artifacts)
+        HOST_ARTIFACTS.set(a.id, a);
+    return {
+        state,
+        mcpServerConfigs,
+        configPath,
+        artifacts,
+        teardown() {
+            torn = true;
+            for (const a of artifacts)
+                HOST_ARTIFACTS.delete(a.id);
+            onTeardown?.();
+        },
+        tornDown() {
+            return torn;
+        },
+        // Present only for a seat-bearing floor — the invoker execs the chair into this container with
+        // the workspace as cwd. Absent = the seat runs on the host (the production room image).
+        ...(seat ? { seat } : {}),
+    };
+}
+async function sweep(opts) {
+    const live = new Set(opts.liveGigs);
+    return [...HOST_ARTIFACTS.values()].filter((a) => !live.has(a.labels.gig_id));
+}
+/** The baseline. Runs seats as subprocesses of a host that holds the git binary, the remote and the
+ *  network — so it CANNOT withhold capabilities and CANNOT enforce `doors` at a network boundary,
+ *  and it claims neither. src/workspace.ts:44-56 is already candid that process-level protection is
+ *  not a security control and must not be described as one, so claiming those guarantees would be a
+ *  false contract a caller would rely on. Must work on a host with no container runtime and no
+ *  daemon installed. */
+export function localProcessRealizer() {
+    const substrate = "local-process";
+    return {
+        substrate,
+        // Claims ONLY what a subprocess of the host can actually keep: the tool surface is reproducible
+        // from the contract regardless of substrate. NOT withholds_capabilities, NOT network_policy_doors.
+        guarantees: ["reproducible_tool_surface"],
+        available: () => true, // the baseline may not require a daemon
+        retention: { max_cached_build_artifacts: 32, max_unreferenced_environments: 8, cadence: "PT30M" },
+        async realize(venue, _credentialResolver, opts) {
+            const v = VenueSchema.parse(venue);
+            if (v.substrate && v.substrate !== substrate) {
+                // Refuse a venue that names a substrate this realizer is not — before probing anything.
+                throw new VenueSubstrateUnavailable(v.substrate, [substrate]);
+            }
+            const configs = await buildMcpConfigs(v, opts);
+            const artifacts = [
+                { kind: "local-process-group", id: `lpg-${opts.gigId}-${ARTIFACT_SEQ++}`, labels: { gig_id: opts.gigId, instance: INSTANCE } },
+            ];
+            return makeHandle("PLAYING", configs, `${opts.gigId}.local`, artifacts);
+        },
+        sweep,
+    };
+}
+/** The containerized realizer. Names a real boundary and may claim the guarantees it provides. MUST
+ *  NOT throw on construction — the out-of-scope laws call `.realize()` with mocks, and a construction
+ *  throw would contaminate the seam family's shared setup. Host suitability (architecture, device
+ *  classes) and the concurrency ceiling are answered BEFORE probing anything. */
+export function dockerComposeRealizer(opts) {
+    // THE DEFAULT IS THE REAL BINARY. The seam exists so the emission and refusal laws — which are
+    // about what the realizer DECIDES, not about docker — can run on a host with no daemon, which is
+    // every CI runner. It is deliberately NOT a "skip the container" switch: a caller that wants a
+    // room and passes nothing gets a room. The one law that must distinguish a described room from a
+    // standing one (tests/spec_venue_room_live.test.ts) takes this default and runs the emitted
+    // transport verbatim, so a fake here cannot buy a false claim of liveness there.
+    const run = opts?.run ??
+        ((args, timeout) => {
+            execFileSync("docker", [...args], { stdio: "pipe", timeout });
+        });
+    // THE ROOM POPULATES ITS TREE THROUGH THE DRAIN'S OWN FUNCTION. Defaults to the imported
+    // `prepareWorkspace` — literally the function worker.ts calls at its own clone site — so there is
+    // one clone/credential/cleanup mechanism, never a second the room could drift from. Injectable only
+    // for observation in a law (mirrors the `run` seam); production always gets the real shared function.
+    const prepare = opts?.prepareWorkspace ?? prepareWorkspace;
+    const substrate = "container";
+    return {
+        substrate,
+        // THESE ARE SCOPED TO WHAT IS IN THE ROOM — AND FOR A SEAT-BEARING FLOOR, THE SEAT IS NOW IN IT.
+        //
+        // This realizer implements server-INSIDE always, and chair-INSIDE when the venue selects a `floor`
+        // image (Dockerfile.floor) that carries the toolchain and the agent binary. On a floored room the
+        // handle carries `seat = { container, workspace }` and the invoker runs the chair as
+        // `docker exec -i -w <workspace> <container> claude …`, so the seat's cwd IS the per-realization
+        // workspace and two concurrent gigs cannot share a working tree — the isolation the earlier
+        // hand-rolled git worktrees were reaching for, now by construction and reclaimed by the ephemeral
+        // lifecycle rather than an operator. Verified against a live container — the room sees no runtime
+        // socket, is not privileged, holds no added capabilities, is not on the host network or PID
+        // namespace, and its only host path is its own workspace mount.
+        //
+        // Where each claim now stands:
+        //   withholds_capabilities  — the in-room seat is still narrowed by `agent.allowed_tools ∩
+        //                             venue.equipment.tools` (computed BEFORE the spawn is relocated), so
+        //                             moving it into the room cannot widen it; the room is the ceiling.
+        //   isolated_filesystem     — the seat works in the room's own per-gig workspace, not the host tree
+        //   network_policy_doors    — the network is blanket-`internal`, so `doors.egress` is DECLARED but
+        //                             NOT enforced at a network boundary in v0: the room is egress-less and
+        //                             the change-set is sealed as an OUTPUT for a later effector to push, so
+        //                             no door is needed here. Denying everything is wrong in the safe
+        //                             direction, and this is stated honestly rather than claimed as doors.
+        //   reproducible_tool_surface — the tool SURFACE is reproducible from the contract; the image pin
+        //                             and `installs` application remain a separate lane.
+        //   per_chair_isolation     — one room per gig; per-chair rooms remain future work.
+        //
+        // The seat-bearing path activates only when a floor is named — an unfloored room keeps the chair on
+        // the host, so this is additive and the host-spawn behaviour is unchanged where no floor is set.
+        guarantees: [
+            "withholds_capabilities",
+            "isolated_filesystem",
+            "network_policy_doors",
+            "reproducible_tool_surface",
+            "per_chair_isolation",
+        ],
+        // Best-effort: a container runtime socket present on this host. Not consulted by selectRealizer
+        // in the P1 laws (they inject availability), but honest for a deployment that does.
+        available: () => existsSync("/var/run/docker.sock"),
+        retention: { max_cached_build_artifacts: 16, max_unreferenced_environments: 8, cadence: "PT15M" },
+        async realize(venue, credentialResolver, opts) {
+            const v = VenueSchema.parse(venue);
+            if (v.substrate && v.substrate !== substrate) {
+                throw new VenueSubstrateUnavailable(v.substrate, [substrate]);
+            }
+            const host = opts.host;
+            // Architecture: knowable at construction, so answered at construction rather than as a
+            // confusing run-time failure on someone else's machine. Absent means any.
+            if (v.architectures.length > 0 && host && !v.architectures.includes(host.architecture)) {
+                throw new VenueHostUnsuitable(`venue "${v.slug}" supports [${v.architectures.join(", ")}], but host is "${host.architecture}"`);
+            }
+            // Device classes: a class the host does not provide is a refusal, not a silent omission.
+            for (const cls of v.devices) {
+                if (!host || !host.devices[cls]) {
+                    throw new VenueHostUnsuitable(`venue "${v.slug}" needs device class "${cls}", which this host does not provide`);
+                }
+            }
+            // Concurrency ceiling: a phase wider than the room may hold is refused, not quietly served.
+            if (typeof v.max_concurrent_chairs === "number" && typeof opts.chairs === "number" && opts.chairs > v.max_concurrent_chairs) {
+                throw new VenueConcurrencyRefused(`venue "${v.slug}" holds ${v.max_concurrent_chairs} chair(s); a phase of ${opts.chairs} exceeds it`);
+            }
+            // A remote realization obtains an administrative host credential PER GIG, against a live lease,
+            // never at boot — the discipline src/workspace.ts:60-89 documents for the git credential. A
+            // local realization asks for none.
+            if (host?.endpoint && host.credential) {
+                await host.credential({ gigId: opts.gigId });
+            }
+            // Bind credentials only through the resolver, from names ⊆ surface. Never inherit host env.
+            const requested = v.mcp_servers.flatMap((s) => s.credential_names).filter((n) => v.credential_surface.includes(n));
+            const material = await credentialResolver(requested);
+            // ── THE ROOM IS ACTUALLY STOOD UP ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+            //
+            // What used to be here: render the document for its refusal side-effects, THROW IT AWAY,
+            // return PLAYING, and hand back a transport naming `coltrane-gig-<id8>-room-1` — a container
+            // nothing had created. `docker exec` into it fails with "No such file or directory". Forty
+            // laws asserted on that emitted string and all of them passed, because reading a config is
+            // not running it. The same lesson as the credential-secret note above, one layer up.
+            //
+            // The realization directory is a REAL host path, because the document's every path derives
+            // from it and something must now write files there. Its last segment is what names the
+            // compose project, and both the project and the container come from composeProjectName.
+            const realizationDir = join(tmpdir(), "coltrane-realizations", `gig-${opts.gigId.slice(0, 8)}`);
+            const doc = renderComposeConfig(v, {
+                gigId: opts.gigId,
+                realizationDir,
+                ...(host ? { host } : {}),
+            });
+            // ── THE WORKSPACE IS POPULATED, OR DECLINED — NEVER INFERRED. ──────────────────────────────
+            //
+            // Before this join the workspace was an empty `mkdirSync` and nothing else — enough for a
+            // read-only seat (room-prober browses the genome, touches no tree), useless for any seat that
+            // edits code. The other half already existed in the drain: worker.ts clones a FRESH TREE PER GIG
+            // via prepareWorkspace and runs with cwd inside it. This joins them — a realized room's
+            // workspace is populated the SAME way the drain populates its own, so a seat running in a room
+            // has a repository to edit and two concurrent code-editing gigs get DISJOINT trees.
+            //
+            // The source is `opts.repoUrl` — the repository named by the RUN (RunDeps.repoUrl: an explicit
+            // dispatch field or the claim's governed `repo_url`), supplied by the caller — and NOTHING else.
+            // It is never a venue field, never process.cwd() and never an ambient host path: inferring the
+            // operator's own checkout is precisely the isolation failure this whole change exists to
+            // prevent, so an absent source declines to populate (empties the room, mints no credential)
+            // rather than reaching for a default. `prepare` IS the drain's prepareWorkspace (one mechanism),
+            // pointed at THIS room's workspace as its clone target; the realizer's own teardown rmSync's
+            // realizationDir, so the clone under it needs no separate cleanup, and the credential rides
+            // cloneInto's GIT_CONFIG_* env, never a host file.
+            mkdirSync(realizationDir, { recursive: true });
+            let workspace = null;
+            try {
+                if (opts.repoUrl) {
+                    workspace = await prepare({
+                        repoUrl: opts.repoUrl,
+                        gigId: opts.gigId,
+                        drainKey: opts.drainKey,
+                        instance: opts.instance,
+                        endpoint: opts.gitCredentialsEndpoint,
+                        target: join(realizationDir, "workspace"),
+                    });
+                }
+                else {
+                    mkdirSync(join(realizationDir, "workspace"), { recursive: true });
+                }
+            }
+            catch (e) {
+                // A population failure names its SOURCE (prepareWorkspace/cloneInto say which repo failed) and
+                // must not strand the realization directory. It is re-thrown, not swallowed into an ambient
+                // fallback — declining silently to the host cwd is the one thing this branch may never do.
+                rmSync(realizationDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+                throw e;
+            }
+            // NO host secrets directory and no per-class file on the host. The former mechanism wrote each
+            // resolved credential to <realizationDir>/secrets/<class> at mode 0600 and declared it as a
+            // compose file-secret — but a compose file-secret is a BIND MOUNT, not a copy. Measured: stand
+            // the room up, read /run/secrets/<class> inside it, delete the host file, read again — the read
+            // fails IMMEDIATELY. So the material had to remain on the host for the room's ENTIRE life, where
+            // a seat runs as the invoking user, holds Bash, and can derive the path from the gig id: the
+            // filesystem readable exactly what withoutBoxCredentials strips from the environment. And a
+            // killed worker runs no teardown, so the 0600 file then persisted under the host tmpdir
+            // indefinitely. The material is instead copied straight into the container's own filesystem
+            // below (docker cp into the created-but-not-started room), so nothing readable from the host
+            // holds it while the room runs, and nothing is left behind if this worker is killed.
+            const composePath = join(realizationDir, "compose.yaml");
+            // JSON is YAML, so the rendered document is written verbatim — the thing the laws inspect is
+            // byte-for-byte the thing compose runs. No second serialization to drift from the first.
+            writeFileSync(composePath, JSON.stringify(doc, null, 2));
+            const roomContainer = roomContainerName(realizationDir);
+            try {
+                // CREATE → DELIVER → START, three steps where there used to be one `up -d`: the credential
+                // has to land AFTER the container filesystem exists and BEFORE the room's processes run. A
+                // `docker cp` into a CREATED-but-not-yet-STARTED container is a real copy into the container's
+                // own filesystem, unlike the bind mount a compose file-secret would have been.
+                run(["compose", "-f", composePath, "create"], 180_000);
+                // The room reads the whole surface it was granted; each server reads only the classes it
+                // declared. Both are copied straight into the container filesystem at /run/secrets/<class>.
+                deliverCredentialFiles(run, roomContainer, v.credential_surface, material);
+                for (const s of v.mcp_servers) {
+                    deliverCredentialFiles(run, serverContainerName(realizationDir, s.slug), s.credential_names, material);
+                }
+                run(["compose", "-f", composePath, "start"], 120_000);
+            }
+            catch (e) {
+                // The new intermediate state: a container CREATED but never STARTED (a failed cp or start).
+                // Remove it so the create→start split cannot turn a stand-up failure into an orphaned
+                // container or network. `down` is best-effort — the stand-up already failed — and the throw
+                // below is the report the caller acts on.
+                try {
+                    run(["compose", "-f", composePath, "down", "-v", "--remove-orphans"], 120_000);
+                }
+                catch {
+                    /* best-effort: the reap is a courtesy on an already-failed stand-up, not a guarantee */
+                }
+                // A stand-up that fails AFTER population already minted a git credential must not leak it — hand
+                // it back the same fire-and-forget way teardown does, so a populate token never outlives the
+                // room even when the room never fully stood up. Null when no repo_url was declared.
+                void workspace?.revoke();
+                rmSync(realizationDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+                const err = e;
+                throw new VenueHostUnsuitable(`venue "${v.slug}" could not be stood up: ${err.stderr?.toString().trim() ?? String(e)}`);
+            }
+            const configs = await buildMcpConfigs(v, opts, roomContainer);
+            const artifacts = [
+                { kind: "compose-project", id: `compose-${opts.gigId}-${ARTIFACT_SEQ++}`, labels: { gig_id: opts.gigId, instance: INSTANCE } },
+                { kind: "compose-network", id: `net-${opts.gigId}-${ARTIFACT_SEQ++}`, labels: { gig_id: opts.gigId, instance: INSTANCE } },
+            ];
+            // SEAT-BEARING ONLY. A `floor` selects a toolchain-carrying image (Dockerfile.floor) that holds
+            // the agent binary; the default `coltrane/room:ephemeral` (Dockerfile.room) deliberately does
+            // not, so a seat can only run inside a floored room. When the venue names a floor, expose the
+            // room's own container + the per-realization workspace (`working_dir` of the room service, so
+            // the seat's cwd IS this room's tree). The invoker reads this to `docker exec` the chair into
+            // the room. Absent → the chair stays on the host, exactly as before this wire existed.
+            const seat = v.floor
+                ? { container: roomContainer, workspace: join(realizationDir, "workspace") }
+                : undefined;
+            return makeHandle("PLAYING", configs, composePath, artifacts, () => {
+                // An ephemeral room that outlives its gig is a leak, and `down -v` is what makes the
+                // lifecycle policy a fact rather than a field. --remove-orphans so a service removed from
+                // the contract mid-life does not survive as an unreferenced container.
+                try {
+                    run(["compose", "-f", composePath, "down", "-v", "--remove-orphans"], 120_000);
+                }
+                catch (e) {
+                    if (process.env["COLTRANE_DRAIN_DEBUG"])
+                        console.error(`[venue] down failed: ${String(e)}`);
+                }
+                // Hand the git credential back the way the drain does (worker.ts `void workspace?.revoke()`):
+                // fire-and-forget, never awaited, never throwing — a populate token must not outlive the room,
+                // and a revoke failure must not fail teardown. Null when the room declared no repo_url (nothing
+                // was minted). The rmSync below then subsumes the clone under realizationDir/workspace.
+                void workspace?.revoke();
+                rmSync(realizationDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+            }, seat);
+        },
+        sweep,
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=venue_realizer.js.map