@eddyskywalker/dsh-chatgpt-subscription 0.24.2 → 0.24.3

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
 
 ## Unreleased
 
+## 0.24.3 - 2026-10-15
+- **[Linux 凭据存储] 账号池撞上 secret-tool 的 8192 字节 stdin 上限：第 3 个账号添加后凭据写入成功、池写入失败，账号在 UI 闪现后消失（issue #54）**
+  - **现象**：Linux（gnome-keyring）下添加第 3 个 WorkBuddy 账号后账号区闪现即消失——凭据条目（7934B）惊险通过，但池条目（约 8960B）≥ 8192 被 `SecretServiceCredentialStore.save` 拒绝，`status.accounts`（池）永远少一个。该上限对齐的是 libsecret `secret-tool` 的 stdin 固定缓冲（超限静默截断仍 exit 0），且对**所有线路**（antigravity / claude / command-code / glm-coding-plan / kimi-code / minimax-code / ollama / step-code / workbuddy 的池与凭据共 25 处调用点）一视同仁，账号一多都会撞。
+  - **改法（`credential-store-secret-service.ts`，一处修复全线路受益）**：载荷 ≥ 8192 字节时改为**分片存储**——UTF-8 载荷 base64 后按 7000 字符切片写入独立 shard 条目（account 属性为 `<account>#<gen>#<i>`，Secret Service 属性精确匹配所以互不串扰），主条目最后写入作为**提交点**，内容为信封 `{ __dshChunked: { gen, chunks, bytes } }`；读取时按信封重组并校验解码字节数，损坏即报 `payload is too large` 同款 invalid 错误而非静默截断。小于上限的载荷保持单条目原格式，存量数据零迁移。shard 用随机代际（gen）标签：中断的 save 不触碰旧信封与旧分片，新代际要么整体提交要么回滚清理；提交成功后清理上一代分片（含分片→单条目的收缩场景）。`clear()` 改为先 lookup 探测：既拿到待清理的分片代际，也绕开 Ubuntu libsecret-tools 0.20.4 对不存在条目 `clear` 段错误的坑。分片数上限 128（约 650 KiB）防畸形信封。
+  - **验证**：`npm run typecheck` 0 错误；全量 **225 passed | 1 skipped（226 文件）、3739 passed | 7 skipped、0 failed**。新增/更新 12 条 store 用例：分片往返（断言每片 stdin < 8192、重组后逐字节等于原载荷、载荷不出现在命令行参数）、缺失/篡改分片报 invalid、畸形信封拒绝、换代清理、收缩清理、clear 连带清分片、shard 写失败时主条目零触碰。launch 计数测试同步更新（save 多一次探测启动，这是分代清理的信息来源）。
+
 ## 0.24.2 - 2026-10-14
 - **[三条登录线路] 回调端口探测窗口按「100 端口一块」的否证前提定宽，导致整段保留区把探测窗口吃穿：Windows 实测连续 277 个端口不可用，而窗口只有 128（command-code 只有 10）**
   - **现象**：本机全量 `npx vitest run` 稳定复现 **7 failed / 3711 passed**，全部集中在 `test/antigravity-callback-port.test.ts`（5 条）与 `test/login-open-browser-seams.test.ts`（2 条），报 `No usable local port for the Antigravity sign-in callback (tried 128 ports from 51121 on localhost)`，另有一条直接 `listen EACCES: permission denied ::1:51121`。

package/lib/index.js

@@ -1321,6 +1321,7 @@ function runSecurity(args) {
 //#endregion
 //#region src/host/credential-store-secret-service.ts
 const UNAVAILABLE = "Linux encrypted credential storage requires secret-tool (libsecret) and an unlocked Secret Service keyring.";
+const INVALID = "Secret Service credential payload is invalid";
 /**
 * How long one Secret Service read may stand in for the stored value.
 *
@@ -1331,6 +1332,46 @@ const UNAVAILABLE = "Linux encrypted credential storage requires secret-tool (li
 * credentials.
 */
 const KEYRING_READ_CACHE_TTL_MS = 15e3;
+/**
+* secret-tool reads the secret from stdin into a fixed 8192-byte buffer
+* (`tool/secret-tool.c` `read_password_stdin()`) and, past the limit, prints
+* `password is too long` yet still stores the truncated bytes with exit 0 —
+* a silent corruption the caller cannot detect from the exit code. Payloads
+* that do not fit are therefore split into shard entries that each stay well
+* under the limit.
+*/
+const SECRET_TOOL_STDIN_LIMIT = 8192;
+/**
+* Base64 characters per shard entry. Base64 is ASCII, so characters equal
+* bytes and any split point is safe; 7000 leaves the shard comfortably below
+* the stdin limit.
+*/
+const SHARD_PAYLOAD_SIZE = 7e3;
+/**
+* Upper bound on the shard count one value may occupy. A corrupt or hostile
+* envelope cannot ask for unbounded lookups; 128 shards still hold ~650 KiB,
+* far past any plausible credential or account pool.
+*/
+const MAX_SHARDS = 128;
+/** Property that marks a primary entry as the envelope of a chunked value. */
+const ENVELOPE_KEY = "__dshChunked";
+/**
+* Read the envelope of a stored primary entry, or null when the entry holds a
+* plain value. A malformed envelope is invalid stored data, not a plain value.
+*/
+function envelopeFrom(parsed) {
+	if (typeof parsed !== "object" || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) return null;
+	const marker = parsed[ENVELOPE_KEY];
+	if (marker === void 0) return null;
+	if (typeof marker !== "object" || marker === null) throw new Error(INVALID);
+	const { gen, chunks, bytes } = marker;
+	if (typeof gen !== "string" || gen === "" || typeof chunks !== "number" || !Number.isInteger(chunks) || chunks < 1 || chunks > MAX_SHARDS || typeof bytes !== "number" || !Number.isInteger(bytes) || bytes < 0) throw new Error(INVALID);
+	return {
+		gen,
+		chunks,
+		bytes
+	};
+}
 /** Secrets travel over stdin/stdout; command arguments contain only lookup attributes. */
 var SecretServiceCredentialStore = class {
 	service;
@@ -1350,31 +1391,142 @@ var SecretServiceCredentialStore = class {
 			this.account
 		];
 	}
+	/**
+	* Lookup attributes of one shard entry. Secret Service matching is exact on
+	* every given attribute pair, so the primary account value never matches a
+	* shard and vice versa.
+	*/
+	shardAttributes(gen, index) {
+		return [
+			"service",
+			this.service,
+			"account",
+			`${this.account}#${gen}#${index}`
+		];
+	}
 	async load() {
 		return this.cache.load(async () => {
 			const result = await runSecretTool(["lookup", ...this.attributes()]);
 			if (result.code === 1 && !result.hasStderr && result.stdout === "") return null;
 			if (result.code !== 0) throw new Error(UNAVAILABLE);
+			let parsed;
 			try {
-				return this.parse(JSON.parse(result.stdout));
+				parsed = JSON.parse(result.stdout);
+			} catch {
+				throw new Error(INVALID);
+			}
+			const envelope = envelopeFrom(parsed);
+			if (envelope === null) try {
+				return this.parse(parsed);
+			} catch {
+				throw new Error(INVALID);
+			}
+			const pieces = [];
+			for (let index = 0; index < envelope.chunks; index += 1) {
+				const shard = await runSecretTool(["lookup", ...this.shardAttributes(envelope.gen, index)]);
+				if (shard.code !== 0) throw new Error(INVALID);
+				pieces.push(shard.stdout);
+			}
+			try {
+				const decoded = Buffer.from(pieces.join(""), "base64");
+				if (decoded.length !== envelope.bytes) throw new Error("shard byte count mismatch");
+				return this.parse(JSON.parse(decoded.toString("utf8")));
 			} catch {
-				throw new Error("Secret Service credential payload is invalid");
+				throw new Error(INVALID);
 			}
 		});
 	}
 	async save(value) {
 		const payload = JSON.stringify(value);
-		if (Buffer.byteLength(payload, "utf8") >= 8192) throw new Error("Secret Service credential payload is too large");
+		const bytes = Buffer.byteLength(payload, "utf8");
+		const stale = await this.storedEnvelope();
+		if (bytes < SECRET_TOOL_STDIN_LIMIT) {
+			if ((await runSecretTool([
+				"store",
+				"--label=DSH Antigravity OAuth",
+				...this.attributes()
+			], payload)).code !== 0) throw new Error(UNAVAILABLE);
+		} else await this.saveChunked(payload, bytes);
+		if (stale !== null) await this.clearShards(stale.gen, stale.chunks);
+		this.cache.invalidate();
+	}
+	/**
+	* Store an oversized payload as shard entries plus an envelope. The shards
+	* are written under a fresh generation tag first and the primary entry last:
+	* that entry is the commit point, so an interrupted save leaves the previous
+	* envelope and its shards fully intact and the new generation is either
+	* committed whole or cleaned up.
+	*/
+	async saveChunked(payload, bytes) {
+		const encoded = Buffer.from(payload, "utf8").toString("base64");
+		const chunks = Math.ceil(encoded.length / SHARD_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+		if (chunks > MAX_SHARDS) throw new Error("Secret Service credential payload is too large");
+		const gen = randomBytes(6).toString("hex");
+		for (let index = 0; index < chunks; index += 1) {
+			const piece = encoded.slice(index * SHARD_PAYLOAD_SIZE, (index + 1) * SHARD_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+			if ((await runSecretTool([
+				"store",
+				"--label=DSH Antigravity OAuth",
+				...this.shardAttributes(gen, index)
+			], piece)).code !== 0) {
+				await this.clearShards(gen, index);
+				throw new Error(UNAVAILABLE);
+			}
+		}
+		const envelope = {
+			gen,
+			chunks,
+			bytes
+		};
 		if ((await runSecretTool([
 			"store",
 			"--label=DSH Antigravity OAuth",
 			...this.attributes()
-		], payload)).code !== 0) throw new Error(UNAVAILABLE);
-		this.cache.invalidate();
+		], JSON.stringify({ [ENVELOPE_KEY]: envelope }))).code !== 0) {
+			await this.clearShards(gen, chunks);
+			throw new Error(UNAVAILABLE);
+		}
+	}
+	/**
+	* Envelope of the currently stored value, or null when the entry is missing,
+	* holds a plain value, or cannot be read at all. A save that goes on to fail
+	* surfaces its own error, so a probe failure must not fail the save first.
+	*/
+	async storedEnvelope() {
+		const probe = await runSecretTool(["lookup", ...this.attributes()]);
+		if (probe.code !== 0) return null;
+		try {
+			return envelopeFrom(JSON.parse(probe.stdout));
+		} catch {
+			return null;
+		}
+	}
+	/**
+	* Remove shard entries, tolerating the ones that are already gone. A missing
+	* entry exits 1 with empty stderr — the same shape a segfaulting secret-tool
+	* takes through the close event (Ubuntu libsecret-tools 0.20.4 crashes on
+	* clearing an entry that does not exist) — so that answer is never an error.
+	*/
+	async clearShards(gen, chunks) {
+		for (let index = 0; index < chunks; index += 1) {
+			const result = await runSecretTool(["clear", ...this.shardAttributes(gen, index)]);
+			if (result.code !== 0 && !(result.code === 1 && !result.hasStderr)) return;
+		}
 	}
 	async clear() {
-		const result = await runSecretTool(["clear", ...this.attributes()]);
-		if (result.code !== 0 && !(result.code === 1 && !result.hasStderr)) throw new Error(UNAVAILABLE);
+		const probe = await runSecretTool(["lookup", ...this.attributes()]);
+		if (probe.code !== 0 && !(probe.code === 1 && !probe.hasStderr)) throw new Error(UNAVAILABLE);
+		if (probe.code === 0) {
+			let envelope = null;
+			try {
+				envelope = envelopeFrom(JSON.parse(probe.stdout));
+			} catch {
+				envelope = null;
+			}
+			if (envelope !== null) await this.clearShards(envelope.gen, envelope.chunks);
+			const result = await runSecretTool(["clear", ...this.attributes()]);
+			if (result.code !== 0 && !(result.code === 1 && !result.hasStderr)) throw new Error(UNAVAILABLE);
+		}
 		this.cache.invalidate();
 	}
 };

package/lib/types/host/credential-store-secret-service.d.ts

@@ -7,8 +7,35 @@ export declare class SecretServiceCredentialStore<T> implements CredentialStore<
     private readonly cache;
     constructor(service: string, account: string, parse: (value: unknown) => T);
     private attributes;
+    /**
+     * Lookup attributes of one shard entry. Secret Service matching is exact on
+     * every given attribute pair, so the primary account value never matches a
+     * shard and vice versa.
+     */
+    private shardAttributes;
     load(): Promise<T | null>;
     save(value: T): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Store an oversized payload as shard entries plus an envelope. The shards
+     * are written under a fresh generation tag first and the primary entry last:
+     * that entry is the commit point, so an interrupted save leaves the previous
+     * envelope and its shards fully intact and the new generation is either
+     * committed whole or cleaned up.
+     */
+    private saveChunked;
+    /**
+     * Envelope of the currently stored value, or null when the entry is missing,
+     * holds a plain value, or cannot be read at all. A save that goes on to fail
+     * surfaces its own error, so a probe failure must not fail the save first.
+     */
+    private storedEnvelope;
+    /**
+     * Remove shard entries, tolerating the ones that are already gone. A missing
+     * entry exits 1 with empty stderr — the same shape a segfaulting secret-tool
+     * takes through the close event (Ubuntu libsecret-tools 0.20.4 crashes on
+     * clearing an entry that does not exist) — so that answer is never an error.
+     */
+    private clearShards;
     clear(): Promise<void>;
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=credential-store-secret-service.d.ts.map

package/lib/types/host/credential-store-secret-service.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"credential-store-secret-service.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/host/credential-store-secret-service.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAGA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAA;AAyEvD,0FAA0F;AAC1F,qBAAa,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,CAAE,YAAW,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAMtE,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO;IACxB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO;IACxB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK;IAPxB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAErB;gBAGkB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IAG/C,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU;IAIlB;;;;OAIG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe;IAIjB,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAqCzB,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;IAgBnC;;;;;;OAMG;YACW,WAAW;IA2BzB;;;;OAIG;YACW,cAAc;IAU5B;;;;;OAKG;YACW,WAAW;IAWnB,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;CAmB7B"}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@eddyskywalker/dsh-chatgpt-subscription",
-  "version": "0.24.2",
+  "version": "0.24.3",
   "description": "DSH provider plugin for Codex access through a ChatGPT subscription.",
   "icon": "./icon.svg",
   "author": {