@eco-incorp/sauce 0.99.0

package/sdk/dist/svm/venues/tesserav/index.js

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+/**
+ * TesseraV venue adapter (program `TessVdML9pBGgG9yGks7o4HewRaXVAMuoVj4x83GLQH`)
+ * — a closed-source prop-AMM. No on-chain IDL / published SDK exists, so this
+ * adapter is built from a live-mainnet reverse-engineering pass (real
+ * `getAccountInfo`/`getTransaction` reads, a `solana program dump`, and
+ * LiteSVM replays of the deployed binary against cloned mainnet state — see
+ * ./ladder.ts's header for the exact evidence and the honest exactness
+ * caveat).
+ *
+ * ACCOUNT SHAPE (pool `FLckHLGMJy5gEoXWwcE68Nprde1D4araK4TGLw4pQq2n`, the live
+ * SOL/USDC market, 1264 bytes, confirmed stable across multiple live
+ * snapshots on 2026-07-31):
+ *
+ *   24   mintA   32B          56   mintB   32B
+ *   120  lastUpdateSlot  u64 LE (matches the live cluster slot at every
+ *        snapshot taken — an off-chain maker bot rewrites the ladder on a
+ *        near-continuous cadence, confirmed by a separate direct top-level
+ *        instruction to this program carrying an ~700-byte opaque payload and
+ *        touching only 2 accounts, 408-412 CU, no logs — an oracle/ladder
+ *        PUSH, not a swap)
+ *   144  mid           u64 LE, scaled 1e15: `mid = round(1e15 * A_raw_per_B_raw)`
+ *        — i.e. mid/1e15 is mintA-raw-units per mintB-raw-unit. Empirically
+ *        matched: 1e15/mid ≈ the measured wSOL→USDC raw exchange rate to
+ *        within ~0.03-0.1% across independently fetched snapshots (the
+ *        residual is consistent with real price drift between fetches, not a
+ *        derivation error — see ladder.ts).
+ *   168  ladder A→B (sell mintA, buy mintB): 10 populated slots, stride 24:
+ *          +0 price (ppm of 1e6, non-increasing across slots)
+ *          +8 flag (observed constant 1 — kind/liveness marker, unmodeled)
+ *          +16 cum (OUTPUT=mintB raw units for this level)
+ *        then zero-padded slots (a 0-price slot terminates the walkable
+ *        prefix, same convention this SDK already uses for quantum/manifest).
+ *   640  ladder B→A (sell mintB, buy mintA), same 10-slot/24-byte-stride
+ *        shape but fields REORDERED: +0 cum (OUTPUT=mintA raw units), +8
+ *        price (ppm — numerically IDENTICAL to the A→B slot at the same
+ *        index, confirmed byte-for-byte on every snapshot taken), +16 flag.
+ *
+ * This adapter ships ONLY the best (index-0) slot of whichever direction is
+ * requested — see ladder.ts's header for why a single-slot model is the
+ * correct, conservative MVP here (level-0 capacity dwarfed every size this
+ * pass could test, up to 100 SOL notional, with no measurable curve
+ * degradation) and the plan to extend to the full 10-slot walk.
+ *
+ * SWAP CPI — the mainnet program was UPGRADED (deployed binary sha256
+ * `82fd37995fcece47a253b1a00c1dd7e4c3fff706b2e42384110e2cbabf4201b3`) and the
+ * swap ix changed shape. VERIFIED FIRST-HAND 2026-09-11 against the live
+ * program: a fresh LANDING swap (sig `3ViRTJm9…`, cbBTC/USDC pool) decodes to
+ * tag 0x11 + 14 accounts, and the three APPENDED accounts are byte-identical
+ * across 25 landing swaps on 3 distinct pools (SOL/USDC `FLckH…`, `Ce8W…`,
+ * `7sJf…`), all read-only.
+ *   ix data:  tag(1B)=0x11 ++ direction(1B, 1=A→B / 0=B→A) ++
+ *             amountIn(u64 LE) ++ minOut(u64 LE)      [ARG LAYOUT UNCHANGED]
+ *   accounts (14): [auth, pool(w), owner(signer), vaultA(w), vaultB(w),
+ *              userSrcAta(w), userDstAta(w), mintA, mintB, tokenProgram,
+ *              tokenProgram (again — an unused Token-2022 slot on this pool),
+ *              <TESSERAV_SWAP_GLOBAL_ACCOUNTS[0..2] — 3 global read-only accts>]
+ *   DELTA vs the pre-upgrade wire: the trailing Instructions-sysvar account is
+ *   DROPPED, three global read-only accounts are APPENDED, and the tag byte is
+ *   0x10 -> 0x11 (12 -> 14 accounts). The old 0x10/12-account wire now fails
+ *   on-chain with `InstructionError { NotEnoughAccountKeys }`.
+ *
+ *   The SDK does NOT emit this account list — it decodes the pool and produces
+ *   `TesseraVPoolConfig`; the 14-account CPI is assembled DOWNSTREAM (the
+ *   consuming recipes package's `buildSwapV2`) from these config fields plus
+ *   `TESSERAV_SWAP_TAG` / `TESSERAV_SWAP_GLOBAL_ACCOUNTS` below.
+ *
+ * INTROSPECTION IS NOT A CALLER ALLOWLIST (measured, not assumed). Calling
+ * this instruction as the transaction's OUTERMOST instruction reverts (custom
+ * 0xffff / 0x5, ~34-37k CU, size-independent — an early guard). Calling it as
+ * a CPI from a real Jupiter `route` succeeds; calling it as a CPI from a
+ * freshly-generated, never-before-seen program id (a from-scratch native
+ * passthrough, deployed nowhere) ALSO succeeds (verified: 46,908 CU, real
+ * output credited). So the Instructions-sysvar read gates "must be CPI'd, not
+ * top-level" only — the SAME shape as this SDK's own engine (`execute_from_
+ * account` always CPIs a venue swap, never top-level) — NOT a caller
+ * allowlist like Quantum's (see quantum/index.ts's own "hardcoded list of 15
+ * aggregator ids" finding — a DIFFERENT, and stricter, gate that TesseraV
+ * does not share). Confirm this holds on every re-verification pass; it is
+ * the load-bearing fact that makes this venue buildable at all.
+ *
+ * UPGRADE NOTE (2026-09-11): the upgraded swap ix NO LONGER carries the
+ * Instructions sysvar in its account list (see the SWAP CPI note above — it was
+ * dropped when the 3 global accounts were appended). The 25 landing swaps
+ * inspected in this pass are all CPIs and all succeeded, so the CPI-only
+ * behavior still holds empirically; the exact mechanism the upgraded program
+ * uses for that gate (without the sysvar in the swap ix) was not re-derived.
+ *
+ * NOTE — RELOCATED LADDER. This venue's merge-decomposition ladder used to sit
+ * next to this file as `./ladder.ts`; it now lives in the consuming recipes
+ * package, which defines every `*Ladder`, window selector and rung-feeding
+ * decomposition helper itself. The SDK keeps only the generic venue
+ * integration below (pool-account decode, program ids, pool-config types, and
+ * the AMM/tick math the decode needs). Every `ladder.ts` reference in the text
+ * above therefore points at that relocated module, not at a file in this
+ * directory.
+ */
+import { address, getAddressCodec } from "@solana/kit";
+import { memoizedFindAssociatedTokenPda } from "../pda-memo.js";
+import { readUintLE } from "../math.js";
+import { TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ID, classifyMintProgram } from "../../token-program.js";
+import { parseMintExtensions } from "../../token-extensions.js";
+const SLUG = "tesserav";
+export const TESSERAV_PROGRAM_ID = address("TessVdML9pBGgG9yGks7o4HewRaXVAMuoVj4x83GLQH");
+export const TOKEN_PROGRAM = address("TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA");
+// The Instructions sysvar constant is shared via ../../cpi-probe.js (already
+// barreled at the top svm/index.ts level) — NOT re-declared/re-exported here,
+// to avoid a duplicate-export collision at the package barrel (see ladder.ts).
+const OFF_MINT_A = 24;
+const OFF_MINT_B = 56;
+export const OFF_MID = 144;
+export const MID_SCALE = 1000000000000000n; // 1e15
+// A->B ladder (sell mintA for mintB): stride 24, fields (price, flag, cum).
+export const OFF_LADDER_AB = 168;
+export const AB_STRIDE = 24;
+export const AB_OFF_PRICE = 0;
+export const AB_OFF_CUM = 16;
+// B->A ladder (sell mintB for mintA): stride 24, fields (cum, price, flag).
+export const OFF_LADDER_BA = 640;
+export const BA_STRIDE = 24;
+export const BA_OFF_CUM = 0;
+export const BA_OFF_PRICE = 8;
+export const TESSERAV_LEVEL_SLOTS = 10;
+export const PRICE_PPM_DEN = 1000000n;
+/** Minimum pool account size this adapter reads from (level 9's last byte + 1). */
+export const TESSERAV_MIN_POOL_SIZE = OFF_LADDER_BA + TESSERAV_LEVEL_SLOTS * BA_STRIDE;
+/**
+ * The TesseraV vault-AUTHORITY — a FIXED GLOBAL SINGLETON, correcting the
+ * earlier "per-pool fact" framing. It is one program-owned (owner =
+ * TessVdML…), 10240-byte account that is byte-identical as the swap CPI's
+ * account[0] across every pool traced (SOL/USDC, cbBTC/USDC, BONK/USDC). It is
+ * NOT a PDA of the program under any tried seed, and NOT a mint→vault registry
+ * (the 10240 bytes contain none of the mint or vault bytes) — so it is carried
+ * as this verified constant, never derived. Verified against live swap-CPI
+ * traces (SOL/USDC sig 3p2JFpLN…, cbBTC/USDC sig 4KZPEcyC…, BONK/USDC sig
+ * 3JZMZyMy…), all giving account[0] = 8ekCy2….
+ */
+export const TESSERAV_GLOBAL_AUTH = address("8ekCy2jHHUbW2yeNGFWYJT9Hm9FW7SvZcZK66dSZCDiF");
+/**
+ * The swap instruction discriminator. The mainnet upgrade bumped it 0x10 ->
+ * 0x11 (see the SWAP CPI note in this file's header); a program compiled to the
+ * old 0x10 tag now reverts. Exported so the downstream CPI builder reads the tag
+ * from one place rather than hardcoding it.
+ */
+export const TESSERAV_SWAP_TAG = 0x11;
+/**
+ * The three GLOBAL read-only accounts the upgraded swap ix (tag 0x11) APPENDS
+ * after the two token-program slots — wire positions [11], [12], [13]. ORDER IS
+ * LOAD-BEARING.
+ *
+ * These are program GLOBALS, not per-pool PDAs, and are carried as verified
+ * CONSTANTS for exactly the reason TESSERAV_GLOBAL_AUTH is: they were BYTE-
+ * IDENTICAL across 25 landing swaps on 3 distinct pools (SOL/USDC `FLckH…`,
+ * `Ce8W…`, `7sJf…`) on 2026-09-11, all read-only — so there is nothing per-pool
+ * to derive. (Deriving a per-pool PDA here would be WRONG: the chain shows one
+ * fixed trio for every pool.) There is no on-chain IDL (closed-source), so the
+ * names below are ROLES INFERRED from each account's on-chain owner/size, not
+ * asserted semantics — re-verify on any re-capture:
+ *   [0] 8xeaWCsJ…tb3d — owner = System Program, 0 bytes  → global authority/holder
+ *   [1] BAT1Ndpu…vdhK — owner = TessVdML… (the program), 2048 bytes → global config/state
+ *   [2] 4cG31VNF…brhPs — owner = tickUcs…ULWY6N (a tick/oracle program), 88 bytes → global oracle/tick
+ * Verified against landing swap sig `3ViRTJm9…` (positions 11-13).
+ */
+export const TESSERAV_SWAP_GLOBAL_ACCOUNTS = Object.freeze([
+    address("8xeaWCsJYxRoudEZGJWURdfrtFhLYZz9b4iHJnW5tb3d"),
+    address("BAT1Ndpu5gbLTp2AZkSXP79LJBZfCH4B3zGhi6LtvdhK"),
+    address("4cG31VNF9TzFinNc7BmnjhFvGjxkY3sCETVMtMgbrhPs"),
+]);
+/**
+ * Committed global-per-mint vault cache. Each TesseraV vault is a plain
+ * keypair-generated legacy-SPL token account that is (a) authority =
+ * TESSERAV_GLOBAL_AUTH and (b) GLOBAL PER MINT — one shared vault per token,
+ * reused by every pool touching that token (measured: the SOL/USDC and
+ * cbBTC/USDC pools share the SAME USDC vault 9t4P5w…). Vaults are stable, so
+ * this map is the RPC-free fast path; a mint NOT here resolves through the
+ * optional `resolveVault` (getTokenAccountsByOwner) arg of fetchTesseraVConfig
+ * — which `pickTesseraVVault` implements — or self-drops. Refresh this map with
+ * that same owner-scoped sweep, keyed off TESSERAV_GLOBAL_AUTH. Only vaults
+ * verified byte-exactly against a live swap-CPI trace are seeded here.
+ */
+export const TESSERAV_KNOWN_VAULTS = Object.freeze({
+    // wSOL — verified as swap account[3] of the SOL/USDC pool (sig 3p2JFpLN…)
+    So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112: address("5pVN5XZB8cYBjNLFrsBCPWkCQBan5K5Mq2dWGzwPgGJV"),
+    // USDC — the single global USDC vault (swap account[4] of both SOL/USDC and cbBTC/USDC)
+    EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v: address("9t4P5wMwfFkyn92Z7hf463qYKEZf8ERVZsGBEPNp8uJx"),
+    // cbBTC — verified as swap account[3] of the cbBTC/USDC pool (sig 4KZPEcyC…)
+    cbbtcf3aa214zXHbiAZQwf4122FBYbraNdFqgw4iMij: address("37hggNyT4Ec8GEcxMLrWrZyrMSSFMSiFT6VBayRYceZH"),
+});
+/**
+ * Exclude-ATA vault picker — the GENERAL derivation core. Of the legacy-SPL
+ * token accounts owned by `owner` for `mint`, drop the canonical
+ * ATA(owner, mint, TOKEN_PROGRAM) (observed as a dust account for USDC: the
+ * real vault 9t4P5w… alongside its ATA at ~50000) and return the single
+ * remainder. 0 remainders → null (the global vault does not exist yet →
+ * self-drop). >1 remainders → the largest-balance one when balances are known,
+ * else null (ambiguous → self-drop rather than guess) — the caveat the debug
+ * flagged for the >1 case.
+ */
+export async function pickTesseraVVault(owner, mint, owned) {
+    const ata = await memoizedFindAssociatedTokenPda({ owner, mint, tokenProgram: TOKEN_PROGRAM });
+    const nonAta = owned.filter((account) => account.address !== ata);
+    if (nonAta.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    if (nonAta.length === 1)
+        return nonAta[0].address;
+    // >1 non-ATA auth-owned account for this mint: prefer the largest balance
+    // when every candidate's balance is known (the real vault dwarfs any dust),
+    // otherwise self-drop rather than route funds to the wrong account.
+    if (nonAta.every((account) => account.amount !== undefined)) {
+        return nonAta.reduce((best, account) => (account.amount > best.amount ? account : best))
+            .address;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve one side's vault: committed cache first (RPC-free, stable), then the
+ * optional owner-scoped resolver, else a graceful self-drop. Always under
+ * TESSERAV_GLOBAL_AUTH — vaults are global per mint, never per pool.
+ */
+async function resolveTesseraVVault(mint, resolveVault, pool) {
+    const cached = TESSERAV_KNOWN_VAULTS[mint];
+    if (cached)
+        return cached;
+    if (resolveVault) {
+        const resolved = await resolveVault(TESSERAV_GLOBAL_AUTH, mint);
+        if (resolved)
+            return resolved;
+        throw new Error(`${SLUG}: dropping pool ${pool} — no auth-owned vault for mint ${mint} ` +
+            `(getTokenAccountsByOwner(${TESSERAV_GLOBAL_AUTH}, ${mint}) yielded no unambiguous non-ATA account)`);
+    }
+    throw new Error(`${SLUG}: dropping pool ${pool} — mint ${mint} is not in the committed vault cache and no ` +
+        `resolveVault (getTokenAccountsByOwner) was provided`);
+}
+const codec = getAddressCodec();
+const pubkeyAt = (data, offset) => codec.decode(data.subarray(offset, offset + 32));
+/** Level-0 price (ppm of 1e6) for a direction — non-increasing across slots, this adapter ships slot 0 only. */
+export function level0PriceOffset(direction) {
+    return direction === "aToB" ? OFF_LADDER_AB + AB_OFF_PRICE : OFF_LADDER_BA + BA_OFF_PRICE;
+}
+/** Level-0 capacity, in OUTPUT-token raw units, for a direction. */
+export function level0CumOffset(direction) {
+    return direction === "aToB" ? OFF_LADDER_AB + AB_OFF_CUM : OFF_LADDER_BA + BA_OFF_CUM;
+}
+/**
+ * Fetch + gate one TesseraV pool. Read-only against the loader. Gates: wrong
+ * owner/size, an unprimed mid (0 — a pool the maker bot has never quoted),
+ * and a zero/absent level-0 price or capacity (an empty book for this
+ * direction — self-drop, not a revert, at the orchestrator layer).
+ */
+export async function fetchTesseraVConfig(load, pool, direction, resolveVault) {
+    if (direction === "bToA") {
+        // See ladder.ts's header: the reverse swap-CPI account order was never
+        // independently verified, and a launched-then-failing CPI aborts the
+        // WHOLE cook on SVM (no execution-time catch/re-route here) — so this
+        // stays a hard gate, not a self-drop, until a second live replay confirms
+        // the shape.
+        throw new Error(`${SLUG}: 'bToA' is unverified (see ladder.ts) and is not wired for production use yet`);
+    }
+    const data = await load(pool);
+    if (data === null)
+        throw new Error(`${SLUG}: pool account ${pool} not found`);
+    if (data.length < TESSERAV_MIN_POOL_SIZE) {
+        throw new Error(`${SLUG}: pool ${pool} has ${data.length} bytes, expected at least ${TESSERAV_MIN_POOL_SIZE}`);
+    }
+    const mid = readUintLE(data, OFF_MID, 8);
+    if (mid === 0n)
+        throw new Error(`${SLUG}: pool ${pool} has an unprimed mid price (never quoted by the maker)`);
+    const price0 = readUintLE(data, level0PriceOffset(direction), 8);
+    const cum0 = readUintLE(data, level0CumOffset(direction), 8);
+    if (price0 === 0n || cum0 === 0n) {
+        throw new Error(`${SLUG}: pool ${pool} has no walkable level-0 for direction ${direction}`);
+    }
+    const mintA = pubkeyAt(data, OFF_MINT_A);
+    const mintB = pubkeyAt(data, OFF_MINT_B);
+    // The swap CPI carries an unused Token-2022 slot but the instruction is
+    // legacy-SPL (Tokenkeg) only. Detect a Token-2022 (or otherwise un-routable)
+    // mint per side and GRACEFULLY SELF-DROP the pool (the SvmRoute orchestrator
+    // catches a fetchPoolConfig throw and drops the venue). The LEGACY path is
+    // byte-identical; an unreadable mint falls back to the legacy assumption.
+    const _mints = [mintA, mintB];
+    const _mintDatas = await Promise.all(_mints.map((mint) => load(mint)));
+    for (let _i = 0; _i < _mints.length; _i++) {
+        const mint = _mints[_i];
+        const mintData = _mintDatas[_i];
+        if (mintData === null)
+            continue;
+        if (classifyMintProgram(mint, mintData) === TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM_ID) {
+            throw new Error(`${SLUG}: dropping pool ${pool} — mint ${mint} is Token-2022 (this venue's swap is legacy-SPL only)`);
+        }
+        const { blocking } = parseMintExtensions(mintData);
+        if (blocking.length > 0) {
+            throw new Error(`${SLUG}: dropping pool ${pool} — mint ${mint} is un-routable: ${blocking.join("; ")}`);
+        }
+    }
+    // auth is the GLOBAL singleton (not per-pool); each vault is GLOBAL PER MINT
+    // and lives on the swap CPI's account list, NOT inline in the pool account,
+    // so it is resolved from the committed per-mint cache (RPC-free) or, for a
+    // mint not yet cached, the owner-scoped `resolveVault` (getTokenAccountsByOwner
+    // + exclude-ATA, see pickTesseraVVault). A mint with neither a cache hit nor a
+    // resolver-found vault self-drops the pool (a graceful "dropping pool" throw
+    // the SvmRoute orchestrator catches), rather than the old FLckH-only hard gate.
+    const vaultA = await resolveTesseraVVault(mintA, resolveVault, pool);
+    const vaultB = await resolveTesseraVVault(mintB, resolveVault, pool);
+    return {
+        venue: SLUG,
+        pool,
+        direction,
+        mintA,
+        mintB,
+        auth: TESSERAV_GLOBAL_AUTH,
+        vaultA,
+        vaultB,
+        swapGlobalAccounts: TESSERAV_SWAP_GLOBAL_ACCOUNTS,
+    };
+}
+/** Family facade for the recipe orchestrator (ladder-only — not in the v1 registry). */
+export const tesserav = {
+    slug: SLUG,
+    programId: TESSERAV_PROGRAM_ID,
+    tokenProgram: TOKEN_PROGRAM,
+    fetchPoolConfig: fetchTesseraVConfig,
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/sdk/dist/svm/venues/tesserav/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/sdk/dist/svm/venues/tree-walk.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/**
+ * Shared iteration budget for the off-chain order-book tree walks the CLOB
+ * venues (manifest, phoenix) run over raw market bytes.
+ *
+ * A PER-CALL iteration guard bounds nothing useful: with a cyclic parent/child
+ * pointer set every successor call burns its own full guard, so the cost is
+ * (guard x levels), not (guard). One counter for the WHOLE walk — successor
+ * descents, parent climbs and level steps all drawing from it — makes a walk
+ * O(nodes) in total no matter the pointer shape.
+ */
+/** Draws one pointer hop from the walk's budget; throws once it is exhausted. */
+export type SpendHop = () => void;
+/**
+ * A budget of `3 * nodeCapacity` hops — the MEASURED worst case of a
+ * legitimate full walk, not an estimate. Per side, over a tree of n nodes:
+ *
+ * - the emit loop spends one hop per node VISITED (zero-size orders are
+ *   skipped but still visited), so n;
+ * - manifest's `nextLower` leaves the first left step and the final parent
+ *   step uncounted, so its descend and climb loops together spend exactly one
+ *   hop per tree edge: n - 1. Manifest tops out at 2n - 1;
+ * - phoenix's `successor` climb spends a hop per iteration INCLUDING the one
+ *   that returns the parent, so every node with no right child costs a hop
+ *   even when its successor is its immediate parent — up to n more on top of
+ *   the per-edge n - 1. Phoenix tops out at 3n - 1.
+ *
+ * Both book sides draw from ONE budget and `nodeCapacity` counts every block
+ * the account can physically hold, so bids + asks <= nodeCapacity and the
+ * whole-market worst case is 3 * nodeCapacity - 2. Measured against
+ * fully-populated all-zero-size markets: manifest 2.000x capacity (chain) /
+ * 1.998x (balanced), phoenix 3.000x (chain) / 2.499x (balanced) — a BALANCED
+ * phoenix tree alone overruns a 2x budget, which is why the factor is 3 and
+ * not 2. A real market is nowhere near either: the SOL/USDC manifest fixture
+ * spends 42 hops against a 2,983-block capacity, because MANIFEST_MAX_ORDERS /
+ * PHOENIX_MAX_ORDERS stop the walk after a handful of levels.
+ *
+ * `nodeCapacity` must be derived from the account's own byte length, never from
+ * a capacity field inside it: a corrupt account can declare any capacity.
+ */
+export declare function makeTreeWalkBudget(slug: string, nodeCapacity: number): SpendHop;
+//# sourceMappingURL=tree-walk.d.ts.map

package/sdk/dist/svm/venues/tree-walk.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/sdk/dist/svm/venues/tree-walk.js

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/**
+ * Shared iteration budget for the off-chain order-book tree walks the CLOB
+ * venues (manifest, phoenix) run over raw market bytes.
+ *
+ * A PER-CALL iteration guard bounds nothing useful: with a cyclic parent/child
+ * pointer set every successor call burns its own full guard, so the cost is
+ * (guard x levels), not (guard). One counter for the WHOLE walk — successor
+ * descents, parent climbs and level steps all drawing from it — makes a walk
+ * O(nodes) in total no matter the pointer shape.
+ */
+/**
+ * A budget of `3 * nodeCapacity` hops — the MEASURED worst case of a
+ * legitimate full walk, not an estimate. Per side, over a tree of n nodes:
+ *
+ * - the emit loop spends one hop per node VISITED (zero-size orders are
+ *   skipped but still visited), so n;
+ * - manifest's `nextLower` leaves the first left step and the final parent
+ *   step uncounted, so its descend and climb loops together spend exactly one
+ *   hop per tree edge: n - 1. Manifest tops out at 2n - 1;
+ * - phoenix's `successor` climb spends a hop per iteration INCLUDING the one
+ *   that returns the parent, so every node with no right child costs a hop
+ *   even when its successor is its immediate parent — up to n more on top of
+ *   the per-edge n - 1. Phoenix tops out at 3n - 1.
+ *
+ * Both book sides draw from ONE budget and `nodeCapacity` counts every block
+ * the account can physically hold, so bids + asks <= nodeCapacity and the
+ * whole-market worst case is 3 * nodeCapacity - 2. Measured against
+ * fully-populated all-zero-size markets: manifest 2.000x capacity (chain) /
+ * 1.998x (balanced), phoenix 3.000x (chain) / 2.499x (balanced) — a BALANCED
+ * phoenix tree alone overruns a 2x budget, which is why the factor is 3 and
+ * not 2. A real market is nowhere near either: the SOL/USDC manifest fixture
+ * spends 42 hops against a 2,983-block capacity, because MANIFEST_MAX_ORDERS /
+ * PHOENIX_MAX_ORDERS stop the walk after a handful of levels.
+ *
+ * `nodeCapacity` must be derived from the account's own byte length, never from
+ * a capacity field inside it: a corrupt account can declare any capacity.
+ */
+export function makeTreeWalkBudget(slug, nodeCapacity) {
+    const hops = 3 * Math.max(nodeCapacity, 0);
+    let remaining = hops;
+    return () => {
+        if (remaining === 0) {
+            throw new Error(`${slug}: order-book tree walk exceeded ${hops} pointer hops — the account's tree is cyclic or corrupt`);
+        }
+        remaining--;
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=tree-walk.js.map

package/sdk/dist/svm/venues/tree-walk.js.map

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package/sdk/dist/svm/venues/trends/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import type { Address } from "@solana/kit";
+import type { AccountLoader, PoolConfig } from "../types.js";
+declare const SLUG = "trends";
+export declare const TRENDS_PROGRAM_ID: Address<"CURVEmPpijXDTNdqrA9PGP1io2rkgiVXH26xdXVGLLfz">;
+export declare const WSOL_MINT: Address<"So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112">;
+/** Global `config` PDA (seeds `["config"]`) — same account for every pool (verified live). */
+export declare const TRENDS_CONFIG_PDA: Address<"BMejsRsPsaMypBsexufEmEGh8vjxfp2CMVHZE2PTTetj">;
+/** Global `pool_authority` — a hardcoded Anchor `address` constraint, identical for every pool. */
+export declare const TRENDS_POOL_AUTHORITY: Address<"C6B7knNSF8X8YfW54D8jQvM3VUCifsphHEQZSCyAERoE">;
+/** Global `event_authority` PDA (seeds `["__event_authority"]`) — same for every pool. */
+export declare const TRENDS_EVENT_AUTHORITY: Address<"87jkvJSERNjGmzftppK4Kt4Trv6tDh25K66aatP9esXQ">;
+export declare const POOL_ACCOUNT_SIZE = 312;
+/** sha256('account:Pool')[0..8] (the `bonding_curve` Pool account — see module header point 2). */
+export declare const POOL_DISCRIMINATOR: number[];
+export interface TrendsPoolConfig extends PoolConfig {
+    venue: typeof SLUG;
+    /** 'quoteToBase' (default, BUY: pay wSOL, receive base) | 'baseToQuote' (SELL: pay base, receive wSOL). */
+    direction: "quoteToBase" | "baseToQuote";
+    baseMint: Address;
+    baseVault: Address;
+    quoteVault: Address;
+    baseTokenProgram: Address;
+}
+/** Fetch + decode one Pool account. Read-only against the loader; reserves are read LIVE on-chain
+ *  at swap time (see emitSetup) — nothing about the curve state is baked here. */
+export declare function fetchTrendsPoolConfig(load: AccountLoader, pool: Address): Promise<TrendsPoolConfig>;
+/** Family facade for the recipe orchestrator (ladder-only, like obric-v2/solfi-v2). */
+export declare const trends: {
+    slug: string;
+    programId: Address<"CURVEmPpijXDTNdqrA9PGP1io2rkgiVXH26xdXVGLLfz">;
+    fetchPoolConfig: typeof fetchTrendsPoolConfig;
+};
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/sdk/dist/svm/venues/trends/index.d.ts.map

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