@dzhechkov/p-replicator 1.5.7 → 1.5.10

package/README/ru/html/build.js

@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ function renderCode(code, lang) {
 }
 
 // ─── Main parser ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-function parseMarkdown(md, idPrefix = '') {
+function parseMarkdown(md, idPrefix = '', usedIds = new Set()) {
   // Normalize line endings
   const lines = md.replace(/\r\n/g, '\n').split('\n');
   const out = [];
@@ -228,7 +228,15 @@ function parseMarkdown(md, idPrefix = '') {
       const level = h[1].length;
       const text = h[2].trim();
       const baseId = slugify(text);
-      const id = idPrefix && level > 1 ? `${idPrefix}-${baseId}` : baseId || idPrefix || 'section';
+      let id = idPrefix && level > 1 ? `${idPrefix}-${baseId}` : baseId || idPrefix || 'section';
+      // P3: de-duplicate heading slugs (GitHub-style -2/-3 suffix) so duplicate headings never emit
+      // duplicate `id` attributes (invalid HTML + hash-nav resolving only to the first occurrence).
+      if (usedIds.has(id)) {
+        let n = 2;
+        while (usedIds.has(`${id}-${n}`)) n++;
+        id = `${id}-${n}`;
+      }
+      usedIds.add(id);
       out.push(`<h${level} id="${escapeAttr(id)}">${processInline(text)}</h${level}>`);
       i++;
       continue;
@@ -248,7 +256,7 @@ function parseMarkdown(md, idPrefix = '') {
         qLines.push(lines[i].replace(/^>\s?/, ''));
         i++;
       }
-      out.push(`<blockquote>${parseMarkdown(qLines.join('\n'), idPrefix)}</blockquote>`);
+      out.push(`<blockquote>${parseMarkdown(qLines.join('\n'), idPrefix, usedIds)}</blockquote>`);
       continue;
     }
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@dzhechkov/p-replicator",
-  "version": "1.5.7",
+  "version": "1.5.10",
   "description": "P-Replicator — Claude Code toolkit for AI-assisted product development (Vibe Coding). Full /replicate pipeline, 10 modular skills (194K+ chars), /harvest knowledge extraction, swarm agents, quality gates, security patterns, cross-project learning.",
   "main": "src/cli.js",
   "bin": {

package/src/commands/remove.js

@@ -37,7 +37,12 @@ function run(options) {
 
   if (existingFiles.length === 0) {
     warn('No files found to remove (already cleaned up?).');
-    // Still remove manifest
+    // Dry run is a strict no-op — must NOT unregister the install (the P2 bug: this ran BEFORE the
+    // dryRun guard below, so `remove --dry-run` deleted the manifest on the already-cleaned path).
+    if (dryRun) {
+      warn(`Dry run — would remove ${MANIFEST_FILE} to unregister the (already-empty) install. Nothing written.`);
+      process.exit(0);
+    }
     const manifestPath = path.join(targetDir, MANIFEST_FILE);
     if (fileExists(manifestPath)) {
       fs.unlinkSync(manifestPath);
@@ -53,6 +58,7 @@ function run(options) {
 
   // ── c) Remove files ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   let removed = 0;
+  const failed = [];
   for (const f of existingFiles) {
     const fullPath = path.join(targetDir, f);
     try {
@@ -60,6 +66,7 @@ function run(options) {
       removed++;
     } catch (err) {
       warn(`Could not remove: ${f} (${err.message})`);
+      failed.push(f);
     }
   }
 
@@ -88,9 +95,16 @@ function run(options) {
   }
 
   // ── e) Remove manifest ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  // P3: only unregister the install when EVERY tracked file was actually removed. If some failed
+  // (permissions, locked, read-only mount), keep the manifest so the survivors stay tracked and a
+  // later `remove`/`doctor` can still see + finish them — deleting it would strand them as orphans.
   const manifestPath = path.join(targetDir, MANIFEST_FILE);
   if (fileExists(manifestPath)) {
-    fs.unlinkSync(manifestPath);
+    if (failed.length > 0) {
+      warn(`${failed.length} file(s) could not be removed — keeping ${MANIFEST_FILE} so they stay tracked (re-run remove after fixing permissions).`);
+    } else {
+      fs.unlinkSync(manifestPath);
+    }
   }
 
   console.log('');

package/src/commands/update.js

@@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ function run(options) {
   console.log('');
 
   if (added.length === 0 && modified.length === 0) {
+    // P3: refresh the recorded version even when templates are byte-identical, so the manifest is not
+    // a STALE version record after a metadata-only release (doctor/update kept reporting the old
+    // installed version). Only the version field changes — no files touched.
+    if (manifest.version !== newVersion) {
+      writeManifest(targetDir, { ...manifest, version: newVersion });
+      info(`Version record refreshed to ${bold(newVersion)} (templates unchanged).`);
+    }
     success('Already up to date!');
     process.exit(0);
   }

package/templates/.claude/rules/replicate-pipeline.md

@@ -11,6 +11,22 @@ Product Discovery     Planning   Validation  Toolkit    Finalize
 
 Never skip Phase 2 (Validation). Toolkit (Phase 3) MUST be built on validated documentation.
 
+### Optional: UI replication (post-pipeline)
+
+When the goal includes rebuilding a target's **frontend** (not just the business/toolkit), the
+`clone-website` skill — [`@dzhechkov/skills-website-cloner`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@dzhechkov/skills-website-cloner),
+the implementation counterpart to `reverse-engineering-unicorn` — produces a pixel-perfect
+Next.js clone of a live site.
+
+| Skill | Required | Purpose | Fallback |
+|-------|----------|---------|----------|
+| `clone-website` | OPTIONAL (external) | Reverse-engineer a live site → running Next.js/shadcn clone | use `frontend-design` to build a fresh UI, or skip |
+
+**Reference, not vendored** (per ADR-0001). It is NOT one of the pre-shipped p-replicator skills
+and has hard runtime prerequisites (a browser-MCP + a Next.js/shadcn/Tailwind scaffold). Install
+separately: `npx @dzhechkov/skills-website-cloner init` or `dz init --select clone-website`. If
+absent or its prerequisites are unmet, skip the UI-clone step and log a warning.
+
 ## Skill Loading Protocol
 
 When executing skills during the pipeline:

package/templates/.claude/skills/brutal-honesty-review/scripts/assess-tests.sh

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ assess_edge_cases() {
     found_count=0
     for pattern in "${edge_case_patterns[@]}"; do
         if grep -ri "$pattern" "$TEST_DIR" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
-            ((found_count++))
+            found_count=$((found_count+1))
         fi
     done
 
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ assess_stability() {
     failures=0
     for i in {1..3}; do
         if ! npm test > /dev/null 2>&1; then
-            ((failures++))
+            failures=$((failures+1))
         fi
     done
 

package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/SKILL.md

@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ Run in Phase 6 before delivery.
 | brutal-honesty-review | .claude/skills/ | P0 | Always |
 | idea2prd-manual | .claude/skills/ | P1 | IF DDD detected |
 | goap-research-ed25519 | .claude/skills/ | P1 | IF DDD detected |
-| feature-navigator | .claude/skills/ | P1 | Always (recommended) |
+| feature-navigator | .claude/skills/ (GENERATED per-project by module 04 — NOT a module-08 copy-dependency) | P1 | Always (recommended) |
 
 ## Reusability
 

package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/modules/06-package-deliver.md

@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ Scan targets:
 
 Scan patterns (all are CRITICAL if found):
 
-  Pattern: {{[A-Z_]+}}
+  Pattern: {{[^}]+}}  # ANY placeholder token — uppercase, lowercase, hyphenated, or spaced (was {{[A-Z_]+}}, which silently passed {{feature-id}}, {{Feature Name}})
   Examples: {{PROJECT_NAME}}, {{LANGUAGE}}, {{MAX_ENTITIES}}, {{TECH_KEYWORDS}}
   Action: Look up value in IPM and substitute
 

package/templates/.claude/skills/goap-research-ed25519/SKILL.md

@@ -1,415 +1,125 @@
 ---
 name: goap-research-ed25519
-description: Advanced GOAP research system with Ed25519 cryptographic verification for anti-hallucination protection. Combines Goal-Oriented Action Planning with cryptographic signatures to ensure source authenticity, claim verification, and citation chain integrity. Use for high-stakes research requiring verifiable facts, competitive intelligence, legal/medical research, or any context where hallucination prevention is critical. Triggers on "verified research", "trusted sources only", "anti-hallucination", "signed sources", "cryptographic verification".
+description: GOAP research system with Ed25519 provenance and tamper-evidence under pinned trusted-issuer keys. Use for high-stakes research that needs cited sources, explicit confidence, signed audit trails, or cryptographic proof of who signed a fact. Ed25519 does not prove truthfulness or prevent hallucination.
+trust_tier: 1
+trust_tier_label: "Structured"
+trust_tier_path: "Run /bto-test to promote to Tier 2"
 ---
 
-# GOAP Research Skill with Ed25519 Verification
+# GOAP Research with Ed25519 Provenance
 
-Advanced research system combining Goal-Oriented Action Planning (GOAP) with Ed25519 cryptographic verification for maximum anti-hallucination protection.
+This skill combines Goal-Oriented Action Planning (GOAP), source evaluation, and optional Ed25519 signatures.
 
-## Key Differentiators from Standard GOAP
+Ed25519 provides cryptographic provenance and tamper-evidence under pinned trusted-issuer keys: it proves who signed the canonical message and that the signed bytes were not altered. It does not prove that the claim is true, prevent plagiarism, or replace ordinary source evaluation.
 
-| Feature | Standard GOAP | GOAP-Ed25519 |
-|---------|---------------|--------------|
-| Source Trust | Reliability scoring (1-5) | Cryptographic signatures + scoring |
-| Claim Verification | Cross-reference | Cross-reference + signature chain |
-| Anti-Hallucination | Triangulation | Triangulation + mandatory citations |
-| Audit Trail | Research path log | Signed verification ledger |
-| Trust Anchors | Editorial reputation | Trusted issuer whitelist |
+## Core Rules
 
-## Ed25519 Verification Architecture
+1. Every factual claim needs a source URL.
+2. Unknown, unsigned, revoked, mismatched, or invalid issuer signatures are not issuer-verified.
+3. Trusted issuer status requires an explicit issuer -> pinned Ed25519 public key mapping. A domain string alone is never trusted.
+4. Strict and paranoid modes reject plans with remaining unsigned or invalid claims.
+5. Self-attested researcher signatures provide audit-log tamper-evidence only and are capped below issuer-trusted confidence.
 
-```
-┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
-│                    RESEARCH PIPELINE                         │
-├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
-│  ┌──────────┐    ┌──────────┐    ┌──────────┐              │
-│  │ Source   │───▶│ Ed25519  │───▶│ Verified │              │
-│  │ Content  │    │ Verifier │    │ Facts    │              │
-│  └──────────┘    └──────────┘    └──────────┘              │
-│        │              │               │                     │
-│        ▼              ▼               ▼                     │
-│  ┌──────────┐    ┌──────────┐    ┌──────────┐              │
-│  │ Citation │    │ Signature│    │ Confidence│              │
-│  │ Extractor│    │ Chain    │    │ Calculator│              │
-│  └──────────┘    └──────────┘    └──────────┘              │
-│        │              │               │                     │
-│        └──────────────┴───────────────┘                     │
-│                       │                                     │
-│                       ▼                                     │
-│              ┌────────────────┐                             │
-│              │ Verification   │                             │
-│              │ Ledger (signed)│                             │
-│              └────────────────┘                             │
-└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
-```
+## Trust Classes
 
-## Core GOAP Methodology (Enhanced)
-
-### Phase 1: State Assessment with Trust Initialization
-
-**Define Current State:**
-- Existing knowledge about the topic
-- Available sources and access constraints
-- **NEW:** Trusted issuer whitelist configuration
-- **NEW:** Ed25519 keypair availability
-- Time and depth requirements
-
-**Define Goal State:**
-- Specific questions to answer
-- Required evidence types
-- **NEW:** Minimum verification threshold (0.85 default, 0.95 strict)
-- **NEW:** Required signature chain depth
-- Confidence thresholds for conclusions
-
-**Gap Analysis:**
-- Knowledge gaps to fill
-- **NEW:** Unsigned claims requiring verification
-- **NEW:** Citation chain breaks to resolve
-
-### Phase 2: Action Inventory (Extended)
-
-Research actions with Ed25519 verification extensions:
-
-| Action | Preconditions | Effects | Cost | Verification |
-|--------|---------------|---------|------|--------------|
-| `web_search_broad` | topic_defined | candidates_found | 1 | None |
-| `web_search_verified` | topic_defined, trusted_issuers_set | verified_candidates_found | 2 | Domain signature |
-| `fetch_source` | url_known | content_retrieved | 2 | TLS certificate |
-| `fetch_signed_source` | url_known, issuer_pubkey | signed_content_retrieved | 3 | Ed25519 signature |
-| `extract_facts` | content_retrieved | facts_cataloged | 1 | None |
-| `sign_extracted_facts` | facts_cataloged, private_key | signed_facts | 2 | Self-signature |
-| `verify_claim` | claim_identified | claim_verified/refuted | 3 | Cross-ref |
-| `verify_claim_cryptographic` | claim_identified, signature_available | cryptographically_verified | 4 | Ed25519 verify |
-| `cross_reference` | multiple_sources | consistency_checked | 2 | None |
-| `cross_reference_signed` | multiple_signed_sources | signed_consistency_checked | 3 | Multi-sig verify |
-| `build_citation_chain` | facts_cataloged | citation_chain_complete | 2 | Chain integrity |
-| `verify_citation_chain` | citation_chain_complete | chain_verified | 3 | Ed25519 chain |
-| `generate_signed_report` | conclusions_formed, private_key | signed_report_delivered | 3 | Report signature |
-
-### Phase 3: Plan Generation (A* with Verification Cost)
-
-Enhanced cost function:
-```
-f(n) = g(n) + h(n) + v(n)
-```
-- `g(n)`: Actual cost (searches performed, time spent)
-- `h(n)`: Heuristic distance to goal (remaining questions)
-- `v(n)`: **Verification penalty** (unsigned claims × 0.5)
-
-**Planning Heuristics:**
-1. Prioritize signed sources over unsigned (lower total cost)
-2. Prefer sources from trusted issuers whitelist
-3. Weight cryptographically verified claims higher
-4. Factor citation chain depth in confidence
-
-### Phase 4: OODA Loop with Verification Checkpoints
-
-**Observe:**
-- Monitor search results quality
-- **Track signature validity status**
-- **Monitor citation chain integrity**
-- Identify information gaps
-
-**Orient:**
-- Assess if current path leads to goal
-- **Evaluate cryptographic trust level**
-- **Check for signature chain breaks**
-- Recognize when verification fails
-
-**Decide:**
-- Continue current research branch or pivot
-- **Accept or reject unsigned sources**
-- **Trigger re-verification on suspicious content**
-- Choose between depth and breadth
-
-**Act:**
-- Execute next optimal action
-- **Sign verified findings**
-- **Update verification ledger**
-- Trigger replanning if deviation detected
-
-### Phase 5: Dynamic Replanning with Trust Recalculation
-
-Trigger replanning when:
-- Key assumption invalidated
-- **Signature verification fails**
-- **Trusted issuer removed from whitelist**
-- **Citation chain broken**
-- Higher-quality signed source discovered
-
-## Ed25519 Verification Protocol
-
-### Trusted Issuers Whitelist
-
-Default trusted issuers (Level 5 sources):
-```yaml
-trusted_issuers:
-  news:
-    - reuters.com
-    - ap.org
-    - bbc.com
-  academic:
-    - arxiv.org
-    - nature.com
-    - science.org
-    - pubmed.gov
-  government:
-    - .gov domains
-    - .gov.uk domains
-    - europa.eu
-  financial:
-    - sec.gov
-    - federalreserve.gov
-    - ecb.europa.eu
-```
+| Trust class | Requirement | What it proves | Confidence |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `ISSUER_SIGNED` | Signature verifies against the active pinned key for the claimed issuer | The pinned issuer signed this exact canonical message | up to `0.95` |
+| `SELF_ATTESTED` | Researcher signature verifies against the embedded researcher key | The research record was not altered after self-signing | up to `0.60` |
+| `UNVERIFIED` | Unknown issuer, missing pin, revoked key, key mismatch, malformed key, or invalid signature | No cryptographic provenance | `0.0` |
 
-### Signature Verification Flow
+## Signed Message
 
-```
-1. Source provides content + signature + public_key_id
-2. Fetch public key from trusted keyserver or issuer
-3. Verify Ed25519 signature: verify(signature, content_hash, public_key)
-4. Check issuer against trusted whitelist
-5. Record verification result in ledger
-6. Assign cryptographic trust score
-```
+`sign_fact()` and `verify_fact()` use the same deterministic JSON message containing:
 
-### Citation Chain Verification
-
-Each fact in the chain must have:
-```json
-{
-  "claim": "The statement being made",
-  "source_url": "https://...",
-  "source_hash": "sha256:abc123...",
-  "issuer_pubkey": "ed25519:xyz789...",
-  "signature": "ed25519_sig:...",
-  "timestamp": "2025-01-22T10:30:00Z",
-  "parent_citation": "chain_id:previous_fact_id",
-  "confidence": 0.95
-}
-```
+- `issuer`
+- `source_url`
+- `claim`
+- `source_hash`
+- `timestamp`
+- optional `research_context` / nonce
 
-Chain verification:
-1. Verify each fact's signature individually
-2. Verify chain integrity (parent hashes match)
-3. Check all issuers are in trusted whitelist
-4. Calculate aggregate chain confidence
+Changing the issuer or moving the source URL after signing invalidates the signature. The code signs the raw canonical message bytes; Ed25519 performs its own internal hashing. Do not pre-hash with SHA-512 before signing.
 
-## Anti-Hallucination Rules
+## Pinned Issuers
 
-### 100% Citation Rule
-**Every factual claim MUST have a verifiable source.** No exceptions.
+The default pinned issuer registry is empty. Add real keys explicitly:
 
-```
-❌ FORBIDDEN: "Studies show that X leads to Y"
-✅ REQUIRED:  "A 2024 study published in Nature (DOI: 10.1038/...) found that X leads to Y"
+```python
+verifier = Ed25519Verifier(
+    trusted_issuers={
+        "example.org": {"pubkey_b64": "base64-public-key", "status": "active"}
+    }
+)
 ```
 
-### Verification Thresholds
+`status: revoked` rejects the key. Online revocation fetching is not implemented. Replay protection is limited to binding `research_context` / nonce into the signed message; there is no persistent nonce ledger.
 
-| Mode | Threshold | Use Case |
-|------|-----------|----------|
-| `development` | 0.75 | Exploratory research, brainstorming |
-| `moderate` | 0.85 | Standard research (default) |
-| `strict` | 0.95 | Legal, medical, financial research |
-| `paranoid` | 0.99 | Critical decisions, published reports |
+## Citation Chain Verification
 
-### Confidence Calculation
+Each non-root fact stores `parent_hash = sha256(canonical_message(parent_fact))`. Chain verification:
 
-```
-confidence = base_reliability × verification_multiplier × recency_factor
+1. Verifies each fact signature.
+2. Recomputes each parent content hash and compares it to the child's `parent_hash`.
+3. Verifies `chain_signature` over the ordered list of fact hashes.
 
-where:
-  base_reliability = source level (1-5) / 5
-  verification_multiplier = 1.0 if unsigned, 1.2 if signed, 1.5 if chain_verified
-  recency_factor = 1.0 if <24h, 0.9 if <7d, 0.8 if <30d, 0.6 if older
-```
+Reordering, substituting, editing, relabeling, or moving a signed fact fails verification.
 
-## Research Execution Patterns (Enhanced)
+## GOAP Research Modes
 
-### Pattern A: Verified Exploratory Research
-```
-Goal: comprehensive_verified_understanding
-Actions:
-1. configure_trusted_issuers → whitelist_active
-2. web_search_verified → verified_candidates_found
-3. FOR EACH candidate: fetch_signed_source → signed_content_retrieved
-4. extract_facts → facts_cataloged
-5. sign_extracted_facts → signed_facts
-6. cross_reference_signed → signed_consistency_checked
-7. build_citation_chain → citation_chain_complete
-8. verify_citation_chain → chain_verified
-9. synthesize_findings → conclusions_formed
-10. generate_signed_report → signed_report_delivered
-```
+| Mode | Behavior |
+|---|---|
+| `development` | Allows unsigned claims with clear labels and lower confidence. |
+| `moderate` | Prefers signed and cross-checked sources but may continue with labeled uncertainty. |
+| `strict` | Rejects plans with unsigned, invalid, unknown, revoked, or mismatched claims. |
+| `paranoid` | Same as strict, with stronger source redundancy expectations. |
 
-### Pattern B: High-Stakes Fact Verification
-```
-Goal: cryptographically_verified_claim
-Mode: strict (0.95 threshold)
-Actions:
-1. identify_claim → claim_defined
-2. configure_trusted_issuers (strict list) → whitelist_active
-3. find_primary_source → primary_located
-4. fetch_signed_source → signed_content_retrieved
-5. verify_claim_cryptographic → cryptographically_verified
-6. cross_reference_signed (≥3 sources) → multi_source_verified
-7. build_citation_chain → citation_chain_complete
-8. verify_citation_chain → chain_verified (confidence ≥0.95)
-```
+## Confidence Formula
 
-### Pattern C: Competitive Analysis with Audit Trail
 ```
-Goal: auditable_competitive_landscape
-Actions:
-1. identify_players → competitors_listed
-2. configure_trusted_issuers → whitelist_active
-3. FOR EACH competitor:
-   - web_search_verified → verified_info_found
-   - fetch_signed_source (official sources) → signed_content
-   - extract_facts → facts_cataloged
-   - sign_extracted_facts → signed_facts
-4. cross_reference_signed → consistency_verified
-5. build_citation_chain → full_chain
-6. generate_signed_report → auditable_report
+confidence =
+  0.0   if UNVERIFIED
+  <=0.60 if SELF_ATTESTED
+  min(0.95, base_by_source_level * recency_factor) if ISSUER_SIGNED
 ```
 
-## Output Structure (Enhanced)
-
-### Verified Research Report Format
-
-```markdown
-## Executive Summary
-[Key findings in 2-3 sentences]
-
-## Verification Status
-- Mode: strict (0.95 threshold)
-- Chain Integrity: ✅ VERIFIED
-- Unsigned Claims: 0
-- Total Citations: 15
-- Trusted Issuers Used: 8
+Invalid signatures are rejected with confidence `0.0`; they are never a recoverable `0.5` penalty.
 
-## Research Objective
-[Original question/goal]
+## Research Workflow
 
-## Methodology
-[GOAP plan executed, verification protocol used]
+1. Define the research goal and required evidence threshold.
+2. Configure pinned issuer keys when issuer-grade provenance is required.
+3. Search and fetch sources.
+4. Extract claims and source URLs.
+5. Hash source content with SHA-256 for `source_hash`.
+6. Create self-attested facts for the research ledger or issuer-signed facts when a pinned issuer key actually signed the message.
+7. Verify facts and citation chains.
+8. Cross-check claims through ordinary source evaluation.
+9. Report confidence, unsigned claims, rejected signatures, and limitations explicitly.
 
-## Verified Findings
+## Output Expectations
 
-### [Subtopic 1]
-[Findings with signed inline citations]
+Reports should include:
 
-**Verification Details:**
-| Claim | Source | Signature | Confidence |
-|-------|--------|-----------|------------|
-| ... | ... | ✅ | 0.96 |
-
-### [Subtopic 2]
-[Findings with signed inline citations]
-
-## Confidence Assessment
-- Cryptographically Verified (≥0.95): [claims list]
-- Cross-Reference Verified (0.85-0.95): [claims list]
-- Single Source (0.75-0.85): [claims list]
-- Unverified (<0.75): NONE (strict mode)
-
-## Citation Chain
-[Full chain with signatures - see Appendix A]
-
-## Verification Ledger
-[Signed log of all verification operations]
-
-## Sources
-[Numbered list with URLs, signatures, and trust scores]
-
-## Appendix A: Cryptographic Verification Details
-[Full Ed25519 signature data for audit]
-```
-
-## Quality Standards (Enhanced)
-
-**Completeness Checks:**
-- [ ] All original questions addressed
-- [ ] **100% of claims have citations**
-- [ ] **All citations are verifiable**
-- [ ] **Citation chain integrity verified**
-- [ ] Primary sources found where possible
-- [ ] Contradictions identified and addressed
-- [ ] Confidence levels assigned to conclusions
-- [ ] **Verification ledger signed and complete**
-
-**Anti-Hallucination Checks:**
-- [ ] No claims without sources
-- [ ] No "studies show" without specific citation
-- [ ] No statistics without methodology source
-- [ ] No quotes without attribution + verification
-- [ ] No predictions presented as facts
+- Research objective and GOAP plan executed.
+- Findings with source URLs.
+- Verification status per claim (`ISSUER_SIGNED`, `SELF_ATTESTED`, or `UNVERIFIED`).
+- Chain integrity result when citation chains are used.
+- Unsigned and rejected claims.
+- Explicit caveat that cryptographic provenance is not truth verification.
 
 ## Implementation
 
-### Python Usage
-
-```python
-from goap_planner import GOAPResearchPlanner
-from ed25519_verifier import Ed25519Verifier
-
-# Initialize with Ed25519 verification
-planner = GOAPResearchPlanner(
-    verification_mode="strict",
-    trusted_issuers=["reuters.com", "ap.org", "nature.com"]
-)
-
-# Generate research plan
-plan = planner.plan(
-    goal_type="verified_exploratory",
-    topic="AI safety regulations 2025"
-)
-
-# Execute with verification
-results = planner.execute(plan, verify_all=True)
+Use the scripts in this skill:
 
-# Generate signed report
-report = planner.generate_report(
-    results,
-    sign=True,
-    include_verification_ledger=True
-)
-```
+- [scripts/ed25519_verifier.py](scripts/ed25519_verifier.py)
+- [scripts/goap_planner.py](scripts/goap_planner.py)
 
-### CLI Usage (via goalie integration)
+Install Python crypto dependencies in a virtual environment:
 
 ```bash
-# Install goalie for Ed25519 support
-npm install -g goalie
-
-# Verified research
-goalie search "Your research question" \
-  --verify \
-  --strict-verify \
-  --trusted-issuers "reuters.com,ap.org,nature.com" \
-  --mode academic \
-  --save
-
-# Anti-hallucination check
-goalie reason --mode anti-hallucination \
-  --claims "Your claim to verify" \
-  --citations "Source URL"
+python3 -m venv .venv
+.venv/bin/pip install cryptography
 ```
 
-## References
-
-For detailed implementations, see:
-- [references/research-actions.md](references/research-actions.md) - Complete action specifications with Ed25519 extensions
-- [references/source-evaluation.md](references/source-evaluation.md) - Source credibility with cryptographic trust
-- [references/ed25519-verification.md](references/ed25519-verification.md) - Ed25519 protocol details
-- [scripts/goap_planner.py](scripts/goap_planner.py) - Enhanced GOAP planner
-- [scripts/ed25519_verifier.py](scripts/ed25519_verifier.py) - Verification module
-
-## Dependencies
-
-- Python 3.9+
-- `@noble/ed25519` (Node.js) or `cryptography` (Python) for Ed25519
-- Optional: `goalie` npm package for CLI integration
+Use `--break-system-packages` only as a last-resort local workaround when you understand the system-integrity risk.