@dzhechkov/p-replicator 1.1.0 → 1.3.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +4 -2
- package/templates/.claude/rules/replicate-pipeline.md +5 -1
- package/templates/.claude/skills/brutal-honesty-review/SKILL.md +43 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/SKILL.md +8 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/modules/03-generate-p0.md +46 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/modules/04-generate-p1.md +9 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/modules/05-generate-p2p3.md +11 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/modules/06-package-deliver.md +46 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/references/security-patterns-library.md +196 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/references/templates/automation-commands.md +15 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/references/templates/ddd-agents.md +39 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/references/templates/feature-lifecycle.md +8 -0
- package/templates/.claude/skills/requirements-validator/SKILL.md +25 -1
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@dzhechkov/p-replicator",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "1.
|
|
4
|
-
"description": "P-Replicator — Claude Code toolkit for AI-assisted product development (Vibe Coding). Full /replicate pipeline, 10 modular skills (
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "1.3.0",
|
|
4
|
+
"description": "P-Replicator — Claude Code toolkit for AI-assisted product development (Vibe Coding). Full /replicate pipeline, 10 modular skills (194K+ chars), /harvest knowledge extraction, swarm agents, quality gates, security patterns, cross-project learning.",
|
|
5
5
|
"main": "src/cli.js",
|
|
6
6
|
"bin": {
|
|
7
7
|
"p-replicator": "bin/cli.js"
|
|
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
|
|
|
35
35
|
"bdd",
|
|
36
36
|
"invest",
|
|
37
37
|
"smart",
|
|
38
|
+
"security",
|
|
39
|
+
"owasp",
|
|
38
40
|
"documentation",
|
|
39
41
|
"skill-pack",
|
|
40
42
|
"modular-skills",
|
|
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ When executing skills during the pipeline:
|
|
|
20
20
|
3. When a skill references `/mnt/user-data/uploads/` — read from `docs/` instead
|
|
21
21
|
4. When a skill outputs to `/output/` — write to `docs/` or project root instead
|
|
22
22
|
5. `goap-research` skill name maps to `goap-research-ed25519` in this repo
|
|
23
|
-
6. When a skill has `modules/` directory — read the module file
|
|
23
|
+
6. **CRITICAL:** When a skill has `modules/` directory — you MUST read the FULL module file for EVERY phase before executing it. SKILL.md is the orchestrator only — it contains summaries, NOT the actual generation logic. NEVER generate artifacts from SKILL.md summaries. In a real project, skipping `modules/04-generate-p1.md` caused 10+ artifacts to be silently omitted.
|
|
24
24
|
7. See `.claude/rules/skill-interface-protocol.md` for full interface specification
|
|
25
25
|
|
|
26
26
|
## Modular Skills
|
|
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ When executing skills during the pipeline:
|
|
|
28
28
|
Skills with `modules/` directories delegate phases to self-contained module files.
|
|
29
29
|
Each module follows: INPUT → PROCESS → OUTPUT → QUALITY GATE interface.
|
|
30
30
|
|
|
31
|
+
**MANDATORY:** Before executing any modular skill phase, read the corresponding module file in full.
|
|
32
|
+
Module files contain the actual generation instructions, templates, and quality gates.
|
|
33
|
+
SKILL.md contains only summaries and orchestration logic — it is NOT sufficient for generation.
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
31
35
|
Currently modularized skills:
|
|
32
36
|
- `cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced` — 9 modules (6 core pipeline + 3 extensions)
|
|
33
37
|
- `knowledge-extractor` — 4 modules (agent review → classify → decontextualize → integrate)
|
|
@@ -136,6 +136,49 @@ higher quality. They don't."
|
|
|
136
136
|
|
|
137
137
|
---
|
|
138
138
|
|
|
139
|
+
## Security Review Checklist (Linus Mode — CRITICAL)
|
|
140
|
+
|
|
141
|
+
When reviewing code that handles authentication, authorization, data storage,
|
|
142
|
+
or external integrations, apply this checklist in addition to standard code quality:
|
|
143
|
+
|
|
144
|
+
### OWASP Top 10 Quick Checks
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
| # | Vulnerability | What to Look For | Severity |
|
|
147
|
+
|---|--------------|-------------------|----------|
|
|
148
|
+
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Missing auth middleware, RLS bypass (pool.query vs dbClient), cross-tenant entity access without ownership check | CRITICAL |
|
|
149
|
+
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Weak JWT secrets with fallback defaults, hardcoded secrets, missing HMAC on webhooks | CRITICAL |
|
|
150
|
+
| A03 | Injection | SQL via string interpolation (SET LOCAL), template literals in queries, unsanitized user input in commands | CRITICAL |
|
|
151
|
+
| A04 | Insecure Design | Per-request stateful services (circuit breakers never trigger), missing rate limiting | HIGH |
|
|
152
|
+
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Same CORS policy across environments, verbose errors in production, missing security headers | HIGH |
|
|
153
|
+
| A07 | Auth Failures | No account lockout, weak password policy, session fixation | HIGH |
|
|
154
|
+
| A08 | Data Integrity | Unsigned webhook payloads, missing CSRF tokens, unvalidated redirects | HIGH |
|
|
155
|
+
| A09 | Logging Failures | No audit trail for auth events, PII in logs, missing failed-attempt logging | MEDIUM |
|
|
156
|
+
|
|
157
|
+
### Multi-Tenant Security (if applicable)
|
|
158
|
+
|
|
159
|
+
- [ ] All DB queries use tenant-scoped connection, NOT shared pool
|
|
160
|
+
- [ ] SET LOCAL uses parameterized set_config(), NOT string interpolation
|
|
161
|
+
- [ ] Cross-entity references verify tenant ownership before operation
|
|
162
|
+
- [ ] Tenant isolation tested with cross-tenant attack scenarios
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
### Secret Management
|
|
165
|
+
|
|
166
|
+
- [ ] All secrets validated at startup — missing = process.exit(1)
|
|
167
|
+
- [ ] No fallback defaults for security-critical secrets
|
|
168
|
+
- [ ] Secrets never appear in logs, error messages, or stack traces
|
|
169
|
+
- [ ] Environment-specific security posture (dev/staging/prod)
|
|
170
|
+
|
|
171
|
+
### Webhook Security
|
|
172
|
+
|
|
173
|
+
- [ ] Every webhook endpoint verifies request signature/HMAC
|
|
174
|
+
- [ ] Unsigned payloads are rejected and logged
|
|
175
|
+
- [ ] Webhook secrets stored in environment variables
|
|
176
|
+
|
|
177
|
+
**Calibration:** Security violations ALWAYS trigger Level 3 (Brutal).
|
|
178
|
+
Security bugs are not "style issues" — they are negligence.
|
|
179
|
+
|
|
180
|
+
---
|
|
181
|
+
|
|
139
182
|
## Assessment Rubrics
|
|
140
183
|
|
|
141
184
|
### Code Quality (Linus Mode)
|
|
@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ description: >
|
|
|
18
18
|
Three modes: AUTO, HYBRID (default), MANUAL.
|
|
19
19
|
---
|
|
20
20
|
|
|
21
|
+
> **CRITICAL MODULE LOADING REQUIREMENT:**
|
|
22
|
+
> This skill has 9 modules in `modules/`. SKILL.md is the orchestrator ONLY.
|
|
23
|
+
> You MUST read EVERY module file referenced in the Module Execution Protocol below
|
|
24
|
+
> before executing its phase. Skipping module files causes entire artifact categories
|
|
25
|
+
> to be silently omitted. In one real project, skipping `modules/04-generate-p1.md`
|
|
26
|
+
> caused 10+ P1 artifacts (agents, skills, commands) to be completely missing.
|
|
27
|
+
> NEVER generate artifacts from SKILL.md summaries alone — always read the full module.
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
21
29
|
# CC-Toolkit-Generator Enhanced
|
|
22
30
|
|
|
23
31
|
Generate production-ready Claude Code instruments from **SPARC or idea2prd-manual documentation**.
|
|
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ From the Instrument Map this module uses:
|
|
|
27
27
|
|
|
28
28
|
## Process
|
|
29
29
|
|
|
30
|
+
> **ANTI-COMPRESSION DIRECTIVE:** When generating files from templates in this module,
|
|
31
|
+
> COPY the FULL text of each template. Do NOT summarize, compress, or "interpret" templates.
|
|
32
|
+
> Every section, every placeholder, every comment must be preserved verbatim.
|
|
33
|
+
> AI systems routinely compress 211-line templates to 60 lines — this is a CRITICAL defect.
|
|
34
|
+
> Validate: generated file line count must be >= 80% of template line count.
|
|
35
|
+
|
|
30
36
|
### P0 Mandatory Items (always generated)
|
|
31
37
|
|
|
32
38
|
The following 16 items are generated for every project, regardless of pipeline
|
|
@@ -37,6 +43,7 @@ type or user mode.
|
|
|
37
43
|
#### Item 1: CLAUDE.md
|
|
38
44
|
|
|
39
45
|
**Template:** `view() references/claude-md-strategy.md`
|
|
46
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
40
47
|
|
|
41
48
|
The project's root context file. Generation strategy differs by pipeline:
|
|
42
49
|
|
|
@@ -154,6 +161,39 @@ Generate `.claude/rules/coding-style.md` containing:
|
|
|
154
161
|
- Code organization patterns
|
|
155
162
|
- IF idea2prd: DDD tactical patterns (aggregate rules, entity identity, VO immutability)
|
|
156
163
|
|
|
164
|
+
**Known Gotchas section (always include):**
|
|
165
|
+
|
|
166
|
+
Add a `## Known Gotchas` section to coding-style.md with language/framework-specific
|
|
167
|
+
pitfalls extracted from harvest insights. Include at minimum:
|
|
168
|
+
|
|
169
|
+
```markdown
|
|
170
|
+
## Known Gotchas
|
|
171
|
+
|
|
172
|
+
### TypeScript / JavaScript
|
|
173
|
+
- `\w` in regex does NOT match Cyrillic or other non-Latin characters.
|
|
174
|
+
Use `\p{L}` with `/u` flag or explicit character classes for Unicode text.
|
|
175
|
+
- Direct type casting `req as CustomType` fails with TS2352. Use double-cast
|
|
176
|
+
via `unknown`: `(req as unknown as CustomType)`. Better: use generic route handlers.
|
|
177
|
+
- Jest `coverageThreshold` (singular) silently fails if spelled `coverageThresholds` (plural).
|
|
178
|
+
Per-directory thresholds require a `global` key. ts-jest needs `ts-node` as peer dependency.
|
|
179
|
+
- `jest.fn(async () => value)` doesn't satisfy `jest.Mocked<T>` in strict mode.
|
|
180
|
+
Use `jest.fn().mockResolvedValue(value)` or `jest.fn().mockImplementation(...)`.
|
|
181
|
+
- Opossum `CircuitBreaker.fire()` returns `Promise<unknown>`, requires explicit cast.
|
|
182
|
+
Both `@types/opossum` and `opossum` packages are needed.
|
|
183
|
+
- Socket.io `Server` has no `.toRoom()` method. Wrap it:
|
|
184
|
+
`{ toRoom: (room) => io.to(room) }` for hexagonal architecture ports.
|
|
185
|
+
|
|
186
|
+
### Infrastructure
|
|
187
|
+
- Services with circuit breakers/rate limiters MUST be singletons.
|
|
188
|
+
Per-request instances bypass protection (breaker never accumulates failures).
|
|
189
|
+
- `SET LOCAL` in PostgreSQL only affects the current transaction on the current connection.
|
|
190
|
+
Use parameterized `set_config()` instead of string interpolation.
|
|
191
|
+
```
|
|
192
|
+
|
|
193
|
+
Adapt gotchas to the specific tech stack detected in IPM. Remove irrelevant entries
|
|
194
|
+
(e.g., no TypeScript gotchas for Python projects). Add stack-specific gotchas from
|
|
195
|
+
`view() references/security-patterns-library.md` if applicable.
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
157
197
|
**Output path:** `.claude/rules/coding-style.md`
|
|
158
198
|
|
|
159
199
|
---
|
|
@@ -161,6 +201,7 @@ Generate `.claude/rules/coding-style.md` containing:
|
|
|
161
201
|
#### Item 4: /start command
|
|
162
202
|
|
|
163
203
|
**Template:** `view() references/templates/start-command.md`
|
|
204
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
164
205
|
|
|
165
206
|
Generate `.claude/commands/start.md` -- the full project bootstrap command.
|
|
166
207
|
|
|
@@ -189,6 +230,7 @@ code from memory. Every Phase 2 Task includes explicit doc references.
|
|
|
189
230
|
#### Item 5: /myinsights command
|
|
190
231
|
|
|
191
232
|
**Template:** `view() references/templates/insights-system.md` (Section 1)
|
|
233
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
192
234
|
|
|
193
235
|
Generate `.claude/commands/myinsights.md` -- the insight capture and management
|
|
194
236
|
command with:
|
|
@@ -207,6 +249,7 @@ command with:
|
|
|
207
249
|
#### Item 6: /feature command
|
|
208
250
|
|
|
209
251
|
**Template:** `view() references/templates/feature-lifecycle.md` (Section 2)
|
|
252
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
210
253
|
|
|
211
254
|
Generate `.claude/commands/feature.md` -- the 4-phase feature lifecycle command:
|
|
212
255
|
|
|
@@ -278,6 +321,7 @@ type(scope): description
|
|
|
278
321
|
#### Item 8: insights-capture.md rule
|
|
279
322
|
|
|
280
323
|
**Template:** `view() references/templates/insights-system.md` (Section 2)
|
|
324
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
281
325
|
|
|
282
326
|
Generate `.claude/rules/insights-capture.md` with:
|
|
283
327
|
- Error-First Lookup protocol (grep index BEFORE debugging)
|
|
@@ -293,6 +337,7 @@ Generate `.claude/rules/insights-capture.md` with:
|
|
|
293
337
|
#### Item 9: feature-lifecycle.md rule
|
|
294
338
|
|
|
295
339
|
**Template:** `view() references/templates/feature-lifecycle.md` (Section 3)
|
|
340
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
296
341
|
|
|
297
342
|
Generate `.claude/rules/feature-lifecycle.md` with:
|
|
298
343
|
- Protocol definition (4-phase lifecycle)
|
|
@@ -310,6 +355,7 @@ Generate `.claude/rules/feature-lifecycle.md` with:
|
|
|
310
355
|
#### Item 10: settings.json hooks
|
|
311
356
|
|
|
312
357
|
**Template:** `view() references/templates/insights-system.md` (Section 3 -- Stop hook)
|
|
358
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
313
359
|
|
|
314
360
|
Generate `.claude/settings.json` with hook configuration:
|
|
315
361
|
|
|
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ engine and conditionally included based on project characteristics and document
|
|
|
19
19
|
|
|
20
20
|
## Process
|
|
21
21
|
|
|
22
|
+
> **ANTI-COMPRESSION DIRECTIVE:** When generating files from templates in this module,
|
|
23
|
+
> COPY the FULL text of each template. Do NOT summarize, compress, or "interpret" templates.
|
|
24
|
+
> Every section, every placeholder, every comment must be preserved verbatim.
|
|
25
|
+
> AI systems routinely compress 211-line templates to 60 lines — this is a CRITICAL defect.
|
|
26
|
+
> Validate: generated file line count must be >= 80% of template line count.
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
22
28
|
### Step 1: Filter P1 Candidates
|
|
23
29
|
|
|
24
30
|
Select all instruments assigned tier P1 from the Instrument Map (score >= 12 after tier boosts).
|
|
@@ -208,6 +214,7 @@ Generate .claude/rules/testing.md:
|
|
|
208
214
|
**Trigger:** `IPM.has_ddd == true`
|
|
209
215
|
|
|
210
216
|
Read complete template: `view("references/templates/feature-lifecycle-ent.md")`
|
|
217
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
211
218
|
|
|
212
219
|
```
|
|
213
220
|
IF has_ddd:
|
|
@@ -254,6 +261,7 @@ IF has_ddd:
|
|
|
254
261
|
**Trigger:** Always generated for P1 (enhances developer workflow regardless of pipeline).
|
|
255
262
|
|
|
256
263
|
Read complete template: `view("references/templates/feature-suggestions.md")`
|
|
264
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
257
265
|
|
|
258
266
|
```
|
|
259
267
|
7a. Generate .claude/feature-roadmap.json
|
|
@@ -305,6 +313,7 @@ Read complete template: `view("references/templates/feature-suggestions.md")`
|
|
|
305
313
|
**Trigger:** Always generated for P1 (provides autonomous execution capabilities).
|
|
306
314
|
|
|
307
315
|
Read complete template: `view("references/templates/automation-commands.md")`
|
|
316
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
308
317
|
|
|
309
318
|
```
|
|
310
319
|
8a. Generate .claude/commands/go.md
|
|
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ when DDD documentation is detected.
|
|
|
22
22
|
|
|
23
23
|
## Process
|
|
24
24
|
|
|
25
|
+
> **ANTI-COMPRESSION DIRECTIVE:** When generating files from templates in this module,
|
|
26
|
+
> COPY the FULL text of each template. Do NOT summarize, compress, or "interpret" templates.
|
|
27
|
+
> Every section, every placeholder, every comment must be preserved verbatim.
|
|
28
|
+
> AI systems routinely compress 211-line templates to 60 lines — this is a CRITICAL defect.
|
|
29
|
+
> Validate: generated file line count must be >= 80% of template line count.
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
25
31
|
### Tier Overview
|
|
26
32
|
|
|
27
33
|
```
|
|
@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@ P3 — External Integrations:
|
|
|
41
47
|
Source: Pseudocode (SPARC/idea2prd) + Gherkin tests (idea2prd) + Fitness Functions (idea2prd)
|
|
42
48
|
|
|
43
49
|
Read template: `view("references/templates/ddd-agents.md")` section "tdd-guide.md Agent (Enhanced)"
|
|
50
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
44
51
|
|
|
45
52
|
```
|
|
46
53
|
Generate .claude/agents/tdd-guide.md:
|
|
@@ -156,6 +163,7 @@ skip this entire step.
|
|
|
156
163
|
Source: DDD Tactical (aggregates) + Fitness Functions
|
|
157
164
|
|
|
158
165
|
Read template: `view("references/templates/ddd-agents.md")` section "ddd-validator.md Agent"
|
|
166
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
159
167
|
|
|
160
168
|
```
|
|
161
169
|
IF has_ddd:
|
|
@@ -191,6 +199,7 @@ IF has_ddd:
|
|
|
191
199
|
Source: DDD Tactical (aggregates, entities, value-objects)
|
|
192
200
|
|
|
193
201
|
Read template: `view("references/templates/ddd-skills.md")` section "aggregate-patterns/ Skill"
|
|
202
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
194
203
|
|
|
195
204
|
```
|
|
196
205
|
IF has_ddd:
|
|
@@ -213,6 +222,7 @@ IF has_ddd:
|
|
|
213
222
|
Source: DDD Tactical (events)
|
|
214
223
|
|
|
215
224
|
Read template: `view("references/templates/ddd-skills.md")` section "event-handlers/ Skill"
|
|
225
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
216
226
|
|
|
217
227
|
```
|
|
218
228
|
IF has_ddd:
|
|
@@ -284,6 +294,7 @@ IF has_ddd AND has_fitness:
|
|
|
284
294
|
### Step 3: Generate P3 Items — MCP Configuration
|
|
285
295
|
|
|
286
296
|
Read complete template: `view("references/templates/mcp.md")`
|
|
297
|
+
> CRITICAL: COPY the full template. Do NOT compress or summarize.
|
|
287
298
|
|
|
288
299
|
```
|
|
289
300
|
Generate .mcp.json in project root:
|
package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/modules/06-package-deliver.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -216,6 +216,52 @@ CHECK 20: P3 MCP (IF external integrations detected)
|
|
|
216
216
|
[ ] INSTALL.md documents all required env vars from .mcp.json
|
|
217
217
|
```
|
|
218
218
|
|
|
219
|
+
### Step 1.5: Automated File-Existence Validation
|
|
220
|
+
|
|
221
|
+
Before proceeding to placeholder scanning, run an automated file-existence check
|
|
222
|
+
against the expected output manifest. This catches the most common generation failure:
|
|
223
|
+
files that should exist but were silently omitted (often due to skipping module files).
|
|
224
|
+
|
|
225
|
+
```
|
|
226
|
+
AUTOMATED FILE CHECK PROTOCOL:
|
|
227
|
+
|
|
228
|
+
Step 1: Build expected file list from Instrument Map tiers:
|
|
229
|
+
- P0 mandatory: 16 items (always expected)
|
|
230
|
+
- P0 conditional: check IPM flags before expecting
|
|
231
|
+
- P1 core: 10 items (if P1 was executed)
|
|
232
|
+
- P1 conditional: check IPM flags
|
|
233
|
+
- P2/P3: check flags and execution status
|
|
234
|
+
|
|
235
|
+
Step 2: For each expected file, run existence check:
|
|
236
|
+
for file in expected_files:
|
|
237
|
+
if not exists(file.path):
|
|
238
|
+
log CRITICAL: "Missing file: {file.path} (expected from {file.phase})"
|
|
239
|
+
missing_count++
|
|
240
|
+
|
|
241
|
+
Step 3: For each expected directory, verify SKILL.md exists inside:
|
|
242
|
+
for skill_dir in expected_skill_directories:
|
|
243
|
+
if not exists(skill_dir + "/SKILL.md"):
|
|
244
|
+
log CRITICAL: "Missing SKILL.md in {skill_dir}"
|
|
245
|
+
missing_count++
|
|
246
|
+
|
|
247
|
+
Step 4: Verify file sizes (anti-compression check):
|
|
248
|
+
for file in generated_files:
|
|
249
|
+
if file.size_bytes < 100:
|
|
250
|
+
log WARNING: "Suspiciously small file: {file.path} ({file.size_bytes} bytes)"
|
|
251
|
+
log WARNING: "Possible template compression — verify content completeness"
|
|
252
|
+
|
|
253
|
+
Step 5: Report
|
|
254
|
+
if missing_count > 0:
|
|
255
|
+
CRITICAL FAILURE: {missing_count} expected files are missing.
|
|
256
|
+
List each missing file with its expected source phase/module.
|
|
257
|
+
Attempt auto-fix by re-reading the relevant module and regenerating.
|
|
258
|
+
else:
|
|
259
|
+
PASS: All {total_count} expected files exist.
|
|
260
|
+
```
|
|
261
|
+
|
|
262
|
+
This step was added based on a real-project insight where skipping `modules/04-generate-p1.md`
|
|
263
|
+
caused 10+ P1 artifacts to be silently omitted without any error in the final report.
|
|
264
|
+
|
|
219
265
|
### Step 2: Verify Placeholder Substitution
|
|
220
266
|
|
|
221
267
|
Scan ALL generated files for unsubstituted placeholders:
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Security Patterns Library
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
Reference library of security patterns extracted from real-project harvest insights.
|
|
4
|
+
Used by toolkit generator modules (03, 04, 05) when generating security.md rules,
|
|
5
|
+
secrets-management.md, security-patterns/ skill, and code-reviewer agent.
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
## Critical Patterns (Must-Have for Multi-Tenant Systems)
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
### S-01: RLS Bypass Prevention — Pool vs Client Query
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
**Problem:** Tenant middleware sets `app.tenant_id` via `SET LOCAL` on a dedicated
|
|
12
|
+
PoolClient (`req.dbClient`), but repositories use `pool.query()` (shared pool).
|
|
13
|
+
The query runs on a different connection without tenant context — RLS is bypassed.
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
**Pattern:**
|
|
16
|
+
```
|
|
17
|
+
RULE: NEVER use pool.query() in multi-tenant systems with RLS.
|
|
18
|
+
ALWAYS pass the tenant-scoped dbClient from middleware through service layer to repository.
|
|
19
|
+
Every database query MUST use the same connection where SET LOCAL was executed.
|
|
20
|
+
```
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
**Detection:** Search for `pool.query()` in repository files when RLS is enabled.
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
**Generated Rule (security.md):**
|
|
25
|
+
```markdown
|
|
26
|
+
- Multi-tenant RLS: All database queries MUST use tenant-scoped connection (req.dbClient),
|
|
27
|
+
NEVER the shared pool. Verify by grepping for pool.query() — any hit is a security bug.
|
|
28
|
+
```
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
---
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
### S-02: SQL Injection via SET LOCAL
|
|
33
|
+
|
|
34
|
+
**Problem:** String interpolation in `SET LOCAL app.tenant_id = '${tenantId}'`
|
|
35
|
+
is an SQL injection vector even with UUID validation.
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
**Pattern:**
|
|
38
|
+
```
|
|
39
|
+
RULE: NEVER use string interpolation for SET LOCAL.
|
|
40
|
+
ALWAYS use parameterized set_config():
|
|
41
|
+
SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', $1, true)
|
|
42
|
+
```
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
**Detection:** Search for `SET LOCAL` with template literals or string concatenation.
|
|
45
|
+
|
|
46
|
+
**Generated Rule (security.md):**
|
|
47
|
+
```markdown
|
|
48
|
+
- Parameterized config: Use `set_config('key', $1, true)` instead of
|
|
49
|
+
`SET LOCAL key = '${value}'`. Applies to all session-level config.
|
|
50
|
+
```
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
---
|
|
53
|
+
|
|
54
|
+
### S-03: Fail-Fast Secret Validation at Startup
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
**Problem:** Service A falls back to `'dev-secret-change-me'` when JWT_SECRET is
|
|
57
|
+
missing, while Service B uses `process.env.JWT_SECRET!`. Creates split-brain:
|
|
58
|
+
signing uses weak fallback, verification uses undefined.
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
**Pattern:**
|
|
61
|
+
```
|
|
62
|
+
RULE: NEVER provide fallback values for security-critical secrets.
|
|
63
|
+
ALWAYS validate at startup and exit with process.exit(1) if missing or too short.
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
Required checks:
|
|
66
|
+
- JWT_SECRET: exists AND length >= 32 characters
|
|
67
|
+
- DATABASE_URL: exists AND not localhost in production
|
|
68
|
+
- API keys: exist AND not placeholder values
|
|
69
|
+
```
|
|
70
|
+
|
|
71
|
+
**Generated Rule (security.md):**
|
|
72
|
+
```markdown
|
|
73
|
+
- Startup secret guard: All security secrets (JWT_SECRET, API keys, encryption keys)
|
|
74
|
+
MUST be validated at application startup. Missing or weak secrets MUST cause
|
|
75
|
+
immediate process.exit(1). NEVER use fallback defaults for secrets.
|
|
76
|
+
```
|
|
77
|
+
|
|
78
|
+
---
|
|
79
|
+
|
|
80
|
+
### S-04: Cross-Tenant Entity Ownership
|
|
81
|
+
|
|
82
|
+
**Problem:** API endpoint accepts an entity ID (e.g., operatorId) without
|
|
83
|
+
verifying that the entity belongs to the requesting tenant. RLS on the target
|
|
84
|
+
table may not cover this cross-reference.
|
|
85
|
+
|
|
86
|
+
**Pattern:**
|
|
87
|
+
```
|
|
88
|
+
RULE: Before using any entity ID from request params in a cross-table operation,
|
|
89
|
+
verify the entity belongs to the same tenant:
|
|
90
|
+
1. Load entity by ID
|
|
91
|
+
2. Check entity.tenantId === request.tenantId
|
|
92
|
+
3. Return 403 if mismatch
|
|
93
|
+
```
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
**Generated Rule (security.md):**
|
|
96
|
+
```markdown
|
|
97
|
+
- Cross-tenant ownership: When an API accepts entity IDs (operatorId, userId, etc.),
|
|
98
|
+
ALWAYS verify entity.tenantId matches the requesting tenant before any operation.
|
|
99
|
+
RLS alone may not protect cross-table references.
|
|
100
|
+
```
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
---
|
|
103
|
+
|
|
104
|
+
### S-05: Webhook Signature Verification
|
|
105
|
+
|
|
106
|
+
**Problem:** Webhook endpoints accept any POST without HMAC/signature verification.
|
|
107
|
+
Attackers can inject fake messages if webhook URLs are discovered.
|
|
108
|
+
|
|
109
|
+
**Pattern:**
|
|
110
|
+
```
|
|
111
|
+
RULE: Every webhook endpoint MUST verify the request signature:
|
|
112
|
+
- Telegram: verify X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token header
|
|
113
|
+
- Stripe: verify Stripe-Signature header with webhook secret
|
|
114
|
+
- GitHub: verify X-Hub-Signature-256 header
|
|
115
|
+
- Generic: verify HMAC-SHA256 of body with shared secret
|
|
116
|
+
```
|
|
117
|
+
|
|
118
|
+
**Generated Rule (security.md):**
|
|
119
|
+
```markdown
|
|
120
|
+
- Webhook HMAC: Every webhook endpoint MUST verify request signature/HMAC.
|
|
121
|
+
NEVER accept unsigned webhook requests. Log and reject unsigned payloads.
|
|
122
|
+
```
|
|
123
|
+
|
|
124
|
+
---
|
|
125
|
+
|
|
126
|
+
## High-Priority Patterns
|
|
127
|
+
|
|
128
|
+
### S-06: Singleton Service Instances
|
|
129
|
+
|
|
130
|
+
**Problem:** Creating service instances per-request (e.g., `Service.fromEnv()` in
|
|
131
|
+
route handler) means stateful components like circuit breakers never accumulate
|
|
132
|
+
failure state and never trigger protection.
|
|
133
|
+
|
|
134
|
+
**Pattern:**
|
|
135
|
+
```
|
|
136
|
+
RULE: Services with stateful protection mechanisms (circuit breakers, rate limiters,
|
|
137
|
+
connection pools) MUST be created as singletons at application startup.
|
|
138
|
+
NEVER create per-request instances of stateful services.
|
|
139
|
+
```
|
|
140
|
+
|
|
141
|
+
**Impact on Generated Code:**
|
|
142
|
+
- In architect.md agent: include singleton pattern for infrastructure services
|
|
143
|
+
- In coding-style.md rule: "stateful services are singletons, injected at startup"
|
|
144
|
+
|
|
145
|
+
---
|
|
146
|
+
|
|
147
|
+
### S-07: Environment-Specific Security Posture
|
|
148
|
+
|
|
149
|
+
**Pattern:**
|
|
150
|
+
```
|
|
151
|
+
RULE: Security posture MUST match environment:
|
|
152
|
+
- Development: relaxed CORS, verbose errors, debug logging
|
|
153
|
+
- Staging: production-like security, sanitized test data
|
|
154
|
+
- Production: strict CORS, generic errors, structured logging only
|
|
155
|
+
|
|
156
|
+
NEVER: same security config across all environments
|
|
157
|
+
NEVER: expose stack traces in production error responses
|
|
158
|
+
```
|
|
159
|
+
|
|
160
|
+
---
|
|
161
|
+
|
|
162
|
+
## Integration Patterns for Generated Toolkit
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
### How Patterns Map to Generated Files
|
|
165
|
+
|
|
166
|
+
| Pattern | security.md | secrets-management.md | code-reviewer.md | architect.md |
|
|
167
|
+
|---------|------------|----------------------|-------------------|--------------|
|
|
168
|
+
| S-01 RLS Bypass | Rule | — | Check | Architecture note |
|
|
169
|
+
| S-02 SQL Injection | Rule | — | Check | — |
|
|
170
|
+
| S-03 Secret Validation | Rule | Primary content | Check | Startup validation |
|
|
171
|
+
| S-04 Cross-Tenant | Rule | — | Check | — |
|
|
172
|
+
| S-05 Webhook HMAC | Rule | Secret storage | Check | — |
|
|
173
|
+
| S-06 Singleton | — | — | Check | Architecture pattern |
|
|
174
|
+
| S-07 Env Security | Rule | Env-specific rules | — | Environment guide |
|
|
175
|
+
|
|
176
|
+
### Usage in Module 03 (Generate P0)
|
|
177
|
+
|
|
178
|
+
When generating `security.md` rule (Item 2), include applicable patterns:
|
|
179
|
+
- IF multi-tenant detected: S-01, S-02, S-04
|
|
180
|
+
- IF has_external_apis: S-03, S-05
|
|
181
|
+
- IF has_database: S-01, S-02
|
|
182
|
+
- ALWAYS: S-03, S-07
|
|
183
|
+
|
|
184
|
+
### Usage in Module 04 (Generate P1)
|
|
185
|
+
|
|
186
|
+
When generating `code-reviewer.md` agent (Step 2b), add security review checklist
|
|
187
|
+
from applicable patterns to the agent's review criteria.
|
|
188
|
+
|
|
189
|
+
When generating `architect.md` agent (Step 2c), include S-06 singleton pattern
|
|
190
|
+
and S-07 environment posture in architecture guidelines.
|
|
191
|
+
|
|
192
|
+
### Usage in brutal-honesty-review
|
|
193
|
+
|
|
194
|
+
When reviewing code in Linus Mode, check for violations of all S-01 through S-07
|
|
195
|
+
patterns as CRITICAL findings. Security violations should always trigger
|
|
196
|
+
Level 3 (Brutal) calibration.
|
|
@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ description: Intelligent feature implementation pipeline. Analyzes complexity an
|
|
|
27
27
|
One-command feature implementation that automatically selects the right pipeline
|
|
28
28
|
based on feature complexity, then executes it without manual confirmations.
|
|
29
29
|
|
|
30
|
+
> **PROCESS COMPLIANCE — BLOCKING RULES:**
|
|
31
|
+
> - MUST use /plan, /feature, or /feature-ent commands — NEVER launch raw Agent tools directly
|
|
32
|
+
> - MUST follow the skill chain: /next -> /go -> /plan|/feature|/feature-ent
|
|
33
|
+
> - FORBIDDEN: Bypassing the skill chain by spawning parallel agents without commands
|
|
34
|
+
> - FORBIDDEN: Batching multiple features into a single commit wave
|
|
35
|
+
> - CRITICAL: Each feature MUST get its own plan, validation, and commit sequence
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
30
37
|
## Step 1: Determine Target Feature
|
|
31
38
|
|
|
32
39
|
IF $ARGUMENTS is provided:
|
|
@@ -186,6 +193,14 @@ description: Autonomous project build loop. Bootstraps project and implements fe
|
|
|
186
193
|
End-to-end autonomous project build: bootstrap → implement features in loop → done.
|
|
187
194
|
Combines `/start`, `/next`, and `/go` into a single continuous pipeline.
|
|
188
195
|
|
|
196
|
+
> **AUTONOMOUS EXECUTION — BLOCKING RULES:**
|
|
197
|
+
> - MUST execute features ONE AT A TIME through the full /go pipeline
|
|
198
|
+
> - MUST create 1 plan per feature, 1 validation per feature, 1 commit per feature
|
|
199
|
+
> - NEVER batch features into parallel waves without individual plans
|
|
200
|
+
> - NEVER skip the /next -> /go pipeline by launching raw implementation agents
|
|
201
|
+
> - CRITICAL: If a feature fails 3 times, skip it and log — NEVER retry indefinitely
|
|
202
|
+
> - MUST push state after each feature completion (independent commits)
|
|
203
|
+
|
|
189
204
|
## Step 0: Parse Scope
|
|
190
205
|
|
|
191
206
|
```
|
package/templates/.claude/skills/cc-toolkit-generator-enhanced/references/templates/ddd-agents.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -194,6 +194,44 @@ Proposed
|
|
|
194
194
|
[What was rejected and why?]
|
|
195
195
|
```
|
|
196
196
|
|
|
197
|
+
## Architecture Patterns
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
### Singleton Services (Infrastructure)
|
|
200
|
+
|
|
201
|
+
Services with stateful protection mechanisms MUST be created as singletons at
|
|
202
|
+
application startup. NEVER create per-request instances of stateful services.
|
|
203
|
+
|
|
204
|
+
**Why:** Per-request instances of circuit breakers, rate limiters, or connection pools
|
|
205
|
+
bypass protection — the breaker never accumulates failure state and never opens.
|
|
206
|
+
|
|
207
|
+
**Pattern:**
|
|
208
|
+
```
|
|
209
|
+
CORRECT:
|
|
210
|
+
const mcpService = MCPService.fromEnv() // at startup, once
|
|
211
|
+
app.use((req, res, next) => {
|
|
212
|
+
req.mcpService = mcpService // inject singleton
|
|
213
|
+
next()
|
|
214
|
+
})
|
|
215
|
+
|
|
216
|
+
WRONG:
|
|
217
|
+
app.get('/api', (req, res) => {
|
|
218
|
+
const mcpService = MCPService.fromEnv() // new instance per request!
|
|
219
|
+
// circuit breaker resets every request — never trips
|
|
220
|
+
})
|
|
221
|
+
```
|
|
222
|
+
|
|
223
|
+
**Applies to:** circuit breakers, rate limiters, connection pools, MCP clients,
|
|
224
|
+
external service adapters, cache managers.
|
|
225
|
+
|
|
226
|
+
### Security-by-Environment
|
|
227
|
+
|
|
228
|
+
Security posture MUST match environment:
|
|
229
|
+
- **Development:** relaxed CORS, verbose errors, debug logging
|
|
230
|
+
- **Staging:** production-like security, sanitized test data
|
|
231
|
+
- **Production:** strict CORS, generic errors, structured logging only
|
|
232
|
+
|
|
233
|
+
NEVER use the same security configuration across all environments.
|
|
234
|
+
|
|
197
235
|
## Fitness Functions
|
|
198
236
|
|
|
199
237
|
{{ARCHITECTURE_FITNESS_FUNCTIONS}}
|
|
@@ -206,6 +244,7 @@ For architecture questions:
|
|
|
206
244
|
- Explain bounded context impact
|
|
207
245
|
- List trade-offs explicitly
|
|
208
246
|
- Suggest ADR if recording needed
|
|
247
|
+
- Check singleton pattern for infrastructure services
|
|
209
248
|
```
|
|
210
249
|
|
|
211
250
|
---
|
|
@@ -65,6 +65,14 @@ description: Full feature lifecycle — from idea to reviewed implementation.
|
|
|
65
65
|
Four-phase feature development lifecycle with quality gates between each phase.
|
|
66
66
|
All documentation goes to `docs/features/<feature-name>/sparc/`.
|
|
67
67
|
|
|
68
|
+
> **SKILL CHAIN — BLOCKING RULES:**
|
|
69
|
+
> - MUST execute Phase 0 (pre-flight check) before ANY generation
|
|
70
|
+
> - MUST use sparc-prd-mini skill for planning — NEVER generate SPARC docs from memory
|
|
71
|
+
> - MUST use requirements-validator for validation — NEVER skip validation phase
|
|
72
|
+
> - MUST use brutal-honesty-review for review — NEVER self-review
|
|
73
|
+
> - FORBIDDEN: Skipping any phase without explicit user permission
|
|
74
|
+
> - CRITICAL: Each phase MUST complete and commit before the next phase starts
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
68
76
|
## Phase 0: PRE-FLIGHT CHECK
|
|
69
77
|
|
|
70
78
|
Before starting, verify all required skills exist:
|
|
@@ -103,13 +103,37 @@ Always flag these terms and suggest specific replacements:
|
|
|
103
103
|
- Add AC: "Given X, when Y, then Z within 200ms"
|
|
104
104
|
```
|
|
105
105
|
|
|
106
|
+
### Security Acceptance Criteria (10% bonus weight)
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
When requirements involve authentication, data storage, external APIs, or multi-tenancy,
|
|
109
|
+
apply additional security validation:
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
| Criterion | Check | Red Flags |
|
|
112
|
+
|-----------|-------|-----------|
|
|
113
|
+
| Input Validation | All user inputs sanitized? | No validation mentioned, "trust client" |
|
|
114
|
+
| Authentication | Auth mechanism specified? | "users can access", no auth context |
|
|
115
|
+
| Authorization | Access control defined? | No role/permission model |
|
|
116
|
+
| Data Protection | Sensitive data handling specified? | PII without encryption rules |
|
|
117
|
+
| Multi-Tenant Isolation | Tenant boundary enforced? | Shared queries, no tenant context |
|
|
118
|
+
| Secret Management | Secrets externalized? | Hardcoded keys, fallback defaults |
|
|
119
|
+
| Webhook Security | Signature verification? | "Accept POST", no HMAC |
|
|
120
|
+
|
|
121
|
+
**Scoring Bonus:** +5 points if security criteria present and specific, +0 if not applicable,
|
|
122
|
+
-10 if security-relevant requirement lacks any security criteria (BLOCKED if score drops below 50).
|
|
123
|
+
|
|
124
|
+
**Security BDD Scenarios:** For security-relevant requirements, ALWAYS generate:
|
|
125
|
+
- Auth bypass attempt scenario
|
|
126
|
+
- Input injection scenario (SQL, XSS, command)
|
|
127
|
+
- Cross-tenant access attempt (if multi-tenant)
|
|
128
|
+
- Rate limiting / brute force scenario (if auth endpoint)
|
|
129
|
+
|
|
106
130
|
### BDD Scenario Generation
|
|
107
131
|
|
|
108
132
|
For each requirement, generate scenarios covering:
|
|
109
133
|
1. **Happy path** (1-2 scenarios) — Primary success flow
|
|
110
134
|
2. **Error handling** (2-3 scenarios) — Validation, network, server errors
|
|
111
135
|
3. **Edge cases** (1-2 scenarios) — Boundaries, concurrent access
|
|
112
|
-
4. **Security** (
|
|
136
|
+
4. **Security** (1-3 scenarios) — Auth bypass, injection, cross-tenant, rate limiting
|
|
113
137
|
|
|
114
138
|
See `references/bdd-patterns.md` for Gherkin templates and examples.
|
|
115
139
|
|