@dynamic-labs/iframe-setup 5.0.0-rc.0 → 5.0.0-rc.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,76 @@
 
-## [5.0.0-rc.0](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/compare/v4.91.6...v5.0.0-rc.0) (2026-07-05)
+## [5.0.0-rc.1](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/compare/v5.0.0-rc.0...v5.0.0-rc.1) (2026-07-17)
+
+
+### ⚠ BREAKING CHANGES
+
+* move legacy embedded wallet to waas upgrade flow to new legacy-embedded-wallet-migration package (#11841)
+* drop default injection of legacy embedded wallet connectors (#11833)
+* remove legacy embedded wallet support (#11979)
+* throw when legacy embedded wallet is detected without migration provider (#11855)
+* remove deprecated eclipse package (#11831)
+* remove deprecated functions and props (#11832)
+
+
+### [4.92.4](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/compare/v4.92.3...v4.92.4) (2026-07-16)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **bitcoin:** per-network address switching and dust-limit send validation [v4] ([#11970](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11970)) ([76a4a9a](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/76a4a9a5025d78798ebd1beffe6c0af59d2d029a)), closes [#11896](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11896) [#11800](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11800)
+* **midnight:** per-network addresses in deposit and wallet info views [v4] ([#11949](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11949)) ([978446a](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/978446aca8546eb038ba9ed3be0503d10594ee15))
+* **midnight:** resolve wallet address per selected network [v4] ([#11948](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11948)) ([d6f858c](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/d6f858c5e35defda7ed73cf97b3fdbe5ed9d131d))
+* set useMetamaskSdk to true by default ([#11926](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11926)) ([75b5a4a](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/75b5a4a0fe8b1a375afce145c0b8bdc3ce761117))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **midnight:** align per-network code with the final main iteration [v4] ([#11971](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11971)) ([3ef3ba8](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/3ef3ba8c090dfd9e4286b4e51bf350ea5e6feac7))
+* settle social sign-in when captcha is backed out or oauth popup never responds (v4) ([#11956](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11956)) ([ad49477](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/ad49477f2acf61a154bb79cbe26b24f803cdb0e2))
+* validate that private key is not empty before upgrading to WaaS ([#11952](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11952)) ([21dfb83](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/21dfb83cb29e42b335bc94a0cdd2062cf14a262a))
+
+### [4.92.3](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/compare/v4.92.2...v4.92.3) (2026-07-10)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **sdk-react-core:** fix deterministic 'Wallet not found' crash in embedded wallet export (v4) ([#11906](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11906)) ([913ef23](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/913ef236b26245488e1cd5db7e874601b65ff0a2)), closes [#11905](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11905) [#11729](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11729)
+
+### [4.92.2](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/compare/v4.92.1...v4.92.2) (2026-07-09)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* engage captcha during step-up OTP re-auth ([#11879](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11879)) ([585460a](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/585460a8976803a8ed0aad16a4a00047bd6c115a))
+* **waas:** gate v1 wallet upgrade on recovery for email-only wallets ([#11897](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11897)) ([5a6f0c6](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/5a6f0c6bf3120e59cf502004d09fae56f193e977))
+
+### [4.92.1](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/compare/v4.92.0...v4.92.1) (2026-07-09)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **ethereum:** fire in-app-browser redirect on sign for injected EVM wallets that use in-app-browser experience ([#11888](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11888)) ([5116d91](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/5116d91ab2c71000a490d72c5d278549d4d8ae9a))
+* **sdk-react-core:** show clear message for Phantom redirect signing failures (v4 backport) ([#11886](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11886)) ([60ac897](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/60ac897ba81f7758ccd7a05f97b619785e1f50a7))
+* **social:** use redirect strategy for step-up OAuth on mobile [V4 backport] ([#11881](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11881)) ([42a202e](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/42a202e6255de8db73df02eff37c0b10b24fef1a))
+* **solana:** fire in-app-browser redirect on sign and wallet switch ([#11871](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11871)) ([4e2d6b7](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/4e2d6b7ac8fdef5bf7c62b8a726ecaef1c6210ec))
+* **solana:** resolve Phantom/Backpack provider collision and Backpack >=0.10.x connect hangs ([#11856](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11856)) ([#11882](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11882)) ([5784aff](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/5784aff9641bbc85445fb466f3ab1d6a14331e73))
+
+## [4.92.0](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/compare/v4.91.6...v4.92.0) (2026-07-08)
+
+
+### Features
+
+* **captcha:** add Cloudflare Turnstile provider support alongside hCaptcha (v4) ([#11798](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11798)) ([114c770](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/114c7702e900d8dedeebe7be867de35d11a93f31))
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **ethereum-aa:** resolve kernel client config per wallet (v4) ([#11870](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11870)) ([1b66d79](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/1b66d79b4a32b4b6de433b7536bc46e6719224c6))
+* **iframe-setup:** block dangerous URL schemes and verify sender in OPEN_URL ([#11819](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11819)) ([329b27e](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/329b27e9fac825916ab227ec8cf93dc343898923))
+* improve social OAuth error messages ([#11837](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11837)) ([8e57c06](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/8e57c067c5a89111a32a12fb82e190cf6c46ad67))
+* **react-native-extension:** reject path traversal in downloadFile fileName ([#11816](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11816)) ([9367a56](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/9367a56b6daa853d7f7e7f5534261bc68825b239))
+* **sdk-react-core:** display exactly the bytes signed in personal_sign preview ([#11818](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/issues/11818)) ([30b9382](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/commit/30b93829122f00060cb484aef09a03294c03f651))
+  
 
 ### [4.91.6](https://github.com/dynamic-labs/dynamic-auth/compare/v4.91.5...v4.91.6) (2026-07-03)
 

package/README.md

@@ -146,12 +146,20 @@ export const setupIframe = (
 ): VoidFunction => {
   if (typeof window === 'undefined') return () => {};
 
-  const messageHandler = createMessageHandler<IFRAME_EVENTS>(window, origin);
+  const messageHandler = createMessageHandler<IFRAME_EVENTS>(
+    window,
+    origin,
+    iframe,
+  );
   const messageSender = createMessageSender<IFRAME_EVENTS>(iframe);
 
   // Add event listener to handle deeplink
   const setupOpenUrlHandler = () =>
     messageHandler('OPEN_URL', ({ url, target = 'self', features }) => {
+      // This navigates the host top window, so never honor a URL whose scheme
+      // can execute script in the host origin (iframe->host XSS).
+      if (hasDangerousScheme(url)) return;
+
       if (target === 'blank') {
         window.open(url, '_blank', features);
       } else {
@@ -220,6 +228,45 @@ export const setupIframe = (
 
 // Utils
 
+/**
+ * URL schemes that can execute script in the host origin. Navigating the host
+ * top window to any of these turns an OPEN_URL message into arbitrary code
+ * execution in the integrator's origin, so they are blocked.
+ *
+ * A deny-list (rather than an http/https allow-list) is used deliberately:
+ * wallet flows legitimately open custom-scheme deep links, and allow-listing
+ * http(s) would break them.
+ */
+const DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = [
+  'javascript:',
+  'data:',
+  'blob:',
+  'vbscript:',
+  'file:',
+];
+
+/**
+ * Leading characters the browser ignores when resolving a URL scheme: spaces,
+ * tabs, newlines and other C0 control chars (U+0000–U+0020). Stripping them
+ * defeats obfuscation such as "\tjavascript:alert(1)".
+ */
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+const LEADING_IGNORED_CHARS = /^[\u0000-\u0020]+/;
+
+/**
+ * Returns true when the URL begins with a script-executing scheme.
+ *
+ * Non-string input is treated as dangerous, leading ignored chars are stripped
+ * first, and the comparison is case-insensitive ("JavaScript:" is blocked).
+ */
+const hasDangerousScheme = (url: unknown): boolean => {
+  if (typeof url !== 'string') return true;
+
+  const normalized = url.replace(LEADING_IGNORED_CHARS, '').toLowerCase();
+
+  return DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.some((scheme) => normalized.startsWith(scheme));
+};
+
 /**
  * Custom event dispatched when the parent URL changes via the History API.
  * Used instead of re-patching history per setupIframe call so that multiple
@@ -262,7 +309,11 @@ const patchHistoryOnce = (): void => {
  * Create a message handler for the iframe
  */
 const createMessageHandler =
-  <T extends Record<string, MESSAGE_HANDLER>>(window: Window, origin: string) =>
+  <T extends Record<string, MESSAGE_HANDLER>>(
+    window: Window,
+    origin: string,
+    iframe: HTMLIFrameElement,
+  ) =>
   <EVENT_NAME extends Extract<keyof T, string>>(
     eventName: EVENT_NAME,
     handler: T[EVENT_NAME],
@@ -270,6 +321,10 @@ const createMessageHandler =
     const messageHandler = (event: MessageEvent) => {
       if (event.origin !== origin) return;
 
+      // Only trust messages coming from this iframe's own window. Checking the
+      // origin alone lets any frame/tab at the SDK-iframe origin forge events.
+      if (event.source !== iframe.contentWindow) return;
+
       const { eventName: incomingEventName, args } = event.data;
 
       if (eventName === incomingEventName) {

package/package.cjs

@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
 
 Object.defineProperty(exports, '__esModule', { value: true });
 
-var version = "5.0.0-rc.0";
+var version = "5.0.0-rc.1";
 
 exports.version = version;

package/package.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 'use client'
-var version = "5.0.0-rc.0";
+var version = "5.0.0-rc.1";
 
 export { version };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@dynamic-labs/iframe-setup",
-  "version": "5.0.0-rc.0",
+  "version": "5.0.0-rc.1",
   "description": "Collection of utilities to use the Dynamic SDK in an iframe",
   "author": "Dynamic Labs, Inc.",
   "license": "MIT",
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
   },
   "homepage": "https://www.dynamic.xyz/",
   "dependencies": {
-    "@dynamic-labs/assert-package-version": "5.0.0-rc.0"
+    "@dynamic-labs/assert-package-version": "5.0.0-rc.1"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {}
 }

package/src/lib/setupIframe/setupIframe.cjs

@@ -22,10 +22,14 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, '__esModule', { value: true });
 const setupIframe = (iframe, origin) => {
     if (typeof window === 'undefined')
         return () => { };
-    const messageHandler = createMessageHandler(window, origin);
+    const messageHandler = createMessageHandler(window, origin, iframe);
     const messageSender = createMessageSender(iframe);
     // Add event listener to handle deeplink
     const setupOpenUrlHandler = () => messageHandler('OPEN_URL', ({ url, target = 'self', features }) => {
+        // This navigates the host top window, so never honor a URL whose scheme
+        // can execute script in the host origin (iframe->host XSS).
+        if (hasDangerousScheme(url))
+            return;
         if (target === 'blank') {
             window.open(url, '_blank', features);
         }
@@ -82,6 +86,41 @@ const setupIframe = (iframe, origin) => {
     return () => cleanupHandlers.forEach((offHandler) => offHandler());
 };
 // Utils
+/**
+ * URL schemes that can execute script in the host origin. Navigating the host
+ * top window to any of these turns an OPEN_URL message into arbitrary code
+ * execution in the integrator's origin, so they are blocked.
+ *
+ * A deny-list (rather than an http/https allow-list) is used deliberately:
+ * wallet flows legitimately open custom-scheme deep links, and allow-listing
+ * http(s) would break them.
+ */
+const DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = [
+    'javascript:',
+    'data:',
+    'blob:',
+    'vbscript:',
+    'file:',
+];
+/**
+ * Leading characters the browser ignores when resolving a URL scheme: spaces,
+ * tabs, newlines and other C0 control chars (U+0000–U+0020). Stripping them
+ * defeats obfuscation such as "\tjavascript:alert(1)".
+ */
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+const LEADING_IGNORED_CHARS = /^[\u0000-\u0020]+/;
+/**
+ * Returns true when the URL begins with a script-executing scheme.
+ *
+ * Non-string input is treated as dangerous, leading ignored chars are stripped
+ * first, and the comparison is case-insensitive ("JavaScript:" is blocked).
+ */
+const hasDangerousScheme = (url) => {
+    if (typeof url !== 'string')
+        return true;
+    const normalized = url.replace(LEADING_IGNORED_CHARS, '').toLowerCase();
+    return DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.some((scheme) => normalized.startsWith(scheme));
+};
 /**
  * Custom event dispatched when the parent URL changes via the History API.
  * Used instead of re-patching history per setupIframe call so that multiple
@@ -117,10 +156,14 @@ const patchHistoryOnce = () => {
 /**
  * Create a message handler for the iframe
  */
-const createMessageHandler = (window, origin) => (eventName, handler) => {
+const createMessageHandler = (window, origin, iframe) => (eventName, handler) => {
     const messageHandler = (event) => {
         if (event.origin !== origin)
             return;
+        // Only trust messages coming from this iframe's own window. Checking the
+        // origin alone lets any frame/tab at the SDK-iframe origin forge events.
+        if (event.source !== iframe.contentWindow)
+            return;
         const { eventName: incomingEventName, args } = event.data;
         if (eventName === incomingEventName) {
             handler(...args);

package/src/lib/setupIframe/setupIframe.js

@@ -18,10 +18,14 @@
 const setupIframe = (iframe, origin) => {
     if (typeof window === 'undefined')
         return () => { };
-    const messageHandler = createMessageHandler(window, origin);
+    const messageHandler = createMessageHandler(window, origin, iframe);
     const messageSender = createMessageSender(iframe);
     // Add event listener to handle deeplink
     const setupOpenUrlHandler = () => messageHandler('OPEN_URL', ({ url, target = 'self', features }) => {
+        // This navigates the host top window, so never honor a URL whose scheme
+        // can execute script in the host origin (iframe->host XSS).
+        if (hasDangerousScheme(url))
+            return;
         if (target === 'blank') {
             window.open(url, '_blank', features);
         }
@@ -78,6 +82,41 @@ const setupIframe = (iframe, origin) => {
     return () => cleanupHandlers.forEach((offHandler) => offHandler());
 };
 // Utils
+/**
+ * URL schemes that can execute script in the host origin. Navigating the host
+ * top window to any of these turns an OPEN_URL message into arbitrary code
+ * execution in the integrator's origin, so they are blocked.
+ *
+ * A deny-list (rather than an http/https allow-list) is used deliberately:
+ * wallet flows legitimately open custom-scheme deep links, and allow-listing
+ * http(s) would break them.
+ */
+const DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = [
+    'javascript:',
+    'data:',
+    'blob:',
+    'vbscript:',
+    'file:',
+];
+/**
+ * Leading characters the browser ignores when resolving a URL scheme: spaces,
+ * tabs, newlines and other C0 control chars (U+0000–U+0020). Stripping them
+ * defeats obfuscation such as "\tjavascript:alert(1)".
+ */
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+const LEADING_IGNORED_CHARS = /^[\u0000-\u0020]+/;
+/**
+ * Returns true when the URL begins with a script-executing scheme.
+ *
+ * Non-string input is treated as dangerous, leading ignored chars are stripped
+ * first, and the comparison is case-insensitive ("JavaScript:" is blocked).
+ */
+const hasDangerousScheme = (url) => {
+    if (typeof url !== 'string')
+        return true;
+    const normalized = url.replace(LEADING_IGNORED_CHARS, '').toLowerCase();
+    return DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.some((scheme) => normalized.startsWith(scheme));
+};
 /**
  * Custom event dispatched when the parent URL changes via the History API.
  * Used instead of re-patching history per setupIframe call so that multiple
@@ -113,10 +152,14 @@ const patchHistoryOnce = () => {
 /**
  * Create a message handler for the iframe
  */
-const createMessageHandler = (window, origin) => (eventName, handler) => {
+const createMessageHandler = (window, origin, iframe) => (eventName, handler) => {
     const messageHandler = (event) => {
         if (event.origin !== origin)
             return;
+        // Only trust messages coming from this iframe's own window. Checking the
+        // origin alone lets any frame/tab at the SDK-iframe origin forge events.
+        if (event.source !== iframe.contentWindow)
+            return;
         const { eventName: incomingEventName, args } = event.data;
         if (eventName === incomingEventName) {
             handler(...args);