@dumbmice/pi-mailbridge 0.0.0-stage → 0.1.1

package/src/daemon/service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,550 @@
+// Daemon HTTP service.
+//
+// Transport-neutral: construction takes its collaborators, so tests boot the real
+// server against fake mail/source and assert the whole contract over HTTP.
+//
+// Auth: every route except /health requires `Authorization: Bearer <token>`,
+// compared in constant time. Loopback is not authorization.
+//
+// Bounds: request body, SSE clients, registry entries. A local process should not
+// be able to exhaust the daemon.
+
+import http from "node:http"
+import { timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto"
+
+import type { ResolvedConfig } from "../core/config.ts"
+import type { ScanSummary } from "../core/status.ts"
+
+type ScanSummaryLike = ScanSummary
+import { CAPABILITIES } from "./api.ts"
+import { createSendBudget } from "./send-budget.ts"
+import type { MailSource } from "./process.ts"
+import { ackPending, claimPending, listPending } from "../store/pending-store.ts"
+import { journal } from "../store/journal.ts"
+import { recordOutbound, removeOutbound, sessionThread } from "../store/threads.ts"
+import { generateMessageId } from "../core/mailer.ts"
+import { readMode, writeMode, isMode, type Mode } from "../store/mode-store.ts"
+import { createRegistry, type Registry } from "../store/registry.ts"
+
+export const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1_000_000
+/** A body that is not JSON: the caller's fault, and the only 400 the handler emits. */
+class BadBodyError extends Error {}
+
+async function readJson(req: import("node:http").IncomingMessage): Promise<unknown> {
+	const text = await readBody(req)
+	try {
+		return JSON.parse(text)
+	} catch {
+		throw new BadBodyError("body is not valid JSON")
+	}
+}
+
+export const MAX_SSE_CLIENTS = 100
+/** Heartbeat entries kept; sessions that vanished are pruned on /health anyway. */
+export const MAX_PINGS = 256
+
+export type DaemonEvent =
+	| { type: "delivery"; pending: ReturnType<typeof listPending>[number] }
+	| { type: "mode"; mode: Mode }
+
+export interface DaemonDeps {
+	config: ResolvedConfig
+	token: string
+	source: MailSource
+	/** Sends mail. Injected so tests never open a socket. */
+	send: (message: {
+		to: string
+		subject: string
+		text: string
+		cwd?: string
+		sessionId?: string
+		/** RFC 5322 threading, derived here from the outbound id registry. */
+		inReplyTo?: string
+		references?: string[]
+		/** Minted and recorded before this is called; the transport must stamp it. */
+		messageId: string
+	}) => Promise<{ messageId?: string } | void>
+	/**
+	 * Called after a successful send with the assigned Message-ID, so the caller can
+	 * record it for reply-chain routing. Kept out of this module so the service does
+	 * not need the routing secret.
+	 */
+	onSent?: (info: { messageId?: string; subject: string; sessionId?: string }) => void
+	/**
+	 * Re-read config and restart the watcher. Called after `/mailbridge setup` or
+	 * `auth` so a fresh config or token takes effect without killing the daemon.
+	 */
+	reload?: () => Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string; warning?: string }>
+	/**
+	 * Ask the daemon to exit so a supervisor can start a fresh process.
+	 * `/reload` re-reads config but cannot replace running code, so an updated
+	 * package would otherwise keep executing the previous version until reboot.
+	 */
+	shutdown?: (reason?: string) => void
+	/**
+	 * Called after a mode change. Turning mode on must trigger a scan: the only other
+	 * triggers are an IMAP `exists` (a NEW arrival) and reconnect, so without this a reply
+	 * that arrived while the channel was closed would wait for unrelated mail.
+	 */
+	onModeChange?: (mode: Mode) => void
+	/**
+	 * Live config accessor. /reload swaps the config, so anything that reads it per
+	 * request (recipient, Message-ID domain, device name, listen address) must ask here
+	 * rather than capture the object this service was built with.
+	 */
+	getConfig?: () => ResolvedConfig
+	/** Outcome of the most recent scan, for diagnostics. */
+	scanSummary?: () => ScanSummaryLike | undefined
+	/** mtime of the config file the daemon is running on (0 when there was no file). */
+	configLoadedAt?: () => number
+	/** Is the IMAP watcher connected? A revoked credential shows here, not in the process. */
+	imapHealthy?: () => boolean
+	/** This build's version. Diagnostic only - compatibility is `apiVersion`. */
+	version?: string
+	/** The wire contract this daemon implements. */
+	apiVersion?: number
+	/** How long after the last ping to exit. Default 120s. */
+	idleTimeoutMs?: number
+	env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv
+	now?: () => number
+	/** Diagnostics: the daemon's log. */
+	log?: (message: string) => void
+	registry?: Registry
+}
+
+export interface DaemonService {
+	server: http.Server
+	listen(port?: number, host?: string): Promise<{ port: number; host: string }>
+	close(): Promise<void>
+	/** Push an event to every connected SSE client. */
+	broadcast(event: DaemonEvent): void
+	readonly sseClients: number
+}
+
+function constantTimeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {
+	const ab = Buffer.from(a)
+	const bb = Buffer.from(b)
+	return ab.length === bb.length && timingSafeEqual(ab, bb)
+}
+
+function readBody(req: http.IncomingMessage): Promise<string> {
+	return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+		let size = 0
+		const chunks: Buffer[] = []
+		req.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => {
+			size += chunk.length
+			if (size > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
+				reject(new Error("request body too large"))
+				req.destroy()
+				return
+			}
+			chunks.push(chunk)
+		})
+		req.on("end", () => resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8")))
+		req.on("error", reject)
+	})
+}
+
+function asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {
+	return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value) ? (value as Record<string, unknown>) : undefined
+}
+
+export function createDaemonService(deps: DaemonDeps): DaemonService {
+	const env = deps.env ?? process.env
+	const now = deps.now ?? (() => Date.now())
+	const registry = deps.registry ?? createRegistry()
+
+	/** live SSE response objects */
+	const streams = new Set<http.ServerResponse>()
+
+	// Sliding one-minute budget for outbound mail. Ten notifications a minute is far above any
+	// human-answered flow; the point is that a loop cannot spend the account's quota.
+	const sendBudget = createSendBudget({ limit: 10, windowMs: 60_000 })
+
+	// Liveness of pi sessions. A session pings on its poll tick; when every session has gone quiet
+	// the daemon stops - always, and by design: an updated package cannot leave an orphan running
+	// old code, and nothing reads a mailbox no session will consume. A daemon nobody ever pings
+	// (started by hand, and pi never attached) stops on the same clock.
+	const pings = new Map<string, number>()
+	// Idleness is measured from the daemon's own start when nobody has pinged yet, so a fresh
+	// daemon gets the full grace period rather than looking infinitely stale.
+	const startedAt = Date.now()
+	const idleTimeout = deps.idleTimeoutMs ?? 120_000
+
+	const idleCheck = setInterval(() => {
+		const newest = Math.max(startedAt, ...pings.values())
+		if (Date.now() - newest <= idleTimeout) return
+		deps.shutdown?.(`idle: no ping for ${Math.round(idleTimeout / 1000)}s`)
+	}, Math.min(15_000, Math.max(1_000, Math.floor(idleTimeout / 4))))
+	// Never hold the process open just for this timer.
+	if (typeof idleCheck.unref === "function") idleCheck.unref()
+
+	function broadcast(event: DaemonEvent): void {
+		const payload = `data: ${JSON.stringify(event)}\n\n`
+		for (const res of streams) {
+			try {
+				res.write(payload)
+			} catch {
+				streams.delete(res)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// The handler is a separate function so a throw anywhere in it - including the URL parse,
+	// which runs before authentication - becomes a 500 rather than an unhandled rejection that
+	// kills the daemon. Node accepts absolute-form request targets, so `new URL` can throw on a
+	// single unauthenticated request.
+	const dispatch = async (req: import("node:http").IncomingMessage, res: import("node:http").ServerResponse): Promise<void> => {
+		const url = new URL(req.url ?? "/", "http://127.0.0.1")
+		const send = (status: number, body: unknown) => {
+			const payload = JSON.stringify(body)
+			res.writeHead(status, { "content-type": "application/json", "content-length": Buffer.byteLength(payload) })
+			res.end(payload)
+		}
+		const fail = (status: number, code: string, extra?: Record<string, unknown>) =>
+			send(status, { error: { code, ...extra } })
+
+		// Liveness is unauthenticated so a supervisor can probe without a secret.
+		if (url.pathname === "/health") {
+			// Prune here as well as on /bye: a crashed session never sends one, and an
+			// unbounded map plus a spread into Math.max is its own failure mode.
+			const nowMs = now()
+			const stale = nowMs - (deps.idleTimeoutMs ?? 120_000) * 4
+			for (const [id, at] of pings) if (at < stale) pings.delete(id)
+			// Track the maximum by iteration: spreading an unbounded map into Math.max throws
+			// RangeError (and kills the daemon) long before the map is "large".
+			let newestPing = 0
+			for (const at of pings.values()) if (at > newestPing) newestPing = at
+			return send(200, {
+				ok: true,
+				mode: readMode(env),
+				pending: listPending(env).length,
+				// `sessions` is the decision registry (sessions that were told about a
+				// notification), not connected clients — a raw payload showed `sessions: 0`
+				// next to `clients: 2`. Both keys, so neither reading is wrong.
+				sessions: registry.list().length,
+				registry: registry.list().length,
+				sseClients: streams.size,
+				// Liveness: how many sessions are pinging, and how long ago the last one did.
+				clients: pings.size,
+				lastPingAgoMs: newestPing ? Math.max(0, now() - newestPing) : null,
+				lastScan: deps.scanSummary?.() ?? null,
+				// Diagnostic (which build), and the contract (which protocol). The session
+				// replaces a daemon whose apiVersion differs; the version is for the panel.
+				version: deps.version,
+				apiVersion: deps.apiVersion,
+				capabilities: CAPABILITIES,
+				configLoadedAt: deps.configLoadedAt?.() ?? null,
+				imap: deps.imapHealthy ? (deps.imapHealthy() ? "connected" : "disconnected") : "unknown",
+			})
+		}
+
+		const header = req.headers.authorization ?? ""
+		const presented = header.startsWith("Bearer ") ? header.slice(7) : ""
+		if (!constantTimeEqual(presented, deps.token)) return fail(401, "unauthorized")
+
+		const route = `${req.method} ${url.pathname}`
+		try {
+			switch (route) {
+				case "GET /events": {
+					if (streams.size >= MAX_SSE_CLIENTS) return fail(503, "too_many_clients")
+					res.writeHead(200, {
+						"content-type": "text/event-stream",
+						"cache-control": "no-cache",
+						connection: "keep-alive",
+					})
+					res.write(": connected\n\n")
+					// Tell a fresh client the current mode immediately.
+					res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify({ type: "mode", mode: readMode(env) })}\n\n`)
+					streams.add(res)
+					req.on("close", () => streams.delete(res))
+					return undefined
+				}
+
+				case "GET /pending": {
+					// Filtered: a whole-file payload of another machine's mail is both wrong to
+					// deliver and wastefully large. The daemon's own live config is the authority -
+					// the same one /claim uses - so a client holding a stale device name (renamed,
+					// or rewritten by `setup`) cannot ask for records it will then be refused.
+					const mine = deps.getConfig?.()?.device.name
+					const all = listPending(env)
+					const offered = mine ? all.filter((r) => r.device === undefined || r.device === mine) : all
+					return send(200, {
+						pending: offered,
+						// A count, never the content: these are another device's replies, and after a
+						// rename they are the user's own mail sitting here invisible.
+						withheld: all.length - offered.length,
+					})
+				}
+
+				case "GET /mode":
+					return send(200, { mode: readMode(env) })
+
+				case "POST /claim": {
+					const body = asRecord(await readJson(req))
+					const uid = Number(body?.uid)
+					const instanceId = typeof body?.instanceId === "string" ? body.instanceId : ""
+					if (!Number.isInteger(uid) || !instanceId) return fail(400, "bad_request")
+					const uidValidity =
+						typeof body?.uidValidity === "number" && Number.isFinite(body.uidValidity) ? body.uidValidity : undefined
+					const result = claimPending(
+						env,
+						uid,
+						instanceId,
+						now(),
+						uidValidity,
+						deps.source.uidValidity?.(),
+						deps.getConfig?.()?.device.name,
+					)
+					if (!result.ok) return fail(result.reason === "not-found" ? 404 : 409, result.reason)
+					return send(200, { ok: true })
+				}
+
+				case "POST /ack": {
+					const body = asRecord(await readJson(req))
+					const uid = Number(body?.uid)
+					const instanceId = typeof body?.instanceId === "string" ? body.instanceId : ""
+					if (!Number.isInteger(uid) || !instanceId) return fail(400, "bad_request")
+
+					// Remove the record, THEN journal, then touch the mail. The order looks
+					// backwards but is the safe one: the journal is read at scan time, so
+					// journalling while the record still exists would leave a window where a
+					// polling session claims and injects the same reply twice. Losing the
+					// journal write after a successful ack only re-opens dedupe for a UID that
+					// is no longer in `pending`, which the scanner never reads again.
+					const uidValidity =
+						typeof body?.uidValidity === "number" && Number.isFinite(body.uidValidity) ? body.uidValidity : undefined
+					const acked = ackPending(env, uid, instanceId, uidValidity, deps.source.uidValidity?.())
+					if (!acked.ok) return fail(acked.reason === "not-found" ? 404 : 409, acked.reason)
+					// The record's space, never the watcher's: after a renumbering the two differ,
+					// and journaling under the live space would suppress a brand-new message at
+					// that UID. A record predating UIDVALIDITY carries none, and journal() then
+					// keeps the space the file already records.
+					journal(env, uid, acked.uidValidity)
+					// The record's session, never the request body's: a client that acks
+					// another session's mail must not also free its decision slot.
+					registry.release(acked.sessionId)
+
+					// Mailbox hygiene only. A failure here must not resurrect the delivery.
+					try {
+						await deps.source.markSeen?.(uid)
+					} catch {
+						/* logged by the caller in production; delivery is already acked */
+					}
+					return send(200, { ok: true })
+				}
+
+				case "POST /register": {
+					const body = asRecord(await readJson(req))
+					const sessionId = typeof body?.sessionId === "string" ? body.sessionId : ""
+					if (!sessionId) return fail(400, "bad_request")
+					const result = registry.register(sessionId)
+					if (result.full) return fail(503, "registry_full")
+					return send(200, result)
+				}
+
+				case "DELETE /register": {
+					const body = asRecord(await readJson(req))
+					const sessionId = typeof body?.sessionId === "string" ? body.sessionId : ""
+					if (!sessionId) return fail(400, "bad_request")
+					registry.release(sessionId)
+					return send(200, { ok: true })
+				}
+
+				case "POST /ping": {
+					const body = asRecord(await readJson(req))
+					const instanceId = typeof body?.instanceId === "string" ? body.instanceId : ""
+					if (!instanceId) return fail(400, "bad_request")
+					pings.set(instanceId, now())
+					// Bounded: a client that keeps changing its id must not grow this map without
+					// limit. Oldest entries are dropped first.
+					while (pings.size > MAX_PINGS) {
+						const oldest = pings.keys().next().value
+						if (oldest === undefined) break
+						pings.delete(oldest)
+					}
+					return send(200, { ok: true, clients: pings.size })
+				}
+
+				case "POST /bye": {
+					const body = asRecord(await readJson(req))
+					const instanceId = typeof body?.instanceId === "string" ? body.instanceId : ""
+					if (!instanceId) return fail(400, "bad_request")
+					pings.delete(instanceId)
+					return send(200, { ok: true, clients: pings.size })
+				}
+
+				case "POST /shutdown": {
+					if (!deps.shutdown) return fail(501, "not_supported")
+					// Answer first, then exit: a client that got no response would report
+					// a failure for a restart that actually worked.
+					send(200, { ok: true })
+					setTimeout(() => deps.shutdown?.(), 50)
+					return undefined
+				}
+
+				case "POST /reload": {
+					if (!deps.reload) return fail(501, "not_supported")
+					try {
+						const result = await deps.reload()
+						if (!result.ok) return fail(500, "reload_failed", { message: result.error ?? "unknown" })
+						return send(200, { ok: true, ...(result.warning ? { warning: result.warning } : {}) })
+					} catch (error) {
+						return fail(500, "reload_failed", { message: (error as Error).message })
+					}
+				}
+
+				case "POST /mode": {
+					const body = asRecord(await readJson(req))
+					if (!isMode(body?.mode)) return fail(400, "bad_request")
+					const mode = writeMode(env, body.mode, now())
+					broadcast({ type: "mode", mode })
+					deps.onModeChange?.(mode)
+					return send(200, { mode })
+				}
+
+				case "POST /send": {
+					const body = asRecord(await readJson(req))
+					const subject = typeof body?.subject === "string" ? body.subject : ""
+					const text = typeof body?.text === "string" ? body.text : ""
+					const config = deps.getConfig?.() ?? deps.config
+					const to = typeof body?.to === "string" && body.to ? body.to : config.mail.to
+					// cwd lets the mailer resolve relative image paths from the agent's project.
+					const cwd = typeof body?.cwd === "string" ? body.cwd : undefined
+					// sessionId lets the sender thread this mail into the session's conversation.
+					const sessionId = typeof body?.sessionId === "string" ? body.sessionId : undefined
+					if (!subject || !text) return fail(400, "bad_request")
+					// A budget, not a rate limiter: an injected agent can ask for unbounded mail.
+					// A settle notification is exempt - it is the one mail that says the agent is
+					// waiting, and a legitimate `notify_user` burst must not silence it.
+					const kind =
+						body?.kind === "settle" ? "settle" : body?.kind === "decision" ? "decision" : "notification"
+					// Only unbounded, model-driven notifications are budgeted: a settle says the
+					// agent is waiting, and a decision is already capped at one outstanding per
+					// session by the registry.
+					if (kind === "notification" && !sendBudget.take(Date.now())) {
+						return fail(429, "send_budget")
+					}
+
+					// Thread every notification for a session into one conversation: reply to
+					// the previous message, reference the session root. Read BEFORE sending,
+					// because recording happens after.
+					// Mint and record BEFORE calling deps.send. The scan can see the mail come
+					// back into INBOX as soon as SMTP accepts it, so an id recorded after the
+					// send leaves the self-echo guard empty for exactly that window.
+					// Read the thread BEFORE recording: recording moves lastMessageId to the new
+					// id, and a message must answer its predecessor, not itself.
+					const thread = sessionId ? sessionThread(env, sessionId) : {}
+					const messageId = generateMessageId(config.mail.smtp.user ?? "")
+					if (sessionId) {
+						recordOutbound(env, {
+							messageId,
+							sessionId,
+							device: config.device.name,
+							subject,
+						})
+					}
+					const threading = {
+						...(thread.lastMessageId ? { inReplyTo: `<${thread.lastMessageId}>` } : {}),
+						...(thread.rootMessageId ? { references: [`<${thread.rootMessageId}>`] } : {}),
+					}
+					try {
+						const result = await deps.send({
+							to,
+							subject,
+							text,
+							...(cwd ? { cwd } : {}),
+							...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),
+							messageId,
+							...threading,
+						})
+						// Sends were invisible in daemon.log: "did my notification go out?" had no
+						// answer. Kind and size only - never the subject, per AGENTS invariant 8.
+						deps.log?.(`send ok (${kind}, ${text.length} chars)`)
+						// Record the outbound id so a reply reaches this session even if a
+						// client or a human rewrites the subject token away.
+					} catch (error) {
+						// The id was recorded before the send, because the mail can come back
+						// before the transport resolves. It will not come back now, so drop it:
+						// otherwise the next notification threads against a parent that never
+						// existed.
+						removeOutbound(env, messageId)
+						return fail(502, "send_failed", { message: (error as Error).message })
+					}
+					// Bookkeeping only, and outside the failure path: a recording error here must
+					// not report a delivered mail as undelivered.
+					try {
+						deps.onSent?.({ messageId, subject, ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}) })
+					} catch {
+						/* the thread store is an optimisation; the mail is already gone */
+					}
+					return send(200, { ok: true })
+				}
+
+				default:
+					return fail(404, "not_found")
+			}
+		} catch (error) {
+			const message = (error as Error).message
+			if (message === "request body too large") return fail(413, "body_too_large")
+			// Classified by cause, not by prose: a store write failure mentions `threads.json`,
+			// and a substring match on "json" reported it as the client's fault.
+			if (error instanceof BadBodyError) return fail(400, "bad_request", { message })
+			return fail(500, "internal", { message })
+		}
+	}
+
+	const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+		void dispatch(req, res).catch(() => {
+			// A malformed request must not take the process down with it.
+			try {
+				if (!res.headersSent) {
+					res.writeHead(500, { "content-type": "application/json" })
+					res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: { code: "internal" } }))
+				} else {
+					res.destroy()
+				}
+			} catch {
+				/* the socket is already gone */
+			}
+		})
+	})
+	// Unparseable HTTP never reaches the handler at all.
+	server.on("clientError", (_error, socket) => {
+		socket.destroy()
+	})
+
+	return {
+		server,
+		get sseClients() {
+			return streams.size
+		},
+		broadcast,
+		// Never fall back to the unspecified address: `undefined` binds 0.0.0.0, and the port is
+		// what keeps one daemon per machine. loadConfig repairs this, so this is a belt.
+		listen(port = deps.config.daemon.port, host = deps.config.daemon.host || "127.0.0.1") {
+			return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+				server.once("error", reject)
+				server.listen(port, host, () => {
+					server.removeListener("error", reject)
+					const address = server.address()
+					resolve({ port: typeof address === "object" && address ? address.port : port, host })
+				})
+			})
+		},
+		close() {
+			clearInterval(idleCheck)
+			return new Promise((resolve) => {
+				for (const res of streams) {
+					try {
+						res.end()
+					} catch {
+						/* already gone */
+					}
+				}
+				streams.clear()
+				server.close(() => resolve())
+			})
+		},
+	}
+}

package/src/daemon/source-proxy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// The MailSource the daemon actually hands to the scanner and the HTTP service.
+//
+// This is a seam, not a convenience: it exists so a test can exercise exactly what production
+// wires up. Three rounds of "the guard is inert in production" came from code that was only
+// ever tested through a hand-built fixture, so the proxy and the UIDVALIDITY bookkeeping live
+// here, in one small file, where they can be driven directly.
+
+import { dropPendingFromOtherSpaces, listPending } from "../store/pending-store.ts"
+import { syncUidValidity } from "../store/uid-cursor.ts"
+import type { MailSource } from "./process.ts"
+
+/** What the proxy needs from the watcher. */
+export interface ProxyTarget extends MailSource {
+	uidValidity(): number | undefined
+	uidNext(): number | undefined
+}
+
+export interface SourceProxyDeps {
+	/** The current watcher, or undefined while it is stopped or being replaced. */
+	watcher: () => ProxyTarget | undefined
+	env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv
+}
+
+export function createSourceProxy(deps: SourceProxyDeps): MailSource {
+	const target = (): ProxyTarget => {
+		const watcher = deps.watcher()
+		if (!watcher) throw new Error("pi-mailbridge: imap watcher not started")
+		return watcher
+	}
+	return {
+		searchAfter: (uid) => target().searchAfter(uid),
+		fetch: (uid) => target().fetch(uid),
+		markSeen: async (uid) => {
+			await deps.watcher()?.markSeen?.(uid)
+		},
+		// Every call reads the live watcher: the daemon swaps watchers on reload, and a
+		// captured reference would answer from the old connection.
+		uidValidity: () => deps.watcher()?.uidValidity(),
+	}
+}
+
+export interface UidValidityOutcome {
+	reset: boolean
+	validity: number | undefined
+	dropped: number
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compare the mailbox's UIDVALIDITY with the recorded one, and reset what a renumbering
+ * invalidates.
+ *
+ * Called on every successful connect. A renumbering cannot be detected by the cursor alone,
+ * so this is the only place it is noticed - and the only place its consequences are undone.
+ */
+export function applyUidValidity(
+	env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv,
+	watcher: ProxyTarget | undefined,
+	onDropped?: (sessionId: string) => void,
+): UidValidityOutcome {
+	const validity = watcher?.uidValidity()
+	if (validity === undefined) return { reset: false, validity, dropped: 0 }
+	const reset = syncUidValidity(env, validity, watcher?.uidNext())
+
+	// Drop on EVERY connect, not only on a reset: a crash between the cursor write and the
+	// drop leaves records from another space that nothing can claim (the guard refuses them)
+	// and nothing would ever remove, because the cursor already carries the new validity.
+	// Queued records from the wrong numbering could collide with new UIDs and be replaced
+	// silently. Dropping them is safe: they were never acked, so the mail is still unread.
+	// On a reset the cursor re-reads it; on the orphan path (no reset) the message is behind
+	// an already-advanced cursor, which is why the drop runs every connect. Their decision
+	// slots are freed, or that session would be told it has an outstanding decision for a day.
+	// Only records from another UID space are dropped here. Age-based expiry used to run on every
+	// connect, which deleted replies for sessions that were merely quiet - a user on `off` for a
+	// week came home to nothing to drain, with the cursor already past the mail. Expiry now
+	// happens under queue pressure only (see process.ts).
+	// On a reset, unknown-space records go too: see dropPendingFromOtherSpaces.
+	const dropped = dropPendingFromOtherSpaces(env, validity, { includeUnknown: reset })
+	if (dropped.length > 0) {
+		// Only free a slot the dropped record was holding: a session that still has a live
+		// record in the current space must keep its reservation, or it could be granted a
+		// second decision while the first is unanswered.
+		const stillQueued = new Set(listPending(env).map((r) => r.sessionId))
+		for (const record of dropped) {
+			if (!stillQueued.has(record.sessionId)) onDropped?.(record.sessionId)
+		}
+	}
+	return { reset, validity, dropped: dropped.length }
+}