@dtlabs/ai-toolkit 0.13.0 → 0.14.1

package/lib/task-executor/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,3729 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// Task-executor module skeleton (FTR-018, INFRA-TASK-BE-03).
+//
+// Public interface for the deterministic task executor: the seven commands
+// from the CLI contract (FTR-018-Tech-Spec.md section 10) — execute
+// (backing the `start` CLI command), status, diagnose, stop, reconcile,
+// resume, replan.
+//
+// This module wires the real state/ledger modules (store.js,
+// INFRA-TASK-BE-01; execution-ledger.js finalizeActivity, INFRA-TASK-BE-02)
+// together with placeholder modules for the pieces that later Work
+// Breakdown tasks implement (ownership.js, plan.js, claude-process.js,
+// git.js — each documented with the task that will replace its stub body).
+// Every public function below currently throws NOT_IMPLEMENTED pointing at
+// the task that implements its real body: this task (INFRA-TASK-BE-03)
+// only establishes the module skeleton and public interface, per its
+// Work Breakdown outcome.
+//
+// dispatchTaskAttempt (US-03-TASK-BE-03), runVerifications (US-04-TASK-BE-01),
+// runReview (US-04-TASK-BE-02) and finalizeTaskCheckpoint (US-05-TASK-BE-05),
+// all added below, are the exceptions: each is a new addition, not one of
+// the seven skeleton commands above, and each has a real body. Together they
+// are the single-task dispatch/verify/review/checkpoint primitives the real
+// run loop (execute(), US-07-TASK-BE-01, still NOT_IMPLEMENTED) will call
+// once per ready task — see each function's own doc comment for its design.
+
+const fs     = require('fs');
+const path   = require('path');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { spawn, spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+
+const store        = require('./store');
+const ownership    = require('./ownership');
+const plan         = require('./plan');
+const claudeProcess = require('./claude-process');
+const git          = require('./git');
+const ledger       = require('../execution-ledger');
+const agentRegistry = require('../agent-registry');
+
+const IS_WINDOWS = process.platform === 'win32';
+
+// ── worker-liveness process tagging (US-06-TASK-BE-02) ──────────────────────
+//
+// Generalizes the E-02 evidence-spike's PROVEN "intent-first + reconcile-by-
+// tag" technique (see internal_docs/features/FTR-018-deterministic-task-
+// execution-checkpoints-and-resume/evidence/E-02-process-supervision/
+// harness-registration-window.js): every dispatched worker's argv carries a
+// unique, discoverable tag; a coordinator that crashes and later comes back
+// (reconcile/resume) can positively confirm whether that exact worker is
+// still alive by querying the OS for a live process whose command line
+// contains the tag — never by trusting its own possibly-stale in-memory
+// belief about what it dispatched. dispatchTaskAttempt (US-03-TASK-BE-03,
+// below) is the writer side: it generates the tag and durably persists it
+// into attempt.processIdentity BEFORE spawning. _findLiveTaggedProcess below
+// is the reader side, used by reconcile/resume's evidence evaluation
+// (US-06-TASK-BE-02) to answer "is the worker that owns this tag still
+// running right now".
+const PROCESS_TAG_PREFIX = 'ai-toolkit-task';
+
+function _buildProcessTag(runId, taskId, attemptNumber) {
+  return PROCESS_TAG_PREFIX + ':' + runId + ':' + taskId + ':' + attemptNumber;
+}
+
+// Default basename of the real, qualified Claude CLI executable this module
+// spawns in production (Windows: claude.exe) — the actual spawned executable
+// dispatchTaskAttempt invokes, NOT node.exe (the harness spike's own fake
+// workers were plain Node scripts, which is why its filter used
+// "Name='node.exe'"; this module's real, production spawn target is the
+// Claude CLI itself, so the filter must match ITS basename instead).
+// Callers (reconcile/resume/evaluateTaskEvidence) may override this default
+// via an explicit exeBasename — tests do so unconditionally, since they
+// spawn a real, short-lived Node child process (never a real claude.exe) as
+// the tagged "worker" under test, per this task's own testing constraint.
+const DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME = 'claude.exe';
+
+// Real, positive-evidence-only liveness query for a tagged process, using
+// the exact E-02-qualified Win32_Process/CIM technique proven in the Gate-1
+// evidence spike, adapted from `Name='node.exe'` to the caller-supplied
+// `exeBasename` (the real executable dispatchTaskAttempt actually spawned):
+//   Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -Filter "Name='<exeBasename>'" |
+//     Where-Object { $_.CommandLine -like '*<tag>*' } |
+//     Select-Object -ExpandProperty ProcessId
+// Same shell:false-at-the-Node-level, single-PowerShell-argv-string spawn
+// convention already used by ownership.js's own _queryProcessStartTimeSync
+// and claude-process.js's tree-kill helper (the PowerShell command string
+// itself is unavoidably one argument; nothing here is built by concatenating
+// untrusted input into a shell command outside that one, already-established
+// pattern).
+//
+// Windows-only (Gate-1 E-02 qualification: "no implicit cross-platform
+// guarantee") — mirrors ownership.js's checkOwnerLiveness discipline exactly:
+// only ever returns positive evidence, never coerces an inconclusive result
+// into either extreme.
+//
+// Returns exactly one of:
+//   { status: 'found-alive', pids: number[], reason }         — one or more
+//     live processes named `exeBasename` whose command line contains `tag`.
+//   { status: 'confirmed-not-found', pids: [], reason }       — the OS
+//     positively confirms no such process exists (positive absence
+//     evidence, not merely "we didn't look").
+//   { status: 'unknown', pids: [], reason }                   — non-Windows,
+//     invalid input, or the OS query itself failed/returned an untrusted
+//     result. Callers MUST treat this exactly like 'found-alive' for any
+//     "is it safe to touch this attempt" decision — never as evidence of
+//     death.
+function _findLiveTaggedProcess(tag, exeBasename) {
+  if (!IS_WINDOWS) {
+    return {
+      status: 'unknown',
+      pids: [],
+      reason:
+        'process liveness checking is only qualified on Windows (E-02 evidence spike); ' +
+        'this platform ("' + process.platform + '") has no qualified liveness mechanism yet',
+    };
+  }
+  if (typeof tag !== 'string' || tag.length === 0) {
+    return { status: 'unknown', pids: [], reason: '_findLiveTaggedProcess: tag must be a non-empty string' };
+  }
+  if (typeof exeBasename !== 'string' || exeBasename.length === 0) {
+    return { status: 'unknown', pids: [], reason: '_findLiveTaggedProcess: exeBasename must be a non-empty string' };
+  }
+
+  let result;
+  try {
+    result = spawnSync(
+      'powershell',
+      [
+        '-NoProfile',
+        '-NonInteractive',
+        '-Command',
+        "Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -Filter \"Name='" + exeBasename + "'\" | " +
+          "Where-Object { $_.CommandLine -like '*" + tag + "*' } | " +
+          'Select-Object -ExpandProperty ProcessId',
+      ],
+      { encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true }
+    );
+  } catch (_) {
+    return { status: 'unknown', pids: [], reason: '_findLiveTaggedProcess: failed to spawn the OS process query' };
+  }
+
+  if (!result || result.error || result.status !== 0 || typeof result.stdout !== 'string') {
+    return {
+      status: 'unknown',
+      pids: [],
+      reason: '_findLiveTaggedProcess: the OS process query failed or returned an untrusted result',
+    };
+  }
+
+  const pids = result.stdout
+    .split(/\r?\n/)
+    .map(function (s) { return s.trim(); })
+    .filter(Boolean)
+    .map(Number)
+    .filter(function (n) { return Number.isInteger(n) && n > 0; });
+
+  if (pids.length > 0) {
+    return {
+      status: 'found-alive',
+      pids: pids,
+      reason:
+        'found ' + pids.length + ' live process(es) named "' + exeBasename + '" whose command line ' +
+        'matches tag "' + tag + '" (confirmed via OS process query)',
+    };
+  }
+  return {
+    status: 'confirmed-not-found',
+    pids: [],
+    reason:
+      'no live process named "' + exeBasename + '" with a command line matching tag "' + tag + '" was found ' +
+      '(positive absence evidence, confirmed via OS process query)',
+  };
+}
+
+// Tree-kill for stop()'s 'immediate' mode, given only a bare PID discovered
+// via _findLiveTaggedProcess — NOT claude-process.js's own
+// _killProcessTreeSync(child), which requires a live ChildProcess handle this
+// process spawned itself. stop() has no such handle: the worker it is
+// terminating may belong to a completely different coordinator process (the
+// one that originally called dispatchTaskAttempt), discovered only through
+// the OS-level tag query. Same E-02-qualified technique otherwise
+// (`taskkill /PID <pid> /T /F` on Windows; best-effort SIGKILL by PID,
+// reported 'unknown', elsewhere) — duplicated rather than exported from
+// claude-process.js for the same reason _killVerificationProcessTreeSync
+// above already duplicates it: a different trust/lifetime domain, kept
+// independently readable.
+function _killProcessTreeByPidSync(pid) {
+  if (IS_WINDOWS) {
+    const res = spawnSync('taskkill', ['/PID', String(pid), '/T', '/F'], {
+      stdio: 'ignore',
+      windowsHide: true,
+    });
+    return !res.error && res.status === 0;
+  }
+  try {
+    process.kill(pid, 'SIGKILL');
+  } catch (_) {
+    // best-effort only
+  }
+  return 'unknown';
+}
+
+function _sleep(ms) {
+  return new Promise(function (resolve) { setTimeout(resolve, ms); });
+}
+
+// Bounded poll for stop()'s 'immediate' mode: after issuing the kill above,
+// re-queries _findLiveTaggedProcess up to `maxAttempts` times (a handful of
+// short waits, never an unbounded loop) until the OS positively confirms the
+// tagged process is gone. Returns true ONLY on an explicit
+// 'confirmed-not-found' result — 'found-alive' (kill did not yet take
+// effect) and 'unknown' (inconclusive OS query) both resolve to false, per
+// this module's existing discipline of never coercing an inconclusive result
+// into a positive claim (mirrors _findLiveTaggedProcess's own contract).
+async function _awaitConfirmedTermination(tag, exeBasename, opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  const maxAttempts = Number.isInteger(opts.maxAttempts) && opts.maxAttempts > 0 ? opts.maxAttempts : 5;
+  const intervalMs = Number.isInteger(opts.intervalMs) && opts.intervalMs > 0 ? opts.intervalMs : 200;
+
+  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < maxAttempts; attempt++) {
+    const check = _findLiveTaggedProcess(tag, exeBasename);
+    if (check.status === 'confirmed-not-found') {
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (attempt < maxAttempts - 1) {
+      await _sleep(intervalMs);
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+// Bounded per-stream output ceiling for verification commands (10 MiB).
+// Unlike claude-process.js's spawnClaudeAgent (which kills the process tree
+// on overflow, because an LLM agent's output is open-ended and unbounded-by-
+// design), verification commands are finite, deterministic invocations
+// (npm test, grep, test -f, ...) — bounding here only guards memory against
+// a pathological command, not runaway control loss. So on overflow this
+// module simply stops buffering further chunks and marks the stream
+// truncated; it lets the command run to its real exit code rather than
+// killing it, which keeps the recorded exitCode meaningful.
+const DEFAULT_MAX_VERIFICATION_OUTPUT_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+function _notImplemented(fnName, task) {
+  const err = new Error(
+    fnName + ' is NOT_IMPLEMENTED — see Work Breakdown task ' + task
+  );
+  err.code = 'NOT_IMPLEMENTED';
+  err.task = task;
+  throw err;
+}
+
+function _err(code, message) {
+  const e = new Error(message);
+  e.code = code;
+  return e;
+}
+
+function _requireNonEmptyString(value, label) {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', label + ' must be a non-empty string');
+  }
+}
+
+// Unlike _requireNonEmptyString, an empty string is valid here (a no-op
+// task's diff is legitimately empty per Tech-Spec section 8: "No-op tasks:
+// require verifications and review proving outcome at the current
+// baseline"). Only non-string values (missing/undefined/wrong type) fail.
+function _requireString(value, label) {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string') {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', label + ' must be a string');
+  }
+}
+
+// Canonical agent ID for the review-solution agent — the same string
+// lib/agent-registry.js's AGENT_TYPE_TO_CANONICAL_ID['review-solution'] and
+// its AGENT_RECORDS entry both use to resolve/dispatch this agent everywhere
+// else in the toolkit. runReview hardcodes it (rather than accepting it as a
+// caller-supplied parameter like dispatchTaskAttempt's generic args.agentId)
+// because this function is specific to one agent, not a generic dispatch
+// primitive for any domain agent.
+const REVIEW_AGENT_ID = 'gaia.agent.review.solution';
+
+// Deterministic default prompt built from the plan task's own fields (id,
+// title, outcome, domain, dependsOn, acceptanceCriteria, verificationCommands
+// — see plan.js's parseMarkdown/mapPhases for this shape). This task's scope
+// is dispatch orchestration, not prompt authoring; the prompt is assembled
+// here (rather than requiring every caller to build one) purely so
+// dispatchTaskAttempt is callable with only the plan task object, per its
+// documented signature.
+function _buildTaskPrompt(task) {
+  const lines = [
+    'Task ID: ' + task.id,
+    'Title: ' + (task.title || ''),
+    'Domain: ' + (task.domain || ''),
+    'Outcome: ' + (task.outcome || ''),
+  ];
+  if (Array.isArray(task.dependsOn) && task.dependsOn.length > 0) {
+    lines.push('Depends on: ' + task.dependsOn.join(', '));
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(task.acceptanceCriteria) && task.acceptanceCriteria.length > 0) {
+    lines.push('Acceptance criteria: ' + task.acceptanceCriteria.join(', '));
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(task.verificationCommands) && task.verificationCommands.length > 0) {
+    lines.push('Verification commands:');
+    task.verificationCommands.forEach(function (cmd) { lines.push('  ' + cmd); });
+  }
+  return lines.join('\n') + '\n';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Dispatches exactly one implementation agent invocation for one task
+ * attempt (US-03-TASK-BE-03; completes US-03 "dispatch one implementation
+ * agent per task per attempt"). This is the single-task dispatch primitive
+ * the real run loop (US-07-TASK-BE-01, execute()) will call once per ready
+ * task — it does not itself iterate the ready queue, and it does not
+ * acquire/reclaim the repo-wide execution lease (that is the run-start/
+ * resume responsibility of US-07/US-06); it only CHECKS that the caller
+ * already holds it.
+ *
+ * Ordering guarantees (fail-closed at every step, in order):
+ *   1. Ownership check — ownership.readLease(executionRoot) must return a
+ *      lease whose runId matches `runId`. No lease, or a lease held by a
+ *      different runId, throws NO_LOCK_HELD before anything else happens.
+ *   2. Identity verification — claude-process.verifyAgentIdentity({
+ *      projectDir, agentId }) must succeed. Any failure (AGENT_NOT_VERIFIED,
+ *      DEFINITION_HASH_MISMATCH) propagates unmodified — dispatch never
+ *      swallows or rewraps it.
+ *   3. Persist-before-invoke (AC-01) — the attempt is recorded via
+ *      store.js's addAttempt (brand-new attempt: stage 'prepared', written,
+ *      then updated to 'dispatching', written again) or updateAttempt alone
+ *      (an attempt numbered `attemptNumber` already exists in state — e.g. a
+ *      resumed dispatch: stage moves directly to 'dispatching'), and TWO
+ *      ledger activities for this attempt are opened via execution-ledger.js's
+ *      open()/computeOperationId — both complete BEFORE spawnClaudeAgent is
+ *      ever called:
+ *        - 'implementation' (kind 'implementation'): this one dispatch
+ *          invocation. Closed as soon as its result is durably received
+ *          (US-04-TASK-BE-03's persistVerificationReviewOutcome path, via
+ *          runVerifications/runReview — not by this function).
+ *        - 'task' (kind 'task'): spans the WHOLE per-task-attempt lifecycle
+ *          (Tech-Spec section 6: "kinds: task, implementation,
+ *          verification-<index>, review ... The task activity carries null
+ *          token usage (reason: control-only) and closes after checkpoint
+ *          and, for N>1, verified integration"). Opened here (dispatch is the
+ *          first point at which this attempt becomes active) but ONLY closed
+ *          by finalizeTaskCheckpoint (US-05-TASK-BE-05, below) — never by
+ *          this function.
+ *   4. Only once 1-3 have succeeded: claude-process.spawnClaudeAgent(...) is
+ *      called with the verified identity's nativeName wired in as the
+ *      --agent selector and the task's prompt fed via stdin.
+ *   5. Returns a structured result combining the raw spawn result with the
+ *      run/task/attempt identifiers used. No verification/review/checkpoint
+ *      happens here (US-04/US-05) — scope ends at "dispatch happened and its
+ *      raw result was captured".
+ *
+ * Ledger placement: the per-run ledger file lives alongside the run's other
+ * artifacts, at store._executionPaths(executionRoot, runId).runDir, using
+ * `runId` itself as the file-name prefix (i.e.
+ * <executionRoot>/runs/<runId>/<runId>-token-ledger.json) — this is
+ * deliberately separate from any feature-delivery-pipeline ledger (e.g.
+ * FTR-018-token-ledger.json), which tracks the cost of building the
+ * executor, not the cost of tasks the executor itself dispatches at
+ * runtime. The ledger agent keys follow Tech-Spec section 6 exactly:
+ * `executor:<runId>:<taskId>:implementation` and
+ * `executor:<runId>:<taskId>:task`.
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.executionRoot - Absolute path to
+ *   <common-git-dir>/ai-toolkit/execution.
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the run that must currently hold the
+ *   repo-wide execution lease.
+ * @param {object} args.task - Plan task object (plan.js shape): at least
+ *   `id`; `title`/`outcome`/`domain`/`dependsOn`/`acceptanceCriteria`/
+ *   `verificationCommands` are used to build the default prompt when
+ *   `args.prompt` is not supplied.
+ * @param {number} args.attemptNumber - Positive integer attempt number for
+ *   this dispatch. Must equal the task's next attempt number
+ *   (task.attempts.length + 1 in current state) when no attempt numbered
+ *   `attemptNumber` already exists, or match an existing attempt's number
+ *   for a resumed dispatch.
+ * @param {string} args.claudePath - Absolute path to the qualified Claude
+ *   CLI executable (forwarded to spawnClaudeAgent).
+ * @param {string} args.agentId - Canonical agent ID to verify and dispatch
+ *   (forwarded to verifyAgentIdentity; its resolved nativeName is what is
+ *   actually passed as the --agent selector).
+ * @param {string} args.projectDir - Project root used both for identity
+ *   verification (--project) and as the spawned process's cwd.
+ * @param {number} [args.taskTimeoutMs] - Optional per-task timeout budget,
+ *   forwarded to spawnClaudeAgent.
+ * @param {string} [args.prompt] - Explicit prompt override. When omitted, a
+ *   deterministic default is built from `args.task`'s own fields.
+ * @param {string[]} [args.spawnArgs] - Test-only override of the full CLI
+ *   args array forwarded to spawnClaudeAgent. Defaults to the production
+ *   shape (`--print --output-format json --agent <nativeName>`). Tests use
+ *   this to substitute the fake-claude-cli fixture's own invocation shape
+ *   (see tests/fixtures/fake-claude-cli.js) while still exercising a real
+ *   subprocess spawn end-to-end. Either way (default or override), the
+ *   attempt's processIdentity tag (US-06-TASK-BE-02) is appended as one
+ *   extra trailing argv element before spawning — see the inline comment at
+ *   the actual spawnArgs assignment below for the documented residual risk
+ *   this carries against the real (not-yet-exercised) Claude CLI.
+ * @returns {Promise<{
+ *   runId: string, taskId: string, attemptNumber: number,
+ *   agentId: string, nativeAgentName: string,
+ *   ledgerOperationId: string, processIdentity: string, spawnResult: object
+ * }>}
+ * @throws {Error} NO_LOCK_HELD, AGENT_NOT_VERIFIED, DEFINITION_HASH_MISMATCH,
+ *   ATTEMPT_NUMBER_MISMATCH, STATE_NOT_FOUND, STATE_TASK_NOT_FOUND, or any
+ *   error surfaced by spawnClaudeAgent (e.g. CLAUDE_EXECUTABLE_NOT_FOUND,
+ *   CLAUDE_SPAWN_FAILED).
+ */
+async function dispatchTaskAttempt(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.executionRoot, 'dispatchTaskAttempt: args.executionRoot');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.runId, 'dispatchTaskAttempt: args.runId');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.claudePath, 'dispatchTaskAttempt: args.claudePath');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.agentId, 'dispatchTaskAttempt: args.agentId');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.projectDir, 'dispatchTaskAttempt: args.projectDir');
+  if (args.task == null || typeof args.task !== 'object') {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'dispatchTaskAttempt: args.task must be an object');
+  }
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.task.id, 'dispatchTaskAttempt: args.task.id');
+  if (!Number.isInteger(args.attemptNumber) || args.attemptNumber < 1) {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'dispatchTaskAttempt: args.attemptNumber must be a positive integer');
+  }
+
+  const executionRoot = args.executionRoot;
+  const runId = args.runId;
+  const task = args.task;
+  const attemptNumber = args.attemptNumber;
+
+  // 1. Ownership check — never acquire/reclaim here, only verify the caller
+  // already holds the lease it claims to hold.
+  const lease = ownership.readLease(executionRoot);
+  if (!lease || lease.runId !== runId) {
+    throw _err(
+      'NO_LOCK_HELD',
+      'dispatchTaskAttempt: no repo-wide execution lease held by runId "' + runId + '" at ' +
+        executionRoot + (lease ? ' (currently held by runId "' + lease.runId + '")' : ' (no lease held)')
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 2. Identity verification — propagate failures unmodified.
+  const identity = claudeProcess.verifyAgentIdentity({
+    projectDir: args.projectDir,
+    agentId: args.agentId,
+  });
+
+  // 3. Persist-before-invoke: attempt identity, then ledger activity.
+  //
+  // processIdentity (US-06-TASK-BE-02): a unique, discoverable per-attempt
+  // tag (see the "worker-liveness process tagging" file comment above
+  // IS_WINDOWS) is generated here and written into the attempt's
+  // processIdentity field in the SAME updateAttempt/writeState call that
+  // advances the stage to 'dispatching' — i.e. durably on disk BEFORE
+  // spawnClaudeAgent is ever invoked below. This ordering is the whole
+  // point: a coordinator crash between this write and the actual spawn (or
+  // between the spawn and any later write) still leaves a discoverable,
+  // already-persisted trail that reconcile/resume's evidence evaluation can
+  // positively confirm alive or dead later, with no dependency on any
+  // in-memory state the crashed coordinator held.
+  const processIdentity = _buildProcessTag(runId, task.id, attemptNumber);
+
+  let state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+  const stateTaskEntry = state.tasks[task.id];
+  const existingAttempt = stateTaskEntry
+    ? stateTaskEntry.attempts.find(function (a) { return a.number === attemptNumber; })
+    : undefined;
+
+  if (existingAttempt) {
+    state = state.updateAttempt(task.id, attemptNumber, { stage: 'dispatching', processIdentity: processIdentity });
+    state = store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+  } else {
+    const expectedNextNumber = stateTaskEntry ? stateTaskEntry.attempts.length + 1 : 1;
+    if (attemptNumber !== expectedNextNumber) {
+      throw _err(
+        'ATTEMPT_NUMBER_MISMATCH',
+        'dispatchTaskAttempt: task "' + task.id + '" expected next attempt number ' +
+          expectedNextNumber + ', got ' + attemptNumber
+      );
+    }
+    state = state.addAttempt(task.id, { stage: 'prepared' });
+    state = store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+    state = state.updateAttempt(task.id, attemptNumber, { stage: 'dispatching', processIdentity: processIdentity });
+    state = store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+  }
+
+  const ledgerPaths = store._executionPaths(executionRoot, runId);
+  const ledgerAgentKey = 'executor:' + runId + ':' + task.id + ':implementation';
+  const ledgerMetadata = {
+    agentId: identity.agentId,
+    nativeAgentName: identity.nativeName,
+    platform: process.platform,
+    toolkitVersion: identity.toolkitVersion,
+    resolutionScope: identity.scope,
+    definitionHash: identity.sha256,
+  };
+  const ledgerOpenResult = ledger.open(
+    ledgerPaths.runDir,
+    runId,
+    ledgerAgentKey,
+    'implementation',
+    null,
+    attemptNumber,
+    ledgerMetadata
+  );
+
+  // Task-kind ledger activity (Tech-Spec section 6) — opened together with
+  // 'implementation' above, but spans the whole task-attempt lifecycle: it
+  // is deliberately left open here and only ever closed by
+  // finalizeTaskCheckpoint (US-05-TASK-BE-05) once the checkpoint SHA has
+  // been registered and verified reachable on the feature branch. Opened
+  // AFTER 'implementation' so ledgerOpenResult (and every existing caller
+  // that reads the first ledger entry written for this attempt) keeps
+  // referring to the 'implementation' activity unchanged.
+  const ledgerTaskAgentKey = 'executor:' + runId + ':' + task.id + ':task';
+  ledger.open(
+    ledgerPaths.runDir,
+    runId,
+    ledgerTaskAgentKey,
+    'task',
+    null,
+    attemptNumber,
+    ledgerMetadata
+  );
+
+  // 4. Only now: dispatch the verified agent.
+  const prompt = typeof args.prompt === 'string' ? args.prompt : _buildTaskPrompt(task);
+  const baseSpawnArgs = Array.isArray(args.spawnArgs)
+    ? args.spawnArgs
+    : ['--print', '--output-format', 'json', '--agent', identity.nativeName];
+  // Append the same processIdentity tag already persisted above as one extra
+  // trailing argv element, so it appears verbatim in the spawned process's
+  // own command line — this is what makes _findLiveTaggedProcess's later OS
+  // query able to find it (see the file-level "worker-liveness process
+  // tagging" comment above IS_WINDOWS).
+  //
+  // RESIDUAL RISK (documented, not blocking): this appends an extra argv
+  // element to whatever args the real Claude CLI would otherwise receive.
+  // Nothing in this codebase's E-00/E-01/E-02 evidence dossier (see
+  // FTR-018-Tech-Spec.md section 3's evidence table) documents a claude.exe
+  // CLI flag reference that conclusively confirms an unrecognized trailing
+  // positional argv element is safe/ignored by the real executable — every
+  // spawn in this test suite (and in this codebase to date) targets
+  // tests/fixtures/fake-claude-cli.js, never real claude.exe. The
+  // real-Claude-runtime test (US-09-TASK-TEST-02) is separately gated and
+  // not yet authorized, so this cannot be empirically validated here. Flagged
+  // for verification once that real-runtime test is authorized.
+  const spawnArgs = baseSpawnArgs.concat([processIdentity]);
+  const spawnResult = await claudeProcess.spawnClaudeAgent({
+    claudePath: args.claudePath,
+    args: spawnArgs,
+    prompt: prompt,
+    cwd: args.projectDir,
+    taskTimeoutMs: args.taskTimeoutMs,
+  });
+
+  // 5. Raw capture only — no verification/review/checkpoint here.
+  return {
+    runId: runId,
+    taskId: task.id,
+    attemptNumber: attemptNumber,
+    agentId: identity.agentId,
+    nativeAgentName: identity.nativeName,
+    ledgerOperationId: ledgerOpenResult.operation_id,
+    processIdentity: processIdentity,
+    spawnResult: spawnResult,
+  };
+}
+
+// Deterministic review prompt: task context, the exact diff bytes (verbatim,
+// never re-escaped or reformatted — Tech-Spec section 8: "unexpected tracked
+// changes invalidate the reviewed diff", so the review agent must see
+// exactly what will be checkpointed), and the review criteria the diff must
+// satisfy. There is no separate "review criteria" field in the plan.js task
+// shape (see plan.js's parseMarkdown/mapPhases) — Tech-Spec section 7's
+// binding rule is "review passed=true with no blocking finding" evaluated
+// against the task's own approved acceptance/verification contract, so the
+// task's acceptanceCriteria and verificationCommands are exactly what this
+// function feeds as the criteria the diff must satisfy.
+function _buildReviewPrompt(task, diff) {
+  const lines = [
+    'Task ID: ' + task.id,
+    'Title: ' + (task.title || ''),
+    'Domain: ' + (task.domain || ''),
+    'Outcome: ' + (task.outcome || ''),
+  ];
+  if (task.groupingRationale) {
+    lines.push('Grouping rationale: ' + task.groupingRationale);
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(task.acceptanceCriteria) && task.acceptanceCriteria.length > 0) {
+    lines.push('Acceptance criteria: ' + task.acceptanceCriteria.join(', '));
+  }
+  lines.push('');
+  lines.push('Review criteria (the diff below must satisfy ALL of these):');
+  if (Array.isArray(task.acceptanceCriteria) && task.acceptanceCriteria.length > 0) {
+    task.acceptanceCriteria.forEach(function (ac) { lines.push('  - Acceptance criterion: ' + ac); });
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(task.verificationCommands) && task.verificationCommands.length > 0) {
+    task.verificationCommands.forEach(function (cmd) { lines.push('  - Verification command must pass: ' + cmd); });
+  }
+  if (
+    (!Array.isArray(task.acceptanceCriteria) || task.acceptanceCriteria.length === 0) &&
+    (!Array.isArray(task.verificationCommands) || task.verificationCommands.length === 0)
+  ) {
+    lines.push('  (none declared on the task)');
+  }
+  lines.push('');
+  lines.push('--- BEGIN DIFF (exact, verbatim) ---');
+  lines.push(diff);
+  lines.push('--- END DIFF ---');
+  return lines.join('\n') + '\n';
+}
+
+// Parses whatever structured verdict it can out of the review-solution
+// agent's reply. That agent's own definition (src/claude/agents/
+// gaia-review-solution.md, "## Output") specifies a fixed human-readable text
+// template — "Verdict: PASS / FAIL", "CRITICAL (blocks merge): ..." — not a
+// JSON contract; there is no machine schema published for it. This function
+// is therefore a best-effort pattern match over that documented template,
+// applied to the CLI's own `result.result` field — spawnClaudeAgent's parsed
+// --output-format json envelope; see tests/fixtures/fake-claude-cli.js's
+// 'echo-json' mode for the shape it mimics: { is_error, result: <agent reply
+// text> }. When the reply does not match the template (missing/malformed
+// envelope, or free text that doesn't follow it), `passed` is reported as
+// `null` rather than guessed — this function never fabricates a pass.
+// Authoritative pass/fail enforcement against the Tech-Spec's binding rule
+// ("review passed=true with no blocking finding") is intentionally left to
+// US-04-TASK-BE-03 (closing / combined verification+review outcome
+// persistence), which is free to treat a non-matching or null reply as a
+// failure — this function only reports what it can read.
+function _extractReviewVerdict(spawnResult) {
+  const text = spawnResult && spawnResult.result && typeof spawnResult.result.result === 'string'
+    ? spawnResult.result.result
+    : null;
+
+  if (text === null) {
+    return { passed: null, criticalFindings: [] };
+  }
+
+  const verdictMatch = text.match(/Verdict:\s*(PASS|FAIL)/i);
+  const passed = verdictMatch ? verdictMatch[1].toUpperCase() === 'PASS' : null;
+
+  const criticalFindings = [];
+  const criticalSectionMatch = text.match(
+    /CRITICAL \(blocks merge\):([\s\S]*?)(?:\n\s*\n\s*WARNING \(should fix\):|\n\s*\n\s*INFO \(improvements\):|$)/i
+  );
+  if (criticalSectionMatch) {
+    criticalSectionMatch[1].split('\n').forEach(function (line) {
+      const trimmed = line.trim();
+      if (trimmed.length > 0 && trimmed.toLowerCase() !== 'none') {
+        criticalFindings.push(trimmed);
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  return { passed: passed, criticalFindings: criticalFindings };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Dispatches exactly one review-solution agent invocation for one task
+ * attempt (US-04-TASK-BE-02; completes the "dispatch review agent with diff
+ * context" half of US-04). Mirrors dispatchTaskAttempt's fail-closed
+ * ordering discipline exactly, adapted for the review-solution agent instead
+ * of a developer agent:
+ *   1. Ownership check — ownership.readLease(executionRoot) must return a
+ *      lease whose runId matches `runId`. No lease, or a lease held by a
+ *      different runId, throws NO_LOCK_HELD before anything else happens —
+ *      no agent (implementation or review) is ever dispatched without the
+ *      caller demonstrably holding the repo-wide execution lease it claims.
+ *   2. Identity verification — claude-process.verifyAgentIdentity({
+ *      projectDir, agentId: REVIEW_AGENT_ID }) must succeed (Tech-Spec
+ *      section 7: "Before EACH implementation and review invocation:
+ *      operational resolveAgent..."). Any failure (AGENT_NOT_VERIFIED,
+ *      DEFINITION_HASH_MISMATCH) propagates unmodified.
+ *   3. Persist-before-invoke — the ledger 'review' activity for this attempt
+ *      is opened via execution-ledger.js's open()/computeOperationId BEFORE
+ *      spawnClaudeAgent is ever called. Unlike dispatchTaskAttempt, this does
+ *      NOT add/update a state attempt: the attempt already exists from the
+ *      implementation stage, and recording its 'reviewed' stage or any
+ *      pass/fail outcome is US-04-TASK-BE-03's job (closing / combined
+ *      verification+review outcome persistence), not this function's — this
+ *      function only opens the ledger activity.
+ *   4. Only once 1-3 have succeeded: claude-process.spawnClaudeAgent(...) is
+ *      called with the verified identity's nativeName wired in as the
+ *      --agent selector, and a prompt containing the task's context, the
+ *      exact diff (verbatim, via stdin — never argv), and the review
+ *      criteria (the task's own acceptanceCriteria/verificationCommands).
+ *   5. Returns a structured result combining the raw spawn result with a
+ *      best-effort parsed verdict (see _extractReviewVerdict) and the
+ *      run/task/attempt identifiers used. No outcome persistence happens
+ *      here — scope ends at "review dispatched and its raw result captured".
+ *
+ * Ledger placement: same per-run ledger file dispatchTaskAttempt uses
+ * (<executionRoot>/runs/<runId>/<runId>-token-ledger.json). The ledger agent
+ * key follows Tech-Spec section 6 exactly: `executor:<runId>:<taskId>:review`
+ * (kind `review`, per section 6's kinds list: task, implementation,
+ * verification-<index>, review).
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.executionRoot - Absolute path to
+ *   <common-git-dir>/ai-toolkit/execution.
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the run that must currently hold the
+ *   repo-wide execution lease.
+ * @param {object} args.task - Plan task object (plan.js shape): at least
+ *   `id`; `title`/`outcome`/`domain`/`groupingRationale`/`acceptanceCriteria`/
+ *   `verificationCommands` are used to build the review prompt.
+ * @param {number} args.attemptNumber - Positive integer attempt number this
+ *   review belongs to (the attempt already dispatched/verified earlier).
+ * @param {string} args.claudePath - Absolute path to the qualified Claude
+ *   CLI executable (forwarded to spawnClaudeAgent).
+ * @param {string} args.projectDir - Project root used both for identity
+ *   verification (--project) and as the spawned process's cwd.
+ * @param {string} args.diff - Exact diff text (e.g. `git diff` output) the
+ *   review must evaluate against the review criteria. This function does not
+ *   compute the diff itself — that is the caller's responsibility. An empty
+ *   string is valid (a no-op task's diff is legitimately empty).
+ * @param {number} [args.taskTimeoutMs] - Optional per-task timeout budget,
+ *   forwarded to spawnClaudeAgent.
+ * @param {string[]} [args.spawnArgs] - Test-only override of the full CLI
+ *   args array forwarded to spawnClaudeAgent, exactly like dispatchTaskAttempt's
+ *   own args.spawnArgs (see tests/fixtures/fake-claude-cli.js).
+ * @returns {Promise<{
+ *   runId: string, taskId: string, attemptNumber: number,
+ *   agentId: string, nativeAgentName: string,
+ *   ledgerOperationId: string, spawnResult: object,
+ *   reviewPassed: (boolean|null), criticalFindings: string[]
+ * }>}
+ * @throws {Error} NO_LOCK_HELD, AGENT_NOT_VERIFIED, DEFINITION_HASH_MISMATCH,
+ *   DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR, or any error surfaced by spawnClaudeAgent
+ *   (e.g. CLAUDE_EXECUTABLE_NOT_FOUND, CLAUDE_SPAWN_FAILED).
+ */
+async function runReview(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.executionRoot, 'runReview: args.executionRoot');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.runId, 'runReview: args.runId');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.claudePath, 'runReview: args.claudePath');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.projectDir, 'runReview: args.projectDir');
+  if (args.task == null || typeof args.task !== 'object') {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'runReview: args.task must be an object');
+  }
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.task.id, 'runReview: args.task.id');
+  if (!Number.isInteger(args.attemptNumber) || args.attemptNumber < 1) {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'runReview: args.attemptNumber must be a positive integer');
+  }
+  _requireString(args.diff, 'runReview: args.diff');
+
+  const executionRoot = args.executionRoot;
+  const runId = args.runId;
+  const task = args.task;
+  const attemptNumber = args.attemptNumber;
+  const diff = args.diff;
+
+  // 1. Ownership check — never acquire/reclaim here, only verify the caller
+  // already holds it (same precondition dispatchTaskAttempt enforces).
+  const lease = ownership.readLease(executionRoot);
+  if (!lease || lease.runId !== runId) {
+    throw _err(
+      'NO_LOCK_HELD',
+      'runReview: no repo-wide execution lease held by runId "' + runId + '" at ' +
+        executionRoot + (lease ? ' (currently held by runId "' + lease.runId + '")' : ' (no lease held)')
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 2. Identity verification — propagate failures unmodified.
+  const identity = claudeProcess.verifyAgentIdentity({
+    projectDir: args.projectDir,
+    agentId: REVIEW_AGENT_ID,
+  });
+
+  // 3. Persist-before-invoke: open the ledger 'review' activity only (no
+  // state attempt mutation — see doc comment above).
+  const ledgerPaths = store._executionPaths(executionRoot, runId);
+  const ledgerAgentKey = 'executor:' + runId + ':' + task.id + ':review';
+  const ledgerMetadata = {
+    agentId: identity.agentId,
+    nativeAgentName: identity.nativeName,
+    platform: process.platform,
+    toolkitVersion: identity.toolkitVersion,
+    resolutionScope: identity.scope,
+    definitionHash: identity.sha256,
+  };
+  const ledgerOpenResult = ledger.open(
+    ledgerPaths.runDir,
+    runId,
+    ledgerAgentKey,
+    'review',
+    null,
+    attemptNumber,
+    ledgerMetadata
+  );
+
+  // 4. Only now: dispatch the verified review agent.
+  const prompt = _buildReviewPrompt(task, diff);
+  const spawnArgs = Array.isArray(args.spawnArgs)
+    ? args.spawnArgs
+    : ['--print', '--output-format', 'json', '--agent', identity.nativeName];
+  const spawnResult = await claudeProcess.spawnClaudeAgent({
+    claudePath: args.claudePath,
+    args: spawnArgs,
+    prompt: prompt,
+    cwd: args.projectDir,
+    taskTimeoutMs: args.taskTimeoutMs,
+  });
+
+  // 5. Raw capture + best-effort verdict extraction — no outcome persistence
+  // here (US-04-TASK-BE-03 owns closing this out).
+  const verdict = _extractReviewVerdict(spawnResult);
+
+  return {
+    runId: runId,
+    taskId: task.id,
+    attemptNumber: attemptNumber,
+    agentId: identity.agentId,
+    nativeAgentName: identity.nativeName,
+    ledgerOperationId: ledgerOpenResult.operation_id,
+    spawnResult: spawnResult,
+    reviewPassed: verdict.passed,
+    criticalFindings: verdict.criticalFindings,
+  };
+}
+
+// Tree-kill for a verification command that exceeded its optional
+// commandTimeoutMs. Duplicates (rather than imports) claude-process.js's
+// E-02-qualified `taskkill /PID <pid> /T /F` technique: that helper is not
+// exported (claude-process.js's public surface is intentionally limited to
+// spawnClaudeAgent/verifyAgentIdentity), and verification commands are a
+// different trust/lifetime domain from Claude subprocess supervision, so
+// duplicating this small helper here keeps the two modules independently
+// readable rather than forcing a cross-module export for one shared branch.
+function _killVerificationProcessTreeSync(child) {
+  if (IS_WINDOWS) {
+    const res = spawnSync('taskkill', ['/PID', String(child.pid), '/T', '/F'], {
+      stdio: 'ignore',
+      windowsHide: true,
+    });
+    return !res.error && res.status === 0;
+  }
+  try {
+    child.kill('SIGKILL');
+  } catch (_) {
+    // best-effort only
+  }
+  return 'unknown';
+}
+
+// Runs one verification command line as a real Bash command (see
+// runVerifications' doc comment for why Bash + shell:false, rather than
+// shell:true, is the correct choice here). Resolves — never rejects — with a
+// result object describing exactly what happened, including the case where
+// the command could not even be spawned (e.g. no `bash` on PATH): that case
+// is reported via `spawnError` rather than thrown, so a missing shell is
+// handled the same way as any other command failure (AC: "the code should
+// not crash uncaught").
+function _runVerificationCommand(command, cwd, timeoutMs) {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    const startedAt = new Date();
+    const startedHr = process.hrtime.bigint();
+    let settled = false;
+    let timedOut = false;
+    let timeoutHandle = null;
+
+    function clearTimer() {
+      if (timeoutHandle) {
+        clearTimeout(timeoutHandle);
+        timeoutHandle = null;
+      }
+    }
+
+    function finish(fields) {
+      if (settled) return;
+      settled = true;
+      clearTimer();
+      const endedAt = new Date();
+      const durationMs = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - startedHr) / 1e6;
+      resolve(Object.assign(
+        {
+          command: command,
+          startedAt: startedAt.toISOString(),
+          endedAt: endedAt.toISOString(),
+          durationMs: durationMs,
+          exitCode: null,
+          signal: null,
+          stdout: '',
+          stderr: '',
+          stdoutTruncated: false,
+          stderrTruncated: false,
+          timedOut: timedOut,
+          spawnError: null,
+        },
+        fields
+      ));
+    }
+
+    let child;
+    try {
+      child = spawn('bash', ['-c', command], {
+        cwd: cwd,
+        shell: false, // never true: shell:true on Windows silently runs cmd.exe, not Bash
+        stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+        windowsHide: true,
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      finish({ spawnError: 'failed to spawn bash: ' + err.message });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const stdoutChunks = [];
+    const stderrChunks = [];
+    let stdoutBytes = 0;
+    let stderrBytes = 0;
+    let stdoutTruncated = false;
+    let stderrTruncated = false;
+
+    child.stdout.on('data', (chunk) => {
+      if (stdoutTruncated) return;
+      stdoutBytes += chunk.length;
+      if (stdoutBytes > DEFAULT_MAX_VERIFICATION_OUTPUT_BYTES) {
+        stdoutTruncated = true;
+        return;
+      }
+      stdoutChunks.push(chunk);
+    });
+
+    child.stderr.on('data', (chunk) => {
+      if (stderrTruncated) return;
+      stderrBytes += chunk.length;
+      if (stderrBytes > DEFAULT_MAX_VERIFICATION_OUTPUT_BYTES) {
+        stderrTruncated = true;
+        return;
+      }
+      stderrChunks.push(chunk);
+    });
+
+    child.on('error', (err) => {
+      // Covers "bash not found on PATH" (ENOENT) and other un-spawnable
+      // cases — Tech-Spec section 8's "unsupported shell fails preflight"
+      // is satisfied here: the very first verification command fails
+      // closed with a clear reason instead of crashing the coordinator.
+      finish({ spawnError: 'bash command failed to run: ' + err.message });
+    });
+
+    child.on('close', (code, signal) => {
+      finish({
+        exitCode: code === undefined ? null : code,
+        signal: signal === undefined ? null : signal,
+        stdout: Buffer.concat(stdoutChunks).toString('utf8'),
+        stderr: Buffer.concat(stderrChunks).toString('utf8'),
+        stdoutTruncated: stdoutTruncated,
+        stderrTruncated: stderrTruncated,
+      });
+    });
+
+    if (timeoutMs !== null && timeoutMs !== undefined) {
+      timeoutHandle = setTimeout(() => {
+        if (settled) return;
+        timedOut = true;
+        _killVerificationProcessTreeSync(child);
+      }, timeoutMs);
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Executes one task attempt's APPROVED verification commands — the fenced
+ * command blocks parsed losslessly out of the Work Breakdown by plan.js's
+ * parseMarkdown (task.verificationCommands) — as real shell command lines
+ * (US-04-TASK-BE-01). Tech-Spec section 8: "Verification commands come from
+ * approved fenced blocks, preserve exact bytes and declared shell semantics
+ * ... Execute independently and require each exit 0; generic npm test
+ * success cannot hide an individual failure."
+ *
+ * Why Bash + shell:false here, unlike claude-process.js's spawnClaudeAgent
+ * (shell:false, argv array, no shell at all): spawnClaudeAgent spawns an LLM
+ * agent whose prompt content is potentially adversarial natural-language
+ * input, so it deliberately avoids a shell entirely to rule out any
+ * metacharacter-injection risk. Verification commands are the opposite trust
+ * case — they are authored by an approved planning agent, embedded verbatim
+ * in the Work Breakdown, and only ever reach this function after a human has
+ * approved them at Gate 2 (reviewed, static, versioned text, never raw
+ * end-user input). They also legitimately depend on real shell features the
+ * Work Breakdown already uses verbatim: pipes, `grep -E 'a|b'`, `test -f`,
+ * `||`, redirects like `2>/dev/null` (see this very feature's own Work
+ * Breakdown command `npm pack --dry-run 2>/dev/null | grep -E '...'`).
+ * Running these without a shell would silently break every command that
+ * isn't a single bare argv invocation.
+ *
+ * This function still spawns with shell:false and an explicit argv array —
+ * it just names `bash` as the executable and `-c <command>` as its argv,
+ * rather than passing Node's own shell:true (which on Windows launches
+ * cmd.exe, not Bash, and would silently reinterpret Unix-only syntax like
+ * `test -f`, single-quoted `grep` patterns, or `2>/dev/null`). This is
+ * exactly Tech-Spec section 8's requirement: "Existing Bash commands run
+ * under an explicitly available Bash, not silently converted to PowerShell
+ * ... Unsupported shell fails preflight" — spawning Bash directly is what
+ * makes that hold on every platform, Windows included. A missing/unspawnable
+ * Bash is not treated as a special preflight step; it surfaces as the first
+ * command's `spawnError`, which fails that command exactly like a non-zero
+ * exit (see _runVerificationCommand).
+ *
+ * Fail-fast: commands run strictly in the order given. The first command
+ * that exits non-zero (or cannot be spawned at all) stops the loop —
+ * subsequent commands are never run for this attempt. This matches the
+ * outcome's "requires each command exit 0" and Tech-Spec's "require each
+ * exit 0; generic npm test success cannot hide an individual failure."
+ *
+ * Persistence: every command's result — including a failing or unspawnable
+ * one — is written as an immutable receipt via store.writeReceipt (the
+ * existing INFRA-TASK-BE-01 primitive; no new persistence primitive was
+ * needed here) BEFORE the loop moves on to the next command, using id
+ * `<taskId>-attempt<attemptNumber>-verification-<index>`. This is a stronger
+ * guarantee than the outcome's literal wording ("persists each result before
+ * proceeding to review" — review is the separate US-04-TASK-BE-02 stage),
+ * but per-command persist-as-you-go is the simplest correct design: it costs
+ * nothing extra, and it means a crash between two verification commands
+ * still leaves every already-completed command's evidence durable on disk,
+ * not just whatever happened to finish before the later review stage began.
+ *
+ * Empty verificationCommands is a trivial pass (nothing to verify) — it is
+ * never treated as a failure or as "unverified".
+ *
+ * Timeout: Tech-Spec section 8 does not mandate a timeout for verification
+ * commands (unlike claude-process.js's taskTimeoutMs for agent dispatch), so
+ * `args.commandTimeoutMs` is optional and defaults to no timeout — a caller
+ * (the future run loop, US-07/US-08) may supply one if it wants to bound a
+ * hanging verification command. When supplied and exceeded, the process
+ * tree is killed using the same E-02-qualified technique claude-process.js
+ * uses (see _killVerificationProcessTreeSync).
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.executionRoot - Absolute path to
+ *   <common-git-dir>/ai-toolkit/execution (forwarded to store.writeReceipt).
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the current run (forwarded to
+ *   store.writeReceipt).
+ * @param {object} args.task - Plan task object (plan.js shape): at least
+ *   `id`; `verificationCommands` (array of exact command-line strings) is
+ *   the field this function executes. Missing/non-array is treated as no
+ *   commands to verify.
+ * @param {number} args.attemptNumber - Positive integer attempt number this
+ *   verification run belongs to (used in receipt ids).
+ * @param {string} [args.cwd] - Working directory each command runs in.
+ *   Defaults to `process.cwd()`.
+ * @param {number} [args.commandTimeoutMs] - Optional per-command timeout
+ *   budget; see "Timeout" above. No default (no timeout) when omitted.
+ * @returns {Promise<{
+ *   taskId: string, attemptNumber: number, passed: boolean,
+ *   results: Array<{ command: string, exitCode: ?number, stdout: string,
+ *     stderr: string, durationMs: number, passed: boolean }>
+ * }>} `results` holds every command run up to and including the first
+ *   failure (or all commands, if every one passed).
+ * @throws {Error} code DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR on malformed input (the same
+ *   shared validation-error code _requireNonEmptyString already uses for
+ *   dispatchTaskAttempt's argument checks above); any
+ *   error store.writeReceipt itself throws (e.g. RECEIPT_CONFLICT if this
+ *   exact attempt/index was already recorded with different content)
+ *   propagates unmodified.
+ */
+async function runVerifications(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.executionRoot, 'runVerifications: args.executionRoot');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.runId, 'runVerifications: args.runId');
+  if (args.task == null || typeof args.task !== 'object') {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'runVerifications: args.task must be an object');
+  }
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.task.id, 'runVerifications: args.task.id');
+  if (!Number.isInteger(args.attemptNumber) || args.attemptNumber < 1) {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'runVerifications: args.attemptNumber must be a positive integer');
+  }
+
+  const executionRoot = args.executionRoot;
+  const runId = args.runId;
+  const task = args.task;
+  const attemptNumber = args.attemptNumber;
+  const cwd = args.cwd === undefined ? process.cwd() : args.cwd;
+  const commandTimeoutMs = args.commandTimeoutMs === undefined ? null : args.commandTimeoutMs;
+
+  const commands = Array.isArray(task.verificationCommands) ? task.verificationCommands : [];
+
+  const results = [];
+  for (let index = 0; index < commands.length; index++) {
+    const command = commands[index];
+    const outcome = await _runVerificationCommand(command, cwd, commandTimeoutMs);
+    const passed = outcome.spawnError === null && outcome.exitCode === 0;
+
+    const receiptId = task.id + '-attempt' + attemptNumber + '-verification-' + index;
+    store.writeReceipt(executionRoot, runId, receiptId, {
+      taskId: task.id,
+      attemptNumber: attemptNumber,
+      index: index,
+      command: command,
+      exitCode: outcome.exitCode,
+      signal: outcome.signal,
+      stdout: outcome.stdout,
+      stderr: outcome.stderr,
+      stdoutTruncated: outcome.stdoutTruncated,
+      stderrTruncated: outcome.stderrTruncated,
+      durationMs: outcome.durationMs,
+      startedAt: outcome.startedAt,
+      endedAt: outcome.endedAt,
+      timedOut: outcome.timedOut,
+      spawnError: outcome.spawnError,
+      passed: passed,
+    });
+
+    results.push({
+      command: command,
+      exitCode: outcome.exitCode,
+      stdout: outcome.stdout,
+      stderr: outcome.stderr,
+      durationMs: outcome.durationMs,
+      passed: passed,
+    });
+
+    if (!passed) {
+      return { taskId: task.id, attemptNumber: attemptNumber, passed: false, results: results };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { taskId: task.id, attemptNumber: attemptNumber, passed: true, results: results };
+}
+
+// 40-character hex SHA-1, case-insensitive — same pattern store.js's
+// registerCommitSHA and git.js's createTaskCommit already use; kept as its
+// own local constant here (no shared export exists for it) rather than
+// reaching into either module's private scope.
+const SHA_PATTERN = /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/i;
+
+// Real git reachability check: is `sha` an ancestor of (i.e. reachable by
+// walking parent links from) whatever `ref` currently resolves to?
+//
+// `git merge-base --is-ancestor <sha> <ref>` is used rather than
+// `git rev-list <ref> | grep <sha>` (enumerate every reachable commit and
+// text-search it) for two reasons: (1) correctness — rev-list | grep is a
+// substring match that can false-positive on a SHA that is merely a prefix
+// of another, and requires shelling a pipe, which this codebase's git
+// helpers deliberately avoid (shell:false, argv array, no shell
+// interpolation — see git.js's _runGitSync); merge-base needs no pipe at
+// all, one argv-only spawnSync call. (2) efficiency — merge-base is the
+// git-native primitive for exactly this question and can use the commit
+// graph/generation numbers to answer in effectively O(log history) rather
+// than materializing and scanning the full reachable set, which matters
+// once a feature branch has a non-trivial history. Exit code contract per
+// git-merge-base(1): 0 = is an ancestor (reachable), 1 = is not, anything
+// else = the query itself was invalid (bad SHA/ref) and is surfaced as a
+// real error rather than silently treated as "not reachable".
+//
+// Duplicated here (not imported from git.js) because git.js has no exported
+// generic git-spawn helper — its own _runGitSync/_runGitOrThrow are module-
+// private, and exporting one purely for this one call would widen git.js's
+// public surface for a single caller. index.js already imports spawnSync
+// from child_process (dispatchTaskAttempt's sibling helpers use it too), so
+// this duplicates only the minimal spawn call, in the same shell:false,
+// argv-array, windowsHide style git.js itself uses.
+function _isCommitReachableOnRef(cwd, sha, ref) {
+  const res = spawnSync('git', ['merge-base', '--is-ancestor', sha, ref], {
+    cwd: cwd,
+    shell: false,
+    encoding: 'utf8',
+    windowsHide: true,
+  });
+  if (res.error) {
+    throw _err(
+      'GIT_SPAWN_FAILED',
+      'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: failed to spawn "git merge-base --is-ancestor ' + sha + ' ' + ref + '": ' +
+        res.error.message
+    );
+  }
+  if (res.status === 0) return true;
+  if (res.status === 1) return false;
+  throw _err(
+    'GIT_MERGE_BASE_FAILED',
+    'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: "git merge-base --is-ancestor ' + sha + ' ' + ref + '" in ' + cwd +
+      ' failed unexpectedly (exit ' + res.status + '): ' + (res.stderr || '').trim()
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Finalizes one task attempt's checkpoint (US-05-TASK-BE-05; completes US-05
+ * "checkpoint, stage, commit, and register SHA"). Runs only after
+ * createTaskCommit (US-05-TASK-BE-03, git.js) has produced a commit and
+ * store.js's registerCommitSHA (US-05-TASK-BE-04) has already durably
+ * recorded it — this function does not commit or register anything itself,
+ * it reconciles and closes out what was already recorded:
+ *
+ *   1. Read the attempt's registered SHA. The attempt must already be at
+ *      stage 'committed' (the stage registerCommitSHA leaves it at) — if it
+ *      is not, fails closed with TASK_NOT_COMMITTED before touching Git or
+ *      the ledger. This is the literal "commit/ledger reconciliation" guard:
+ *      a checkpoint can never be finalized on the strength of a chat/agent
+ *      self-report alone, only on a durably persisted, staged transition.
+ *   2. Verify the registered SHA is REACHABLE on `taskRef` right now, via a
+ *      real `git merge-base --is-ancestor` call (see
+ *      _isCommitReachableOnRef above for why this call and not a
+ *      rev-list-and-grep). A trailer or a bare `git show` success is
+ *      explicitly insufficient (Tech-Spec section 8: "A trailer alone or
+ *      git show success is insufficient") — ancestry is the only thing this
+ *      function trusts. Fails closed with SHA_NOT_ON_BRANCH if the SHA is
+ *      not an ancestor of `taskRef`.
+ *   3. Mark the task's overall status 'checkpointed' via store.js's
+ *      setTaskStatus (existing TASK_STATUSES enum value — not a new status).
+ *   4. Close the ledger's 'task'-kind activity — the one dispatchTaskAttempt
+ *      (US-03-TASK-BE-03) opens at dispatch time and deliberately never
+ *      closes — via execution-ledger.js's finalizeActivity, status 'done',
+ *      tokens null with reason 'control-only' (Tech-Spec section 6: "The
+ *      task activity carries null token usage (reason: control-only)"),
+ *      using the exact same operation_id/agent-key dispatchTaskAttempt used
+ *      to open it (`executor:<runId>:<taskId>:task`, same attemptNumber).
+ *
+ * Scope boundary (explicit — do not extend past this without a later Work
+ * Breakdown task): this function implements the N=1 case only, where
+ * "closing after checkpoint" IS the terminal task-activity closure
+ * (Tech-Spec section 6: "closes after checkpoint and, for N>1, verified
+ * integration"; section 8: "N=1: task commit is on feature branch and
+ * integratedSha=originalSha after verification"). For maxConcurrency N>1,
+ * an attempt's commit lands on a private technical branch first and is only
+ * later cherry-picked onto the feature branch by a separate, serialized
+ * integration step (US-08-TASK-BE-03/04, not yet implemented) — closing the
+ * task activity here, before that integration has happened and been
+ * verified, would violate the Tech-Spec's own closing rule for N>1. This
+ * function does not know or enforce N=1 vs N>1 itself (no execute()/run
+ * loop exists yet to drive either path, per US-07/US-08); it is the future
+ * N>1 call site's responsibility to call this function only once
+ * integration is verified (or to route through a different, integration-
+ * aware finalization step once US-08-TASK-BE-03/04 land), not to call it
+ * straight after createTaskCommit's original commit the way the current N=1
+ * call site does.
+ *
+ * Idempotency: calling this twice for the same already-checkpointed attempt
+ * is safe. Step 1's precondition (attempt.stage === 'committed') still holds
+ * on a second call — nothing in this function advances attempt.stage past
+ * 'committed' — so the reachability check simply re-verifies (cheap, no
+ * side effect), store.setTaskStatus('checkpointed') is a harmless repeat
+ * assignment, and finalizeActivity's own replay contract (identical
+ * status/tokens/reason/completedAt returns the existing entry unchanged; is
+ * exact-operation_id-match, so a second call finds the entry finalizeActivity
+ * would find are conflicting instead of duplicated) makes the ledger close
+ * idempotent without any extra bookkeeping in this function.
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.executionRoot - Absolute path to
+ *   <common-git-dir>/ai-toolkit/execution.
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the run.
+ * @param {string} args.taskId - Task ID whose attempt is being finalized.
+ * @param {number} args.attemptNumber - Positive integer attempt number to
+ *   finalize (must match the attempt registerCommitSHA already advanced to
+ *   'committed').
+ * @param {string} args.projectDir - Absolute path to the Git worktree/repo
+ *   the reachability check runs in (the same repo createTaskCommit committed
+ *   into).
+ * @param {string} args.taskRef - The feature/task ref the registered SHA
+ *   must be reachable from (N=1: the feature branch itself, per Tech-Spec
+ *   section 8).
+ * @returns {{taskId: string, attemptNumber: number, taskStatus: 'checkpointed',
+ *   originalSha: string, taskRef: string, ledgerOperationId: string}}
+ * @throws {Error} DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR for malformed input;
+ *   STATE_NOT_FOUND / STATE_TASK_NOT_FOUND / STATE_ATTEMPT_NOT_FOUND when the
+ *   target does not exist; TASK_NOT_COMMITTED when the attempt has not yet
+ *   reached stage 'committed'; SHA_NOT_ON_BRANCH when the registered SHA is
+ *   not reachable from `taskRef`; GIT_SPAWN_FAILED / GIT_MERGE_BASE_FAILED
+ *   for a git invocation problem; ACTIVITY_NOT_FOUND / TERMINAL_CONFLICT
+ *   propagated unmodified from execution-ledger.js's finalizeActivity.
+ */
+function finalizeTaskCheckpoint(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.executionRoot, 'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: args.executionRoot');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.runId, 'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: args.runId');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.taskId, 'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: args.taskId');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.projectDir, 'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: args.projectDir');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.taskRef, 'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: args.taskRef');
+  if (!Number.isInteger(args.attemptNumber) || args.attemptNumber < 1) {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: args.attemptNumber must be a positive integer');
+  }
+
+  const executionRoot = args.executionRoot;
+  const runId = args.runId;
+  const taskId = args.taskId;
+  const attemptNumber = args.attemptNumber;
+  const projectDir = args.projectDir;
+  const taskRef = args.taskRef;
+
+  // 1. Read the registered SHA — the attempt must already be 'committed'.
+  let state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+  const task = state.tasks[taskId];
+  if (!task) {
+    throw _err('STATE_TASK_NOT_FOUND', 'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: task "' + taskId + '" not found');
+  }
+  const attempt = task.attempts.find(function (a) { return a.number === attemptNumber; });
+  if (!attempt) {
+    throw _err(
+      'STATE_ATTEMPT_NOT_FOUND',
+      'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: attempt ' + attemptNumber + ' not found for task "' + taskId + '"'
+    );
+  }
+  if (attempt.stage !== 'committed' || typeof attempt.originalSha !== 'string' || !SHA_PATTERN.test(attempt.originalSha)) {
+    throw _err(
+      'TASK_NOT_COMMITTED',
+      'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: attempt ' + attemptNumber + ' of task "' + taskId + '" is at stage "' + attempt.stage +
+        '" and cannot be checkpointed — a checkpoint may only be finalized once the commit SHA has been ' +
+        'registered (expected stage "committed" with a valid originalSha)'
+    );
+  }
+  const commitSha = attempt.originalSha;
+
+  // 2. Real git reachability check — never trust the trailer/SHA alone.
+  const reachable = _isCommitReachableOnRef(projectDir, commitSha, taskRef);
+  if (!reachable) {
+    throw _err(
+      'SHA_NOT_ON_BRANCH',
+      'finalizeTaskCheckpoint: registered commit ' + commitSha + ' for attempt ' + attemptNumber + ' of task "' +
+        taskId + '" is not reachable from "' + taskRef + '" — refusing to finalize the checkpoint; nothing changed'
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 3. Mark the task's overall status 'checkpointed' (existing TASK_STATUSES
+  // value — see store.js).
+  state = state.setTaskStatus(taskId, 'checkpointed');
+  state = store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+
+  // 4. Close the ledger's 'task'-kind activity dispatchTaskAttempt opened
+  // and deliberately left open — same operation_id/agent-key/attempt it was
+  // opened with.
+  const ledgerPaths = store._executionPaths(executionRoot, runId);
+  const ledgerTaskAgentKey = 'executor:' + runId + ':' + taskId + ':task';
+  const finalizeResult = ledger.finalizeActivity(ledgerPaths.runDir, runId, ledgerTaskAgentKey, attemptNumber, {
+    status: 'done',
+    tokens: null,
+    reason: 'control-only',
+  });
+
+  return {
+    taskId: taskId,
+    attemptNumber: attemptNumber,
+    taskStatus: 'checkpointed',
+    originalSha: commitSha,
+    taskRef: taskRef,
+    ledgerOperationId: finalizeResult.operation_id,
+  };
+}
+
+// ── reconcile/resume evidence classification (US-06-TASK-BE-01/02) ─────────
+//
+// Classifies each task's current evidence against the Tech-Spec section 9
+// edge-cases table and applies an idempotent repair for the rows that have
+// one (registerCommitSHA, finalizeTaskCheckpoint).
+//
+// US-06-TASK-BE-02 completes the two rows US-06-TASK-BE-01 left as an
+// honest partial (see its own historical comment, preserved in git history):
+//   - "Worker still live or unknown" / "Dead worker, partial diff": now a
+//     REAL check, via the processIdentity tag dispatchTaskAttempt persists
+//     before spawning and _findLiveTaggedProcess's OS-level query (see the
+//     "worker-liveness process tagging" file comment above IS_WINDOWS) —
+//     _classifyLiveOrDeadWorkerAttempt below. An attempt with no recorded
+//     processIdentity (predates this feature, or dispatch never reached the
+//     persist step) is still reported honestly as liveness-unknown — never
+//     silently treated as dead, never replaced. Only a positive
+//     confirmed-not-found result, together with the retry policy still
+//     permitting a new attempt, ever reports 'dead-worker'.
+//   - "Failed verification/review ... within retry policy": full retry-
+//     policy attempt-count enforcement ("one initial implementation + one
+//     automatic rework, two total per task ... a task beyond policy is
+//     blocked: replan-required") is now applied — _classifyFailedAttempt
+//     below.
+// Also NOT implemented: the Tech-Spec's full "Recovery of missing SHA"
+// search ("search reachable commits from recorded task/feature refs; match
+// exact trailers, parent, full tree and path inventory ... one exact
+// candidate is recoverable ... multiple/incompatible candidates block").
+// That is a full scan over every commit reachable from taskRef. This module
+// only inspects the CURRENT TIP of taskRef as the sole recovery candidate
+// (reusing finalizeTaskCheckpoint's own merge-base-adjacent, single-commit
+// inspection style) — a narrower, real, working check consistent with
+// createTaskCommit's own post-commit tree/parent/trailer reinspection
+// pattern (lib/task-executor/git.js), not a reachable-set-wide scan. A tip
+// that does not exactly match this attempt's persisted checkpoint intent is
+// reported as blocked (ambiguous), never guessed at.
+//
+// "Reconcile/resume require no live competing coordinator" (Tech-Spec
+// section 9) IS enforced, by _ensureNoLiveCompetingCoordinator below, called
+// at the very start of both reconcile() and resume() — before any repair
+// (registerCommitSHA/finalizeTaskCheckpoint). See that function's own doc
+// comment for the exact decision table. Neither function acquires or
+// reclaims the repo-wide execution lease itself — only verifies no OTHER
+// live coordinator holds it.
+
+// Narrow, tip-only commit inspection — NOT a reachable-set scan (see file
+// comment above). Duplicates (rather than imports) the minimal tree/parent/
+// trailer parsing git.js's createTaskCommit already does privately, in the
+// same shell:false/argv-array/windowsHide spawn style already used
+// throughout this file (e.g. _isCommitReachableOnRef above). Returns null
+// (never throws) when `sha` cannot be read as a commit object.
+function _readCommitObjectSummary(cwd, sha) {
+  const res = spawnSync('git', ['cat-file', '-p', sha], {
+    cwd: cwd,
+    shell: false,
+    encoding: 'utf8',
+    windowsHide: true,
+  });
+  if (res.error || res.status !== 0) return null;
+
+  const lines = res.stdout.split('\n');
+  let tree = null;
+  const parents = [];
+  let i = 0;
+  for (; i < lines.length; i += 1) {
+    const line = lines[i];
+    if (line === '') { i += 1; break; }
+    if (line.indexOf('tree ') === 0) {
+      tree = line.slice(5).trim();
+    } else if (line.indexOf('parent ') === 0) {
+      parents.push(line.slice(7).trim());
+    }
+  }
+  const message = lines.slice(i).join('\n');
+  const trimmed = message.replace(/\s+$/, '');
+  const paragraphs = trimmed.split(/\n\n+/);
+  const lastParagraph = paragraphs[paragraphs.length - 1] || '';
+  const trailers = {};
+  lastParagraph.split('\n').forEach(function (line) {
+    const idx = line.indexOf(': ');
+    if (idx === -1) return;
+    trailers[line.slice(0, idx)] = line.slice(idx + 2);
+  });
+
+  return { tree: tree, parents: parents, trailers: trailers };
+}
+
+// "Corrupted/modified state" (AC-12, US-06-TASK-BE-02): a completed task
+// (checkpointed/integrated) or an already-'committed' attempt awaiting only
+// checkpoint finalization whose last dispatched attempt's TAGGED WORKER
+// PROCESS IS STILL ALIVE right now is an internally inconsistent evidence
+// set. dispatchTaskAttempt only ever returns once spawnClaudeAgent's promise
+// resolves — i.e. after that process has fully exited — so a genuinely
+// finished attempt's worker should already be gone; a live match here means
+// either the tag was reused/corrupted, or a stale/orphaned process is still
+// running under the identity this run believes is done and checkpointed.
+// Detected ONLY from POSITIVE liveness evidence (found-alive): 'unknown' and
+// 'confirmed-not-found' are the expected, non-corrupted outcomes for a
+// genuinely finished attempt's worker (already exited, or liveness simply
+// can't be checked on this platform) and are never themselves treated as
+// evidence of corruption — mirrors this whole file's "never guess" discipline.
+function _isCompletedAttemptWorkerUnexpectedlyAlive(ctx, attempt) {
+  if (typeof attempt.processIdentity !== 'string' || attempt.processIdentity.length === 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const liveness = _findLiveTaggedProcess(attempt.processIdentity, ctx.exeBasename);
+  return liveness.status === 'found-alive';
+}
+
+// "Integrated commit + valid intent and receipts" / "Completed task but
+// unreachable/mismatched commit" / "Corrupted/missing evidence" (for an
+// already-checkpointed/integrated task). Read-only — never repairs a
+// completed task; a task that already reached 'checkpointed'/'integrated'
+// with bad evidence is reported blocked, not silently reopened.
+function _classifyCompletedTask(ctx, taskId, attempt) {
+  if (_isCompletedAttemptWorkerUnexpectedlyAlive(ctx, attempt)) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-modified-state' };
+  }
+
+  if (typeof attempt.originalSha !== 'string' || !SHA_PATTERN.test(attempt.originalSha)) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+
+  let reachable;
+  try {
+    reachable = _isCommitReachableOnRef(ctx.projectDir, attempt.originalSha, ctx.taskRef);
+  } catch (_err) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+  if (!reachable) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'unreachable-or-mismatched-commit' };
+  }
+
+  if (!Array.isArray(attempt.intentIds) || attempt.intentIds.length === 0) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+  try {
+    attempt.intentIds.forEach(function (id) { store.readIntent(ctx.executionRoot, ctx.runId, id); });
+    store.readReceipt(ctx.executionRoot, ctx.runId, taskId + '-attempt' + attempt.number + '-outcome');
+  } catch (_err) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+
+  return { classification: 'up-to-date', action: 'keep-completion' };
+}
+
+// "Integration commit/ref exists but state missing" (N=1 shape: attempt
+// already 'committed', task overall status not yet advanced past it).
+// Repair: finalizeTaskCheckpoint — an already-existing, already-idempotent
+// primitive (US-05-TASK-BE-05) — is invoked directly; this function does not
+// duplicate its reachability/ledger logic.
+function _classifyCommittedAttempt(ctx, taskId, attempt) {
+  if (_isCompletedAttemptWorkerUnexpectedlyAlive(ctx, attempt)) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-modified-state' };
+  }
+
+  if (typeof attempt.originalSha !== 'string' || !SHA_PATTERN.test(attempt.originalSha)) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+
+  let reachable;
+  try {
+    reachable = _isCommitReachableOnRef(ctx.projectDir, attempt.originalSha, ctx.taskRef);
+  } catch (_err) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+  if (!reachable) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'unreachable-or-mismatched-commit' };
+  }
+
+  try {
+    finalizeTaskCheckpoint({
+      executionRoot: ctx.executionRoot,
+      runId: ctx.runId,
+      taskId: taskId,
+      attemptNumber: attempt.number,
+      projectDir: ctx.projectDir,
+      taskRef: ctx.taskRef,
+    });
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'checkpoint-finalization-failed:' + (err.code || 'UNKNOWN') };
+  }
+
+  return { classification: 'reconciled', action: 'checkpoint-finalized', repairAction: 'finalize-checkpoint' };
+}
+
+// "Commit exists but SHA not recorded" (attempt at 'checkpoint-prepared',
+// no originalSha registered yet) vs the case where no commit has landed at
+// all yet. See the file-level scope comment above: only taskRef's CURRENT
+// TIP is inspected as the sole recovery candidate — this is intentionally
+// narrower than the Tech-Spec's full reachable-commit-set scan.
+function _classifyCheckpointPreparedAttempt(ctx, taskId, attempt) {
+  const checkpointIntentId = taskId + '-attempt' + attempt.number + '-checkpoint';
+  const intentIds = Array.isArray(attempt.intentIds) ? attempt.intentIds : [];
+  if (intentIds.indexOf(checkpointIntentId) === -1) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+
+  let intent;
+  try {
+    intent = store.readIntent(ctx.executionRoot, ctx.runId, checkpointIntentId);
+  } catch (_err) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+
+  const tipRes = spawnSync('git', ['rev-parse', '--verify', ctx.taskRef + '^{commit}'], {
+    cwd: ctx.projectDir,
+    shell: false,
+    encoding: 'utf8',
+    windowsHide: true,
+  });
+  if (tipRes.error || tipRes.status !== 0) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+  const tip = tipRes.stdout.trim();
+
+  if (tip === intent.parentSha) {
+    // taskRef has not moved since the checkpoint intent was persisted — no
+    // commit has landed yet. Reconcile never creates commits; this only
+    // reports the classification.
+    return { classification: 'checkpoint-prepared-no-commit', action: 'needs-commit-creation' };
+  }
+
+  const candidate = _readCommitObjectSummary(ctx.projectDir, tip);
+  const trailerKeys = intent.trailers ? Object.keys(intent.trailers) : [];
+  const matches = candidate !== null &&
+    candidate.parents.length === 1 &&
+    candidate.parents[0] === intent.parentSha &&
+    candidate.tree === intent.expectedTreeSha &&
+    trailerKeys.length > 0 &&
+    trailerKeys.every(function (key) { return candidate.trailers[key] === intent.trailers[key]; });
+
+  if (!matches) {
+    // taskRef moved, but the tip does not exactly match this attempt's own
+    // persisted intent — an ambiguous/incompatible candidate. Per Tech-Spec
+    // ("multiple/incompatible candidates block"): block, never guess.
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'unreachable-or-mismatched-commit' };
+  }
+
+  try {
+    store.registerCommitSHA(ctx.executionRoot, ctx.runId, taskId, attempt.number, tip, { sequential: true });
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'sha-registration-failed:' + (err.code || 'UNKNOWN') };
+  }
+
+  return { classification: 'reconciled', action: 'commit-sha-registered', repairAction: 'register-commit-sha' };
+}
+
+// "Worker still live or unknown" / "Dead worker, partial diff" (Tech-Spec
+// section 9, US-06-TASK-BE-02). Real check via the processIdentity tag
+// dispatchTaskAttempt persists before spawning (see the "worker-liveness
+// process tagging" file comment above IS_WINDOWS) and _findLiveTaggedProcess's
+// OS-level query.
+function _classifyLiveOrDeadWorkerAttempt(ctx, taskId, task, attempt) {
+  if (typeof attempt.processIdentity !== 'string' || attempt.processIdentity.length === 0) {
+    // No tag recorded at all (an attempt that predates this feature, or one
+    // whose dispatch never reached the persist-before-invoke step) — cannot
+    // be checked. Same honest-partial result US-06-TASK-BE-01 already
+    // reported unconditionally for every attempt at these stages.
+    return { classification: 'worker-live-or-unknown', action: 'no-replacement-diagnose' };
+  }
+
+  const liveness = _findLiveTaggedProcess(attempt.processIdentity, ctx.exeBasename);
+
+  if (liveness.status === 'found-alive') {
+    // Worker confirmed live: never touch, never dispatch a replacement — the
+    // same safe behavior US-06-TASK-BE-01 already applied unconditionally,
+    // now backed by a real, positive OS confirmation instead of an assumption.
+    return { classification: 'worker-live', action: 'no-replacement-diagnose-or-pause' };
+  }
+
+  if (liveness.status === 'unknown') {
+    // Inconclusive (non-Windows, or the OS query itself failed/untrusted) —
+    // never coerce into either extreme; refuse to touch, exactly like a
+    // confirmed-live worker.
+    return { classification: 'worker-live-or-unknown', action: 'no-replacement-diagnose' };
+  }
+
+  // confirmed-not-found: positive absence evidence — the tagged worker
+  // process genuinely no longer exists. Subject to the retry policy
+  // (Tech-Spec section 9: "one initial implementation + one automatic
+  // rework, two total per task ... a task beyond policy is blocked:
+  // replan-required") — this attempt itself already consumed one of the (at
+  // most two) real implementation invocations task.attempts.length counts
+  // (see _classifyFailedAttempt's own comment for why that count needs no
+  // extra filtering).
+  if (task.attempts.length >= 2) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'replan-required' };
+  }
+
+  // "Dead worker, partial diff" -> "Preserve and attribute; new attempt
+  // within retry policy". Whatever partial evidence this attempt already
+  // recorded (a verification/review outcome, or even a commit that somehow
+  // landed despite the worker dying) is preserved as-is — nothing here
+  // discards or rewrites it; hasPartialEvidence is reported for visibility
+  // only, the action is the same either way (a new attempt is needed, subject
+  // to the retry policy just enforced above).
+  const hasPartialEvidence =
+    (Array.isArray(attempt.verificationRefs) && attempt.verificationRefs.length > 0) ||
+    (Array.isArray(attempt.reviewRefs) && attempt.reviewRefs.length > 0) ||
+    (typeof attempt.originalSha === 'string' && attempt.originalSha.length > 0);
+
+  return {
+    classification: 'dead-worker',
+    action: 'preserve-and-attribute-new-attempt-within-retry-policy',
+    hasPartialEvidence: hasPartialEvidence,
+  };
+}
+
+// "Failed verification/review" (Tech-Spec section 9, US-06-TASK-BE-02): full
+// retry-policy attempt-count enforcement. "One initial implementation + one
+// automatic rework (two total per task). Review rejections and
+// implementation failures consume attempts when new implementation is
+// invoked. Resuming verification, ledger projection or an existing commit
+// does not. A task beyond policy is blocked: replan-required."
+//
+// task.attempts.length is exactly the count of real implementation
+// invocations recorded for this task: store.js's addAttempt is only ever
+// called from dispatchTaskAttempt (US-03-TASK-BE-03) — nothing in this
+// codebase calls it merely to resume verification, project the ledger, or
+// re-inspect an existing commit. So this count already matches the
+// Tech-Spec's own "resuming ... does not [consume attempts]" rule with no
+// extra filtering needed: a task whose attempts.length is already 2 has used
+// both the initial implementation and its one automatic rework, so a third
+// attempt is beyond policy.
+function _classifyFailedAttempt(task) {
+  if (task.attempts.length >= 2) {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'replan-required' };
+  }
+  return { classification: 'failed', action: 'needs-new-attempt-subject-to-retry-policy' };
+}
+
+// Single per-task classification dispatch. Never touches a task that has
+// never been dispatched (status 'pending' with zero attempts) — reconcile
+// "does not dispatch" (Tech-Spec section 9).
+function _classifyTask(ctx, taskId, task) {
+  if (task.status === 'skipped') {
+    return { classification: 'skipped', action: 'none' };
+  }
+
+  if (task.status === 'checkpointed' || task.status === 'integrated') {
+    const attempt = task.attempts[task.attempts.length - 1];
+    if (!attempt) {
+      return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+    }
+    return _classifyCompletedTask(ctx, taskId, attempt);
+  }
+
+  if (task.status === 'blocked') {
+    return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'already-blocked' };
+  }
+
+  if (!Array.isArray(task.attempts) || task.attempts.length === 0) {
+    return { classification: 'not-started', action: 'none' };
+  }
+
+  const attempt = task.attempts[task.attempts.length - 1];
+  switch (attempt.stage) {
+    case 'committed':
+      return _classifyCommittedAttempt(ctx, taskId, attempt);
+    case 'checkpoint-prepared':
+      return _classifyCheckpointPreparedAttempt(ctx, taskId, attempt);
+    case 'reviewed':
+      // "Review passed, no commit" -> recheck unchanged tree then finish
+      // checkpoint. Recomputing/re-verifying the tree is out of scope here
+      // (it needs the same inputs persistCheckpointIntent/stageTaskFiles
+      // need, which reconcile is not given); this reports the classification
+      // only.
+      return { classification: 'reviewed-no-checkpoint', action: 'needs-checkpoint-completion' };
+    case 'verified':
+      // Real, reachable persisted stage only between the two writes
+      // persistVerificationReviewOutcome makes when verification passes
+      // (store.js) — evidence of a passed verification without a recorded
+      // review outcome yet.
+      return { classification: 'verified-no-review-outcome', action: 'needs-review' };
+    case 'implementation-recorded':
+      // "Implementation result persisted" -> continue verification, not
+      // implementation.
+      return { classification: 'implementation-recorded', action: 'needs-verification' };
+    case 'prepared':
+    case 'dispatching':
+    case 'running':
+    case 'interrupted':
+      return _classifyLiveOrDeadWorkerAttempt(ctx, taskId, task, attempt);
+    case 'failed':
+      return _classifyFailedAttempt(task);
+    default:
+      return { classification: 'blocked', action: 'corrupted-or-missing-evidence' };
+  }
+}
+
+// ── execute() main loop (US-07-TASK-BE-01) ──────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Sequential (maxConcurrency=1) run loop: derives the executor's run identity
+// from the approved feature's own Work Breakdown, acquires the repo-wide
+// execution lease for a brand-new run, creates the initial run state, then
+// drives the ready queue to completion one task at a time. Each ready task's
+// slot is reserved (task status 'active') through dispatch -> verify ->
+// review -> checkpoint -> commit, and released only once the task reaches a
+// terminal status ('checkpointed' or 'blocked') — before the next ready task
+// is ever considered. N>1 concurrent slots is explicitly out of scope here
+// (US-08).
+
+// One initial implementation + one automatic rework, two total per task
+// (Tech-Spec section 9) — the same retry-policy rule US-06-TASK-BE-02's
+// _classifyFailedAttempt/_classifyLiveOrDeadWorkerAttempt already enforce via
+// a literal `>= 2` check; named here so execute()'s own enforcement of the
+// identical rule reads as the same policy, not a coincidentally-matching
+// magic number.
+const MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_TASK = 2;
+
+function _isBeyondRetryPolicy(state, taskId) {
+  return state.tasks[taskId].attempts.length >= MAX_ATTEMPTS_PER_TASK;
+}
+
+// Resolves the absolute common Git directory for `projectDir` THROUGH Git
+// (Tech-Spec section 5: "Discover absolute worktree root and common Git
+// directory through Git, not root/.git string concatenation") — never
+// hand-built by string-concatenating ".git" onto the project path, which
+// would be wrong for a linked worktree. `git rev-parse --git-common-dir` may
+// return a path relative to `projectDir` depending on the installed Git
+// version, so the result is resolved to absolute via `path.resolve` against
+// `projectDir` — that resolution step is the only non-Git part of this
+// function; the directory identity itself always comes from Git.
+function _resolveCommonGitDir(projectDir) {
+  const res = spawnSync('git', ['rev-parse', '--git-common-dir'], {
+    cwd: projectDir, shell: false, encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true,
+  });
+  if (res.error || res.status !== 0) {
+    throw _err(
+      'GIT_SPAWN_FAILED',
+      'execute: failed to resolve the common Git directory for "' + projectDir + '": ' +
+        (res.error ? res.error.message : (res.stderr || '').trim())
+    );
+  }
+  return path.resolve(projectDir, res.stdout.trim());
+}
+
+function _resolveRefTip(cwd, ref, label) {
+  const res = spawnSync('git', ['rev-parse', '--verify', ref + '^{commit}'], {
+    cwd: cwd, shell: false, encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true,
+  });
+  if (res.error || res.status !== 0) {
+    throw _err(
+      'GIT_REF_RESOLUTION_FAILED',
+      'execute: failed to resolve ' + label + ' "' + ref + '" in ' + cwd + ': ' +
+        (res.error ? res.error.message : (res.stderr || '').trim())
+    );
+  }
+  return res.stdout.trim();
+}
+
+// Derives taskRef as the CURRENT checked-out branch (Tech-Spec's N=1 model:
+// "task commit is on feature branch") via `git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD` —
+// used only when the caller (execute()) does not supply an explicit
+// args.taskRef override. A detached HEAD has no branch to derive a ref from,
+// so it fails closed rather than guessing.
+function _currentBranchRef(projectDir) {
+  const res = spawnSync('git', ['rev-parse', '--abbrev-ref', 'HEAD'], {
+    cwd: projectDir, shell: false, encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true,
+  });
+  if (res.error || res.status !== 0) {
+    throw _err(
+      'GIT_REF_RESOLUTION_FAILED',
+      'execute: failed to resolve the current branch for "' + projectDir + '": ' +
+        (res.error ? res.error.message : (res.stderr || '').trim())
+    );
+  }
+  const name = res.stdout.trim();
+  if (name === 'HEAD') {
+    throw _err(
+      'EXECUTE_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+      'execute: "' + projectDir + '" has a detached HEAD — a task/feature ref cannot be derived automatically; ' +
+        'check out a branch first, or pass args.taskRef explicitly'
+    );
+  }
+  return 'refs/heads/' + name;
+}
+
+function _buildTaskCommitMessage(task) {
+  if (task.commit && typeof task.commit.type === 'string' && typeof task.commit.subject === 'string') {
+    const scope = typeof task.commit.scope === 'string' && task.commit.scope.length > 0
+      ? '(' + task.commit.scope + ')'
+      : '';
+    return task.commit.type + scope + ': ' + task.commit.subject;
+  }
+  return 'chore: ' + task.id;
+}
+
+// Real, side-effect-free diff for the review agent (Tech-Spec section 8:
+// "the review must see exactly what will be checkpointed" / "unexpected
+// tracked changes invalidate the reviewed diff"). Built per enumerated
+// changedPaths entry (the SAME array git.detectChangedPaths just produced,
+// and that will later be staged/committed unchanged) rather than a single
+// blanket `git diff`, specifically so this function never mutates the Git
+// index (no `git add -N`/intent-to-add trick, which WOULD mutate it) —
+// stageTaskFiles's own before/after index snapshot (US-05-TASK-BE-02) must
+// still see the exact pre-staging state this function ran against.
+//   - 'delete'/'modify' entries: plain `git diff -- <path>` (tracked file,
+//     real exit 0 either way).
+//   - 'add' entries: `git diff --no-index -- /dev/null <path>` — the
+//     documented git idiom for diffing an untracked file against "nothing"
+//     without ever touching the index; per git-diff(1), --no-index exits 1
+//     when a difference is found (the expected, common case here), which is
+//     NOT an error and must not be treated as one.
+function _computeReviewDiff(cwd, changedPaths) {
+  const parts = changedPaths.map(function (entry) {
+    let res;
+    if (entry.changeType === 'add') {
+      res = spawnSync('git', ['diff', '--no-color', '--no-index', '--', '/dev/null', entry.path], {
+        cwd: cwd, shell: false, encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true,
+      });
+      if (res.error || (res.status !== 0 && res.status !== 1)) {
+        throw _err(
+          'REVIEW_DIFF_FAILED',
+          '_computeReviewDiff: "git diff --no-index" for added path "' + entry.path + '" failed: ' +
+            (res.error ? res.error.message : (res.stderr || '').trim())
+        );
+      }
+    } else {
+      res = spawnSync('git', ['diff', '--no-color', '--', entry.path], {
+        cwd: cwd, shell: false, encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true,
+      });
+      if (res.error || res.status !== 0) {
+        throw _err(
+          'REVIEW_DIFF_FAILED',
+          '_computeReviewDiff: "git diff" for path "' + entry.path + '" (changeType "' + entry.changeType +
+            '") failed: ' + (res.error ? res.error.message : (res.stderr || '').trim())
+        );
+      }
+    }
+    return res.stdout;
+  });
+  return parts.join('\n');
+}
+
+// Drives ONE ready task through dispatch -> verify -> review -> checkpoint,
+// retrying (a NEW attempt on the SAME task) within the retry policy on a
+// failure, and only returning once the task has reached a terminal status
+// ('checkpointed' or 'blocked') — i.e. once its reserved slot can safely be
+// released back to the outer ready-queue loop in execute().
+async function _runTaskToResolution(ctx) {
+  const executionRoot = ctx.executionRoot;
+  const runId = ctx.runId;
+  const projectDir = ctx.projectDir;
+  const taskRef = ctx.taskRef;
+  const featureRef = ctx.featureRef;
+  const planDigest = ctx.planDigest;
+  const task = ctx.task;
+  const taskId = task.id;
+  const agentId = agentRegistry.resolveWorkBreakdownAgentType(task.agentType).canonicalId;
+
+  for (;;) {
+    let state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+    state = state.setTaskStatus(taskId, 'active');
+    state = store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+
+    const attemptNumber = state.tasks[taskId].attempts.length + 1;
+
+    let dispatchResult;
+    try {
+      dispatchResult = await dispatchTaskAttempt({
+        executionRoot: executionRoot,
+        runId: runId,
+        task: task,
+        attemptNumber: attemptNumber,
+        claudePath: ctx.claudePath,
+        agentId: agentId,
+        projectDir: projectDir,
+        taskTimeoutMs: ctx.taskTimeoutMs,
+        spawnArgs: ctx.implementationSpawnArgs,
+      });
+    } catch (dispatchErr) {
+      state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+      const attemptRecord = state.tasks[taskId].attempts.find(function (a) { return a.number === attemptNumber; });
+      if (!attemptRecord) {
+        // Failed BEFORE persist-before-invoke (e.g. NO_LOCK_HELD,
+        // AGENT_NOT_VERIFIED, DEFINITION_HASH_MISMATCH, a systemic/config
+        // problem, not a per-task transient failure). Never consume a task
+        // attempt for an environment problem outside the task itself —
+        // propagate so execute() itself fails (the lease is still released
+        // via its own try/finally).
+        throw dispatchErr;
+      }
+      // Genuine spawn-level failure (spawnClaudeAgent itself threw) AFTER
+      // the attempt was already durably recorded — this DOES consume the
+      // attempt, exactly like a verification/review failure does.
+      state = state.updateAttempt(taskId, attemptNumber, {
+        stage: 'failed',
+        terminalReason: 'dispatch-error:' + (dispatchErr.code || 'UNKNOWN'),
+      });
+      state = store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+      if (_isBeyondRetryPolicy(state, taskId)) {
+        state = state.setTaskStatus(taskId, 'blocked');
+        store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+        return;
+      }
+      if (state.runStatus === 'stopping') {
+        // A stop request was persisted while this attempt was in flight
+        // (Tech-Spec section 7: "immediate: request termination ... await
+        // confirmed terminal state" — stop work on this task now, not after
+        // one more retry attempt). Still within retry policy, so this is NOT
+        // 'blocked' (that status means "retry policy exhausted", which is
+        // not what happened here) — leave the attempt's/task's status as
+        // already recorded ('failed'/'active') and return without dispatching
+        // attempt 2. execute()'s own outer loop observes 'stopping' on its
+        // very next iteration and sets the final runStatus to 'paused'.
+        return;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    void dispatchResult; // raw spawn capture only — not otherwise consulted here.
+
+    const verification = await runVerifications({
+      executionRoot: executionRoot, runId: runId, task: task, attemptNumber: attemptNumber,
+      cwd: projectDir, commandTimeoutMs: ctx.taskTimeoutMs,
+    });
+
+    let review = null;
+    let changedPaths = null;
+    if (verification.passed) {
+      // Detected once per attempt (Gate-1 binding constraint #2's mandatory
+      // negative test relies on this: a self-reported "success" that wrote
+      // nothing real is caught here/by verification, never trusted alone).
+      changedPaths = git.detectChangedPaths(projectDir);
+      const diff = _computeReviewDiff(projectDir, changedPaths);
+      review = await runReview({
+        executionRoot: executionRoot, runId: runId, task: task, attemptNumber: attemptNumber,
+        claudePath: ctx.claudePath, projectDir: projectDir, diff: diff, taskTimeoutMs: ctx.taskTimeoutMs,
+        spawnArgs: ctx.reviewSpawnArgs,
+      });
+    }
+
+    const outcome = store.persistVerificationReviewOutcome(executionRoot, runId, taskId, attemptNumber, verification, review);
+
+    if (outcome.stage !== 'reviewed') {
+      state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+      if (_isBeyondRetryPolicy(state, taskId)) {
+        state = state.setTaskStatus(taskId, 'blocked');
+        store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+        return;
+      }
+      if (state.runStatus === 'stopping') {
+        // Same stop-awareness as the dispatch-error retry site above: a stop
+        // request was persisted while this attempt's verification/review was
+        // in flight (or just after). Still within retry policy — return
+        // without dispatching another attempt rather than forcing 'blocked',
+        // and let execute()'s outer loop settle the run to 'paused'.
+        return;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Checkpoint: stage first (US-05-TASK-BE-02) so its OWN write-tree
+    // result becomes the checkpoint intent's expectedTreeSha, THEN persist
+    // the intent (US-05-TASK-BE-01) with that now-known treeSha, THEN commit
+    // (US-05-TASK-BE-03) against the exact intent just persisted, THEN
+    // register the SHA (US-05-TASK-BE-04, store.js) sequentially — this run
+    // is always N=1 — THEN finalize (US-05-TASK-BE-05).
+    const stagingResult = git.stageTaskFiles(projectDir, changedPaths);
+    const parentSha = _resolveRefTip(projectDir, taskRef, 'taskRef');
+
+    const verificationReceiptIds = verification.results.map(function (_result, index) {
+      return taskId + '-attempt' + attemptNumber + '-verification-' + index;
+    });
+
+    state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+    const persisted = git.persistCheckpointIntent(executionRoot, runId, {
+      featureId: state.featureId,
+      runId: runId,
+      taskId: taskId,
+      attemptNumber: attemptNumber,
+      planDigest: planDigest,
+      featureRef: featureRef,
+      taskRef: taskRef,
+      parentSha: parentSha,
+      expectedTreeSha: stagingResult.treeSha,
+      changedPaths: changedPaths,
+      verificationReceiptIds: verificationReceiptIds,
+      reviewReceiptId: outcome.reviewReceiptId,
+      outcomeReceiptId: outcome.outcomeReceiptId,
+      commitMessage: _buildTaskCommitMessage(task),
+    });
+
+    const commitResult = git.createTaskCommit(projectDir, persisted.intent, stagingResult);
+
+    store.registerCommitSHA(executionRoot, runId, taskId, attemptNumber, commitResult.commitSha, { sequential: true });
+
+    finalizeTaskCheckpoint({
+      executionRoot: executionRoot, runId: runId, taskId: taskId, attemptNumber: attemptNumber,
+      projectDir: projectDir, taskRef: taskRef,
+    });
+
+    return;
+  }
+}
+
+// ── createTaskWorktree (US-08-TASK-BE-01) ───────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Creates and manages one isolated Git worktree for one task attempt — the
+// standalone primitive later US-08 tasks (N-limit concurrency/slot
+// reservation, US-08-TASK-BE-02; serial cherry-pick integration,
+// US-08-TASK-BE-03) will build on. This function does NOT dispatch any
+// agent and does NOT stage/commit anything — it only creates/manages the
+// worktree directory itself. It is NOT wired into execute()'s existing
+// sequential main loop above, which stays N=1/single-worktree-free per
+// US-07-TASK-BE-01's explicit scope; execute() never calls this function.
+//
+// Path convention: <executionRoot>/runs/<runId>/worktrees/<taskId>-attempt
+// <attemptNumber> — reuses store.js's own run-owned root layout
+// (store._executionPaths: runs/<runId>/{state.json,receipts/,intents/}, see
+// that module's file-header comment) rather than inventing a new root.
+// Tech-Spec section 8 requires only "an external worktree path under a
+// validated run-owned root; no reused slot names" for N>1 attempts — it does
+// not mandate a more precise shape — so extending store.js's existing runDir
+// convention is the natural, non-duplicating choice. taskId+attemptNumber
+// together are already the unique identity of an attempt throughout this
+// module (see _buildProcessTag, addAttempt's own `id: taskId + '#' +
+// number`), so this path can never collide across tasks or attempts within
+// one run.
+//
+// Branch convention: Tech-Spec section 8 DOES mandate an exact branch name
+// for N>1 attempts — "each attempt has unique branch
+// ai-toolkit/<runId>/<taskId>/<attempt>" — so createTaskWorktree creates
+// exactly that branch (`git worktree add -b <branch> <path> <baseSha>`),
+// never a detached HEAD, so later cherry-pick/integration (US-08-TASK-BE-03)
+// has a real ref to read the attempt's commit(s) from.
+const WORKTREE_BRANCH_PREFIX = 'ai-toolkit';
+
+function _worktreeFail(field, reason) {
+  throw _err('WORKTREE_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'createTaskWorktree: ' + field + ' ' + reason);
+}
+
+// Local string validator (rather than the shared _requireNonEmptyString,
+// which is hardcoded to DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR for the dispatch-family
+// functions above) so every malformed-input error this function throws
+// carries the same, single WORKTREE_VALIDATION_ERROR code.
+function _requireWorktreeString(value, field) {
+  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {
+    _worktreeFail(field, 'must be a non-empty string');
+  }
+}
+
+// Shared spawn helper for every git invocation in this section — same house
+// style as every other git.js/index.js spawn site: shell:false (argv array,
+// no shell interpolation/globbing), encoding utf8, windowsHide.
+function _runGitForWorktree(cwd, args) {
+  return spawnSync('git', args, { cwd: cwd, shell: false, encoding: 'utf8', windowsHide: true });
+}
+
+// Parses `git worktree list --porcelain` into the absolute, resolved list of
+// every worktree path Git currently knows about for this repo (the main
+// worktree first, then every linked one) — the ground truth this function
+// cross-checks a newly requested path against, rather than trusting its own
+// computed path never to collide.
+function _listWorktreePaths(projectDir) {
+  const res = _runGitForWorktree(projectDir, ['worktree', 'list', '--porcelain']);
+  if (res.error || res.status !== 0) {
+    throw _err(
+      'GIT_WORKTREE_LIST_FAILED',
+      'createTaskWorktree: failed to list existing worktrees for "' + projectDir + '": ' +
+        (res.error ? res.error.message : (res.stderr || '').trim())
+    );
+  }
+  const paths = [];
+  (res.stdout || '').split(/\r?\n/).forEach(function (line) {
+    if (line.indexOf('worktree ') === 0) {
+      paths.push(path.resolve(line.slice('worktree '.length).trim()));
+    }
+  });
+  return paths;
+}
+
+// Canonicalizes `p` for COMPARISON purposes only (never for the path
+// actually handed to git argv or returned to callers — those stay the
+// plain, deterministic path.resolve() form). This exists because on
+// Windows, a path built from os.tmpdir()/fs.mkdtempSync can be an 8.3
+// short-name alias (e.g. "...\TOMADA~1\...") while Git reports the SAME
+// directory using its long form (e.g. "...\Tomada D\...") in
+// `git worktree list --porcelain` — proven by direct experiment, not
+// assumed: plain fs.realpathSync does NOT resolve this alias on this
+// platform, but fs.realpathSync.native (the libuv-backed, OS-level call)
+// does. Without canonicalizing both sides before comparison, every
+// collision/independence check below would silently never match, and every
+// "same path" check would silently never fire.
+// For a path that does not exist yet (the target worktree path, before
+// creation), realpath.native has nothing to resolve — so this walks up to
+// the deepest EXISTING ancestor, canonicalizes that, and re-appends the
+// not-yet-existing suffix unchanged.
+function _canonicalizePathForCompare(p) {
+  const resolved = path.resolve(p);
+  let existing = resolved;
+  const suffix = [];
+  for (;;) {
+    try {
+      const real = fs.realpathSync.native(existing);
+      return suffix.length > 0 ? path.join.apply(path, [real].concat(suffix)) : real;
+    } catch (_) {
+      const parent = path.dirname(existing);
+      if (parent === existing) {
+        return resolved; // reached the filesystem root; nothing existed to canonicalize against
+      }
+      suffix.unshift(path.basename(existing));
+      existing = parent;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function _samePath(a, b) {
+  return _canonicalizePathForCompare(a) === _canonicalizePathForCompare(b);
+}
+
+// True when `b` is exactly `a`, or is nested one or more levels inside `a` —
+// used both directions (new path inside an existing worktree, or an
+// existing worktree inside the new path) so createTaskWorktree fails closed
+// on ANY overlap rather than only the more obvious direction. Compares
+// canonicalized forms (see _canonicalizePathForCompare) so Windows
+// short/long path aliasing can never hide a real collision or manufacture a
+// false one.
+function _pathsOverlap(a, b) {
+  const realA = _canonicalizePathForCompare(a);
+  const realB = _canonicalizePathForCompare(b);
+  if (realA === realB) return true;
+  const rel = path.relative(realA, realB);
+  return rel !== '' && rel !== '.' && !rel.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(rel);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates one isolated Git worktree for one task attempt, under a run-owned
+ * root, and returns its path plus a cleanup callback. See the file comment
+ * immediately above for the path/branch conventions this follows.
+ *
+ * Independence is validated BOTH before and after creation:
+ *   - Before: the computed target path is cross-checked against every path
+ *     `git worktree list --porcelain` reports (main worktree included) for
+ *     exact collision and for nesting in either direction. Any overlap fails
+ *     closed with WORKTREE_COLLISION before `git worktree add` ever runs.
+ *   - After: the path Git actually registers must include the exact
+ *     requested path (WORKTREE_INDEPENDENCE_CHECK_FAILED otherwise), and its
+ *     real (symlink-resolved) directory must differ from the main
+ *     worktree's real directory — guards against a path that Git or the
+ *     filesystem silently aliased back onto the main checkout.
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.projectDir - Absolute path to the main Git worktree
+ *   (the project root `git worktree add` is run from).
+ * @param {string} args.executionRoot - Absolute path to
+ *   <common-git-dir>/ai-toolkit/execution (same root store.js's
+ *   _executionPaths resolves runs/<runId>/... under).
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the current run.
+ * @param {string} args.taskId - Task identifier this worktree is for.
+ * @param {number} args.attemptNumber - Positive integer attempt number this
+ *   worktree is for.
+ * @param {string} args.baseSha - Commit-ish (full SHA, or any ref Git can
+ *   resolve) the new attempt branch is created from.
+ * @returns {{ worktreePath: string, branch: string, cleanup: Function }}
+ *   `cleanup` is synchronous, idempotent, and safe to call even if the
+ *   worktree directory was already removed by hand — see its own inline
+ *   comment below for exactly what "safe" means here.
+ * @throws {Error} WORKTREE_VALIDATION_ERROR for malformed input;
+ *   GIT_WORKTREE_LIST_FAILED if `git worktree list` cannot be run;
+ *   WORKTREE_COLLISION if the computed path collides with or is nested
+ *   inside/around an existing worktree, or already exists on disk;
+ *   GIT_WORKTREE_ADD_FAILED if `git worktree add` itself fails;
+ *   WORKTREE_INDEPENDENCE_CHECK_FAILED if post-creation verification does
+ *   not confirm a genuinely separate, registered worktree.
+ */
+function createTaskWorktree(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+  _requireWorktreeString(args.projectDir, 'args.projectDir');
+  _requireWorktreeString(args.executionRoot, 'args.executionRoot');
+  _requireWorktreeString(args.runId, 'args.runId');
+  _requireWorktreeString(args.taskId, 'args.taskId');
+  _requireWorktreeString(args.baseSha, 'args.baseSha');
+  if (!Number.isInteger(args.attemptNumber) || args.attemptNumber < 1) {
+    _worktreeFail('args.attemptNumber', 'must be a positive integer');
+  }
+
+  const projectDir = path.resolve(args.projectDir);
+  const executionRoot = args.executionRoot;
+  const runId = args.runId;
+  const taskId = args.taskId;
+  const attemptNumber = args.attemptNumber;
+  const baseSha = args.baseSha;
+
+  const runDir = store._executionPaths(executionRoot, runId).runDir;
+  const worktreesRoot = path.join(runDir, 'worktrees');
+  const worktreePath = path.resolve(path.join(worktreesRoot, taskId + '-attempt' + attemptNumber));
+  const branch = WORKTREE_BRANCH_PREFIX + '/' + runId + '/' + taskId + '/' + attemptNumber;
+
+  if (fs.existsSync(worktreePath)) {
+    throw _err(
+      'WORKTREE_COLLISION',
+      'createTaskWorktree: target path "' + worktreePath + '" already exists on disk — refusing to overwrite it'
+    );
+  }
+
+  // The run-owned root (executionRoot, hence worktreePath) lives under the
+  // repo's common Git directory (Tech-Spec section 5 / store.js's own
+  // convention: <common-git-dir>/ai-toolkit/execution) — administrative Git
+  // storage that is, BY GIT'S OWN DESIGN, excluded from every worktree's
+  // tracked file tree (no `git status`/diff in ANY worktree ever reports
+  // into another worktree's .git internals). A worktree path that lands
+  // under commonDir is therefore never actually "inside" any worktree's
+  // checked-out content, even though it is filesystem-nested under the main
+  // worktree's own directory for a standard (non `--separate-git-dir`)
+  // repo — so nesting under commonDir specifically is exempted from the
+  // collision check below. Anything else — a path nested inside a
+  // worktree's real tracked directory, or identical to one — still fails
+  // closed.
+  const commonDir = path.resolve(_resolveCommonGitDir(projectDir));
+  const worktreePathIsUnderCommonDir = _samePath(commonDir, worktreePath) || _pathsOverlap(commonDir, worktreePath);
+
+  // Pre-creation independence check against every worktree Git already
+  // knows about, main included — fail closed on any real overlap rather
+  // than letting `git worktree add` decide (it would happily create a
+  // worktree nested inside another one's tracked directory).
+  const knownPaths = _listWorktreePaths(projectDir);
+  if (!knownPaths.some(function (p) { return _samePath(p, projectDir); })) {
+    knownPaths.push(projectDir);
+  }
+  knownPaths.forEach(function (knownPath) {
+    if (_samePath(knownPath, worktreePath)) {
+      throw _err(
+        'WORKTREE_COLLISION',
+        'createTaskWorktree: requested worktree path "' + worktreePath + '" is identical to the existing ' +
+          'worktree "' + knownPath + '" — refusing to create a non-independent worktree'
+      );
+    }
+    if (_pathsOverlap(worktreePath, knownPath)) {
+      // The new path would be an ANCESTOR of an existing worktree — always a
+      // real collision (it would swallow that worktree's tracked directory),
+      // regardless of commonDir.
+      throw _err(
+        'WORKTREE_COLLISION',
+        'createTaskWorktree: requested worktree path "' + worktreePath + '" would contain the existing ' +
+          'worktree "' + knownPath + '" — refusing to create a non-independent worktree'
+      );
+    }
+    if (_pathsOverlap(knownPath, worktreePath)) {
+      // The new path is nested inside knownPath's directory. Exempt only
+      // when that nesting is entirely explained by commonDir sitting inside
+      // knownPath (i.e., the overlap is administrative Git storage, not
+      // knownPath's own tracked content).
+      const exemptViaCommonDir = worktreePathIsUnderCommonDir &&
+        (_samePath(knownPath, commonDir) || _pathsOverlap(knownPath, commonDir));
+      if (!exemptViaCommonDir) {
+        throw _err(
+          'WORKTREE_COLLISION',
+          'createTaskWorktree: requested worktree path "' + worktreePath + '" is nested inside the existing ' +
+            'worktree "' + knownPath + '" — refusing to create a non-independent worktree'
+        );
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  fs.mkdirSync(worktreesRoot, { recursive: true });
+
+  const addRes = _runGitForWorktree(projectDir, ['worktree', 'add', '-b', branch, worktreePath, baseSha]);
+  if (addRes.error || addRes.status !== 0) {
+    throw _err(
+      'GIT_WORKTREE_ADD_FAILED',
+      'createTaskWorktree: "git worktree add -b ' + branch + ' ' + worktreePath + ' ' + baseSha + '" failed: ' +
+        (addRes.error ? addRes.error.message : (addRes.stderr || '').trim())
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Post-creation independence verification: the path Git actually
+  // registered must be exactly the one requested (not silently normalized
+  // or aliased to something else), and its real, symlink-resolved directory
+  // must differ from the main worktree's.
+  const postPaths = _listWorktreePaths(projectDir);
+  if (!postPaths.some(function (p) { return _samePath(p, worktreePath); })) {
+    throw _err(
+      'WORKTREE_INDEPENDENCE_CHECK_FAILED',
+      'createTaskWorktree: "git worktree add" reported success but "' + worktreePath + '" is not listed by ' +
+        '"git worktree list --porcelain" afterward — refusing to trust an unconfirmed worktree'
+    );
+  }
+  let realWorktreePath;
+  let realProjectDir;
+  try {
+    realWorktreePath = fs.realpathSync.native(worktreePath);
+    realProjectDir = fs.realpathSync.native(projectDir);
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw _err(
+      'WORKTREE_INDEPENDENCE_CHECK_FAILED',
+      'createTaskWorktree: failed to resolve real paths for independence verification: ' + err.message
+    );
+  }
+  if (realWorktreePath === realProjectDir) {
+    throw _err(
+      'WORKTREE_INDEPENDENCE_CHECK_FAILED',
+      'createTaskWorktree: the created worktree resolves to the SAME real directory as the main worktree "' +
+        projectDir + '" — refusing an alias rather than a genuinely independent checkout'
+    );
+  }
+
+  let cleaned = false;
+
+  // Removes the worktree directory (`git worktree remove --force`, never the
+  // plain/"safe" variant — deliberate: by the time this primitive's caller
+  // is done with an attempt's worktree, the attempt's real output is already
+  // checkpointed as a commit on `branch` (Tech-Spec section 8: "commit
+  // remains on technical ref until integration"), so any leftover
+  // uncommitted/untracked worktree state is disposable, never the sole copy
+  // of anything that matters. A plain `git worktree remove` refuses on any
+  // uncommitted change, which would leave a slot permanently stuck for a
+  // reason this primitive does not need to honor here).
+  //
+  // Safe to call more than once (no-op after the first successful removal),
+  // and safe to call after the worktree directory was already removed by
+  // hand: this is confirmed by RE-QUERYING `git worktree list --porcelain`
+  // after a failed/no-op remove attempt — only a remove that fails AND still
+  // leaves the path registered is treated as a real failure (e.g. genuinely
+  // locked, or blocked by something other than "it's already gone").
+  function cleanup() {
+    if (cleaned) return;
+
+    const removeRes = _runGitForWorktree(projectDir, ['worktree', 'remove', '--force', worktreePath]);
+    if (!removeRes.error && removeRes.status === 0) {
+      cleaned = true;
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const stillRegistered = _listWorktreePaths(projectDir).some(function (p) { return _samePath(p, worktreePath); });
+    if (!stillRegistered) {
+      cleaned = true; // already gone (manually removed, or already cleaned up) — safe no-op
+      return;
+    }
+
+    throw _err(
+      'GIT_WORKTREE_REMOVE_FAILED',
+      'createTaskWorktree.cleanup: "git worktree remove --force ' + worktreePath + '" failed and the worktree ' +
+        'is still registered: ' + (removeRes.error ? removeRes.error.message : (removeRes.stderr || '').trim())
+    );
+  }
+
+  return { worktreePath: worktreePath, branch: branch, cleanup: cleanup };
+}
+
+// ── createSlotPool (US-08-TASK-BE-02) ───────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// N-limit concurrency control / slot reservation — the second standalone
+// US-08 primitive, alongside createTaskWorktree (US-08-TASK-BE-01) above.
+// Like createTaskWorktree, this is NOT wired into execute()'s existing
+// sequential main loop (US-07-TASK-BE-01, which stays N=1/unchanged);
+// execute() never calls this function. Real N>1 dispatch integration is
+// US-08-TASK-BE-03 (serial integration) and US-08-TASK-BE-04 (SHA tracking) —
+// both later, separate tasks.
+//
+// Tech-Spec's binding rule for N (section 7): "N counts reserved task slots
+// through verification/review/commit/integration; a full slot is released
+// only when consolidated or safely stopped. This bounds unintegrated work as
+// well."
+//
+// SCOPE BOUNDARY — read before wiring this into any future orchestrator:
+// this primitive tracks ONLY the count/identity of currently held slot
+// tokens against a fixed capacity N. It has no idea what a "task", an
+// "attempt", "verification", "review", "checkpoint", or "integration" is —
+// those concepts do not appear anywhere in this section. The Tech-Spec rule
+// above is an OPERATIONAL DISCIPLINE the CALLER must follow, not something
+// this primitive enforces or even observes: a future execute()-level
+// orchestrator is responsible for calling tryAcquire() at dispatch time and
+// holding the returned token through the ENTIRE dispatch → verify → review →
+// checkpoint → commit → integration lifecycle for that task attempt, calling
+// release() only once that whole lifecycle reaches a terminal outcome
+// (successful integration, or a safe-stop/terminal-failure path that gives
+// up on the attempt for good). If a future caller released the slot early
+// (e.g. right after dispatch, before verification/review/integration
+// complete), this primitive would have no way to know that was wrong — it
+// would simply see one more free unit of capacity and hand it out to a new
+// acquire. Enforcing "released only after integration verified" as a system
+// property requires the future orchestrator to hold the token op-for-op
+// across that whole lifecycle; this primitive only supplies the fail-closed
+// counting/identity mechanism that discipline is built on top of.
+//
+// maxConcurrency validation deliberately mirrors execute()'s own
+// "args.maxConcurrency must be a positive safe integer" check (Number.isInteger
+// + Number.isSafeInteger + >= 1) for consistency of error shape across the
+// module — but NOT execute()'s separate "only 1 is supported, reject any
+// other value, never downgrade" policy: that reject/never-downgrade decision
+// is about what execute() itself currently implements, not a constraint
+// createSlotPool needs to know about or duplicate. This primitive accepts
+// any valid positive-safe-integer N — enforcing which N values a future
+// orchestrator is allowed to request stays entirely execute()'s call.
+function createSlotPool(maxConcurrency) {
+  if (!Number.isInteger(maxConcurrency) || !Number.isSafeInteger(maxConcurrency) || maxConcurrency < 1) {
+    throw _err('SLOT_POOL_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'createSlotPool: maxConcurrency must be a positive safe integer');
+  }
+
+  // Held-slot identity set, keyed by an opaque token string this pool itself
+  // mints and hands back from tryAcquire(). Using an explicit per-slot token
+  // (rather than a bare counter) is what makes double-release and
+  // bogus-release detectable: release() can check "is this EXACT token
+  // currently held" instead of merely "is the counter above zero" — a caller
+  // that fabricates a token, reuses one already released, or passes a token
+  // from a different pool entirely is rejected the same way a genuine
+  // double-release is (SLOT_NOT_HELD), never silently accepted.
+  const heldTokens = new Set();
+  let nextTokenSeq = 1;
+
+  // Fails closed: returns null (never throws, never blocks) the instant all
+  // maxConcurrency slots are already held — per this task's own documented
+  // choice of "returns null" over "throws SLOT_POOL_EXHAUSTED", since a
+  // future caller driving a ready-queue loop naturally wants a plain falsy
+  // "no capacity right now, try another task or wait" signal here rather
+  // than an exception for what is an entirely expected, non-error condition
+  // (a full pool is the normal steady state of a busy run, not a fault).
+  function tryAcquire() {
+    if (heldTokens.size >= maxConcurrency) {
+      return null;
+    }
+    const token = 'slot-' + (nextTokenSeq++);
+    heldTokens.add(token);
+    return token;
+  }
+
+  // Releases exactly one previously acquired, still-held token. Guards
+  // against double-release and bogus/unknown tokens by construction (Set
+  // membership check) rather than trusting the caller: an already-released
+  // token, a fabricated string, or a token from a different createSlotPool()
+  // instance all fail the same way (SLOT_NOT_HELD) instead of silently
+  // decrementing a bare counter below zero or accepting a release that was
+  // never actually a held slot.
+  function release(token) {
+    if (typeof token !== 'string' || !heldTokens.has(token)) {
+      throw _err(
+        'SLOT_NOT_HELD',
+        'createSlotPool.release: "' + token + '" is not a currently held slot in this pool ' +
+          '(never acquired, already released, or acquired from a different pool)'
+      );
+    }
+    heldTokens.delete(token);
+  }
+
+  // Read-only inspection for tests/diagnostics — neither call ever mutates
+  // pool state; both simply report the CURRENT snapshot at call time (there
+  // is no cached/stale value to go wrong, since heldTokens.size is read
+  // fresh on every call).
+  function activeCount() {
+    return heldTokens.size;
+  }
+
+  function remainingCapacity() {
+    return maxConcurrency - heldTokens.size;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    tryAcquire: tryAcquire,
+    release: release,
+    activeCount: activeCount,
+    remainingCapacity: remainingCapacity,
+    maxConcurrency: maxConcurrency,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * `start` command real implementation (US-07-TASK-BE-01): sequential
+ * (maxConcurrency=1) main loop with ready-queue dispatch. Validates
+ * args/config, acquires the repo-wide execution lease for a brand-new run,
+ * creates an immutable initial state from the feature's OWN approved plan
+ * (this feature's own Work-Breakdown.md/.csv, read from disk via the same
+ * _deriveFeatureDir/_derivePrefix convention replan() already uses), and
+ * drives dispatch/verification/review/checkpoint to completion or block.
+ *
+ * Only maxConcurrency=1 is implemented here — any other requested value is
+ * REJECTED (UNSUPPORTED_CONCURRENCY), never silently downgraded (Tech-Spec
+ * section 10: "Requested N=effective N; if host cannot support it, reject,
+ * never downgrade"). N>1 concurrent slots is US-08 scope.
+ *
+ * Main-loop design (see file-level "execute() main loop" comment above and
+ * _runTaskToResolution for the per-task detail):
+ *   1. Compute the ready queue (plan.computeReadyQueue) once, up front, over
+ *      the immutable plan snapshot — this is the full stable dispatch order
+ *      the run will use whenever nothing is actually blocked (see
+ *      computeReadyQueue's own doc comment for why one static pass suffices).
+ *   2. Repeatedly: re-read state, find the FIRST task (in that stable order)
+ *      that is still 'pending' AND whose dependencies are all
+ *      'checkpointed'/'integrated'. Dispatch it via _runTaskToResolution,
+ *      which reserves its slot (status 'active') through dispatch, verify,
+ *      review, checkpoint and commit — retrying a NEW attempt on the SAME
+ *      task within the retry policy on failure, or marking it 'blocked' once
+ *      the policy is exhausted — before this loop ever considers another
+ *      task. This is the literal "one task slot" invariant (AC-06).
+ *   3. Stop (never spin) once no task is both non-terminal and ready — e.g.
+ *      every remaining task is pending on a dependency that is itself
+ *      blocked. The final run status reflects this (see below).
+ *
+ * Final runStatus: 'completed' if every task reached
+ * checkpointed/integrated/skipped; 'blocked' otherwise (at least one task is
+ * blocked, or pending on a dependency that never resolved).
+ *
+ * The repo-wide execution lease is released in a try/finally, so it is
+ * released even if the loop exits via an uncaught error (e.g. a
+ * DEFINITION_HASH_MISMATCH / NO_LOCK_HELD systemic failure propagated by
+ * _runTaskToResolution) — this run never leaves the lease dangling on the
+ * failure path it itself created.
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.project - Absolute or project-relative path used to
+ *   resolve the repo root and common Git directory (also used as `cwd` for
+ *   every dispatch/verification/git operation).
+ * @param {string} args.feature - Path to the feature's feature.md, used to
+ *   derive PREFIX and locate this feature's OWN Work-Breakdown.md/.csv.
+ * @param {number} [args.maxConcurrency=1] - Requested task slot count N.
+ *   Must be a positive safe integer; only 1 is supported by this task — any
+ *   other value is rejected with UNSUPPORTED_CONCURRENCY, never downgraded.
+ * @param {string} [args.claudePath] - Explicit path to the qualified Claude
+ *   CLI executable, forwarded to every dispatch/review invocation.
+ * @param {number} [args.taskTimeoutMs] - Per-task timeout budget, forwarded
+ *   to dispatch/verification/review.
+ * @param {number} [args.agentBudgetUsd] - Per-run agent spend budget,
+ *   persisted into state.config unchanged (not itself enforced here).
+ * @param {string} [args.taskRef] - Explicit override for the feature/task ref
+ *   commits land on. When omitted, derived from the CURRENT checked-out
+ *   branch of args.project via `git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD`.
+ * @param {string[]} [args.implementationSpawnArgs] - Test-only override of
+ *   the full CLI args array forwarded to every dispatchTaskAttempt call (see
+ *   dispatchTaskAttempt's own args.spawnArgs) — tests use this to substitute
+ *   tests/fixtures/fake-claude-cli.js's own invocation shape while still
+ *   exercising a real subprocess spawn end-to-end. Omitted in production.
+ * @param {string[]} [args.reviewSpawnArgs] - Test-only override of the full
+ *   CLI args array forwarded to every runReview call (see runReview's own
+ *   args.spawnArgs). Omitted in production.
+ * @returns {Promise<object>} Versioned result object:
+ *   { protocolVersion, runId, runStatus, tasks: [{ taskId, status }] }.
+ * @throws {Error} DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR for malformed maxConcurrency;
+ *   UNSUPPORTED_CONCURRENCY for any requested maxConcurrency other than 1;
+ *   EXECUTE_VALIDATION_ERROR when a PREFIX cannot be derived or HEAD is
+ *   detached with no explicit args.taskRef; PLAN_NOT_FOUND when this
+ *   feature's own Work-Breakdown.md/.csv cannot be read; PLAN_PARSE_ERROR
+ *   propagated unmodified from plan.createPlanSnapshot; LEASE_HELD when a
+ *   repo-wide execution lease is already held; any error propagated
+ *   unmodified from dispatchTaskAttempt/runVerifications/runReview/git.js/
+ *   store.js for a systemic (non-task-attempt) failure.
+ */
+async function execute(args) {
+  // Platform qualification guard (US-08-TASK-BE-05) — the single most
+  // fundamental precondition of this whole function, checked before ANY
+  // other validation, before deriving executionRoot, before touching the
+  // plan/snapshot, before acquiring the ownership lease, and before creating
+  // any worktree. Checked dynamically against the live process.platform
+  // (never a module-load-time-cached constant like this file's own
+  // IS_WINDOWS above) so it reflects the real, current platform at call
+  // time. Fail-closed, no partial/"best effort" execution on any other
+  // platform: this feature's own Gate-1 approval (binding constraint #3)
+  // states "E-02 is Windows-only qualified. Other platforms require
+  // dedicated proofs before their execution is enabled; no implicit
+  // cross-platform guarantee." E-02 is the process-supervision evidence
+  // dossier (tree-kill via taskkill, tag-based liveness scanning via
+  // Win32_Process CIM queries) that this executor's crash-recovery/stop/
+  // worker-liveness machinery (ownership.js's checkOwnerLiveness, this
+  // file's own _findLiveTaggedProcess, stop()'s immediate-mode kill) depends
+  // on — none of it is proven correct on non-Windows platforms.
+  if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
+    throw _err(
+      'PLATFORM_NOT_QUALIFIED',
+      'execute: platform "' + process.platform + '" is not qualified to run the task executor — the E-02 ' +
+        'process-supervision qualification (tree-kill via taskkill, tag-based liveness scanning via ' +
+        'Win32_Process CIM queries) that this executor\'s crash-recovery/stop/worker-liveness machinery ' +
+        'depends on is proven for Windows only. Other platforms require dedicated proofs before their ' +
+        'execution is enabled; refusing to proceed (no partial or best-effort execution).'
+    );
+  }
+
+  args = args || {};
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.project, 'execute: args.project');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.feature, 'execute: args.feature');
+
+  const maxConcurrency = args.maxConcurrency === undefined ? 1 : args.maxConcurrency;
+  if (!Number.isInteger(maxConcurrency) || !Number.isSafeInteger(maxConcurrency) || maxConcurrency < 1) {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'execute: args.maxConcurrency must be a positive safe integer');
+  }
+  if (maxConcurrency !== 1) {
+    throw _err(
+      'UNSUPPORTED_CONCURRENCY',
+      'execute: requested maxConcurrency ' + maxConcurrency + ' is not supported yet — only maxConcurrency=1 is ' +
+        'implemented (US-07-TASK-BE-01); N>1 concurrent slots is US-08 scope. Refusing to silently downgrade ' +
+        '(Tech-Spec section 10: "Requested N=effective N; if host cannot support it, reject, never downgrade").'
+    );
+  }
+
+  const projectDir = args.project;
+
+  const featureDir = _deriveFeatureDir(args.feature);
+  const prefix = _derivePrefix(featureDir);
+  if (!prefix) {
+    throw _err(
+      'EXECUTE_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+      'execute: could not derive a PREFIX (e.g. "FTR-018") from feature directory "' + featureDir + '"'
+    );
+  }
+  const mdPath = path.join(featureDir, prefix + '-Work-Breakdown.md');
+  const csvPath = path.join(featureDir, prefix + '-Work-Breakdown.csv');
+  let md;
+  let csv;
+  try {
+    md = fs.readFileSync(mdPath, 'utf8');
+    csv = fs.readFileSync(csvPath, 'utf8');
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw _err(
+      'PLAN_NOT_FOUND',
+      'execute: Work Breakdown MD/CSV not found at "' + mdPath + '" / "' + csvPath + '": ' + err.message
+    );
+  }
+  // Propagates PLAN_PARSE_ERROR unmodified — a malformed/unapproved plan
+  // never silently starts a run.
+  const snapshot = plan.createPlanSnapshot(md, csv);
+
+  const commonDir = _resolveCommonGitDir(projectDir);
+  const executionRoot = path.join(commonDir, 'ai-toolkit', 'execution');
+
+  const runId = crypto.randomUUID();
+  // Fail closed if already held — this is a brand-new run; reclaiming a
+  // stale lease is an explicit reconcile/resume/replan decision, never an
+  // implicit part of starting a fresh execute() call.
+  const lease = ownership.acquireLease(executionRoot, runId);
+
+  try {
+    const taskRef = typeof args.taskRef === 'string' && args.taskRef.length > 0
+      ? args.taskRef
+      : _currentBranchRef(projectDir);
+    const featureRef = taskRef;
+    const baseSha = _resolveRefTip(projectDir, 'HEAD', 'HEAD');
+
+    let state = new store.State({
+      runId: runId,
+      featureId: prefix,
+      repo: projectDir,
+      commonDir: commonDir,
+      featureRef: featureRef,
+      baseSha: baseSha,
+      planDigest: snapshot.planDigest,
+      config: {
+        maxConcurrency: 1,
+        claudePath: args.claudePath,
+        taskTimeoutMs: args.taskTimeoutMs,
+        agentBudgetUsd: args.agentBudgetUsd,
+      },
+      runStatus: 'running',
+    });
+
+    snapshot.tasks.forEach(function (task) {
+      state = state.addTask(task.id, { dependencies: task.dependsOn });
+    });
+    store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+
+    const tasksById = new Map(snapshot.tasks.map(function (t) { return [t.id, t]; }));
+    const orderedTaskIds = plan.computeReadyQueue(snapshot).map(function (t) { return t.id; });
+
+    // US-07-TASK-BE-02 loop-cooperation flag: stop()'s graceful mode is
+    // documented as "block new dispatch" — this loop is the only thing that
+    // can actually enforce that block, since stop() itself never touches a
+    // task in flight. Set only when this loop observes runStatus 'stopping'
+    // at its own natural iteration boundary (the re-read below, which
+    // already happens once per completed/blocked task — never mid-task);
+    // used after the loop to report 'paused' instead of running the normal
+    // completed/blocked classification against a run that still has
+    // legitimately-pending (never dispatched) tasks.
+    let stopRequested = false;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+
+      if (state.runStatus === 'stopping') {
+        // A stop request (either mode) was persisted by a concurrent stop()
+        // call. This is the exact "natural iteration boundary" the request
+        // waits for: the previous task (if any) already reached a terminal
+        // outcome (checkpointed/blocked) via the prior loop iteration's
+        // await below, and no task is currently reserved by this loop. Do
+        // not dispatch the next ready task — leave it 'pending' — and stop.
+        stopRequested = true;
+        break;
+      }
+
+      const nonTerminalIds = orderedTaskIds.filter(function (id) {
+        const st = state.tasks[id].status;
+        return st !== 'checkpointed' && st !== 'integrated' && st !== 'skipped' && st !== 'blocked';
+      });
+      if (nonTerminalIds.length === 0) break;
+
+      const readyTaskId = orderedTaskIds.find(function (id) {
+        const t = state.tasks[id];
+        if (t.status !== 'pending') return false;
+        return t.dependencies.every(function (depId) {
+          const dep = state.tasks[depId];
+          return dep && (dep.status === 'checkpointed' || dep.status === 'integrated');
+        });
+      });
+
+      if (!readyTaskId) {
+        // Nothing more can proceed right now (e.g. every remaining task is
+        // pending on a dependency that is itself blocked) — stop, do not
+        // spin. Reflected in the final run status below.
+        break;
+      }
+
+      await _runTaskToResolution({
+        executionRoot: executionRoot,
+        runId: runId,
+        projectDir: projectDir,
+        taskRef: taskRef,
+        featureRef: featureRef,
+        planDigest: snapshot.planDigest,
+        task: tasksById.get(readyTaskId),
+        claudePath: args.claudePath,
+        taskTimeoutMs: args.taskTimeoutMs,
+        implementationSpawnArgs: args.implementationSpawnArgs,
+        reviewSpawnArgs: args.reviewSpawnArgs,
+      });
+    }
+
+    state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+    let finalRunStatus;
+    if (stopRequested) {
+      // Tech-Spec section 10: "Stopping a run returns accepted request
+      // state; status confirms when it actually paused." 'paused' (already
+      // part of RUN_STATUSES) is the correct terminal-for-this-loop status
+      // here — unlike the completed/blocked branch below, a stop-truncated
+      // run legitimately still has 'pending' tasks that were never attempted
+      // and are not "blocked" in the retry-policy/dependency sense.
+      finalRunStatus = 'paused';
+    } else {
+      const allTerminalSuccess = Object.keys(state.tasks).every(function (id) {
+        const st = state.tasks[id].status;
+        return st === 'checkpointed' || st === 'integrated' || st === 'skipped';
+      });
+      finalRunStatus = allTerminalSuccess ? 'completed' : 'blocked';
+    }
+    state = state.setRunStatus(finalRunStatus);
+    state = store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+
+    return {
+      protocolVersion: store.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+      runId: runId,
+      runStatus: finalRunStatus,
+      tasks: Object.keys(state.tasks).sort().map(function (id) {
+        return { taskId: id, status: state.tasks[id].status };
+      }),
+    };
+  } finally {
+    try {
+      ownership.releaseLease(executionRoot, runId, lease.nonce);
+    } catch (_releaseErr) {
+      // Best-effort: never mask the loop's own result/error because the
+      // lease could not be released (e.g. it was already gone).
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * `status` command. Read-only summary of a run: counts of tasks per
+ * status, current run status, and total cost as reported by the ledger
+ * (the sole cost source). Never mutates state.
+ *
+ * Real implementation: US-06-TASK-BE-01 (loads persisted state/evidence and
+ * classifies task status per the edge-cases table this summary is built
+ * from).
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.project - Absolute or project-relative repo path.
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the run to inspect.
+ * @returns {Promise<object>} Versioned result object:
+ *   { protocolVersion, runId, runStatus,
+ *     taskCounts: { pending, active, checkpointed, integrated, skipped, blocked },
+ *     totalTokens, totalCostUsd }.
+ */
+async function status(args) {
+  return _notImplemented('status', 'US-06-TASK-BE-01');
+}
+
+/**
+ * `diagnose` command. Read-only detailed evidence dump for a run:
+ * per-task/attempt evidence (checkpoint, commit, review, diff, worker
+ * liveness), ownership/lease state, and repair suggestions. Never mutates
+ * state.
+ *
+ * Real implementation: US-06-TASK-BE-02 (evidence evaluation per the
+ * edge-cases table: no-reimplementation, reconcile-SHA,
+ * recheck-verification, preserve-diff, or block).
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.project - Absolute or project-relative repo path.
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the run to inspect.
+ * @returns {Promise<object>} Versioned result object:
+ *   { protocolVersion, runId, ownership: {...},
+ *     tasks: [{ taskId, attempts: [...], evidence: {...}, suggestedAction }] }.
+ */
+async function diagnose(args) {
+  return _notImplemented('diagnose', 'US-06-TASK-BE-02');
+}
+
+/**
+ * `stop` command (US-07-TASK-BE-02). Persists a stop request for a running
+ * coordinator and acknowledges receipt of the request ONLY — this function
+ * never itself claims the run has actually stopped. `status`/`diagnose`
+ * (both still NOT_IMPLEMENTED — US-06-TASK-BE-01/02, out of scope here)
+ * confirm that once the coordinator's own loop observes the request.
+ *
+ * Modes:
+ *   - 'graceful' (default): persists the request only. execute()'s own main
+ *     loop (see its inline comment at the top-of-loop runStatus check, above)
+ *     is the ONLY thing that can actually "block new dispatch" — it observes
+ *     runStatus 'stopping' at its next natural iteration boundary (after its
+ *     current task reaches checkpointed/blocked) and stops there, leaving
+ *     every remaining task 'pending'. This function does nothing further for
+ *     'graceful': collecting already-running results and checkpointing only
+ *     when evidence is already sufficient (Tech-Spec section 7) is the
+ *     RUNNING coordinator's job when it next observes the request, not this
+ *     call's — this call only persists the request.
+ *   - 'immediate': ADDITIONALLY attempts real termination of every attempt
+ *     whose stage is 'dispatching' or 'running' (i.e. potentially mid-flight
+ *     right now) with a recorded processIdentity: finds it via the same
+ *     tag-scan technique already used elsewhere in this module
+ *     (_findLiveTaggedProcess, US-06-TASK-BE-02), and if found alive (or
+ *     liveness unknown), terminates it via the same E-02-qualified tree-kill
+ *     technique used elsewhere, adapted to a bare PID
+ *     (_killProcessTreeByPidSync — needed because, unlike
+ *     claude-process.js's spawnClaudeAgent, this function never held a
+ *     ChildProcess handle for a worker it did not itself spawn: the worker
+ *     may belong to an entirely different coordinator process). It then
+ *     polls _findLiveTaggedProcess with a bounded number of short waits
+ *     (_awaitConfirmedTermination) before returning. If termination cannot
+ *     be positively confirmed within that bound, this function still
+ *     acknowledges the request as persisted, but reports
+ *     `terminationConfirmed: false` — it never claims a termination it
+ *     cannot verify (the same discipline _findLiveTaggedProcess itself
+ *     already enforces for 'unknown').
+ *
+ * Idempotency (exact rule): if the run's CURRENT runStatus is already
+ * 'stopping', or is settled — 'completed'/'blocked'/'superseded', or
+ * 'paused' (execute()'s own loop already fully drained a prior stop request
+ * — see its final-status computation) — this call is a pure no-op: nothing
+ * is re-persisted (no generation bump) and NO mode-specific action runs (no
+ * re-kill attempt, and no escalation if this call's mode differs from
+ * whatever was originally requested — a second stop() call never upgrades a
+ * prior 'graceful' request to 'immediate'; only the first accepted request
+ * for a run ever performs mode-specific work). The acknowledged `mode` in
+ * the idempotent-'stopping' case reflects the ORIGINALLY recorded mode
+ * (state.config.stopRequest.mode), not necessarily this call's own mode.
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.project - Absolute or project-relative repo path
+ *   (resolved to the common Git directory / execution root exactly like
+ *   execute() does).
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the run to stop.
+ * @param {'graceful'|'immediate'} [args.mode='graceful'] - Stop mode.
+ * @param {string} [args.exeBasename] - Test-only override of the real
+ *   spawned executable's basename to match for 'immediate' mode's worker
+ *   termination (_findLiveTaggedProcess) — same override reconcile()/
+ *   resume() already accept via ctx.exeBasename. Defaults to
+ *   DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME ('claude.exe') in production.
+ * @returns {Promise<object>} Versioned result object:
+ *   { protocolVersion, runId, requestAccepted: true, mode,
+ *     idempotent?: true,
+ *     terminationConfirmed?: boolean,
+ *     killAttempts?: Array<{taskId, attemptNumber, processIdentity, confirmed: boolean}> }
+ *   `terminationConfirmed`/`killAttempts` are present only for a
+ *   newly-accepted 'immediate' request (never for 'graceful', never for an
+ *   idempotent replay).
+ * @throws {Error} STOP_VALIDATION_ERROR for a malformed args.project/args.
+ *   runId/args.mode; any error store.readState throws (STATE_NOT_FOUND,
+ *   STATE_CORRUPTED) propagates unmodified — a corrupted/missing run is
+ *   never silently defaulted.
+ */
+async function stop(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.project, 'stop: args.project');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.runId, 'stop: args.runId');
+
+  const mode = args.mode === undefined ? 'graceful' : args.mode;
+  if (mode !== 'graceful' && mode !== 'immediate') {
+    throw _err(
+      'STOP_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+      'stop: args.mode must be "graceful" or "immediate", got ' + JSON.stringify(args.mode)
+    );
+  }
+
+  const projectDir = args.project;
+  const runId = args.runId;
+  const commonDir = _resolveCommonGitDir(projectDir);
+  const executionRoot = path.join(commonDir, 'ai-toolkit', 'execution');
+
+  // Propagates STATE_NOT_FOUND / STATE_CORRUPTED unmodified — never
+  // fabricates an empty/default run for a corrupted/missing one.
+  let state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+
+  // Idempotency (see doc comment above for the exact rule and rationale for
+  // including 'paused' alongside the terminal statuses).
+  const SETTLED_OR_STOPPING_RUN_STATUSES = ['stopping', 'completed', 'blocked', 'superseded', 'paused'];
+  if (SETTLED_OR_STOPPING_RUN_STATUSES.indexOf(state.runStatus) !== -1) {
+    const recordedMode = state.config && state.config.stopRequest && state.config.stopRequest.mode;
+    return {
+      protocolVersion: store.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+      runId: runId,
+      requestAccepted: true,
+      mode: recordedMode || mode,
+      idempotent: true,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Persist the stop request: one write, both the runStatus transition and
+  // the requested mode (store.js's State#requestStop — see its own doc
+  // comment for why `config` was chosen over a new top-level field).
+  state = state.requestStop(mode);
+  state = store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, state);
+
+  if (mode === 'graceful') {
+    // That's it — the already-running execute() loop enforces the block
+    // (see execute()'s own inline comment at its loop-top runStatus check).
+    return {
+      protocolVersion: store.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+      runId: runId,
+      requestAccepted: true,
+      mode: mode,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // mode === 'immediate': additionally attempt real termination of every
+  // attempt that is potentially mid-flight right now.
+  const exeBasename = typeof args.exeBasename === 'string' && args.exeBasename.length > 0
+    ? args.exeBasename
+    : DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME;
+
+  const inFlightStages = ['dispatching', 'running'];
+  const candidates = [];
+  Object.keys(state.tasks).sort().forEach(function (taskId) {
+    const task = state.tasks[taskId];
+    (Array.isArray(task.attempts) ? task.attempts : []).forEach(function (attempt) {
+      if (inFlightStages.indexOf(attempt.stage) === -1) return;
+      if (typeof attempt.processIdentity !== 'string' || attempt.processIdentity.length === 0) return;
+      candidates.push({ taskId: taskId, attemptNumber: attempt.number, processIdentity: attempt.processIdentity });
+    });
+  });
+
+  const killAttempts = [];
+  let terminationConfirmed = true; // vacuously true when there is nothing to kill
+
+  for (let i = 0; i < candidates.length; i++) {
+    const candidate = candidates[i];
+    const liveness = _findLiveTaggedProcess(candidate.processIdentity, exeBasename);
+
+    if (liveness.status === 'confirmed-not-found') {
+      killAttempts.push(Object.assign({}, candidate, { confirmed: true }));
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // 'found-alive': kill it now. 'unknown': never coerced into either
+    // extreme up front — no kill is attempted without positive evidence,
+    // but the poll below still gets a chance to observe a confirmed-dead
+    // result before this attempt is reported unconfirmed.
+    if (liveness.status === 'found-alive') {
+      for (let p = 0; p < liveness.pids.length; p++) {
+        _killProcessTreeByPidSync(liveness.pids[p]);
+      }
+    }
+
+    const confirmed = await _awaitConfirmedTermination(candidate.processIdentity, exeBasename);
+    killAttempts.push(Object.assign({}, candidate, { confirmed: confirmed }));
+    if (!confirmed) {
+      terminationConfirmed = false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    protocolVersion: store.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+    runId: runId,
+    requestAccepted: true,
+    mode: mode,
+    terminationConfirmed: terminationConfirmed,
+    killAttempts: killAttempts,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Enforces Tech-Spec section 9's "reconcile/resume require no live competing
+ * coordinator" precondition. Called at the very start of both reconcile()
+ * and resume(), before any repair (registerCommitSHA/finalizeTaskCheckpoint)
+ * — fails closed, so no partial repair is ever applied while a different,
+ * live coordinator might also be acting on the same run.
+ *
+ * Decision table:
+ *   - No lease held at all: nothing to compete with — proceed.
+ *   - Lease held by the SAME `runId` as the caller: this is the caller
+ *     reconciling its own run (e.g. as part of its own resume flow, whether
+ *     called before or after it re-acquires the lease) — proceed.
+ *   - Lease held by a DIFFERENT runId: consult
+ *     ownership.checkOwnerLiveness(lease).
+ *       - alive === true: a different coordinator is actively live — refuse
+ *         with COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVE.
+ *       - alive === 'unknown': never treat unknown as safe-to-proceed (the
+ *         same invariant enforced everywhere else in this codebase, e.g.
+ *         ownership.reclaimLease's own LEASE_LIVENESS_UNKNOWN) — refuse with
+ *         COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVENESS_UNKNOWN.
+ *       - alive === false (confirmed dead): proceed. reconcile/resume are
+ *         read-mostly + idempotent-repair operations, not a reclaim of the
+ *         lease itself — none of their classification/repair work requires
+ *         actually holding the lease, so a confirmed-dead old coordinator's
+ *         still-present lease file is not a blocker here. This function
+ *         deliberately does NOT call ownership.reclaimLease — reclaiming the
+ *         lease is a separate, explicit operator/coordinator decision made
+ *         elsewhere, not an implicit side effect of reconciling evidence.
+ *
+ * @param {string} executionRoot
+ * @param {string} runId - The calling run's own runId (args.runId).
+ * @param {string} callerName - 'reconcile' or 'resume', used only to make
+ *   the thrown error message identify which command refused to proceed.
+ * @throws {Error} COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVE, COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVENESS_UNKNOWN
+ */
+function _ensureNoLiveCompetingCoordinator(executionRoot, runId, callerName) {
+  const lease = ownership.readLease(executionRoot);
+  if (!lease || lease.runId === runId) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const liveness = ownership.checkOwnerLiveness(lease);
+  if (liveness.alive === true) {
+    throw _err(
+      'COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVE',
+      callerName + ': refusing to proceed — a different coordinator (runId "' + lease.runId +
+        '", host ' + lease.host + ', pid ' + lease.pid + ') currently holds the repo-wide execution ' +
+        'lease at ' + executionRoot + ' and is confirmed live: ' + liveness.reason
+    );
+  }
+  if (liveness.alive !== false) {
+    throw _err(
+      'COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVENESS_UNKNOWN',
+      callerName + ': refusing to proceed — a different coordinator (runId "' + lease.runId +
+        '", host ' + lease.host + ', pid ' + lease.pid + ') currently holds the repo-wide execution ' +
+        'lease at ' + executionRoot + ' and its liveness could not be conclusively determined: ' +
+        liveness.reason
+    );
+  }
+  // liveness.alive === false (confirmed dead): fall through and proceed.
+  // Never reclaim the lease here — see doc comment above.
+}
+
+/**
+ * `reconcile` command (US-06-TASK-BE-01). Loads persisted state and
+ * evidence (receipts, intents, registered commit SHAs) and classifies every
+ * task's current attempt per the Tech-Spec section 9 edge-cases table (see
+ * the file-level "reconcile/resume evidence classification" comment above
+ * _classifyTask for exactly which rows are fully covered here versus
+ * explicitly deferred to US-06-TASK-BE-02). Applies ONLY two kinds of
+ * idempotent repair, both reusing an already-existing primitive:
+ *   - registerCommitSHA, when a checkpoint-prepared attempt's taskRef tip is
+ *     found to be an exact match for its own persisted checkpoint intent
+ *     (narrow, tip-only recovery — see scope comment above);
+ *   - finalizeTaskCheckpoint, when a committed attempt's registered SHA is
+ *     confirmed reachable on taskRef but the task's overall status was not
+ *     yet advanced to 'checkpointed'.
+ * Never dispatches new work, never touches a task that was never started
+ * (status 'pending' with zero attempts), never reinterprets approvals, never
+ * cleans resources. If `args.planDigest` is supplied and does not match the
+ * run's own recorded state.planDigest, every task is reported blocked
+ * ('blocked-plan-changed') and no repair is attempted for any task (Tech-Spec:
+ * "Plan/config changed -> Block until approved successor plan").
+ *
+ * Enforces "no live competing coordinator" (Tech-Spec section 9) via
+ * _ensureNoLiveCompetingCoordinator, called first — before store.readState,
+ * before any classification, before any repair. See that function's own doc
+ * comment for the exact decision table (no lease / same runId / different-
+ * but-dead runId all proceed; different-and-live-or-unknown refuses).
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.executionRoot - Absolute path to
+ *   <common-git-dir>/ai-toolkit/execution.
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the run to reconcile.
+ * @param {string} args.projectDir - Absolute path to the Git worktree/repo
+ *   the commit-reachability checks run in.
+ * @param {string} args.taskRef - The feature/task ref every task's commits
+ *   are checked against (N=1 model only — see file-level scope comment).
+ * @param {string} [args.planDigest] - The currently-approved plan's digest
+ *   (e.g. from plan.createPlanSnapshot). When supplied and it differs from
+ *   the run's recorded planDigest, every task is reported blocked and no
+ *   repair is attempted.
+ * @param {string} [args.exeBasename] - Basename of the real spawned
+ *   executable to match against for worker-liveness checks
+ *   (_findLiveTaggedProcess, US-06-TASK-BE-02). Defaults to
+ *   DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME ('claude.exe'); tests override this
+ *   to whatever real, short-lived child process they spawn under test.
+ * @returns {Promise<object>} Versioned result object:
+ *   { protocolVersion, runId, repairsApplied: [{ taskId, action }],
+ *     classifications: [{ taskId, classification, action }] } — the last
+ *   field is additive (beyond the documented minimum shape above) so callers
+ *   get the full per-task classification, not just applied repairs.
+ * @throws {Error} DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR for malformed input;
+ *   COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVE / COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVENESS_UNKNOWN when
+ *   a different, live-or-unknown-liveness coordinator holds the repo-wide
+ *   execution lease; any error store.readState throws (STATE_NOT_FOUND,
+ *   STATE_CORRUPTED) propagates unmodified — a corrupted/missing run is
+ *   never silently defaulted.
+ */
+async function reconcile(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.executionRoot, 'reconcile: args.executionRoot');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.runId, 'reconcile: args.runId');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.projectDir, 'reconcile: args.projectDir');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.taskRef, 'reconcile: args.taskRef');
+  if (args.planDigest !== undefined && args.planDigest !== null) {
+    _requireNonEmptyString(args.planDigest, 'reconcile: args.planDigest');
+  }
+
+  const executionRoot = args.executionRoot;
+  const runId = args.runId;
+
+  // Fail closed BEFORE any repair — see _ensureNoLiveCompetingCoordinator's
+  // own doc comment for the exact decision table.
+  _ensureNoLiveCompetingCoordinator(executionRoot, runId, 'reconcile');
+
+  const ctx = {
+    executionRoot: executionRoot,
+    runId: runId,
+    projectDir: args.projectDir,
+    taskRef: args.taskRef,
+    // US-06-TASK-BE-02: basename of the real spawned executable to match
+    // against when checking worker liveness (_findLiveTaggedProcess). Tests
+    // override this to the real, short-lived child process they spawn under
+    // test (e.g. 'node.exe') — see the DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME
+    // file comment above IS_WINDOWS for why production defaults to
+    // 'claude.exe' rather than 'node.exe'.
+    exeBasename: typeof args.exeBasename === 'string' && args.exeBasename.length > 0
+      ? args.exeBasename
+      : DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME,
+  };
+
+  // Propagates STATE_NOT_FOUND / STATE_CORRUPTED unmodified — never
+  // fabricates an empty run for a corrupted/missing one.
+  const state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+
+  const planChanged = typeof args.planDigest === 'string' && args.planDigest !== state.planDigest;
+
+  const repairsApplied = [];
+  const classifications = [];
+
+  Object.keys(state.tasks).sort().forEach(function (taskId) {
+    if (planChanged) {
+      classifications.push({ taskId: taskId, classification: 'blocked', action: 'blocked-plan-changed' });
+      return;
+    }
+    const task = state.tasks[taskId];
+    const result = _classifyTask(ctx, taskId, task);
+    classifications.push({ taskId: taskId, classification: result.classification, action: result.action });
+    if (result.repairAction) {
+      repairsApplied.push({ taskId: taskId, action: result.repairAction });
+    }
+  });
+
+  return {
+    protocolVersion: store.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+    runId: runId,
+    repairsApplied: repairsApplied,
+    classifications: classifications,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * `resume` command (US-06-TASK-BE-01). Enforces "no live competing
+ * coordinator" itself (see _ensureNoLiveCompetingCoordinator) before doing
+ * anything else, then calls reconcile() (which enforces the same precondition
+ * again — cheap and read-only, and keeps reconcile correct as a standalone
+ * entry point too) to apply its idempotent repairs, then re-reads state and
+ * reports, for every task, its current status plus the next-safe-action
+ * classification reconcile already computed. Does NOT dispatch new work
+ * itself — no run loop exists yet (the real dispatch loop is
+ * US-07-TASK-BE-01, execute()); resume's job here ends at "reconcile, then
+ * report what is safe to continue".
+ *
+ * @param {object} args - same shape as reconcile's args (forwarded as-is).
+ * @param {string} args.executionRoot
+ * @param {string} args.runId
+ * @param {string} args.projectDir
+ * @param {string} args.taskRef
+ * @param {string} [args.planDigest]
+ * @returns {Promise<object>} Versioned result object:
+ *   { protocolVersion, runId, runStatus, tasks: [{ taskId, status,
+ *     nextAction }] } — `nextAction` is additive (beyond the documented
+ *   minimum `{ taskId, status }` shape above), taken from reconcile's own
+ *   per-task classification.
+ * @throws {Error} Same as reconcile — propagated unmodified, including
+ *   COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVE / COMPETING_COORDINATOR_LIVENESS_UNKNOWN.
+ */
+async function resume(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.executionRoot, 'resume: args.executionRoot');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.runId, 'resume: args.runId');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.projectDir, 'resume: args.projectDir');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.taskRef, 'resume: args.taskRef');
+
+  // Fail closed BEFORE any repair — same precondition reconcile() enforces
+  // (and will enforce again just below); checked here too so resume fails
+  // closed even if its own delegation to reconcile ever changes.
+  _ensureNoLiveCompetingCoordinator(args.executionRoot, args.runId, 'resume');
+
+  const reconcileResult = await reconcile(args);
+
+  const state = store.readState(args.executionRoot, args.runId);
+
+  const classificationByTaskId = {};
+  reconcileResult.classifications.forEach(function (c) { classificationByTaskId[c.taskId] = c; });
+
+  const tasks = Object.keys(state.tasks).sort().map(function (taskId) {
+    const task = state.tasks[taskId];
+    const classification = classificationByTaskId[taskId];
+    return {
+      taskId: taskId,
+      status: task.status,
+      nextAction: classification ? classification.action : 'none',
+    };
+  });
+
+  return {
+    protocolVersion: store.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+    runId: args.runId,
+    runStatus: state.runStatus,
+    tasks: tasks,
+    repairsApplied: reconcileResult.repairsApplied,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Evaluates ONE task's persisted evidence (checkpoint, commit, review, diff,
+ * worker liveness) and returns the classification/action reconcile()/
+ * resume() already compute per task, for a single task in isolation
+ * (US-06-TASK-BE-02; completes the Work Breakdown outcome "evaluates
+ * persisted evidence ... and determines: no-reimplementation, reconcile-SHA,
+ * recheck-verification, preserve-diff, or block"). Built directly on top of
+ * reconcile()'s own per-task dispatch (_classifyTask and its helpers) rather
+ * than duplicating any evidence-reading logic — this function's whole
+ * contribution over calling reconcile() for the same run is scoping the
+ * question to one task and returning its full classification result object
+ * (including additive fields like hasPartialEvidence, not just the
+ * {taskId, classification, action} triple reconcile()'s own summary keeps).
+ *
+ * Read-only for the specific case evaluated here EXCEPT for the same two
+ * idempotent repairs reconcile() itself may apply (registerCommitSHA,
+ * finalizeTaskCheckpoint) when this task's evidence matches one of those two
+ * rows — this function does not introduce a new "read-only" mode separate
+ * from reconcile()'s own documented repair behavior.
+ *
+ * Does NOT enforce "no live competing coordinator" itself — a single-task
+ * evidence read is intentionally lighter-weight than reconcile()/resume()'s
+ * own repo-wide precondition; callers that need that guarantee should call
+ * reconcile()/resume() instead, or add it themselves before calling this
+ * function repeatedly in a loop.
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.executionRoot - Absolute path to
+ *   <common-git-dir>/ai-toolkit/execution.
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the run to evaluate.
+ * @param {object} args.task - Plan task object (plan.js shape): at least
+ *   `id`, matching a task already recorded in the run's state.
+ * @param {string} args.projectDir - Absolute path to the Git worktree/repo
+ *   the commit-reachability checks run in.
+ * @param {string} args.taskRef - The feature/task ref this task's commits
+ *   are checked against (N=1 model only — see file-level scope comment above
+ *   the reconcile/resume evidence classification section).
+ * @param {string} [args.exeBasename] - Basename of the real spawned
+ *   executable to match against for worker-liveness checks. Defaults to
+ *   DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME ('claude.exe').
+ * @returns {Promise<{taskId: string, classification: string, action: string,
+ *   repairAction?: string, hasPartialEvidence?: boolean}>}
+ * @throws {Error} DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR for malformed input;
+ *   STATE_TASK_NOT_FOUND when the task is not recorded in the run's state;
+ *   any error store.readState throws (STATE_NOT_FOUND, STATE_CORRUPTED)
+ *   propagates unmodified.
+ */
+async function evaluateTaskEvidence(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.executionRoot, 'evaluateTaskEvidence: args.executionRoot');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.runId, 'evaluateTaskEvidence: args.runId');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.projectDir, 'evaluateTaskEvidence: args.projectDir');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.taskRef, 'evaluateTaskEvidence: args.taskRef');
+  if (args.task == null || typeof args.task !== 'object') {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'evaluateTaskEvidence: args.task must be an object');
+  }
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.task.id, 'evaluateTaskEvidence: args.task.id');
+
+  const executionRoot = args.executionRoot;
+  const runId = args.runId;
+  const taskId = args.task.id;
+
+  const state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+  const task = state.tasks[taskId];
+  if (!task) {
+    throw _err('STATE_TASK_NOT_FOUND', 'evaluateTaskEvidence: task "' + taskId + '" not found');
+  }
+
+  const ctx = {
+    executionRoot: executionRoot,
+    runId: runId,
+    projectDir: args.projectDir,
+    taskRef: args.taskRef,
+    exeBasename: typeof args.exeBasename === 'string' && args.exeBasename.length > 0
+      ? args.exeBasename
+      : DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME,
+  };
+
+  const result = _classifyTask(ctx, taskId, task);
+  return Object.assign({ taskId: taskId }, result);
+}
+
+// ── replan (US-06-TASK-BE-03) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Derives the successor feature's directory from its feature.md path, using
+// the EXACT same separator-agnostic convention src/claude/workflows/
+// pm-phase2.js's own deriveFeatureDir uses: feature directory = parent of the
+// feature.md path; strip a trailing "<sep>feature.md" tail (case-insensitive,
+// POSIX "/" or Windows "\"), or just a trailing separator if the path is
+// already a directory. Duplicated here rather than imported — pm-phase2.js is
+// a Claude Code Workflow script (run by the workflow runtime, not a
+// requirable Node module; see AGENTS.md's "Workflow script pattern"), so this
+// library module cannot depend on it. Keeping the exact same regex is the
+// point: both places must agree on where a feature's artifacts live.
+function _deriveFeatureDir(featurePath) {
+  return /[/\\]feature\.md$/i.test(featurePath)
+    ? featurePath.replace(/[/\\]feature\.md$/i, '')
+    : featurePath.replace(/[/\\]+$/, '');
+}
+
+// Same convention pm-phase2.js uses: PREFIX is the first "<UPPER>-<digits>"
+// substring found in the feature directory name (e.g. "FTR-018", "ASSESS-001").
+function _derivePrefix(featureDir) {
+  const m = featureDir.match(/([A-Z]+-\d+)/);
+  return m ? m[1] : null;
+}
+
+// Minimal, deliberately non-generic Markdown check: does a case-sensitive
+// "## Gate 2" heading appear anywhere in the successor's Approvals.md?
+//
+// This codebase has no existing generic Markdown-section-reader/parser to
+// reuse for this: every other "verify Gate 2 is present in Approvals.md"
+// pre-condition in this repo (e.g. src/claude/skills/implement-feature/
+// SKILL.md Step 4/6, AGENTS.md's "Approval Gate Protocol") is carried out by
+// an LLM agent reading the file in the main loop, not by a JS utility — there
+// is nothing to import. plan.js's own section extraction
+// (_extractTaskDetailsSection) is specific to the "## Task Details" section's
+// very different internal structure (task anchors, fenced verification
+// blocks) and would be a wrong-shaped tool bent to a one-line question here.
+// Writing a full generic Markdown-section parser purely to answer "did a
+// '## Gate 2' heading ever get appended to this file" would be
+// over-engineering for what this function actually needs. `^## Gate 2`
+// anchored to a line start (multiline, case-sensitive — no 'i' flag) is the
+// literal heading text this codebase's own Approvals.md template always
+// writes verbatim (see this feature's own FTR-018-Approvals.md: "## Gate 2 —
+// Work Breakdown Approval").
+const _GATE_2_HEADING_RE = /^## Gate 2\b/m;
+
+function _hasGate2Approval(approvalsText) {
+  return _GATE_2_HEADING_RE.test(approvalsText);
+}
+
+/**
+ * `replan` command (US-06-TASK-BE-03; completes US-06 "resume from persisted
+ * evidence and reconcile without re-execution" for the branch-off case: an
+ * original run that cannot simply resume because its plan itself must
+ * change). Tech-Spec section 9 (Gate-1-binding, carried into this Work
+ * Breakdown): "Replan does not grant approval. First produce a proposed
+ * successor plan and human decision outside the executor. Then replan
+ * command validates new Gate 2/revision evidence and records old->new digest
+ * and task mapping. Original run becomes superseded only after no live
+ * workers and evidence retained. Carry completion only for unchanged
+ * task/context with reachable verified checkpoints and explicit approved
+ * mapping; otherwise require a new task identity. No data deletion,
+ * automatic branch rewrite or reset of failed-attempt counters to evade
+ * policy."
+ *
+ * This function grants NO approval itself (the successor's Gate 2 approval
+ * must already exist on disk, produced by the normal implement-feature main-
+ * loop gate protocol — see AGENTS.md's "Approval Gate Protocol" — entirely
+ * outside this executor) and does NOT dispatch, start, or touch the
+ * successor run in any way: its job ends at validating + recording the
+ * mapping the caller already decided, and superseding the original run.
+ * `taskMapping` is an explicit, caller-supplied old->new task ID mapping —
+ * this function never invents one.
+ *
+ * Ordering, fail-closed at every step, in order (no step above ever mutates
+ * anything once a later step can still fail):
+ *   1. Successor Gate 2 / revision approval evidence must exist on disk (a
+ *      "## Gate 2" heading in the successor's Approvals.md — see
+ *      _hasGate2Approval above for why this minimal check, not a generic
+ *      parser). Missing/unreadable Approvals.md or no such heading:
+ *      SUCCESSOR_NOT_APPROVED, before anything else is read.
+ *   2. The successor's plan snapshot is built via plan.createPlanSnapshot
+ *      from its REAL Work-Breakdown.md/.csv files on disk (US-01-TASK-BE-04,
+ *      already implemented) — this both proves the successor plan parses/
+ *      validates cleanly and yields its planDigest. Missing MD/CSV files:
+ *      SUCCESSOR_PLAN_NOT_FOUND. A malformed MD/CSV: the underlying
+ *      PLAN_PARSE_ERROR propagates unmodified.
+ *   3. The ORIGINAL run's state is read (store.readState — STATE_NOT_FOUND /
+ *      STATE_CORRUPTED propagate unmodified; a corrupted/missing original
+ *      run is never silently defaulted).
+ *   4. Every taskMapping entry is validated against BOTH sides: oldTaskId
+ *      must exist in the original run's state.tasks; newTaskId must exist in
+ *      the successor snapshot's tasks. Any entry referencing an unknown ID on
+ *      either side fails the WHOLE call closed with
+ *      REPLAN_UNKNOWN_TASK_MAPPING, before any mutation and before any
+ *      carry-completion eligibility is even computed.
+ *   5. For each validated pair, carry-completion eligibility is computed —
+ *      read-only, never touches the old task's own evidence either way. A
+ *      pair is eligible ONLY when the OLD task's status is already
+ *      'checkpointed' or 'integrated' AND its last attempt's registered
+ *      originalSha is a valid SHA reachable on `taskRef` right now (reusing
+ *      this same file's own _isCommitReachableOnRef — the identical
+ *      merge-base-based check finalizeTaskCheckpoint/reconcile already use;
+ *      not duplicated as a new helper). Anything else (wrong status, no
+ *      attempt, no/invalid SHA, unreachable, or the reachability check itself
+ *      failing) is recorded with carriesCompletion=false — "otherwise require
+ *      a new task identity" — never guessed into true.
+ *   6. "No live workers" gate: EVERY task/attempt in the ORIGINAL run (not
+ *      just the mapped ones) whose attempt carries a recorded
+ *      processIdentity is checked via US-06-TASK-BE-02's own
+ *      _findLiveTaggedProcess. Any 'found-alive' OR 'unknown' result refuses
+ *      the whole call closed with LIVE_WORKER_BLOCKS_REPLAN — 'unknown' is
+ *      never treated as safe, mirroring _ensureNoLiveCompetingCoordinator's
+ *      and _classifyLiveOrDeadWorkerAttempt's identical "never assume dead"
+ *      discipline elsewhere in this file. Only proceeds once every checked
+ *      attempt is 'confirmed-not-found', or has no processIdentity at all
+ *      (nothing to check).
+ *   7. Only once 1-6 have all succeeded: the old->new plan digest mapping
+ *      (including each pair's carriesCompletion flag) is persisted as a
+ *      durable, immutable record via store.js's existing writeIntent
+ *      primitive — reused rather than inventing a new persistence primitive,
+ *      the same immutable-record-by-id mechanism checkpoint intents already
+ *      use (see store.js's persistCheckpointIntent-adjacent writeIntent). A
+ *      single fixed id ("replan") is used per original run: at most one
+ *      supersession decision is ever recorded for a given run; a replayed
+ *      call with IDENTICAL inputs is an idempotent no-op (writeIntent's own
+ *      identical-content replay rule), while a conflicting second call
+ *      (different successor/mapping) fails closed with INTENT_CONFLICT
+ *      rather than silently overwriting the first decision. This record is
+ *      written BEFORE the run status changes below, so a conflicting replay
+ *      never leaves the original run superseded without its mapping record
+ *      durably alongside it.
+ *   8. Only after the record is durably persisted: the original run's status
+ *      is set to 'superseded' (store.js's existing RUN_STATUSES value — not a
+ *      new status) via State.setRunStatus + store.writeState. Nothing about
+ *      any task's own attempts/evidence is deleted, rewritten, or reset —
+ *      this function never touches task/attempt records at all, only the
+ *      run-level runStatus field and the new immutable replan record.
+ *
+ * Does NOT dispatch, start, or touch the successor run in any way (per its
+ * own scope — see the module-level file comment's original stub doc, which
+ * this replaces).
+ *
+ * @param {object} args
+ * @param {string} args.executionRoot - Absolute path to
+ *   <common-git-dir>/ai-toolkit/execution.
+ * @param {string} args.runId - UUID of the original run being replanned;
+ *   must already hold a valid state.json (STATE_NOT_FOUND otherwise).
+ * @param {string} args.projectDir - Absolute path to the Git worktree/repo
+ *   the commit-reachability checks (step 5) run in.
+ * @param {string} args.taskRef - The feature/task ref carry-completion
+ *   eligibility's reachability check runs against (N=1 model only — same
+ *   scope boundary as reconcile()/finalizeTaskCheckpoint()).
+ * @param {string} args.feature - Path to the SUCCESSOR feature's feature.md,
+ *   used to derive its PREFIX/directory (same convention as
+ *   src/claude/workflows/pm-phase2.js) and locate its Approvals.md and
+ *   Work-Breakdown.md/.csv.
+ * @param {Array<{oldTaskId: string, newTaskId: string}>} args.taskMapping -
+ *   Caller-supplied explicit old->new task ID mapping (the human/caller's own
+ *   decision — this function validates and records it, never invents one).
+ * @param {string} [args.exeBasename] - Basename of the real spawned
+ *   executable to match against for worker-liveness checks
+ *   (_findLiveTaggedProcess). Defaults to DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME
+ *   ('claude.exe'); tests override this to whatever real, short-lived child
+ *   process they spawn under test.
+ * @returns {Promise<{protocolVersion: number, originalRunId: string,
+ *   successorPlanDigest: string,
+ *   taskMapping: Array<{oldTaskId: string, newTaskId: string,
+ *     carriesCompletion: boolean}>}>}
+ * @throws {Error} DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR for malformed input;
+ *   SUCCESSOR_NOT_APPROVED when the successor's Approvals.md is missing,
+ *   unreadable, or has no "## Gate 2" section; SUCCESSOR_PLAN_NOT_FOUND when
+ *   the successor's Work-Breakdown.md/.csv cannot be read; the underlying
+ *   PLAN_PARSE_ERROR when the successor plan itself is malformed;
+ *   REPLAN_UNKNOWN_TASK_MAPPING when any mapping entry references an unknown
+ *   ID on either side; LIVE_WORKER_BLOCKS_REPLAN when any original-run
+ *   attempt's worker liveness is not confirmed-not-found;
+ *   STATE_NOT_FOUND / STATE_CORRUPTED propagated unmodified from
+ *   store.readState; INTENT_CONFLICT propagated unmodified from
+ *   store.writeIntent when a conflicting replan record already exists for
+ *   this run.
+ */
+async function replan(args) {
+  args = args || {};
+
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.executionRoot, 'replan: args.executionRoot');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.runId, 'replan: args.runId');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.projectDir, 'replan: args.projectDir');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.taskRef, 'replan: args.taskRef');
+  _requireNonEmptyString(args.feature, 'replan: args.feature');
+  if (!Array.isArray(args.taskMapping)) {
+    throw _err('DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR', 'replan: args.taskMapping must be an array');
+  }
+  args.taskMapping.forEach(function (entry, idx) {
+    if (
+      entry == null || typeof entry !== 'object' ||
+      typeof entry.oldTaskId !== 'string' || entry.oldTaskId.length === 0 ||
+      typeof entry.newTaskId !== 'string' || entry.newTaskId.length === 0
+    ) {
+      throw _err(
+        'DISPATCH_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+        'replan: args.taskMapping[' + idx + '] must be an object with non-empty string "oldTaskId"/"newTaskId"'
+      );
+    }
+  });
+
+  const executionRoot = args.executionRoot;
+  const runId = args.runId;
+  const projectDir = args.projectDir;
+  const taskRef = args.taskRef;
+  const exeBasename = typeof args.exeBasename === 'string' && args.exeBasename.length > 0
+    ? args.exeBasename
+    : DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME;
+
+  // 1. Successor Gate 2 / revision approval evidence — fail closed FIRST,
+  // before reading anything about the original run or the successor's plan
+  // files.
+  const successorFeatureDir = _deriveFeatureDir(args.feature);
+  const successorPrefix = _derivePrefix(successorFeatureDir);
+  if (!successorPrefix) {
+    throw _err(
+      'SUCCESSOR_NOT_APPROVED',
+      'replan: could not derive a PREFIX (e.g. "FTR-018") from successor feature directory "' +
+        successorFeatureDir + '" — refusing to treat an unidentifiable feature as approved'
+    );
+  }
+  const successorApprovalsPath = path.join(successorFeatureDir, successorPrefix + '-Approvals.md');
+  let successorApprovalsText;
+  try {
+    successorApprovalsText = fs.readFileSync(successorApprovalsPath, 'utf8');
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw _err(
+      'SUCCESSOR_NOT_APPROVED',
+      'replan: successor Approvals.md not found or unreadable at "' + successorApprovalsPath +
+        '" — refusing to replan onto an unapproved successor: ' + err.message
+    );
+  }
+  if (!_hasGate2Approval(successorApprovalsText)) {
+    throw _err(
+      'SUCCESSOR_NOT_APPROVED',
+      'replan: successor Approvals.md at "' + successorApprovalsPath +
+        '" has no "## Gate 2" approval section — refusing to replan onto an unapproved successor plan'
+    );
+  }
+
+  // 2. Successor plan snapshot — real Work-Breakdown.md/.csv on disk, same
+  // parser pipeline every other run uses (plan.createPlanSnapshot). Its own
+  // PLAN_PARSE_ERROR propagates unmodified for a malformed successor plan.
+  const successorMdPath = path.join(successorFeatureDir, successorPrefix + '-Work-Breakdown.md');
+  const successorCsvPath = path.join(successorFeatureDir, successorPrefix + '-Work-Breakdown.csv');
+  let successorMd;
+  let successorCsv;
+  try {
+    successorMd = fs.readFileSync(successorMdPath, 'utf8');
+    successorCsv = fs.readFileSync(successorCsvPath, 'utf8');
+  } catch (err) {
+    throw _err(
+      'SUCCESSOR_PLAN_NOT_FOUND',
+      'replan: successor Work Breakdown MD/CSV not found at "' + successorMdPath + '" / "' +
+        successorCsvPath + '": ' + err.message
+    );
+  }
+  const successorSnapshot = plan.createPlanSnapshot(successorMd, successorCsv);
+  const successorTaskIds = new Set(successorSnapshot.tasks.map(function (t) { return t.id; }));
+
+  // 3. Load the ORIGINAL run's state — STATE_NOT_FOUND/STATE_CORRUPTED
+  // propagate unmodified.
+  const state = store.readState(executionRoot, runId);
+
+  // 4. Validate the caller-supplied taskMapping against BOTH sides before
+  // touching anything — fail closed on the first unknown ID found.
+  args.taskMapping.forEach(function (entry) {
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(state.tasks, entry.oldTaskId)) {
+      throw _err(
+        'REPLAN_UNKNOWN_TASK_MAPPING',
+        'replan: taskMapping references oldTaskId "' + entry.oldTaskId +
+          '", which does not exist in original run "' + runId + '"'
+      );
+    }
+    if (!successorTaskIds.has(entry.newTaskId)) {
+      throw _err(
+        'REPLAN_UNKNOWN_TASK_MAPPING',
+        'replan: taskMapping references newTaskId "' + entry.newTaskId +
+          '", which does not exist in the successor plan snapshot (' + successorMdPath + ')'
+      );
+    }
+  });
+
+  // 5. Carry-completion eligibility per mapped pair — read-only, never
+  // touches the old task's own evidence either way regardless of outcome.
+  const taskMappingResult = args.taskMapping.map(function (entry) {
+    const oldTask = state.tasks[entry.oldTaskId];
+    let carriesCompletion = false;
+    if (oldTask.status === 'checkpointed' || oldTask.status === 'integrated') {
+      const lastAttempt = Array.isArray(oldTask.attempts) && oldTask.attempts.length > 0
+        ? oldTask.attempts[oldTask.attempts.length - 1]
+        : null;
+      if (lastAttempt && typeof lastAttempt.originalSha === 'string' && SHA_PATTERN.test(lastAttempt.originalSha)) {
+        try {
+          carriesCompletion = _isCommitReachableOnRef(projectDir, lastAttempt.originalSha, taskRef);
+        } catch (_reachErr) {
+          carriesCompletion = false; // never guess — an unverifiable check is never eligible
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    return { oldTaskId: entry.oldTaskId, newTaskId: entry.newTaskId, carriesCompletion: carriesCompletion };
+  });
+
+  // 6. "No live workers" gate over EVERY task/attempt in the ORIGINAL run
+  // (not just the mapped ones) — reuses US-06-TASK-BE-02's own
+  // _findLiveTaggedProcess exactly like reconcile()'s own worker-liveness
+  // classification. 'unknown' blocks exactly like 'found-alive' — never
+  // assume dead.
+  Object.keys(state.tasks).sort().forEach(function (taskId) {
+    const task = state.tasks[taskId];
+    (Array.isArray(task.attempts) ? task.attempts : []).forEach(function (attempt) {
+      if (typeof attempt.processIdentity !== 'string' || attempt.processIdentity.length === 0) {
+        return; // nothing recorded to check
+      }
+      const liveness = _findLiveTaggedProcess(attempt.processIdentity, exeBasename);
+      if (liveness.status !== 'confirmed-not-found') {
+        throw _err(
+          'LIVE_WORKER_BLOCKS_REPLAN',
+          'replan: refusing to supersede run "' + runId + '" — task "' + taskId + '" attempt ' +
+            attempt.number + '\'s worker liveness is "' + liveness.status + '" (' + liveness.reason +
+            '); a run may only be superseded once every worker is confirmed not running'
+        );
+      }
+    });
+  });
+
+  // 7. Persist the durable old->new mapping record BEFORE changing run
+  // status, so a conflicting replay (INTENT_CONFLICT) never leaves the
+  // original run superseded without its mapping record durably alongside it.
+  // Deliberately no wall-clock timestamp field here (unlike, say, a receipt's
+  // startedAt/endedAt): store.js's _writeImmutableRecord treats a replay as
+  // idempotent only when its content is byte-for-byte identical to what is
+  // already recorded (see git.js's own persistCheckpointIntent, which
+  // likewise carries no timestamp in its intent payload) — a fresh
+  // Date().toISOString() on every call would make even a genuine, intentional
+  // replay of the exact same replan decision always look like a conflicting
+  // second decision.
+  const replanRecord = {
+    protocolVersion: store.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+    originalRunId: runId,
+    successorFeaturePath: args.feature,
+    successorPlanDigest: successorSnapshot.planDigest,
+    taskMapping: taskMappingResult,
+  };
+  store.writeIntent(executionRoot, runId, 'replan', replanRecord);
+
+  // 8. Only now: mark the original run superseded. Task/attempt evidence is
+  // never touched by this function, in either direction.
+  const supersededState = state.setRunStatus('superseded');
+  store.writeState(executionRoot, runId, supersededState);
+
+  return {
+    protocolVersion: store.PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+    originalRunId: runId,
+    successorPlanDigest: successorSnapshot.planDigest,
+    taskMapping: taskMappingResult,
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  execute,
+  status,
+  diagnose,
+  stop,
+  reconcile,
+  resume,
+  replan,
+  dispatchTaskAttempt,
+  runVerifications,
+  runReview,
+  finalizeTaskCheckpoint,
+  evaluateTaskEvidence,
+  createTaskWorktree,
+  createSlotPool,
+  DEFAULT_TAGGED_PROCESS_EXE_BASENAME,
+  _buildProcessTag,
+  _findLiveTaggedProcess,
+};