@drakon-systems/ekho-sdk 0.6.2 → 0.7.1

package/dist/esm/identity/verification.js

@@ -0,0 +1,492 @@
+// Agent-side verification wiring (mirrors the Python plugin's verification.py):
+// pin sync (endorsement-chained, no relay TOFU), per-message verdicts, the
+// graceful execution-authority gate, and outbound signing.
+import { endorsementPayload, fromB64url, keyId as deriveKeyId, publicKeyB64urlFromSeed, revocationPayload, sha256Hex, signCanonical, unrevokePayload, verifyCanonical } from "./primitives.js";
+import { verifyInbound } from "./verify.js";
+import { identityPublicKey } from "./store.js";
+/** How many identical advisory polls to swallow before a reminder. ~5s poll
+ *  → a reminder about every 10 minutes, not 150k lines in a day and a half. */
+export const ADVISORY_REVOCATION_WARNING_SUMMARY_EVERY = 120;
+/** Process-local cap on identity+fleet throttle scopes. Eviction re-emits that
+ *  scope's next first-seen warning; it cannot mute a different live scope. */
+export const ADVISORY_REVOCATION_WARNING_MAX_SCOPES = 64;
+const MAX_ADVISORY_KEYS_IN_LOG = 8;
+const MAX_ADVISORY_KID_CHARS = 32;
+/** Process-local only. Keyed by identity public key + fleet so one box cannot
+ *  mute another identity or fleet. Cleared when the advisory set goes empty. */
+const advisoryWarnByScope = new Map();
+/** Test-only isolation for the process-local Map. Not plugin runtime API. */
+export function resetAdvisoryRevocationWarningStateForTests() {
+    advisoryWarnByScope.clear();
+}
+function advisoryScopeKey(identity, fleetId) {
+    return `${identityPublicKey(identity)}\0${fleetId ?? ""}`;
+}
+function touchAdvisoryScope(scopeKey, entry) {
+    advisoryWarnByScope.delete(scopeKey);
+    advisoryWarnByScope.set(scopeKey, entry);
+    while (advisoryWarnByScope.size > ADVISORY_REVOCATION_WARNING_MAX_SCOPES) {
+        const oldest = advisoryWarnByScope.keys().next().value;
+        if (oldest === undefined || oldest === scopeKey)
+            break;
+        advisoryWarnByScope.delete(oldest);
+    }
+}
+/** Relay-supplied key IDs are untrusted. Escape C0/C1 controls (U+0000–U+001F,
+ *  U+007F–U+009F, including CSI/OSC) and Unicode line separators so each warning
+ *  stays one bounded line; truncate the escaped form, never the raw id. */
+function formatKidForLog(kid) {
+    let escaped = "";
+    for (const ch of kid) {
+        const code = ch.charCodeAt(0);
+        if (ch === "\\")
+            escaped += "\\\\";
+        else if (ch === "\n")
+            escaped += "\\n";
+        else if (ch === "\r")
+            escaped += "\\r";
+        else if (ch === "\t")
+            escaped += "\\t";
+        else if (ch === "\0")
+            escaped += "\\0";
+        else if (code < 0x20 || (code >= 0x7f && code <= 0x9f) || code === 0x2028 || code === 0x2029) {
+            escaped += `\\u${code.toString(16).padStart(4, "0")}`;
+        }
+        else {
+            escaped += ch;
+        }
+    }
+    if (escaped.length <= MAX_ADVISORY_KID_CHARS)
+        return escaped;
+    return `${escaped.slice(0, MAX_ADVISORY_KID_CHARS)}...`;
+}
+/** Bounded sample for the log line. Fingerprinting uses the complete sorted set. */
+function formatAdvisoryKeyList(kids) {
+    const shown = kids.slice(0, MAX_ADVISORY_KEYS_IN_LOG).map(formatKidForLog);
+    const omitted = kids.length - shown.length;
+    const list = shown.join(", ");
+    if (omitted <= 0)
+        return list;
+    return `${list} (+${omitted} omitted)`;
+}
+function formatAdvisoryWarning(kids) {
+    if (kids.length === 1) {
+        return (`[ekho] relay reports operator key ${formatKidForLog(kids[0])} as REVOKED without a valid revocation signature. ` +
+            `Treating the claim as ADVISORY: the key is NOT unpinned and NOT tombstoned, but it will not ` +
+            `be newly adopted until a signed revocation arrives.`);
+    }
+    return (`[ekho] relay reports ${kids.length} operator keys as REVOKED without a valid revocation signature: ` +
+        `${formatAdvisoryKeyList(kids)}. Treating the claim as ADVISORY: the keys are NOT unpinned and NOT ` +
+        `tombstoned, but they will not be newly adopted until a signed revocation arrives.`);
+}
+function formatAdvisorySummary(kids, suppressed) {
+    return (`[ekho] still treating ${kids.length} unsigned/invalid operator-key revocation claim(s) as ADVISORY ` +
+        `(suppressed ${suppressed} identical warning(s) this process). Keys: ${formatAdvisoryKeyList(kids)}. ` +
+        `Not unpinned, not tombstoned; still blocking new adoption.`);
+}
+/** One aggregate warning when the advisory set appears or changes; identical
+ *  repeats are silent; a bounded reminder keeps the condition visible; an empty
+ *  set forgets the scope so a later recurrence is logged again. Trust is
+ *  untouched — this is log volume only. */
+function warnAdvisoryRevocations(ctx, advisory) {
+    if (advisory.size === 0) {
+        advisoryWarnByScope.delete(ctx.scopeKey);
+        return;
+    }
+    const kids = [...advisory].sort();
+    // Canonical JSON is unambiguous; NUL-join collides `["a\0b"]` with `["a","b"]`.
+    const fingerprint = sha256Hex(JSON.stringify(kids));
+    const prev = advisoryWarnByScope.get(ctx.scopeKey);
+    if (!prev || prev.fingerprint !== fingerprint) {
+        ctx.log?.warn?.(formatAdvisoryWarning(kids));
+        touchAdvisoryScope(ctx.scopeKey, { fingerprint, suppressed: 0 });
+        return;
+    }
+    prev.suppressed += 1;
+    if (prev.suppressed >= ADVISORY_REVOCATION_WARNING_SUMMARY_EVERY) {
+        ctx.log?.warn?.(formatAdvisorySummary(kids, prev.suppressed));
+        prev.suppressed = 0;
+        touchAdvisoryScope(ctx.scopeKey, prev);
+    }
+}
+/** Apply the relay's revocation / un-revocation claims to the working trust root
+ *  (#27). Mutates `pinned`, `revokedLedger` and `admissions` in place; a claim
+ *  only lands if a currently pinned operator key signed it. */
+function applyRelayKeyClaims(ctx) {
+    const out = {
+        advisory: new Set(),
+        pinRemoved: false,
+        ledgerChanged: false,
+        admissionsChanged: false
+    };
+    clearTombstonesOnSignedUnrevoke(ctx, out);
+    applySignedRevocations(ctx, out);
+    warnAdvisoryRevocations(ctx, out.advisory);
+    return out;
+}
+/** A SIGNED un-revoke clears a tombstone so the key can be re-admitted through
+ *  the endorsement chain. It never re-pins by itself — re-admission still costs
+ *  a valid endorsement. Runs before the revocation pass so a valid revocation in
+ *  the same batch still wins (fail closed).
+ *
+ *  The unsigned ABSENCE of `revoked` must never clear a tombstone: that was the
+ *  #14 hole, where a relay could resurrect a dead key just by not mentioning it.
+ *
+ *  #48: the payload now binds revoked_at_being_cleared + issued_at + nonce.
+ *  Missing bind fields refuse the un-revoke (fail closed). The relay still
+ *  does not emit unrevoke_sig. */
+function clearTombstonesOnSignedUnrevoke(ctx, out) {
+    for (const k of ctx.operatorKeys) {
+        const kid = k.key_id;
+        const sig = k.unrevoke_sig;
+        const revokedAt = k.unrevoke_revoked_at;
+        const issuedAt = k.unrevoke_issued_at;
+        const nonce = k.unrevoke_nonce;
+        if (!kid || !sig || !ctx.revokedLedger[kid])
+            continue;
+        if (!revokedAt || !issuedAt || !nonce) {
+            ctx.log?.warn?.(`[ekho] refusing un-revoke of operator key ${kid}: payload bind fields missing. ` +
+                `The tombstone stands.`);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!ctx.fleetId || !ctx.signedByAPinnedKey(unrevokePayload(ctx.fleetId, kid, revokedAt, issuedAt, nonce), sig)) {
+            ctx.log?.warn?.(`[ekho] refusing un-revoke of operator key ${kid}: no currently pinned operator key signed it. ` +
+                `The tombstone stands.`);
+            continue;
+        }
+        // #52: the compare half of the compare-and-swap. Signing over
+        // revoked_at_being_cleared is only worth anything if apply-time checks it
+        // against the tombstone actually standing right now — otherwise a valid
+        // un-revoke captured for an OLD revocation clears whatever NEWER one has
+        // replaced it.
+        if (revokedAt !== ctx.revokedLedger[kid]) {
+            ctx.log?.warn?.(`[ekho] refusing un-revoke of operator key ${kid}: it is bound to a revocation at ${revokedAt}, ` +
+                `but the live tombstone is at ${ctx.revokedLedger[kid]} — a newer revocation this un-revoke ` +
+                `never authorized. The tombstone stands.`);
+            continue;
+        }
+        delete ctx.revokedLedger[kid];
+        out.ledgerChanged = true;
+        ctx.log?.info?.(`[ekho] operator key ${kid} un-revoked by a signed operator instruction; tombstone cleared. ` +
+            `The key is NOT re-pinned — it has to be re-endorsed by a pinned key.`);
+    }
+}
+/** A SIGNED revocation is the only thing that can remove trust. Anything less is
+ *  recorded as advisory: the key is skipped for new adoption and nothing else. */
+function applySignedRevocations(ctx, out) {
+    for (const k of ctx.operatorKeys) {
+        const kid = k.key_id;
+        if (!kid || !k.revoked)
+            continue;
+        const at = k.revoked_at;
+        const sig = k.revocation_sig;
+        const proven = Boolean(sig && at && ctx.fleetId && ctx.signedByAPinnedKey(revocationPayload(ctx.fleetId, kid, at), sig));
+        if (!proven) {
+            noteAdvisoryClaim(out, kid);
+        }
+        else if (isLastPinnedKey(ctx, kid)) {
+            noteLastRootRefusal(ctx, kid);
+        }
+        else {
+            dropRevokedKey(ctx, out, kid, at);
+        }
+    }
+}
+/** The relay says a key is dead but cannot prove it. Skip the key for NEW
+ *  adoption, write nothing. Visibility is the process-local aggregate throttle
+ *  in warnAdvisoryRevocations — not a per-key line on every poll.
+ *
+ *  Deleting the pin here is the tempting one-liner and it is wrong twice over:
+ *  it lets whoever controls the relay drop trust unilaterally, AND a deleted pin
+ *  is re-admitted on the very next poll by the same still-valid endorsement.
+ *  Rejecting a key takes a revokedOperatorKeys tombstone, not a deletion — and a
+ *  tombstone takes a signature. */
+function noteAdvisoryClaim(out, kid) {
+    out.advisory.add(kid);
+}
+function isLastPinnedKey(ctx, kid) {
+    return Boolean(ctx.pinned[kid]) && Object.keys(ctx.pinned).length === 1;
+}
+/** Last-root protection: honoring this would leave the box with no trust root at
+ *  all — indistinguishable from the attack the signature requirement just
+ *  closed. Refuse the claim whole, so we never hold a key that is tombstoned
+ *  (unrecoverable) and still pinned (still trusted). */
+function noteLastRootRefusal(ctx, kid) {
+    ctx.log?.warn?.(`[ekho] refusing the signed revocation of operator key ${kid}: it is the LAST pinned operator key, ` +
+        `and honoring it would leave this agent with no trust root at all. Endorse a replacement key ` +
+        `first — the replacement makes this revocation safe to honor on the next poll.`);
+}
+/** Honor a proven revocation: tombstone, then unpin.
+ *
+ *  #14: the tombstone is the durable half. Unpinning alone never made a
+ *  revocation stick — the config seed re-added the key on the very next wake,
+ *  and TOFU/chaining would too. */
+function dropRevokedKey(ctx, out, kid, at) {
+    if (!ctx.revokedLedger[kid]) {
+        ctx.revokedLedger[kid] = at;
+        out.ledgerChanged = true;
+    }
+    if (ctx.pinned[kid]) {
+        Reflect.deleteProperty(ctx.pinned, kid);
+        out.pinRemoved = true;
+        ctx.log?.warn?.(`[ekho] operator key ${kid} is revoked (signed, at ${at}); it is no longer pinned.`);
+    }
+    if (ctx.admissions[kid]) {
+        // The admission record answers "why is this key trusted here?" — keep it
+        // only while the answer is "it is".
+        Reflect.deleteProperty(ctx.admissions, kid);
+        out.admissionsChanged = true;
+    }
+}
+/** Update pinned operator keys from the inbox. Adds a new key ONLY if endorsed by
+ *  an already-pinned key; removes one ONLY on a SIGNED revocation. Returns true
+ *  if the identity changed (and so must be persisted).
+ *
+ *  Trust mutates in one direction only, and never on the relay's say-so (#27).
+ *  An unsigned `revoked: true` is a HINT: the key is skipped for new adoption
+ *  and the claim is logged, but nothing is written and nothing is unpinned.
+ *  Treating it as authoritative (the #14 regression) meant one poll from a
+ *  compromised relay could tombstone and unpin an entire fleet's trust root,
+ *  permanently — the tombstone survives restarts by design, so the damage was
+ *  not even recoverable by restarting against an honest relay.
+ *
+ *  One deliberate exception to "no relay TOFU" (#5): an identity that has never
+ *  pinned ANY key can't grow a chain — endorsements need an already-pinned root,
+ *  so verification stayed dormant forever on every agent nobody hand-configured
+ *  (the Aug 2026 silent-drop incident). First contact with an empty pin set
+ *  adopts the relay's current non-revoked keys as the trust root, exactly once
+ *  (tofuAt latches). Enrollment already trusts the relay this much — it accepts
+ *  the shared secret over the same channel. Pre-pinning via config/env skips
+ *  TOFU entirely and stays the stronger option. */
+export function syncPinnedOperatorKeys(identity, operatorKeys, fleetId, log = console) {
+    const pinned = { ...identity.pinnedOperatorKeys };
+    const revokedLedger = { ...(identity.revokedOperatorKeys ?? {}) };
+    const admissions = { ...(identity.operatorKeyAdmissions ?? {}) };
+    // The keys allowed to authorize a trust-root mutation this poll, snapshotted
+    // BEFORE any of them are applied. Frozen on purpose: verifying against the
+    // live map would make the outcome depend on the order the relay happened to
+    // serve its entries in, which is the relay's choice, not ours.
+    const authorities = { ...identity.pinnedOperatorKeys };
+    const signedByAPinnedKey = (payload, sig) => {
+        for (const pub of Object.values(authorities)) {
+            if (verifyCanonical(payload, sig, fromB64url(pub)))
+                return true;
+        }
+        return false;
+    };
+    // Phases 1 and 2 (#27) — mutates `pinned` / `revokedLedger` / `admissions` in
+    // place and reports back what it touched.
+    const claims = applyRelayKeyClaims({
+        operatorKeys,
+        fleetId,
+        log,
+        pinned,
+        revokedLedger,
+        admissions,
+        signedByAPinnedKey,
+        scopeKey: advisoryScopeKey(identity, fleetId)
+    });
+    const advisory = claims.advisory;
+    let changed = claims.pinRemoved;
+    let admissionsChanged = claims.admissionsChanged;
+    if (claims.ledgerChanged) {
+        identity.revokedOperatorKeys = revokedLedger;
+        changed = true; // must persist, even when the key was never pinned here
+    }
+    if (Object.keys(pinned).length === 0 && !identity.tofuAt) {
+        let adopted = false;
+        const at = new Date().toISOString();
+        for (const k of operatorKeys) {
+            if (k.key_id && k.public_key && !advisory.has(k.key_id) && !revokedLedger[k.key_id]) {
+                pinned[k.key_id] = k.public_key;
+                admissions[k.key_id] = { admitted_by: "tofu", admitted_at: at }; // #26
+                admissionsChanged = true;
+                adopted = true;
+            }
+        }
+        if (adopted) {
+            // Latch only when something was adopted — an empty roster now must not
+            // burn the one TOFU opportunity of a fresh identity. (Tracked separately
+            // from `changed`, which a revocation tombstone alone can now set.)
+            identity.tofuAt = at;
+            identity.pinnedOperatorKeys = pinned;
+            identity.operatorKeyAdmissions = admissions;
+            return true;
+        }
+    }
+    for (const k of operatorKeys) {
+        const kid = k.key_id;
+        if (!kid)
+            continue;
+        if (pinned[kid])
+            continue;
+        if (revokedLedger[kid])
+            continue; // #14: a tombstoned key never comes back
+        if (advisory.has(kid))
+            continue; // #27: claimed-revoked → no NEW adoption
+        const endorser = k.endorsed_by_key_id;
+        const esig = k.endorsement_sig;
+        const pub = k.public_key;
+        if (endorser && esig && pub && fleetId && pinned[endorser]) {
+            if (verifyCanonical(endorsementPayload(fleetId, kid, pub), esig, fromB64url(pinned[endorser]))) {
+                pinned[kid] = pub;
+                changed = true;
+                // #26: keep the endorsement we just verified, so this box can answer
+                // "why is this key trusted here?" offline — the relay is exactly the
+                // party we would otherwise have to ask.
+                admissions[kid] = {
+                    admitted_by: "chain",
+                    endorsed_by_key_id: endorser,
+                    endorsement_sig: esig,
+                    admitted_at: new Date().toISOString()
+                };
+                admissionsChanged = true;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (changed)
+        identity.pinnedOperatorKeys = pinned;
+    if (admissionsChanged) {
+        identity.operatorKeyAdmissions = admissions;
+        changed = true;
+    }
+    return changed;
+}
+export function verifyBatch(messages, opts) {
+    const operatorKeys = { ...(opts.identity.pinnedOperatorKeys ?? {}) };
+    const out = {};
+    if (Object.keys(operatorKeys).length === 0 || !opts.fleetId) {
+        for (const m of messages)
+            out[String(m.message_id)] = null;
+        return out;
+    }
+    const rosterByAgent = {};
+    for (const r of opts.roster)
+        if (r.agent_id)
+            rosterByAgent[String(r.agent_id)] = r;
+    for (const m of messages) {
+        out[String(m.message_id)] = verifyInbound(m, {
+            selfAgentId: opts.selfAgentId,
+            fleetId: opts.fleetId,
+            operatorKeys,
+            rosterByAgent,
+            seenNonces: opts.seenNonces,
+            now: opts.now
+        });
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+export function parseRequireSignedMode(raw) {
+    const v = String(raw ?? "").trim().toLowerCase();
+    return v === "require" || v === "off" ? v : "warn";
+}
+/** The execution-authority gate. Signed → act iff verified; signed-but-invalid →
+ *  blocked; unsigned → per requireSigned mode (see above). */
+export function shouldAutowake(msg, verification, operatorTrusted, peerEnabled, requireSigned = "warn") {
+    const isOperator = msg.sender_kind === "operator";
+    const signed = Boolean(isOperator ? msg.operator_sig : msg.agent_sig);
+    if (isOperator) {
+        if (signed && verification)
+            return Boolean(verification.verified);
+        return Boolean(operatorTrusted);
+    }
+    if (!peerEnabled)
+        return false;
+    if (requireSigned === "require") {
+        // Fail closed: signed AND verified, nothing less. A null verification
+        // (no pinned keys yet) is exactly the dormant state this mode refuses
+        // to treat as trustworthy.
+        return Boolean(signed && verification && verification.verified);
+    }
+    if (signed && verification)
+        return Boolean(verification.verified);
+    return true;
+}
+/** Sign an outbound peer message so recipients can verify it came from us.
+ *
+ *  v2 (#9) extends coverage to message_type, priority and the attachment ids —
+ *  previously a compromised relay could relabel a message (direct → alert) or
+ *  swap its attachments under a still-valid signature. Compatibility is free in
+ *  both directions: verifiers check the signature over the WHOLE canonical and
+ *  only bind the fields they know, so old verifiers accept v2 envelopes and new
+ *  verifiers enforce the extra bindings only when the envelope declares v>=2. */
+export function buildSignedSendFields(opts) {
+    const seed = new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(opts.identity.seedHex, "hex"));
+    const kid = deriveKeyId(fromB64url(publicKeyB64urlFromSeed(seed)));
+    const canonical = {
+        v: 2,
+        fleet_id: opts.fleetId,
+        sender_agent_id: opts.selfAgentId,
+        key_id: kid,
+        recipient: opts.recipient,
+        conversation_id: opts.conversationId,
+        body_sha256: sha256Hex(opts.bodyText),
+        sent_at: opts.sentAt,
+        nonce: opts.nonce,
+        message_type: opts.messageType,
+        priority: opts.priority,
+        attachments: [...(opts.attachments ?? [])].sort()
+    };
+    return { agent_sig: signCanonical(canonical, seed), key_id: kid, sig_canonical: canonical };
+}
+/** The fail-closed default (#20): when verification cannot run — no pinned
+ *  operator keys, no fleet id, no identity — every snapshot is UNVERIFIED.
+ *  Never "it has a signature field, so call it signed". */
+export const NO_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION = () => false;
+/**
+ * Build the snapshot verifier for one turn, from the same trust root the
+ * autowake path uses: this agent's pinned operator keys plus the batch roster.
+ *
+ * Runs the ordinary inbound verifier (`verifyInbound`) over a snapshot mapped
+ * into its `SignedMessage` shape — there is deliberately no second, laxer
+ * verifier for quoted text. Two consequences worth naming:
+ *
+ *  - An older relay that omits `sig_canonical` (or the v2-bound `message_type` /
+ *    `priority` / `attachments`) simply fails the checks, so its snapshots read
+ *    UNVERIFIED. That is the intended direction to fail in.
+ *  - The nonce set is fresh per turn rather than the live seen-nonce set. A
+ *    quote is by definition a re-presentation of a message that may already
+ *    have been delivered and had its nonce burned; the burn exists to stop a
+ *    replayed message WAKING a turn, and a snapshot can never wake one. The
+ *    staleness window is left at the verifier's default, so a snapshot replayed
+ *    from beyond it still reads UNVERIFIED.
+ */
+export function makeSnapshotVerifier(opts) {
+    const operatorKeys = { ...(opts.identity?.pinnedOperatorKeys ?? {}) };
+    const fleetId = opts.fleetId;
+    if (Object.keys(operatorKeys).length === 0 || !fleetId)
+        return NO_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION;
+    const rosterByAgent = {};
+    for (const r of opts.roster ?? [])
+        if (r.agent_id)
+            rosterByAgent[String(r.agent_id)] = r;
+    return (snapshot) => {
+        if (!snapshot || typeof snapshot !== "object")
+            return false;
+        const asMessage = {
+            message_id: snapshot.message_id,
+            sender_kind: snapshot.sender_kind,
+            sender_agent_id: snapshot.sender_agent_id,
+            message_type: snapshot.message_type,
+            priority: snapshot.priority,
+            // `text` -> `body.text`: body_sha256 must bind the snapshot's own text.
+            body: {
+                text: typeof snapshot.text === "string" ? snapshot.text : "",
+                attachments: Array.isArray(snapshot.attachments) ? snapshot.attachments : []
+            },
+            operator_sig: snapshot.operator_sig ?? null,
+            agent_sig: snapshot.agent_sig ?? null,
+            key_id: snapshot.key_id ?? null,
+            sig_canonical: snapshot.sig_canonical ?? null
+        };
+        return verifyInbound(asMessage, {
+            selfAgentId: opts.selfAgentId,
+            fleetId,
+            operatorKeys,
+            rosterByAgent,
+            seenNonces: new Set(),
+            now: opts.now
+        }).verified;
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=verification.js.map

package/dist/esm/identity/verification.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/esm/identity/verify.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+export interface SignedMessage {
+    message_id?: string;
+    sender_kind?: string;
+    sender_agent_id?: string;
+    message_type?: string;
+    priority?: string;
+    body?: {
+        text?: string;
+    } & Record<string, unknown>;
+    operator_sig?: string | null;
+    agent_sig?: string | null;
+    key_id?: string | null;
+    sig_canonical?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+}
+export interface RosterEntryLike {
+    agent_id?: string;
+    identity_public_key?: string | null;
+    key_id?: string | null;
+    endorsed_by_key_id?: string | null;
+    endorsement_sig?: string | null;
+}
+export interface VerifyResult {
+    verified: boolean;
+    kind: "operator" | "peer";
+    reason: string | null;
+    keyId: string | null;
+}
+export interface VerifyOpts {
+    selfAgentId: string;
+    fleetId: string;
+    operatorKeys: Record<string, string>;
+    rosterByAgent: Record<string, RosterEntryLike>;
+    seenNonces: Set<string>;
+    now: Date;
+    maxSkewSeconds?: number;
+    maxFutureSkewSeconds?: number;
+}
+export declare const MAX_PAST_SKEW_SECONDS: number;
+export declare const MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_SECONDS = 300;
+export declare function verifyInbound(msg: SignedMessage, opts: VerifyOpts): VerifyResult;
+//# sourceMappingURL=verify.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/identity/verify.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"verify.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/identity/verify.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAOA,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;QAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACnD,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC7B,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC1B,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACvB,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CAChD;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACpC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACvB,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACnC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CACjC;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,YAAY;IAC3B,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAClB,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IACtB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CACtB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;IACzB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACrC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;IAC/C,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACxB,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IACV,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACxB,oBAAoB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAC/B;AASD,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,QAAc,CAAC;AACjD,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,MAAM,CAAC;AAE3C,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,YAAY,CA8EhF"}

package/dist/esm/identity/verify.js

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+// Inbound message verification — the agent independently decides whether to trust
+// a message, rather than trusting the relay's attribution. Mirrors the Python
+// plugin's ekho.verify byte-for-byte (operator key pinned; peer key must be
+// operator-endorsed). Same 7 binding checks.
+import { agentKeyEndorsementPayload, fromB64url, sha256Hex, verifyCanonical } from "./primitives.js";
+// The past-window must cover the relay's max message TTL (86400s) plus delivery
+// slack: the relay legitimately holds a message for its whole TTL while the
+// recipient is down (gateway restart, sleeping laptop), and 300s of "staleness"
+// was silently discarding every signed peer message delivered 5-15+ min late —
+// acked but never waking the recipient. Replay is defended by the nonce burn
+// and the relay's server-side replay_nonces, not by this window. The
+// future-window stays tight: a sent_at ahead of our clock is only clock skew.
+export const MAX_PAST_SKEW_SECONDS = 86400 + 300;
+export const MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_SECONDS = 300;
+export function verifyInbound(msg, opts) {
+    const isOperator = msg.sender_kind === "operator";
+    const kind = isOperator ? "operator" : "peer";
+    const keyIdOf = msg.key_id ?? null;
+    const fail = (reason) => ({ verified: false, kind, reason, keyId: keyIdOf });
+    const canonical = msg.sig_canonical;
+    const sig = isOperator ? msg.operator_sig : msg.agent_sig;
+    if (!sig || !canonical || !msg.key_id)
+        return fail("unsigned");
+    // 1. Resolve the signer's public key (peers must be operator-rooted).
+    let signerPub;
+    if (isOperator) {
+        const pub = opts.operatorKeys[msg.key_id];
+        if (!pub)
+            return fail("unknown-operator-key");
+        signerPub = pub;
+    }
+    else {
+        const entry = opts.rosterByAgent[msg.sender_agent_id ?? ""];
+        if (!entry || !entry.identity_public_key || entry.key_id !== msg.key_id) {
+            return fail("unknown-sender-key");
+        }
+        if (!entry.endorsed_by_key_id || !entry.endorsement_sig)
+            return fail("sender-key-unendorsed");
+        const endorserPub = opts.operatorKeys[entry.endorsed_by_key_id];
+        if (!endorserPub)
+            return fail("endorser-not-pinned");
+        const endorsement = agentKeyEndorsementPayload(opts.fleetId, msg.sender_agent_id ?? "", entry.key_id ?? "", entry.identity_public_key);
+        if (!verifyCanonical(endorsement, entry.endorsement_sig, fromB64url(endorserPub))) {
+            return fail("bad-endorsement");
+        }
+        signerPub = entry.identity_public_key;
+    }
+    // 2. The signature itself must verify over the canonical payload.
+    if (!verifyCanonical(canonical, sig, fromB64url(signerPub)))
+        return fail("bad-signature");
+    // 3-7. Bind the signed payload to THIS message.
+    const c = canonical;
+    if (c.key_id !== msg.key_id)
+        return fail("key-id-mismatch");
+    if (c.fleet_id !== opts.fleetId)
+        return fail("fleet-mismatch");
+    if (!isOperator && c.sender_agent_id !== msg.sender_agent_id)
+        return fail("sender-mismatch");
+    const recipient = (c.recipient ?? {});
+    if (recipient.kind === "agent" && recipient.id !== opts.selfAgentId)
+        return fail("recipient-mismatch");
+    const text = typeof msg.body?.text === "string" ? msg.body.text : "";
+    if (c.body_sha256 !== sha256Hex(text))
+        return fail("body-mismatch");
+    // v2 envelopes (#9) additionally bind type, priority and attachments — a
+    // relay relabelling a message or swapping its attachments breaks the binding.
+    // v1 envelopes (older signers) skip these checks during the transition.
+    if (Number(c.v ?? 1) >= 2) {
+        if (c.message_type !== (msg.message_type ?? ""))
+            return fail("type-mismatch");
+        if (c.priority !== (msg.priority ?? ""))
+            return fail("priority-mismatch");
+        const declared = Array.isArray(c.attachments) ? c.attachments.map(String).sort() : [];
+        const actual = Array.isArray(msg.body?.attachments) ? msg.body.attachments.map(String).sort() : [];
+        if (declared.length !== actual.length || declared.some((a, i) => a !== actual[i])) {
+            return fail("attachments-mismatch");
+        }
+    }
+    const sentAt = Date.parse(String(c.sent_at));
+    if (Number.isNaN(sentAt))
+        return fail("bad-timestamp");
+    const ageMs = opts.now.getTime() - sentAt;
+    if (ageMs > (opts.maxSkewSeconds ?? MAX_PAST_SKEW_SECONDS) * 1000 ||
+        -ageMs > (opts.maxFutureSkewSeconds ?? MAX_FUTURE_SKEW_SECONDS) * 1000) {
+        return fail("stale");
+    }
+    const nonce = c.nonce;
+    if (!nonce || opts.seenNonces.has(String(nonce)))
+        return fail("replay");
+    return { verified: true, kind, reason: null, keyId: msg.key_id };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=verify.js.map