@dotenvx/next-env 1.74.3 → 2.0.1

package/node_modules/@noble/ciphers/src/aes.ts

@@ -1,1016 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard)
- * a.k.a. Advanced Encryption Standard
- * is a variant of Rijndael block cipher, standardized by NIST in 2001.
- * We provide the fastest available pure JS implementation.
- *
- * Data is split into 128-bit blocks. Encrypted in 10/12/14 rounds (128/192/256 bits). In every round:
- * 1. **S-box**, table substitution
- * 2. **Shift rows**, cyclic shift left of all rows of data array
- * 3. **Mix columns**, multiplying every column by fixed polynomial
- * 4. **Add round key**, round_key xor i-th column of array
- *
- * Check out [FIPS-197](https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/fips/197/final/docs/fips-197.pdf)
- * and [original proposal](https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-standards-and-guidelines/documents/aes-development/rijndael-ammended.pdf)
- * @module
- */
-import { ghash, polyval } from './_polyval.ts';
-// prettier-ignore
-import {
-  abytes, clean, complexOverlapBytes, concatBytes,
-  copyBytes, createView, equalBytes, getOutput, isAligned32, overlapBytes,
-  setBigUint64, u32, u64Lengths, u8, wrapCipher,
-  type Cipher, type CipherWithOutput,
-} from './utils.ts';
-
-const BLOCK_SIZE = 16;
-const BLOCK_SIZE32 = 4;
-const EMPTY_BLOCK = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(BLOCK_SIZE);
-const POLY = 0x11b; // 1 + x + x**3 + x**4 + x**8
-
-// TODO: remove multiplication, binary ops only
-function mul2(n: number) {
-  return (n << 1) ^ (POLY & -(n >> 7));
-}
-
-function mul(a: number, b: number) {
-  let res = 0;
-  for (; b > 0; b >>= 1) {
-    // Montgomery ladder
-    res ^= a & -(b & 1); // if (b&1) res ^=a (but const-time).
-    a = mul2(a); // a = 2*a
-  }
-  return res;
-}
-
-// AES S-box is generated using finite field inversion,
-// an affine transform, and xor of a constant 0x63.
-const sbox = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => {
-  const t = new Uint8Array(256);
-  for (let i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++, x ^= mul2(x)) t[i] = x;
-  const box = new Uint8Array(256);
-  box[0] = 0x63; // first elm
-  for (let i = 0; i < 255; i++) {
-    let x = t[255 - i];
-    x |= x << 8;
-    box[t[i]] = (x ^ (x >> 4) ^ (x >> 5) ^ (x >> 6) ^ (x >> 7) ^ 0x63) & 0xff;
-  }
-  clean(t);
-  return box;
-})();
-
-// Inverted S-box
-const invSbox = /* @__PURE__ */ sbox.map((_, j) => sbox.indexOf(j));
-
-// Rotate u32 by 8
-const rotr32_8 = (n: number) => (n << 24) | (n >>> 8);
-const rotl32_8 = (n: number) => (n << 8) | (n >>> 24);
-// The byte swap operation for uint32 (LE<->BE)
-const byteSwap = (word: number) =>
-  ((word << 24) & 0xff000000) |
-  ((word << 8) & 0xff0000) |
-  ((word >>> 8) & 0xff00) |
-  ((word >>> 24) & 0xff);
-
-// T-table is optimization suggested in 5.2 of original proposal (missed from FIPS-197). Changes:
-// - LE instead of BE
-// - bigger tables: T0 and T1 are merged into T01 table and T2 & T3 into T23;
-//   so index is u16, instead of u8. This speeds up things, unexpectedly
-function genTtable(sbox: Uint8Array, fn: (n: number) => number) {
-  if (sbox.length !== 256) throw new Error('Wrong sbox length');
-  const T0 = new Uint32Array(256).map((_, j) => fn(sbox[j]));
-  const T1 = T0.map(rotl32_8);
-  const T2 = T1.map(rotl32_8);
-  const T3 = T2.map(rotl32_8);
-  const T01 = new Uint32Array(256 * 256);
-  const T23 = new Uint32Array(256 * 256);
-  const sbox2 = new Uint16Array(256 * 256);
-  for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
-    for (let j = 0; j < 256; j++) {
-      const idx = i * 256 + j;
-      T01[idx] = T0[i] ^ T1[j];
-      T23[idx] = T2[i] ^ T3[j];
-      sbox2[idx] = (sbox[i] << 8) | sbox[j];
-    }
-  }
-  return { sbox, sbox2, T0, T1, T2, T3, T01, T23 };
-}
-
-const tableEncoding = /* @__PURE__ */ genTtable(
-  sbox,
-  (s: number) => (mul(s, 3) << 24) | (s << 16) | (s << 8) | mul(s, 2)
-);
-const tableDecoding = /* @__PURE__ */ genTtable(
-  invSbox,
-  (s) => (mul(s, 11) << 24) | (mul(s, 13) << 16) | (mul(s, 9) << 8) | mul(s, 14)
-);
-
-const xPowers = /* @__PURE__ */ (() => {
-  const p = new Uint8Array(16);
-  for (let i = 0, x = 1; i < 16; i++, x = mul2(x)) p[i] = x;
-  return p;
-})();
-
-/** Key expansion used in CTR. */
-function expandKeyLE(key: Uint8Array): Uint32Array {
-  abytes(key);
-  const len = key.length;
-  if (![16, 24, 32].includes(len))
-    throw new Error('aes: invalid key size, should be 16, 24 or 32, got ' + len);
-  const { sbox2 } = tableEncoding;
-  const toClean = [];
-  if (!isAligned32(key)) toClean.push((key = copyBytes(key)));
-  const k32 = u32(key);
-  const Nk = k32.length;
-  const subByte = (n: number) => applySbox(sbox2, n, n, n, n);
-  const xk = new Uint32Array(len + 28); // expanded key
-  xk.set(k32);
-  // 4.3.1 Key expansion
-  for (let i = Nk; i < xk.length; i++) {
-    let t = xk[i - 1];
-    if (i % Nk === 0) t = subByte(rotr32_8(t)) ^ xPowers[i / Nk - 1];
-    else if (Nk > 6 && i % Nk === 4) t = subByte(t);
-    xk[i] = xk[i - Nk] ^ t;
-  }
-  clean(...toClean);
-  return xk;
-}
-
-function expandKeyDecLE(key: Uint8Array): Uint32Array {
-  const encKey = expandKeyLE(key);
-  const xk = encKey.slice();
-  const Nk = encKey.length;
-  const { sbox2 } = tableEncoding;
-  const { T0, T1, T2, T3 } = tableDecoding;
-  // Inverse key by chunks of 4 (rounds)
-  for (let i = 0; i < Nk; i += 4) {
-    for (let j = 0; j < 4; j++) xk[i + j] = encKey[Nk - i - 4 + j];
-  }
-  clean(encKey);
-  // apply InvMixColumn except first & last round
-  for (let i = 4; i < Nk - 4; i++) {
-    const x = xk[i];
-    const w = applySbox(sbox2, x, x, x, x);
-    xk[i] = T0[w & 0xff] ^ T1[(w >>> 8) & 0xff] ^ T2[(w >>> 16) & 0xff] ^ T3[w >>> 24];
-  }
-  return xk;
-}
-
-// Apply tables
-function apply0123(
-  T01: Uint32Array,
-  T23: Uint32Array,
-  s0: number,
-  s1: number,
-  s2: number,
-  s3: number
-) {
-  return (
-    T01[((s0 << 8) & 0xff00) | ((s1 >>> 8) & 0xff)] ^
-    T23[((s2 >>> 8) & 0xff00) | ((s3 >>> 24) & 0xff)]
-  );
-}
-
-function applySbox(sbox2: Uint16Array, s0: number, s1: number, s2: number, s3: number) {
-  return (
-    sbox2[(s0 & 0xff) | (s1 & 0xff00)] |
-    (sbox2[((s2 >>> 16) & 0xff) | ((s3 >>> 16) & 0xff00)] << 16)
-  );
-}
-
-function encrypt(
-  xk: Uint32Array,
-  s0: number,
-  s1: number,
-  s2: number,
-  s3: number
-): { s0: number; s1: number; s2: number; s3: number } {
-  const { sbox2, T01, T23 } = tableEncoding;
-  let k = 0;
-  (s0 ^= xk[k++]), (s1 ^= xk[k++]), (s2 ^= xk[k++]), (s3 ^= xk[k++]);
-  const rounds = xk.length / 4 - 2;
-  for (let i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
-    const t0 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s0, s1, s2, s3);
-    const t1 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s1, s2, s3, s0);
-    const t2 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s2, s3, s0, s1);
-    const t3 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s3, s0, s1, s2);
-    (s0 = t0), (s1 = t1), (s2 = t2), (s3 = t3);
-  }
-  // last round (without mixcolumns, so using SBOX2 table)
-  const t0 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s0, s1, s2, s3);
-  const t1 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s1, s2, s3, s0);
-  const t2 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s2, s3, s0, s1);
-  const t3 = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s3, s0, s1, s2);
-  return { s0: t0, s1: t1, s2: t2, s3: t3 };
-}
-
-// Can't be merged with encrypt: arg positions for apply0123 / applySbox are different
-function decrypt(
-  xk: Uint32Array,
-  s0: number,
-  s1: number,
-  s2: number,
-  s3: number
-): {
-  s0: number;
-  s1: number;
-  s2: number;
-  s3: number;
-} {
-  const { sbox2, T01, T23 } = tableDecoding;
-  let k = 0;
-  (s0 ^= xk[k++]), (s1 ^= xk[k++]), (s2 ^= xk[k++]), (s3 ^= xk[k++]);
-  const rounds = xk.length / 4 - 2;
-  for (let i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
-    const t0 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s0, s3, s2, s1);
-    const t1 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s1, s0, s3, s2);
-    const t2 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s2, s1, s0, s3);
-    const t3 = xk[k++] ^ apply0123(T01, T23, s3, s2, s1, s0);
-    (s0 = t0), (s1 = t1), (s2 = t2), (s3 = t3);
-  }
-  // Last round
-  const t0: number = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s0, s3, s2, s1);
-  const t1: number = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s1, s0, s3, s2);
-  const t2: number = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s2, s1, s0, s3);
-  const t3: number = xk[k++] ^ applySbox(sbox2, s3, s2, s1, s0);
-  return { s0: t0, s1: t1, s2: t2, s3: t3 };
-}
-
-// TODO: investigate merging with ctr32
-function ctrCounter(
-  xk: Uint32Array,
-  nonce: Uint8Array,
-  src: Uint8Array,
-  dst?: Uint8Array
-): Uint8Array {
-  abytes(nonce, BLOCK_SIZE);
-  abytes(src);
-  const srcLen = src.length;
-  dst = getOutput(srcLen, dst);
-  complexOverlapBytes(src, dst);
-  const ctr = nonce;
-  const c32 = u32(ctr);
-  // Fill block (empty, ctr=0)
-  let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]);
-  const src32 = u32(src);
-  const dst32 = u32(dst);
-  // process blocks
-  for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= src32.length; i += 4) {
-    dst32[i + 0] = src32[i + 0] ^ s0;
-    dst32[i + 1] = src32[i + 1] ^ s1;
-    dst32[i + 2] = src32[i + 2] ^ s2;
-    dst32[i + 3] = src32[i + 3] ^ s3;
-    // Full 128 bit counter with wrap around
-    let carry = 1;
-    for (let i = ctr.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-      carry = (carry + (ctr[i] & 0xff)) | 0;
-      ctr[i] = carry & 0xff;
-      carry >>>= 8;
-    }
-    ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]));
-  }
-  // leftovers (less than block)
-  // It's possible to handle > u32 fast, but is it worth it?
-  const start = BLOCK_SIZE * Math.floor(src32.length / BLOCK_SIZE32);
-  if (start < srcLen) {
-    const b32 = new Uint32Array([s0, s1, s2, s3]);
-    const buf = u8(b32);
-    for (let i = start, pos = 0; i < srcLen; i++, pos++) dst[i] = src[i] ^ buf[pos];
-    clean(b32);
-  }
-  return dst;
-}
-
-// AES CTR with overflowing 32 bit counter
-// It's possible to do 32le significantly simpler (and probably faster) by using u32.
-// But, we need both, and perf bottleneck is in ghash anyway.
-function ctr32(
-  xk: Uint32Array,
-  isLE: boolean,
-  nonce: Uint8Array,
-  src: Uint8Array,
-  dst?: Uint8Array
-): Uint8Array {
-  abytes(nonce, BLOCK_SIZE);
-  abytes(src);
-  dst = getOutput(src.length, dst);
-  const ctr = nonce; // write new value to nonce, so it can be re-used
-  const c32 = u32(ctr);
-  const view = createView(ctr);
-  const src32 = u32(src);
-  const dst32 = u32(dst);
-  const ctrPos = isLE ? 0 : 12;
-  const srcLen = src.length;
-  // Fill block (empty, ctr=0)
-  let ctrNum = view.getUint32(ctrPos, isLE); // read current counter value
-  let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]);
-  // process blocks
-  for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= src32.length; i += 4) {
-    dst32[i + 0] = src32[i + 0] ^ s0;
-    dst32[i + 1] = src32[i + 1] ^ s1;
-    dst32[i + 2] = src32[i + 2] ^ s2;
-    dst32[i + 3] = src32[i + 3] ^ s3;
-    ctrNum = (ctrNum + 1) >>> 0; // u32 wrap
-    view.setUint32(ctrPos, ctrNum, isLE);
-    ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, c32[0], c32[1], c32[2], c32[3]));
-  }
-  // leftovers (less than a block)
-  const start = BLOCK_SIZE * Math.floor(src32.length / BLOCK_SIZE32);
-  if (start < srcLen) {
-    const b32 = new Uint32Array([s0, s1, s2, s3]);
-    const buf = u8(b32);
-    for (let i = start, pos = 0; i < srcLen; i++, pos++) dst[i] = src[i] ^ buf[pos];
-    clean(b32);
-  }
-  return dst;
-}
-
-/**
- * CTR: counter mode. Creates stream cipher.
- * Requires good IV. Parallelizable. OK, but no MAC.
- */
-export const ctr: ((key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array) => CipherWithOutput) & {
-  blockSize: number;
-  nonceLength: number;
-} = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher(
-  { blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 16 },
-  function aesctr(key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array): CipherWithOutput {
-    function processCtr(buf: Uint8Array, dst?: Uint8Array) {
-      abytes(buf);
-      if (dst !== undefined) {
-        abytes(dst);
-        if (!isAligned32(dst)) throw new Error('unaligned destination');
-      }
-      const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
-      const n = copyBytes(nonce); // align + avoid changing
-      const toClean = [xk, n];
-      if (!isAligned32(buf)) toClean.push((buf = copyBytes(buf)));
-      const out = ctrCounter(xk, n, buf, dst);
-      clean(...toClean);
-      return out;
-    }
-    return {
-      encrypt: (plaintext: Uint8Array, dst?: Uint8Array) => processCtr(plaintext, dst),
-      decrypt: (ciphertext: Uint8Array, dst?: Uint8Array) => processCtr(ciphertext, dst),
-    };
-  }
-);
-
-function validateBlockDecrypt(data: Uint8Array) {
-  abytes(data);
-  if (data.length % BLOCK_SIZE !== 0) {
-    throw new Error(
-      'aes-(cbc/ecb).decrypt ciphertext should consist of blocks with size ' + BLOCK_SIZE
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-function validateBlockEncrypt(plaintext: Uint8Array, pcks5: boolean, dst?: Uint8Array) {
-  abytes(plaintext);
-  let outLen = plaintext.length;
-  const remaining = outLen % BLOCK_SIZE;
-  if (!pcks5 && remaining !== 0)
-    throw new Error('aec/(cbc-ecb): unpadded plaintext with disabled padding');
-  if (!isAligned32(plaintext)) plaintext = copyBytes(plaintext);
-  const b = u32(plaintext);
-  if (pcks5) {
-    let left = BLOCK_SIZE - remaining;
-    if (!left) left = BLOCK_SIZE; // if no bytes left, create empty padding block
-    outLen = outLen + left;
-  }
-  dst = getOutput(outLen, dst);
-  complexOverlapBytes(plaintext, dst);
-  const o = u32(dst);
-  return { b, o, out: dst };
-}
-
-function validatePCKS(data: Uint8Array, pcks5: boolean) {
-  if (!pcks5) return data;
-  const len = data.length;
-  if (!len) throw new Error('aes/pcks5: empty ciphertext not allowed');
-  const lastByte = data[len - 1];
-  if (lastByte <= 0 || lastByte > 16) throw new Error('aes/pcks5: wrong padding');
-  const out = data.subarray(0, -lastByte);
-  for (let i = 0; i < lastByte; i++)
-    if (data[len - i - 1] !== lastByte) throw new Error('aes/pcks5: wrong padding');
-  return out;
-}
-
-function padPCKS(left: Uint8Array) {
-  const tmp = new Uint8Array(16);
-  const tmp32 = u32(tmp);
-  tmp.set(left);
-  const paddingByte = BLOCK_SIZE - left.length;
-  for (let i = BLOCK_SIZE - paddingByte; i < BLOCK_SIZE; i++) tmp[i] = paddingByte;
-  return tmp32;
-}
-
-/** Options for ECB and CBC. */
-export type BlockOpts = { disablePadding?: boolean };
-
-/**
- * ECB: Electronic CodeBook. Simple deterministic replacement.
- * Dangerous: always map x to y. See [AES Penguin](https://words.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/).
- */
-export const ecb: ((key: Uint8Array, opts?: BlockOpts) => CipherWithOutput) & {
-  blockSize: number;
-} = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher(
-  { blockSize: 16 },
-  function aesecb(key: Uint8Array, opts: BlockOpts = {}): CipherWithOutput {
-    const pcks5 = !opts.disablePadding;
-    return {
-      encrypt(plaintext: Uint8Array, dst?: Uint8Array) {
-        const { b, o, out: _out } = validateBlockEncrypt(plaintext, pcks5, dst);
-        const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
-        let i = 0;
-        for (; i + 4 <= b.length; ) {
-          const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, b[i + 0], b[i + 1], b[i + 2], b[i + 3]);
-          (o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
-        }
-        if (pcks5) {
-          const tmp32 = padPCKS(plaintext.subarray(i * 4));
-          const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, tmp32[0], tmp32[1], tmp32[2], tmp32[3]);
-          (o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
-        }
-        clean(xk);
-        return _out;
-      },
-      decrypt(ciphertext: Uint8Array, dst?: Uint8Array) {
-        validateBlockDecrypt(ciphertext);
-        const xk = expandKeyDecLE(key);
-        dst = getOutput(ciphertext.length, dst);
-        const toClean: (Uint8Array | Uint32Array)[] = [xk];
-        if (!isAligned32(ciphertext)) toClean.push((ciphertext = copyBytes(ciphertext)));
-        complexOverlapBytes(ciphertext, dst);
-        const b = u32(ciphertext);
-        const o = u32(dst);
-        for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= b.length; ) {
-          const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = decrypt(xk, b[i + 0], b[i + 1], b[i + 2], b[i + 3]);
-          (o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
-        }
-        clean(...toClean);
-        return validatePCKS(dst, pcks5);
-      },
-    };
-  }
-);
-
-/**
- * CBC: Cipher-Block-Chaining. Key is previous round’s block.
- * Fragile: needs proper padding. Unauthenticated: needs MAC.
- */
-export const cbc: ((key: Uint8Array, iv: Uint8Array, opts?: BlockOpts) => CipherWithOutput) & {
-  blockSize: number;
-  nonceLength: number;
-} = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher(
-  { blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 16 },
-  function aescbc(key: Uint8Array, iv: Uint8Array, opts: BlockOpts = {}): CipherWithOutput {
-    const pcks5 = !opts.disablePadding;
-    return {
-      encrypt(plaintext: Uint8Array, dst?: Uint8Array) {
-        const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
-        const { b, o, out: _out } = validateBlockEncrypt(plaintext, pcks5, dst);
-        let _iv = iv;
-        const toClean: (Uint8Array | Uint32Array)[] = [xk];
-        if (!isAligned32(_iv)) toClean.push((_iv = copyBytes(_iv)));
-        const n32 = u32(_iv);
-        // prettier-ignore
-        let s0 = n32[0], s1 = n32[1], s2 = n32[2], s3 = n32[3];
-        let i = 0;
-        for (; i + 4 <= b.length; ) {
-          (s0 ^= b[i + 0]), (s1 ^= b[i + 1]), (s2 ^= b[i + 2]), (s3 ^= b[i + 3]);
-          ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3));
-          (o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
-        }
-        if (pcks5) {
-          const tmp32 = padPCKS(plaintext.subarray(i * 4));
-          (s0 ^= tmp32[0]), (s1 ^= tmp32[1]), (s2 ^= tmp32[2]), (s3 ^= tmp32[3]);
-          ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3));
-          (o[i++] = s0), (o[i++] = s1), (o[i++] = s2), (o[i++] = s3);
-        }
-        clean(...toClean);
-        return _out;
-      },
-      decrypt(ciphertext: Uint8Array, dst?: Uint8Array) {
-        validateBlockDecrypt(ciphertext);
-        const xk = expandKeyDecLE(key);
-        let _iv = iv;
-        const toClean: (Uint8Array | Uint32Array)[] = [xk];
-        if (!isAligned32(_iv)) toClean.push((_iv = copyBytes(_iv)));
-        const n32 = u32(_iv);
-        dst = getOutput(ciphertext.length, dst);
-        if (!isAligned32(ciphertext)) toClean.push((ciphertext = copyBytes(ciphertext)));
-        complexOverlapBytes(ciphertext, dst);
-        const b = u32(ciphertext);
-        const o = u32(dst);
-        // prettier-ignore
-        let s0 = n32[0], s1 = n32[1], s2 = n32[2], s3 = n32[3];
-        for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= b.length; ) {
-          // prettier-ignore
-          const ps0 = s0, ps1 = s1, ps2 = s2, ps3 = s3;
-          (s0 = b[i + 0]), (s1 = b[i + 1]), (s2 = b[i + 2]), (s3 = b[i + 3]);
-          const { s0: o0, s1: o1, s2: o2, s3: o3 } = decrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3);
-          (o[i++] = o0 ^ ps0), (o[i++] = o1 ^ ps1), (o[i++] = o2 ^ ps2), (o[i++] = o3 ^ ps3);
-        }
-        clean(...toClean);
-        return validatePCKS(dst, pcks5);
-      },
-    };
-  }
-);
-
-/**
- * CFB: Cipher Feedback Mode. The input for the block cipher is the previous cipher output.
- * Unauthenticated: needs MAC.
- */
-export const cfb: ((key: Uint8Array, iv: Uint8Array) => CipherWithOutput) & {
-  blockSize: number;
-  nonceLength: number;
-} = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher(
-  { blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 16 },
-  function aescfb(key: Uint8Array, iv: Uint8Array): CipherWithOutput {
-    function processCfb(src: Uint8Array, isEncrypt: boolean, dst?: Uint8Array) {
-      abytes(src);
-      const srcLen = src.length;
-      dst = getOutput(srcLen, dst);
-      if (overlapBytes(src, dst)) throw new Error('overlapping src and dst not supported.');
-      const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
-      let _iv = iv;
-      const toClean: (Uint8Array | Uint32Array)[] = [xk];
-      if (!isAligned32(_iv)) toClean.push((_iv = copyBytes(_iv)));
-      if (!isAligned32(src)) toClean.push((src = copyBytes(src)));
-      const src32 = u32(src);
-      const dst32 = u32(dst);
-      const next32 = isEncrypt ? dst32 : src32;
-      const n32 = u32(_iv);
-      // prettier-ignore
-      let s0 = n32[0], s1 = n32[1], s2 = n32[2], s3 = n32[3];
-      for (let i = 0; i + 4 <= src32.length; ) {
-        const { s0: e0, s1: e1, s2: e2, s3: e3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3);
-        dst32[i + 0] = src32[i + 0] ^ e0;
-        dst32[i + 1] = src32[i + 1] ^ e1;
-        dst32[i + 2] = src32[i + 2] ^ e2;
-        dst32[i + 3] = src32[i + 3] ^ e3;
-        (s0 = next32[i++]), (s1 = next32[i++]), (s2 = next32[i++]), (s3 = next32[i++]);
-      }
-      // leftovers (less than block)
-      const start = BLOCK_SIZE * Math.floor(src32.length / BLOCK_SIZE32);
-      if (start < srcLen) {
-        ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3));
-        const buf = u8(new Uint32Array([s0, s1, s2, s3]));
-        for (let i = start, pos = 0; i < srcLen; i++, pos++) dst[i] = src[i] ^ buf[pos];
-        clean(buf);
-      }
-      clean(...toClean);
-      return dst;
-    }
-    return {
-      encrypt: (plaintext: Uint8Array, dst?: Uint8Array) => processCfb(plaintext, true, dst),
-      decrypt: (ciphertext: Uint8Array, dst?: Uint8Array) => processCfb(ciphertext, false, dst),
-    };
-  }
-);
-
-// TODO: merge with chacha, however gcm has bitLen while chacha has byteLen
-function computeTag(
-  fn: typeof ghash,
-  isLE: boolean,
-  key: Uint8Array,
-  data: Uint8Array,
-  AAD?: Uint8Array
-) {
-  const aadLength = AAD ? AAD.length : 0;
-  const h = fn.create(key, data.length + aadLength);
-  if (AAD) h.update(AAD);
-  const num = u64Lengths(8 * data.length, 8 * aadLength, isLE);
-  h.update(data);
-  h.update(num);
-  const res = h.digest();
-  clean(num);
-  return res;
-}
-
-/**
- * GCM: Galois/Counter Mode.
- * Modern, parallel version of CTR, with MAC.
- * Be careful: MACs can be forged.
- * Unsafe to use random nonces under the same key, due to collision chance.
- * As for nonce size, prefer 12-byte, instead of 8-byte.
- */
-export const gcm: ((key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, AAD?: Uint8Array) => Cipher) & {
-  blockSize: number;
-  nonceLength: number;
-  tagLength: number;
-  varSizeNonce: true;
-} = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher(
-  { blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 12, tagLength: 16, varSizeNonce: true },
-  function aesgcm(key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, AAD?: Uint8Array): Cipher {
-    // NIST 800-38d doesn't enforce minimum nonce length.
-    // We enforce 8 bytes for compat with openssl.
-    // 12 bytes are recommended. More than 12 bytes would be converted into 12.
-    if (nonce.length < 8) throw new Error('aes/gcm: invalid nonce length');
-    const tagLength = 16;
-    function _computeTag(authKey: Uint8Array, tagMask: Uint8Array, data: Uint8Array) {
-      const tag = computeTag(ghash, false, authKey, data, AAD);
-      for (let i = 0; i < tagMask.length; i++) tag[i] ^= tagMask[i];
-      return tag;
-    }
-    function deriveKeys() {
-      const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
-      const authKey = EMPTY_BLOCK.slice();
-      const counter = EMPTY_BLOCK.slice();
-      ctr32(xk, false, counter, counter, authKey);
-      // NIST 800-38d, page 15: different behavior for 96-bit and non-96-bit nonces
-      if (nonce.length === 12) {
-        counter.set(nonce);
-      } else {
-        const nonceLen = EMPTY_BLOCK.slice();
-        const view = createView(nonceLen);
-        setBigUint64(view, 8, BigInt(nonce.length * 8), false);
-        // ghash(nonce || u64be(0) || u64be(nonceLen*8))
-        const g = ghash.create(authKey).update(nonce).update(nonceLen);
-        g.digestInto(counter); // digestInto doesn't trigger '.destroy'
-        g.destroy();
-      }
-      const tagMask = ctr32(xk, false, counter, EMPTY_BLOCK);
-      return { xk, authKey, counter, tagMask };
-    }
-    return {
-      encrypt(plaintext: Uint8Array) {
-        const { xk, authKey, counter, tagMask } = deriveKeys();
-        const out = new Uint8Array(plaintext.length + tagLength);
-        const toClean: (Uint8Array | Uint32Array)[] = [xk, authKey, counter, tagMask];
-        if (!isAligned32(plaintext)) toClean.push((plaintext = copyBytes(plaintext)));
-        ctr32(xk, false, counter, plaintext, out.subarray(0, plaintext.length));
-        const tag = _computeTag(authKey, tagMask, out.subarray(0, out.length - tagLength));
-        toClean.push(tag);
-        out.set(tag, plaintext.length);
-        clean(...toClean);
-        return out;
-      },
-      decrypt(ciphertext: Uint8Array) {
-        const { xk, authKey, counter, tagMask } = deriveKeys();
-        const toClean: (Uint8Array | Uint32Array)[] = [xk, authKey, tagMask, counter];
-        if (!isAligned32(ciphertext)) toClean.push((ciphertext = copyBytes(ciphertext)));
-        const data = ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength);
-        const passedTag = ciphertext.subarray(-tagLength);
-        const tag = _computeTag(authKey, tagMask, data);
-        toClean.push(tag);
-        if (!equalBytes(tag, passedTag)) throw new Error('aes/gcm: invalid ghash tag');
-        const out = ctr32(xk, false, counter, data);
-        clean(...toClean);
-        return out;
-      },
-    };
-  }
-);
-
-const limit = (name: string, min: number, max: number) => (value: number) => {
-  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(value) || min > value || value > max) {
-    const minmax = '[' + min + '..' + max + ']';
-    throw new Error('' + name + ': expected value in range ' + minmax + ', got ' + value);
-  }
-};
-
-/**
- * AES-GCM-SIV: classic AES-GCM with nonce-misuse resistance.
- * Guarantees that, when a nonce is repeated, the only security loss is that identical
- * plaintexts will produce identical ciphertexts.
- * RFC 8452, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8452
- */
-export const gcmsiv: ((key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, AAD?: Uint8Array) => Cipher) & {
-  blockSize: number;
-  nonceLength: number;
-  tagLength: number;
-  varSizeNonce: true;
-} = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher(
-  { blockSize: 16, nonceLength: 12, tagLength: 16, varSizeNonce: true },
-  function aessiv(key: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, AAD?: Uint8Array): Cipher {
-    const tagLength = 16;
-    // From RFC 8452: Section 6
-    const AAD_LIMIT = limit('AAD', 0, 2 ** 36);
-    const PLAIN_LIMIT = limit('plaintext', 0, 2 ** 36);
-    const NONCE_LIMIT = limit('nonce', 12, 12);
-    const CIPHER_LIMIT = limit('ciphertext', 16, 2 ** 36 + 16);
-    abytes(key, 16, 24, 32);
-    NONCE_LIMIT(nonce.length);
-    if (AAD !== undefined) AAD_LIMIT(AAD.length);
-    function deriveKeys() {
-      const xk = expandKeyLE(key);
-      const encKey = new Uint8Array(key.length);
-      const authKey = new Uint8Array(16);
-      const toClean: (Uint8Array | Uint32Array)[] = [xk, encKey];
-      let _nonce = nonce;
-      if (!isAligned32(_nonce)) toClean.push((_nonce = copyBytes(_nonce)));
-      const n32 = u32(_nonce);
-      // prettier-ignore
-      let s0 = 0, s1 = n32[0], s2 = n32[1], s3 = n32[2];
-      let counter = 0;
-      for (const derivedKey of [authKey, encKey].map(u32)) {
-        const d32 = u32(derivedKey);
-        for (let i = 0; i < d32.length; i += 2) {
-          // aes(u32le(0) || nonce)[:8] || aes(u32le(1) || nonce)[:8] ...
-          const { s0: o0, s1: o1 } = encrypt(xk, s0, s1, s2, s3);
-          d32[i + 0] = o0;
-          d32[i + 1] = o1;
-          s0 = ++counter; // increment counter inside state
-        }
-      }
-      const res = { authKey, encKey: expandKeyLE(encKey) };
-      // Cleanup
-      clean(...toClean);
-      return res;
-    }
-    function _computeTag(encKey: Uint32Array, authKey: Uint8Array, data: Uint8Array) {
-      const tag = computeTag(polyval, true, authKey, data, AAD);
-      // Compute the expected tag by XORing S_s and the nonce, clearing the
-      // most significant bit of the last byte and encrypting with the
-      // message-encryption key.
-      for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++) tag[i] ^= nonce[i];
-      tag[15] &= 0x7f; // Clear the highest bit
-      // encrypt tag as block
-      const t32 = u32(tag);
-      // prettier-ignore
-      let s0 = t32[0], s1 = t32[1], s2 = t32[2], s3 = t32[3];
-      ({ s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(encKey, s0, s1, s2, s3));
-      (t32[0] = s0), (t32[1] = s1), (t32[2] = s2), (t32[3] = s3);
-      return tag;
-    }
-    // actual decrypt/encrypt of message.
-    function processSiv(encKey: Uint32Array, tag: Uint8Array, input: Uint8Array) {
-      let block = copyBytes(tag);
-      block[15] |= 0x80; // Force highest bit
-      const res = ctr32(encKey, true, block, input);
-      // Cleanup
-      clean(block);
-      return res;
-    }
-    return {
-      encrypt(plaintext: Uint8Array) {
-        PLAIN_LIMIT(plaintext.length);
-        const { encKey, authKey } = deriveKeys();
-        const tag = _computeTag(encKey, authKey, plaintext);
-        const toClean: (Uint8Array | Uint32Array)[] = [encKey, authKey, tag];
-        if (!isAligned32(plaintext)) toClean.push((plaintext = copyBytes(plaintext)));
-        const out = new Uint8Array(plaintext.length + tagLength);
-        out.set(tag, plaintext.length);
-        out.set(processSiv(encKey, tag, plaintext));
-        // Cleanup
-        clean(...toClean);
-        return out;
-      },
-      decrypt(ciphertext: Uint8Array) {
-        CIPHER_LIMIT(ciphertext.length);
-        const tag = ciphertext.subarray(-tagLength);
-        const { encKey, authKey } = deriveKeys();
-        const toClean: (Uint8Array | Uint32Array)[] = [encKey, authKey];
-        if (!isAligned32(ciphertext)) toClean.push((ciphertext = copyBytes(ciphertext)));
-        const plaintext = processSiv(encKey, tag, ciphertext.subarray(0, -tagLength));
-        const expectedTag = _computeTag(encKey, authKey, plaintext);
-        toClean.push(expectedTag);
-        if (!equalBytes(tag, expectedTag)) {
-          clean(...toClean);
-          throw new Error('invalid polyval tag');
-        }
-        // Cleanup
-        clean(...toClean);
-        return plaintext;
-      },
-    };
-  }
-);
-
-/**
- * AES-GCM-SIV, not AES-SIV.
- * This is legace name, use `gcmsiv` export instead.
- * @deprecated
- */
-export const siv: typeof gcmsiv = gcmsiv;
-
-function isBytes32(a: unknown): a is Uint32Array {
-  return (
-    a instanceof Uint32Array || (ArrayBuffer.isView(a) && a.constructor.name === 'Uint32Array')
-  );
-}
-
-function encryptBlock(xk: Uint32Array, block: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
-  abytes(block, 16);
-  if (!isBytes32(xk)) throw new Error('_encryptBlock accepts result of expandKeyLE');
-  const b32 = u32(block);
-  let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, b32[0], b32[1], b32[2], b32[3]);
-  (b32[0] = s0), (b32[1] = s1), (b32[2] = s2), (b32[3] = s3);
-  return block;
-}
-
-function decryptBlock(xk: Uint32Array, block: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
-  abytes(block, 16);
-  if (!isBytes32(xk)) throw new Error('_decryptBlock accepts result of expandKeyLE');
-  const b32 = u32(block);
-  let { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = decrypt(xk, b32[0], b32[1], b32[2], b32[3]);
-  (b32[0] = s0), (b32[1] = s1), (b32[2] = s2), (b32[3] = s3);
-  return block;
-}
-
-/**
- * AES-W (base for AESKW/AESKWP).
- * Specs: [SP800-38F](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf),
- * [RFC 3394](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3394/),
- * [RFC 5649](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5649/).
- */
-const AESW = {
-  /*
-  High-level pseudocode:
-  ```
-  A: u64 = IV
-  out = []
-  for (let i=0, ctr = 0; i<6; i++) {
-    for (const chunk of chunks(plaintext, 8)) {
-      A ^= swapEndianess(ctr++)
-      [A, res] = chunks(encrypt(A || chunk), 8);
-      out ||= res
-    }
-  }
-  out = A || out
-  ```
-  Decrypt is the same, but reversed.
-  */
-  encrypt(kek: Uint8Array, out: Uint8Array) {
-    // Size is limited to 4GB, otherwise ctr will overflow and we'll need to switch to bigints.
-    // If you need it larger, open an issue.
-    if (out.length >= 2 ** 32) throw new Error('plaintext should be less than 4gb');
-    const xk = expandKeyLE(kek);
-    if (out.length === 16) encryptBlock(xk, out);
-    else {
-      const o32 = u32(out);
-      // prettier-ignore
-      let a0 = o32[0], a1 = o32[1]; // A
-      for (let j = 0, ctr = 1; j < 6; j++) {
-        for (let pos = 2; pos < o32.length; pos += 2, ctr++) {
-          const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = encrypt(xk, a0, a1, o32[pos], o32[pos + 1]);
-          // A = MSB(64, B) ^ t where t = (n*j)+i
-          (a0 = s0), (a1 = s1 ^ byteSwap(ctr)), (o32[pos] = s2), (o32[pos + 1] = s3);
-        }
-      }
-      (o32[0] = a0), (o32[1] = a1); // out = A || out
-    }
-    xk.fill(0);
-  },
-  decrypt(kek: Uint8Array, out: Uint8Array) {
-    if (out.length - 8 >= 2 ** 32) throw new Error('ciphertext should be less than 4gb');
-    const xk = expandKeyDecLE(kek);
-    const chunks = out.length / 8 - 1; // first chunk is IV
-    if (chunks === 1) decryptBlock(xk, out);
-    else {
-      const o32 = u32(out);
-      // prettier-ignore
-      let a0 = o32[0], a1 = o32[1]; // A
-      for (let j = 0, ctr = chunks * 6; j < 6; j++) {
-        for (let pos = chunks * 2; pos >= 1; pos -= 2, ctr--) {
-          a1 ^= byteSwap(ctr);
-          const { s0, s1, s2, s3 } = decrypt(xk, a0, a1, o32[pos], o32[pos + 1]);
-          (a0 = s0), (a1 = s1), (o32[pos] = s2), (o32[pos + 1] = s3);
-        }
-      }
-      (o32[0] = a0), (o32[1] = a1);
-    }
-    xk.fill(0);
-  },
-};
-
-const AESKW_IV = /* @__PURE__ */ new Uint8Array(8).fill(0xa6); // A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6
-
-/**
- * AES-KW (key-wrap). Injects static IV into plaintext, adds counter, encrypts 6 times.
- * Reduces block size from 16 to 8 bytes.
- * For padded version, use aeskwp.
- * [RFC 3394](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc3394/),
- * [NIST.SP.800-38F](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf).
- */
-export const aeskw: ((kek: Uint8Array) => Cipher) & {
-  blockSize: number;
-} = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher(
-  { blockSize: 8 },
-  (kek: Uint8Array): Cipher => ({
-    encrypt(plaintext: Uint8Array) {
-      if (!plaintext.length || plaintext.length % 8 !== 0)
-        throw new Error('invalid plaintext length');
-      if (plaintext.length === 8)
-        throw new Error('8-byte keys not allowed in AESKW, use AESKWP instead');
-      const out = concatBytes(AESKW_IV, plaintext);
-      AESW.encrypt(kek, out);
-      return out;
-    },
-    decrypt(ciphertext: Uint8Array) {
-      // ciphertext must be at least 24 bytes and a multiple of 8 bytes
-      // 24 because should have at least two block (1 iv + 2).
-      // Replace with 16 to enable '8-byte keys'
-      if (ciphertext.length % 8 !== 0 || ciphertext.length < 3 * 8)
-        throw new Error('invalid ciphertext length');
-      const out = copyBytes(ciphertext);
-      AESW.decrypt(kek, out);
-      if (!equalBytes(out.subarray(0, 8), AESKW_IV)) throw new Error('integrity check failed');
-      out.subarray(0, 8).fill(0); // ciphertext.subarray(0, 8) === IV, but we clean it anyway
-      return out.subarray(8);
-    },
-  })
-);
-
-/*
-We don't support 8-byte keys. The rabbit hole:
-
-- Wycheproof says: "NIST SP 800-38F does not define the wrapping of 8 byte keys.
-  RFC 3394 Section 2  on the other hand specifies that 8 byte keys are wrapped
-  by directly encrypting one block with AES."
-    - https://github.com/C2SP/wycheproof/blob/master/doc/key_wrap.md
-    - "RFC 3394 specifies in Section 2, that the input for the key wrap
-      algorithm must be at least two blocks and otherwise the constant
-      field and key are simply encrypted with ECB as a single block"
-- What RFC 3394 actually says (in Section 2):
-    - "Before being wrapped, the key data is parsed into n blocks of 64 bits.
-      The only restriction the key wrap algorithm places on n is that n be
-      at least two"
-    - "For key data with length less than or equal to 64 bits, the constant
-      field used in this specification and the key data form a single
-      128-bit codebook input making this key wrap unnecessary."
-- Which means "assert(n >= 2)" and "use something else for 8 byte keys"
-- NIST SP800-38F actually prohibits 8-byte in "5.3.1 Mandatory Limits".
-  It states that plaintext for KW should be "2 to 2^54 -1 semiblocks".
-- So, where does "directly encrypt single block with AES" come from?
-    - Not RFC 3394. Pseudocode of key wrap in 2.2 explicitly uses
-      loop of 6 for any code path
-    - There is a weird W3C spec:
-      https://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/Overview.html#kw-aes128
-    - This spec is outdated, as admitted by Wycheproof authors
-    - There is RFC 5649 for padded key wrap, which is padding construction on
-      top of AESKW. In '4.1.2' it says: "If the padded plaintext contains exactly
-      eight octets, then prepend the AIV as defined in Section 3 above to P[1] and
-      encrypt the resulting 128-bit block using AES in ECB mode [Modes] with key
-      K (the KEK).  In this case, the output is two 64-bit blocks C[0] and C[1]:"
-    - Browser subtle crypto is actually crashes on wrapping keys less than 16 bytes:
-      `Error: error:1C8000E6:Provider routines::invalid input length] { opensslErrorStack: [ 'error:030000BD:digital envelope routines::update error' ]`
-
-In the end, seems like a bug in Wycheproof.
-The 8-byte check can be easily disabled inside of AES_W.
-*/
-
-const AESKWP_IV = 0xa65959a6; // single u32le value
-
-/**
- * AES-KW, but with padding and allows random keys.
- * Second u32 of IV is used as counter for length.
- * [RFC 5649](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5649)
- */
-export const aeskwp: ((kek: Uint8Array) => Cipher) & {
-  blockSize: number;
-} = /* @__PURE__ */ wrapCipher(
-  { blockSize: 8 },
-  (kek: Uint8Array): Cipher => ({
-    encrypt(plaintext: Uint8Array) {
-      if (!plaintext.length) throw new Error('invalid plaintext length');
-      const padded = Math.ceil(plaintext.length / 8) * 8;
-      const out = new Uint8Array(8 + padded);
-      out.set(plaintext, 8);
-      const out32 = u32(out);
-      out32[0] = AESKWP_IV;
-      out32[1] = byteSwap(plaintext.length);
-      AESW.encrypt(kek, out);
-      return out;
-    },
-    decrypt(ciphertext: Uint8Array) {
-      // 16 because should have at least one block
-      if (ciphertext.length < 16) throw new Error('invalid ciphertext length');
-      const out = copyBytes(ciphertext);
-      const o32 = u32(out);
-      AESW.decrypt(kek, out);
-      const len = byteSwap(o32[1]) >>> 0;
-      const padded = Math.ceil(len / 8) * 8;
-      if (o32[0] !== AESKWP_IV || out.length - 8 !== padded)
-        throw new Error('integrity check failed');
-      for (let i = len; i < padded; i++)
-        if (out[8 + i] !== 0) throw new Error('integrity check failed');
-      out.subarray(0, 8).fill(0); // ciphertext.subarray(0, 8) === IV, but we clean it anyway
-      return out.subarray(8, 8 + len);
-    },
-  })
-);
-
-/** Unsafe low-level internal methods. May change at any time. */
-export const unsafe: {
-  expandKeyLE: typeof expandKeyLE;
-  expandKeyDecLE: typeof expandKeyDecLE;
-  encrypt: typeof encrypt;
-  decrypt: typeof decrypt;
-  encryptBlock: typeof encryptBlock;
-  decryptBlock: typeof decryptBlock;
-  ctrCounter: typeof ctrCounter;
-  ctr32: typeof ctr32;
-} = {
-  expandKeyLE,
-  expandKeyDecLE,
-  encrypt,
-  decrypt,
-  encryptBlock,
-  decryptBlock,
-  ctrCounter,
-  ctr32,
-};