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package/node_modules/@noble/ciphers/README.md

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+# noble-ciphers
+
+Audited & minimal JS implementation of Salsa20, ChaCha and AES.
+
+- 🔒 [**Audited**](#security) by an independent security firm
+- 🔻 Tree-shakeable: unused code is excluded from your builds
+- 🏎 Fast: hand-optimized for caveats of JS engines
+- 🔍 Reliable: property-based / cross-library / wycheproof tests ensure correctness
+- 💼 AES: ECB, CBC, CTR, CFB, GCM, SIV (nonce misuse-resistant), AESKW, AESKWP
+- 💃 Salsa20, ChaCha, XSalsa20, XChaCha, ChaCha8, ChaCha12, Poly1305
+- 🥈 Two AES implementations: pure JS or friendly wrapper around webcrypto
+- 🪶 29KB (11KB gzipped) for everything, 7KB (3KB gzipped) for ChaCha build
+
+Take a glance at [GitHub Discussions](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ciphers/discussions) for questions and support.
+
+### This library belongs to _noble_ cryptography
+
+> **noble cryptography** — high-security, easily auditable set of contained cryptographic libraries and tools.
+
+- Zero or minimal dependencies
+- Highly readable TypeScript / JS code
+- PGP-signed releases and transparent NPM builds
+- All libraries:
+  [ciphers](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ciphers),
+  [curves](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-curves),
+  [hashes](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-hashes),
+  [post-quantum](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-post-quantum),
+  4kb [secp256k1](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-secp256k1) /
+  [ed25519](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ed25519)
+- [Check out homepage](https://paulmillr.com/noble/)
+  for reading resources, documentation and apps built with noble
+
+## Usage
+
+> `npm install @noble/ciphers`
+
+> `deno add jsr:@noble/ciphers`
+
+> `deno doc jsr:@noble/ciphers` # command-line documentation
+
+We support all major platforms and runtimes.
+For React Native, you may need a
+[polyfill for getRandomValues](https://github.com/LinusU/react-native-get-random-values).
+A standalone file
+[noble-ciphers.js](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ciphers/releases) is also available.
+
+```ts
+// import * from '@noble/ciphers'; // Error: use sub-imports, to ensure small app size
+import { gcm, siv } from '@noble/ciphers/aes';
+import { chacha20poly1305, xchacha20poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha';
+import { xsalsa20poly1305, secretbox } from '@noble/ciphers/salsa';
+
+// Unauthenticated encryption: make sure to use HMAC or similar
+import { ctr, cfb, cbc, ecb } from '@noble/ciphers/aes';
+import { salsa20, xsalsa20 } from '@noble/ciphers/salsa';
+import { chacha20, xchacha20, chacha8, chacha12 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha';
+import { aeskw, aeskwp } from '@noble/ciphers/aes'; // KW
+import { bytesToHex, hexToBytes, bytesToUtf8, utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils';
+import { managedNonce, randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/webcrypto';
+```
+
+- [Examples](#examples)
+  - [XChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption](#xchacha20-poly1305-encryption)
+  - [AES-256-GCM encryption](#aes-256-gcm-encryption)
+  - [AES: gcm, siv, ctr, cfb, cbc, ecb](#aes-gcm-siv-ctr-cfb-cbc-ecb)
+  - [Friendly WebCrypto AES](#friendly-webcrypto-aes)
+  - [AESKW and AESKWP](#aeskw-and-aeskwp)
+  - [Auto-handle nonces](#auto-handle-nonces)
+  - [Reuse array for input and output](#reuse-array-for-input-and-output)
+- [Internals](#internals)
+  - [Implemented primitives](#implemented-primitives)
+  - [Which cipher should I pick?](#which-cipher-should-i-pick)
+  - [How to encrypt properly](#how-to-encrypt-properly)
+  - [Nonces](#nonces)
+  - [Encryption limits](#encryption-limits)
+  - [AES internals and block modes](#aes-internals-and-block-modes)
+- [Security](#security)
+- [Speed](#speed)
+- [Upgrading](#upgrading)
+- [Contributing & testing](#contributing--testing)
+- [License](#license)
+
+## Examples
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Use different nonce every time `encrypt()` is done.
+
+#### XChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption
+
+```js
+import { xchacha20poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha';
+import { utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils';
+import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/webcrypto';
+const key = randomBytes(32); // random key
+// const key = new Uint8Array([ // existing key
+//   169, 88, 160, 139, 168, 29, 147, 196, 14, 88, 237, 76, 243, 177, 109, 140,
+//   195, 140, 80, 10, 216, 134, 215, 71, 191, 48, 20, 104, 189, 37, 38, 55,
+// ]);
+// import { hexToBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils'; // hex key
+// const key = hexToBytes('4b7f89bac90a1086fef73f5da2cbe93b2fae9dfbf7678ae1f3e75fd118ddf999');
+const nonce = randomBytes(24);
+const chacha = xchacha20poly1305(key, nonce);
+const data = utf8ToBytes('hello, noble');
+const ciphertext = chacha.encrypt(data);
+const data_ = chacha.decrypt(ciphertext); // utils.bytesToUtf8(data_) === data
+```
+
+#### AES-256-GCM encryption
+
+```js
+import { gcm } from '@noble/ciphers/aes';
+import { utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils';
+import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/webcrypto';
+const key = randomBytes(32);
+const nonce = randomBytes(24);
+const data = utf8ToBytes('hello, noble');
+const aes = gcm(key, nonce);
+const ciphertext = aes.encrypt(data);
+const data_ = aes.decrypt(ciphertext); // utils.bytesToUtf8(data_) === data
+```
+
+#### AES: gcm, siv, ctr, cfb, cbc, ecb
+
+```js
+import { gcm, siv, ctr, cfb, cbc, ecb } from '@noble/ciphers/aes';
+import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/webcrypto';
+const plaintext = new Uint8Array(32).fill(16);
+for (let cipher of [gcm, siv]) {
+  const key = randomBytes(32); // 24 for AES-192, 16 for AES-128
+  const nonce = randomBytes(12);
+  const ciphertext_ = cipher(key, nonce).encrypt(plaintext);
+  const plaintext_ = cipher(key, nonce).decrypt(ciphertext_);
+}
+for (const cipher of [ctr, cbc, cfb]) {
+  const key = randomBytes(32); // 24 for AES-192, 16 for AES-128
+  const nonce = randomBytes(16);
+  const ciphertext_ = cipher(key, nonce).encrypt(plaintext);
+  const plaintext_ = cipher(key, nonce).decrypt(ciphertext_);
+}
+for (const cipher of [ecb]) {
+  const key = randomBytes(32); // 24 for AES-192, 16 for AES-128
+  const ciphertext_ = cipher(key).encrypt(plaintext);
+  const plaintext_ = cipher(key).decrypt(ciphertext_);
+}
+```
+
+#### Friendly WebCrypto AES
+
+Noble implements AES. Sometimes people want to use built-in `crypto.subtle` instead. However, it has terrible API. We simplify access to built-ins.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Webcrypto methods are always async.
+
+```js
+import { gcm, ctr, cbc, randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/webcrypto';
+const plaintext = new Uint8Array(32).fill(16);
+const key = randomBytes(32);
+for (const cipher of [gcm]) {
+  const nonce = randomBytes(12);
+  const ciphertext_ = await cipher(key, nonce).encrypt(plaintext);
+  const plaintext_ = await cipher(key, nonce).decrypt(ciphertext_);
+}
+for (const cipher of [ctr, cbc]) {
+  const nonce = randomBytes(16);
+  const ciphertext_ = await cipher(key, nonce).encrypt(plaintext);
+  const plaintext_ = await cipher(key, nonce).decrypt(ciphertext_);
+}
+```
+
+#### AESKW and AESKWP
+
+```ts
+import { aeskw, aeskwp } from '@noble/ciphers/aes';
+import { hexToBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils';
+
+const kek = hexToBytes('000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F');
+const keyData = hexToBytes('00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF');
+const ciphertext = aeskw(kek).encrypt(keyData);
+```
+
+#### Auto-handle nonces
+
+We provide API that manages nonce internally instead of exposing them to library's user.
+
+For `encrypt`, a `nonceBytes`-length buffer is fetched from CSPRNG and prenended to encrypted ciphertext.
+
+For `decrypt`, first `nonceBytes` of ciphertext are treated as nonce.
+
+```js
+import { xchacha20poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha';
+import { managedNonce } from '@noble/ciphers/webcrypto';
+import { hexToBytes, utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils';
+const key = hexToBytes('fa686bfdffd3758f6377abbc23bf3d9bdc1a0dda4a6e7f8dbdd579fa1ff6d7e1');
+const chacha = managedNonce(xchacha20poly1305)(key); // manages nonces for you
+const data = utf8ToBytes('hello, noble');
+const ciphertext = chacha.encrypt(data);
+const data_ = chacha.decrypt(ciphertext);
+```
+
+#### Reuse array for input and output
+
+To avoid additional allocations, Uint8Array can be reused
+between encryption and decryption calls.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> Some ciphers don't support unaligned (`byteOffset % 4 !== 0`) Uint8Array as
+> destination. It can decrease performance, making the optimization pointless.
+
+```js
+import { chacha20poly1305 } from '@noble/ciphers/chacha';
+import { utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/utils';
+import { randomBytes } from '@noble/ciphers/webcrypto';
+
+const key = randomBytes(32);
+const nonce = randomBytes(12);
+const chacha = chacha20poly1305(key, nonce);
+
+const input = utf8ToBytes('hello, noble'); // length == 12
+const inputLength = input.length;
+const tagLength = 16;
+
+const buf = new Uint8Array(inputLength + tagLength);
+const start = buf.subarray(0, inputLength);
+start.set(input); // copy input to buf
+
+chacha.encrypt(start, buf); // encrypt into `buf`
+chacha.decrypt(buf, start); // decrypt into `start`
+```
+
+xsalsa20poly1305 also supports this, but requires 32 additional bytes for encryption / decryption,
+due to its inner workings.
+
+## Internals
+
+### Implemented primitives
+
+- [Salsa20](https://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html) stream cipher, released in 2005.
+  Salsa's goal was to implement AES replacement that does not rely on S-Boxes,
+  which are hard to implement in a constant-time manner.
+  Salsa20 is usually faster than AES, a big deal on slow, budget mobile phones.
+  - [XSalsa20](https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/xsalsa-20110204.pdf), extended-nonce
+    variant was released in 2008. It switched nonces from 96-bit to 192-bit,
+    and became safe to be picked at random. - Nacl / Libsodium popularized term "secretbox", a simple black-box
+    authenticated encryption. Secretbox is just xsalsa20-poly1305. We provide the
+    alias and corresponding seal / open methods. We don't provide "box" or "sealedbox".
+  - Check out [PDF](https://cr.yp.to/snuffle/salsafamily-20071225.pdf) and
+    [wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salsa20).
+- [ChaCha20](https://cr.yp.to/chacha.html) stream cipher, released
+  in 2008. Developed after Salsa20, ChaCha aims to increase diffusion per round.
+  It was standardized in [RFC 8439](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439)
+  and is now used in TLS 1.3.
+  - [XChaCha20](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha)
+    extended-nonce variant is also provided. Similar to XSalsa, it's safe to use with
+    randomly-generated nonces.
+  - Check out [PDF](http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf) and [wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salsa20).
+- [AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard)
+  is a variant of Rijndael block cipher, standardized by NIST in 2001.
+  We provide the fastest available pure JS implementation.
+  - We support AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256: the mode is selected dynamically,
+    based on key length (16, 24, 32).
+  - [AES-GCM-SIV](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES-GCM-SIV)
+    nonce-misuse-resistant mode is also provided. It's recommended to use it,
+    to prevent catastrophic consequences of nonce reuse. Our implementation of SIV
+    has the same speed as GCM: there is no performance hit.
+  - We also have AESKW and AESKWP from
+    [RFC 3394](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3394) / [RFC 5649](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5649)
+  - Check out [AES internals and block modes](#aes-internals-and-block-modes).
+- We expose polynomial-evaluation MACs: [Poly1305](https://cr.yp.to/mac.html), AES-GCM's [GHash](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galois/Counter_Mode) and
+  AES-SIV's [Polyval](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES-GCM-SIV).
+  - Poly1305 ([PDF](https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf),
+    [wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poly1305))
+    is a fast and parallel secret-key message-authentication code suitable for
+    a wide variety of applications. It was standardized in
+    [RFC 8439](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8439) and is now used in TLS 1.3.
+  - Polynomial MACs are not perfect for every situation:
+    they lack Random Key Robustness: the MAC can be forged, and can't
+    be used in PAKE schemes. See
+    [invisible salamanders attack](https://keymaterial.net/2020/09/07/invisible-salamanders-in-aes-gcm-siv/).
+    To combat invisible salamanders, `hash(key)` can be included in ciphertext,
+    however, this would violate ciphertext indistinguishability:
+    an attacker would know which key was used - so `HKDF(key, i)`
+    could be used instead.
+- Format-preserving encryption algorithm (FPE-FF1) specified in NIST Special Publication 800-38G.
+  [See more info](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf).
+
+### Which cipher should I pick?
+
+We suggest to use XChaCha20-Poly1305.
+If you can't use it, prefer AES-GCM-SIV, or AES-GCM.
+
+### How to encrypt properly
+
+- Use unpredictable key with enough entropy
+  - Random key must be using cryptographically secure random number generator (CSPRNG), not `Math.random` etc.
+  - Non-random key generated from KDF is fine
+  - Re-using key is fine, but be aware of rules for cryptographic key wear-out and [encryption limits](#encryption-limits)
+- Use new nonce every time and [don't repeat it](#nonces)
+  - chacha and salsa20 are fine for sequential counters that _never_ repeat: `01, 02...`
+  - xchacha and xsalsa20 should use random nonces instead
+  - AES-GCM should use 12-byte nonces: smaller nonces are security risk
+- Prefer authenticated encryption (AEAD)
+  - chacha20poly1305 / aes-gcm / ChaCha + HMAC / AES + HMAC is good
+  - chacha20 / aes-ctr / aes-cbc without poly1305 or hmac is bad
+  - Flipping bits or ciphertext substitution won't be detected in unauthenticated ciphers
+- Don't re-use keys between different protocols
+  - For example, using secp256k1 key in AES can be bad
+  - Use hkdf or, at least, a hash function to create sub-key instead
+- If you need AES, only use AES-256 for new protocols
+  - For post-quantum security
+
+### Nonces
+
+Most ciphers need a key and a nonce (aka initialization vector / IV) to encrypt a data:
+
+    ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext, key, nonce)
+
+Repeating (key, nonce) pair with different plaintexts would allow an attacker to decrypt it:
+
+    ciphertext_a = encrypt(plaintext_a, key, nonce)
+    ciphertext_b = encrypt(plaintext_b, key, nonce)
+    stream_diff = xor(ciphertext_a, ciphertext_b)   # Break encryption
+
+So, you can't repeat nonces. One way of doing so is using counters:
+
+    for i in 0..:
+        ciphertext[i] = encrypt(plaintexts[i], key, i)
+
+Another is generating random nonce every time:
+
+    for i in 0..:
+        rand_nonces[i] = random()
+        ciphertext[i] = encrypt(plaintexts[i], key, rand_nonces[i])
+
+Counters are OK, but it's not always possible to store current counter value:
+e.g. in decentralized, unsyncable systems.
+
+Randomness is OK, but there's a catch:
+ChaCha20 and AES-GCM use 96-bit / 12-byte nonces, which implies higher chance of collision.
+In the example above, `random()` can collide and produce repeating nonce.
+Chance is even higher for 64-bit nonces, which GCM allows - don't use them.
+
+To safely use random nonces, utilize XSalsa20 or XChaCha:
+they increased nonce length to 192-bit, minimizing a chance of collision.
+AES-SIV is also fine. In situations where you can't use eXtended-nonce
+algorithms, key rotation is advised. hkdf would work great for this case.
+
+### Encryption limits
+
+A "protected message" would mean a probability of `2**-50` that a passive attacker
+successfully distinguishes the ciphertext outputs of the AEAD scheme from the outputs
+of a random function. See [draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits/) for details.
+
+- Max message size:
+  - AES-GCM: ~68GB, `2**36-256`
+  - Salsa, ChaCha, XSalsa, XChaCha: ~256GB, `2**38-64`
+- Max amount of protected messages, under same key:
+  - AES-GCM: `2**32.5`
+  - Salsa, ChaCha: `2**46`, but only integrity is affected, not confidentiality
+  - XSalsa, XChaCha: `2**72`
+- Max amount of protected messages, across all keys:
+  - AES-GCM: `2**69/B` where B is max blocks encrypted by a key. Meaning
+    `2**59` for 1KB, `2**49` for 1MB, `2**39` for 1GB
+  - Salsa, ChaCha, XSalsa, XChaCha: `2**100`
+
+##### AES internals and block modes
+
+`cipher = encrypt(block, key)`. Data is split into 128-bit blocks. Encrypted in 10/12/14 rounds (128/192/256bit). Every round does:
+
+1. **S-box**, table substitution
+2. **Shift rows**, cyclic shift left of all rows of data array
+3. **Mix columns**, multiplying every column by fixed polynomial
+4. **Add round key**, round_key xor i-th column of array
+
+For non-deterministic (not ECB) schemes, initialization vector (IV) is mixed to block/key;
+and each new round either depends on previous block's key, or on some counter.
+
+- ECB (Electronic Codebook): Deterministic encryption; identical plaintext blocks yield identical ciphertexts. Insecure due to pattern leakage.
+  See [AES Penguin](https://words.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/)
+- CBC (Cipher Block Chaining): Each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block before encryption.
+  Hard to use: requires proper padding and an IV. Needs a separate MAC.
+- CTR (Counter Mode): Turns a block cipher into a stream cipher using a counter and IV (nonce).
+  Efficient and parallelizable. Requires a unique nonce per encryption. Better, but still needs a separate MAC.
+- GCM (Galois/Counter Mode): Combines CTR mode with polynomial MAC. Efficient and widely used.
+- SIV (Synthetic IV): Nonce-misuse-resistant mode; repeating nonces reveal only if plaintexts are identical.
+  Maintains security even if nonces are reused.
+- XTS: Designed for disk encryption.
+  Similar to ECB (deterministic), but has `[i][j]` tweak arguments corresponding to sector i and 16-byte block (part of sector) j.
+  Lacks MAC.
+
+GCM / SIV are not ideal:
+
+- Conservative key wear-out is `2**32` (4B) msgs
+- MAC can be forged: see Poly1305 section above. Same for SIV
+
+## Security
+
+The library has been independently audited:
+
+- at version 1.0.0, in Sep 2024, by [cure53](https://cure53.de)
+  - PDFs: [website](https://cure53.de/audit-report_noble-crypto-libs.pdf), [in-repo](./audit/2024-09-cure53-audit-nbl4.pdf)
+  - [Changes since audit](https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-ciphers/compare/1.0.0..main)
+  - Scope: everything
+  - The audit has been funded by [OpenSats](https://opensats.org)
+
+It is tested against property-based, cross-library and Wycheproof vectors,
+and is being fuzzed in [the separate repo](https://github.com/paulmillr/fuzzing).
+
+If you see anything unusual: investigate and report.
+
+### Constant-timeness
+
+We're targetting algorithmic constant time. _JIT-compiler_ and _Garbage Collector_ make "constant time"
+extremely hard to achieve [timing attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_attack) resistance
+in a scripting language. Which means _any other JS library can't have
+constant-timeness_. Even statically typed Rust, a language without GC,
+[makes it harder to achieve constant-time](https://www.chosenplaintext.ca/open-source/rust-timing-shield/security)
+for some cases. If your goal is absolute security, don't use any JS lib — including bindings to native ones.
+Use low-level libraries & languages.
+
+The library uses T-tables for AES, which
+[leak access timings](https://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf).
+This is also done in [OpenSSL](https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/2f33265039cdbd0e4589c80970e02e208f3f94d2/crypto/aes/aes_core.c#L706) and
+[Go stdlib](https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.22.6:src/crypto/aes/const.go;l=90) for performance reasons.
+The analysis was mentioned in [hal-04652991](https://hal.science/hal-04652991/document).
+
+### Supply chain security
+
+- **Commits** are signed with PGP keys, to prevent forgery. Make sure to verify commit signatures
+- **Releases** are transparent and built on GitHub CI. Make sure to verify [provenance](https://docs.npmjs.com/generating-provenance-statements) logs
+  - Use GitHub CLI to verify single-file builds:
+    `gh attestation verify --owner paulmillr noble-ciphers.js`
+- **Rare releasing** is followed to ensure less re-audit need for end-users
+- **Dependencies** are minimized and locked-down: any dependency could get hacked and users will be downloading malware with every install.
+  - We make sure to use as few dependencies as possible
+  - Automatic dep updates are prevented by locking-down version ranges; diffs are checked with `npm-diff`
+- **Dev Dependencies** are disabled for end-users; they are only used to develop / build the source code
+
+For this package, there are 0 dependencies; and a few dev dependencies:
+
+- micro-bmark, micro-should and jsbt are used for benchmarking / testing / build tooling and developed by the same author
+- prettier, fast-check and typescript are used for code quality / test generation / ts compilation. It's hard to audit their source code thoroughly and fully because of their size
+
+### Randomness
+
+We're deferring to built-in
+[crypto.getRandomValues](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Crypto/getRandomValues)
+which is considered cryptographically secure (CSPRNG).
+
+In the past, browsers had bugs that made it weak: it may happen again.
+Implementing a userspace CSPRNG to get resilient to the weakness
+is even worse: there is no reliable userspace source of quality entropy.
+
+## Speed
+
+To summarize, noble is the fastest JS implementation of Salsa, ChaCha and AES.
+
+You can gain additional speed-up and
+avoid memory allocations by passing `output`
+uint8array into encrypt / decrypt methods.
+
+Benchmark results on Apple M4:
+
+```
+64B
+xsalsa20poly1305 x 675,675 ops/sec @ 1μs/op
+chacha20poly1305 x 568,181 ops/sec @ 1μs/op
+xchacha20poly1305 x 460,617 ops/sec @ 2μs/op
+aes-256-gcm x 201,126 ops/sec @ 4μs/op
+aes-256-gcm-siv x 162,284 ops/sec @ 6μs/op
+# Unauthenticated encryption
+salsa20 x 1,655,629 ops/sec @ 604ns/op
+xsalsa20 x 1,400,560 ops/sec @ 714ns/op
+chacha20 x 1,996,007 ops/sec @ 501ns/op
+xchacha20 x 1,404,494 ops/sec @ 712ns/op
+chacha8 x 2,145,922 ops/sec @ 466ns/op
+chacha12 x 2,036,659 ops/sec @ 491ns/op
+aes-ecb-256 x 1,019,367 ops/sec @ 981ns/op
+aes-cbc-256 x 931,966 ops/sec @ 1μs/op
+aes-ctr-256 x 954,198 ops/sec @ 1μs/op
+
+1MB
+xsalsa20poly1305 x 322 ops/sec @ 3ms/op
+chacha20poly1305 x 327 ops/sec @ 3ms/op
+xchacha20poly1305 x 331 ops/sec @ 3ms/op
+aes-256-gcm x 94 ops/sec @ 10ms/op
+aes-256-gcm-siv x 90 ops/sec @ 11ms/op
+# Unauthenticated encryption
+salsa20 x 791 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+xsalsa20 x 801 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+chacha20 x 787 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+xchacha20 x 781 ops/sec @ 1ms/op
+chacha8 x 1,457 ops/sec @ 686μs/op
+chacha12 x 1,130 ops/sec @ 884μs/op
+aes-ecb-256 x 289 ops/sec @ 3ms/op
+aes-cbc-256 x 114 ops/sec @ 8ms/op
+aes-ctr-256 x 127 ops/sec @ 7ms/op
+# Wrapper over built-in webcrypto
+webcrypto ctr-256 x 6,508 ops/sec @ 153μs/op
+webcrypto cbc-256 x 1,820 ops/sec @ 549μs/op
+webcrypto gcm-256 x 5,106 ops/sec @ 195μs/op
+```
+
+Compare to other implementations:
+
+```
+xsalsa20poly1305 (encrypt, 1MB)
+├─tweetnacl x 196 ops/sec
+└─noble x 305 ops/sec
+
+chacha20poly1305 (encrypt, 1MB)
+├─node x 1,668 ops/sec
+├─stablelib x 202 ops/sec
+└─noble x 319 ops/sec
+
+aes-ctr-256 (encrypt, 1MB)
+├─stablelib x 123 ops/sec
+├─aesjs x 42 ops/sec
+├─noble-webcrypto x 5,965 ops/sec
+└─noble x 124 ops/sec
+```
+
+## Contributing & testing
+
+- `npm install && npm run build && npm test` will build the code and run tests.
+- `npm run lint` / `npm run format` will run linter / fix linter issues.
+- `npm run bench` will run benchmarks, which may need their deps first (`npm run bench:install`)
+- `npm run build:release` will build single file
+
+Check out [github.com/paulmillr/guidelines](https://github.com/paulmillr/guidelines)
+for general coding practices and rules.
+
+See [paulmillr.com/noble](https://paulmillr.com/noble/)
+for useful resources, articles, documentation and demos
+related to the library.
+
+## License
+
+The MIT License (MIT)
+
+Copyright (c) 2023 Paul Miller [(https://paulmillr.com)](https://paulmillr.com)
+Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+
+See LICENSE file.

package/node_modules/@noble/ciphers/_arx.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/**
+ * Basic utils for ARX (add-rotate-xor) salsa and chacha ciphers.
+
+RFC8439 requires multi-step cipher stream, where
+authKey starts with counter: 0, actual msg with counter: 1.
+
+For this, we need a way to re-use nonce / counter:
+
+    const counter = new Uint8Array(4);
+    chacha(..., counter, ...); // counter is now 1
+    chacha(..., counter, ...); // counter is now 2
+
+This is complicated:
+
+- 32-bit counters are enough, no need for 64-bit: max ArrayBuffer size in JS is 4GB
+- Original papers don't allow mutating counters
+- Counter overflow is undefined [^1]
+- Idea A: allow providing (nonce | counter) instead of just nonce, re-use it
+- Caveat: Cannot be re-used through all cases:
+- * chacha has (counter | nonce)
+- * xchacha has (nonce16 | counter | nonce16)
+- Idea B: separate nonce / counter and provide separate API for counter re-use
+- Caveat: there are different counter sizes depending on an algorithm.
+- salsa & chacha also differ in structures of key & sigma:
+  salsa20:      s[0] | k(4) | s[1] | nonce(2) | ctr(2) | s[2] | k(4) | s[3]
+  chacha:       s(4) | k(8) | ctr(1) | nonce(3)
+  chacha20orig: s(4) | k(8) | ctr(2) | nonce(2)
+- Idea C: helper method such as `setSalsaState(key, nonce, sigma, data)`
+- Caveat: we can't re-use counter array
+
+xchacha [^2] uses the subkey and remaining 8 byte nonce with ChaCha20 as normal
+(prefixed by 4 NUL bytes, since [RFC8439] specifies a 12-byte nonce).
+
+[^1]: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/gsOnTJzcbgG6OqD8Sc0GO5aR_tU/
+[^2]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha#appendix-A.2
+
+ * @module
+ */
+import { type XorStream } from './utils.ts';
+export declare function rotl(a: number, b: number): number;
+/** Ciphers must use u32 for efficiency. */
+export type CipherCoreFn = (sigma: Uint32Array, key: Uint32Array, nonce: Uint32Array, output: Uint32Array, counter: number, rounds?: number) => void;
+/** Method which extends key + short nonce into larger nonce / diff key. */
+export type ExtendNonceFn = (sigma: Uint32Array, key: Uint32Array, input: Uint32Array, output: Uint32Array) => void;
+/** ARX cipher options.
+ * * `allowShortKeys` for 16-byte keys
+ * * `counterLength` in bytes
+ * * `counterRight`: right: `nonce|counter`; left: `counter|nonce`
+ * */
+export type CipherOpts = {
+    allowShortKeys?: boolean;
+    extendNonceFn?: ExtendNonceFn;
+    counterLength?: number;
+    counterRight?: boolean;
+    rounds?: number;
+};
+/** Creates ARX-like (ChaCha, Salsa) cipher stream from core function. */
+export declare function createCipher(core: CipherCoreFn, opts: CipherOpts): XorStream;
+//# sourceMappingURL=_arx.d.ts.map

package/node_modules/@noble/ciphers/_arx.d.ts.map

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