@dogfood-lab/verify 1.9.0 → 1.11.0

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@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
1
+ /**
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+ * f-f50e779b-retry-warn-fallback-guard.test.js
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+ *
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+ * F-f50e779b (wave 31, backend amend) — a defect INSIDE the wave-29 fix for
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+ * F-2a5ddafa, found by this same lane's own wave-30 audit of its own prior
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+ * work. defaultOnRetryWarn's doc comment states the invariant "the logger
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+ * must never throw and mask a real retry" and wraps its primary
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+ * `console.error(JSON.stringify(line))` call in try/catch — but the catch
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+ * block's OWN recovery action, a second `console.error(...)` call, was not
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+ * itself guarded. If console.error throws on BOTH calls (a broken stderr fd
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+ * — EPIPE/ENOSPC, realistic on a CI runner), the second throw escaped
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+ * defaultOnRetryWarn uncaught, out of the retry loop, out of confirm() —
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+ * turning a retry that was about to SUCCEED into a rejected promise. Blast
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+ * radius is bounded by an unrelated, pre-existing mechanism (verify/index.js
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+ * reclassifies any confirm() throw as a structured PROVENANCE_FAULT, exit 2,
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+ * nothing persisted) — so this was never a crash, but a submission whose
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+ * provenance check would have succeeded after a retry was discarded solely
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+ * because the NEW observability line could not be written: the opposite of
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+ * what an observability feature should do to reliability.
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+ *
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+ * Fix: give the fallback console.error (provenance.js ~line 153-162) its own
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+ * try/catch, mirroring the two-level guard `dogfood-swarm/lib/log-stage.js`
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+ * already uses for the identical shape (`catch { try { ... } catch {} }`) —
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+ * that file was independently swept and confirmed already-hardened; nothing
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+ * else in this domain shares defaultOnRetryWarn (grepped for
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+ * onRetryWarn/defaultOnRetryWarn/onWarn/onLog across every owned package —
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+ * only provenance.js and its two test files match).
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+ *
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+ * RED proof — ACTUALLY EXECUTED, not just reasoned (per this wave's brief:
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+ * "a verification that cannot fail is not a verification"). This exact
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+ * fixture was run via `node --test` against a byte-identical scratch copy of
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+ * the PRE-FIX provenance.js in an isolated temp dir (this file has zero
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+ * imports, so a bare copy is fully self-contained — no workspace needed).
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+ * Both cases below FAILED against the pre-fix copy, each stack trace pinned
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+ * to `defaultOnRetryWarn (provenance.js:153)`:
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+ * - the "resolves true" case rejected with the raw 'EPIPE: simulated
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+ * broken stderr' error instead of resolving `true`.
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+ * - the "scope" case rejected with that SAME raw EPIPE error instead of
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+ * the expected 'provenance: GitHub API timeout' operational error —
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+ * proving the pre-fix bug also clobbers a genuine exhausted-retry error
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+ * with the logger's own unrelated failure.
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+ * The identical fixture was then re-run against a fixed copy (the nested
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+ * try/catch added, nothing else changed) and both cases passed. Only that
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+ * one nested try/catch differed between the RED run and the GREEN run.
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+ *
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+ * Care taken against the "vacuous test" shape (this wave's own named lesson,
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+ * re: F-2a5ddafa's original test asserting a fix fired without ever proving
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+ * it fired ONLY where it should): `opts.onRetryWarn` is deliberately NEVER
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+ * overridden below — overriding it would bypass defaultOnRetryWarn entirely
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+ * and the test would pass whether or not this fix exists, regardless of the
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+ * production code. The global `console.error` (not `process.stderr.write`,
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+ * which the F-2a5ddafa suite already uses for a *different* assertion) is
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+ * the monkey-patch target because that is exactly what defaultOnRetryWarn
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+ * calls. The second test below additionally proves the guard is scoped
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+ * correctly: it swallows ONLY the logger's own failure and does not mask a
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+ * real, unrelated operational error the caller is entitled to see.
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+ */
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+
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+ import { describe, it } from 'node:test';
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+ import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
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+
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+ import { githubProvenance } from './provenance.js';
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+
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+ const RUN_HEAD = 'c5d6c4e0000000000000000000000000deadbeef';
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+
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+ const GH_SOURCE = {
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+ provider: 'github',
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+ workflow: 'dogfood.yml',
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+ provider_run_id: '9123456789',
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+ run_url: 'https://github.com/acme/widget/actions/runs/9123456789'
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+ };
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+
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+ function abortError() {
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+ const e = new Error('This operation was aborted');
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+ e.name = 'AbortError';
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+ return e;
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+ }
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+
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+ const noSleep = async () => {};
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+
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+ function okGithubResp() {
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+ return {
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+ ok: true,
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+ status: 200,
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+ json: async () => ({
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+ id: 9123456789,
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+ status: 'completed',
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+ head_sha: RUN_HEAD,
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+ repository: { full_name: 'acme/widget' }
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+ })
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+ };
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+ }
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Monkey-patch the GLOBAL console.error for the duration of `fn` so every
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+ * call throws, simulating a broken stderr fd (EPIPE/ENOSPC) — the exact
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+ * mechanism the finding proved live. Always restores the original in
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+ * `finally` so a failing assertion cannot leak the patch into a sibling
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+ * test (node:test runs this file's cases sequentially, but a leaked patch
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+ * would still poison any later suite in the same process).
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+ *
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+ * @param {(getCallCount: () => number) => Promise<void>} fn
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+ */
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+ async function withThrowingConsoleError(fn) {
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+ const orig = console.error;
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+ let calls = 0;
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+ console.error = () => {
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+ calls++;
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+ throw new Error('EPIPE: simulated broken stderr');
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+ };
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+ try {
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+ await fn(() => calls);
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+ } finally {
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+ console.error = orig;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ /** @pins F-f50e779b */
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+ describe('F-f50e779b — defaultOnRetryWarn fallback is itself guarded', () => {
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+ it('a retry that would succeed still resolves true when console.error throws on every call', async () => {
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+ await withThrowingConsoleError(async (getCalls) => {
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+ let fetchCalls = 0;
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+ const adapter = githubProvenance('token', {
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+ timeoutMs: 1000, retries: 2, sleepImpl: noSleep,
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+ // Deliberately NOT overriding onRetryWarn — must exercise the real
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+ // defaultOnRetryWarn, or this test never reaches the guarded code
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+ // (the exact vacuous-test shape this suite's header warns against).
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+ fetchImpl: async () => {
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+ fetchCalls++;
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+ if (fetchCalls === 1) throw abortError();
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+ return okGithubResp();
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+ }
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+ });
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+ const ok = await adapter.confirm(GH_SOURCE, { refCommitSha: RUN_HEAD });
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+ assert.equal(ok, true, 'a retry that succeeds must resolve true, not reject');
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+ assert.equal(getCalls(), 2, 'expected exactly 2 console.error attempts: primary (line ~149) + fallback (line ~153)');
137
+ });
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+ });
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+
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+ it('scope: a genuinely exhausted retry budget still throws the real operational error, not the logger error', async () => {
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+ await withThrowingConsoleError(async () => {
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+ const adapter = githubProvenance('token', {
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+ timeoutMs: 1000, retries: 2, sleepImpl: noSleep,
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+ fetchImpl: async () => { throw abortError(); } // never succeeds — budget exhausts
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+ });
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+ await assert.rejects(
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+ () => adapter.confirm(GH_SOURCE, { refCommitSha: RUN_HEAD }),
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+ /provenance: GitHub API timeout/,
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+ 'the fallback guard must swallow ONLY the logger failure — it must never mask the real exhausted-retry error behind it'
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+ );
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+ });
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+ });
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+ });
@@ -118,6 +118,15 @@ function resolveSurfacePolicy(surface, globalPolicy, repoPolicy) {
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  * `configErrors` (VERIFY-F1) are eval-time repo custom-rule predicate faults; the
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119
  * caller emits them with a `policy-config:` prefix (submission-bad). A non-empty
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120
  * `configErrors` makes `valid` false.
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+ * @throws {Error} F-3ef6b03e: a global rule declared `severity: reject` whose id
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+ * is outside {@link KNOWN_REJECT_RULE_IDS} — a maintainer-authored
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+ * global-policy.yaml gap, not a submission fault. Mirrors the GLOBAL-rule
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+ * predicate-fault throw above: `runValidator('policy', ...)` in index.js
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+ * wraps this as `VALIDATOR_FAULT_POLICY:`, which parseRejectionReason
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+ * classifies 'operational' by family match. Pre-fix this pushed into
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+ * `errors` under the `policy:` prefix, which parseRejectionReason
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+ * classifies 'submission-bad' — telling every consumer in the fleet to fix
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+ * a payload that was never the problem.
121
130
  */
122
131
  export function validatePolicy(submission, { globalPolicy, repoPolicy }) {
123
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  const errors = [];
@@ -196,15 +205,21 @@ export function validatePolicy(submission, { globalPolicy, repoPolicy }) {
196
205
 
197
206
  // schema-valid, provenance-confirmed, step-results-present, step-verdict-consistent,
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  // no-verdict-upgrade are enforced by other validators or the main verify() function.
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- // PROACT-VERIFY-002: a reject rule the build neither handles here NOR enforces
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- // elsewhere would otherwise pass SILENTLY — the operator's new gate never runs.
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- // Reject the submission with a diagnostic naming the unenforced rule so the gap
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- // is visible instead of failing open.
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+ // PROACT-VERIFY-002 / F-3ef6b03e: a reject rule the build neither handles here NOR
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+ // enforces elsewhere would otherwise pass SILENTLY — the operator's new gate never
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+ // runs. THROW rather than push to `errors`: this is a maintainer-authored
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+ // global-policy.yaml gap (the same class of broken-policy-file fault
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+ // loadGlobalPolicy's schema gate already fails loud on), not a submission fault.
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+ // Pushing to `errors` would route through the `policy:` prefix — classified
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+ // 'submission-bad' by parseRejectionReason — telling the submitter to fix a
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+ // payload that was never the problem, fleet-wide, for every submission until a
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+ // maintainer notices. Throwing here mirrors the GLOBAL-rule predicate-fault
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+ // throw above: runValidator('policy', ...) in index.js wraps it as
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+ // `VALIDATOR_FAULT_POLICY:`, classified 'operational' — exit 2, nothing
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+ // persisted, no run_id poisoned via the duplicate guard (F-82429f90).
203
220
  default:
204
221
  if (!KNOWN_REJECT_RULE_IDS.has(rule.id)) {
205
- // No `policy:` prefix here — index.js prepends it to every policy
206
- // error (mirrors the `[rule.id]` / `surface[...]` messages above).
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- errors.push(
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+ throw new Error(
208
223
  `rule "${rule.id}" is declared severity:reject but has no enforcement in this build — ` +
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  `add an enforcement arm in validators/policy.js or register it in KNOWN_REJECT_RULE_IDS`
210
225
  );
@@ -299,13 +314,24 @@ export function validatePolicy(submission, { globalPolicy, repoPolicy }) {
299
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  const ciReqs = surfacePolicy.ci_requirements;
300
315
  if (!ciReqs) continue;
301
316
 
302
- if (ciReqs.tests_must_pass && submission.ci_checks) {
303
- const failingTests = submission.ci_checks.filter(
304
- c => c.kind === 'test' && c.status === 'fail'
305
- );
306
- if (failingTests.length > 0) {
307
- const ids = failingTests.map(c => c.id).join(', ');
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- errors.push(`surface[${surface}]: CI tests must pass but [${ids}] failed`);
317
+ // F-3b34d51e: mirror coverage_min's missing-data contract. Pre-fix the
318
+ // gate was `if (tests_must_pass && submission.ci_checks)` — omitting the
319
+ // optional ci_checks field (or sending [] / no kind:'test' entries)
320
+ // skipped the branch entirely and policy-validated clean under a
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+ // tests_must_pass:true surface. Require at least one kind:'test' check
322
+ // whose status is not 'fail'; reject absent/empty/no-test-kind evidence.
323
+ if (ciReqs.tests_must_pass) {
324
+ const testChecks = (submission.ci_checks || []).filter(c => c.kind === 'test');
325
+ if (testChecks.length === 0) {
326
+ errors.push(
327
+ `surface[${surface}]: tests_must_pass is true but no kind:test CI check provided`
328
+ );
329
+ } else {
330
+ const failingTests = testChecks.filter(c => c.status === 'fail');
331
+ if (failingTests.length > 0) {
332
+ const ids = failingTests.map(c => c.id).join(', ');
333
+ errors.push(`surface[${surface}]: CI tests must pass but [${ids}] failed`);
334
+ }
309
335
  }
310
336
  }
311
337
 
@@ -25,6 +25,22 @@ const schemaPath = require.resolve(
25
25
  const submissionSchema = JSON.parse(readFileSync(schemaPath, 'utf-8'));
26
26
  const PROVIDER_ENUM = submissionSchema.properties.source.properties.provider.enum;
27
27
 
28
+ /**
29
+ * F-a2fb624f: the pre-fix tripwire (`provenanceForProvider('bitbucket') ===
30
+ * null`) only probed a NON-prototype unknown key — green both before AND
31
+ * after F-2965699b's fix, so it gave zero coverage for the actual defect
32
+ * class. This table-driven set is the real regression guard: every
33
+ * Object.prototype own-property name, which is exactly the key space
34
+ * `PROVENANCE_ADAPTERS[provider]` resolved (as a truthy inherited method,
35
+ * defeating `?? null`) before the Object.hasOwn fix. Shared verbatim with
36
+ * repo-binding.test.js's sibling table so both prototype-safety sites are
37
+ * proven against the identical key set.
38
+ */
39
+ const OBJECT_PROTOTYPE_KEYS = [
40
+ 'constructor', 'toString', 'valueOf', '__proto__',
41
+ 'hasOwnProperty', 'isPrototypeOf', 'propertyIsEnumerable', 'toLocaleString',
42
+ ];
43
+
28
44
  describe('provenance adapter coverage', () => {
29
45
  it('exposes the provider enum it is meant to cover (sanity)', () => {
30
46
  assert.ok(Array.isArray(PROVIDER_ENUM) && PROVIDER_ENUM.length > 0);
@@ -53,4 +69,23 @@ describe('provenance adapter coverage', () => {
53
69
  it('provenanceForProvider returns null for an unknown provider (no throw)', () => {
54
70
  assert.equal(provenanceForProvider('bitbucket'), null);
55
71
  });
72
+
73
+ describe('F-2965699b: provenanceForProvider never resolves an inherited Object.prototype key', () => {
74
+ for (const key of OBJECT_PROTOTYPE_KEYS) {
75
+ it(`returns null (not the inherited method) for provider="${key}"`, () => {
76
+ // Deletion/emptiness proof: revert provenanceForProvider to
77
+ // `PROVENANCE_ADAPTERS[provider] ?? null` and this goes red for
78
+ // every key here — each one currently resolves a truthy inherited
79
+ // Object.prototype value that `?? null` cannot catch.
80
+ assert.equal(provenanceForProvider(key), null,
81
+ `provider="${key}" must resolve to null, not an inherited Object.prototype member`);
82
+ });
83
+ }
84
+
85
+ it('a non-string provider (object, number, null, undefined) never throws and returns null', () => {
86
+ for (const bad of [{}, 42, null, undefined, ['github']]) {
87
+ assert.equal(provenanceForProvider(bad), null, `provider=${JSON.stringify(bad)} must resolve to null`);
88
+ }
89
+ });
90
+ });
56
91
  });
@@ -14,6 +14,24 @@
14
14
  * `source.provider`, so the provider enum, the run_url parsers
15
15
  * (validators/repo-binding.js), and the adapters here stay in lockstep —
16
16
  * coverage tests fail CI if any of the three drifts.
17
+ *
18
+ * F-936c83f4 (wave 39, feature-pass integration finding): this module's
19
+ * `--provenance=stub|github` (the flag both packages/verify/cli.js and
20
+ * packages/ingest/run.js parse, both delegating to the adapters here) answers
21
+ * ONE of three structurally-similar-but-distinct 'how do we know this claim is
22
+ * true' questions living in this repo: (1) THIS module — does a submitted CI
23
+ * run really exist and match its claims; (2) dogfood-finding.schema.json's
24
+ * `evidence[].evidence_kind` enum — what evidence backs a distilled cross-repo
25
+ * lesson (see that property's own cross-reference note); (3) the swarm
26
+ * control-plane's incoming `verified_how`
27
+ * (independent|self_attested|operator_evidence,
28
+ * docs/trajectory-and-closure.dispatch.md's C2 `swarm close` verb) — how a
29
+ * finding CLOSURE was verified. This is NOT a request to unify the three
30
+ * enums — CI-run provenance, cross-repo-lesson evidence, and
31
+ * closure-verification-method are genuinely different axes, and forcing one
32
+ * shared enum would misrepresent that. The pointer exists only so the next
33
+ * reader of any of the three doesn't rediscover the pattern from scratch a
34
+ * fourth time.
17
35
  */
18
36
 
19
37
  /**
@@ -105,6 +123,67 @@ function defaultSleep(ms) {
105
123
  return new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
106
124
  }
107
125
 
126
+ /**
127
+ * F-2a5ddafa: emit ONE structured NDJSON warn line to stderr each time a
128
+ * retry is about to happen, so an operator tailing CI logs sees a degrading
129
+ * provider BEFORE the retry budget exhausts and throws. Pre-fix, every
130
+ * `await sleep(...); continue;` branch in both adapters below was completely
131
+ * silent — a submission that succeeded only after 1-2 retries against a
132
+ * degrading GitHub/GitLab API was byte-for-byte indistinguishable in the log
133
+ * from one that succeeded on the first try. The eventual exhausted-retry
134
+ * failure is already loud (an operational throw); this closes the gap on
135
+ * the way there, which is exactly the window an operator could act in
136
+ * (e.g. correlate a slow ingest with a known provider incident).
137
+ *
138
+ * Deliberately NOT named `logStage` and NOT importing
139
+ * `@dogfood-lab/dogfood-swarm/lib/log-stage.js`: packages/verify depends on
140
+ * nothing but `@dogfood-lab/schemas` + `js-yaml` today (see package.json),
141
+ * and the accepted workspace cycle (root CLAUDE.md, "Workspace dependency
142
+ * graph") is `findings -> ingest -> dogfood-swarm -> findings`. `ingest`
143
+ * ALSO depends on `verify`, so a NEW `verify -> dogfood-swarm` edge would
144
+ * not reuse that cycle — it would close a SECOND, larger one:
145
+ * `verify -> dogfood-swarm -> findings -> ingest -> verify`. This mirrors
146
+ * the repo's existing precedent for exactly this constraint —
147
+ * `packages/ingest/lib/sleep-sync.js` duplicates
148
+ * `packages/findings/lib/file-lock.js`'s private `sleepSync` verbatim,
149
+ * per that file's own header, rather than take a disallowed cross-edge —
150
+ * so this emits the same NDJSON stage-line SHAPE independently instead of
151
+ * importing the shared helper.
152
+ * `packages/ingest/wave22-log-stage-discipline.test.js` (Class #9 sweep)
153
+ * enforces that no file under `packages/**` defines its OWN `logStage`
154
+ * without delegating to the shared helper; this helper uses a distinct
155
+ * name for exactly that reason and is not a competing definition of that
156
+ * convention.
157
+ *
158
+ * Injectable via `opts.onRetryWarn` (mirrors the already-injectable
159
+ * `opts.fetchImpl` / `opts.sleepImpl` on this file) so tests assert the
160
+ * exact fields without scraping stderr.
161
+ *
162
+ * @param {{ kind: string, provider: string, attempt: number, status_or_reason: string|number, next_backoff_ms: number }} fields
163
+ */
164
+ function defaultOnRetryWarn(fields) {
165
+ const line = { ts: new Date().toISOString(), component: 'verify', stage: 'warn', ...fields };
166
+ try {
167
+ console.error(JSON.stringify(line));
168
+ } catch {
169
+ // The logger must never throw and mask a real retry — same last-resort
170
+ // discipline as the shared dogfood-swarm helper (log-stage.js). F-f50e779b:
171
+ // this fallback itself must not throw either — a broken stderr fd
172
+ // (EPIPE/ENOSPC) fails BOTH console.error calls, and pre-fix this second
173
+ // call was unguarded, so its throw escaped defaultOnRetryWarn uncaught and
174
+ // turned a retry that was about to SUCCEED into a rejected confirm() (the
175
+ // observability feature converting a good outcome into a discarded
176
+ // submission — see log-stage.js's own two-level guard for the same shape,
177
+ // which this now mirrors exactly).
178
+ try {
179
+ console.error('{"stage":"warn","kind":"log_serialization_failed"}');
180
+ } catch {
181
+ // stderr itself is broken; nothing further to do, but must not crash
182
+ // the caller — there is no third fallback to hand the failure to.
183
+ }
184
+ }
185
+ }
186
+
108
187
  /**
109
188
  * Stub provenance adapter. Always confirms.
110
189
  * Use in tests and local development.
@@ -139,6 +218,7 @@ export function githubProvenance(token, opts = {}) {
139
218
  const retries = opts.retries ?? PROVENANCE_RETRIES;
140
219
  const backoffMs = opts.backoffMs ?? PROVENANCE_BACKOFF_MS;
141
220
  const sleep = opts.sleepImpl ?? defaultSleep;
221
+ const onRetryWarn = opts.onRetryWarn ?? defaultOnRetryWarn;
142
222
  return {
143
223
  /**
144
224
  * @param {object} source - submission.source (provider-scoped run claim)
@@ -204,7 +284,11 @@ export function githubProvenance(token, opts = {}) {
204
284
  // transport-reject branch below (mirrors the scenario fetcher's
205
285
  // retryable-timeout discipline), then throw on exhaustion.
206
286
  if (attempt < retries) {
207
- await sleep(nextBackoffMs(null, attempt + 1, backoffMs));
287
+ const waitMs = nextBackoffMs(null, attempt + 1, backoffMs);
288
+ // F-2a5ddafa: visibility BEFORE the budget exhausts (see
289
+ // defaultOnRetryWarn's doc above for why this is 'warn').
290
+ onRetryWarn({ kind: 'provenance_retry', provider: 'github', attempt: attempt + 1, status_or_reason: 'timeout', next_backoff_ms: waitMs });
291
+ await sleep(waitMs);
208
292
  continue;
209
293
  }
210
294
  throw new Error(`provenance: GitHub API timeout after ${timeoutMs}ms`);
@@ -218,7 +302,9 @@ export function githubProvenance(token, opts = {}) {
218
302
  // and the duplicate guard then blocked a clean resubmission under the
219
303
  // same run_id. `return false` is reserved for HTTP 404 (mirrors GitLab).
220
304
  if (attempt < retries) {
221
- await sleep(nextBackoffMs(null, attempt + 1, backoffMs));
305
+ const waitMs = nextBackoffMs(null, attempt + 1, backoffMs);
306
+ onRetryWarn({ kind: 'provenance_retry', provider: 'github', attempt: attempt + 1, status_or_reason: err && err.message ? err.message : 'network_error', next_backoff_ms: waitMs });
307
+ await sleep(waitMs);
222
308
  continue;
223
309
  }
224
310
  throw new Error(`provenance: network error: ${err.message}`);
@@ -238,7 +324,9 @@ export function githubProvenance(token, opts = {}) {
238
324
  // last 429/5xx throws so a real outage still surfaces (operational).
239
325
  if (resp.status === 404) return false;
240
326
  if (isRetryableStatus(resp.status) && attempt < retries) {
241
- await sleep(nextBackoffMs(resp, attempt + 1, backoffMs));
327
+ const waitMs = nextBackoffMs(resp, attempt + 1, backoffMs);
328
+ onRetryWarn({ kind: 'provenance_retry', provider: 'github', attempt: attempt + 1, status_or_reason: resp.status, next_backoff_ms: waitMs });
329
+ await sleep(waitMs);
242
330
  continue;
243
331
  }
244
332
  throw new Error(`provenance: GitHub API returned ${resp.status}`);
@@ -312,6 +400,7 @@ export function gitlabProvenance(token, opts = {}) {
312
400
  const retries = opts.retries ?? PROVENANCE_RETRIES;
313
401
  const backoffMs = opts.backoffMs ?? PROVENANCE_BACKOFF_MS;
314
402
  const sleep = opts.sleepImpl ?? defaultSleep;
403
+ const onRetryWarn = opts.onRetryWarn ?? defaultOnRetryWarn;
315
404
  return {
316
405
  /**
317
406
  * @param {object} source - submission.source (provider-scoped run claim)
@@ -382,7 +471,9 @@ export function gitlabProvenance(token, opts = {}) {
382
471
  // F-8e72d0de: retry timeouts within the shared budget — peer
383
472
  // discipline with githubProvenance (see that adapter's note).
384
473
  if (attempt < retries) {
385
- await sleep(nextBackoffMs(null, attempt + 1, backoffMs));
474
+ const waitMs = nextBackoffMs(null, attempt + 1, backoffMs);
475
+ onRetryWarn({ kind: 'provenance_retry', provider: 'gitlab', attempt: attempt + 1, status_or_reason: 'timeout', next_backoff_ms: waitMs });
476
+ await sleep(waitMs);
386
477
  continue;
387
478
  }
388
479
  throw new Error(`provenance: GitLab API timeout after ${timeoutMs}ms`);
@@ -390,7 +481,9 @@ export function gitlabProvenance(token, opts = {}) {
390
481
  // F-dac7e08c: transport reject = operational, retried then thrown —
391
482
  // mirrors githubProvenance exactly. `return false` is 404-only.
392
483
  if (attempt < retries) {
393
- await sleep(nextBackoffMs(null, attempt + 1, backoffMs));
484
+ const waitMs = nextBackoffMs(null, attempt + 1, backoffMs);
485
+ onRetryWarn({ kind: 'provenance_retry', provider: 'gitlab', attempt: attempt + 1, status_or_reason: err && err.message ? err.message : 'network_error', next_backoff_ms: waitMs });
486
+ await sleep(waitMs);
394
487
  continue;
395
488
  }
396
489
  throw new Error(`provenance: network error: ${err.message}`);
@@ -408,7 +501,9 @@ export function gitlabProvenance(token, opts = {}) {
408
501
  // budget. 401/403 = non-transient operational, throw immediately.
409
502
  if (resp.status === 404) return false;
410
503
  if (isRetryableStatus(resp.status) && attempt < retries) {
411
- await sleep(nextBackoffMs(resp, attempt + 1, backoffMs));
504
+ const waitMs = nextBackoffMs(resp, attempt + 1, backoffMs);
505
+ onRetryWarn({ kind: 'provenance_retry', provider: 'gitlab', attempt: attempt + 1, status_or_reason: resp.status, next_backoff_ms: waitMs });
506
+ await sleep(waitMs);
412
507
  continue;
413
508
  }
414
509
  throw new Error(`provenance: GitLab API returned ${resp.status}`);
@@ -459,10 +554,34 @@ export const PROVENANCE_ADAPTERS = {
459
554
  /**
460
555
  * Resolve the provenance-adapter factory for a `source.provider`.
461
556
  *
557
+ * F-2965699b: `PROVENANCE_ADAPTERS[provider]` alone resolves inherited
558
+ * `Object.prototype` keys (`provider: 'valueOf'` returns
559
+ * `Object.prototype.valueOf`, a truthy function) — the `??` operator only
560
+ * catches `null`/`undefined`, so the `if (!factory)` unknown-provider gate at
561
+ * this function's ONE caller (`resolveProviderProvenance`, packages/ingest/
562
+ * run.js) never fires for the whole Object.prototype key space, and
563
+ * `factory(token)` goes on to call an unrelated Object.prototype method with
564
+ * an unbound `this`, producing an uncaught TypeError (`valueOf`/`__proto__`)
565
+ * or a misleading downstream error (`constructor`/`toString`/
566
+ * `isPrototypeOf`) instead of the correct "unknown provenance provider"
567
+ * message. This site is reached on FULLY UNTRUSTED input — `submission.
568
+ * source.provider` — BEFORE verify()'s schema gate constrains it to the
569
+ * [github, gitlab] enum.
570
+ *
571
+ * `Object.hasOwn` restricts the lookup to the registry's own properties,
572
+ * matching the idiom `safeGet()` already uses in validators/predicate.js —
573
+ * the two prototype-safety sites now read the same.
574
+ *
462
575
  * @param {string} provider The `source.provider` token (e.g. 'github', 'gitlab').
463
576
  * @returns {((token: string, opts?: object) => { confirm: Function }) | null}
464
- * The adapter factory, or `null` when the provider has no registered adapter.
577
+ * The adapter factory, or `null` when the provider has no registered adapter
578
+ * (including every Object.prototype key — `constructor`, `toString`,
579
+ * `valueOf`, `__proto__`, `hasOwnProperty`, `isPrototypeOf`,
580
+ * `propertyIsEnumerable`, `toLocaleString` — none of which are OWN
581
+ * properties of PROVENANCE_ADAPTERS).
465
582
  */
466
583
  export function provenanceForProvider(provider) {
467
- return PROVENANCE_ADAPTERS[provider] ?? null;
584
+ return typeof provider === 'string' && Object.hasOwn(PROVENANCE_ADAPTERS, provider)
585
+ ? PROVENANCE_ADAPTERS[provider]
586
+ : null;
468
587
  }
@@ -88,13 +88,28 @@ export const RUN_URL_PARSERS = {
88
88
  /**
89
89
  * Decode the owner/repo a run_url attests to, for the given provider.
90
90
  *
91
+ * F-7ce07baa: family sibling of F-2965699b (validators/provenance.js). Plain
92
+ * bracket access resolves inherited Object.prototype keys, so
93
+ * `RUN_URL_PARSERS[provider]` for `provider: '__proto__'` (etc.) returns a
94
+ * truthy Object.prototype method instead of `undefined` — the `if (!parser)`
95
+ * unknown-provider gate cannot fire for that key space, and `parser(runUrl)`
96
+ * goes on to call an unrelated Object.prototype method. This site is reached
97
+ * even EARLIER in the trust chain than provenanceForProvider: verify/
98
+ * index.js's repo-binding guard runs at step 0, before the schema gate, so
99
+ * `submission.source.provider` is raw untrusted input here too.
100
+ * `Object.hasOwn` matches the safeGet()/provenanceForProvider idiom so every
101
+ * prototype-safety site in this codebase reads the same.
102
+ *
91
103
  * @param {string} provider The `source.provider` token (e.g. 'github').
92
104
  * @param {string} runUrl The `source.run_url`.
93
105
  * @returns {RunUrlRepo | null} `{ owner, repo }`, or `null` when the provider
94
- * has no parser or the URL does not match the provider's shape.
106
+ * has no parser (including every Object.prototype key) or the URL does not
107
+ * match the provider's shape.
95
108
  */
96
109
  export function parseRunUrlRepo(provider, runUrl) {
97
- const parser = RUN_URL_PARSERS[provider];
110
+ const parser = typeof provider === 'string' && Object.hasOwn(RUN_URL_PARSERS, provider)
111
+ ? RUN_URL_PARSERS[provider]
112
+ : null;
98
113
  if (!parser) return null;
99
114
  return parser(runUrl);
100
115
  }
@@ -29,6 +29,19 @@ const schemaPath = require.resolve(
29
29
  const submissionSchema = JSON.parse(readFileSync(schemaPath, 'utf-8'));
30
30
  const PROVIDER_ENUM = submissionSchema.properties.source.properties.provider.enum;
31
31
 
32
+ /**
33
+ * F-a2fb624f: sibling table to provenance-registry.test.js's — the pre-fix
34
+ * tripwire here ('returns null for a provider with no parser') only probed
35
+ * 'bitbucket', a NON-prototype key, so it gave zero coverage for the actual
36
+ * F-7ce07baa defect class (every Object.prototype own-property name, which
37
+ * `RUN_URL_PARSERS[provider]` resolved as a truthy inherited method before
38
+ * the Object.hasOwn fix).
39
+ */
40
+ const OBJECT_PROTOTYPE_KEYS = [
41
+ 'constructor', 'toString', 'valueOf', '__proto__',
42
+ 'hasOwnProperty', 'isPrototypeOf', 'propertyIsEnumerable', 'toLocaleString',
43
+ ];
44
+
32
45
  describe('repo-binding guard coverage (verify-B-001)', () => {
33
46
  it('exposes the provider enum it is meant to cover (sanity)', () => {
34
47
  assert.ok(Array.isArray(PROVIDER_ENUM) && PROVIDER_ENUM.length > 0);
@@ -115,4 +128,31 @@ describe('repo-binding guard coverage (verify-B-001)', () => {
115
128
  it('returns null for a provider with no parser (no throw)', () => {
116
129
  assert.equal(parseRunUrlRepo('bitbucket', 'https://bitbucket.org/a/b/pipelines/1'), null);
117
130
  });
131
+
132
+ describe('F-7ce07baa: parseRunUrlRepo never resolves an inherited Object.prototype key', () => {
133
+ for (const key of OBJECT_PROTOTYPE_KEYS) {
134
+ it(`returns null (not the inherited method) for provider="${key}"`, () => {
135
+ // Deletion/emptiness proof: revert parseRunUrlRepo to a bare
136
+ // `RUN_URL_PARSERS[provider]` lookup and this goes red for every key
137
+ // here — each currently resolves a truthy inherited Object.prototype
138
+ // value the `if (!parser)` guard cannot catch, and `parser(runUrl)`
139
+ // then calls an unrelated built-in method.
140
+ assert.equal(
141
+ parseRunUrlRepo(key, 'https://github.com/acme/widget/actions/runs/1'),
142
+ null,
143
+ `provider="${key}" must resolve to null, not an inherited Object.prototype member`
144
+ );
145
+ });
146
+ }
147
+
148
+ it('a non-string provider (object, number, null, undefined) never throws and returns null', () => {
149
+ for (const bad of [{}, 42, null, undefined, ['github']]) {
150
+ assert.equal(
151
+ parseRunUrlRepo(bad, 'https://github.com/acme/widget/actions/runs/1'),
152
+ null,
153
+ `provider=${JSON.stringify(bad)} must resolve to null`
154
+ );
155
+ }
156
+ });
157
+ });
118
158
  });