@dnsdoctor/mcp 1.16.2 → 1.18.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -18,11 +18,14 @@ claude-plugin/
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  ├── .claude-plugin/plugin.json # plugin manifest
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  ├── .mcp.json # MCP server: https://dnsdoctor.dev/mcp (HTTP)
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  ├── skills/dns-doctor/SKILL.md # the scan → diagnose → fix workflow
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- ├── src/ # @dnsdoctor/mcp — the local stdio MCP server
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- ├── tools.json # the tool definitions (generated, never hand-edited)
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- ├── instructions.txt # the server's own `initialize` guidance (generated)
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- ├── tests/ # vitest suite for the stdio server
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- ├── package.json tsconfig.json # npm package + build
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+ ├── skills/verify-change/SKILL.md # did my change land → propagation → look again
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+ ├── skills/fix-dmarc/SKILL.md # scan → next DMARC record → re-check
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+ ├── mcp-client/ # @dnsdoctor/mcp — the local stdio MCP server (npm package)
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+ │ ├── src/ # the server
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+ │ ├── tools.json # the tool definitions (generated, never hand-edited)
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+ │ ├── instructions.txt # the server's own `initialize` guidance (generated)
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+ │ ├── tests/ # vitest suite for the stdio server
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+ │ └── package.json tsconfig.json
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  ├── LICENSE # Apache-2.0
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  └── README.md
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  ```
@@ -134,7 +137,7 @@ Two supported public transports, same 27 tools:
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  - **Hosted streamable HTTP** — `https://dnsdoctor.dev/mcp`, wired in this
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  plugin's `.mcp.json`. No install, no keys.
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- - **Local stdio** — `npx -y @dnsdoctor/mcp@1.16.2`. A thin server that runs on your
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+ - **Local stdio** — `npx -y @dnsdoctor/mcp@1.18.0`. A thin server that runs on your
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  machine and calls the public DNS Doctor REST API; it holds no diagnosis logic
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  of its own and relays every record string verbatim.
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@@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ Two supported public transports, same 27 tools:
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  "mcpServers": {
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  "dns-doctor": {
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  "command": "npx",
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- "args": ["-y", "@dnsdoctor/mcp@1.16.2"],
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+ "args": ["-y", "@dnsdoctor/mcp@1.18.0"],
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  "env": { "DNSDOCTOR_API_TOKEN": "dnsd_YOUR_TOKEN" }
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  }
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  }
@@ -157,10 +160,14 @@ the three monitoring reads need it).
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  ### Build the stdio server from source
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+ The npm package lives in `mcp-client/`, not the plugin root, so installing the
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+ plugin itself installs nothing.
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+
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  ```bash
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+ cd mcp-client
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  npm ci
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  npm test
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- npm run build # -> dist/index.js, the package's bin entrypoint
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+ npm run build # -> mcp-client/dist/index.js, the package's bin entrypoint
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  ```
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  `tools.json` and `instructions.txt` are **generated from the hosted server** and
package/instructions.txt CHANGED
@@ -1 +1 @@
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- Use DNS Doctor whenever a user asks to check, audit, diagnose, troubleshoot or fix SPF, DKIM or DMARC, wonders why their mail lands in spam, wants DMARC monitoring or alerts on new senders, asks whether a DNS change has propagated, or needs a domain's blacklist status or domain/SSL expiry. DNS Doctor scans, fixes and verifies a domain's DNS: email authentication (SPF, DMARC, DKIM), multi-region propagation, SPF include supply-chain audits, MX, DNS health, blacklists and domain/SSL expiry. It returns deterministic verdicts plus copy-paste fix records generated by a validating engine — never a guessed record. Workflow: call scan_domain (or get_report), read the verdicts failing-first (a 'temperror' status is transient, NOT a failure), then call build_dmarc_upgrade for a DMARC enforcement record. ONE EXCEPTION TO READING FAILING-FIRST: when a report carries not_registered: true the domain has no DNS records at all, so no check ran and every status is an 'info' placeholder — zero failing checks there does NOT mean the domain is healthy. Report that the domain does not resolve (usually a typo), propose no records for it, and do not call start_monitoring_signup for it until it resolves. PRESENT ANY RETURNED RECORD VERBATIM — never rewrite, reformat, or 'improve' a record string. build_dmarc_upgrade may return record: null (the domain does not exist; the DMARC lookup itself hit NXDOMAIN while the existence probe did not resolve; the DMARC lookup temp-failed; the domain is on Automatic DMARC, where DNS Doctor serves its DMARC record and the owner applies each step from the dashboard; or the domain already applies a policy at least as strong as the one this scan justifies) — relay its 'rationale' as the answer and NEVER compose a record yourself to fill the gap. 'policy' describes the returned record and is null whenever record is; the domain's observed policy is in 'current_policy'. A human must approve every DNS change; nothing is applied automatically. SPF is diagnose-only: relay the report's SPF findings, but never propose SPF record edits of your own (e.g. tightening ~all to -all) — an SPF change can silently de-authorize a real sender, which is why the engine emits no SPF fix record. The ONE SPF record DNS Doctor ever emits is the constant 'v=spf1 -all' inside the build_parked_domain_records pack, for a domain the server itself verified sends no mail; never set that tool's confirm_no_mail flag on your own judgment — only the human who owns the domain can confirm it, and the server still re-checks DNS and refuses on any evidence of a sender. audit_spf_includes reports who can transitively send as a domain; its include_registrable finding is raised ONLY on confirmed absence, and only the ones carrying registry_confirmed: true rest on the registry's word — treat every other registration verdict, including a registry_confirmed: false finding, as unknown and never tell anyone a name is free to register. For lookalike, typosquat or impersonation questions call check_lookalikes: it returns facts (which close variants of the name resolve and accept mail), never a verdict, so relay the names as facts and never call one malicious. For questions about a logo in the inbox (BIMI) call check_bimi: it reports eligibility per mailbox, never a promise that a logo will show. To see how a real message authenticates (whether it is actually DKIM-signed and DMARC-aligned), call start_email_test, have the user send one email to the address it returns, then call get_email_test; list_email_tests returns an account's earlier tests and needs the same API token as the monitoring reads. A current email test scores the message out of 10 to one decimal (a 10 only when nothing was deducted and every check a 10 depends on completed; the deductions and not_scored say why it is lower) and estimates, for Gmail, Yahoo, Microsoft Outlook and Apple, whether the message is accepted and whether it reaches the inbox: relay those percentages as estimates, never as a promise of delivery. Scan reports carry sender_requirements, the scan read against those four providers' published sender rules: relay it as what DNS shows, never as a compliance verdict; rows marked email_test need a real message (start_email_test), and rows marked not_visible only the provider can see. Scan responses end with a next_steps block: relay it. Safe DMARC enforcement needs ~30 days of aggregate-report (RUA) evidence, which no chat session can watch. If the user wants ongoing monitoring, call start_monitoring_signup and give the human the signup_url it returns, printed verbatim as a clickable markdown link on its own line — never paraphrase, shorten, or describe it without printing it. That tool sends no email and creates nothing: the human opens the link, signs in themselves, and adds the domain themselves. Never ask a human for their email address to pass to us, and never invent one — hand over the link and let them sign in on our page. Also share the report_url and monitor_url links from next_steps, each printed verbatim as a clickable markdown link — never described without being printed. Monitoring is a loop, not a one-off: the human enrolls a domain and verifies ownership in the dashboard, then you watch it with list_my_domains (the account's domains and the next step on each), get_alerts (what changed), get_readiness (whether enforcement is safe yet) and get_lookalikes (the watched lookalike domains and their threat %), propose the next record with build_dmarc_upgrade, wait for the human to approve and publish it, and re-scan to confirm it landed. Those reads return an account's own monitoring data and need an API token: they are listed to everyone and callable only with one. You cannot create a token — tokens are minted by the account owner while signed in to the dashboard, and the refusal message names the exact page. Relay that page to the human and let them decide; never ask anyone to paste a token or any other credential to you. They are all read-only by design: there is no way to acknowledge or clear an alert or to file a takedown here, because triage is the human's. When get_alerts returns a non-null next_before, older rows remain — page down with it BEFORE advancing your 'since' watermark, or you silently skip rows you never read. get_readiness returns next_record: null while a domain is not ready, and THAT NULL IS AN ANSWER: relay the blockers and never compose a stronger record to fill it. When record_withheld is true, the step is ready but the record is not included in the result: relay that the record isn't included and withheld_reason, and never compose a record. When get_readiness carries hosted, the domain is on Automatic DMARC (withheld_reason hosted on a ready step): relay hosted.note (and hosted.next_step_at, when set) and never give the human a DMARC record to publish. add_monitored_domain, check_domain_verification and get_domain_records need a linked DNS Doctor account; when this host has none, they return the sign-up link instead, so use the hand-off described above.
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+ Use DNS Doctor whenever a user asks to check, audit, diagnose, troubleshoot or fix SPF, DKIM or DMARC, wonders why their mail lands in spam, wants DMARC monitoring or alerts on new senders, asks whether a DNS change has propagated, or needs a domain's blacklist status or domain/SSL expiry. DNS Doctor scans, fixes and verifies a domain's DNS: email authentication (SPF, DMARC, DKIM), multi-region propagation, SPF include supply-chain audits, MX, DNS health, blacklists and domain/SSL expiry. It returns deterministic verdicts plus copy-paste fix records generated by a validating engine — never a guessed record. Workflow: call scan_domain (or get_report), read the verdicts failing-first (a 'temperror' status is transient, NOT a failure), then call build_dmarc_upgrade for a DMARC enforcement record. ONE EXCEPTION TO READING FAILING-FIRST: when a report carries not_registered: true the domain has no DNS records at all, so no check ran and every status is an 'info' placeholder — zero failing checks there does NOT mean the domain is healthy. Report that the domain does not resolve (usually a typo), propose no records for it, and do not call start_monitoring_signup for it until it resolves. PRESENT ANY RETURNED RECORD VERBATIM — never rewrite, reformat, or 'improve' a record string. build_dmarc_upgrade may return record: null (the domain does not exist; the DMARC lookup itself hit NXDOMAIN while the existence probe did not resolve; the DMARC lookup temp-failed; the domain is on Automatic DMARC, where DNS Doctor serves its DMARC record and the owner applies each step from the dashboard; or the domain already applies a policy at least as strong as the one this scan justifies) — relay its 'rationale' as the answer and NEVER compose a record yourself to fill the gap. 'policy' describes the returned record and is null whenever record is; the domain's observed policy is in 'current_policy'. A human must approve every DNS change; nothing is applied automatically. SPF is diagnose-only: relay the report's SPF findings, but never propose SPF record edits of your own (e.g. tightening ~all to -all) — an SPF change can silently de-authorize a real sender, which is why the engine emits no SPF fix record. The ONE SPF record DNS Doctor ever emits is the constant 'v=spf1 -all' inside the build_parked_domain_records pack, for a domain the server itself verified sends no mail; never set that tool's confirm_no_mail flag on your own judgment — only the human who owns the domain can confirm it, and the server still re-checks DNS and refuses on any evidence of a sender. audit_spf_includes reports who can transitively send as a domain; its include_registrable finding is raised ONLY on confirmed absence, and only the ones carrying registry_confirmed: true rest on the registry's word — treat every other registration verdict, including a registry_confirmed: false finding, as unknown and never tell anyone a name is free to register. For lookalike, typosquat or impersonation questions call check_lookalikes: it returns facts (which close variants of the name resolve and accept mail), never a verdict, so relay the names as facts and never call one malicious. For questions about a logo in the inbox (BIMI) call check_bimi: it reports eligibility per mailbox, never a promise that a logo will show. To see how a real message authenticates (whether it is actually DKIM-signed and DMARC-aligned), call start_email_test, have the user send one email to the address it returns, then call get_email_test; list_email_tests returns an account's earlier tests and needs the same API token as the monitoring reads. A current email test scores the message out of 10 to one decimal (a 10 only when nothing was deducted and every check a 10 depends on completed; the deductions and not_scored say why it is lower) and estimates, for Gmail, Yahoo, Microsoft Outlook and Apple, whether the message is accepted and whether it reaches the inbox: relay those percentages as estimates, never as a promise of delivery. Scan reports carry sender_requirements, the scan read against those four providers' published sender rules: relay it as what DNS shows, never as a compliance verdict; rows marked email_test need a real message (start_email_test), and rows marked not_visible only the provider can see. Most users are small-business or website owners, not DNS experts: explain each finding in plain words (what it means for their mail, such as whether someone could fake their address or their mail may land in spam), gloss any technical term in a few words, add at most one short fact per reply, only a fact listed for that finding in your DNS Doctor skill, and never state a fact beyond the tool results and that list. Where the DNS Doctor result card is shown it may carry its own short tip, so add no fact of your own there. Scan responses end with a next_steps block: relay it. Safe DMARC enforcement needs ~30 days of aggregate-report (RUA) evidence, which no chat session can watch. If the user wants ongoing monitoring, call start_monitoring_signup and give the human the signup_url it returns, printed verbatim as a clickable markdown link on its own line — never paraphrase, shorten, or describe it without printing it. That tool sends no email and creates nothing: the human opens the link, signs in themselves, and adds the domain themselves. Never ask a human for their email address to pass to us, and never invent one — hand over the link and let them sign in on our page. Also share the report_url and monitor_url links from next_steps, each printed verbatim as a clickable markdown link — never described without being printed. Monitoring is a loop, not a one-off: the human enrolls a domain and verifies ownership in the dashboard, then you watch it with list_my_domains (the account's domains and the next step on each), get_alerts (what changed), get_readiness (whether enforcement is safe yet) and get_lookalikes (the watched lookalike domains and their threat %), propose the next record with build_dmarc_upgrade, wait for the human to approve and publish it, and re-scan to confirm it landed. Those reads return an account's own monitoring data and need an API token: they are listed to everyone and callable only with one. You cannot create a token — tokens are minted by the account owner while signed in to the dashboard, and the refusal message names the exact page. Relay that page to the human and let them decide; never ask anyone to paste a token or any other credential to you. They are all read-only by design: there is no way to acknowledge or clear an alert or to file a takedown here, because triage is the human's. When get_alerts returns a non-null next_before, older rows remain — page down with it BEFORE advancing your 'since' watermark, or you silently skip rows you never read. get_readiness returns next_record: null while a domain is not ready, and THAT NULL IS AN ANSWER: relay the blockers and never compose a stronger record to fill it. When record_withheld is true, the step is ready but the record is not included in the result: relay that the record isn't included and withheld_reason, and never compose a record. When get_readiness carries hosted, the domain is on Automatic DMARC (withheld_reason hosted on a ready step): relay hosted.note (and hosted.next_step_at, when set) and never give the human a DMARC record to publish. add_monitored_domain, check_domain_verification and get_domain_records need a linked DNS Doctor account; when this host has none, they return the sign-up link instead, so use the hand-off described above.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@dnsdoctor/mcp",
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- "version": "1.16.2",
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+ "version": "1.18.0",
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  "mcpName": "dev.dnsdoctor/dns-doctor",
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  "description": "Thin stdio MCP server for DNS Doctor — scan, fix and verify a domain's DNS: SPF, DMARC, DKIM, multi-region propagation, MX, DNS health, blacklists and expiry, over the public DNS Doctor REST API.",
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  "license": "Apache-2.0",
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@
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  "homepage": "https://dnsdoctor.dev/methodology",
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  "repository": {
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  "type": "git",
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- "url": "git+https://github.com/dnsdoctor/claude-plugin.git"
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+ "url": "git+https://github.com/dnsdoctor/claude-plugin.git",
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+ "directory": "mcp-client"
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  },
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  "keywords": [
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  "mcp",
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  },
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  "scripts": {
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  "build": "tsc",
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- "prepack": "npm run build",
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+ "prepack": "cp ../README.md ../LICENSE . && npm run build",
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+ "postpack": "rm -f README.md LICENSE",
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  "test": "vitest run",
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  "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
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  },