@directive-run/core 1.12.0 → 1.14.0

package/dist/index-DErb8sV3.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+import { F as FactPredicate, C as ClauseResult, P as Plugin, M as ModuleSchema } from './plugins-BIzXaYbg.cjs';
+
+/**
+ * Audit-ledger type definitions — entry shapes, sink interface, query
+ * filter, verify result, and plugin options. Pure types + the two
+ * schema-version constants (`HASH_ALGO`, `SCHEMA_VERSION`) that are
+ * referenced by the entry shape.
+ *
+ * Kept free of runtime imports so the hash/freeze/sink modules can pull
+ * types from here without a cycle.
+ */
+
+/** Hash algorithm tag — bumped if canonicalization or hash function changes. */
+declare const HASH_ALGO: "djb2-1";
+/**
+ * Entry schema version. Bumped if `AuditEntry` field shape changes in
+ * a way that breaks back-compat parsers. Persisted on every entry so
+ * exports remain self-describing across library upgrades. (F-5)
+ */
+declare const SCHEMA_VERSION: 1;
+type AuditEntryKind = "constraint.evaluate" | "resolver.write.rejected" | "fact.change" | "resolver.complete" | "resolver.error" | "system.init" | "system.start" | "system.stop" | "system.destroy" | "system.snapshot" | "system.history.navigate" | "system.truncated" | "system.entry-erased" | "system.subject-erased";
+/**
+ * Internal sentinel symbol type. The actual symbol VALUE lives in
+ * `hash.ts` and is never exported from this folder's public surface —
+ * but the TYPE must be referenceable here so `AuditEntryBase` can
+ * declare the optional `__internal` field.
+ *
+ * We use `symbol` rather than `typeof LEDGER_INTERNAL_TOKEN` because
+ * importing the symbol value into types.ts would either re-export it
+ * (defeating the defense) or create a circular import. The runtime
+ * check in `verify()` compares against the actual symbol reference.
+ */
+type LedgerInternalSentinel = symbol;
+interface AuditEntryBase {
+    /** Monotonic sequence number, starting at 0. */
+    readonly seq: number;
+    /** Wall-clock timestamp (ms epoch). */
+    readonly ts: number;
+    /** Discriminator. */
+    readonly kind: AuditEntryKind;
+    /** Hash of the previous entry's full payload. null on the genesis entry. */
+    readonly prevHash: string | null;
+    /**
+     * Hash algorithm tag identifying the canonicalization + hash
+     * function in use. Bumped if the algorithm or canonical form
+     * changes, so exports remain verifiable across versions.
+     */
+    readonly hashAlgo: typeof HASH_ALGO;
+    /**
+     * Entry schema version — bumped if any `AuditEntry` field shape
+     * changes in a way that breaks back-compat. Pair with `hashAlgo`
+     * when migrating older exports. (F-5)
+     */
+    readonly schemaVersion: typeof SCHEMA_VERSION;
+    /**
+     * Private sentinel — present (and equal to the in-module token) only
+     * on legitimate tombstones minted by `ledger.erase()`. Filtered out
+     * of all public read paths (`query`, `recent`, `toJSON`, etc.) so
+     * consumers never see or copy it. (N7)
+     *
+     * NOT serialized. NOT exported. Forging this from outside the module
+     * is impossible without the symbol reference; `verify()` rejects any
+     * `system.entry-erased` entry that lacks it.
+     *
+     * @internal
+     */
+    readonly __internal?: LedgerInternalSentinel;
+}
+type AuditEntry = (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "constraint.evaluate";
+    constraintId: string;
+    active: boolean;
+    /** Cached at ledger start from `system.inspect().constraints[].whenSpec`. Refreshed on `register()`/`assign()`/`unregister()`. May be undefined for function-form constraints (see `whenSource`). PII operands redacted unless `capturePII: true`. */
+    whenSpec?: FactPredicate<unknown>;
+    whenExplain?: readonly ClauseResult[];
+    /**
+     * For function-form constraints (no `whenSpec`), a tamper-evident
+     * identity for the function. We DO NOT capture the raw source —
+     * closures routinely reference secrets, API keys, or PII (e.g.
+     * `if (apiKey === "sk-live-xxx")`) and a preview would leak them
+     * into the audit log. Instead, we capture a djb2 hash of the
+     * stringified function (`hashObject(String(fn))`). Auditors can
+     * detect "the function changed between deploys" by comparing
+     * hashes across entries, without ever seeing the function body.
+     *
+     * Informational only — NOT replayable. (N5, M22)
+     */
+    whenSource?: {
+        kind: "function";
+        sourceHash: string;
+    };
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "resolver.write.rejected";
+    rejection: "rejection" | "summary";
+    resolverId: string;
+    requirementId: string;
+    reason: string;
+    fact?: string;
+    expected?: unknown;
+    actual?: unknown;
+    dropped?: number;
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "fact.change";
+    key: string;
+    prior: unknown;
+    next: unknown;
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "resolver.complete";
+    resolverId: string;
+    requirementId: string;
+    duration: number;
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "resolver.error";
+    resolverId: string;
+    requirementId: string;
+    error: string;
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "system.init" | "system.start" | "system.stop" | "system.destroy";
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "system.snapshot";
+    snapshotId: number;
+    trigger: string;
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "system.history.navigate";
+    from: number;
+    to: number;
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "system.truncated";
+    droppedSeq: number;
+    droppedCount: number;
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "system.entry-erased";
+    originalKind: AuditEntryKind;
+    erasedAt: number;
+}) | (AuditEntryBase & {
+    kind: "system.subject-erased";
+    /**
+     * djb2 hash of the filter (via `hashObject(filter)`). PII-safe —
+     * the raw filter values never land in the ledger. Pair with
+     * `filterShape` to see which filter fields were used. (N2)
+     */
+    filterHash: string;
+    /**
+     * Stripped-values shape of the filter — captures WHICH fields were
+     * present without recording their values. (N2)
+     */
+    filterShape: {
+        factPath: boolean;
+        constraintId: boolean;
+        kind: AuditEntryKind | readonly AuditEntryKind[] | undefined;
+        changedBetween: "[range]" | undefined;
+    };
+    erased: number;
+});
+interface QueryFilter {
+    /** Exact-match fact path. */
+    factPath?: string;
+    /** Filter by constraint id. */
+    constraintId?: string;
+    /** Filter by entry kind. */
+    kind?: AuditEntryKind | readonly AuditEntryKind[];
+    /** Time range as `[startMs, endMs]`, ISO strings, or epoch numbers. */
+    changedBetween?: [string | number | Date, string | number | Date];
+    /** Maximum entries returned. Default 1000. */
+    limit?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Verify result — chain valid OR a break with full context for tamper visualization.
+ *
+ * Erased entries (via `ledger.erase()`) appear as legitimate chain breaks —
+ * `verify()` reports them in `erasedSeqs` and continues the walk from the
+ * tombstone's own hash. Real tamper still surfaces as `valid: false`.
+ *
+ * Forged tombstones (a caller writes `kind: "system.entry-erased"`
+ * directly via `sink.write()` to mask tamper as erasure) are detected:
+ * legitimate tombstones carry an in-module sentinel that forgeries
+ * cannot mint, so `verify()` reports them as tamper. (N7)
+ */
+type VerifyResult = {
+    valid: true;
+    entryCount: number;
+    /**
+     * Seq numbers of entries legitimately broken by `erase()`
+     * tombstones. NOT timestamps — each entry pairs this seq with
+     * the per-entry `system.entry-erased.erasedAt` (ms epoch) for
+     * the timestamp. Empty unless the chain contains erasures.
+     * (N1 + M1; renamed from `erasedAt` in R3)
+     */
+    erasedSeqs?: number[];
+} | {
+    valid: false;
+    brokenAt: number;
+    expectedHash: string;
+    actualHash: string;
+    entry: AuditEntry;
+    /**
+     * Human-readable reason for the break — populated for cases
+     * where the cause is more specific than "hash mismatch" (e.g.
+     * tombstone forgery detected via missing sentinel).
+     */
+    reason?: string;
+};
+interface AuditLedgerSink {
+    write(entry: AuditEntry): void;
+    query(filter: QueryFilter): readonly AuditEntry[];
+    recent(n: number): readonly AuditEntry[];
+    forFact(path: string, opts?: {
+        limit?: number;
+    }): readonly AuditEntry[];
+    forConstraint(id: string, opts?: {
+        limit?: number;
+    }): readonly AuditEntry[];
+    toJSON(): {
+        entries: readonly AuditEntry[];
+        capturedAt: number;
+    };
+    clear(): void;
+    destroy(): void;
+    /**
+     * Replace matching entries with marker entries IN PLACE (preserving seq +
+     * prevHash so the hash chain still verifies — the marker is a
+     * tombstone in chain terms; the chain break is what makes erasure
+     * visible to `verify()`). v1 implementation matches on the same
+     * `QueryFilter` shape used by `query()`. Returns the count of entries
+     * replaced.
+     *
+     * WARNING: erases only from this sink. Any external copies (toJSON
+     * exports, downstream pipelines) must be erased separately.
+     */
+    erase?(filter: QueryFilter, markerEntryFactory: (e: AuditEntry) => AuditEntry): number;
+    /**
+     * Optional hook fired by the sink BEFORE shifting the oldest entry
+     * out of a bounded ring buffer. The ledger plugin uses this to emit
+     * a `system.truncated` marker so an auditor sees that the log was
+     * truncated and where. (M23)
+     */
+    onTruncate?(handler: (droppedSeq: number, droppedCount: number) => void): void;
+}
+interface AuditLedgerOptions {
+    /** Sink to write entries to. Default: in-memory ring buffer (capacity 10k). */
+    sink?: AuditLedgerSink;
+    /**
+     * Whether to capture raw fact values (`prior`/`next` on fact.change,
+     * `actual` in whenExplain). Default `false` — PII-tagged facts are
+     * redacted by default. Set `true` to opt out of redaction.
+     */
+    capturePII?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Optional caller-supplied redactor. Runs AFTER the default
+     * pii-tag-based redaction. Useful for additional sanitization.
+     */
+    redact?: (entry: AuditEntry) => AuditEntry;
+}
+interface AuditLedger {
+    /** The plugin to pass to `createSystem({ plugins: [...] })`. */
+    readonly plugin: Plugin<ModuleSchema>;
+    /** Query entries matching the filter. */
+    query(filter?: QueryFilter): readonly AuditEntry[];
+    /** Most recent N entries (chronological). */
+    recent(n: number): readonly AuditEntry[];
+    /** All entries that touch this fact path (exact match). */
+    forFact(path: string, opts?: {
+        limit?: number;
+    }): readonly AuditEntry[];
+    /** All entries for this constraint id. */
+    forConstraint(id: string, opts?: {
+        limit?: number;
+    }): readonly AuditEntry[];
+    /** Full ledger snapshot for export / serialization. */
+    toJSON(): {
+        entries: readonly AuditEntry[];
+        capturedAt: number;
+    };
+    /**
+     * Walk the hash chain genesis → tip. Returns `{ valid: true }` iff
+     * every entry's `prevHash` matches the (sync, djb2-based) hash of
+     * the previous entry. On break, returns the index of the first
+     * broken link plus the expected vs actual hashes — feed into a
+     * "TAMPERED" visualization.
+     *
+     * Erased entries (via `ledger.erase()`) appear as legitimate chain
+     * breaks — `verify()` reports them in `erasedSeqs` and continues
+     * the walk from the tombstone's actual hash. Real tamper still
+     * surfaces as `valid: false`. (N1 + M1)
+     *
+     * Forged tombstones — `kind: "system.entry-erased"` entries written
+     * directly via `sink.write()` to mask tamper — are detected as
+     * forgery. Legitimate tombstones carry an in-module sentinel that
+     * forgeries cannot mint. (N7)
+     *
+     * v1 ships sync djb2 only. `verify({ strong: true })` is reserved
+     * for v2 (SHA-256) and THROWS today — there is no silent fallback.
+     * Call `verify()` (no args) for tamper detection.
+     */
+    verify(opts?: {
+        strong?: boolean;
+    }): VerifyResult;
+    /**
+     * Per-subject erasure (GDPR Art. 17 stub). Replaces matching entries
+     * in this sink with `system.entry-erased` tombstones (preserving
+     * seq + prevHash so verify() can resync), then appends a chained
+     * `system.subject-erased` marker entry that summarises the erasure.
+     *
+     * Returns `{ erased, markerEntry }` — `markerEntry` is the chained
+     * `system.subject-erased` summary (the N per-entry tombstones live
+     * in the sink, not on the return value). (M7)
+     *
+     * When `erased === 0` (filter matched nothing), `markerEntry` is
+     * `null` and no marker is emitted into the chain — avoids polluting
+     * the audit trail with empty "erased: 0" records. (MAJOR-3)
+     *
+     * WARNING: v1 erases only from THIS sink. External copies (toJSON
+     * exports, downstream pipelines, persisted backups) must be erased
+     * separately. (C8)
+     */
+    erase(filter: QueryFilter): {
+        erased: number;
+        markerEntry: AuditEntry | null;
+    };
+    /** Empty the sink. */
+    clear(): void;
+    /** Unsubscribe + drop the sink. */
+    destroy(): void;
+}
+
+/**
+ * `memorySink()` — bounded ring-buffer implementation of
+ * `AuditLedgerSink`. Drops the oldest entry past `capacity`
+ * (default 10,000), exposes a truncation hook so the ledger plugin
+ * can emit a `system.truncated` marker before the shift, and
+ * supports in-place tombstone erasure for GDPR Art. 17.
+ *
+ * Pure storage layer — no hash chain awareness, no PII redaction.
+ * The plugin in `./index.ts` owns those concerns and routes them
+ * through this sink via `write()` / `erase()`.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * In-memory bounded ring-buffer sink. Drops oldest entries past
+ * `capacity` (default 10,000). Use this as the default sink for dev,
+ * tests, and StackBlitz demos.
+ */
+declare function memorySink(opts?: {
+    capacity?: number;
+}): AuditLedgerSink;
+
+/**
+ * createAuditLedger — append-only, queryable, hash-chained
+ * (djb2; SHA-256 reserved for v2) audit of every state change. For
+ * forensics and "show me why this user got that decision."
+ *
+ * Captures (per observation event):
+ *
+ *   - `constraint.evaluate` → { whenSpec, whenExplain, active, whenSource? }
+ *   - `resolver.write.rejected` (rejection + summary kinds)
+ *   - `fact.change` → { key, prior, next }
+ *   - `resolver.complete` → { resolverId, requirementId, duration }
+ *   - `system.init` / `system.start` / `system.stop` / `system.destroy`
+ *   - `system.snapshot` / `system.history.navigate` (lifecycle markers)
+ *   - `system.truncated` (ring-buffer overflow marker)
+ *   - `system.entry-erased` / `system.subject-erased` (GDPR Art.17 stub)
+ *
+ * PII redaction: by default, fact keys whose meta carries the `pii`
+ * tag (via `system.meta.byTag("pii")`) have their values replaced with
+ * `"[redacted]"` in `whenExplain.actual`, `fact.change.prior`,
+ * `fact.change.next`, and the cached `whenSpec` operands. Opt out with
+ * `capturePII: true`.
+ *
+ * Folder layout:
+ *   types.ts            — public type surface + version stamps
+ *   hash.ts             — djb2 dispatch + freeze helper + INTERNAL TOKEN
+ *   sink.ts             — memorySink() ring buffer
+ *   predicate-redact.ts — PII-aware redactWhenSpec
+ *   verify.ts           — tombstone-aware chain walk
+ *   index.ts (this)     — createAuditLedger factory + plugin wiring
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Create an audit ledger that subscribes to the given system's
+ * observation stream. Returns a `Plugin` to install + a query/verify
+ * API for the ledger.
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * import { createAuditLedger } from "@directive-run/core/plugins";
+ *
+ * const ledger = createAuditLedger();
+ * const system = createSystem({ module, plugins: [ledger.plugin] });
+ * system.start();
+ *
+ * // Six months later — auditor asks "what changed cart-total in March?"
+ * ledger.query({
+ *   factPath: "cartTotal",
+ *   changedBetween: ["2026-03-01", "2026-04-01"],
+ * });
+ *
+ * // Verify nobody tampered with the ledger
+ * const verdict = await ledger.verify();
+ * if (!verdict.valid) {
+ *   console.error("Tamper at entry", verdict.brokenAt);
+ * }
+ * ```
+ */
+declare function createAuditLedger(opts?: AuditLedgerOptions): AuditLedger;
+
+export { type AuditEntry as A, type QueryFilter as Q, type VerifyResult as V, type AuditEntryKind as a, type AuditLedger as b, type AuditLedgerOptions as c, type AuditLedgerSink as d, createAuditLedger as e, memorySink as m };