@didit-protocol/sdk-node 1.0.1 → 2.1.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -209,77 +209,6 @@ declare abstract class APIResource {
     constructor(client: APIClient);
 }
 
-/** All fields are optional. Sending an empty body creates an application with a default name. */
-interface AccountApplicationsCreateParams {
-    /** Application display name. Defaults to `"<organization name> App"`. */
-    name?: string;
-    /** Website or app URL associated with this application. */
-    website_url?: string;
-    /** Allowed redirect URIs for OAuth-style and verification redirect flows. */
-    redirect_uris?: string[];
-    /** Terms of service URL shown in the verification flow. */
-    terms_url?: string;
-    /** Privacy policy URL shown in the verification flow. */
-    privacy_url?: string;
-    /** Internal description for the application (not shown to end users). */
-    description?: string;
-}
-interface AccountApplicationsListParams {
-    /** Number of applications per page. Defaults to 50. */
-    limit?: number;
-    /** Number of applications to skip before the page starts. Defaults to 0. */
-    offset?: number;
-}
-/** PATCH body for application metadata. Send only the fields you want to change; omitted fields are preserved. `uuid`, `client_id`, and `api_key` cannot be updated. `products` is read-only: a `products` key in the body is ignored. */
-interface AccountApplicationsUpdateParams {
-    /** Application display name. */
-    name?: string;
-    /** Website or app URL associated with this application. */
-    website_url?: string;
-    /** Allowed redirect URIs for OAuth-style and verification redirect flows. */
-    redirect_uris?: string[];
-    /** Terms of service URL shown in the verification flow. */
-    terms_url?: string;
-    /** Privacy policy URL shown in the verification flow. */
-    privacy_url?: string;
-    /** Internal description for the application. */
-    description?: string;
-}
-interface AccountLoginParams {
-    email: string;
-    password: string;
-}
-interface AccountOrganizationsListParams {
-    /** Page size. Defaults to 50. */
-    limit?: number;
-    /** Zero-based offset of the first result. */
-    offset?: number;
-}
-interface AccountRegisterParams {
-    /** Any valid email address (personal, work, alias). Used as the unique account identifier. */
-    email: string;
-    /** Minimum 8 characters. Must contain at least one uppercase letter (`A-Z`), one lowercase letter (`a-z`), one digit (`0-9`), and one special character from `!@#$%^&*()_+-=[]{}|;:,.<>?`. Validation reports one failed rule at a time. */
-    password: string;
-}
-interface AccountResendOtpParams {
-    /** Email of the pending (unverified) account. */
-    email: string;
-    /** Password chosen at registration. */
-    password: string;
-}
-interface AccountResendOtpResponse {
-    /** Always `A new verification code has been sent to your email.` */
-    message: string;
-    /** The address the code was sent to, normalized: lowercased, with any `+tag` removed from the local part (`Dev+test@Example.com` becomes `dev@example.com`). */
-    email: string;
-}
-interface AccountVerifyEmailParams {
-    /** Email used during `POST /programmatic/register/`. */
-    email: string;
-    /** 6-character alphanumeric code from the verification email. Codes expire 10 minutes after the most recent code was sent. */
-    code: string;
-}
-
 /** How current the AML datasets were when a screening ran. Dates are never estimated. */
 interface AMLDatasetFreshness {
     /** When Didit read the dataset catalog this freshness comes from. */
@@ -507,7 +436,7 @@ interface AMLScreening {
     warnings?: AMLScreeningWarnings[];
 }
 interface AMLScreeningHits {
-    /** Unique identifier of the match */
+    /** Didit's stable identifier for the hit: `hit_` followed by 24 hexadecimal characters. The same matched entity keeps the same `id` when the subject is screened again. Pass it as `hit_id` to the AML hit review endpoints. */
     id?: string;
     /** Source URL for the match */
     url?: string;
@@ -523,8 +452,8 @@ interface AMLScreeningHits {
     target?: boolean | null;
     /** Caption or title of the match */
     caption?: string;
-    /** List of dataset categories where the match was found. Indicates whether the entity appeared in PEP lists (with level), sanctions databases, adverse media, warnings/regulatory enforcement, or other compliance datasets. */
-    datasets?: ("PEP" | "PEP Level 1" | "PEP Level 2" | "PEP Level 3" | "PEP Level 4" | "Sanctions" | "Adverse Media" | "Warnings and Regulatory Enforcement" | "Fitness and Probity" | "SIP" | "SIE" | "Insolvency" | (string & {}))[];
+    /** List of dataset categories where the match was found. Indicates whether the entity appeared in PEP lists (with level), sanctions databases, adverse media, warnings/regulatory enforcement, or other compliance datasets. `Other Lists` when the entity's source states none of these categories. */
+    datasets?: ("PEP" | "PEP Level 1" | "PEP Level 2" | "PEP Level 3" | "PEP Level 4" | "Sanctions" | "Adverse Media" | "Warnings and Regulatory Enforcement" | "Fitness and Probity" | "SIP" | "SIE" | "Insolvency" | "Other Lists" | (string & {}))[];
     /** Additional features of the match */
     features?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** RCA name if applicable */
@@ -746,6 +675,8 @@ interface AMLScreeningHitsWarningMatchesAdditionalDataDataCaseDetails {
 interface AMLScreeningRun {
     /** Identifier of this screening run. */
     uuid: string;
+    /** The monitoring run this screening belongs to. Every verification screened in the same run shares it. */
+    run_id: string;
     /** When this subject's re-screen finished. Results are ordered by it, newest first. */
     completed_at: Date;
     /** When the monitoring batch this re-screen belongs to started. */
@@ -762,6 +693,10 @@ interface AMLScreeningRun {
     score: number | null;
     /** Number of hits this run left the check in. */
     total_hits: number | null;
+    /** Number of hits this run found that the check did not have before it. `0` when nothing new was found; `null` when the run failed or was recorded before this count existed. */
+    new_hits: number | null;
+    /** Number of entities this run screened for the verification: `1` when the subject was screened, `0` when the run failed. */
+    entities_screened: number;
     /** Dataset freshness behind this run, or `null` when no dates were available. */
     dataset_freshness: AMLDatasetFreshness | null;
 }
@@ -773,7 +708,7 @@ interface AMLScreeningScreenedData {
 }
 interface AMLScreeningWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Within an AML screening this is typically `AML`, but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     log_type?: string;
@@ -815,7 +750,7 @@ interface AddressValidationResultAddress {
     /** ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country code. */
     country?: string | null;
 }
-/** Full application record. `uuid`, `client_id`, and `api_key` never change after creation. */
+/** Full application record. `uuid`, `client_id`, and `api_key` never change after creation. `data_location` doesn't either, except once on the live application created with your organization, before it is used (see the update request). */
 interface Application {
     /** Application UUID. Use as `{app_id}` in subsequent calls. */
     uuid?: string;
@@ -836,6 +771,8 @@ interface Application {
     /** Internal description for the application (not shown to end users). */
     description?: string | null;
     created_at?: Date;
+    /** Where the application's verification data is stored and processed, chosen when the application is created. `eu` is the European Union (Ireland), the default. `au` (Australia, Sydney) and `mx` (Mexico) are coming soon: a request that names them answers 400 `This data location is not available yet.` An organization's Sandbox application is always in the European Union. */
+    data_location?: ApplicationDataLocation;
     /** The application's products. Always all three, in this order: `identity`, `transactions`, `authentication`. A new application has `identity` enabled with every module on, and `transactions` and `authentication` disabled. Read-only: a `products` key in a create or update body is ignored. */
     products?: ApplicationProduct[];
 }
@@ -1040,6 +977,33 @@ interface ApplicationAnalyticsSummary {
     resubmission_time_series: ApplicationAnalyticsResubmissionPoint[];
     original_status_time_series: ApplicationAnalyticsOriginalStatusPoint[];
 }
+/** Today's verifications by local hour against the same weekday last week. */
+interface ApplicationAnalyticsToday {
+    /** The IANA time zone the day and its hours are in. */
+    time_zone: string;
+    /** Today in that time zone. */
+    date: string;
+    /** The local hour it is now. */
+    current_hour: number;
+    /** The comparison day: the same weekday one week before. */
+    previous_date: string;
+    /** Verifications created today, per local hour from 00:00. The hours still to come are 0. */
+    hours: number[];
+    /** Verifications created on the comparison day, per local hour from 00:00. */
+    previous_hours: number[];
+    /** Verifications created today so far. */
+    total: number;
+    /** Verifications created on the comparison day up to the same local time. */
+    previous_total_so_far: number;
+    /** Of today's verifications, how many are approved, waiting in review and declined now. The rest are not finished yet. */
+    outcomes: ApplicationAnalyticsTodayOutcomes;
+}
+/** Of today's verifications, how many are approved, waiting in review and declined now. The rest are not finished yet. */
+interface ApplicationAnalyticsTodayOutcomes {
+    approved: number;
+    in_review: number;
+    declined: number;
+}
 interface ApplicationAnalyticsVerificationTimePoint {
     /** Period key: `YYYY-MM-DD` for a day, the Monday of a week, or `YYYY-MM` for a month, following `grouping_mode`. */
     date?: string;
@@ -1162,7 +1126,11 @@ interface ApplicationCredentialsSummary {
     client_id?: string;
     /** Use this as `x-api-key` on every verification API call. New keys start with `sk_live_` (live application) or `sk_test_` (sandbox application), followed by 43 URL-safe characters (letters, digits, `-` and `_`). Keys created before this format have no prefix and keep working unchanged. */
     api_key?: string;
+    /** Where the application's verification data is stored and processed, chosen when the application is created. `eu` is the European Union (Ireland), the default. `au` (Australia, Sydney) and `mx` (Mexico) are coming soon: a request that names them answers 400 `This data location is not available yet.` An organization's Sandbox application is always in the European Union. */
+    data_location?: ApplicationDataLocation;
 }
+/** Where the application's verification data is stored and processed, chosen when the application is created. `eu` is the European Union (Ireland), the default. `au` (Australia, Sydney) and `mx` (Mexico) are coming soon: a request that names them answers 400 `This data location is not available yet.` An organization's Sandbox application is always in the European Union. */
+type ApplicationDataLocation = "eu" | "au" | "mx" | (string & {});
 /** One product of an application and its state. Read-only: the application endpoints return it and ignore it in a request body. */
 interface ApplicationProduct {
     /** `identity` (Identity verification), `transactions` (Transaction monitoring) or `authentication` (Authentication). */
@@ -1429,6 +1397,13 @@ interface BankVerificationResultRoute {
     /** The data the connection asked for, for example `ownership` or `balances`. */
     requested_scopes?: string[];
 }
+/** When the live biometric data of this session is deleted. */
+interface BiometricRetention {
+    /** Codes of the US states whose biometric rules set a deletion limit for this person (`US` when the state is unknown). Empty when none applies. */
+    jurisdictions: string[];
+    /** The date the live biometric data (face images and templates) of this session is deleted, from your application's retention setting and, where one applies, the legal limit for the person's jurisdiction. `null` when no date applies yet. */
+    deletes_at: Date | null;
+}
 /** One blocklisted face, identity document, phone number or email address of a verification session. Fields that do not apply to the item's `type` are `null`. */
 interface BlocklistedItem {
     /** What was blocklisted. */
@@ -2432,6 +2407,14 @@ type DigitalIdWalletApiEudiWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum = "AUT" | "BEL" |
 type DigitalIdWalletApiFranceconnectWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum = "FRA" | (string & {});
 /** * `FIN` - FIN */
 type DigitalIdWalletApiFtnWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum = "FIN" | (string & {});
+/**
+ * * `USA` - USA
+ * * `GBR` - GBR
+ * * `BRA` - BRA
+ * * `SGP` - SGP
+ * * `TWN` - TWN
+ */
+type DigitalIdWalletApiGoogleWalletWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum = "USA" | "GBR" | "BRA" | "SGP" | "TWN" | (string & {});
 /** * `BRA` - BRA */
 type DigitalIdWalletApiGovbrWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum = "BRA" | (string & {});
 /** * `EST` - EST */
@@ -2441,8 +2424,9 @@ type DigitalIdWalletApiIdinWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum = "NLD" | (string
 /**
  * * `redirect` - redirect
  * * `in_app` - in_app
+ * * `digital_credentials` - digital_credentials
  */
-type DigitalIdWalletApiInteractionEnum = "redirect" | "in_app" | (string & {});
+type DigitalIdWalletApiInteractionEnum = "redirect" | "in_app" | "digital_credentials" | (string & {});
 /**
  * * `BEL` - BEL
  * * `LUX` - LUX
@@ -2484,6 +2468,7 @@ interface DigitalIdWalletApiWalletCatalogEntry {
     /**
      * * `redirect` - redirect
      * * `in_app` - in_app
+     * * `digital_credentials` - digital_credentials
      */
     interaction: DigitalIdWalletApiInteractionEnum;
     required_fields: string[];
@@ -2493,6 +2478,12 @@ interface DigitalIdWalletApiWalletCatalogEntry {
 interface DigitalIdWalletApiWalletCatalogResponse {
     wallets: DigitalIdWalletApiWalletCatalogEntry[];
 }
+interface DigitalIdWalletApiWalletDigitalCredentialsRequest {
+    /** openid4vp-v1-signed. */
+    protocol: string;
+    /** Pass as is: navigator.credentials.get({digital: request}) in the browser, or JSON.stringify(request) as GetDigitalCredentialOption's requestJson on Android. Signed by Didit for your application. */
+    request: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
 interface DigitalIdWalletApiWalletIdentity {
     full_name: string | null;
     first_name: string | null;
@@ -2505,14 +2496,17 @@ interface DigitalIdWalletApiWalletIdentity {
 }
 interface DigitalIdWalletApiWalletNextAction {
     /**
-     * redirect: send the user's browser to url. confirm_in_app: show verification_code to the user, who checks it matches the code in their wallet app and confirms there; then poll.
+     * redirect: send the user's browser to url. confirm_in_app: show verification_code to the user, who checks it matches the code in their wallet app and confirms there; then poll. request_digital_credential: in a user gesture on the origin you started with, ask the wallet with digital_credentials.request, then send what it returns to POST .../verifications/{request_id}/response/.
      *
      * * `redirect` - redirect
      * * `confirm_in_app` - confirm_in_app
+     * * `request_digital_credential` - request_digital_credential
      */
     type: DigitalIdWalletApiWalletNextActionTypeEnum;
     /** redirect only: where the user signs in with the wallet. */
     url?: string;
+    /** request_digital_credential only: the request to hand to the wallet. */
+    digital_credentials?: DigitalIdWalletApiWalletDigitalCredentialsRequest;
     /** confirm_in_app only: the 4-digit comparison code the wallet app shows too. */
     verification_code?: string;
     /** confirm_in_app only: how often to call POST .../verifications/{request_id}/poll/ for prompt feedback. Didit also polls pending sign-ins in the background, so the webhook reports the outcome even when you do not poll. */
@@ -2521,8 +2515,9 @@ interface DigitalIdWalletApiWalletNextAction {
 /**
  * * `redirect` - redirect
  * * `confirm_in_app` - confirm_in_app
+ * * `request_digital_credential` - request_digital_credential
  */
-type DigitalIdWalletApiWalletNextActionTypeEnum = "redirect" | "confirm_in_app" | (string & {});
+type DigitalIdWalletApiWalletNextActionTypeEnum = "redirect" | "confirm_in_app" | "request_digital_credential" | (string & {});
 /** One standalone wallet verification, as every wallet endpoint answers it. */
 interface DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResponse {
     request_id: string;
@@ -2612,8 +2607,20 @@ interface EmailIntelligence {
     is_breached?: boolean | null;
     /** Number of known breaches containing the address. */
     no_of_breaches?: number | null;
-    /** Machine-readable codes explaining the score. Values can grow over time, so do not reject unknown codes. */
-    reason_codes?: string[];
+    /** Signals that explain the score, each with a stable Didit code, a direction, a message and an impact level. New codes can appear over time, so do not reject unknown codes. */
+    reason_codes?: EmailIntelligenceReasonCodes[];
+}
+interface EmailIntelligenceReasonCodes {
+    /** Stable Didit identifier of the signal, for example `IR-5AC67A32`. Opaque: group and filter on it, do not parse it. */
+    code?: string;
+    /** For a risk flag (for example `voip`, `leaked`, `disposable`, `spam_trap`), its value: a boolean, a level or a date. Null for a scored reason code. */
+    value?: unknown;
+    /** Whether the signal raised the risk or added trust. */
+    direction?: "risk" | "trust" | (string & {});
+    /** Human-readable explanation of the signal, in English. */
+    message?: string;
+    /** How strongly the signal moved the score, for example `low`, `medium` or `high`. */
+    impact_level?: string | null;
 }
 /** Another session of your application that used the same email address with a different `vendor_data`. */
 interface EmailMatchItem {
@@ -2778,6 +2785,8 @@ interface EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmail {
     matches?: EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailMatches[];
     /** Social footprint of the email address: the online platforms it is registered on. Present only when `enable_social` was set and the check completed. Every count may be null when no data was returned for it. `profiles_registered: 0` means the platforms were checked and the email address was found on none of them - a valid, billable answer and a common synthetic-identity signal. */
     email_social?: EmailSocialFootprint | null;
+    /** Email intelligence signals. Present only when `enable_enrichment` was `true` on the check. */
+    email_intelligence?: EmailIntelligence;
 }
 interface EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailBreaches {
     /** Breach identifier. */
@@ -3220,6 +3229,206 @@ type FraudStatusEnum = "planned" | "completed" | "skipped" | "failed" | (string
  * * `external_id` - External Id
  */
 type FraudTypeEnum = "email" | "phone" | "national_id" | "tax_number" | "passport_number" | "driving_licence_number" | "residence_permit_number" | "voter_id" | "external_id" | (string & {});
+/** One attempt of a Location verification step: the same keys as `geolocation_checks[]` except `warnings`, plus when Didit received it. */
+interface GeolocationAttempt {
+    /** Workflow node that produced this result, so a workflow with two Location verification steps stays readable. */
+    node_id?: string | null;
+    /** Feature-level status of this Location verification step, resolved from its warnings. Independent of the session `status`. */
+    status?: "Not Finished" | "Approved" | "Declined" | "In Review" | "Resub Requested" | (string & {});
+    /** What happened on this attempt. */
+    outcome?: "verified" | "low_accuracy" | "accuracy_undetermined" | "stale" | "approximate" | "denied" | "restricted" | "unavailable" | "timeout" | "mock_detected" | "outside_geofence" | "in_blocked_area" | "anonymizer_detected" | "skipped" | "replay_rejected" | "unsupported_client" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** What the operating system or browser granted. `not_requested` means the step uses the connection's IP location only, so the person is never asked for a permission. */
+    permission?: "granted_precise" | "granted_approximate" | "denied" | "restricted" | "unavailable" | "timeout" | "dismissed" | "not_requested" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** WGS84 latitude of the fix. `null` when there is no fix. */
+    latitude?: number | null;
+    /** WGS84 longitude of the fix. `null` when there is no fix. */
+    longitude?: number | null;
+    /** Radius of uncertainty in metres, at the confidence level in `accuracy_confidence`. */
+    accuracy_m?: number | null;
+    /** Confidence level the platform attaches to `accuracy_m`: `p95` (browsers), `p68` (Android) or `unspecified` (iOS). */
+    accuracy_confidence?: "p95" | "p68" | "unspecified" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** When the device took the fix, by its own clock. */
+    measured_at?: Date | null;
+    /** Seconds between the device taking the fix and Didit receiving it. */
+    age_seconds?: number | null;
+    /** Where the fix came from, when the platform says. `ip` means the position is the connection's IP location. */
+    source?: "gps" | "fused" | "network" | "wifi" | "cell" | "browser" | "unknown" | "ip" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** The client that produced the fix. */
+    platform?: "web" | "ios" | "android" | "react_native" | "flutter" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** Version of the SDK that produced the fix. */
+    sdk_version?: string | null;
+    /** `true` when the device says the fix came from a mock location provider or simulation software. `null` when the platform does not report it (browsers cannot tell); `null` is not `false`. */
+    is_mock?: boolean | null;
+    /** iOS only: `true` when the fix came from an external accessory. `null` elsewhere. */
+    produced_by_accessory?: boolean | null;
+    /** Whether device attestation backs the fix. `unsupported` is what browsers report, because the web has no attestation mechanism; it is not a failure. */
+    integrity?: "attested" | "not_attested" | "failed" | "unsupported" | "not_determined" | (string & {});
+    /** ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country the fix is in. */
+    country_code?: string | null;
+    /** ISO 3166-2 subdivision the fix is in. */
+    region_code?: string | null;
+    /** Nearest populated place, a label for reviewers. */
+    city?: string | null;
+    /** Result of the country and area rules of the step. */
+    geofence?: GeolocationAttemptGeofence;
+    /** `true` when `geofence.result` is `inside`, `false` when `outside`, `null` otherwise. */
+    inside_geofence?: boolean | null;
+    /** Which position the area result was judged from: the `device` fix, or the connection's `ip` location. */
+    geofence_basis?: "device" | "ip" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** Ids of the configured allowed areas the position is inside. */
+    inside_areas?: string[];
+    /** Ids of the configured blocked areas the position is in. */
+    blocked_areas?: string[];
+    /** Where the step takes the position from, as configured: the device checked against the IP location, the device only, or the IP location only. */
+    position_source?: "device_and_ip" | "device_only" | "ip_only" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** What the connection and device look like, each `true`, `false` or `null` when the source cannot tell. */
+    anonymizers?: GeolocationAttemptAnonymizers | null;
+    /** Distance to the session's IP location after both uncertainty radii are subtracted; `0` when they overlap. */
+    ip_distance_km?: number | null;
+    /** Combined radius that was subtracted: the IP location's radius plus this fix's accuracy. */
+    ip_distance_uncertainty_km?: number | null;
+    /** Whether `ip_distance_km` is within the distance configured on the step. `null` when either side is unknown. */
+    ip_consistent?: boolean | null;
+    /** Distance to the geocoded address on the ID document or proof of address. `null` when no address is on file. */
+    document_distance_km?: number | null;
+    /** Whether the step's travel tolerance excused the distance from the address. `null` when tolerance is off. */
+    travel_excused?: boolean | null;
+    /** On the final attempt: this check plus the same person's earlier mismatches in a row. */
+    consecutive_mismatches?: number | null;
+    /** Number of this attempt within the node, starting at 1. */
+    attempts?: number;
+    /** The consent the person gave before the system prompt, recorded with the wording version and language they saw. */
+    consent?: GeolocationAttemptConsent | null;
+    /** When Didit received the attempt. */
+    received_at?: Date | null;
+    created_at?: Date;
+}
+/** What the connection and device look like, each `true`, `false` or `null` when the source cannot tell. */
+interface GeolocationAttemptAnonymizers {
+    vpn?: boolean | null;
+    proxy?: boolean | null;
+    tor?: boolean | null;
+    spoofing?: boolean | null;
+    emulator?: boolean | null;
+}
+/** The consent the person gave before the system prompt, recorded with the wording version and language they saw. */
+interface GeolocationAttemptConsent {
+    accepted_at?: Date;
+    version?: string | null;
+    locale?: string | null;
+}
+/** Result of the country and area rules of the step. */
+interface GeolocationAttemptGeofence {
+    /** Whether the step applies any country or area rule. */
+    enabled?: boolean;
+    /** Where the position sits relative to the rules. `undetermined` means the accuracy circle straddles the border or the position resolved to no country; it is not evidence of being outside. */
+    result?: "inside" | "outside" | "undetermined" | (string & {}) | null;
+}
+/** One Location verification result, the accepted attempt of one workflow node. Measurement, uncertainty and authenticity are separate keys, so a precise unattested fix reads differently from an imprecise attested one. */
+interface GeolocationCheck {
+    /** Workflow node that produced this result, so a workflow with two Location verification steps stays readable. */
+    node_id?: string | null;
+    /** Feature-level status of this Location verification step, resolved from its warnings. Independent of the session `status`. */
+    status?: "Not Finished" | "Approved" | "Declined" | "In Review" | "Resub Requested" | (string & {});
+    /** What happened on this attempt. */
+    outcome?: "verified" | "low_accuracy" | "accuracy_undetermined" | "stale" | "approximate" | "denied" | "restricted" | "unavailable" | "timeout" | "mock_detected" | "outside_geofence" | "in_blocked_area" | "anonymizer_detected" | "skipped" | "replay_rejected" | "unsupported_client" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** What the operating system or browser granted. `not_requested` means the step uses the connection's IP location only, so the person is never asked for a permission. */
+    permission?: "granted_precise" | "granted_approximate" | "denied" | "restricted" | "unavailable" | "timeout" | "dismissed" | "not_requested" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** WGS84 latitude of the fix. `null` when there is no fix. */
+    latitude?: number | null;
+    /** WGS84 longitude of the fix. `null` when there is no fix. */
+    longitude?: number | null;
+    /** Radius of uncertainty in metres, at the confidence level in `accuracy_confidence`. */
+    accuracy_m?: number | null;
+    /** Confidence level the platform attaches to `accuracy_m`: `p95` (browsers), `p68` (Android) or `unspecified` (iOS). */
+    accuracy_confidence?: "p95" | "p68" | "unspecified" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** When the device took the fix, by its own clock. */
+    measured_at?: Date | null;
+    /** Seconds between the device taking the fix and Didit receiving it. */
+    age_seconds?: number | null;
+    /** Where the fix came from, when the platform says. `ip` means the position is the connection's IP location. */
+    source?: "gps" | "fused" | "network" | "wifi" | "cell" | "browser" | "unknown" | "ip" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** The client that produced the fix. */
+    platform?: "web" | "ios" | "android" | "react_native" | "flutter" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** Version of the SDK that produced the fix. */
+    sdk_version?: string | null;
+    /** `true` when the device says the fix came from a mock location provider or simulation software. `null` when the platform does not report it (browsers cannot tell); `null` is not `false`. */
+    is_mock?: boolean | null;
+    /** iOS only: `true` when the fix came from an external accessory. `null` elsewhere. */
+    produced_by_accessory?: boolean | null;
+    /** Whether device attestation backs the fix. `unsupported` is what browsers report, because the web has no attestation mechanism; it is not a failure. */
+    integrity?: "attested" | "not_attested" | "failed" | "unsupported" | "not_determined" | (string & {});
+    /** ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country the fix is in. */
+    country_code?: string | null;
+    /** ISO 3166-2 subdivision the fix is in. */
+    region_code?: string | null;
+    /** Nearest populated place, a label for reviewers. */
+    city?: string | null;
+    /** Result of the country and area rules of the step. */
+    geofence?: GeolocationCheckGeofence;
+    /** `true` when `geofence.result` is `inside`, `false` when `outside`, `null` otherwise. */
+    inside_geofence?: boolean | null;
+    /** Which position the area result was judged from: the `device` fix, or the connection's `ip` location. */
+    geofence_basis?: "device" | "ip" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** Ids of the configured allowed areas the position is inside. */
+    inside_areas?: string[];
+    /** Ids of the configured blocked areas the position is in. */
+    blocked_areas?: string[];
+    /** Where the step takes the position from, as configured: the device checked against the IP location, the device only, or the IP location only. */
+    position_source?: "device_and_ip" | "device_only" | "ip_only" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** What the connection and device look like, each `true`, `false` or `null` when the source cannot tell. */
+    anonymizers?: GeolocationCheckAnonymizers | null;
+    /** Distance to the session's IP location after both uncertainty radii are subtracted; `0` when they overlap. */
+    ip_distance_km?: number | null;
+    /** Combined radius that was subtracted: the IP location's radius plus this fix's accuracy. */
+    ip_distance_uncertainty_km?: number | null;
+    /** Whether `ip_distance_km` is within the distance configured on the step. `null` when either side is unknown. */
+    ip_consistent?: boolean | null;
+    /** Distance to the geocoded address on the ID document or proof of address. `null` when no address is on file. */
+    document_distance_km?: number | null;
+    /** Whether the step's travel tolerance excused the distance from the address. `null` when tolerance is off. */
+    travel_excused?: boolean | null;
+    /** On the final attempt: this check plus the same person's earlier mismatches in a row. */
+    consecutive_mismatches?: number | null;
+    /** Number of this attempt within the node, starting at 1. */
+    attempts?: number;
+    /** The consent the person gave before the system prompt, recorded with the wording version and language they saw. */
+    consent?: GeolocationCheckConsent | null;
+    /** Warnings this Location verification step raised, with `feature` set to `GEOLOCATION`. Warning codes start with `LOCATION_`. */
+    warnings?: GeolocationCheckWarnings[];
+}
+/** What the connection and device look like, each `true`, `false` or `null` when the source cannot tell. */
+interface GeolocationCheckAnonymizers {
+    vpn?: boolean | null;
+    proxy?: boolean | null;
+    tor?: boolean | null;
+    spoofing?: boolean | null;
+    emulator?: boolean | null;
+}
+/** The consent the person gave before the system prompt, recorded with the wording version and language they saw. */
+interface GeolocationCheckConsent {
+    accepted_at?: Date;
+    version?: string | null;
+    locale?: string | null;
+}
+/** Result of the country and area rules of the step. */
+interface GeolocationCheckGeofence {
+    /** Whether the step applies any country or area rule. */
+    enabled?: boolean;
+    /** Where the position sits relative to the rules. `undetermined` means the accuracy circle straddles the border or the position resolved to no country; it is not evidence of being outside. */
+    result?: "inside" | "outside" | "undetermined" | (string & {}) | null;
+}
+interface GeolocationCheckWarnings {
+    /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module (e.g. `PHONE` inside `phone_verifications[].warnings`), but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
+    risk?: string;
+    additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    log_type?: string;
+    short_description?: string;
+    long_description?: string;
+    /** The workflow graph node ID that generated this warning */
+    node_id?: string;
+}
 interface IPRiskResponse {
     /** Id of the API session created for this request. Store it with `vendor_data` if you need to correlate the result with later webhooks or console activity. */
     request_id: string;
@@ -3561,6 +3770,50 @@ interface KYBKeyPeoplePartyVerificationWorkflowFeatures {
     /** Feature status, `Not Finished` until it runs. */
     status: string;
 }
+/** The cap table the registry proved, as it stood when the ownership tier was delivered: direct `shareholders` and `beneficial_owners`. Null when the registry proved no ownership. It never carries the registry source's own rows; read `company.beneficial_owners` and `company.ownership` for the current record. */
+interface KYBOwnershipStructure {
+    shareholders: KYBOwnershipStructureOwner[];
+    beneficial_owners: KYBOwnershipStructureOwner[];
+}
+/** One owner of the ownership snapshot: the same registry identity and stake as `company.beneficial_owners[]`, and its canonical `shareholding`. */
+interface KYBOwnershipStructureOwner {
+    /** Owner name as the registry states it. */
+    name: string | null;
+    /** Given name, for a natural person, when the registry states it. */
+    first_name: string | null;
+    /** Family name, for a natural person, when the registry states it. */
+    last_name: string | null;
+    /** Date of birth (ISO 8601) when the registry publishes it. */
+    date_of_birth: string | null;
+    /** Country of birth when the registry publishes it. */
+    country_of_birth: string | null;
+    /** Company name, for a corporate owner. */
+    company_name: string | null;
+    /** Registration number, for a corporate owner. */
+    registration_number: string | null;
+    /** Whether the owner is a natural person or a company. */
+    entity_type: "person" | "company" | (string & {}) | null;
+    /** Nationality when the registry states it. */
+    nationality: string | null;
+    /** The owner's title or role as the registry prints it. */
+    designation: string | null;
+    /** `shareholder` for a direct holder, `ubo` for a beneficial owner. */
+    roles: string[];
+    /** Lower bound of the stake, in percent (equal to the upper bound for an exact stake). */
+    ownership_min_shares: string | null;
+    /** Upper bound of the stake, in percent. */
+    ownership_max_shares: string | null;
+    /** Lower bound of the voting rights, in percent. */
+    voting_min_shares: string | null;
+    /** Upper bound of the voting rights, in percent. */
+    voting_max_shares: string | null;
+    /** Date the holding or appointment started (ISO 8601). */
+    appointment_date: string | null;
+    /** False for a former owner. */
+    is_active: boolean | null;
+    /** What an owner holds, in the same shape for every country and registry source. Null when the registry states no holding. A band (for example a UK PSC's 25-50%) is not a stake: `percentage` is null and the band stays in `ownership_min_shares` / `ownership_max_shares`. */
+    shareholding: KYBRegistryShareholding | null;
+}
 /** An address the registry states, in the same shape for every country and registry source. Every key is always present; a part the registry does not publish is null. */
 interface KYBRegistryAddress {
     /** Address type in lower case: `registered` for the registered office; other types as the registry names them (for example `postal`, `office`). `null` when the registry does not say what the address is. */
@@ -3580,6 +3833,86 @@ interface KYBRegistryAddress {
     /** The registry's own label for the address, when it gives one. */
     description: string | null;
 }
+/** Didit's normalized registry detail for the company: the ownership outcome (`ownership_error`, `section_errors`, `ubo_resolution`, `lite_enrichment`), the corrections made with update-data, and registry facts that have no field of their own. It never carries the registry source's own record. Every key is optional and present only when the company has a value for it; new keys may be added. Read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) for anything they cover. */
+interface KYBRegistryData {
+    /** Company name as corrected in the console. */
+    company_name?: string;
+    /** Registration number as the registry or a console correction states it. */
+    registration_number?: string;
+    /** Country of the registration as the registry or a console correction states it. */
+    country_code?: string;
+    /** Region or state of the registration. */
+    region?: string;
+    /** Incorporation date (ISO 8601). */
+    incorporation_date?: string;
+    /** Registration date (ISO 8601) when the registry states one apart from the incorporation date. */
+    registration_date?: string;
+    /** Dissolution date (ISO 8601) when the registry states one. */
+    dissolution_date?: string;
+    /** Tax identification number. */
+    tax_number?: string;
+    /** VAT number. */
+    vat_number?: string;
+    /** Legal address as corrected in the console. */
+    legal_address?: string;
+    /** Registered address as the registry states it. */
+    registered_address?: string;
+    /** Legal form. */
+    company_type?: string;
+    /** Company status at the registry. */
+    registry_status?: string;
+    /** Verification status. */
+    verification_status?: string;
+    /** Other names the company trades or traded under. */
+    alternative_names?: string;
+    /** Activity description. */
+    nature_of_business?: string;
+    /** Registered capital as printed. */
+    registered_capital?: string;
+    /** Registered capital amount, as a decimal string. */
+    registered_capital_amount?: string;
+    /** Registered capital currency (ISO 4217). */
+    registered_capital_currency?: string;
+    /** Website. */
+    website?: string;
+    /** Contact email. */
+    email?: string;
+    /** Contact phone. */
+    phone?: string;
+    /** Legal Entity Identifier (LEI). */
+    legal_entity_identifier?: string;
+    /** Place of registration. */
+    location_of_registration?: string;
+    /** Governance scheme when the registry exposes it. */
+    control_scheme?: string;
+    /** Why a requested ownership tier was not delivered, in the same codes as `ownership.unavailable_reason`. `no_owners_on_record` (the registry answered and names no owner) and `ownership_section_unavailable` (the registry did not return the ownership section) are different findings. */
+    ownership_error?: "no_owners_on_record" | "no_natural_person_owner" | "ownership_section_unavailable" | "company_not_found" | "ambiguous_company_match" | "missing_registration_number" | "entity_type_not_covered" | "provider_unavailable" | "other" | (string & {});
+    /** Sections the registry did not return, keyed by section (`officers`, `shareholders`, `group_structure`). A section listed here was never delivered: an empty list next to it says nothing about the company. */
+    section_errors?: Record<string, KYBRegistrySectionError>;
+    /** How the UBO tier walked the ownership chain above the company. */
+    ubo_resolution?: KYBRegistryUboResolution;
+    /** Blank Lite profile fields another of the country's registry sources filled. The source is not named. */
+    lite_enrichment?: KYBRegistryLiteEnrichment;
+    /** The register's own fields for the company, keyed as the register names them, as plain values (legacy records). Only fields reviewed as registry facts are included. */
+    registry_metadata?: Record<string, string | number | boolean>;
+    /** The official registers the record was read from (legacy records). Other sources are not named. */
+    registry_sources?: KYBRegistrySource[];
+    /** Names the company was registered under before (legacy records). */
+    previous_names?: string[];
+    /** Parent companies the registry names (legacy records). */
+    parent_companies?: string[];
+    /** How many filings the registry offers for the company (legacy records). */
+    documents_available?: number;
+}
+/** A company of the corporate group, by its registry identity. */
+interface KYBRegistryGroupCompany {
+    /** Company name. */
+    name: string | null;
+    /** Country of registration. */
+    country_code: string | null;
+    /** Registration number. */
+    registration_number: string | null;
+}
 /** An activity the registry classifies the company under, in the same shape for every country and registry source. */
 interface KYBRegistryIndustry {
     /** Activity code as the registry prints it (for example `73110`). */
@@ -3591,6 +3924,13 @@ interface KYBRegistryIndustry {
     /** True for the company's main activity. Exactly one entry is primary when the list is not empty. */
     is_primary: boolean;
 }
+/** Blank Lite profile fields another of the country's registry sources filled. The source is not named. */
+interface KYBRegistryLiteEnrichment {
+    /** The company fields that were filled. */
+    fields: string[];
+    /** How many officers or owners were added. */
+    people_added: number;
+}
 /** The outcome of the ownership (Shareholders / UBO) tier, in the same shape for every country and registry source. */
 interface KYBRegistryOwnership {
     /** `delivered` when the registry published ownership; `not_held` when the ownership registry answered and does not list the company at all (see `unavailable_reason`); `unavailable` when it did not serve the ownership data for any other reason (see `unavailable_reason`); `pending` while the registry is still fetching it; `not_requested` for the Basic tier. */
@@ -3643,6 +3983,11 @@ interface KYBRegistrySearchResultsPagination {
     page?: number;
     per_page?: number;
 }
+/** A section the registry did not return. */
+interface KYBRegistrySectionError {
+    /** The status the registry answered for the section. */
+    status_code: number | null;
+}
 /** What an owner holds, in the same shape for every country and registry source. Null when the registry states no holding. A band (for example a UK PSC's 25-50%) is not a stake: `percentage` is null and the band stays in `ownership_min_shares` / `ownership_max_shares`. */
 interface KYBRegistryShareholding {
     /** Share class or type as the registry names it. */
@@ -3658,6 +4003,28 @@ interface KYBRegistryShareholding {
     /** Exact stake in percent, to four decimal places. */
     percentage: number | null;
 }
+/** An official register the record was read from. Only official government registers, regulators and the official identifier system are named; any other source is left out. */
+interface KYBRegistrySource {
+    /** Register name, for example `UK Companies House`. */
+    name: string;
+    /** Always `official`. */
+    source_type: "official" | (string & {});
+}
+/** How the UBO tier walked the ownership chain above the company. */
+interface KYBRegistryUboResolution {
+    /** Corporate parents from the ultimate parent down to the company. */
+    parent_chain: KYBRegistryGroupCompany[];
+    /** Companies directly below the company in its corporate group. */
+    subsidiaries: KYBRegistryGroupCompany[];
+    /** Parts of the chain the registry could not resolve (the same entries as `ownership.unresolved`). */
+    unresolved: KYBRegistryUboResolutionUnresolved[];
+}
+interface KYBRegistryUboResolutionUnresolved {
+    /** Why, for example `no_group_structure_on_record`, `selected_company_not_in_group_structure` or `section_error`. */
+    reason: string;
+    /** The section concerned, for example `group_structure`. */
+    section: string | null;
+}
 interface LoginResponse {
     /** RS256-signed JWT. Use as `Authorization: Bearer <token>` for Account Management endpoints. */
     access_token?: string;
@@ -4663,8 +5030,20 @@ interface PhoneIntelligence {
     is_recently_ported?: boolean | null;
     /** Line classification reported by the lookup (e.g., `mobile`). */
     carrier_type?: string | null;
-    /** Machine-readable codes explaining the score. Values can grow over time, so do not reject unknown codes. */
-    reason_codes?: string[];
+    /** Signals that explain the score, each with a stable Didit code, a direction, a message and an impact level. New codes can appear over time, so do not reject unknown codes. */
+    reason_codes?: PhoneIntelligenceReasonCodes[];
+}
+interface PhoneIntelligenceReasonCodes {
+    /** Stable Didit identifier of the signal, for example `IR-5AC67A32`. Opaque: group and filter on it, do not parse it. */
+    code?: string;
+    /** For a risk flag (for example `voip`, `leaked`, `disposable`, `spam_trap`), its value: a boolean, a level or a date. Null for a scored reason code. */
+    value?: unknown;
+    /** Whether the signal raised the risk or added trust. */
+    direction?: "risk" | "trust" | (string & {});
+    /** Human-readable explanation of the signal, in English. */
+    message?: string;
+    /** How strongly the signal moved the score, for example `low`, `medium` or `high`. */
+    impact_level?: string | null;
 }
 /** Another session of your application that used the same phone number with a different `vendor_data`. */
 interface PhoneMatchItem {
@@ -4834,6 +5213,8 @@ interface PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhone {
     matches?: PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneMatches[];
     /** Social footprint of the phone number: the online platforms it is registered on. Present only when `enable_social` was set and the check completed. Every count may be null when no data was returned for it. `profiles_registered: 0` means the platforms were checked and the phone number was found on none of them - a valid, billable answer and a common synthetic-identity signal. */
     phone_social?: PhoneSocialFootprint | null;
+    /** Phone intelligence signals. Present only when `enable_enrichment` was `true` on the check. */
+    phone_intelligence?: PhoneIntelligence;
 }
 /** Current network serving the number, from the carrier lookup run at finalization. */
 interface PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneCarrier {
@@ -5050,7 +5431,7 @@ interface ReviewItem {
     new_value?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** Names of the fields modified by this activity (e.g. `["status"]`). Empty for comments and for entries added via `POST …/reviews/`. */
     changed_fields?: string[];
-    /** Extra context for system-generated entries. Console detail-page views carry `{"system_event": "DETAIL_VIEWED", "detail_type": "verification"}` so they can be filtered out of notification logic. `null` for ordinary entries. */
+    /** Extra context for system-generated entries. Console detail-page views carry `{"system_event": "DETAIL_VIEWED", "detail_type": "verification"}` so they can be filtered out of notification logic. A `COMMENT` its author edited in the Console carries `edited_at`, the ISO 8601 time of the last edit (`comment` and `mentioned_emails` then hold the edited text and its mentions). `null` for ordinary entries. */
     metadata?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** When the entry was written, ISO 8601 UTC. */
     created_at?: Date;
@@ -5181,15 +5562,23 @@ interface SessionDecision {
     session_kind?: "user" | "business" | (string & {});
     /** For a session cloned with `POST /v3/session/import-shared/`: the `session_id` of the original session in the source application. `null` for every other session. Omitted when `include=events` is passed. */
     shared_from_session?: string | null;
+    /** `session_number` of the source session when this session was imported from another application of your organization. `null` otherwise. */
+    shared_from_session_number?: number | null;
     /** The number of the session. */
     session_number?: number | null;
     /** The URL of the session. */
     session_url?: string | null;
     /** Overall lifecycle status of the session - the rolled-up workflow result. Terminal values are `Approved`, `Declined`, `In Review`, `Expired`, `Kyc Expired`, and `Abandoned`; `Not Started`, `In Progress`, `Awaiting User`, and `Resubmitted` indicate the session is still moving through the workflow. */
     status?: "Not Started" | "In Progress" | "Awaiting User" | "In Review" | "Approved" | "Declined" | "Resubmitted" | "Expired" | "Kyc Expired" | "Abandoned" | (string & {});
+    /** Present when a reviewer set `status` by hand. `null` when the status is the automatic one. Use it to tell a manual approval from an automatic one. */
+    status_override?: SessionDecisionStatusOverride | null;
+    /** How the status was reached: who set it and which warnings did. */
+    decision_trace?: SessionDecisionDecisionTrace;
+    /** A summary of other records linked to the session. `null` when there is nothing to show, and for workflows that declare an age assurance standard. */
+    linked_records?: SessionDecisionLinkedRecords | null;
     /** Stable identifier of the workflow group that produced this session. Workflows are versioned - this value identifies the workflow itself, not the specific version. */
     workflow_id?: string | null;
-    /** List of verification features configured for this session, as display names: `ID_VERIFICATION`, `NFC`, `LIVENESS`, `FACE_MATCH`, `POA`, `PHONE`, `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`, `AML`, `IP_ANALYSIS`, `DATABASE_VALIDATION`, `QUESTIONNAIRE`, `AGE_ESTIMATION`, `FACE_SEARCH` (Business Verification sessions use the KYB feature set: `KYB_REGISTRY`, `KYB_DOCUMENTS`, `KYB_KEY_PEOPLE`, `AML`, `PHONE`, `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`, `IP_ANALYSIS`, `QUESTIONNAIRE`). With `include=events` each entry becomes an object `{feature, node_id}` instead of a plain string, and the email feature is renamed: it appears as `EMAIL` in events mode instead of the `EMAIL_VERIFICATION` used here. */
+    /** List of verification features configured for this session, as display names: `ID_VERIFICATION`, `NFC`, `LIVENESS`, `FACE_MATCH`, `POA`, `PHONE`, `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`, `AML`, `IP_ANALYSIS`, `DATABASE_VALIDATION`, `QUESTIONNAIRE`, `AGE_ESTIMATION`, `FACE_SEARCH`, `GEOLOCATION` (Location verification) (Business Verification sessions use the KYB feature set: `KYB_REGISTRY`, `KYB_DOCUMENTS`, `KYB_KEY_PEOPLE`, `AML`, `PHONE`, `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`, `IP_ANALYSIS`, `QUESTIONNAIRE`). With `include=events` each entry becomes an object `{feature, node_id}` instead of a plain string, and the email feature is renamed: it appears as `EMAIL` in events mode instead of the `EMAIL_VERIFICATION` used here. */
     features?: string[];
     /** The vendor data of the session. */
     vendor_data?: string | null;
@@ -5221,14 +5610,18 @@ interface SessionDecision {
     document_ai_documents?: SessionDecisionDocumentAiDocuments[] | null;
     /** **Array of questionnaire response reports** - always a JSON array, never a singular `questionnaire` object. `null` until at least one questionnaire step has produced data. Each item is the full report, including `node_id`, the questionnaire metadata, sections with form elements, and the user's answers. */
     questionnaire_responses?: SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponses[] | null;
-    /** Bank Verification results, one item per Bank Verification step, for User and Business Verification. `null` until a step produces one. Each item's `method` says how the account was verified: `open_banking` (bank sign-in) or `account_lookup` (account check), or a `statement` or `microdeposits` fallback, and `none` when the person continued without a bank before any attempt was evaluated (`continued_without_bank`). See [Bank verification methods](/core-technology/bank-verification/verification-methods). */
+    /** Bank Verification results, one item per Bank Verification step, for User and Business Verification. `null` until a step produces one. Each item's `method` says how the account was verified: `open_banking` (bank sign-in) or `account_lookup` (account check), or a `statement` or `microdeposits` fallback, and `none` when the person continued without a bank before any attempt was evaluated (`continued_without_bank`). See [Bank verification methods](/core-technology/bank-verification/verification-methods). Bank Verification is not enabled in production yet, so this stays `null` on production sessions until it is. */
     bank_verifications?: BankVerificationResult[] | null;
-    /** Electronic Signature results, one item per signer and signature step, for User and Business Verification. Present only when the workflow has an Electronic Signature step; an empty array until a signer reaches it. See the [Electronic Signature report](/core-technology/electronic-signature/report-electronic-signature). */
+    /** E-signature results, one item per signer and signature step, for User and Business Verification. Present only when the workflow has an E-signature step; an empty array until a signer reaches it. See the [E-signature report](/core-technology/electronic-signature/report-electronic-signature). */
     signatures?: SignatureResult[];
     /** **Array of AML screening reports** - always a JSON array, never a singular `aml` object. `null` until at least one AML step has produced data. Each item is the full report, including `node_id`, feature-level `status`, `total_hits`, `entity_type`, `hits[]`, `score`, `screened_data`, `is_ongoing_monitoring_enabled`, and `warnings[]`. */
     aml_screenings?: AMLScreening[] | null;
     /** **Array of Device & IP Analysis reports** - always a JSON array, never a singular `ip_analysis` object. `null` until at least one IP-analysis step has produced data. Each item is the full report, including `node_id`, feature-level `status`, IP and geolocation data, device fingerprint, and `warnings[]`. Entries with duplicate `(node_id, ip_address, device_fingerprint)` are deduplicated server-side. */
     ip_analyses?: SessionDecisionIpAnalyses[] | null;
+    /** **Array of Location verification results**, one per Location verification step: that step's accepted attempt. `null` until a Location verification step has produced data. Earlier attempts of the same step are in `geolocation_attempts`. */
+    geolocation_checks?: GeolocationCheck[] | null;
+    /** Every attempt of every Location verification step of this session, oldest first. Attempts that a resubmission replaced are left out. A workflow that withholds `geolocation_checks` through its response attributes withholds this list too. */
+    geolocation_attempts?: GeolocationAttempt[] | null;
     /**
      * **Array of Database Validation reports** - always a JSON array, never a singular `database_validation` object. `null` until at least one DB validation step has produced data. Each item is the full report, including `node_id`, feature-level `status`, `screened_data`, the per-service `validations[]` (each with its registry `source_data`), and `warnings[]`. The `screened_data` and `source_data` fields vary by country:
      *
@@ -5269,7 +5662,15 @@ interface SessionDecision {
      * **VEN (Venezuela)**: screened_data: {document_number, first_name, last_name}. source_data: {identification_number, first_name, last_name, full_name, gender, date_of_birth, document_type}
      */
     database_validations?: SessionDecisionDatabaseValidations[] | null;
+    /** Why a configured database validation produced no result, as `{code, message}` plus context fields. Present only when `database_validations` is `null` for a workflow that has the step, so you can tell "the registry agreed" from "nothing ran". `null` otherwise. */
+    database_validation_not_performed_reason?: SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationNotPerformedReason | null;
     reviews?: SessionDecisionReviews[];
+    /** The Console reviewer the session is assigned to, or `null` when nobody holds it. */
+    assignee?: SessionDecisionAssignee | null;
+    /** When the session started waiting for review. `null` unless the session is `In Review` and your application sets a review deadline. */
+    waiting_since?: Date | null;
+    /** When the review is due. `null` unless the session is `In Review` and your application sets a review deadline. */
+    sla_due_at?: Date | null;
     /** Timestamp at which the session was created (ISO 8601, UTC). */
     created_at?: Date;
     /** Timestamp at which this session is scheduled to expire. Set on User Verification (KYC) sessions when an expiration was configured at creation time (or once `Approved` status triggers KYC expiry computation). `null` for sessions without a configured expiration, and for kinds that do not use expiry (e.g. Business Verification (KYB) sessions that never received an `expires_at`). */
@@ -5282,12 +5683,27 @@ interface SessionDecision {
     document_verifications?: SessionDecisionDocumentVerifications[] | null;
     /** Whether the session was created by a live application (`live`) or a sandbox application (`sandbox`). Sandbox sessions are free, fully simulated, and never bill credits. */
     environment?: "live" | "sandbox" | (string & {});
+    /** The sandbox scenario the session was created with. `null` for live sessions and for sandbox sessions created without one. */
+    sandbox_scenario?: string | null;
     /** Returned only with `include=resubmissions`, for user and business sessions. One entry per resubmission request, oldest first. Each entry carries the results the resubmitted steps returned before the request, so earlier submissions stay readable. Deleting the session deletes every submission. */
     resubmissions?: SessionDecisionResubmissions[];
     /** Whether the session required explicit biometric consent before a face capture, why, and the evidence of the answer. User Verification (KYC) sessions only; the same object is in the `decision` of session webhooks. `null` when the session was never evaluated, for example a workflow without a face capture. Fields with no recorded value are `null`. A native SDK below 4.10.0, or one that does not report its version, cannot show the consent step: its face captures run as before, and a session that required consent then reports `status: "pending"` with `reason: "BIOMETRIC_CONSENT_UNSUPPORTED_SDK"`. See [Biometric consent](/getting-started/biometric-consent). */
     biometric_consent?: SessionDecisionBiometricConsent | null;
     /** The item's latest Investigator review, or null when it never had one. Carried by the V3 session and business session decision (and so by `status.updated` webhooks). */
     investigator?: InvestigatorBlock | null;
+    /** When the live biometric data of this session is deleted. */
+    biometric_retention?: BiometricRetention;
+    /** The result of a Fraud Check API call. `null` for every other session. */
+    fraud_check?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    /** Expiring URL of the full-session recording. Returned only when your organization records full-session video. */
+    full_session_video?: string | null;
+    /** When the full-session recording was made. Returned only when your organization records full-session video. */
+    full_session_video_recorded_at?: Date | null;
+}
+/** The Console reviewer the session is assigned to, or `null` when nobody holds it. */
+interface SessionDecisionAssignee {
+    email?: string;
+    assigned_at?: Date | null;
 }
 /** Whether the session required explicit biometric consent before a face capture, why, and the evidence of the answer. User Verification (KYC) sessions only; the same object is in the `decision` of session webhooks. `null` when the session was never evaluated, for example a workflow without a face capture. Fields with no recorded value are `null`. A native SDK below 4.10.0, or one that does not report its version, cannot show the consent step: its face captures run as before, and a session that required consent then reports `status: "pending"` with `reason: "BIOMETRIC_CONSENT_UNSUPPORTED_SDK"`. See [Biometric consent](/getting-started/biometric-consent). */
 interface SessionDecisionBiometricConsent {
@@ -5357,6 +5773,14 @@ interface SessionDecisionContactDetails {
     /** Phone number of the user in E.164 format if available (e.g., +14155552671). `null` when only an email was supplied at session creation. Note: This field returns the original phone number provided during session creation. If the number was invalid, it may not be in E.164 format. */
     phone?: string | null;
 }
+/** Why a configured database validation produced no result, as `{code, message}` plus context fields. Present only when `database_validations` is `null` for a workflow that has the step, so you can tell "the registry agreed" from "nothing ran". `null` otherwise. */
+interface SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationNotPerformedReason {
+    /** Stable machine-readable reason. */
+    code?: string;
+    /** Human-readable explanation. */
+    message?: string;
+    [key: string]: unknown;
+}
 interface SessionDecisionDatabaseValidations {
     /** Unique identifier for this database validation step in the workflow graph. */
     node_id?: string;
@@ -5424,7 +5848,7 @@ interface SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsValidationsValidation {
 }
 interface SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module (e.g. `PHONE` inside `phone_verifications[].warnings`), but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     log_type?: string;
@@ -5433,6 +5857,39 @@ interface SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsWarnings {
     /** The workflow graph node ID that generated this warning */
     node_id?: string;
 }
+/** How the status was reached: who set it and which warnings did. */
+interface SessionDecisionDecisionTrace {
+    /** The session status. */
+    status?: string;
+    /** Who set the status. `null` while the session is not decided. */
+    decided_by?: "manual" | "automatic" | "investigator" | (string & {}) | null;
+    decided_at?: Date | null;
+    /** What the platform's own checks conclude, which differs from `status` after a manual decision. */
+    automatic_status?: string | null;
+    /** The workflow status node that ended the session, when one did. */
+    terminal_node_id?: string | null;
+    /** The reviewer behind a manual decision. */
+    actor?: SessionDecisionDecisionTraceActor | null;
+    /** Warnings per `log_type` (`error`, `warning`, `information`) and `total`. */
+    warning_counts?: Record<string, number>;
+    /** The warnings that set a `Declined` or `In Review` status. */
+    status_warnings?: SessionDecisionDecisionTraceStatusWarnings[];
+}
+/** The reviewer behind a manual decision. */
+interface SessionDecisionDecisionTraceActor {
+    user?: string | null;
+    actor_type?: string | null;
+}
+interface SessionDecisionDecisionTraceStatusWarnings {
+    risk?: string;
+    feature?: string | null;
+    node_id?: string | null;
+    log_type?: string | null;
+    check_status?: string | null;
+    /** The payload list the warning came from, for example `id_verifications`. */
+    source?: string;
+    short_description?: string | null;
+}
 /** Document AI results grouped by workflow node. */
 interface SessionDecisionDocumentAiDocuments {
     /** Aggregate Document AI status for this node, rolled up from its `items[]`. */
@@ -5612,6 +6069,10 @@ interface SessionDecisionEmailVerifications {
     lifecycle?: SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsLifecycle[];
     /** Matches found for this email address. Each match has a `source`: `session` (another verification session in your application matched on the same email, returned with `session_id`/`session_number`/`vendor_data`/`verification_date`) or `list_entry` (the email is on an org-managed allow/block list - see `/management-api/lists/overview`). Cross-session matches use different `vendor_data` and are capped at 5. */
     matches?: SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsMatches[];
+    /** Email intelligence signals. Present only when the email intelligence add-on ran for this address. */
+    email_intelligence?: EmailIntelligence;
+    /** Social footprint of the address. Present only when the social footprint add-on ran for this address. */
+    email_social?: EmailSocialFootprint | null;
 }
 interface SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsBreaches {
     /** Name of the breach */
@@ -5658,7 +6119,7 @@ interface SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsMatches {
 }
 interface SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module (e.g. `PHONE` inside `phone_verifications[].warnings`), but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     log_type?: string;
@@ -5716,10 +6177,36 @@ interface SessionDecisionFaceMatches {
     target_image?: string;
     /** Face match verification warnings */
     warnings?: SessionDecisionFaceMatchesWarnings[];
+    /** Whether the eyes, mouth and face are covered in the captured image. Returned by `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/decision/` only; it is not part of webhook payloads. `null` when no coverage reading exists. */
+    face_coverage?: SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverage | null;
+}
+/** Whether the eyes, mouth and face are covered in the captured image. Returned by `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/decision/` only; it is not part of webhook payloads. `null` when no coverage reading exists. */
+interface SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverage {
+    eyes?: SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverageEyes;
+    mouth?: SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverageMouth;
+    face?: SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverageFace;
+}
+interface SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverageEyes {
+    covered?: boolean | null;
+    /** `false` means the reading is shadow evidence only and no warning acts on it. */
+    calibrated?: boolean | null;
+    visibility_score?: number | null;
+}
+interface SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverageFace {
+    covered?: boolean | null;
+    /** `false` means the reading is shadow evidence only and no warning acts on it. */
+    calibrated?: boolean | null;
+    visibility_score?: number | null;
+}
+interface SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverageMouth {
+    covered?: boolean | null;
+    /** `false` means the reading is shadow evidence only and no warning acts on it. */
+    calibrated?: boolean | null;
+    visibility_score?: number | null;
 }
 interface SessionDecisionFaceMatchesWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module (e.g. `PHONE` inside `phone_verifications[].warnings`), but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     log_type?: string;
@@ -5738,7 +6225,7 @@ interface SessionDecisionIdVerifications {
     assurance?: "documentary" | "data_match" | "cryptographic" | (string & {});
     /** Catalog wallet id when `verification_method` is `wallet` (`mitid`, `bankid_se`, `itsme`, ...). `null` otherwise. */
     wallet_provider?: string | null;
-    /** Why a non-document method ended the ID step. Set on the declined report when a lookup or a wallet sign-in failed and the country's fallback switch was `decline`. `null` otherwise. */
+    /** Why a non-document method did not end the ID step. Set when a lookup or a wallet sign-in failed: on the document verification the user continued with when the country's fallback switch was `fallback_to_document` (`action` is `fallback_to_document`), or on the declined report when it was `decline`. `null` otherwise. */
     fallback_from?: SessionDecisionIdVerificationsFallbackFrom | null;
     /** Registry evidence. Present only when `verification_method` is `id_lookup`; `null` otherwise. */
     id_lookup?: SessionDecisionIdVerificationsIdLookup | null;
@@ -5828,6 +6315,12 @@ interface SessionDecisionIdVerifications {
     document_liveness?: SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentLiveness | null;
     /** Address Validation of the address printed on this document: whether it exists and its normalised form, as the document read it (a later correction of `address` does not run it again). Present when this ID verification step enabled the Address Validation add-on; `null` otherwise. */
     address_validation?: AddressValidationResult | null;
+    /** Region or state of the document's issuing country where the document identifies one. */
+    region?: string | null;
+    /** Snapshot of the data extracted from the document that the person was shown to review, kept next to the confirmed values so you can compare what was read with what the person confirmed. `null` when the person was not asked to review. */
+    extracted_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    /** Data read from the document's barcodes. Empty when the document has none or none was read. */
+    barcodes?: Record<string, unknown>[];
 }
 /** Quality metrics for the back document image. Same structure as front_image_quality_score. */
 interface SessionDecisionIdVerificationsBackImageQualityScore {
@@ -5957,14 +6450,14 @@ interface SessionDecisionIdVerificationsExtraFields {
     place_of_birth_latin?: string;
     [key: string]: unknown;
 }
-/** Why a non-document method ended the ID step. Set on the declined report when a lookup or a wallet sign-in failed and the country's fallback switch was `decline`. `null` otherwise. */
+/** Why a non-document method did not end the ID step. Set when a lookup or a wallet sign-in failed: on the document verification the user continued with when the country's fallback switch was `fallback_to_document` (`action` is `fallback_to_document`), or on the declined report when it was `decline`. `null` otherwise. */
 interface SessionDecisionIdVerificationsFallbackFrom {
     /** The method that failed. */
     method?: "id_lookup" | "wallet" | (string & {});
     /** The outcome that ended it, e.g. `no_match`, `provider_error`, `cancelled`, `timeout`. */
     reason?: string;
-    /** The configured action that was taken, e.g. `decline`. */
-    action?: string;
+    /** The configured action that was taken: `fallback_to_document` or `decline`. */
+    action?: "fallback_to_document" | "decline" | (string & {});
 }
 /** Quality metrics for the front document image. Each sub-score ranges from 0 to 100. */
 interface SessionDecisionIdVerificationsFrontImageQualityScore {
@@ -6154,7 +6647,7 @@ interface SessionDecisionIdVerificationsWalletVerification {
 }
 interface SessionDecisionIdVerificationsWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning (e.g., `ID_VERIFICATION`, `NFC`, `LIVENESS`). The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module, but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     /** Additional contextual data about the warning */
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
@@ -6217,6 +6710,20 @@ interface SessionDecisionIpAnalyses {
     warnings?: SessionDecisionIpAnalysesWarnings[];
     /** Cross-session matches found for this entry's IP address or device identity. Every match is another verification session in your application (`source` is always `session`) that shares the same value, always belonging to a different vendor user / `vendor_data` than the current session, capped at 5 per collector (`device_fingerprint` sums two independently capped collectors, so up to 10 entries are possible). Every item carries `match_source`, `confidence`, `match_mode`, `device_info` and `location_info`; the keys `recovery_similarity`, `tls_ja4_corroborated` and `recovery_gate_reason` are present only when `match_source` is `recovered_high`. */
     matches?: SessionDecisionIpAnalysesMatches[];
+    browser_version?: string | null;
+    os_version?: string | null;
+    /** The browser's user agent string. */
+    user_agent?: string | null;
+    /** The `Accept-Language` header the browser sent. */
+    accept_language?: string | null;
+    /** Identifier of the browsing session the verification ran in. */
+    session_identifier?: string | null;
+    /** Age of that browsing session in milliseconds when the step ran. */
+    session_age_ms?: number | null;
+    /** Accuracy radius, in metres, of the coordinates the device reported. */
+    coords_accuracy?: number | null;
+    /** Raw device signals collected for the step. */
+    raw_device_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
 }
 /** Location extracted from the ID document address plus distances (km) to the IP geolocation and the POA document address. `location` is `null` when no document address could be geocoded. */
 interface SessionDecisionIpAnalysesIdDocument {
@@ -6313,7 +6820,7 @@ interface SessionDecisionIpAnalysesPoaDocumentLocation {
 }
 interface SessionDecisionIpAnalysesWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module (e.g. `PHONE` inside `phone_verifications[].warnings`), but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     log_type?: string;
@@ -6557,6 +7064,41 @@ interface SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksUboKycSummary {
     flagged?: number;
     pending?: number;
 }
+/** A summary of other records linked to the session. `null` when there is nothing to show, and for workflows that declare an age assurance standard. */
+interface SessionDecisionLinkedRecords {
+    /** Other people whose face matched one of this session's face searches. */
+    same_face?: SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsSameFace | null;
+    earlier_verifications?: SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsEarlierVerifications | null;
+    networks?: SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsNetworks | null;
+}
+interface SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsEarlierVerifications {
+    count?: number;
+    vendor_user_id?: string | null;
+}
+interface SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsNetworks {
+    count?: number;
+    open?: number;
+    dismissed?: number;
+    items?: SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsNetworksItems[];
+}
+interface SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsNetworksItems {
+    network_id?: string;
+    display_number?: number | null;
+    name?: string;
+    status?: string;
+    risk_score?: number | null;
+}
+/** Other people whose face matched one of this session's face searches. */
+interface SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsSameFace {
+    count?: number;
+    best_match?: SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsSameFaceBestMatch | null;
+}
+interface SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsSameFaceBestMatch {
+    session_id?: string | null;
+    session_number?: number | null;
+    vendor_user_id?: string | null;
+    similarity_percentage?: number | null;
+}
 /** One liveness report - the full report for a single liveness pass. */
 interface SessionDecisionLivenessChecks {
     /** Workflow graph node id of the liveness step that produced this report. */
@@ -6618,7 +7160,7 @@ interface SessionDecisionLivenessChecksMatchesUserDetails {
 }
 interface SessionDecisionLivenessChecksWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module (e.g. `PHONE` inside `phone_verifications[].warnings`), but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     log_type?: string;
@@ -6737,7 +7279,7 @@ interface SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsJpkiCertificates {
 }
 interface SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module (e.g. `PHONE` inside `phone_verifications[].warnings`), but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     log_type?: string;
@@ -6778,6 +7320,10 @@ interface SessionDecisionPhoneVerifications {
     warnings?: SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsWarnings[];
     /** Matches found for this phone number. Each match has a `source`: `session` (another verification session in your application matched on the same number, returned with `session_id`/`session_number`/`vendor_data`/`verification_date`) or `list_entry` (the number is on an org-managed allow/block list - see `/management-api/lists/overview`). Cross-session matches use different `vendor_data` and are capped at 5. */
     matches?: SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsMatches[];
+    /** Phone intelligence signals. Present only when the phone intelligence add-on ran for this number. */
+    phone_intelligence?: PhoneIntelligence;
+    /** Social footprint of the number. Present only when the social footprint add-on ran for this number. */
+    phone_social?: PhoneSocialFootprint | null;
 }
 interface SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsCarrier {
     /** Name of the phone carrier */
@@ -6814,7 +7360,7 @@ interface SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsMatches {
 }
 interface SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module (e.g. `PHONE` inside `phone_verifications[].warnings`), but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     log_type?: string;
@@ -6965,7 +7511,7 @@ interface SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsPoaParsedAddressDocumentLocation {
 }
 interface SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsWarnings {
     /** The feature that generated this warning. The value identifies the feature block the warning belongs to. Each module's warnings array typically uses the value matching its module (e.g. `PHONE` inside `phone_verifications[].warnings`), but the enum above is authoritative across all feature warnings on the decision payload. */
-    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | (string & {});
+    feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACEMATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "AML" | "LOCATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "GEOLOCATION" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
     risk?: string;
     additional_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     log_type?: string;
@@ -7054,8 +7600,8 @@ interface SessionDecisionRegistryChecks {
     data_resolved?: boolean;
     /** Full registry payload for the company (registry record merged with any user-provided or console-edited data). */
     company?: SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompany;
-    /** Raw ownership snapshot kept for reviewers; its shape differs by registry source and is not a stable contract. Read `company.beneficial_owners` and `company.ownership` instead. */
-    ownership_structure?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** The cap table the registry proved, as it stood when the ownership tier was delivered: direct `shareholders` and `beneficial_owners`. Null when the registry proved no ownership. It never carries the registry source's own rows; read `company.beneficial_owners` and `company.ownership` for the current record. */
+    ownership_structure?: KYBOwnershipStructure | null;
     warnings?: Record<string, unknown>[];
 }
 /** Full registry payload for the company (registry record merged with any user-provided or console-edited data). */
@@ -7115,8 +7661,8 @@ interface SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompany {
     industries?: KYBRegistryIndustry[] | null;
     /** Registry filing dates, when available. Annual returns and general meetings use last_annual_return_date and last_agm_date; they are distinct from financial accounts. */
     accounts?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
-    /** Raw record returned by the registry source, kept for reviewers. Its shape differs by country and source and is not a stable contract: read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) instead. */
-    registry_data?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Didit's normalized registry detail for the company: the ownership outcome (`ownership_error`, `section_errors`, `ubo_resolution`, `lite_enrichment`), the corrections made with update-data, and registry facts that have no field of their own. It never carries the registry source's own record. Every key is optional and present only when the company has a value for it; new keys may be added. Read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) for anything they cover. */
+    registry_data?: KYBRegistryData | null;
     /** Data confirmed or edited by the end user. */
     user_provided_data?: Record<string, unknown>;
     confirmed_by_user_at?: Date | null;
@@ -7130,6 +7676,8 @@ interface SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompany {
     registry_tier_delivered?: string | null;
     /** `not_requested`, `pending`, `delivered`, `not_held` or `unavailable`. Also in `ownership.status`. */
     registry_ownership_status?: string | null;
+    /** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+    registry_monitoring?: SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompanyRegistryMonitoring | null;
 }
 interface SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompanyBeneficialOwners {
     uuid?: string;
@@ -7187,6 +7735,20 @@ interface SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompanyOfficers {
     /** Registry-reported birth month. Null when only the year is known. */
     date_of_birth_month?: number | null;
 }
+/** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+interface SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompanyRegistryMonitoring {
+    uuid?: string;
+    status?: string;
+    unavailable_reason?: string | null;
+    enrolled_at?: Date | null;
+    cancelled_at?: Date | null;
+    last_bill_date?: string | null;
+    next_bill_date?: string | null;
+    last_event_at?: Date | null;
+    events_count?: number;
+    /** The company fields the monitor watches. */
+    watched_fields?: unknown;
+}
 interface SessionDecisionResubmissions {
     /** 1 for the first resubmission of the session, 2 for the second, and so on. */
     number?: number;
@@ -7220,6 +7782,12 @@ interface SessionDecisionReviews {
     comment?: string;
     created_at?: Date;
 }
+/** Present when a reviewer set `status` by hand. `null` when the status is the automatic one. Use it to tell a manual approval from an automatic one. */
+interface SessionDecisionStatusOverride {
+    overridden_at?: Date | null;
+    /** The status the platform's own checks conclude. */
+    automatic_status?: string | null;
+}
 /** A bulk session deletion running in the background: progress and counts per outcome, never which sessions it deleted. */
 interface SessionDeletionJob {
     /** Poll `GET /v3/sessions/delete/{job_id}/` with this id. */
@@ -7283,6 +7851,29 @@ interface SessionEvent {
     /** When the event happened, as a Unix timestamp in milliseconds. Results are ordered by it. */
     sent_at: number;
 }
+/** One ZIP with every file of a session, in original quality. */
+interface SessionFilesExport {
+    /** ID of the export. Pass it to `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/files-export/{exportId}/`. */
+    export_id: string;
+    /** The session the files are from. */
+    session_id: string;
+    /** `PENDING` and `PROCESSING` while the ZIP is prepared, `READY` once it can be downloaded, `FAILED` when it could not be prepared (request a new export), `EXPIRED` once the ZIP was deleted. */
+    status: "PENDING" | "PROCESSING" | "READY" | "FAILED" | "EXPIRED" | (string & {});
+    /** Files in the ZIP. Set only while `status` is `READY`. */
+    file_count: number | null;
+    /** Size of the ZIP in bytes. Set only while `status` is `READY`. */
+    size_bytes: number | null;
+    /** Signed URL of the ZIP, valid for a short time. Set only while `status` is `READY`; read the export again for a new one. */
+    download_url: string | null;
+    /** When the ZIP is deleted, 24 hours after it was ready. Set only while `status` is `READY`. */
+    expires_at: Date | null;
+    /** Why the export failed, when `status` is `FAILED`. */
+    error: string | null;
+    /** When the export was requested. */
+    created_at: Date;
+    /** When the ZIP was ready or the export failed. */
+    completed_at: Date | null;
+}
 interface SessionImportError {
     uuid: string;
     row_number: number;
@@ -7461,7 +8052,7 @@ interface SignatureFieldValidation {
     /** Shown to the signer instead of the default error. */
     message?: string | null;
 }
-/** One signer's result for one Electronic Signature step. See the [Electronic Signature report](/core-technology/electronic-signature/report-electronic-signature). */
+/** One signer's result for one E-signature step. See the [E-signature report](/core-technology/electronic-signature/report-electronic-signature). */
 interface SignatureResult {
     /** Pass it as `signature_id` to download this signer's evidence or validate their signature. */
     id?: string;
@@ -7471,17 +8062,19 @@ interface SignatureResult {
     status?: "intro" | "review" | "code" | "signing" | "signed" | "declined" | (string & {});
     /** The step's outcome. A warning sets it through its rule; custom status rules apply after. */
     verdict?: "Not Finished" | "Approved" | "In Review" | "Declined" | (string & {});
-    /** `aes`. `qes` (Qualified Electronic Signature, QES) is coming soon. */
-    level?: "aes" | "qes" | (string & {});
-    format?: "pades" | (string & {});
-    /** `PAdES-B-LT` once signed. */
+    /** `simple` (default) or `aes`. `qes` (Qualified Electronic Signature, QES) is an add-on that is not available yet. */
+    level?: "simple" | "aes" | "qes" | (string & {});
+    /** `pdf` for a Simple signature, `pades` for Advanced (AES). */
+    format?: "pdf" | "pades" | (string & {});
+    /** `PAdES-B-LT` once an Advanced (AES) signature is signed, otherwise null. */
     profile?: string | null;
     signer?: SignatureResultSigner;
+    /** The verified identity the signature relies on. Empty for a Simple signature with no verified identity. */
     identity_used?: SignatureResultIdentityUsed;
-    /** The certificate the documents were signed with. `null` until signed. */
+    /** The certificate the documents were signed with. `null` until signed, and always `null` for a Simple signature. */
     certificate?: SignatureResultCertificate | null;
     confirmation?: SignatureResultConfirmation;
-    /** The trusted timestamp in the signature. `null` until signed. */
+    /** The RFC 3161 timestamp in the signature, issued by Didit. `null` until signed, and always `null` for a Simple signature. */
     timestamp?: SignatureResultTimestamp | null;
     documents?: SignatureResultDocuments[];
     /** The signature and initials the signer adopted for signature and initials fields. `null` until the signer adopts one. */
@@ -7490,7 +8083,7 @@ interface SignatureResult {
     electronic_signature_consent_at?: Date | null;
     /** Path of the evidence PDF, once signed. See [Download the signature evidence](/sessions-api/electronic-signature/download-evidence). */
     evidence_file?: string | null;
-    /** Warnings raised for this signer. See [Electronic Signature warnings](/core-technology/electronic-signature/warnings-electronic-signature). */
+    /** Warnings raised for this signer. See [E-signature warnings](/core-technology/electronic-signature/warnings-electronic-signature). */
     warnings?: SignatureResultWarnings[];
     /** The last cryptographic check of the signed documents. `null` until the documents are signed. If Didit can't confirm the outcome of signing, it's `{"valid": null, "reason": "signature_provider_outcome_unknown", "checked_at": ...}` and `status` stays `signing`: treat it as not signed. */
     validation?: SignatureResultValidation | null;
@@ -7515,7 +8108,7 @@ interface SignatureResultAdoptedSignature {
     font?: string | null;
     adopted_at?: Date;
 }
-/** The certificate the documents were signed with. `null` until signed. */
+/** The certificate the documents were signed with. `null` until signed, and always `null` for a Simple signature. */
 interface SignatureResultCertificate {
     issuer?: string;
     issued_to?: string;
@@ -7525,7 +8118,8 @@ interface SignatureResultCertificate {
     valid_until?: Date;
 }
 interface SignatureResultConfirmation {
-    channel?: "email" | "sms" | (string & {});
+    /** `null` for a Simple signature, which has no code. */
+    channel?: "email" | "sms" | (string & {}) | null;
     /** The masked contact the code went to. */
     destination?: string | null;
     confirmed_at?: Date | null;
@@ -7578,6 +8172,7 @@ interface SignatureResultDocumentsConversion {
     /** Version of the converter that produced the PDF. */
     converter?: string;
 }
+/** The verified identity the signature relies on. Empty for a Simple signature with no verified identity. */
 interface SignatureResultIdentityUsed {
     session_id?: string;
     kyc_id?: string | null;
@@ -7586,7 +8181,7 @@ interface SignatureResultIdentityUsed {
     expected_name?: string | null;
 }
 interface SignatureResultSigner {
-    /** Verified name. */
+    /** The signer's name. Verified (from the approved ID verification or the session) except at the Simple level without a verified session name, where it is the name the signer typed and is not verified. */
     name?: string | null;
     capacity?: "self" | "company" | (string & {});
     company?: string | null;
@@ -7597,7 +8192,7 @@ interface SignatureResultSigner {
     /** The KYC session that verified the signer. */
     identity_session_id?: string;
 }
-/** The trusted timestamp in the signature. `null` until signed. */
+/** The RFC 3161 timestamp in the signature, issued by Didit. `null` until signed, and always `null` for a Simple signature. */
 interface SignatureResultTimestamp {
     time?: Date;
     /** Always `false` for AES. */
@@ -7625,12 +8220,12 @@ interface SignatureResultValidationDocuments {
     revoked?: boolean;
     /** EU Trusted List check. For AES: `{"status": "not_applicable", "reason": "aes_not_qualified"}`. */
     trusted_list?: SignatureResultValidationDocumentsTrustedList;
-    /** The certificate the documents were signed with. `null` until signed. */
+    /** The certificate the documents were signed with. `null` until signed, and always `null` for a Simple signature. */
     certificate?: SignatureResultValidationDocumentsCertificate | null;
-    /** The trusted timestamp in the signature. `null` until signed. */
+    /** The RFC 3161 timestamp in the signature, issued by Didit. `null` until signed, and always `null` for a Simple signature. */
     timestamp?: SignatureResultValidationDocumentsTimestamp | null;
 }
-/** The certificate the documents were signed with. `null` until signed. */
+/** The certificate the documents were signed with. `null` until signed, and always `null` for a Simple signature. */
 interface SignatureResultValidationDocumentsCertificate {
     issuer?: string;
     issued_to?: string;
@@ -7639,7 +8234,7 @@ interface SignatureResultValidationDocumentsCertificate {
     valid_from?: Date;
     valid_until?: Date;
 }
-/** The trusted timestamp in the signature. `null` until signed. */
+/** The RFC 3161 timestamp in the signature, issued by Didit. `null` until signed, and always `null` for a Simple signature. */
 interface SignatureResultValidationDocumentsTimestamp {
     time?: Date;
     /** Always `false` for AES. */
@@ -7694,7 +8289,7 @@ interface SimpleQuestionnaireElementValidation {
 interface SimpleWorkflowFeature {
     /** Feature to run. Use the uppercase values shown here. */
     feature: "OCR" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACE_MATCH" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "PHONE_VERIFICATION" | "EMAIL_VERIFICATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "AML" | "IP_ANALYSIS" | "AGE_ESTIMATION" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "SIGNATURE" | (string & {});
-    /** Feature-specific settings. For `QUESTIONNAIRE`, include `questionnaire_uuid` with the `questionnaire_id` returned by the questionnaire create endpoint. For `OCR`, `methods` selects which ID Verification methods each country may use (document capture, non-doc lookup against a government or other authoritative source, and digital identity wallets); omit it and every country is document capture only. For `SIGNATURE`, see [Electronic Signature settings](/management-api/workflows/feature-configs#electronic-signature): `signature_level` accepts `aes` only for now, and workflow documents and their fields are managed in the console, so through the API send documents and fields per session with `signature_documents_source: "session"`. */
+    /** Feature-specific settings. For `QUESTIONNAIRE`, include `questionnaire_uuid` with the `questionnaire_id` returned by the questionnaire create endpoint. For `SIGNATURE`, a workflow that goes live needs a document to sign: set `signature_documents_source` to `session` or `both` so each session can bring its own, or send `status: "draft"` and add the documents before you publish. `signature_level: "aes"` is refused with `aes_not_available` while `signature_availability.aes` is `false` on the workflow. For `OCR`, `methods` selects which ID Verification methods each country may use (document capture, non-doc lookup against a government or other authoritative source, and digital identity wallets); omit it and every country is document capture only. For `SIGNATURE`, see [E-signature settings](/management-api/workflows/feature-configs#e-signature): `signature_level` accepts `simple` (the default, no ID verification, email or phone needed) and `aes` for now, and workflow documents and their fields are managed in the console, so through the API send documents and fields per session with `signature_documents_source: "session"`. */
     config?: Record<string, unknown>;
     /** Optional internal label for this workflow node. */
     label?: string;
@@ -7789,7 +8384,7 @@ interface TransactionDetail {
     documents?: TransactionDetailDocuments[];
     /** Activity log entries (creation, notes, manual reviews, status changes). */
     activities?: TransactionDetailActivities[];
-    /** Alerts raised by rules and providers. */
+    /** Always empty today. An open alert is a transaction with status `IN_REVIEW` or `AWAITING_USER`. */
     alerts?: TransactionDetailAlerts[];
     /** Per-rule execution results - which rule fired, with what score impact. */
     rule_runs?: TransactionDetailRuleRuns[];
@@ -8077,7 +8672,7 @@ interface TransactionRuleAggregation {
     value: number;
     /** Look-back window ending at the transaction's txn_date: <N>m (MINUTES, not months), <N>h (hours) or <N>d (days), e.g. 30m, 24h, 7d, 30d. */
     window?: string;
-    /** Narrows which historical transactions are aggregated. Keys are field paths from the condition field catalog; a value of "__current__" resolves to the same field's value on the transaction being evaluated (e.g. {"subject_vendor_data": "__current__"} scopes the window to the same subject), and a list value means membership. Filters compare by equality or membership ONLY - there is no lt/gte filter, so a range such as "historical transactions under 10,000" cannot be expressed here. Put the range on the metric instead (metric max with operator lt keeps every transaction in the window below the threshold). */
+    /** Narrows which historical transactions are aggregated. Keys are field paths from the condition field catalog; a value of "__current__" resolves to the same field's value on the transaction being evaluated (e.g. {"subject_vendor_data": "__current__"} scopes the window to the same subject), and a list value means membership. Records without the grouped value are never grouped together: when the transaction being evaluated has no value for a "__current__" field (no counterparty, no device fingerprint), the aggregation does not match, whatever its operator. Filters compare by equality or membership ONLY - there is no lt/gte filter, so a range such as "historical transactions under 10,000" cannot be expressed here. Put the range on the metric instead (metric max with operator lt keeps every transaction in the window below the threshold). */
     filters?: Record<string, unknown>;
 }
 interface TransactionRuleBacktestResult {
@@ -8095,7 +8690,7 @@ interface TransactionRuleCondition {
     field: string;
     /** Comparison operator. in/not_in test membership (value may be a list or a single scalar). contains/not_contains are case-insensitive substring checks against a string value. contains_any takes a list of strings and matches when any is a case-insensitive substring of the field value. regex matches the value pattern against the field. fuzzy_match compares against the value string with the required `score` threshold (0-100). gt/gte/lt/lte never match when either side is missing. exists/is_not_empty/is_not_null (aliases) and not_exists/is_empty/is_null (aliases) are presence checks that ignore `value`. */
     operator: "eq" | "ne" | "gt" | "gte" | "lt" | "lte" | "in" | "not_in" | "contains" | "not_contains" | "contains_any" | "regex" | "fuzzy_match" | "exists" | "is_not_empty" | "is_not_null" | "not_exists" | "is_empty" | "is_null" | (string & {});
-    /** Comparison value. Its shape depends on the operator and value_type; omit for the presence-check operators. */
+    /** Comparison value. Its shape depends on the operator and value_type; omit it for the presence-check operators. Every other operator needs a value that is not `null` or an empty list, otherwise the rule is refused with `400`. `contains_any` needs a list of strings, and `contains`, `not_contains` and `regex` need a single string. */
     value?: unknown;
     /** Optional value interpretation. `list`: value is a List UUID and the list's entries become the comparison value. `field`: value is another field path, compared field-to-field. `relative_date`: value is a relative-date object, e.g. {"direction": "past", "unit": "days", "amount": 30}. */
     value_type?: "list" | "field" | "relative_date" | (string & {});
@@ -8553,6 +9148,12 @@ interface TravelRuleInboundResponse {
     /** Full transfer object returned by the ownership-confirmation and finish/cancel endpoints. While an inbound transfer's wallet ownership is unconfirmed, the counterparty's `originator_data` and `beneficiary_data` come back masked (the first letter of each word is kept; the wallet, chain and VASP routing stay readable) and `data_masked` is true. */
     travel_rule?: TravelRuleTransferDetail;
 }
+interface TravelRuleManualMatchResponse {
+    /** One Travel Rule transfer as the transfers list shows it: VASP names, wallets and memos only, never the originator or beneficiary person data. */
+    deposit: TravelRuleTransferRow;
+    /** One Travel Rule transfer as the transfers list shows it: VASP names, wallets and memos only, never the originator or beneficiary person data. */
+    message: TravelRuleTransferRow;
+}
 /** How strictly each field of the counterparty's data is compared with what you hold, per entity type. A field you leave out keeps its default. `NONE` skips the comparison, `STRICT` needs exactly the same words, `CONTAINS` accepts one value whose words all appear in the other, `DEFAULT` is the standard subset match, and `FUZZY` accepts close spellings (and, for dates of birth, a swapped day and month). */
 interface TravelRuleMatchingRules {
     /** Rules for a natural person. */
@@ -9246,6 +9847,16 @@ interface UserSessionListItem {
     email_address: UserSessionListItemEmailAddress | null;
     /** Compact per-feature extras. Only features that produced data appear as keys; `null` when no feature produced extras. Fields excluded by the workflow's response-attributes configuration are omitted. */
     additional_details: UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetails | null;
+    /** The Console reviewer the session is assigned to, or `null` when nobody holds it. */
+    assignee?: UserSessionListItemAssignee | null;
+    /** When the session started waiting for review. `null` unless the session is `In Review`. */
+    waiting_since?: Date | null;
+    /** When the review is due, from the review deadline set for your application in the Console. `null` unless the session is `In Review` and a deadline is set. */
+    sla_due_at?: Date | null;
+    /** Up to a few of the session's most important warnings, for a quick triage view. The full list is in the decision. */
+    top_warnings?: UserSessionListItemTopWarnings[];
+    /** Number of warnings on the session. */
+    warnings_count?: number;
 }
 /** Compact per-feature extras. Only features that produced data appear as keys; `null` when no feature produced extras. Fields excluded by the workflow's response-attributes configuration are omitted. */
 interface UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetails {
@@ -9324,6 +9935,11 @@ interface UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsPoa {
     address?: string;
     name_on_document?: string;
 }
+/** The Console reviewer the session is assigned to, or `null` when nobody holds it. */
+interface UserSessionListItemAssignee {
+    email?: string;
+    assigned_at?: Date | null;
+}
 /** Email associated with the session: the verified email when email verification ran, otherwise the contact email provided at session creation. `null` when neither exists. */
 interface UserSessionListItemEmailAddress {
     email: string;
@@ -9332,7 +9948,7 @@ interface UserSessionListItemEmailAddress {
 }
 interface UserSessionListItemFeatures {
     /** Verification feature identifier. */
-    feature: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACE_MATCH" | "POA" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "EMAIL_VERIFICATION" | "PHONE" | "AML" | "IP_ANALYSIS" | "AGE_ESTIMATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | (string & {});
+    feature: "ID_VERIFICATION" | "NFC" | "LIVENESS" | "FACE_MATCH" | "POA" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "EMAIL_VERIFICATION" | "PHONE" | "AML" | "IP_ANALYSIS" | "AGE_ESTIMATION" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "GEOLOCATION" | (string & {});
     /** Status of this feature. `Not Finished` until the step completes. */
     status: "Not Finished" | "Approved" | "Declined" | "In Review" | "Resub Requested" | (string & {});
 }
@@ -9343,6 +9959,15 @@ interface UserSessionListItemPhoneNumber {
     /** `true` only when the phone-verification feature approved this number. */
     is_verified: boolean;
 }
+interface UserSessionListItemTopWarnings {
+    /** Warning code, for example `FACE_MATCH_LOW_SIMILARITY`. */
+    risk?: string;
+    /** The feature that raised it. */
+    feature?: string;
+    /** `error` or `warning`; `null` for a legacy entry. */
+    log_type?: string | null;
+    short_description?: string;
+}
 /** A VASP of the directory or a member of the Didit network, with the routes your application has to it. A customer is a member of the Didit network only while its application is live, its Travel Rule is on, its profile is discoverable, has a legal name and a confirmed compliance email, and Didit has not marked the application as a test, demo or internal one. Each row also carries the shared due-diligence assessment (dd_score, risk_level, responsiveness, essential_checks) and your application's own decision, entity screening and questionnaires, which no other customer sees. */
 interface VaspDirectoryEntry {
     /** The entry's id, for GET /v3/travel-rule/vasps/{vasp_id}/. */
@@ -9757,6 +10382,8 @@ interface WebhookConfig {
     allowed_return_hosts: string[];
     /** Every webhook destination of the application, oldest first, each with its signing secret. Read only here: manage destinations with the `/v3/webhook/destinations/` endpoints. */
     endpoints: WebhookConfigDestination[];
+    /** Origins (for example `https://app.example.com`; `http` only for `localhost`) the hosted verification flow may be embedded in and may send the user back to with a session callback. Server-to-server calls are not affected. An empty list means no restriction. Didit stores each origin in lower case without a default port. An invalid entry fails with `400` on `allowed_domains`. */
+    allowed_domains?: string[];
 }
 interface WebhookConfigAvailableEvents {
     /** Supported webhook event name. Use these exact strings in `subscribed_events`; unsupported values are rejected. */
@@ -9826,7 +10453,7 @@ interface WebhookDestinationDeliveryDetail {
     request_body: string;
 }
 /** Supported webhook event name. Use these exact strings in `subscribed_events`; unsupported values are rejected. */
-type WebhookEventType = "status.updated" | "data.updated" | "user.status.updated" | "user.data.updated" | "business.status.updated" | "business.data.updated" | "activity.created" | "transaction.created" | "transaction.status.updated" | "travel_rule.status.updated" | "workflow.compliance_changed" | "auth.signup" | "auth.login" | "auth.login_failed" | "auth.password_reset_requested" | "auth.password_reset_completed" | "auth.mfa_changed" | "auth.new_device" | "auth.account_locked" | "investigator.report.ready" | "investigator.decision.automated" | "investigator.decision.overridden" | "investigator.decision.contested" | "investigator.question.raised" | "investigator.automation.paused" | "investigator.rfi.answered" | "investigator.rfi.overdue" | "investigator.drift.detected" | "investigator.sla.breached" | "investigator.qa.failed" | "investigator.external.report.ready" | (string & {});
+type WebhookEventType = "status.updated" | "data.updated" | "user.status.updated" | "user.data.updated" | "business.status.updated" | "business.data.updated" | "activity.created" | "transaction.created" | "transaction.status.updated" | "travel_rule.status.updated" | "workflow.compliance_changed" | "transaction_rule_suggestions.created" | "auth.signup" | "auth.login" | "auth.login_failed" | "auth.password_reset_requested" | "auth.password_reset_completed" | "auth.mfa_changed" | "auth.new_device" | "auth.account_locked" | "investigator.report.ready" | "investigator.decision.automated" | "investigator.decision.overridden" | "investigator.decision.contested" | "investigator.question.raised" | "investigator.automation.paused" | "investigator.rfi.answered" | "investigator.rfi.overdue" | "investigator.drift.detected" | "investigator.sla.breached" | "investigator.qa.failed" | "investigator.external.report.ready" | (string & {});
 /** Event filter for this webhook destination. Didit delivers only webhooks whose event type exactly matches one of these values - there is no wildcard subscription. When sent, the list must contain at least one valid event (an explicit `[]` is rejected with 400); a destination whose list is empty (field omitted at create) receives nothing. On update the list is replaced wholesale, never merged. */
 type WebhookSubscribedEvents = WebhookEventType[];
 /** The fields below are typed; the object also carries every other column of the workflow configuration (feature toggles, thresholds, warning actions, allowed documents, callbacks) as additional properties. Fields that do not apply to the `workflow_type` are `null`. */
@@ -9879,6 +10506,8 @@ interface WorkflowDetail {
     kyb_role_settings?: Record<string, unknown>[];
     created_at?: Date;
     updated_at?: Date;
+    /** Which E-signature levels can sign right now. Check it before you set `signature_level`. Returned on `kyc`, `kyb` and graph workflows. */
+    signature_availability?: WorkflowDetailSignatureAvailability;
     /** Whether a simple KYC or KYB workflow runs Bank verification. It runs after the contact steps (and Location verification) and before database validation, AML and IP analysis. Bank verification is not generally available yet: turning it on is refused wherever it is not enabled. */
     is_bank_verification_enabled?: boolean;
     /** Bank verification settings of a simple workflow, with the same keys a `BANK_VERIFICATION` node takes (for example `bank_countries` and `bank_method_order`). Unknown keys are dropped. Every key is optional and an absent key keeps its default, so `{}` means all defaults. See [Bank verification settings](/management-api/workflows/feature-configs#bank-verification). */
@@ -9889,6 +10518,15 @@ interface WorkflowDetail {
     geolocation_config?: Record<string, unknown>;
     [key: string]: unknown;
 }
+/** Which E-signature levels can sign right now. Check it before you set `signature_level`. Returned on `kyc`, `kyb` and graph workflows. */
+interface WorkflowDetailSignatureAvailability {
+    /** Simple is always available. */
+    simple?: boolean;
+    /** Whether Advanced (AES) can sign now. While it is `false`, saving a new step at `signature_level: "aes"` is refused with `aes_not_available`. */
+    aes?: boolean;
+    /** Whether Qualified (QES) can sign now. It is `false` until a qualified provider is connected. */
+    qes?: boolean;
+}
 /** One workflow version in the list view. */
 interface WorkflowListItem {
     /** Per-version UUID. Use as `{settings_uuid}` for get/update/delete, and as `workflow_id` when creating sessions. */
@@ -9941,43 +10579,118 @@ interface WorkflowListItemCreatedBy {
     type?: "user" | "api_key" | (string & {});
 }
 
-/** `account.applications` */
-declare class AccountApplications extends APIResource {
-    /**
-     * Create Application
-     *
-     * Create an application inside an organization. The response includes `api_key`; persist it now (recoverable via GET). Requires owner/admin JWT.
-     *
-     * `POST /organizations/me/{org_id}/applications/`
-     *
-     * @param orgId UUID of the organization. Look it up with `GET /organizations/me/`.
-     */
-    create(orgId: string, params?: AccountApplicationsCreateParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<Application>;
-    /**
-     * List the organization's applications
-     *
-     * List the organization's applications, 50 per page by default. Use this to discover `app_id` values when recovering credentials from a new machine, then call `GET /organizations/me/{org_id}/applications/{app_id}/` for the API key. Requires an owner or admin Bearer token.
-     *
-     * `GET /organizations/me/{org_id}/applications/`
-     *
-     * @param orgId UUID of the organization. Look it up with `GET /organizations/me/`.
-     */
-    list(orgId: string, params?: AccountApplicationsListParams, options?: RequestOptions): PagePromise<PaginatedApplicationList, Application>;
-    /**
-     * Get Application Credentials
-     *
-     * Read one application's full record including `client_id` and `api_key`. Use this to recover a lost `api_key`.
-     *
-     * `GET /organizations/me/{org_id}/applications/{app_id}/`
-     *
-     * @param orgId UUID of the organization that owns the application.
-     * @param appId UUID of the application whose credentials you want to read.
-     */
-    retrieve(orgId: string, appId: string, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<Application>;
-    /**
-     * Update Application
+/** All fields are optional. Sending an empty body creates an application with a default name, in the European Union. */
+interface AccountApplicationsCreateParams {
+    /** Application display name. Defaults to `"<organization name> App"`. */
+    name?: string;
+    /** Website or app URL associated with this application. */
+    website_url?: string;
+    /** Allowed redirect URIs for OAuth-style and verification redirect flows. */
+    redirect_uris?: string[];
+    /** Terms of service URL shown in the verification flow. */
+    terms_url?: string;
+    /** Privacy policy URL shown in the verification flow. */
+    privacy_url?: string;
+    /** Internal description for the application (not shown to end users). */
+    description?: string;
+    /** Where the application's verification data is stored and processed, chosen when the application is created. `eu` is the European Union (Ireland), the default. `au` (Australia, Sydney) and `mx` (Mexico) are coming soon: a request that names them answers 400 `This data location is not available yet.` An organization's Sandbox application is always in the European Union. */
+    data_location?: ApplicationDataLocation;
+}
+interface AccountApplicationsListParams {
+    /** Number of applications per page. Defaults to 50. */
+    limit?: number;
+    /** Number of applications to skip before the page starts. Defaults to 0. */
+    offset?: number;
+}
+/** PATCH body for application metadata. Send only the fields you want to change; omitted fields are preserved. `uuid`, `client_id`, and `api_key` cannot be updated. `products` is read-only: a `products` key in the body is ignored. `data_location` can't be changed after the application is created: naming the location it already has is accepted, and any other location answers 400. The one exception is the live application created with your organization: the first update that names a `data_location` chooses it, once, while no API key of the application has been used and it has no verification session. */
+interface AccountApplicationsUpdateParams {
+    /** Application display name. */
+    name?: string;
+    /** Website or app URL associated with this application. */
+    website_url?: string;
+    /** Allowed redirect URIs for OAuth-style and verification redirect flows. */
+    redirect_uris?: string[];
+    /** Terms of service URL shown in the verification flow. */
+    terms_url?: string;
+    /** Privacy policy URL shown in the verification flow. */
+    privacy_url?: string;
+    /** Internal description for the application. */
+    description?: string;
+    /** Where the application's verification data is stored and processed, chosen when the application is created. `eu` is the European Union (Ireland), the default. `au` (Australia, Sydney) and `mx` (Mexico) are coming soon: a request that names them answers 400 `This data location is not available yet.` An organization's Sandbox application is always in the European Union. */
+    data_location?: ApplicationDataLocation;
+}
+interface AccountLoginParams {
+    email: string;
+    password: string;
+}
+interface AccountOrganizationsListParams {
+    /** Page size. Defaults to 50. */
+    limit?: number;
+    /** Zero-based offset of the first result. */
+    offset?: number;
+}
+interface AccountRegisterParams {
+    /** Any valid email address (personal, work, alias). Used as the unique account identifier. */
+    email: string;
+    /** Minimum 8 characters. Must contain at least one uppercase letter (`A-Z`), one lowercase letter (`a-z`), one digit (`0-9`), and one special character from `!@#$%^&*()_+-=[]{}|;:,.<>?`. Validation reports one failed rule at a time. */
+    password: string;
+}
+interface AccountResendOtpParams {
+    /** Email of the pending (unverified) account. */
+    email: string;
+    /** Password chosen at registration. */
+    password: string;
+}
+interface AccountResendOtpResponse {
+    /** Always `A new verification code has been sent to your email.` */
+    message: string;
+    /** The address the code was sent to, normalized: lowercased, with any `+tag` removed from the local part (`Dev+test@Example.com` becomes `dev@example.com`). */
+    email: string;
+}
+interface AccountVerifyEmailParams {
+    /** Email used during `POST /programmatic/register/`. */
+    email: string;
+    /** 6-character alphanumeric code from the verification email. Codes expire 10 minutes after the most recent code was sent. */
+    code: string;
+}
+
+/** `account.applications` */
+declare class AccountApplications extends APIResource {
+    /**
+     * Create Application
+     *
+     * Create an application inside an organization, in the data location you choose (`data_location`, the European Union by default; it can't be changed afterwards). The response includes `api_key`; persist it now (recoverable via GET). Requires owner/admin JWT.
+     *
+     * `POST /organizations/me/{org_id}/applications/`
+     *
+     * @param orgId UUID of the organization. Look it up with `GET /organizations/me/`.
+     */
+    create(orgId: string, params?: AccountApplicationsCreateParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<Application>;
+    /**
+     * List the organization's applications
+     *
+     * List the organization's applications, 50 per page by default. Use this to discover `app_id` values when recovering credentials from a new machine, then call `GET /organizations/me/{org_id}/applications/{app_id}/` for the API key. Requires an owner or admin Bearer token.
+     *
+     * `GET /organizations/me/{org_id}/applications/`
+     *
+     * @param orgId UUID of the organization. Look it up with `GET /organizations/me/`.
+     */
+    list(orgId: string, params?: AccountApplicationsListParams, options?: RequestOptions): PagePromise<PaginatedApplicationList, Application>;
+    /**
+     * Get Application Credentials
+     *
+     * Read one application's full record including `client_id` and `api_key`. Use this to recover a lost `api_key`.
+     *
+     * `GET /organizations/me/{org_id}/applications/{app_id}/`
+     *
+     * @param orgId UUID of the organization that owns the application.
+     * @param appId UUID of the application whose credentials you want to read.
+     */
+    retrieve(orgId: string, appId: string, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<Application>;
+    /**
+     * Update Application
      *
-     * Update application metadata (name, URLs, redirect URIs). `api_key` and `client_id` are never rotated. `products` is read-only: a `products` key in the body is ignored. Requires owner/admin JWT.
+     * Update application metadata (name, URLs, redirect URIs). `api_key` and `client_id` are never rotated. `products` is read-only: a `products` key in the body is ignored. `data_location` can't be changed after the application is created, except once on the live application created with your organization, while it is unused (see the request body). Requires owner/admin JWT.
      *
      * `PATCH /organizations/me/{org_id}/applications/{app_id}/`
      *
@@ -10071,7 +10784,7 @@ declare class AddressValidation extends APIResource {
      *
      * **Authentication.** Send your application's API key in `x-api-key`. Missing or invalid credentials return `403` - this API never returns `401`.
      *
-     * **Rate limit.** Shared write budget of 300 requests per minute per API key across all POST/PATCH/DELETE endpoints.
+     * **Rate limit.** Shared write budget of 300 requests per minute per API key across POST/PATCH/DELETE endpoints (transaction creates and event ingestion have a separate budget of 600).
      *
      * `POST /v3/address-validation/`
      */
@@ -10276,7 +10989,7 @@ interface AmlScreenResponseAml {
 }
 /** One screening hit. `match_score` (0–100) measures identity confidence - hits below `aml_match_score_threshold` are tagged `review_status: "False Positive"` and excluded from the risk assessment; hits at or above it are `"Unreviewed"` possible matches. `risk_score` (0–100) measures how risky the matched entity is and drives the top-level `aml.score`. */
 interface AmlScreenResponseAmlHits {
-    /** Stable identifier of the matched entity in the screening datasets. */
+    /** Didit's stable identifier for the hit: `hit_` followed by 24 hexadecimal characters. The same matched entity keeps the same `id` when the subject is screened again. Pass it as `hit_id` to the AML hit review endpoints. */
     id?: string | null;
     /** Source URL for the matched entity, when available. */
     url?: string | null;
@@ -10291,8 +11004,8 @@ interface AmlScreenResponseAmlHits {
     target?: boolean | null;
     /** Display name of the matched entity. */
     caption?: string | null;
-    /** Datasets the entity appears in (e.g. `PEP`, `PEP Level 1`, sanctions list names). */
-    datasets?: string[] | null;
+    /** Risk categories the entity is listed under: `PEP` (with its level, `PEP Level 1` to `PEP Level 4`), `Sanctions`, `Adverse Media`, `Warnings and Regulatory Enforcement`, `Fitness and Probity`, `SIP`, `SIE` or `Insolvency`. `Other Lists` when the entity's source states none of these categories. */
+    datasets?: ("PEP" | "PEP Level 1" | "PEP Level 2" | "PEP Level 3" | "PEP Level 4" | "Sanctions" | "Adverse Media" | "Warnings and Regulatory Enforcement" | "Fitness and Probity" | "SIP" | "SIE" | "Insolvency" | "Other Lists" | (string & {}))[] | null;
     features?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** Entity profile: `name`, `alias`, `notes`, `gender`, `birthDate`, `birthPlace`, `nationality`, `position`, and other biographical arrays (each nullable). */
     properties?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
@@ -10536,6 +11249,10 @@ interface AnalyticsRetrieveParams {
     /** Transaction widgets only: comma-separated action types (case-insensitive). */
     action_type?: string;
 }
+interface AnalyticsRetrieveTodayParams {
+    /** IANA time zone whose midnight starts today, for example `Europe/Madrid` or `America/Mexico_City`. Omit it for UTC. */
+    tz?: string;
+}
 
 /** `analytics` */
 declare class Analytics extends APIResource {
@@ -10551,6 +11268,16 @@ declare class Analytics extends APIResource {
      * `GET /v3/organization/{organization_id}/application/{application_id}/analytics/`
      */
     retrieve(params?: AnalyticsRetrieveParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<ApplicationAnalyticsSummary | ApplicationAnalyticsWidgetResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Get today's verifications by hour
+     *
+     * Today's user verification (KYC) sessions, from local midnight in `tz`, counted per local hour they were created in, next to the same hours of the same weekday one week before, and split by the outcome each one holds now: approved, in review or declined. This is the volume card of the Business Console's Home.
+     *
+     * `total` is today so far. `previous_total_so_far` counts the comparison day only up to the same local time, so a change between them compares the same part of both days. The hours still to come today are `0`. A day on which the clocks change has 23 or 25 hours: the missing hour stays `0` and the repeated hour holds both.
+     *
+     * `GET /v3/organization/{organization_id}/application/{application_id}/analytics/today/`
+     */
+    retrieveToday(params?: AnalyticsRetrieveTodayParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<ApplicationAnalyticsToday>;
 }
 
 interface BankAccountCheckParams {
@@ -10562,6 +11289,8 @@ interface BankAccountCheckParams {
     holder: BankAccountCheckHolder;
     /** Your own reference for this check, returned unchanged. */
     vendor_data?: string | null;
+    /** Set to `true` when the account holder has explicitly consented to this check. Required in the countries whose account check needs that consent: without it the check is refused with a `400` whose `field` is `consent` and whose `reason` is `required`, and nothing is billed. Elsewhere it is optional, and Didit records it with the check's charge when you send it. */
+    consent?: boolean;
 }
 /** The account the way its country writes it: an `iban`, or an `account_number` with the bank or branch code the country needs (`sort_code`, `routing_number`, `transit_institution`, `bsb`, `ifsc`, `bank_code` or `bic`). Mexico takes a `clabe` and Argentina a `cbu_cvu`, which already name the bank. A business account adds a `registration_id` where the country asks for one. Spaces, dashes and dots are ignored. Keys the country's check does not use are ignored; a key it needs and does not get is a `400` that names it. */
 interface BankAccountCheckParamsAccount {
@@ -10597,6 +11326,8 @@ declare class Bank extends APIResource {
     /**
      * Check a bank account
      *
+     * **Not available in production yet.** Bank Verification is switched off in production, so until it is switched on this endpoint answers `404` with `bank_verification_not_available`. Do not build on it yet. The rest of this description is what the endpoint does once it is available.
+     *
      * Check that a bank account belongs to the person or company you name, before you send money to it. No session and no sign-in: send the name and the account, read the result. It is the [account check](/core-technology/bank-verification/account-check) of the Bank Verification step, run from your backend.
      *
      * **What you send.** The account's `country` (ISO 3166-1 alpha-3), the `account` the way that country writes it, and the `holder` name: `full_name` for a person or `business_name` for a company. A business name checks a business account.
@@ -10607,7 +11338,7 @@ declare class Bank extends APIResource {
      *
      * **Every request is a new check.** There is no idempotency key and no endpoint to read a check back, so a retried request runs, and is billed, again. Store the response.
      *
-     * **Sandbox.** A sandbox key calls no bank and is charged nothing. The last 4 characters of the IBAN, else of the account number, choose the answer: `0001` a `close_match` with a `holder_name`, `0002` a `close_match` without one, `0003` and `0006` a `no_match`, `0004` `cannot_verify`, `0005` a `503` and `0009` a `400`. Any other ending is a `match`.
+     * **Sandbox.** Where Bank Verification is available, a sandbox key calls no bank and is charged nothing. The last 4 characters of the IBAN, else of the account number, choose the answer: `0001` a `close_match` with a `holder_name`, `0002` a `close_match` without one, `0003` and `0006` a `no_match`, `0004` `cannot_verify`, `0005` a `503` and `0009` a `400`. Any other ending is a `match`.
      *
      * **API keys.** A scoped API key needs write access to sessions.
      *
@@ -10621,13 +11352,13 @@ interface BillingRetrieveBalanceResponse {
     balance: string;
     /** When `true`, Didit will automatically charge the saved payment method to add credits once the balance crosses `auto_refill_threshold`. Configured from Console → Billing. */
     auto_refill_enabled: boolean;
-    /** USD amount that will be charged and added to the balance on each auto-refill, at face value. Set from \$50 to \$10,000 in Console → Billing. `null` when auto-refill is disabled or unset. */
+    /** USD amount that will be charged and added to the balance on each auto-refill, at face value. Set from \$50 to \$20,000 in Console → Billing. `null` when auto-refill is disabled or unset. */
     auto_refill_amount?: string | null;
     /** Trigger threshold in USD. Auto-refill fires when `balance` falls below this value. `null` when auto-refill is disabled or unset. */
     auto_refill_threshold?: string | null;
 }
 interface BillingTopUpParams {
-    /** Amount to charge, in USD. **Must be from 50 to 10,000.** The balance receives the same amount, with no discount or bonus. Tax is added automatically at checkout based on the customer's billing address. */
+    /** Amount to charge, in USD. **Must be from 50 to 20,000.** The balance receives the same amount, with no discount or bonus. Tax is added automatically at checkout based on the customer's billing address. */
     amount_in_dollars: number;
     /** URL the hosted checkout redirects the customer to after a successful payment. Currently defaults to `https://console.didit.me`. Pass a working URL explicitly; the default host is unavailable. Append the literal placeholder `{CHECKOUT_SESSION_ID}` if you want the hosted checkout to substitute the session ID. */
     success_url?: string;
@@ -10654,7 +11385,7 @@ declare class Billing extends APIResource {
     /**
      * Top up credits
      *
-     * Add credits via a hosted Stripe Checkout session (**\$50 to \$10,000** per top-up). Top-ups are available on the Free, Growth and Scale plans, added at face value with no discount or bonus, and last 12 months; Enterprise annual contracts cannot top up. Redirect the customer to the returned `checkout_session_url`.
+     * Add credits via a hosted Stripe Checkout session (**\$50 to \$20,000** per top-up). Top-ups are available on the Free, Growth and Scale plans, added at face value with no discount or bonus, and last 12 months; Enterprise annual contracts cannot top up. Redirect the customer to the returned `checkout_session_url`.
      *
      * `POST /v3/billing/top-up/`
      */
@@ -12610,6 +13341,38 @@ interface DatabaseValidationValidateParams {
     bvn?: string;
     /** Bank card number (CHN bank-card verification). */
     bank_card_number?: string;
+    /** Company registration number as issued by the companies register: the CNPJ in Brazil (e.g. `11222333000181`), the registration number in South Africa (e.g. `1936/007721/06`). Required by the company registry and company directors services (`bra_company_registry`, `bra_company_directors`, `zaf_company_registry`, `zaf_company_directors`). */
+    company_registration_number?: string;
+    /** Registered company name, cross-checked against the register entry. Optional for `zaf_company_registry`. */
+    company_name?: string;
+    /** The person's initials as printed on the document. Required by `zaf_drivers_license`; accepted by `zaf_bank_account_holder`. */
+    initials?: string;
+    /** Driving licence number as printed on the card, for `zaf_drivers_license`. When omitted, `document_number` is used. */
+    licence_number?: string;
+    /** Refugee file number issued by South Africa's Department of Home Affairs. Required by `zaf_refugee`. */
+    refugee_file_number?: string;
+    /** Name of the bank that holds the account. Required by `zaf_bank_account_holder`. */
+    bank_name?: string;
+    /** Bank account number. Required by `zaf_bank_account_holder`; accepted by `zaf_fraud_prevention`. */
+    bank_account_number?: string;
+    /** Bank account type for `zaf_bank_account_holder`: `current`, `savings`, `transmission`, `subscriptionShare` or `notKnown`, case-insensitive. Any other value returns `400`. Omit it when you do not know the type: the account-type cross-check is then reported as not confirmed. */
+    account_type?: string;
+    /** Contact mobile number, for the services that cross-check contactability (`zaf_bank_account_holder`, `zaf_fraud_prevention`, `zaf_refugee`). */
+    phone_number?: string;
+    /** Base64-encoded right thumb fingerprint for `zaf_dha_fingerprint_match`, with `left_thumb` or on its own. */
+    right_thumb?: string;
+    /** Base64-encoded left thumb fingerprint for `zaf_dha_fingerprint_match`, with `right_thumb` or on its own. */
+    left_thumb?: string;
+    /** Minimum biometric score level for `zaf_criminal_face_screening`. Defaults to `3`. */
+    score_level?: number;
+    /** Maximum number of candidate matches `zaf_criminal_face_screening` returns. Defaults to `1`. */
+    max_matches?: number;
+    /** Vehicle register number. Required, with `vehicle_licence_plate` and `vin`, by `zaf_vehicle_ownership`. */
+    vehicle_register_number?: string;
+    /** Vehicle licence plate number. Required, with `vehicle_register_number` and `vin`, by `zaf_vehicle_ownership`. */
+    vehicle_licence_plate?: string;
+    /** Vehicle Identification Number (VIN or chassis number). Required, with `vehicle_register_number` and `vehicle_licence_plate`, by `zaf_vehicle_ownership`. */
+    vin?: string;
     /** Social Security Number (USA). */
     ssn?: string;
     /** Phone number for phone-verification services. */
@@ -12869,6 +13632,14 @@ interface EmailCheckCodeParams {
     breached_email_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
     /** What to do when the domain belongs to a disposable/temporary-mail provider (`email.is_disposable`). `DECLINE` flips the final `status` to `Declined`; `NO_ACTION` records the risk in `email.warnings`. */
     disposable_email_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
+    /** When `true`, also run email intelligence on the address: a risk score and its breach history. Billed as one `email_intelligence_api` unit per request ($0.05 at list price) in addition to this endpoint's own price. The request returns `403` when your balance cannot cover it. */
+    enable_enrichment?: boolean;
+    /** Action when the email intelligence risk score is above the threshold. `DECLINE` flips the final `status` to `Declined`; `NO_ACTION` records the signal without declining. Only takes effect when `enable_enrichment` is `true`. */
+    email_intelligence_score_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
+    /** Action when the address appears in a recent known data breach. `DECLINE` flips the final `status` to `Declined`; `NO_ACTION` records the signal without declining. Only takes effect when `enable_enrichment` is `true`. */
+    recent_email_breach_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
+    /** Action when the address appears in many known data breaches. `DECLINE` flips the final `status` to `Declined`; `NO_ACTION` records the signal without declining. Only takes effect when `enable_enrichment` is `true`. */
+    frequent_email_breach_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
     /** When true, also look up the social footprint of the address - the email, social, professional, e-commerce and entertainment platforms it is registered on. Billed as one `email_social` unit per request in addition to this endpoint's own price. */
     enable_social?: boolean;
     /** Action when the social footprint check finds the address registered on none of the platforms it covers. Only NO_ACTION and DECLINE are accepted on this endpoint; REVIEW is available on the workflow configuration key of the same name. */
@@ -12932,7 +13703,7 @@ declare class Email extends APIResource {
      *
      * **Authentication.** Send your application's API key in `x-api-key`. Missing or invalid credentials return `403` - this API never returns `401`.
      *
-     * **Rate limit.** Shared write budget of 300 requests per minute per API key across all POST/PATCH/DELETE endpoints.
+     * **Rate limit.** Shared write budget of 300 requests per minute per API key across POST/PATCH/DELETE endpoints (transaction creates and event ingestion have a separate budget of 600).
      *
      * **Social footprint.** Set `enable_social` to `true` to add a `email_social` block: the online platforms this address is registered on, with per-category counts and any profile details available. `profiles_registered: 0` means the platforms were checked and the address was found on none of them - a valid, billable answer. The block is absent when the add-on was not requested or the check could not be completed, and it is not billed in that case. Billing adds one `email_social` unit per request on top of this endpoint's own price.
      *
@@ -13512,7 +14283,7 @@ interface IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationParsedAddressDocumentLocatio
     longitude?: number;
 }
 interface IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationWarnings {
-    /** Machine-readable risk code. Always-decline risks: `DOCUMENT_EXPIRED`, `MINIMUM_AGE_NOT_MET`, `PORTRAIT_IMAGE_NOT_DETECTED`, `SCREEN_CAPTURE_DETECTED`, `PRINTED_COPY_DETECTED`, `PORTRAIT_MANIPULATION_DETECTED`, `PUBLIC_DOCUMENT_IMAGE_DETECTED`, `INVALID_DATE`, `COULD_NOT_RECOGNIZE_DOCUMENT` (400-only, never a warning), `DOCUMENT_NUMBER_NOT_DETECTED`, `COULD_NOT_DETECT_DOCUMENT_TYPE`, `NAME_NOT_DETECTED`, `DATE_OF_BIRTH_NOT_DETECTED`. Governed by request options: `MRZ_NOT_DETECTED` / `MRZ_VALIDATION_FAILED` (`invalid_mrz_action`), `DATA_INCONSISTENT` / `MRZ_AND_DATA_EXTRACTED_FROM_OCR_NOT_SAME` / `DOCUMENT_NAME_DIFFERENT_FROM_OTHER_APPROVED_DOCUMENTS` (`inconsistent_data_action`), `EXPIRATION_DATE_NOT_DETECTED` (`expiration_date_not_detected_action`). Other risks (e.g. `POSSIBLE_DUPLICATED_USER`) are informational. `DOCUMENT_LIVENESS_NOT_COMPUTED` is raised when `perform_document_liveness=true` but the forgery check returned no usable score; it sets `status` to `In Review`. */
+    /** Machine-readable risk code. Always-decline risks: `DOCUMENT_EXPIRED`, `MINIMUM_AGE_NOT_MET`, `PORTRAIT_IMAGE_NOT_DETECTED`, `SCREEN_CAPTURE_DETECTED`, `PRINTED_COPY_DETECTED`, `PORTRAIT_MANIPULATION_DETECTED`, `PUBLIC_DOCUMENT_IMAGE_DETECTED`, `INVALID_DATE`, `COULD_NOT_RECOGNIZE_DOCUMENT` (400-only, never a warning), `DOCUMENT_NUMBER_NOT_DETECTED`, `COULD_NOT_DETECT_DOCUMENT_TYPE`, `NAME_NOT_DETECTED`, `DATE_OF_BIRTH_NOT_DETECTED`. Governed by request options: `MRZ_NOT_DETECTED` / `MRZ_VALIDATION_FAILED` (`invalid_mrz_action`), `DATA_INCONSISTENT` / `MRZ_AND_DATA_EXTRACTED_FROM_OCR_NOT_SAME` / `DOCUMENT_NAME_DIFFERENT_FROM_OTHER_APPROVED_DOCUMENTS` (`inconsistent_data_action`), `EXPIRATION_DATE_NOT_DETECTED` (`expiration_date_not_detected_action`). Other risks (e.g. `POSSIBLE_DUPLICATED_USER`) are informational. `DOCUMENT_LIVENESS_NOT_COMPUTED` is raised when `perform_document_liveness=true` but the forgery check returned no usable score; it sets `status` to `In Review`. `COULD_NOT_DETECT_DOCUMENT_TYPE` is also returned when the front of the document does not match a known official document design with high confidence, for example an edited or computer-generated document, or a design that is not supported yet. */
     risk?: string;
     /** Feature that raised the warning. Always `ID_VERIFICATION` on this endpoint. */
     feature?: "ID_VERIFICATION" | (string & {});
@@ -13535,7 +14306,7 @@ declare class IdVerification extends APIResource {
      *
      * **How it works.** Send the document's `front_image` (required) and, for two-sided documents, the `back_image`. Upload uncropped photos with all four corners of the document visible - the service detects, aligns, and crops the document itself, so do not pre-crop. The document is classified automatically (you never declare the country or document type), the visual zone is read with OCR, and the MRZ and any barcodes are decoded. Cross-checks then validate dates, number formats, and MRZ check digits, and compare the visual zone against the MRZ. With `perform_document_liveness=true`, the images are additionally screened for screen replays, printed copies, and portrait manipulation.
      *
-     * **Decision logic.** `status` is `Approved` unless at least one warning resolves to a decline. Fraud and hard-failure risks always decline: `DOCUMENT_EXPIRED`, `SCREEN_CAPTURE_DETECTED`, `PRINTED_COPY_DETECTED`, `PORTRAIT_MANIPULATION_DETECTED`, `PUBLIC_DOCUMENT_IMAGE_DETECTED`, plus extraction failures (`NAME_NOT_DETECTED`, `DATE_OF_BIRTH_NOT_DETECTED`, `DOCUMENT_NUMBER_NOT_DETECTED`). (`PORTRAIT_IMAGE_NOT_DETECTED`, `COULD_NOT_DETECT_DOCUMENT_TYPE`, `INVALID_DATE`, and `MRZ_NOT_DETECTED` exist in workflow sessions but are never produced by this standalone endpoint.) Three risk groups are configurable per request via `invalid_mrz_action`, `inconsistent_data_action`, and `expiration_date_not_detected_action` (`DECLINE` or `NO_ACTION`). All other warnings (e.g. `POSSIBLE_DUPLICATED_USER`) are informational and never decline on their own. When `perform_document_liveness=true` (the default) and the forgery check returns no usable score - the provider failed, answered non-200, or answered HTTP 200 with `status="ERR"` - the call returns `200` with `status: "In Review"` and a `DOCUMENT_LIVENESS_NOT_COMPUTED` warning (`log_type: "warning"`) instead of `Approved`: a check that did not run is not evidence that the document is genuine. This escalation is not configurable and never overrides a `Declined`; with `perform_document_liveness=false` the check is skipped and the status follows the remaining warnings as before. A document that cannot be processed at all returns `400` with `{"error": "COULD_NOT_RECOGNIZE_DOCUMENT"}`; a readable but problematic document returns `200` with `status: "Declined"` - always inspect `id_verification.status` and `id_verification.warnings`, not just the HTTP code.
+     * **Decision logic.** `status` is `Approved` unless at least one warning resolves to a decline. Fraud and hard-failure risks always decline: `DOCUMENT_EXPIRED`, `SCREEN_CAPTURE_DETECTED`, `PRINTED_COPY_DETECTED`, `PORTRAIT_MANIPULATION_DETECTED`, `PUBLIC_DOCUMENT_IMAGE_DETECTED`, plus extraction failures (`NAME_NOT_DETECTED`, `DATE_OF_BIRTH_NOT_DETECTED`, `DOCUMENT_NUMBER_NOT_DETECTED`). (`PORTRAIT_IMAGE_NOT_DETECTED`, `INVALID_DATE`, and `MRZ_NOT_DETECTED` exist in workflow sessions but are never produced by this standalone endpoint. `COULD_NOT_DETECT_DOCUMENT_TYPE` is returned here when the front image does not match a known official document design with high confidence, and declines the request.) Three risk groups are configurable per request via `invalid_mrz_action`, `inconsistent_data_action`, and `expiration_date_not_detected_action` (`DECLINE` or `NO_ACTION`). All other warnings (e.g. `POSSIBLE_DUPLICATED_USER`) are informational and never decline on their own. When `perform_document_liveness=true` (the default) and the forgery check returns no usable score - the provider failed, answered non-200, or answered HTTP 200 with `status="ERR"` - the call returns `200` with `status: "In Review"` and a `DOCUMENT_LIVENESS_NOT_COMPUTED` warning (`log_type: "warning"`) instead of `Approved`: a check that did not run is not evidence that the document is genuine. This escalation is not configurable and never overrides a `Declined`; with `perform_document_liveness=false` the check is skipped and the status follows the remaining warnings as before. A document that cannot be processed at all returns `400` with `{"error": "COULD_NOT_RECOGNIZE_DOCUMENT"}`; a readable but problematic document returns `200` with `status: "Declined"` - always inspect `id_verification.status` and `id_verification.warnings`, not just the HTTP code.
      *
      * **Billing.** Each `200` response consumes one ID Verification API credit (paid from your plan credit or top-up balance). When the organization's balance cannot cover the call, the endpoint returns `403` with the not-enough-credits error before any image processing.
      *
@@ -13871,6 +14642,27 @@ interface IdWalletsStartFtnParams {
      */
     device?: DigitalIdWalletApiDeviceEnum;
 }
+/** Start a Google Wallet verification (USA, GBR, BRA, SGP, TWN). */
+interface IdWalletsStartGoogleWalletParams {
+    /** Your own reference for this verification (e.g. your user id). Returned in results and webhooks. */
+    vendor_data?: string | null;
+    /** Optional JSON object stored with the verification and returned in results and webhooks. */
+    metadata?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    /** Sandbox applications only: the simulated outcome - 'wallet_cancelled', 'wallet_timeout' or 'wallet_provider_error'; any other scenario (or none) verifies. Rejected on live applications. The full catalog is available at GET /v1/sandbox/scenarios/. */
+    sandbox_scenario?: string;
+    /**
+     * ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 country of the Google Wallet identity.
+     *
+     * * `USA` - USA
+     * * `GBR` - GBR
+     * * `BRA` - BRA
+     * * `SGP` - SGP
+     * * `TWN` - TWN
+     */
+    country: DigitalIdWalletApiGoogleWalletWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum;
+    /** Where your page or app will ask the wallet: the https origin of your page (its host must be in the application's allowed_return_hosts, or be its white-label domain), e.g. https://app.example.com, or android:apk-key-hash:<base64 SHA-256 of your app's signing certificate, no padding>. The wallet refuses the request anywhere else. */
+    origin: string;
+}
 /** Start a gov.br verification (BRA). */
 interface IdWalletsStartGovbrParams {
     /** Your own reference for this verification (e.g. your user id). Returned in results and webhooks. */
@@ -14177,6 +14969,11 @@ interface IdWalletsStartVippsParams {
      */
     device?: DigitalIdWalletApiDeviceEnum;
 }
+/** What the wallet answered your page or app, for a ``request_digital_credential`` verification. */
+interface IdWalletsSubmitVerificationResponseParams {
+    /** Exactly what the wallet returned: {protocol, data} of the DigitalCredential from navigator.credentials.get, or the parsed credentialJson of Android's DigitalCredential. Encrypted to Didit; do not alter it. */
+    response: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
 
 /** `id_wallets` */
 declare class IdWallets extends APIResource {
@@ -14338,6 +15135,16 @@ declare class IdWallets extends APIResource {
      * Accepts `options.idempotencyKey` (header `Idempotency-Key`).
      */
     startFtn(params: IdWalletsStartFtnParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Start Google Wallet verification
+     *
+     * Start a Google Wallet sign-in (Google Wallet (ID pass) and US state issuers (mobile driving licence); USA, GBR, BRA, SGP, TWN) without any workflow. Billed once, only when the identity is verified. The response carries next_action.type=request_digital_credential with a request Didit signed for your application, usable only from origin. In a user gesture there, pass next_action.digital_credentials.request to navigator.credentials.get({digital: ...}) (or to Android Credential Manager as GetDigitalCredentialOption requestJson), then POST what the wallet returns to /v3/id-verification/wallets/verifications/{request_id}/response/. The browser offers its own QR code when the wallet is on another device. Sandbox applications get a deterministic simulation (simulated: true) that never contacts the provider.
+     *
+     * `POST /v3/id-verification/wallets/google-wallet/`
+     *
+     * Accepts `options.idempotencyKey` (header `Idempotency-Key`).
+     */
+    startGoogleWallet(params: IdWalletsStartGoogleWalletParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResponse>;
     /**
      * Start gov.br verification
      *
@@ -14468,6 +15275,16 @@ declare class IdWallets extends APIResource {
      * Accepts `options.idempotencyKey` (header `Idempotency-Key`).
      */
     startVipps(params: IdWalletsStartVippsParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Submit a wallet response
+     *
+     * Digital Credentials API wallets (Google Wallet): send what the wallet returned to your page or app for a verification whose next_action is request_digital_credential. Didit decrypts it, checks the issuer's signature against the trusted issuer roots, every returned value against its signed digest, and the device signature over your origin and this request, then decides the verification: verified (billed once) or declined with the error code. Single use: a second submit returns the decided verification.
+     *
+     * `POST /v3/id-verification/wallets/verifications/{request_id}/response/`
+     *
+     * @param requestId The request_id the start endpoint returned.
+     */
+    submitVerificationResponse(requestId: string, params: IdWalletsSubmitVerificationResponseParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResponse>;
 }
 
 interface InvestigatorAcceptRunParams {
@@ -14759,7 +15576,7 @@ declare class Ip extends APIResource {
      *
      * **Authentication.** Send your application's API key in `x-api-key`. Missing or invalid credentials return `403` - this API never returns `401`.
      *
-     * **Rate limit.** Shared write budget of 300 requests per minute per API key across all POST/PATCH/DELETE endpoints.
+     * **Rate limit.** Shared write budget of 300 requests per minute per API key across POST/PATCH/DELETE endpoints (transaction creates and event ingestion have a separate budget of 600).
      *
      * `POST /v3/ip/risk/`
      */
@@ -14767,7 +15584,7 @@ declare class Ip extends APIResource {
 }
 
 interface KybListShareholdersParams {
-    /** Candidate handle from `POST /v3/kyb/search/` (`kyb_registry.companies[].kyb_response_id`). Ephemeral - use it shortly after the search that produced it. */
+    /** Candidate handle from `POST /v3/kyb/search/` (`kyb_registry.companies[].kyb_response_id`). Ephemeral: use it shortly after the search that produced it. Handles can be long, so store and send the value exactly as returned, without trimming or assuming a length. */
     kyb_response_id: string;
     /** Your identifier for this company; echoed back and stored with the business session. */
     vendor_data?: string;
@@ -14829,8 +15646,8 @@ interface KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistry {
     tax_number?: string | null;
     /** Registry-reported risk level, when available. */
     risk_level?: string | null;
-    /** Registry verification status, when available. */
-    verification_status?: string | null;
+    /** Cross-jurisdiction verification status: `verified` when the registry status establishes standing (`active`), `failed` when it says the company is no longer standing (for example `dissolved`), otherwise `unknown`. `null` for a company that did not come from a registry and while a selection is still `pending`. */
+    verification_status?: "verified" | "failed" | "unknown" | (string & {}) | null;
     /** Always `true` for this endpoint - the profile was retrieved from an official registry. */
     is_from_registry?: boolean;
     /** Registry fetch lifecycle. Mirrored by `data_resolved`. */
@@ -14877,8 +15694,8 @@ interface KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistry {
     industries?: KYBRegistryIndustry[] | null;
     /** Registry filing dates, when available. Annual returns and general meetings use last_annual_return_date and last_agm_date; they are distinct from financial accounts. */
     accounts?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
-    /** Raw record returned by the registry source, kept for reviewers. Its shape differs by country and source and is not a stable contract: read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) instead. */
-    registry_data?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Didit's normalized registry detail for the company: the ownership outcome (`ownership_error`, `section_errors`, `ubo_resolution`, `lite_enrichment`), the corrections made with update-data, and registry facts that have no field of their own. It never carries the registry source's own record. Every key is optional and present only when the company has a value for it; new keys may be added. Read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) for anything they cover. */
+    registry_data?: KYBRegistryData | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint (used by the hosted KYB flow when end users edit registry data). */
     user_provided_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint. */
@@ -14895,6 +15712,8 @@ interface KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistry {
     ownership?: KYBRegistryOwnership;
     /** The registry tier the workflow ordered: `basic`, `shareholders` or `ubo`. Also in `ownership.tier_requested`. */
     registry_tier?: string | null;
+    /** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+    registry_monitoring?: KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistryRegistryMonitoring | null;
 }
 interface KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistryBeneficialOwners {
     uuid?: string;
@@ -14960,6 +15779,20 @@ interface KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistryOfficers {
     /** Registry-reported birth month. Null when only the year is known. */
     date_of_birth_month?: number | null;
 }
+/** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+interface KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistryRegistryMonitoring {
+    uuid?: string;
+    status?: string;
+    unavailable_reason?: string | null;
+    enrolled_at?: Date | null;
+    cancelled_at?: Date | null;
+    last_bill_date?: string | null;
+    next_bill_date?: string | null;
+    last_event_at?: Date | null;
+    events_count?: number;
+    /** The company fields the monitor watches. */
+    watched_fields?: unknown;
+}
 /** Full registry company profile. */
 interface KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistry {
     /** Didit's id for this company record. */
@@ -14983,8 +15816,8 @@ interface KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistry {
     tax_number?: string | null;
     /** Registry-reported risk level, when available. */
     risk_level?: string | null;
-    /** Registry verification status, when available. */
-    verification_status?: string | null;
+    /** Cross-jurisdiction verification status: `verified` when the registry status establishes standing (`active`), `failed` when it says the company is no longer standing (for example `dissolved`), otherwise `unknown`. `null` for a company that did not come from a registry and while a selection is still `pending`. */
+    verification_status?: "verified" | "failed" | "unknown" | (string & {}) | null;
     /** Always `true` for this endpoint - the profile was retrieved from an official registry. */
     is_from_registry?: boolean;
     /** Registry fetch lifecycle. Mirrored by `data_resolved`. */
@@ -15031,8 +15864,8 @@ interface KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistry {
     industries?: KYBRegistryIndustry[] | null;
     /** Registry filing dates, when available. Annual returns and general meetings use last_annual_return_date and last_agm_date; they are distinct from financial accounts. */
     accounts?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
-    /** Raw record returned by the registry source, kept for reviewers. Its shape differs by country and source and is not a stable contract: read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) instead. */
-    registry_data?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Didit's normalized registry detail for the company: the ownership outcome (`ownership_error`, `section_errors`, `ubo_resolution`, `lite_enrichment`), the corrections made with update-data, and registry facts that have no field of their own. It never carries the registry source's own record. Every key is optional and present only when the company has a value for it; new keys may be added. Read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) for anything they cover. */
+    registry_data?: KYBRegistryData | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint (used by the hosted KYB flow when end users edit registry data). */
     user_provided_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint. */
@@ -15049,6 +15882,8 @@ interface KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistry {
     ownership?: KYBRegistryOwnership;
     /** The registry tier the workflow ordered: `basic`, `shareholders` or `ubo`. Also in `ownership.tier_requested`. */
     registry_tier?: string | null;
+    /** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+    registry_monitoring?: KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistryRegistryMonitoring | null;
 }
 interface KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistryBeneficialOwners {
     uuid?: string;
@@ -15114,8 +15949,22 @@ interface KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistryOfficers {
     /** Registry-reported birth month. Null when only the year is known. */
     date_of_birth_month?: number | null;
 }
+/** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+interface KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistryRegistryMonitoring {
+    uuid?: string;
+    status?: string;
+    unavailable_reason?: string | null;
+    enrolled_at?: Date | null;
+    cancelled_at?: Date | null;
+    last_bill_date?: string | null;
+    next_bill_date?: string | null;
+    last_event_at?: Date | null;
+    events_count?: number;
+    /** The company fields the monitor watches. */
+    watched_fields?: unknown;
+}
 interface KybListUbosParams {
-    /** Candidate handle from `POST /v3/kyb/search/` (`kyb_registry.companies[].kyb_response_id`). Ephemeral - use it shortly after the search that produced it. */
+    /** Candidate handle from `POST /v3/kyb/search/` (`kyb_registry.companies[].kyb_response_id`). Ephemeral: use it shortly after the search that produced it. Handles can be long, so store and send the value exactly as returned, without trimming or assuming a length. */
     kyb_response_id: string;
     /** Your identifier for this company; echoed back and stored with the business session. */
     vendor_data?: string;
@@ -15177,8 +16026,8 @@ interface KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistry {
     tax_number?: string | null;
     /** Registry-reported risk level, when available. */
     risk_level?: string | null;
-    /** Registry verification status, when available. */
-    verification_status?: string | null;
+    /** Cross-jurisdiction verification status: `verified` when the registry status establishes standing (`active`), `failed` when it says the company is no longer standing (for example `dissolved`), otherwise `unknown`. `null` for a company that did not come from a registry and while a selection is still `pending`. */
+    verification_status?: "verified" | "failed" | "unknown" | (string & {}) | null;
     /** Always `true` for this endpoint - the profile was retrieved from an official registry. */
     is_from_registry?: boolean;
     /** Registry fetch lifecycle. Mirrored by `data_resolved`. */
@@ -15225,8 +16074,8 @@ interface KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistry {
     industries?: KYBRegistryIndustry[] | null;
     /** Registry filing dates, when available. Annual returns and general meetings use last_annual_return_date and last_agm_date; they are distinct from financial accounts. */
     accounts?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
-    /** Raw record returned by the registry source, kept for reviewers. Its shape differs by country and source and is not a stable contract: read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) instead. */
-    registry_data?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Didit's normalized registry detail for the company: the ownership outcome (`ownership_error`, `section_errors`, `ubo_resolution`, `lite_enrichment`), the corrections made with update-data, and registry facts that have no field of their own. It never carries the registry source's own record. Every key is optional and present only when the company has a value for it; new keys may be added. Read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) for anything they cover. */
+    registry_data?: KYBRegistryData | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint (used by the hosted KYB flow when end users edit registry data). */
     user_provided_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint. */
@@ -15243,6 +16092,8 @@ interface KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistry {
     ownership?: KYBRegistryOwnership;
     /** The registry tier the workflow ordered: `basic`, `shareholders` or `ubo`. Also in `ownership.tier_requested`. */
     registry_tier?: string | null;
+    /** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+    registry_monitoring?: KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistryRegistryMonitoring | null;
 }
 interface KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistryBeneficialOwners {
     uuid?: string;
@@ -15308,6 +16159,20 @@ interface KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistryOfficers {
     /** Registry-reported birth month. Null when only the year is known. */
     date_of_birth_month?: number | null;
 }
+/** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+interface KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistryRegistryMonitoring {
+    uuid?: string;
+    status?: string;
+    unavailable_reason?: string | null;
+    enrolled_at?: Date | null;
+    cancelled_at?: Date | null;
+    last_bill_date?: string | null;
+    next_bill_date?: string | null;
+    last_event_at?: Date | null;
+    events_count?: number;
+    /** The company fields the monitor watches. */
+    watched_fields?: unknown;
+}
 /** Full registry company profile. */
 interface KybListUbosResponseKybRegistry {
     /** Didit's id for this company record. */
@@ -15331,8 +16196,8 @@ interface KybListUbosResponseKybRegistry {
     tax_number?: string | null;
     /** Registry-reported risk level, when available. */
     risk_level?: string | null;
-    /** Registry verification status, when available. */
-    verification_status?: string | null;
+    /** Cross-jurisdiction verification status: `verified` when the registry status establishes standing (`active`), `failed` when it says the company is no longer standing (for example `dissolved`), otherwise `unknown`. `null` for a company that did not come from a registry and while a selection is still `pending`. */
+    verification_status?: "verified" | "failed" | "unknown" | (string & {}) | null;
     /** Always `true` for this endpoint - the profile was retrieved from an official registry. */
     is_from_registry?: boolean;
     /** Registry fetch lifecycle. Mirrored by `data_resolved`. */
@@ -15379,8 +16244,8 @@ interface KybListUbosResponseKybRegistry {
     industries?: KYBRegistryIndustry[] | null;
     /** Registry filing dates, when available. Annual returns and general meetings use last_annual_return_date and last_agm_date; they are distinct from financial accounts. */
     accounts?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
-    /** Raw record returned by the registry source, kept for reviewers. Its shape differs by country and source and is not a stable contract: read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) instead. */
-    registry_data?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Didit's normalized registry detail for the company: the ownership outcome (`ownership_error`, `section_errors`, `ubo_resolution`, `lite_enrichment`), the corrections made with update-data, and registry facts that have no field of their own. It never carries the registry source's own record. Every key is optional and present only when the company has a value for it; new keys may be added. Read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) for anything they cover. */
+    registry_data?: KYBRegistryData | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint (used by the hosted KYB flow when end users edit registry data). */
     user_provided_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint. */
@@ -15397,6 +16262,8 @@ interface KybListUbosResponseKybRegistry {
     ownership?: KYBRegistryOwnership;
     /** The registry tier the workflow ordered: `basic`, `shareholders` or `ubo`. Also in `ownership.tier_requested`. */
     registry_tier?: string | null;
+    /** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+    registry_monitoring?: KybListUbosResponseKybRegistryRegistryMonitoring | null;
 }
 interface KybListUbosResponseKybRegistryBeneficialOwners {
     uuid?: string;
@@ -15462,6 +16329,20 @@ interface KybListUbosResponseKybRegistryOfficers {
     /** Registry-reported birth month. Null when only the year is known. */
     date_of_birth_month?: number | null;
 }
+/** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+interface KybListUbosResponseKybRegistryRegistryMonitoring {
+    uuid?: string;
+    status?: string;
+    unavailable_reason?: string | null;
+    enrolled_at?: Date | null;
+    cancelled_at?: Date | null;
+    last_bill_date?: string | null;
+    next_bill_date?: string | null;
+    last_event_at?: Date | null;
+    events_count?: number;
+    /** The company fields the monitor watches. */
+    watched_fields?: unknown;
+}
 interface KybSearchParams {
     /** ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code of the country whose company registry to search. For example, `GB`. Where company registries operate at state or province level, append the ISO 3166-2 subdivision code as `XX-YY`: `US-CA` searches the California registry. United States searches always require the subdivision - a bare `US` is rejected. Case-insensitive; normalized to upper case. */
     country_code: string;
@@ -15491,7 +16372,7 @@ interface KybSearchResponse {
     created_at?: Date;
 }
 interface KybSelectParams {
-    /** Candidate handle from `POST /v3/kyb/search/` (`kyb_registry.companies[].kyb_response_id`). Ephemeral - use it shortly after the search that produced it. */
+    /** Candidate handle from `POST /v3/kyb/search/` (`kyb_registry.companies[].kyb_response_id`). Ephemeral: use it shortly after the search that produced it. Handles can be long, so store and send the value exactly as returned, without trimming or assuming a length. */
     kyb_response_id: string;
     /** Your identifier for this company; echoed back and stored with the business session. */
     vendor_data?: string;
@@ -15538,8 +16419,8 @@ interface KybSelectResponseKybRegistry {
     tax_number?: string | null;
     /** Registry-reported risk level, when available. */
     risk_level?: string | null;
-    /** Registry verification status, when available. */
-    verification_status?: string | null;
+    /** Cross-jurisdiction verification status: `verified` when the registry status establishes standing (`active`), `failed` when it says the company is no longer standing (for example `dissolved`), otherwise `unknown`. `null` for a company that did not come from a registry and while a selection is still `pending`. */
+    verification_status?: "verified" | "failed" | "unknown" | (string & {}) | null;
     /** Always `true` for this endpoint - the profile was retrieved from an official registry. */
     is_from_registry?: boolean;
     /** Registry fetch lifecycle. Mirrored by `data_resolved`. */
@@ -15586,8 +16467,8 @@ interface KybSelectResponseKybRegistry {
     industries?: KYBRegistryIndustry[] | null;
     /** Registry filing dates, when available. Annual returns and general meetings use last_annual_return_date and last_agm_date; they are distinct from financial accounts. */
     accounts?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
-    /** Raw record returned by the registry source, kept for reviewers. Its shape differs by country and source and is not a stable contract: read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) instead. */
-    registry_data?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Didit's normalized registry detail for the company: the ownership outcome (`ownership_error`, `section_errors`, `ubo_resolution`, `lite_enrichment`), the corrections made with update-data, and registry facts that have no field of their own. It never carries the registry source's own record. Every key is optional and present only when the company has a value for it; new keys may be added. Read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) for anything they cover. */
+    registry_data?: KYBRegistryData | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint (used by the hosted KYB flow when end users edit registry data). */
     user_provided_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** Always `null` on this endpoint. */
@@ -15604,6 +16485,8 @@ interface KybSelectResponseKybRegistry {
     ownership?: KYBRegistryOwnership;
     /** The registry tier the workflow ordered: `basic`, `shareholders` or `ubo`. Also in `ownership.tier_requested`. */
     registry_tier?: string | null;
+    /** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+    registry_monitoring?: KybSelectResponseKybRegistryRegistryMonitoring | null;
 }
 interface KybSelectResponseKybRegistryBeneficialOwners {
     uuid?: string;
@@ -15669,6 +16552,20 @@ interface KybSelectResponseKybRegistryOfficers {
     /** Registry-reported birth month. Null when only the year is known. */
     date_of_birth_month?: number | null;
 }
+/** The latest registry monitor for the company, or `null` when none exists. */
+interface KybSelectResponseKybRegistryRegistryMonitoring {
+    uuid?: string;
+    status?: string;
+    unavailable_reason?: string | null;
+    enrolled_at?: Date | null;
+    cancelled_at?: Date | null;
+    last_bill_date?: string | null;
+    next_bill_date?: string | null;
+    last_event_at?: Date | null;
+    events_count?: number;
+    /** The company fields the monitor watches. */
+    watched_fields?: unknown;
+}
 
 /** `kyb` */
 declare class Kyb extends APIResource {
@@ -15677,7 +16574,7 @@ declare class Kyb extends APIResource {
      *
      * Retrieve the Lite profile **plus the direct shareholders** (natural persons and corporate entities, with their ownership bands) of one candidate returned by `POST /v3/kyb/search/`.
      *
-     * **Pairing with search.** Pass the candidate's `kyb_response_id` exactly as returned by a search of the same application. The search runs on the Lite registry chain; when the country's ownership data lives at another registry Didit re-finds the company there by registration number, at no extra cost.
+     * **Pairing with search.** Pass the candidate's `kyb_response_id` exactly as returned by a search of the same application. Search at the tier you intend to buy (`tier` on `POST /v3/kyb/search/`), because the search runs on the registry chain that serves that tier and an empty Lite search is not proof that the registry does not hold the company. When the country's ownership data lives at another registry, Didit re-finds the company there by registration number, at no extra cost.
      *
      * **Billing.** Billed at the country's Shareholders price - see [KYB registry pricing](/getting-started/kyb-registry-pricing). When the registry holds no shareholder record for the company (or the country offers no ownership data at all) the Lite profile is delivered and billed instead: read `registry_tier_delivered` and `registry_ownership_status`. The balance is checked against the Shareholders price before any registry call (`403` when short).
      *
@@ -15693,7 +16590,7 @@ declare class Kyb extends APIResource {
      *
      * Retrieve the Lite profile, the direct shareholders **and the ultimate beneficial owners** resolved through the ownership chain (`registry_data.ubo_resolution` carries the corporate parent chain) of one candidate returned by `POST /v3/kyb/search/`.
      *
-     * **Pairing with search.** Pass the candidate's `kyb_response_id` exactly as returned by a search of the same application. The search runs on the Lite registry chain; when the country's ownership data lives at another registry Didit re-finds the company there by registration number, at no extra cost.
+     * **Pairing with search.** Pass the candidate's `kyb_response_id` exactly as returned by a search of the same application. Search at the tier you intend to buy (`tier` on `POST /v3/kyb/search/`), because the search runs on the registry chain that serves that tier and an empty Lite search is not proof that the registry does not hold the company. When the country's ownership data lives at another registry, Didit re-finds the company there by registration number, at no extra cost.
      *
      * **Billing.** Billed at the country's UBO price - see [KYB registry pricing](/getting-started/kyb-registry-pricing). The tier delivered is the highest the country and the registry can serve: Shareholders when the resolved report names no natural person as a beneficial owner, Lite when there is no ownership record at all; `registry_tier_delivered` names what was billed. The balance is checked against the UBO price before any registry call (`403` when short).
      *
@@ -16671,6 +17568,16 @@ interface PhoneCheckCodeParams {
     disposable_number_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
     /** What to do when the carrier lookup reports a virtual line type - `voip`, `isp`, or `vpn` (`phone.is_virtual`). `DECLINE` flips the final `status` to `Declined`; `NO_ACTION` records the risk in `phone.warnings`. */
     voip_number_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
+    /** When `true`, also run phone intelligence on the number: a risk score, the line type, whether it was recently ported and a trust index. Billed as one `phone_intelligence_api` unit per request ($0.05 at list price) in addition to this endpoint's own price. The request returns `403` when your balance cannot cover it. */
+    enable_enrichment?: boolean;
+    /** Action when the phone intelligence risk score is above the threshold. `DECLINE` flips the final `status` to `Declined`; `NO_ACTION` records the signal without declining. Only takes effect when `enable_enrichment` is `true`. */
+    phone_intelligence_score_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
+    /** Action when the number is a high-risk line type. `DECLINE` flips the final `status` to `Declined`; `NO_ACTION` records the signal without declining. Only takes effect when `enable_enrichment` is `true`. */
+    phone_type_risk_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
+    /** Action when the number was ported to another carrier recently. `DECLINE` flips the final `status` to `Declined`; `NO_ACTION` records the signal without declining. Only takes effect when `enable_enrichment` is `true`. */
+    recent_port_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
+    /** Action when the phone intelligence trust index is at or below the threshold. `DECLINE` flips the final `status` to `Declined`; `NO_ACTION` records the signal without declining. Only takes effect when `enable_enrichment` is `true`. */
+    low_phone_trust_action?: "NO_ACTION" | "DECLINE" | (string & {});
     /** When true, also look up the social footprint of the number - the messaging, social, e-commerce and professional platforms it is registered on. Billed as one `phone_social` unit per request in addition to this endpoint's own price. */
     enable_social?: boolean;
     /** Action when the social footprint check finds the number registered on none of the platforms it covers. Only NO_ACTION and DECLINE are accepted on this endpoint; REVIEW is available on the workflow configuration key of the same name. */
@@ -16736,7 +17643,7 @@ declare class Phone extends APIResource {
      *
      * **Authentication.** Send your application's API key in `x-api-key`. Missing or invalid credentials return `403` - this API never returns `401`.
      *
-     * **Rate limit.** Shared write budget of 300 requests per minute per API key across all POST/PATCH/DELETE endpoints.
+     * **Rate limit.** Shared write budget of 300 requests per minute per API key across POST/PATCH/DELETE endpoints (transaction creates and event ingestion have a separate budget of 600).
      *
      * **Social footprint.** Set `enable_social` to `true` to add a `phone_social` block: the online platforms this number is registered on, with per-category counts and any profile details available. `profiles_registered: 0` means the platforms were checked and the number was found on none of them - a valid, billable answer. The block is absent when the add-on was not requested or the check could not be completed, and it is not billed in that case. Billing adds one `phone_social` unit per request on top of this endpoint's own price.
      *
@@ -16804,7 +17711,7 @@ declare class Pricing extends APIResource {
     /**
      * Get bank verification prices (public, unauthenticated)
      *
-     * Returns the list price of each Bank Verification method in every country: bank sign-in with its balance and transactions add-ons, and the account check. Use it to quote a bank step before you build a workflow, or to show bank prices in your own product.
+     * Returns the list price of each Bank Verification method in every country: bank sign-in with its balance and transactions add-ons, and the account check. Bank Verification is not enabled in production yet, so a bank step is refused on production workflows until it is; treat these prices as a list price, not as an offer you can buy today. Use it to quote a bank step before you build a workflow, or to show bank prices in your own product.
      *
      * Public: send no auth header. The response contains no organization data and is the same for every caller. It is cached publicly for one hour and carries an `ETag`, so send `If-None-Match` to get a `304 Not Modified` when nothing changed.
      *
@@ -17418,20 +18325,91 @@ interface SessionsBulkUpdateAmlHitStatusParams {
     node_id_query?: string;
 }
 interface SessionsBulkUpdateAmlHitStatusParamsHitUpdates {
+    /** The `id` of the hit in the AML check's `hits` array (`hit_...`). A hit id returned in the earlier format is still accepted. */
     hit_id: string;
     review_status: "Unreviewed" | "Confirmed Match" | "False Positive" | "Inconclusive" | (string & {});
 }
 interface SessionsBulkUpdateAmlHitStatusResponse {
     /** `Updated {n} hit(s) successfully`, where `n` is the number of entries in `hit_updates`. */
     message: string;
-    /** The `hit_id` of every entry in `hit_updates`, in request order, including hits whose status did not change. */
+    /** The `id` of the hit each entry in `hit_updates` names, as the session decision returns it, in request order, including hits whose status did not change. */
     updated_hits: string[];
 }
+interface SessionsCreateKybPartyDraftParams {
+    /** Whether the party is an individual or a company. */
+    entity_type: "person" | "company" | (string & {});
+    /** Full name of a person. Send it, or `first_name` and `last_name`. */
+    full_name?: string;
+    first_name?: string;
+    last_name?: string;
+    /** Role the party holds. Interchangeable with `roles`; when both are sent they are merged. */
+    role?: "director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {});
+    /** Every role the party holds. A person needs at least one role (here or in `role`). */
+    roles?: ("director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {}))[];
+    /** Job title of a person. */
+    position?: string;
+    date_of_birth?: string | null;
+    /** Name of a company party. Required when `entity_type` is `company`. */
+    company_name?: string;
+    /** Registration number of a company party. */
+    registration_number?: string;
+    /** Where the verification link is sent. Required when the party has to complete verification, which depends on the role settings and ownership thresholds of the workflow. */
+    email?: string;
+    /** Share of the company the party owns. */
+    ownership_percent?: number | null;
+    /** Nationality of a person, or country of incorporation of a company. Required for every party. */
+    nationality: string;
+    phone_number?: string;
+    /** Workflow-defined extra fields. */
+    custom_fields?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Ask to skip this party's verification. Honoured only when the party's role allows skipping in the workflow's Key People settings. */
+    skip_verification?: boolean;
+    /** Workflow node of the KYB step. Only needed when the workflow has more than one KYB node; by default Didit uses the session's own node. */
+    node_id?: string;
+}
+interface SessionsCreateKybPartyDraftResponse {
+    draft_id: string;
+    created_at: Date;
+    updated_at: Date;
+    party: SessionsCreateKybPartyDraftResponseParty;
+}
+interface SessionsCreateKybPartyDraftResponseParty {
+    /** Whether the party is an individual or a company. */
+    entity_type: "person" | "company" | (string & {});
+    /** Full name of a person. Send it, or `first_name` and `last_name`. */
+    full_name?: string;
+    first_name?: string;
+    last_name?: string;
+    /** Role the party holds. Interchangeable with `roles`; when both are sent they are merged. */
+    role?: "director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {});
+    /** Every role the party holds. A person needs at least one role (here or in `role`). */
+    roles?: ("director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {}))[];
+    /** Job title of a person. */
+    position?: string;
+    date_of_birth?: string | null;
+    /** Name of a company party. Required when `entity_type` is `company`. */
+    company_name?: string;
+    /** Registration number of a company party. */
+    registration_number?: string;
+    /** Where the verification link is sent. Required when the party has to complete verification, which depends on the role settings and ownership thresholds of the workflow. */
+    email?: string;
+    /** Share of the company the party owns. */
+    ownership_percent?: number | null;
+    /** Nationality of a person, or country of incorporation of a company. Required for every party. */
+    nationality: string;
+    phone_number?: string;
+    /** Workflow-defined extra fields. */
+    custom_fields?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Ask to skip this party's verification. Honoured only when the party's role allows skipping in the workflow's Key People settings. */
+    skip_verification?: boolean;
+}
 interface SessionsCreateParams {
     /** Stable identifier of the workflow that defines which verification steps the session will run. Workflows are created and managed in the [Workflows](/console/workflows) page of the Console. The `workflow_id` also implicitly selects whether the session is KYC or KYB. */
     workflow_id: string;
     /** A unique identifier for the user being verified, such as a UUID, email, or internal user ID. This field is used for: (1) **User grouping** - sessions with the same vendor_data are linked to the same user profile in the Users tab. (2) **Cross-session duplicate detection** - when checking for duplicated faces, documents, phone numbers, emails, IP addresses, or device fingerprints, sessions with the same vendor_data are treated as the same user and excluded from matches. Without vendor_data, every session is treated as a unique user and all potential duplicates are surfaced. We strongly recommend always providing a vendor_data to reduce noise in duplicate detection. */
     vendor_data?: string;
+    /** Optional duplicate-detection realm inside your organization. Duplicate face checks compare this session only with other sessions that carry the same segment, so separate account bases (personal and business accounts, or one per B2B sub-client) do not flag a person who legitimately holds one account in each. Omit it to use the single default realm, which is what every session uses today. Blocklist and allowlist matching ignore this field. */
+    multi_account_segment?: string;
     /** URL to redirect the user to after verification completes. Didit automatically appends `verificationSessionId` and `status` (Approved, Declined, In Review) as query parameters. Custom URL schemes (e.g. `myapp://`) are supported for mobile callbacks. If omitted, the workflow's default `callback_url` is used. When the application has allowed domains (`allowed_domains` on `PATCH /v3/webhook/`), an `http` or `https` callback must be on one of those origins (same scheme, host and port), otherwise the request fails with 400 on `callback`: `callback must be on one of the application's allowed domains: https://app.example.com`. Custom URL schemes are always accepted. */
     callback?: string;
     /** Determines which device should handle the redirect to the provided callback URL. Use `initiator` to redirect only the device that started the flow, `completer` for the device that finishes it, or `both` to allow either device to trigger the callback. If you ever notice the callback not triggering reliably, we recommend setting this value to `both`. */
@@ -17450,7 +18428,7 @@ interface SessionsCreateParams {
     portrait_image?: string;
     /** Sandbox-only scenario slug. Only accepted when the API key belongs to a sandbox-mode application; rejected on live applications. When set, the create flow expands the scenario's bundled magic values onto the session's input fields (contact_details, expected_details) so the mocked providers reproduce the scenario's outcome through the real workflow pipeline. See the scenario catalog at GET /v1/sandbox/scenarios/ or [Sandbox & Test Data](/integration/sandbox-testing). You can also arm (or re-arm) a scenario after create via POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/sandbox/arm/, as long as the session is still `Not Started`. For non-doc lookup, use `lookup_partial_match`, `lookup_no_match`, or `lookup_provider_error` to test the configured attempt budget and fallback. For identity wallets, use `wallet_cancelled`, `wallet_timeout`, or `wallet_provider_error`; `approve` simulates a verified wallet. All catalog wallets can be tested in sandbox, including schemes unavailable on live applications. Simulated attempts are not charged. */
     sandbox_scenario?: string;
-    /** Electronic Signature input for this session. `documents` are the documents to sign, for a workflow whose Electronic Signature step takes documents from the session (`signature_documents_source` `session` or `both`): up to 20 documents and 50 MB in total. `field_values` fills the fields whose `prefill` is `api.<key>`, on workflow and session documents alike. Creating a session again for the same `workflow_id` and `vendor_data` returns the pending session; if that call sends `sign`, its documents, fields and values must be identical to the first ones, and anything different returns `400` with `{"sign": "signature_document_changed"}`. See [Electronic signature documents](/sessions-api/create-session#electronic-signature-documents). */
+    /** E-signature input for this session. `documents` are the documents to sign, for a workflow whose E-signature step takes documents from the session (`signature_documents_source` `session` or `both`): up to 20 documents and 50 MB in total. `field_values` fills the fields whose `prefill` is `api.<key>`, on workflow and session documents alike. Creating a session again for the same `workflow_id` and `vendor_data` returns the pending session; if that call sends `sign`, its documents, fields and values must be identical to the first ones, and anything different returns `400` with `{"sign": "signature_document_changed"}`. See [E-signature documents](/sessions-api/create-session#e-signature-documents). */
     sign?: SessionsCreateParamsSign;
     /** Where the person lives, when you know it: an ISO 3166-2 subdivision code (`US-IL`, `ES-M`) or a US state code or name (`IL`, `Illinois`). A state whose law requires explicit biometric consent (Illinois, Texas, Colorado) makes the verification flow ask for it before capturing a face, with trigger `declared_state`. An unrecognized value returns `400`. See [Biometric consent](/getting-started/biometric-consent). */
     user_state?: string;
@@ -17508,7 +18486,7 @@ interface SessionsCreateParamsExpectedDetails {
     /** Expected registration number of the business in the company registry. For example, `00445790`. Pre-fills the registration-number field of the registry search in Business Verification (KYB) workflows; when `company_name` is also provided, the registry lookup combines both identifiers. Ignored for KYC workflows. */
     registration_number?: string;
 }
-/** Electronic Signature input for this session. `documents` are the documents to sign, for a workflow whose Electronic Signature step takes documents from the session (`signature_documents_source` `session` or `both`): up to 20 documents and 50 MB in total. `field_values` fills the fields whose `prefill` is `api.<key>`, on workflow and session documents alike. Creating a session again for the same `workflow_id` and `vendor_data` returns the pending session; if that call sends `sign`, its documents, fields and values must be identical to the first ones, and anything different returns `400` with `{"sign": "signature_document_changed"}`. See [Electronic signature documents](/sessions-api/create-session#electronic-signature-documents). */
+/** E-signature input for this session. `documents` are the documents to sign, for a workflow whose E-signature step takes documents from the session (`signature_documents_source` `session` or `both`): up to 20 documents and 50 MB in total. `field_values` fills the fields whose `prefill` is `api.<key>`, on workflow and session documents alike. Creating a session again for the same `workflow_id` and `vendor_data` returns the pending session; if that call sends `sign`, its documents, fields and values must be identical to the first ones, and anything different returns `400` with `{"sign": "signature_document_changed"}`. See [E-signature documents](/sessions-api/create-session#e-signature-documents). */
 interface SessionsCreateParamsSign {
     documents?: SessionSignDocument[];
     /** Values keyed by the `<key>` of each `api.<key>` pre-fill source: strings of 1 to 500 characters for `text` and `data` fields, booleans for a `checkbox`. `400` with `field_value_unknown` for a key no field uses, `field_value_missing` for a required field without its value, and `field_value_invalid` for a value that fails its field's validation. */
@@ -17538,6 +18516,10 @@ interface SessionsCreateResponse {
     /** Version number of the published workflow version the session was pinned to at creation. Didit resolves `workflow_id` to the workflow's latest published version when the session is created, and the session keeps running that version even if the workflow is republished later. */
     workflow_version: number;
 }
+interface SessionsDeleteKybPartyDraftParams {
+    /** Workflow node of the KYB step. Only needed when the workflow has more than one KYB node; by default Didit uses the session's own node. */
+    node_id?: string;
+}
 interface SessionsDeleteParams {
     /** Override the application's `face_retention_policy` for this deletion. `true` keeps one image-free face biometric template anchored to the session's User after the session is deleted; `false` deletes the face embedding with the session; omit or `null` to follow the application policy. Ignored for KYB sessions and for sessions without a face embedding. */
     retain_face_embeddings?: boolean | null;
@@ -17567,6 +18549,8 @@ interface SessionsDeleteResponse {
 interface SessionsExportAmlScreeningHistoryParams {
     /** Workflow graph node ID of the AML check. Needed only when the session ran more than one AML step; without it the most recent AML check is used. An unknown node returns `404`. */
     node_id?: string;
+    /** A UTC calendar month as `YYYY-MM`. Only screenings completed in that month are returned; without it every month is returned. A malformed month returns `400`. */
+    month?: string;
 }
 interface SessionsImportSharedParams {
     /** JWT share token issued by [`POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/share/`](/sessions-api/share-session). */
@@ -17685,6 +18669,8 @@ interface SessionsImportsStartParams {
 interface SessionsListAmlScreeningHistoryParams {
     /** Workflow graph node ID of the AML check. Needed only when the session ran more than one AML step; without it the most recent AML check is used. An unknown node returns `404`. */
     node_id?: string;
+    /** A UTC calendar month as `YYYY-MM`. Only screenings completed in that month are returned; without it every month is returned. A malformed month returns `400`. */
+    month?: string;
     /** Maximum number of screening runs per page. Defaults to 50. A value below 1 or a non-numeric value falls back to 50; a value above 1,000,000 returns `400`. */
     limit?: number;
     /** Number of results to skip before the first returned one. Defaults to 0; a negative or non-numeric value falls back to 0, a value above 1,000,000 returns `400`. Prefer following the `next` and `previous` URLs. */
@@ -17727,6 +18713,91 @@ interface SessionsListFeatureOverridesResponse {
     /** Every override of the session, newest first. */
     overrides: FeatureStatusOverride[];
 }
+interface SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesParams {
+    /** Workflow node of the KYB step. Only needed when the workflow has more than one KYB node; by default Didit uses the session's own node. */
+    node_id?: string;
+}
+interface SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponse {
+    /** The shareholders and directors the uploaded documents name, merged per person. Nobody is labelled a UBO here: that is decided when the parties are submitted. */
+    parties: SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponseParties[];
+    /** Number of uploaded documents the list was read from. */
+    document_count: number;
+    node_id?: string | null;
+}
+interface SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponseParties {
+    name?: string;
+    entity_type?: "person" | "company" | (string & {});
+    first_name?: string | null;
+    last_name?: string | null;
+    appointment_date?: string | null;
+    designation?: string | null;
+    roles?: SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponsePartiesRoles[];
+    /** The uploaded documents that named this party. */
+    documents?: SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponsePartiesDocuments[];
+}
+interface SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponsePartiesDocuments {
+    document_uuid?: string;
+    document_type?: string | null;
+    document_subtype?: string | null;
+    original_filename?: string | null;
+    status?: string | null;
+}
+interface SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponsePartiesRoles {
+    role?: "director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {});
+    ownership_percent?: SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponsePartiesRolesOwnershipPercent;
+}
+interface SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponsePartiesRolesOwnershipPercent {
+    /** The ownership figure exactly as the document states it, such as `25-50%`, `>50%` or `NO EXHIBE`. */
+    text?: string | null;
+    /** Lower number read out of `text`; null when it states none. */
+    min?: number | null;
+    /** Upper number read out of `text`; null when it states none. */
+    max?: number | null;
+}
+interface SessionsListKybPartyDraftsParams {
+    /** Workflow node of the KYB step. Only needed when the workflow has more than one KYB node; by default Didit uses the session's own node. */
+    node_id?: string;
+}
+interface SessionsListKybPartyDraftsResponse {
+    parties?: SessionsListKybPartyDraftsResponseParties[];
+    node_id?: string | null;
+}
+interface SessionsListKybPartyDraftsResponseParties {
+    draft_id: string;
+    created_at: Date;
+    updated_at: Date;
+    party: SessionsListKybPartyDraftsResponsePartiesParty;
+}
+interface SessionsListKybPartyDraftsResponsePartiesParty {
+    /** Whether the party is an individual or a company. */
+    entity_type: "person" | "company" | (string & {});
+    /** Full name of a person. Send it, or `first_name` and `last_name`. */
+    full_name?: string;
+    first_name?: string;
+    last_name?: string;
+    /** Role the party holds. Interchangeable with `roles`; when both are sent they are merged. */
+    role?: "director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {});
+    /** Every role the party holds. A person needs at least one role (here or in `role`). */
+    roles?: ("director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {}))[];
+    /** Job title of a person. */
+    position?: string;
+    date_of_birth?: string | null;
+    /** Name of a company party. Required when `entity_type` is `company`. */
+    company_name?: string;
+    /** Registration number of a company party. */
+    registration_number?: string;
+    /** Where the verification link is sent. Required when the party has to complete verification, which depends on the role settings and ownership thresholds of the workflow. */
+    email?: string;
+    /** Share of the company the party owns. */
+    ownership_percent?: number | null;
+    /** Nationality of a person, or country of incorporation of a company. Required for every party. */
+    nationality: string;
+    phone_number?: string;
+    /** Workflow-defined extra fields. */
+    custom_fields?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Ask to skip this party's verification. Honoured only when the party's role allows skipping in the workflow's Key People settings. */
+    skip_verification?: boolean;
+}
 interface SessionsListParams {
     /** Which kind of sessions to list: `user` (KYC only, default), `business` (KYB only), or `all` (both, concatenated - see the description for merged-pagination semantics). Matching is case-insensitive (`BUSINESS` works); any value other than a case variant of `user`/`business`/`all` returns `400`. */
     session_kind?: "user" | "business" | "all" | (string & {});
@@ -17746,6 +18817,12 @@ interface SessionsListParams {
     date_from?: string;
     /** Only sessions created up to this date (UTC), format `YYYY-MM-DD`. For KYC rows the entire day is included; for KYB rows the comparison is `created_at <= date_to` (midnight), so use the next day's date to include a full day of KYB sessions. */
     date_to?: string;
+    /** Comma-separated tag ids (`tags` of your application). Returns the sessions that carry any of them. Ids that are not valid UUIDs are ignored, and when none is valid the list is empty. */
+    tags?: string;
+    /** ISO 8601 datetime. Returns the sessions whose status last changed at or after it. It filters on the time of the last status change, not on creation time. */
+    decided_from?: string | Date;
+    /** ISO 8601 datetime. Returns the sessions whose status last changed before it. Combine with `decided_from` for a half-open window. */
+    decided_to?: string | Date;
     /** Comma-separated country filter. For KYC rows: ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes of the ID document's issuing state (e.g. `ESP,USA`), which may differ from nationality. For KYB rows: the registry company's country code. */
     country?: string;
     /** Comma-separated ID-document type codes verified in the session (KYC rows only): `P` (Passport), `ID` (Identity Card), `DL` (Driver's License), `RP` (Residence Permit), `SSC` (Social Security Card), `HIC` (Health Insurance Card), `WP` (Work Permit), `TC` (Tax Card), `VISA`, `PSC` (Public Service Card), `BC` (Birth Certificate), `OTHER`. Note the response field `document_type` contains the display name, not the code. */
@@ -17774,7 +18851,7 @@ interface SessionsListParams {
     organization_name?: string;
 }
 interface SessionsListResponse {
-    /** Number of sessions matching the filters. Exact for KYC rows; for KYB rows it is capped at 100 (use `next` to know whether more pages exist). For `session_kind=all` it is the sum of both kinds. */
+    /** Number of sessions matching the filters: exact up to 100 and capped at 100 beyond that, so do not use it as a total. Use `next` to know whether more pages exist. For `session_kind=all` it is the sum of both kinds, each capped at 100. */
     count: number;
     /** Absolute URL of the next page, or `null` on the last page. */
     next: string | null;
@@ -17806,6 +18883,8 @@ interface SessionsPreviewDecisionEmailResponse {
     subject: string;
     /** The email's HTML exactly as it is sent, with its logo embedded as a data URL. Render it in a sandboxed frame, never directly in your application DOM. */
     html: string;
+    /** The email's words as plain text, as the person's Messages thread keeps them, for a compact preview (the HTML stays the email the person receives). */
+    text: string;
     /** The language the email is written in. English (`en`) when the `email_language` you asked for is not offered. */
     language: string;
     /** Whether confirming the change with `send_email: true` sends this email. `false` when `not_sent_reason` is set. */
@@ -17827,7 +18906,7 @@ interface SessionsPreviewResubmissionParamsNodesToResubmit {
     /** Node identifier as it appears in the session's workflow definition (for example `feature_ocr`, `feature_liveness`). */
     node_id: string;
     /** Feature type of the node. The aliases `ID_VERIFICATION`, `POA`, `PHONE`, and `EMAIL` are normalized server-side to `OCR`, `PROOF_OF_ADDRESS`, `PHONE_VERIFICATION`, and `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`. `KYB_REGISTRY`, `KYB_KEY_PEOPLE`, and `KYB` pass schema validation but are always rejected with the business-rule `400` shown in the examples. */
-    feature: "OCR" | "OCR_BACK" | "NFC" | "AML" | "FACE" | "LIVENESS" | "FACE_MATCH" | "IP_ANALYSIS" | "AGE_ESTIMATION" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE_VERIFICATION" | "EMAIL_VERIFICATION" | "FACE_SEARCH" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "ID_VERIFICATION" | "POA" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "KYB" | (string & {});
+    feature: "OCR" | "OCR_BACK" | "NFC" | "AML" | "FACE" | "LIVENESS" | "FACE_MATCH" | "IP_ANALYSIS" | "AGE_ESTIMATION" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE_VERIFICATION" | "EMAIL_VERIFICATION" | "FACE_SEARCH" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "ID_VERIFICATION" | "POA" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "KYB" | "GEOLOCATION" | (string & {});
 }
 interface SessionsPreviewResubmissionResponse {
     /** The address the email goes to. An empty string when no address is known for the person: then no email can be sent and `preview_token` is empty too. Pass it as `email_address` when you confirm. */
@@ -17846,6 +18925,8 @@ interface SessionsPreviewResubmissionResponse {
     subject: string;
     /** The email's HTML exactly as it is sent, with its logo embedded as a data URL. Render it in a sandboxed frame, never directly in your application DOM. */
     html: string;
+    /** The email's words as plain text, as the person's Messages thread keeps them, for a compact preview (the HTML stays the email the person receives). */
+    text: string;
     /** The language the email is written in. English (`en`) when the `email_language` you asked for is not offered. */
     language: string;
     /** Whether confirming the change with `send_email: true` sends this email. `false` when `not_sent_reason` is set. */
@@ -17862,7 +18943,7 @@ interface SessionsPreviewResubmissionResponseNodesToResubmit {
     /** Node identifier as it appears in the session's workflow definition (for example `feature_ocr`, `feature_liveness`). */
     node_id: string;
     /** Feature type of the node. The aliases `ID_VERIFICATION`, `POA`, `PHONE`, and `EMAIL` are normalized server-side to `OCR`, `PROOF_OF_ADDRESS`, `PHONE_VERIFICATION`, and `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`. `KYB_REGISTRY`, `KYB_KEY_PEOPLE`, and `KYB` pass schema validation but are always rejected with the business-rule `400` shown in the examples. */
-    feature: "OCR" | "OCR_BACK" | "NFC" | "AML" | "FACE" | "LIVENESS" | "FACE_MATCH" | "IP_ANALYSIS" | "AGE_ESTIMATION" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE_VERIFICATION" | "EMAIL_VERIFICATION" | "FACE_SEARCH" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "ID_VERIFICATION" | "POA" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "KYB" | (string & {});
+    feature: "OCR" | "OCR_BACK" | "NFC" | "AML" | "FACE" | "LIVENESS" | "FACE_MATCH" | "IP_ANALYSIS" | "AGE_ESTIMATION" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE_VERIFICATION" | "EMAIL_VERIFICATION" | "FACE_SEARCH" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "ID_VERIFICATION" | "POA" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "KYB" | "GEOLOCATION" | (string & {});
 }
 interface SessionsRetrieveDecisionParams {
     /** Comma-separated list of extra payload sections. Supported values: `events` and `resubmissions`, alone or together (`events,resubmissions`). When `include=events` is passed, the response additionally contains the session event timeline (`events`, including the `WORKFLOW_BRANCH_EVALUATED` / `WORKFLOW_STATUS_NODE_REACHED` routing events described on the Retrieve Session page), the full activity log (`activity_reviews`), blocklist flags (`blocklisted`), a per-session `cost_breakdown`, workflow metadata (`workflow_type`, `workflow_version`, `workflow_version_id`, and `workflow_terminal_node_id` - the last recorded workflow status node that set a session status, or `null` if none has been recorded; historical provenance that is not cleared by manual approvals, declines or resubmissions, and is replaced by a later workflow status node), and session metadata (`api_service` - string or `null`, set only for standalone-API sessions; `session_type` - `API`, `HOSTED`, or `MIGRATED`; `has_device_nfc_support` - boolean). Two fields change relative to the plain shape: the top-level `session_kind` discriminator is **omitted** (the events shape only exists for user sessions), and the `features` array switches from plain strings to `{feature, node_id}` objects - where the email feature is reported as `EMAIL` instead of `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`. This expanded shape is primarily used by the Didit Console; most API integrations should omit the parameter. **KYB limitation:** `include=events` only applies to user (KYC) sessions. Business sessions (`session_kind = "business"`) always return the standard business decision shape - `events`, `activity_reviews`, `blocklisted`, `cost_breakdown` and the extra `workflow_*`/session metadata are never returned for business sessions, and their `features` array stays a plain string array. With `include=resubmissions` (user and business sessions alike) the response also contains `resubmissions`: one entry per resubmission request, oldest first, each with `number`, `created_at`, `previous_status`, `nodes`, `reasons`, `requested_by` and `results` (what the resubmitted steps returned before the request, under the same keys and in the same shape as the current results). Each `cost_breakdown` item carries `usage_type`, `price`, `details` and `created_at`: a resubmitted step that runs again is billed as a new item. */
@@ -17942,8 +19023,27 @@ interface SessionsSimulateParams {
     /** `true` sends exactly the webhooks a real status change sends to the sandbox application's destinations: `status.updated`, plus the `user.status.updated` / `user.data.updated` (or `business.status.updated` / `business.data.updated`) events the change causes, for destinations subscribed to them. `false` changes the status without logging or sending any webhook: the missed-webhook recovery never re-sends that decision, the console still updates live, and the next status change of the session sends webhooks as usual. */
     send_webhooks?: boolean;
 }
+interface SessionsSubmitKybPartiesParams {
+    /** Locale used to translate the response of the step the session advances to. */
+    locale?: string;
+    /** Workflow node of the KYB step. Only needed when the workflow has more than one KYB node; by default Didit uses the session's own node. */
+    node_id?: string;
+}
+interface SessionsSubmitKybPartiesResponse {
+    valid?: boolean;
+    /** Step the session is on. */
+    next_step?: string | null;
+    /** Status of the business session. */
+    status?: string;
+    /** `true` when this call declared the parties and advanced the session. */
+    advanced?: boolean;
+    /** `true` when the parties had been declared by an earlier call. */
+    already_submitted?: boolean;
+    kyb_key_people_status?: string;
+    parties?: KYBKeyPeopleParty[];
+}
 interface SessionsUpdateAmlHitStatusParams {
-    /** The `id` of the hit in the AML check's `hits` array. */
+    /** The `id` of the hit in the AML check's `hits` array (`hit_...`). A hit id returned in the earlier format is still accepted. */
     hit_id: string;
     /** The new review status for the hit. */
     review_status: "Unreviewed" | "Confirmed Match" | "False Positive" | "Inconclusive" | (string & {});
@@ -17955,7 +19055,7 @@ interface SessionsUpdateAmlHitStatusParams {
 interface SessionsUpdateAmlHitStatusResponse {
     /** Always `Hit status updated successfully`. */
     message: string;
-    /** The updated hit, with surrounding whitespace removed. */
+    /** The `id` of the updated hit, as the session decision returns it, also when the request named the hit by an id in the earlier format. */
     hit_id: string;
     /** The review status now stored on the hit. */
     review_status: "Unreviewed" | "Confirmed Match" | "False Positive" | "Inconclusive" | (string & {});
@@ -18238,8 +19338,8 @@ interface SessionsUpdateKybCompanyDataResponse {
     industries?: Record<string, unknown>[] | null;
     /** Registry filing dates, when available. Annual returns and general meetings use last_annual_return_date and last_agm_date; they are distinct from financial accounts. */
     accounts?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
-    /** Raw registry payload snapshot. Every key you PATCH is merged into this map (dates serialized as ISO strings), so the "extracted from registry" view reflects operator corrections. */
-    registry_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    /** Didit's normalized registry detail for the company: the ownership outcome (`ownership_error`, `section_errors`, `ubo_resolution`, `lite_enrichment`), the corrections made with update-data, and registry facts that have no field of their own. It never carries the registry source's own record. Every key is optional and present only when the company has a value for it; new keys may be added. Read the canonical fields (`addresses`, `industries`, `ownership`, `beneficial_owners[].shareholding`) for anything they cover. */
+    registry_data?: KYBRegistryData | null;
     /** What the end user typed during the hosted registry-confirmation step. Never modified by this endpoint. */
     user_provided_data?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
     /** When the end user confirmed the company data in the hosted flow. */
@@ -18249,6 +19349,75 @@ interface SessionsUpdateKybCompanyDataResponse {
     /** `true` while the end user can still edit the registry-sourced data in the hosted flow (registry-sourced and not yet confirmed). */
     is_editable?: boolean;
 }
+/** Any subset of the party fields. The edit is merged into the stored draft and the merged party is validated as a whole, so a draft that could be submitted before an edit can still be submitted after it. */
+interface SessionsUpdateKybPartyDraftParams {
+    /** Whether the party is an individual or a company. */
+    entity_type?: "person" | "company" | (string & {});
+    /** Full name of a person. Send it, or `first_name` and `last_name`. */
+    full_name?: string;
+    first_name?: string;
+    last_name?: string;
+    /** Role the party holds. Interchangeable with `roles`; when both are sent they are merged. */
+    role?: "director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {});
+    /** Every role the party holds. A person needs at least one role (here or in `role`). */
+    roles?: ("director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {}))[];
+    /** Job title of a person. */
+    position?: string;
+    date_of_birth?: string | null;
+    /** Name of a company party. Required when `entity_type` is `company`. */
+    company_name?: string;
+    /** Registration number of a company party. */
+    registration_number?: string;
+    /** Where the verification link is sent. Required when the party has to complete verification, which depends on the role settings and ownership thresholds of the workflow. */
+    email?: string;
+    /** Share of the company the party owns. */
+    ownership_percent?: number | null;
+    /** Nationality of a person, or country of incorporation of a company. Required for every party. */
+    nationality?: string;
+    phone_number?: string;
+    /** Workflow-defined extra fields. */
+    custom_fields?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Ask to skip this party's verification. Honoured only when the party's role allows skipping in the workflow's Key People settings. */
+    skip_verification?: boolean;
+    /** Workflow node of the KYB step. Only needed when the workflow has more than one KYB node; by default Didit uses the session's own node. */
+    node_id?: string;
+}
+interface SessionsUpdateKybPartyDraftResponse {
+    draft_id: string;
+    created_at: Date;
+    updated_at: Date;
+    party: SessionsUpdateKybPartyDraftResponseParty;
+}
+interface SessionsUpdateKybPartyDraftResponseParty {
+    /** Whether the party is an individual or a company. */
+    entity_type: "person" | "company" | (string & {});
+    /** Full name of a person. Send it, or `first_name` and `last_name`. */
+    full_name?: string;
+    first_name?: string;
+    last_name?: string;
+    /** Role the party holds. Interchangeable with `roles`; when both are sent they are merged. */
+    role?: "director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {});
+    /** Every role the party holds. A person needs at least one role (here or in `role`). */
+    roles?: ("director" | "non_executive_director" | "secretary" | "chairman" | "ubo" | "shareholder" | "representative" | "founder" | "legal_advisor" | "authorized_signatory" | "trustee" | "beneficiary" | "settlor" | "protector" | "company_officer" | "investor" | "other" | (string & {}))[];
+    /** Job title of a person. */
+    position?: string;
+    date_of_birth?: string | null;
+    /** Name of a company party. Required when `entity_type` is `company`. */
+    company_name?: string;
+    /** Registration number of a company party. */
+    registration_number?: string;
+    /** Where the verification link is sent. Required when the party has to complete verification, which depends on the role settings and ownership thresholds of the workflow. */
+    email?: string;
+    /** Share of the company the party owns. */
+    ownership_percent?: number | null;
+    /** Nationality of a person, or country of incorporation of a company. Required for every party. */
+    nationality: string;
+    phone_number?: string;
+    /** Workflow-defined extra fields. */
+    custom_fields?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    /** Ask to skip this party's verification. Honoured only when the party's role allows skipping in the workflow's Key People settings. */
+    skip_verification?: boolean;
+}
 interface SessionsUpdateKybPartyParams {
     /** `true` exempts the party from verification so the Key People check can settle without it; `false` puts it back in scope. */
     is_skipped: boolean;
@@ -18367,12 +19536,34 @@ interface SessionsUpdateStatusParamsNodesToResubmit {
     /** Node identifier as it appears in the session's workflow definition (for example `feature_ocr`, `feature_liveness`). */
     node_id: string;
     /** Feature type of the node. The aliases `ID_VERIFICATION`, `POA`, `PHONE`, and `EMAIL` are normalized server-side to `OCR`, `PROOF_OF_ADDRESS`, `PHONE_VERIFICATION`, and `EMAIL_VERIFICATION`. `KYB_REGISTRY`, `KYB_KEY_PEOPLE`, and `KYB` pass schema validation but are always rejected with the business-rule `400` shown in the examples. */
-    feature: "OCR" | "OCR_BACK" | "NFC" | "AML" | "FACE" | "LIVENESS" | "FACE_MATCH" | "IP_ANALYSIS" | "AGE_ESTIMATION" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE_VERIFICATION" | "EMAIL_VERIFICATION" | "FACE_SEARCH" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "ID_VERIFICATION" | "POA" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "KYB" | (string & {});
+    feature: "OCR" | "OCR_BACK" | "NFC" | "AML" | "FACE" | "LIVENESS" | "FACE_MATCH" | "IP_ANALYSIS" | "AGE_ESTIMATION" | "PROOF_OF_ADDRESS" | "PHONE_VERIFICATION" | "EMAIL_VERIFICATION" | "FACE_SEARCH" | "DATABASE_VALIDATION" | "QUESTIONNAIRE" | "DOCUMENT_AI" | "KYB_DOCUMENTS" | "ID_VERIFICATION" | "POA" | "PHONE" | "EMAIL" | "KYB_REGISTRY" | "KYB_KEY_PEOPLE" | "KYB" | "GEOLOCATION" | (string & {});
 }
 interface SessionsUpdateStatusResponse {
     /** UUID of the updated session. */
     session_id?: string;
 }
+interface SessionsUploadKybDocumentsParams {
+    /** Files to upload: JPG, JPEG, PNG, TIFF, WEBP, PDF or ZIP archives of them. PDFs up to 50 MB, photos up to 6 MB before compression. */
+    documents: Uploadable[];
+    /** One entry per file in `documents`, in the same order: the password of a protected PDF, empty for any other file. */
+    document_passwords?: string[];
+    /** Required document group this upload answers. */
+    document_group?: "LEGAL_PRESENCE" | "COMPANY_DETAILS" | "OWNERSHIP_STRUCTURE" | "REPRESENTATIVES_AUTHORIZATION" | (string & {});
+    /** Locale used to translate the response of the next step. */
+    locale?: string;
+    /** Workflow node of the KYB step. Only needed when the workflow has more than one KYB node; by default Didit uses the session's own node. */
+    node_id?: string;
+}
+interface SessionsUploadKybDocumentsResponse {
+    valid?: boolean;
+    /** Step the session is on after the upload. */
+    next_step?: string | null;
+    /** Status of the company check. */
+    kyb_status?: string;
+    /** Result per uploaded document and the uploads left. */
+    document_answer?: Record<string, unknown>;
+    [key: string]: unknown;
+}
 
 /** `sessions.imports` */
 declare class SessionsImports extends APIResource {
@@ -18397,7 +19588,7 @@ declare class SessionsImports extends APIResource {
     /**
      * Create a verification import job
      *
-     * Create an asynchronous import job for historical User Verification sessions, Business Verification sessions, transaction monitoring records, or workflow custom status rules. Set `source=provider` to migrate from another provider: Didit reads Sumsub, Onfido, Persona and ComplyCube with your read-only key, reads Veriff, iDenfy and MetaMap records by the IDs you upload in `file`, and imports an export file in Didit's format for the other providers. Record IDs are namespaced by provider (`sumsub:<id>`) so a re-run skips everything already in Didit. Imports are disabled by default and must be enabled per organization by Didit.
+     * Create an asynchronous import job for historical User Verification sessions, Business Verification sessions, transaction monitoring records, or workflow custom status rules. Set `source=provider` to migrate from another provider: Didit reads Sumsub, Onfido, Persona and ComplyCube with your read-only key, reads Veriff, iDenfy and MetaMap records by the IDs you upload in `file`, and imports an export file in Didit's format for the other providers. Record IDs are namespaced by provider (`sumsub:<id>`) so a re-run skips everything already in Didit, and a record imported through a file with the provider's bare ID is recognised too, in both directions, so moving between a file import and a provider migration never imports a record twice. An application can run up to 4 import jobs at once; a job interrupted by a deploy or a worker restart continues from its last imported row by itself. Imports are disabled by default and must be enabled per organization by Didit.
      *
      * `POST /v3/session/imports/`
      */
@@ -18531,28 +19722,28 @@ declare class SessionsSignatures extends APIResource {
     /**
      * Download a signed document
      *
-     * Download the signed PDF of one document of an Electronic Signature step. Use the `signed_file` path of `signatures[].documents[]` in the decision. The PDF holds the document the signer was shown with their field values stamped, the evidence page (unless `signature_evidence_page` is off) and the PAdES signature with its timestamp. Didit checks the file against `sha256_signed` before returning it.
+     * Download the signed PDF of one document of an E-signature step. Use the `signed_file` path of `signatures[].documents[]` in the decision. The PDF holds the document the signer was shown with their field values stamped and the evidence page (unless `signature_evidence_page` is off). An Advanced (AES) PDF also carries the PAdES signature with its timestamp; a Simple PDF has no digital signature, seal or timestamp. Didit checks the file against `sha256_signed` before returning it.
      *
-     * Works for User Verification (KYC) and Business Verification (KYB) sessions. Needs `read:sessions`; your API key works. See the [Electronic Signature report](/core-technology/electronic-signature/report-electronic-signature#download-the-signed-documents).
+     * Works for User Verification (KYC) and Business Verification (KYB) sessions. Needs `read:sessions`; your API key works. See the [E-signature report](/core-technology/electronic-signature/report-electronic-signature#download-the-signed-documents).
      *
      * `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/signatures/{nodeId}/documents/{documentId}/file/`
      *
      * @param sessionId The User Verification (KYC) or Business Verification (KYB) session.
-     * @param nodeId The Electronic Signature step: `node_id` of the item in `signatures[]`.
+     * @param nodeId The E-signature step: `node_id` of the item in `signatures[]`.
      * @param documentId `id` of the document in `signatures[].documents[]`.
      */
     downloadDocument(sessionId: string, nodeId: string, documentId: string, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<Blob>;
     /**
      * Download the signature evidence
      *
-     * Download a signer's evidence PDF: the level and format, the signer and their verified identity session, the code confirmation, the IP address, each document with its original SHA-256 and field values, the certificate, the timestamp and the SHA-256 of every signed file. Use the `evidence_file` path of the signer's item in `signatures[]`.
+     * Download a signer's evidence PDF: the level and format, the signer, the IP address, each document with its original SHA-256 and field values and the SHA-256 of every signed file, plus, for an Advanced (AES) signature, the verified identity session, the code confirmation, the certificate and the timestamp. Use the `evidence_file` path of the signer's item in `signatures[]`.
      *
      * Always pass `signature_id` when a Business Verification step has several signers: without it, the route picks one of the step's signers. Needs `read:sessions`; your API key works.
      *
      * `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/signatures/{nodeId}/evidence/`
      *
      * @param sessionId The User Verification (KYC) or Business Verification (KYB) session.
-     * @param nodeId The Electronic Signature step: `node_id` of the item in `signatures[]`.
+     * @param nodeId The E-signature step: `node_id` of the item in `signatures[]`.
      */
     downloadEvidence(sessionId: string, nodeId: string, params?: SessionsSignaturesDownloadEvidenceParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<Blob>;
     /**
@@ -18563,21 +19754,21 @@ declare class SessionsSignatures extends APIResource {
      * `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/signatures/{nodeId}/fields/{fieldId}/image/`
      *
      * @param sessionId The User Verification (KYC) or Business Verification (KYB) session.
-     * @param nodeId The Electronic Signature step: `node_id` of the item in `signatures[]`.
+     * @param nodeId The E-signature step: `node_id` of the item in `signatures[]`.
      * @param fieldId The field on this signer's copy, as in the field's `image_url`.
      */
     downloadFieldImage(sessionId: string, nodeId: string, fieldId: string, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<Blob>;
     /**
      * Validate signatures again
      *
-     * Re-check the signed documents of an Electronic Signature step. Didit re-reads every signed PDF, checks its SHA-256 and validates the PAdES signature, the certificate, the revocation data and the timestamp, then saves the result in each signer's `validation` and returns the updated items. Nothing is signed again. Send `signature_id` to check one signer; without it, every signer of the step is checked, and the call fails if any of them hasn't signed.
+     * Re-check the signed documents of an E-signature step. Didit re-reads every signed PDF, checks its SHA-256 and, for an Advanced (AES) signature, validates the PAdES signature, the certificate, the revocation data and the timestamp (a Simple signature has no digital signature, so only the file integrity is checked), then saves the result in each signer's `validation` and returns the updated items. Nothing is signed again. Send `signature_id` to check one signer; without it, every signer of the step is checked, and the call fails if any of them hasn't signed.
      *
      * Needs `write:sessions`; your API key works. In the console it's the **Validate again** button.
      *
      * `POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/signatures/{nodeId}/validate/`
      *
      * @param sessionId The User Verification (KYC) or Business Verification (KYB) session.
-     * @param nodeId The Electronic Signature step: `node_id` of the item in `signatures[]`.
+     * @param nodeId The E-signature step: `node_id` of the item in `signatures[]`.
      */
     validate(sessionId: string, nodeId: string, params?: SessionsSignaturesValidateParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsSignaturesValidateResponse>;
 }
@@ -18715,6 +19906,16 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
      * `POST /v3/session/`
      */
     create(params: SessionsCreateParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsCreateResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Create a KYB party draft
+     *
+     * Add a party (a person or a company) to the list you are preparing for this KYB session. The same fields and rules as the hosted Key People screen apply: a person needs `full_name` or `first_name` and `last_name`, at least one role and a nationality; a company needs `company_name` and the country of incorporation in `nationality`. Nothing is declared or billed until `POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/parties/submit/`. Requires `write:businesses`.
+     *
+     * `POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/parties/drafts/`
+     *
+     * @param sessionId UUID of the Business Verification (KYB) session. It must belong to the application of the API key.
+     */
+    createKybPartyDraft(sessionId: string, params: SessionsCreateKybPartyDraftParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsCreateKybPartyDraftResponse>;
     /**
      * Delete a verification session (KYC or KYB)
      *
@@ -18722,7 +19923,7 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
      *
      * **What is deleted:**
      * - The session and every verification attempt it holds, including results that a resubmission replaced: the decision, extracted data, all related feature records (ID verification, face, liveness, face match, AML, registry checks, IP analysis, and so on), its reviews and its activity log.
-     * - All stored files owned by the session: document front/back photos (full, cropped, and privacy-blurred variants), document-capture videos, portrait crops, NFC chip portrait and signature images, face reference images, liveness videos, face-match source/target images, Proof of Address documents, and any extra uploaded files (KYC); uploaded company documents and extra files (KYB). Electronic Signature documents, signed PDFs, evidence PDFs and signature images (KYC and KYB): their download paths stop working. Previously issued media URLs (`https://<media-host>/...`) stop resolving.
+     * - All stored files owned by the session: document front/back photos (full, cropped, and privacy-blurred variants), document-capture videos, portrait crops, NFC chip portrait and signature images, face reference images, liveness videos, face-match source/target images, Proof of Address documents, and any extra uploaded files (KYC); uploaded company documents and extra files (KYB). E-signature documents, signed PDFs, evidence PDFs and signature images (KYC and KYB): their download paths stop working. Previously issued media URLs (`https://<media-host>/...`) stop resolving.
      * - The session's face data. Its face embedding is deleted too, unless you choose to keep an image-free template (see **Face biometric data**).
      * - Webhook deliveries still queued for the session, and their retries. Webhooks already delivered are not affected.
      * - For a Business Verification (KYB) session: the verifications it created for its key people (KYC) and its corporate owners (KYB), recursively, reported as `deleted_child_verifications`. A verification it only links to, such as an existing approved KYC it reused, is not deleted.
@@ -18754,16 +19955,39 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
      * @param sessionId UUID (`session_id`) of the User Verification (KYC) or Business Verification (KYB) session to delete, as returned when the session was created. Must be a canonical hyphenated UUID - a non-UUID value does not match the route and returns `404`.
      */
     delete(sessionId: string, params?: SessionsDeleteParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsDeleteResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Delete a KYB party draft
+     *
+     * Drop one party draft. Declared parties are not affected. Requires `write:businesses`.
+     *
+     * `DELETE /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/parties/drafts/{draftId}/`
+     *
+     * @param sessionId UUID of the Business Verification (KYB) session. It must belong to the application of the API key.
+     * @param draftId UUID of the party draft (`draft_id` returned when it was created).
+     */
+    deleteKybPartyDraft(sessionId: string, draftId: string, params?: SessionsDeleteKybPartyDraftParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<void>;
     /**
      * Export AML screening history as CSV
      *
-     * Download the same ongoing-monitoring history as `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/aml-screening-history/` as a CSV file, one line per completed re-screen, newest first, ready to hand to an auditor. The file is streamed whole (no pagination) and starts with a header line; an empty cell means unknown, dataset dates are never estimated, and a value that would start a spreadsheet formula is prefixed with an apostrophe. Works for KYC and KYB session IDs; pass `node_id` when the session ran more than one AML step. Errors are returned as JSON, not CSV. A scoped API key needs `decisions: read` and `media: read`: the response is a file, so a key without `media: read` gets `403`.
+     * Download the same ongoing-monitoring history as `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/aml-screening-history/` as a CSV file, one line per completed re-screen, newest first, ready to hand to an auditor. The file is streamed whole (no pagination) and starts with a header line; an empty cell means unknown, dataset dates are never estimated, and a value that would start a spreadsheet formula is prefixed with an apostrophe. Works for KYC and KYB session IDs; pass `node_id` when the session ran more than one AML step. Pass `month` to export one calendar month. Errors are returned as JSON, not CSV. A scoped API key needs `decisions: read` and `media: read`: the response is a file, so a key without `media: read` gets `403`.
      *
      * `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/aml-screening-history/export/`
      *
      * @param sessionId UUID of the verification session (the `session_id` returned by `POST /v3/session/`). Accepts both User Verification (KYC) and Business Verification (KYB) session IDs: the server resolves the ID across both session types. Must be a well-formed UUID; a malformed value does not match the route and returns an HTML `404`.
      */
     exportAmlScreeningHistory(sessionId: string, params?: SessionsExportAmlScreeningHistoryParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<Blob>;
+    /**
+     * Export every file of a session
+     *
+     * Start preparing one ZIP with every image, video and document of a User Verification (KYC) or Business Verification (KYB) session, in original quality: the files are stored in the ZIP as they were captured, never recompressed. Answers `202` with the export; read it with `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/files-export/{exportId}/` until `status` is `READY`, then download `download_url`. While an export of the same session is still being prepared, that export is returned instead of a new one.
+     *
+     * The ZIP is deleted 24 hours after it is ready, and at once when the session is deleted. A deleted session cannot be exported. Every export and every download link handed out is written to the session's audit log. A scoped API key needs `media: read` and `decisions: read`; a console user needs the privilege to read sessions.
+     *
+     * `POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/files-export/`
+     *
+     * @param sessionId UUID of the verification session (the `session_id` returned by `POST /v3/session/`). Accepts both User Verification (KYC) and Business Verification (KYB) session IDs. A deleted session returns `404`.
+     */
+    exportFiles(sessionId: string, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionFilesExport>;
     /**
      * Download a PDF report for a verification session
      *
@@ -18796,6 +20020,17 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
      * @param sessionId UUID of the User Verification (KYC) or Business Verification (KYB) session to render - the `session_id` returned by `POST /v3/session/`. The same path works for both session kinds; use the `Content-Disposition` filename on the response to tell which report type you received.  **Must be a well-formed, lowercase UUID.** The route only matches valid UUIDs, so a malformed value is rejected by the URL router before any application code runs and the response is a `404` **HTML** page rather than the JSON `{"detail": ...}` envelope shown below. The route's UUID converter only matches the canonical lowercase form - uppercase-hex UUIDs are rejected with the HTML 404.
      */
     generatePdf(sessionId: string, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<Blob>;
+    /**
+     * Get a session files export
+     *
+     * Progress of an export started with `POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/files-export/`. Once `status` is `READY`, `download_url` is a signed URL of the ZIP that stays valid for a short time; read the export again for a new one until `expires_at`. Each read that hands out a download link is written to the session's audit log. An export of a deleted session returns `404`.
+     *
+     * `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/files-export/{exportId}/`
+     *
+     * @param sessionId UUID of the verification session (the `session_id` returned by `POST /v3/session/`). Accepts both User Verification (KYC) and Business Verification (KYB) session IDs. A deleted session returns `404`.
+     * @param exportId The `export_id` returned by `POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/files-export/`.
+     */
+    getFilesExport(sessionId: string, exportId: string, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionFilesExport>;
     /**
      * Redeem a share token to clone a verification session into your application
      *
@@ -18834,7 +20069,7 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
     /**
      * List AML screening history
      *
-     * List every completed ongoing-monitoring re-screen of a session's AML check, newest first by `completed_at`, including the runs where nothing changed: alerts, activity entries and webhooks fire only when a result moves, so this history is the evidence that a clean subject was still being screened. Works for KYC and KYB session IDs; pass `node_id` when the session ran more than one AML step. Only ongoing-monitoring re-screens are listed (the first screening is part of the session decision) and runs from before this history existed are not reconstructed, so a session without ongoing monitoring returns an empty list. `count` is exact up to 100 and capped at 100 above that, so follow `next` until it is `null`. A scoped API key needs `decisions: read`; see [Continuous AML monitoring](https://docs.didit.me/core-technology/aml-screening/continuous-monitoring-aml-screening).
+     * List every completed ongoing-monitoring re-screen of a session's AML check, newest first by `completed_at`, including the runs where nothing changed: alerts, activity entries and webhooks fire only when a result moves, so this history is the evidence that a clean subject was still being screened. Works for KYC and KYB session IDs; pass `node_id` when the session ran more than one AML step. Only ongoing-monitoring re-screens are listed (the first screening is part of the session decision) and runs from before this history existed are not reconstructed, so a session without ongoing monitoring returns an empty list. `count` is exact up to 100 and capped at 100 above that, so follow `next` until it is `null`. Pass `month` to read one calendar month at a time. A scoped API key needs `decisions: read`; see [Continuous AML monitoring](https://docs.didit.me/core-technology/aml-screening/continuous-monitoring-aml-screening).
      *
      * `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/aml-screening-history/`
      *
@@ -18865,6 +20100,26 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
      * @param sessionId UUID of the verification session. Accepts both user (KYC) and business (KYB) session IDs.
      */
     listFeatureOverrides(sessionId: string, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsListFeatureOverridesResponse>;
+    /**
+     * List the parties named by the uploaded documents
+     *
+     * Return the shareholders and directors that the documents uploaded to this KYB session name, merged per person and attributed to the documents that named them. Show them to your applicant to confirm, then declare them with the party draft endpoints. A range stays a range: `ownership_percent.text` keeps the verbatim figure and `min` / `max` the numbers read from it. Nobody is labelled a UBO here; that is decided when the parties are submitted, from the role settings and ownership thresholds of the workflow. The same list is in the session decision as `document_verifications[].extracted_parties`. Requires `read:businesses` or `read:sessions`.
+     *
+     * `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/extracted-parties/`
+     *
+     * @param sessionId UUID of the Business Verification (KYB) session. It must belong to the application of the API key.
+     */
+    listKybExtractedParties(sessionId: string, params?: SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponse>;
+    /**
+     * List the KYB party drafts
+     *
+     * List the parties you are preparing for this KYB session, oldest first. A draft is not a declared party: it does not appear in the decision or the console and creates no verification session until you submit it with `POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/parties/submit/`. Requires `write:businesses`.
+     *
+     * `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/parties/drafts/`
+     *
+     * @param sessionId UUID of the Business Verification (KYB) session. It must belong to the application of the API key.
+     */
+    listKybPartyDrafts(sessionId: string, params?: SessionsListKybPartyDraftsParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsListKybPartyDraftsResponse>;
     /**
      * List networks for a session
      *
@@ -18923,7 +20178,7 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
      *
      * Retrieve the complete decision report for a verification session - the rolled-up session `status` plus one report per verification feature the workflow executed. This is the canonical read endpoint for both User Verification (KYC) and Business Verification (KYB) sessions: the same path serves both, and the top-level `session_kind` discriminator tells you which shape you received (`"user"` or `"business"`).
      *
-     * **Every feature report is a plural array.** V3 workflows are graphs that can run the same feature more than once, so each block (`id_verifications`, `nfc_verifications`, `liveness_checks`, `face_matches`, `poa_verifications`, `document_ai_documents`, `phone_verifications`, `email_verifications`, `aml_screenings`, `ip_analyses`, `database_validations`, `questionnaire_responses`) is a JSON array whose items each carry a `node_id` identifying the workflow graph node that produced them. Read NFC as `response.nfc_verifications[0]` - never as a singular `nfc` field. A block is `null` until the workflow has run that feature at least once; features the workflow does not include never appear with data. Electronic Signature results are in `signatures`, which is present only when the workflow has an Electronic Signature step.
+     * **Every feature report is a plural array.** V3 workflows are graphs that can run the same feature more than once, so each block (`id_verifications`, `nfc_verifications`, `liveness_checks`, `face_matches`, `poa_verifications`, `document_ai_documents`, `phone_verifications`, `email_verifications`, `aml_screenings`, `ip_analyses`, `database_validations`, `questionnaire_responses`) is a JSON array whose items each carry a `node_id` identifying the workflow graph node that produced them. Read NFC as `response.nfc_verifications[0]` - never as a singular `nfc` field. A block is `null` until the workflow has run that feature at least once; features the workflow does not include never appear with data. E-signature results are in `signatures`, which is present only when the workflow has an E-signature step.
      *
      * **When to call.** The recommended pattern is event-driven: wait for the `status.updated` webhook that fires when the session reaches a decision (`Approved`, `Declined`, `In Review`), then call this endpoint once to fetch the full report. Polling also works - the endpoint can be called at any point in the session lifecycle and returns the data produced so far - but webhook-then-fetch is cheaper and faster. Media URLs in the response (document images, videos, PDFs) are short-lived presigned links: fetch them promptly or re-request the decision to get fresh ones, and do not persist them as long-term references.
      *
@@ -18978,10 +20233,20 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
      * @param sessionId UUID of the sandbox verification session. Accepts both user (KYC) and business (KYB) session IDs.
      */
     simulate(sessionId: string, params?: SessionsSimulateParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SandboxSimulateResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Submit the KYB party drafts
+     *
+     * Declare the stored drafts as the company's key people. This is the hosted Key People step under your API key: Didit decides from the role settings and ownership thresholds of the workflow which parties must be verified, creates one individual KYC session (or a KYB sub-session for a corporate owner) for each of them, sends the emails the workflow asks for, and advances the session. Each child session is billed like in the hosted flow. The drafts are consumed. Repeating the call after a successful submit changes nothing and answers `200` with `already_submitted: true` and the parties that already exist. The session must be on the Key People step. Send each person's `kyc_session_url` to them, or embed it. Requires `write:businesses`.
+     *
+     * `POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/parties/submit/`
+     *
+     * @param sessionId UUID of the Business Verification (KYB) session. It must belong to the application of the API key.
+     */
+    submitKybParties(sessionId: string, params?: SessionsSubmitKybPartiesParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsSubmitKybPartiesResponse>;
     /**
      * Update an AML hit review status
      *
-     * Set the review status of a **single AML hit** (a potential sanction / PEP / watchlist / adverse-media match) returned by AML screening, without changing the overall session decision. Identify the hit by its `hit_id` (the `id` of an entry in the AML check's `hits` array - see the session decision).
+     * Set the review status of a **single AML hit** (a potential sanction / PEP / watchlist / adverse-media match) returned by AML screening, without changing the overall session decision. Identify the hit by its `hit_id` (the `id` of an entry in the AML check's `hits` array - see the session decision). A hit id returned in the earlier format is still accepted; the response always names the hit by its current `id`.
      *
      * `review_status` is one of `Unreviewed`, `Confirmed Match`, `False Positive`, or `Inconclusive`. Reviewer decisions are preserved across ongoing-monitoring updates, so a hit you mark `False Positive` stays that way when the provider re-screens.
      *
@@ -19094,6 +20359,17 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
      * @param partyUuid UUID of the Key People party to update (`key_people_checks[].submitted.parties[].uuid` on the business session decision). Must belong to the session referenced by `sessionId`.
      */
     updateKybParty(sessionId: string, partyUuid: string, params: SessionsUpdateKybPartyParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsUpdateKybPartyResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Edit a KYB party draft
+     *
+     * Change fields of one party draft. The edit is merged into the stored draft and the merged party is validated as a whole, so an edit that would leave the party incomplete is rejected. Changing `first_name` or `last_name` replaces the stored full name. Requires `write:businesses`.
+     *
+     * `PATCH /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/parties/drafts/{draftId}/`
+     *
+     * @param sessionId UUID of the Business Verification (KYB) session. It must belong to the application of the API key.
+     * @param draftId UUID of the party draft (`draft_id` returned when it was created).
+     */
+    updateKybPartyDraft(sessionId: string, draftId: string, params?: SessionsUpdateKybPartyDraftParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsUpdateKybPartyDraftResponse>;
     /**
      * Update Proof of Address data extracted from the POA document on a verification session
      *
@@ -19132,6 +20408,16 @@ declare class Sessions extends APIResource {
      * @param sessionId UUID of the verification session to update. Accepts both user (KYC) and business (KYB) session IDs - the service resolves the ID across both session types.
      */
     updateStatus(sessionId: string, params: SessionsUpdateStatusParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsUpdateStatusResponse>;
+    /**
+     * Upload KYB documents to a session
+     *
+     * Upload one or more corporate documents (articles of incorporation, shareholder register, certificate of incorporation, ...) to the KYB Documents step of a Business Verification session, from your own server instead of the hosted page. Didit runs the hosted pipeline: compression, OCR, tampering and cross-document checks, document grouping, and advances the session when the required document groups are satisfied. The step costs one flat fee however many files you send. The session must be open and on the KYB Documents step, and the company chosen at the registry step must exist. Read the people the documents name with `GET /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/extracted-parties/`. Requires `write:businesses`.
+     *
+     * `POST /v3/session/{sessionId}/kyb/documents/`
+     *
+     * @param sessionId UUID of the Business Verification (KYB) session. It must belong to the application of the API key.
+     */
+    uploadKybDocuments(sessionId: string, params: SessionsUploadKybDocumentsParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<SessionsUploadKybDocumentsResponse>;
 }
 
 interface TransactionsBatchDeleteParamsAllTransactions {
@@ -19334,13 +20620,13 @@ interface TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectPaymentMethod {
 interface TransactionsCreateParamsTransactionDetails {
     /** Direction of the transaction relative to the subject. Case-insensitive; `in`/`out` are accepted as aliases. Echoed back uppercase (`INBOUND`/`OUTBOUND`). */
     direction: "inbound" | "outbound" | "in" | "out" | (string & {});
-    /** Transaction amount (up to 18 decimal places). Send it as a decimal string (e.g. `"0.123456789012345678"`) when exact precision matters: a JSON number is parsed as a binary float first, so digits beyond about 15 significant digits are rounded before the amount is stored. */
+    /** Transaction amount (up to 18 decimal places). Send it as a decimal string (e.g. `"0.123456789012345678"`) when exact precision matters: a JSON number is parsed as a binary float first, so digits beyond about 15 significant digits are rounded before the amount is stored. Must be zero or greater: the direction carries the sign, and a negative amount returns `400`. */
     amount: number;
     /** Currency code. Any ISO 4217 alphabetic code is accepted (e.g. `EUR`, `USD`, `NGN`), as is a crypto asset symbol (e.g. `BTC`). Prefer a currently-circulating code. Not every accepted code has an exchange rate: when none is available for the code (for example the ISO accounting unit `XSU`, or a crypto symbol Didit does not price), automatic conversion fails and `preferred_currency_amount` is returned null unless the request supplied a pre-converted `amount_in_default_currency`. */
     currency: string;
     /** Whether the currency is `fiat` or `crypto`. */
     currency_kind?: string;
-    /** Pre-converted amount in the default currency. If omitted, automatic FX conversion is attempted. */
+    /** Pre-converted amount in the default currency. If omitted, automatic FX conversion is attempted. Must be zero or greater. */
     amount_in_default_currency?: number | null;
     /** The default currency code for the converted amount. Any currently-circulating ISO 4217 code. */
     default_currency?: string;
@@ -19355,7 +20641,7 @@ interface TransactionsCreateParamsTransactionDetails {
 }
 /** Crypto network selection, separate from currency (the asset symbol). Recording a custom token symbol does not guarantee transaction-hash coverage for its contract. */
 interface TransactionsCreateParamsTransactionDetailsCryptoParams {
-    /** Actual network used for screening. Managed screening supports BTC, ETH, LTC, XRP, BCH, DOGE, TRX, SOL, MATIC, BNB, BASE (Base), OP (Optimism) and ARB (Arbitrum One). Always specify this for multi-network tokens. When it is missing for USDT, USDC or ETH sent with a 0x transaction hash, Didit looks the hash up on Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Base, Arbitrum and Optimism and screens it on the network where it is found; if no network has it, the transaction is not screened and custom_values.aml_screening_status is FAILED with the reason in custom_values.aml_screening_error. When it is missing for USDT or USDC screened by wallet (no transaction hash), a Tron address is screened on Tron, a Solana address on Solana, and a 0x address on the first of those six networks where it has sent a transaction or holds the token, or on Ethereum when it is active on none of them. Connected-provider coverage varies; LIGHTNING requires a supported connected provider. */
+    /** Actual network used for screening. Managed screening supports BTC, ETH, LTC, XRP, BCH, DOGE, TRX, SOL, MATIC, BNB, BASE (Base), OP (Optimism), ARB (Arbitrum One), AVAX (Avalanche C-Chain), ADA (Cardano), XLM (Stellar) and HBAR (Hedera). Common network names are accepted too, for example POLYGON or POL for MATIC, BSC for BNB and TRON for TRX. Always specify this for multi-network tokens. When it is missing for USDT, USDC or ETH sent with a 0x transaction hash, Didit looks the hash up on Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, Base, Arbitrum and Optimism and screens it on the network where it is found; if no network has it, the transaction is not screened and custom_values.aml_screening_status is FAILED with the reason in custom_values.aml_screening_error. When it is missing for USDT or USDC screened by wallet (no transaction hash), a Tron address is screened on Tron, a Solana address on Solana, and a 0x address on the first of those six networks where it has sent a transaction or holds the token, or on Ethereum when it is active on none of them. Connected-provider coverage varies; LIGHTNING requires a supported connected provider. */
     crypto_chain?: string;
 }
 /** Travel Rule data. When Travel Rule is enabled and transaction_category is travel_rule, Didit runs the exchange itself: it ignores status, protocol, required and obligations_count, and uses originator_data, beneficiary_data and metadata. Otherwise Didit stores these values as a passive Travel Rule record. While Travel Rule is on, an outbound transfer at or above your threshold must carry what its regime requires (EU TFR or FATF Recommendation 16), checked on the sides you send: a missing field answers 400 under `travel_rule_details.originator_data` or `travel_rule_details.beneficiary_data`, for example "EU TFR requires the originator name." */
@@ -19400,6 +20686,8 @@ interface TransactionsListParams {
     offset?: number;
     /** Return only transactions whose Travel Rule transfer is in this exact status (for example `ON_HOLD` or `AWAITING_COUNTERPARTY`). `count` follows this filter; `total_transactions` still counts every transaction in the application. */
     travel_rule_status?: string;
+    /** Comma-separated; a transaction matches when it meets any value. `unassigned` is what nobody holds yet, `rules` is what the rules decided on their own without a reviewer, and a member email matches the reviewer assigned to it. `me` is the signed-in Console reviewer, so an API key sending `me` gets `400`. */
+    assignee?: string;
 }
 interface TransactionsListRelatedParams {
     /** Number of transactions per page. Defaults to 50. A value that is not a positive integer falls back to 50; a value above 1000000 returns `400`. */
@@ -19709,7 +20997,7 @@ declare class TransactionsRules extends APIResource {
     /**
      * Create rule
      *
-     * Create a CUSTOM transaction-monitoring rule. Titles are unique per application (duplicate -> 400). A `change_status` action targeting `AWAITING_USER` must carry `workflow_id`. Rules created in ACTIVE mode apply to new transactions immediately - the recommended workflow is create in TEST mode, backtest, then switch mode to ACTIVE.
+     * Create a CUSTOM transaction-monitoring rule. Titles are unique per application (duplicate -> 400). A `change_status` action targeting `AWAITING_USER` must carry `workflow_id`. Rules created in ACTIVE mode apply to new transactions immediately - the recommended workflow is create in TEST mode, backtest, then switch mode to ACTIVE. To change a library rule, create it as a copy: send the library rule's definition with `metadata.based_on` (its library key) and `metadata.based_on_rule_uuid`.
      *
      * `POST /v3/transactions/rules/`
      */
@@ -19769,7 +21057,7 @@ declare class TransactionsRules extends APIResource {
     /**
      * Update rule
      *
-     * Partially update a rule. Custom rules accept every configuration field. Library (PRESET) rules accept only `mode` - use it to activate, disable, or switch a preset to TEST; any other field returns 400. An installed copy of a withheld library rule is switched off: setting its `mode` to anything but `DISABLED` answers 400 ("This library rule cannot run yet: its conditions read data the rules engine cannot evaluate.").
+     * Partially update a rule. Custom rules accept every configuration field. Library (PRESET) rules accept only `mode` - use it to activate, disable, or switch a preset to TEST; any other field returns 400, because Didit maintains library rules and applies their updates automatically. To change a library rule's conditions, create a custom copy with `POST /v3/transactions/rules/` using the library rule's definition and `metadata.based_on` (the library key) and `metadata.based_on_rule_uuid`, then switch the library rule off with `mode: DISABLED` so a transaction does not alert twice. An installed copy of a withheld library rule is switched off: setting its `mode` to anything but `DISABLED` answers 400 ("This library rule cannot run yet: its conditions read data the rules engine cannot evaluate.").
      *
      * `PATCH /v3/transactions/rules/{rule_uuid}/`
      *
@@ -20098,6 +21386,38 @@ interface TravelRuleTransfersListResponse {
     previous?: string | null;
     results?: TravelRuleTransferRow[];
 }
+interface TravelRuleUnmatchedDepositsListParams {
+    /** INBOUND, OUTBOUND, or both comma-separated. Case-sensitive. */
+    direction?: string;
+    /** One or more transfer statuses, comma-separated. */
+    status?: string;
+    /** One or more of INTERNAL, TRP, GTR, TRUST, VERIFYVASP, SYGNA, EMAIL, TEST_VASP, comma-separated. */
+    rail?: string;
+    /** withdrawal, deposit or message, comma-separated. */
+    kind?: string;
+    /** The transaction's currency, case-insensitive. */
+    currency?: string;
+    /** Transfers created on or after this day (UTC), YYYY-MM-DD. */
+    start_date?: string;
+    /** Transfers created on or before this day (UTC), YYYY-MM-DD. */
+    end_date?: string;
+    /** The `id` of a directory entry or Didit network member from GET /v3/travel-rule/vasps/: your transfers with that counterparty. A value that is not a valid id answers 400. */
+    counterparty?: string;
+    /** Page size, default 50. */
+    limit?: number;
+    /** Rows to skip. */
+    offset?: number;
+}
+interface TravelRuleUnmatchedDepositsListResponse {
+    count?: number;
+    next?: string | null;
+    previous?: string | null;
+    results?: TravelRuleTransferRow[];
+}
+interface TravelRuleUnmatchedDepositsMatchParams {
+    /** The `transaction_id` of the received Travel Rule message (a row with `kind: message`). */
+    transaction_id: string;
+}
 /** All fields optional; PUT applies a partial update. */
 interface TravelRuleUpdateSettingsParams {
     is_enabled?: boolean;
@@ -20292,6 +21612,27 @@ declare class TravelRuleTransfers extends APIResource {
      */
     list(params?: TravelRuleTransfersListParams, options?: RequestOptions): PagePromise<TravelRuleTransfersListResponse, TravelRuleTransferRow>;
 }
+/** `travel_rule.unmatched_deposits` */
+declare class TravelRuleUnmatchedDeposits extends APIResource {
+    /**
+     * List unmatched Travel Rule deposits
+     *
+     * Inbound deposits that are still waiting for the originating VASP's Travel Rule data: their transfer is `AWAITING_COUNTERPARTY`, `NOT_ENOUGH_COUNTERPARTY_DATA` or `COUNTERPARTY_VASP_NOT_FOUND`, no received message is paired with them, and nobody matched them by hand. The rows and the filters are the same as in `GET /v3/travel-rule/transfers/`, newest first, paginated with `limit` (default 50) and `offset`. Pair a deposit with the message the originating VASP sent with `POST /v3/travel-rule/unmatched/{transaction_uuid}/match/`.
+     *
+     * `GET /v3/travel-rule/unmatched/`
+     */
+    list(params?: TravelRuleUnmatchedDepositsListParams, options?: RequestOptions): PagePromise<TravelRuleUnmatchedDepositsListResponse, TravelRuleTransferRow>;
+    /**
+     * Match a Travel Rule deposit to a received message
+     *
+     * Pair an inbound deposit that is still waiting for originator data with the Travel Rule message the originating VASP sent for it. The deposit takes the message's originator data, counterparty VASP and rail, and both transfers record the match on their timelines. `transaction_uuid` is the deposit's `transaction_id` from `GET /v3/travel-rule/unmatched/`. `transaction_id` in the body is the received message's `transaction_id`, from a row of `GET /v3/travel-rule/transfers/?kind=message`; the transfer's own `id` is not found. The message must be for the same asset as the deposit. A deposit or message deleted from the Console answers `404`; one that has already moved on (matched, or no longer waiting) answers `409`.
+     *
+     * `POST /v3/travel-rule/unmatched/{transaction_uuid}/match/`
+     *
+     * @param transactionUuid The `transaction_id` of the unmatched deposit.
+     */
+    match(transactionUuid: string, params: TravelRuleUnmatchedDepositsMatchParams, options?: RequestOptions): APIPromise<TravelRuleManualMatchResponse>;
+}
 /** `travel_rule.wallet_addresses` */
 declare class TravelRuleWalletAddresses extends APIResource {
     /**
@@ -20416,6 +21757,7 @@ declare class TravelRule extends APIResource {
     readonly counterpartyContacts: TravelRuleCounterpartyContacts;
     readonly networks: TravelRuleNetworks;
     readonly transfers: TravelRuleTransfers;
+    readonly unmatchedDeposits: TravelRuleUnmatchedDeposits;
     readonly walletAddresses: TravelRuleWalletAddresses;
     readonly walletProofs: TravelRuleWalletProofs;
     readonly workspace: TravelRuleWorkspaceResource;
@@ -20557,6 +21899,10 @@ interface UsersBatchDeleteParams {
     didit_internal_id_list?: string[];
     /** If `true`, deletes every user in the application. */
     delete_all?: boolean;
+    /** Your explicit choice to keep one image-free biometric template of each deleted person for duplicate detection, for `face_retention_days`. Everything else about the person is deleted. Omit it, or send `false`, to delete the templates with the users. When `true`, `face_retention_days` is required. */
+    retain_face_embeddings?: boolean;
+    /** Number of days the image-free biometric template is kept when `retain_face_embeddings` is `true`. Required with it, and rejected without it with a `400` on `face_retention_days`. */
+    face_retention_days?: number;
 }
 interface UsersBatchDeleteResponse {
     /** Number of users deleted (excludes vendor_data values that didn't match anything). */
@@ -20796,7 +22142,7 @@ declare class Users extends APIResource {
      *
      * **Permanently delete** users: the user records are removed permanently. For everyday blocking prefer [Update User Status](#patch-/v3/users/-vendor_data-/update-status/) with `BLOCKED`. Select users with `vendor_data_list`, with `didit_internal_id_list`, or with both at once; or pass `delete_all: true`. This endpoint never narrows `delete_all` with filters. The Console's People filters are refused with a `400` (see the `400` response), so a narrowed intent does not turn into a full wipe. Two exceptions: `filter_has_approved_sessions` and `filter_has_declined_sessions` are not refused and not applied, so with `delete_all: true` they still delete every user; do not send them.
      *
-     * **Biometric templates:** every image-free biometric template retained for these users after session deletion (see `/v3/biometric-templates/`) is purged before the user is deleted, so the person stops matching in duplicate detection and Face Search. If a template cannot be purged because a biometric store is unavailable, the call returns `503`, no user in the request is deleted, and repeating the request finishes the job.
+     * **Biometric templates:** unless you set `retain_face_embeddings` to `true`, every image-free biometric template retained for these users after session deletion (see `/v3/biometric-templates/`) is purged before the user is deleted, so the person stops matching in duplicate detection and Face Search. With `retain_face_embeddings: true` and `face_retention_days`, you choose to keep one image-free biometric template per person for that many days, and nothing else about the person is kept. If a template cannot be purged because a biometric store is unavailable, the call returns `503`, no user in the request is deleted, and repeating the request finishes the job.
      *
      * **Filed regulatory reports:** if the selected data is in a finalized regulatory report, the whole request is refused with `409` and nothing is deleted. The body uses `code: in_filed_report` and names each report with `uuid`, `report_number`, `report_type` and `case_uuid`. Delete the reports, then repeat the request.
      *
@@ -20934,8 +22280,8 @@ declare class Users extends APIResource {
 interface WalletScreeningScreenParams {
     /** The crypto address or network identifier to screen. Must match the selected network (e.g. a `0x`-prefixed 40-hex-char address for EVM chains). Alias: `address`. */
     wallet_address: string;
-    /** Network identifier. Managed screening supports BTC, ETH, LTC, XRP, BCH, DOGE, TRX, SOL, MATIC, BNB, BASE (Base), OP (Optimism), and ARB (Arbitrum One). USDT and USDC are legacy Ethereum aliases, not multi-network searches. Connected-provider coverage varies. LIGHTNING requires a supported connected provider. CELO (Celo), MODE (Mode) and PLUME (Plume) are screened through a connected TRM Labs account; managed screening answers 400 for them. Alias: `currency`. */
-    blockchain: "BTC" | "LIGHTNING" | "ETH" | "LTC" | "XRP" | "BCH" | "DOGE" | "TRX" | "SOL" | "MATIC" | "BNB" | "USDT" | "USDC" | "BASE" | "OP" | "ARB" | "CELO" | "MODE" | "PLUME" | (string & {});
+    /** Optional network identifier. When omitted, the network is read from the address format: `bc1`, `1` and `3` addresses are Bitcoin (BTC), `T` addresses are Tron (TRX) and base58 public keys are Solana (SOL). A `0x` address is valid on every EVM network, so omitting `blockchain` for it answers 422 with the candidate networks in `candidate_chains`. Managed screening supports BTC, ETH, LTC, XRP, BCH, DOGE, TRX, SOL, MATIC, BNB, BASE (Base), OP (Optimism), ARB (Arbitrum One), AVAX (Avalanche C-Chain), ADA (Cardano), XLM (Stellar) and HBAR (Hedera). USDT and USDC are legacy Ethereum aliases, not multi-network searches. Connected-provider coverage varies. LIGHTNING requires a supported connected provider. CELO (Celo), MODE (Mode) and PLUME (Plume) are screened through a connected TRM Labs account; managed screening answers 400 for them. Alias: `currency`. */
+    blockchain?: "BTC" | "LIGHTNING" | "ETH" | "LTC" | "XRP" | "BCH" | "DOGE" | "TRX" | "SOL" | "MATIC" | "BNB" | "USDT" | "USDC" | "BASE" | "OP" | "ARB" | "AVAX" | "ADA" | "XLM" | "HBAR" | "CELO" | "MODE" | "PLUME" | (string & {});
     /** Optional. Whether the address is being screened as an inbound (deposit) or outbound (withdrawal) counterparty. Accepts `inbound`, `outbound`, `deposit`, or `withdrawal`. Defaults to a neutral pre-transfer screen when omitted. This is passed to the provider as context only; it does not change the returned `risk_score`, `severity`, or the `source_of_funds`/`destination_of_funds` breakdowns, which are always both returned regardless of `direction`. Changing or omitting `direction` therefore does not require re-screening an address. */
     direction?: "inbound" | "outbound" | "deposit" | "withdrawal" | (string & {});
 }
@@ -21255,6 +22601,8 @@ interface WebhooksUpdateConfigParams {
     biometric_consent_mode?: "auto" | "always" | "never" | (string & {});
     /** Replaces the whole list of Digital ID wallet return hosts. Bare hostnames only, such as `shop.example.com`: no scheme, port, path or wildcard. Values are lowercased and duplicates are dropped. Send `[]` to clear the list. */
     allowed_return_hosts?: string[];
+    /** Replaces the whole list of allowed origins. Origins (for example `https://app.example.com`; `http` only for `localhost`) the hosted verification flow may be embedded in and may send the user back to with a session callback. Server-to-server calls are not affected. An empty list means no restriction. Didit stores each origin in lower case without a default port. An invalid entry fails with `400` on `allowed_domains`. Send `[]` to remove the restriction. */
+    allowed_domains?: string[];
 }
 
 /** Which header authenticated a delivery. */
@@ -21931,7 +23279,7 @@ declare class TokenVerificationError extends DiditError {
     constructor(reason: TokenVerificationReason, message: string);
 }
 
-declare const VERSION = "1.0.1";
+declare const VERSION = "2.1.0";
 
 /**
  * The canonical JSON of a parsed webhook body: the text `X-Signature-V2` signs
@@ -22404,5 +23752,5 @@ declare function createState(): Promise<string>;
  */
 declare function createNonce(): Promise<string>;
 
-export { APIConnectionError, APIPromise, APIResponseValidationError, APIStatusError, APITimeoutError, Account, AccountApplications, AccountOrganizations, AddressValidation, AgeEstimation, Aml, AmlMonitoring, Analytics, Authentication, AuthenticationError, BadRequestError, Bank, Billing, BiometricTemplates, Blocklist, BusinessSessions, Businesses, Cases, CasesBlueprints, CasesChecklist, CasesLinks, CasesNotes, CasesRegulatoryReports, CasesRequests, CasesRoutingRules, CasesTeams, ConfigurationError, ConflictError, Customization, DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_BASE_URL, DEFAULT_BASE_URL, DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, DEFAULT_WEBHOOK_TOLERANCE, DatabaseValidation, Didit, DiditError, DiditResources, DocumentAi, Email, FaceMatch, FaceSearch, FraudChecks, IdVerification, IdWallets, InternalServerError, Investigator, Ip, Kyb, Lists, ListsEntries, MonitoringEvents, Networks, NetworksNotes, NotFoundError, PagePromise, PassiveLiveness, PermissionDeniedError, Phone, Pricing, ProofOfAddress, Questionnaires, RateLimitError, RegulatoryReports, ReportTemplates, Sessions, SessionsImports, SessionsReviews, SessionsSignatures, SessionsWebhooks, TokenVerificationError, Transactions, TransactionsNotes, TransactionsRules, TransactionsTravelRule, TravelRule, TravelRuleCounterpartyContacts, TravelRuleNetworks, TravelRuleTransfers, TravelRuleWalletAddresses, TravelRuleWalletProofs, TravelRuleWorkspaceResource, UnprocessableEntityError, Users, VERSION, WalletScreening, WebhookVerificationError, Webhooks, WebhooksDestinations, Workflows, canonicalJson, createNonce, createPkce, createState, Didit as default, fileFromPath, parsePublishableKey, toFile, verifyWebhook, verifyWebhookParsed, webhooks };
-export type { AMLDatasetFreshness, AMLDatasetFreshnessSources, AMLDatasetSourceFreshness, AMLMonitoringJob, AMLMonitoringJobEstimate, AMLMonitoringJobOutcomes, AMLMonitoringJobResults, AMLMonitoringToggleResult, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant1, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant2, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant2Estimate, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant2Outcomes, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant2Results, AMLScreening, AMLScreeningHits, AMLScreeningHitsAdverseMediaDetails, AMLScreeningHitsAdverseMediaMatches, AMLScreeningHitsLinkedEntities, AMLScreeningHitsPepMatches, AMLScreeningHitsProperties, AMLScreeningHitsRiskView, AMLScreeningHitsRiskViewCategories, AMLScreeningHitsRiskViewCountries, AMLScreeningHitsRiskViewCrimes, AMLScreeningHitsSanctionMatches, AMLScreeningHitsScoreBreakdown, AMLScreeningHitsWarningMatches, AMLScreeningHitsWarningMatchesAdditionalData, AMLScreeningHitsWarningMatchesAdditionalDataData, AMLScreeningHitsWarningMatchesAdditionalDataDataCaseDetails, AMLScreeningRun, AMLScreeningScreenedData, AMLScreeningWarnings, AccessTokenClaims, AccountApplicationsCreateParams, AccountApplicationsListParams, AccountApplicationsUpdateParams, AccountLoginParams, AccountOrganizationsListParams, AccountRegisterParams, AccountResendOtpParams, AccountResendOtpResponse, AccountVerifyEmailParams, ActivityCreatedEvent, ActorClaim, AddressValidationResponse, AddressValidationResult, AddressValidationResultAddress, AddressValidationValidateParams, AgeEstimationEstimateParams, AgeEstimationEstimateResponse, AgeEstimationEstimateResponseAgeEstimation, AgeEstimationEstimateResponseAgeEstimationUserImage, AgeEstimationEstimateResponseAgeEstimationUserImageEntities, AgeEstimationEstimateResponseAgeEstimationWarnings, AmlMonitoringRetrieveJobResponse, AmlMonitoringRetrieveJobResponseOutcomes, AmlMonitoringRetrieveJobResponseResults, AmlRetrieveDatasetFreshnessResponse, AmlScreenParams, AmlScreenResponse, AmlScreenResponseAml, AmlScreenResponseAmlHits, AmlScreenResponseAmlHitsAdverseMediaMatches, AmlScreenResponseAmlHitsLinkedEntities, AmlScreenResponseAmlHitsPepMatches, AmlScreenResponseAmlHitsScoreBreakdown, AmlScreenResponseAmlScreenedData, AmlScreenResponseAmlWarnings, Amount, AnalyticsRetrieveParams, Application, ApplicationAnalyticsCountryCount, ApplicationAnalyticsDataPoint, ApplicationAnalyticsDemographicPoint, ApplicationAnalyticsDemographicStats, ApplicationAnalyticsDemographicStatsAgeDistribution, ApplicationAnalyticsDeviceDetails, ApplicationAnalyticsDeviceDetailsBrowsers, ApplicationAnalyticsDeviceDetailsDeviceModels, ApplicationAnalyticsDeviceDetailsOperatingSystems, ApplicationAnalyticsDevicePoint, ApplicationAnalyticsLocationStats, ApplicationAnalyticsLocationStatsCities, ApplicationAnalyticsLocationStatsConversionByCountry, ApplicationAnalyticsOriginalStatusPoint, ApplicationAnalyticsOriginalStatusStats, ApplicationAnalyticsRequestBreakdown, ApplicationAnalyticsResubmissionPoint, ApplicationAnalyticsResubmissionStats, ApplicationAnalyticsSummary, ApplicationAnalyticsVerificationTimePoint, ApplicationAnalyticsVerificationTimeStats, ApplicationAnalyticsVerificationTimeStatsPerFeatureValue, ApplicationAnalyticsVerificationTimeStatsPerSubStepValueValue, ApplicationAnalyticsWarningStats, ApplicationAnalyticsWarningStatsValue, ApplicationAnalyticsWarningStatsValueRisksValue, ApplicationAnalyticsWidget, ApplicationAnalyticsWidgetResponse, ApplicationAnalyticsWidgetSearch, ApplicationAnalyticsWidgetThresholds, ApplicationAnalyticsWorkflowFunnel, ApplicationAnalyticsWorkflowFunnelValue, ApplicationAnalyticsWorkflowFunnelValueStepsValue, ApplicationCredentialsSummary, ApplicationProduct, Audience, AuthenticationOptions, AuthenticationSession, BankAccountCheckBusinessHolder, BankAccountCheckHolder, BankAccountCheckParams, BankAccountCheckParamsAccount, BankAccountCheckPersonHolder, BankAccountCheckPricing, BankAccountCheckResponse, BankSignInPricing, BankSignInPricingAddOns, BankStatementUploadPricing, BankVerificationPricing, BankVerificationPricingCountry, BankVerificationPricingMethods, BankVerificationResult, BankVerificationResultAccount, BankVerificationResultBilling, BankVerificationResultConnection, BankVerificationResultContinuation, BankVerificationResultFinancialData, BankVerificationResultOwnership, BankVerificationResultRoute, BillingRetrieveBalanceResponse, BillingTopUpParams, BillingTopUpResponse, BiometricTemplatesBatchDeleteParams, BiometricTemplatesBatchDeleteResponse, BiometricTemplatesBatchDeleteResponseResults, BiometricTemplatesCountParams, BiometricTemplatesCountResponse, BiometricTemplatesDeleteResponse, BiometricTemplatesListParams, BiometricTemplatesListResponse, BiometricTemplatesListResponseResults, BiometricTemplatesRetrieveResponse, BlocklistAddParams, BlocklistAddResponse, BlocklistListParams, BlocklistListResponse, BlocklistRemoveParams, BlocklistRemoveResponse, BlocklistedItem, BrandingCustomization, BusinessDataUpdatedEvent, BusinessDetailItem, BusinessDetailItemFeaturesList, BusinessDetailItemTags, BusinessListItem, BusinessListItemFeaturesList, BusinessListItemTags, BusinessSessionListItem, BusinessStatusUpdatedEvent, BusinessesBatchDeleteParams, BusinessesBatchDeleteResponse, BusinessesCreateParams, BusinessesListParams, BusinessesListResponse, BusinessesSetAmlMonitoringParams, BusinessesSetOngoingMonitoringParams, BusinessesSetSessionOngoingMonitoringParams, BusinessesUpdateParams, BusinessesUpdateStatusParams, CaseActionActionEnum, CaseActionCaseActionReceipt, CaseActionCaseActionReceiptPage, CaseActionCaseEntityActionResult, CaseActionEntityTypeEnum, CaseActionStatusEnum, CaseAssignee, CaseBlueprintDetail, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfig, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigAmlControl, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigChecklist, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigChecklistItems, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigFinancial, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigIdentity, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigReporting, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigVerifications, CaseBlueprintDetailCreationSources, CaseBlueprintDetailReceivesEscalationFrom, CaseBlueprintListItem, CaseBlueprintPresetInstallResult, CaseBlueprintSummary, CaseBulkUpdateResult, CaseBulkUpdateResultFailures, CaseChecker, CaseChecklistItem, CaseCollaborationCaseNote, CaseCollaborationCaseNoteReply, CaseCollaborationPaginatedCaseNoteList, CaseContentConfig, CaseContentConfigAmlControl, CaseContentConfigChecklist, CaseContentConfigChecklistItems, CaseContentConfigFinancial, CaseContentConfigIdentity, CaseContentConfigReporting, CaseContentConfigVerifications, CaseDetail, CaseDetailPendingResolution, CaseDuplicateCaseDuplicate, CaseDuplicateCaseDuplicatePage, CaseDuplicateCaseFraudSourceContextRequest, CaseDuplicateCaseLinkCreateRequest, CaseDuplicateCaseSubjectInputRequest, CaseDuplicateEntityTypeEnum, CaseDuplicatePriorityEnum, CaseDuplicateStatusEnum, CaseDuplicateTypeEnum, CaseEvent, CaseLink, CaseListItem, CaseListItemPendingResolution, CaseNote, CaseNoteAttachments, CasePublicationAssignmentMethodEnum, CasePublicationCaseBlueprint, CasePublicationPaginatedPolicyRevisionList, CasePublicationPolicyDraft, CasePublicationPolicyDraftResponse, CasePublicationPolicyRevision, CaseReviewTeam, CaseReviewTeamMember, CaseReviewTeamMemberParam, CaseRoutingCondition, CaseRoutingPreview, CaseRoutingPreviewCandidates, CaseRoutingPreviewMatchedRules, CaseRoutingRule, CaseRoutingRuleCreate, CaseSubject, CaseTeamSummary, CasesApplyEntityActionParams, CasesAssignParams, CasesBlueprintsCreateParams, CasesBlueprintsDiscardDraftParams, CasesBlueprintsInstallPresetsParams, CasesBlueprintsListHistoryParams, CasesBlueprintsListParams, CasesBlueprintsListPresetsResponse, CasesBlueprintsListPresetsResponseResults, CasesBlueprintsListResponse, CasesBlueprintsPublishParams, CasesBlueprintsSaveDraftParams, CasesBlueprintsUpdateParams, CasesBulkAssignParams, CasesBulkUpdateStatusParams, CasesChecklistToggleItemParams, CasesCreateParams, CasesCreateParamsSubject, CasesFindDuplicatesParams, CasesLinksCreateParams, CasesListActionReceiptsParams, CasesListEventsParams, CasesListEventsResponse, CasesListParams, CasesListResponse, CasesListReviewersResponse, CasesListReviewersResponseResults, CasesNotesCreateAttachmentUploadParams, CasesNotesCreateAttachmentUploadResponse, CasesNotesCreateParams, CasesNotesListParams, CasesNotesRetrieveAttachmentUrlParams, CasesNotesRetrieveAttachmentUrlResponse, CasesNotesUpdateParams, CasesPrintResponse, CasesRegulatoryReportsCreateParams, CasesRegulatoryReportsCreateParamsNarrative, CasesRegulatoryReportsListParams, CasesRejectResolutionParams, CasesRequestsCreateParams, CasesRequestsListParams, CasesRequestsPreviewParams, CasesRequestsRemindResponse, CasesResolveParams, CasesRetrieveStatisticsParams, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponse, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseQueue, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseSeries, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTables, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTablesBlueprint, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTablesOfficer, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTablesSource, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTablesStatus, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTotals, CasesRoutingRulesCreateParams, CasesRoutingRulesDiscardDraftParams, CasesRoutingRulesListHistoryParams, CasesRoutingRulesListParams, CasesRoutingRulesListResponse, CasesRoutingRulesPreviewParams, CasesRoutingRulesPublishParams, CasesRoutingRulesSaveDraftParams, CasesRoutingRulesUpdateParams, CasesTeamsCreateParams, CasesTeamsListParams, CasesTeamsListResponse, CasesTeamsUpdateParams, CasesTransferParams, CasesUpdateParams, ClientOptions, ComplianceList, ComplianceListEntry, ComplianceListEntryMetadata, CreateStepUpParams, CustomerMessagingCaseRequest, CustomerMessagingCaseRequestContact, CustomerMessagingCaseRequestOptions, CustomerMessagingCaseRequestPreviewResponse, CustomerMessagingLanguageEnum, CustomerMessagingLanguagesEnum, CustomerMessagingPaginatedCaseRequestList, CustomerMessagingPurposeEnum, CustomerMessagingPurposesEnum, CustomizationUpdateParams, DatabaseValidationValidateParams, DatabaseValidationValidateParamsAddressVariant1, DatabaseValidationValidateResponse, DatabaseValidationValidateResponseDatabaseValidation, DatabaseValidationValidateResponseDatabaseValidationErrors, DatabaseValidationValidateResponseDatabaseValidationValidationsVariant1, DatabaseValidationValidateResponseDatabaseValidationWarnings, DigitalIdWalletApiAudkenniWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiConnectidWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiCountry520Enum, DigitalIdWalletApiCountryAfcEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiCountryE2dEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiCountryEe9Enum, DigitalIdWalletApiDeviceEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiDiiaWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiEparakstsMobileWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiEudiWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiFranceconnectWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiFtnWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiGovbrWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiIdcardEeWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiIdinWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiInteractionEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiItsmeWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiMitidWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiMobileIdWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiPersonalausweisWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiSmartIdWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiUaePassWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiWallet, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletCatalogEntry, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletCatalogResponse, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletIdentity, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletNextAction, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletNextActionTypeEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResponse, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResult, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResultOutcomeEnum, DocumentAIDetectedCode, DocumentAiAnalyzeParams, DocumentAiAnalyzeResponse, DocumentAiAnalyzeResponseDocumentAi, DocumentAiAnalyzeResponseDocumentAiFields, DocumentAiAnalyzeResponseDocumentAiWarnings, EmailAssessRiskParams, EmailCheckCodeParams, EmailIntelligence, EmailMatchItem, EmailRiskResponse, EmailRiskResponseEmail, EmailRiskResponseEmailBreaches, EmailSendCodeParams, EmailSendCodeParamsOptions, EmailSendCodeParamsSignals, EmailSocialFootprint, EmailVerificationCheckResponse, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmail, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailBreaches, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailLifecycle, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailMatches, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailWarnings, EmailVerificationSendResponse, EntityNetworkMembership, EntityNetworkMembershipList, ExchangeCodeParams, FaceMatchCompareParams, FaceMatchCompareResponse, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatch, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchRefImage, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchRefImageEntities, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchUserImage, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchUserImageEntities, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchWarnings, FaceSearchSearchParams, FaceSearchSearchResponse, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearch, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchMatches, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchMatchesUserDetails, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchUserImage, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchUserImageEntities, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchWarnings, FeatureStatusOverride, FeatureStatusOverrideRequestedBy, Fetch, FileData, FileUpload, FraudAvailabilityEnum, FraudBandEnum, FraudCheckAttributesRequest, FraudCheckContextRequest, FraudCheckIdentifierRequest, FraudCheckIdentityRelationship, FraudCheckInput, FraudCheckModuleReport, FraudCheckModuleSelectionRequest, FraudCheckPlan, FraudCheckPlannedModule, FraudCheckResponse, FraudCheckRisk, FraudCheckSubjectRequest, FraudChecksCreateParams, FraudChecksPlanParams, FraudDimensionEnum, FraudExcludeEnum, FraudNextActionEnum, FraudProcessingStatusEnum, FraudRecommendationEnum, FraudResultEnum, FraudStatusEnum, FraudTypeEnum, IPRiskResponse, IPRiskResponseIp, IdTokenClaims, IdVerificationVerifyParams, IdVerificationVerifyResponse, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerification, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationBackImageQualityScore, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationBarcodes, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationFrontImageQualityScore, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationMrz, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationParsedAddress, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationParsedAddressDocumentLocation, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationWarnings, IdWalletsStartAudkenniParams, IdWalletsStartBankidCzParams, IdWalletsStartBankidNoParams, IdWalletsStartBankidSeParams, IdWalletsStartBuypassParams, IdWalletsStartConnectidParams, IdWalletsStartDiiaParams, IdWalletsStartEparakstsMobileParams, IdWalletsStartEudiParams, IdWalletsStartFranceconnectParams, IdWalletsStartFrejaidParams, IdWalletsStartFtnParams, IdWalletsStartGovbrParams, IdWalletsStartGovukWalletParams, IdWalletsStartIdcardEeParams, IdWalletsStartIdinParams, IdWalletsStartItsmeParams, IdWalletsStartMitidParams, IdWalletsStartMobileIdParams, IdWalletsStartMojeidParams, IdWalletsStartOneidParams, IdWalletsStartPersonalausweisParams, IdWalletsStartSmartIdParams, IdWalletsStartUaePassParams, IdWalletsStartVippsParams, ImportJobSummary, ImportJobSummaryFaceTemplates, ImportJobSummaryProgress, ImportJobSummaryStartedBy, ImportProvider, ImportProviderCredentialFields, InvestigatorAcceptRunParams, InvestigatorBatchAcceptResponse, InvestigatorBatchAcceptResponseResults, InvestigatorBatchAcceptRunsParams, InvestigatorBlock, InvestigatorDecision, InvestigatorDecisionOriginalOutcome, InvestigatorDecisionOverrides, InvestigatorExportActivityParams, InvestigatorListActivityParams, InvestigatorListActivityResponse, InvestigatorListGuardrailsResponse, InvestigatorListGuardrailsResponseResults, InvestigatorListQueueParams, InvestigatorListQueueResponse, InvestigatorOverrideRunParams, InvestigatorQueueRow, InvestigatorRetrieveDashboardParams, InvestigatorRetrieveDashboardResponse, InvestigatorRetrievePerformanceParams, InvestigatorRetrievePerformanceResponse, InvestigatorRetrieveSummaryParams, InvestigatorRetrieveSummaryResponse, InvestigatorRetrieveTransactionResponse, InvestigatorRunDetail, InvestigatorSettings, InvestigatorSettingsSpendLimit, InvestigatorUpdateSettingsParams, IpAssessRiskParams, KYBKeyPeopleParty, KYBKeyPeoplePartyRoles, KYBKeyPeoplePartyVerificationWorkflowFeatures, KYBRegistryAddress, KYBRegistryIndustry, KYBRegistryOwnership, KYBRegistryOwnershipUnresolved, KYBRegistrySearchResults, KYBRegistrySearchResultsCompanies, KYBRegistrySearchResultsPagination, KYBRegistryShareholding, KnownWebhookEvent, KybListShareholdersParams, KybListShareholdersResponse, KybListShareholdersResponse202, KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistry, KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistryOfficers, KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistry, KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistryOfficers, KybListUbosParams, KybListUbosResponse, KybListUbosResponse202, KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistry, KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistryOfficers, KybListUbosResponseKybRegistry, KybListUbosResponseKybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybListUbosResponseKybRegistryOfficers, KybRegistrySearchResolvedEvent, KybSearchParams, KybSearchResponse, KybSelectParams, KybSelectResponse, KybSelectResponseKybRegistry, KybSelectResponseKybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybSelectResponseKybRegistryOfficers, ListsCreateParams, ListsEntriesCreateParams, ListsEntriesCreateParamsMetadata, ListsEntriesListParams, ListsEntriesListResponse, ListsEntriesUploadFaceParams, ListsListParams, ListsListResponse, ListsUpdateParams, ListsUpdateResponse, LogLevel, Logger, LoginResponse, MonitoringEvent, MonitoringEventCreateRequest, MonitoringEventCreateRequestBusiness, MonitoringEventCreateRequestDeviceContext, MonitoringEventCreateRequestDeviceContextNetworkContext, MonitoringEventCreateRequestSession, MonitoringEventCreateRequestSubject, MonitoringEventCreateRequestTransactionContext, MonitoringEventDetail, MonitoringEventDetailIpEnrichment, MonitoringEventDetailSubjectProfile, MonitoringEventIngestResult, MonitoringEventIngestResultRuleMatches, MonitoringEventPage, MonitoringEventRuleRun, MonitoringEventsCreateBatchParams, MonitoringEventsCreateBatchResponse, MonitoringEventsCreateBatchResponseResults, MonitoringEventsCreateBatchResponseResultsRuleMatches, MonitoringEventsCreateParams, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsBusiness, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsDeviceContext, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsDeviceContextNetworkContext, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsSession, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsSubject, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsTransactionContext, MonitoringEventsCreateSdkTokenParams, MonitoringEventsCreateSdkTokenResponse, MonitoringEventsListParams, MonitoringEventsRetrieveEnrichmentMetricsParams, MonitoringEventsRetrieveEnrichmentMetricsResponse, MonitoringEventsRetrieveSubjectTimelineParams, NetworkDetail, NetworkDetailResponse, NetworkGraph, NetworkGraphEdge, NetworkGraphMetrics, NetworkGraphNode, NetworkListCounts, NetworkListCountsFacets, NetworkListCountsFacetsAssignee, NetworkListCountsFacetsAssigneeUsers, NetworkListCountsFacetsLastActivityDays, NetworkListCountsFacetsMinSize, NetworkListCountsFacetsPriority, NetworkListCountsFacetsRiskMin, NetworkListCountsFacetsSignalTypes, NetworkListCountsScopes, NetworkListCountsViews, NetworkListItem, NetworkMap, NetworkMapPoints, NetworkMember, NetworkMemberProvenance, NetworkNodeTag, NetworkNote, NetworkOutcomes, NetworkPatternScore, NetworkRiskDisplay, NetworkSignal, NetworkTag, NetworkTimeline, NetworkTimelineAccount, NetworkTimelineAmount, NetworkTimelineAttempt, NetworkTimelineCaseLinked, NetworkTimelineDeclineReason, NetworkTimelineDevice, NetworkTimelineEvent, NetworkTimelineIP, NetworkTimelineLogin, NetworkTimelineNoteAdded, NetworkTimelinePage, NetworkTimelineRoute, NetworkTimelineRuleHit, NetworkTimelineSourceRef, NetworkTimelineTransaction, NetworkTypedTimelineEvent, NetworksAddTagParams, NetworksListMembersResponse, NetworksListParams, NetworksListResponse, NetworksListResponseKpis, NetworksListSignalsResponse, NetworksNotesCreateParams, NetworksNotesListParams, NetworksNotesListResponse, NetworksRemoveTagParams, NetworksRetrieveGraphParams, NetworksRetrieveTimelineParams, OngoingMonitoringJob, OngoingMonitoringJobEstimate, OngoingMonitoringJobOutcomes, OngoingMonitoringToggleResult, OngoingMonitoringToggleResultVariant1, Organization, OrganizationClaim, OrganizationRole, OrganizationSummary, Page, PageMethods, PageResponse, PaginatedApplicationList, PaginatedOrganizationList, PassiveLivenessCheckParams, PassiveLivenessCheckResponse, PassiveLivenessCheckResponseLiveness, PassiveLivenessCheckResponseLivenessUserImage, PassiveLivenessCheckResponseLivenessUserImageEntities, PassiveLivenessCheckResponseLivenessWarnings, PhoneAssessRiskParams, PhoneCheckCodeParams, PhoneIntelligence, PhoneMatchItem, PhoneRiskResponse, PhoneRiskResponsePhone, PhoneRiskResponsePhoneCarrier, PhoneSendCodeParams, PhoneSendCodeParamsOptions, PhoneSendCodeParamsSignals, PhoneSocialFootprint, PhoneVerificationCheckResponse, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhone, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneCarrier, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneLifecycle, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneMatches, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneWarnings, PhoneVerificationSendResponse, PkcePair, ProofOfAddressVerifyParams, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponse, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoa, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoaExtraFields, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoaPoaParsedAddress, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoaPoaParsedAddressDocumentLocation, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoaWarnings, PublishableKey, PublishableKeyEnvironment, QuestionnaireDetail, QuestionnaireListItem, QuestionnairesCreateParams, QuestionnairesListParams, QuestionnairesListResponse, QuestionnairesUpdateParams, RegisterResponse, RegulatoryReportDetail, RegulatoryReportDetailNarrative, RegulatoryReportDetailValidationErrors, RegulatoryReportList, RegulatoryReportsCreateParams, RegulatoryReportsCreateParamsNarrative, RegulatoryReportsDeleteParams, RegulatoryReportsListParams, RegulatoryReportsRetrieveDownloadUrlParams, RegulatoryReportsRetrieveDownloadUrlResponse, RegulatoryReportsUpdateParams, RegulatoryReportsUpdateParamsNarrative, RegulatoryReportsValidateResponse, RegulatoryReportsValidateResponseErrors, ReportTemplateDetail, ReportTemplatesCreateParams, ReportTemplatesListParams, ReportTemplatesListResponse, ReportTemplatesUpdateParams, RequestOptions, ReviewItem, RiskLifecycleEvent, RiskSignals, RiskWarning, RoutingPublicationCaseRoutingRule, RoutingPublicationFieldEnum, RoutingPublicationOperatorEnum, RoutingPublicationPaginatedPolicyRevisionList, RoutingPublicationPolicyDraft, RoutingPublicationPolicyDraftResponse, RoutingPublicationPolicyRevision, RoutingPublicationRoutingCondition, SandboxSimulateResponse, SessionCustomRole, SessionDataUpdatedEvent, SessionDecision, SessionDecisionBiometricConsent, SessionDecisionContactDetails, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidations, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsErrors, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsScreenedData, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsValidations, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsValidationsValidation, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsWarnings, SessionDecisionDocumentAiDocuments, SessionDecisionDocumentAiDocumentsItems, SessionDecisionDocumentAiDocumentsItemsFields, SessionDecisionDocumentVerifications, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsGroupsValue, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsItems, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsItemsDocumentMetadata, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsItemsDocumentMetadataOverlayManipulation, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsItemsDocumentMetadataOverlayManipulationManipulatedRegions, SessionDecisionEmailVerifications, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsBreaches, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsLifecycle, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsLifecycleDetails, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsMatches, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionExpectedDetails, SessionDecisionFaceMatches, SessionDecisionFaceMatchesWarnings, SessionDecisionIdVerifications, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsBackImageQualityScore, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentLiveness, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentLivenessPortraitReplace, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentLivenessPrintedCopy, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentLivenessScreenReplay, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentSelfieFaceMatches, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentSelfieFaceMatchesUserDetails, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsExtraFields, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsFallbackFrom, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsFrontImageQualityScore, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsIdLookup, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsIdLookupComparison, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsMatches, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsMatchesUserDetails, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsMrz, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddress, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressDocumentLocation, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResults, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsAddressComponents, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometry, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometryLocation, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometryViewport, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometryViewportNortheast, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometryViewportSouthwest, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsNavigationPoints, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsNavigationPointsLocation, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsWalletVerification, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionIpAnalyses, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesIdDocument, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesIdDocumentLocation, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesIp, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesIpLocation, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesMatches, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesMatchesDeviceInfo, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesMatchesLocationInfo, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesPoaDocument, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesPoaDocumentLocation, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesWarnings, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecks, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistry, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryBeneficialOwners, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryBeneficialOwnersKycAmlCategories, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryBeneficialOwnersVerificationWorkflowFeatures, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryOfficers, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryOfficersKycAmlCategories, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryOfficersVerificationWorkflowFeatures, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksSubmitted, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksSubmittedParties, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksSubmittedPartiesRoles, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksSubmittedPartiesVerificationWorkflowFeatures, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksUboKycSummary, SessionDecisionLivenessChecks, SessionDecisionLivenessChecksMatches, SessionDecisionLivenessChecksMatchesUserDetails, SessionDecisionLivenessChecksWarnings, SessionDecisionNfcVerifications, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsAuthenticity, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsCertificateSummary, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsChipData, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsJpki, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsJpkiAttributes, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsJpkiCertificates, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionPhoneVerifications, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsCarrier, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsLifecycle, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsLifecycleDetails, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsMatches, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionPoaVerifications, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsDocumentMetadata, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsDocumentMetadataOverlayManipulation, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsDocumentMetadataOverlayManipulationManipulatedRegions, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsExtraFields, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsPoaParsedAddress, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsPoaParsedAddressDocumentLocation, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponses, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponsesSections, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponsesSectionsItems, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponsesSectionsItemsAnswer, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponsesSectionsItemsChoices, SessionDecisionRegistryChecks, SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompany, SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompanyBeneficialOwners, SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompanyOfficers, SessionDecisionResubmissions, SessionDecisionResubmissionsNodes, SessionDecisionResubmissionsRequestedBy, SessionDecisionReviews, SessionDeletionJob, SessionDeletionJobOutcomes, SessionEvent, SessionImportError, SessionImportJob, SessionOrganization, SessionSignDocument, SessionStatusUpdatedEvent, SessionWebhookDelivery, SessionsAddImagesParams, SessionsAddImagesResponse, SessionsBatchDeleteParams, SessionsBatchDeleteResponse, SessionsBatchDeleteResponseResults, SessionsBulkUpdateAmlHitStatusParams, SessionsBulkUpdateAmlHitStatusParamsHitUpdates, SessionsBulkUpdateAmlHitStatusResponse, SessionsCreateParams, SessionsCreateParamsBiometricConsent, SessionsCreateParamsContactDetails, SessionsCreateParamsExpectedDetails, SessionsCreateParamsSign, SessionsCreateResponse, SessionsDeleteParams, SessionsDeleteResponse, SessionsExportAmlScreeningHistoryParams, SessionsImportSharedParams, SessionsImportsCheckProviderParams, SessionsImportsCheckProviderParamsOptions, SessionsImportsCheckProviderResponse, SessionsImportsCreateParams, SessionsImportsCreateParamsOptions, SessionsImportsListActiveJobsResponse, SessionsImportsListErrorsParams, SessionsImportsListErrorsResponse, SessionsImportsListJobsParams, SessionsImportsListJobsResponse, SessionsImportsListJobsResponseCounts, SessionsImportsListProvidersResponse, SessionsImportsRetrieveTemplateParams, SessionsImportsRetryParams, SessionsImportsStartParams, SessionsListAmlScreeningHistoryParams, SessionsListAmlScreeningHistoryResponse, SessionsListEventsParams, SessionsListEventsResponse, SessionsListFeatureOverridesResponse, SessionsListParams, SessionsListResponse, SessionsPreviewDecisionEmailParams, SessionsPreviewDecisionEmailResponse, SessionsPreviewResubmissionParams, SessionsPreviewResubmissionParamsNodesToResubmit, SessionsPreviewResubmissionResponse, SessionsPreviewResubmissionResponseNodesToResubmit, SessionsRetrieveDecisionParams, SessionsReviewsCreateParams, SessionsReviewsCreateResponse, SessionsReviewsListParams, SessionsReviewsListResponse, SessionsShareParams, SessionsShareResponse, SessionsSignaturesDownloadEvidenceParams, SessionsSignaturesValidateParams, SessionsSignaturesValidateResponse, SessionsSimulateParams, SessionsUpdateAmlHitStatusParams, SessionsUpdateAmlHitStatusResponse, SessionsUpdateAmlStatusParams, SessionsUpdateAmlStatusResponse, SessionsUpdateDataParams, SessionsUpdateDataParamsParsedAddress, SessionsUpdateDataResponse, SessionsUpdateDataResponseParsedAddress, SessionsUpdateDocumentAiDataParams, SessionsUpdateDocumentAiDataResponse, SessionsUpdateFeatureStatusParams, SessionsUpdateFeatureStatusResponse, SessionsUpdateKybCompanyDataParams, SessionsUpdateKybCompanyDataResponse, SessionsUpdateKybPartyParams, SessionsUpdateKybPartyResponse, SessionsUpdatePoaDataParams, SessionsUpdatePoaDataParamsPoaParsedAddress, SessionsUpdatePoaDataResponse, SessionsUpdatePoaDataResponsePoaParsedAddress, SessionsUpdateStatusParams, SessionsUpdateStatusParamsNodesToResubmit, SessionsUpdateStatusResponse, SignatureField, SignatureFieldAnchor, SignatureFieldResult, SignatureFieldValidation, SignatureResult, SignatureResultAdoptedSignature, SignatureResultCertificate, SignatureResultConfirmation, SignatureResultDocuments, SignatureResultDocumentsConversion, SignatureResultIdentityUsed, SignatureResultSigner, SignatureResultTimestamp, SignatureResultValidation, SignatureResultValidationDocuments, SignatureResultValidationDocumentsCertificate, SignatureResultValidationDocumentsTimestamp, SignatureResultValidationDocumentsTrustedList, SignatureResultWarnings, SimpleQuestionnaireElement, SimpleQuestionnaireElementOptions, SimpleQuestionnaireElementValidation, SimpleWorkflowFeature, SocialFootprintCategorySummary, SocialFootprintPlatform, SocialFootprintProfile, StepUp, StepUpAction, StepUpMethod, StepUpNotRequired, StepUpRule, StepUpStatus, TokenClaims, TokenResponse, TokenVerificationReason, TransactionCreatedEvent, TransactionDetail, TransactionDetailActivities, TransactionDetailAlerts, TransactionDetailDocuments, TransactionDetailDocumentsFiles, TransactionDetailNetworkSnapshot, TransactionDetailParties, TransactionDetailPartiesDevice, TransactionDetailPartiesDeviceNetworkContext, TransactionDetailPaymentMethods, TransactionDetailProviderResults, TransactionDetailRemediation, TransactionDetailRuleRuns, TransactionDetailTags, TransactionNote, TransactionNoteMetadata, TransactionRuleAction, TransactionRuleActionAddNote, TransactionRuleActionAddScore, TransactionRuleActionAddTags, TransactionRuleActionAddToList, TransactionRuleActionChangeStatus, TransactionRuleActionOpenCase, TransactionRuleAggregation, TransactionRuleBacktestResult, TransactionRuleCondition, TransactionRuleDetail, TransactionRuleInstallResult, TransactionRuleLibraryEntry, TransactionRuleScope, TransactionStatusUpdatedEvent, TransactionSummary, TransactionSummaryTags, TransactionTravelRule, TransactionTravelRuleCounterpartyVasp, TransactionTravelRuleCounterpartyVaspDdScoreBreakdownValue, TransactionVerificationSessionAction, TransactionWalletOwnershipAction, TransactionsBatchDeleteParamsAllTransactions, TransactionsBatchDeleteParamsSelectedTransactions, TransactionsCreateParams, TransactionsCreateParamsCounterparty, TransactionsCreateParamsCounterpartyDeviceContext, TransactionsCreateParamsCounterpartyDeviceContextNetworkContext, TransactionsCreateParamsCounterpartyPaymentMethod, TransactionsCreateParamsNetworkSnapshot, TransactionsCreateParamsSubject, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectAddress, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectDeviceContext, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectDeviceContextNetworkContext, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectInstitutionDetails, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectPaymentMethod, TransactionsCreateParamsTransactionDetails, TransactionsCreateParamsTransactionDetailsCryptoParams, TransactionsCreateParamsTravelRuleDetails, TransactionsCreateSdkTokenParams, TransactionsCreateSdkTokenResponse, TransactionsListParams, TransactionsListRelatedParams, TransactionsListRelatedResponse, TransactionsListResponse, TransactionsListResponseResults, TransactionsListResponseResultsTags, TransactionsNotesCreateParams, TransactionsNotesListParams, TransactionsNotesListResponse, TransactionsRulesBacktestParams, TransactionsRulesCreateParams, TransactionsRulesInstallLibraryParams, TransactionsRulesListLibraryParams, TransactionsRulesListLibraryResponse, TransactionsRulesListParams, TransactionsRulesListResponse, TransactionsRulesUninstallLibraryParams, TransactionsRulesUpdateParams, TransactionsTravelRuleConfirmOwnershipParams, TransactionsTravelRuleCreateMessageParams, TransactionsTravelRuleTriggerTestVaspInboundParams, TransactionsTravelRuleUpdateTransferParams, TravelRuleChainDetails, TravelRuleChainDetailsUtxo, TravelRuleChainSide, TravelRuleCounterpartyContact, TravelRuleCounterpartyContactsCreateParams, TravelRuleCounterpartyContactsListParams, TravelRuleCounterpartyContactsListResponse, TravelRuleCounterpartyDecision, TravelRuleCounterpartyDecisionInheritedFrom, TravelRuleCounterpartyDecisionResponse, TravelRuleCounterpartyQuestionnaire, TravelRuleCounterpartyQuestionnaireList, TravelRuleCounterpartyScreening, TravelRuleCounterpartyScreeningResult, TravelRuleCounterpartyScreeningStatus, TravelRuleCreateWidgetSessionParams, TravelRuleDataMatch, TravelRuleDataMatchFieldsValue, TravelRuleDataSharingFields, TravelRuleDataUnmasked, TravelRuleDelivery, TravelRuleDiscoveryStep, TravelRuleInboundResponse, TravelRuleListVaspsParams, TravelRuleListVaspsResponse, TravelRuleMatchingRules, TravelRuleMatchingRulesCompany, TravelRuleMatchingRulesIndividual, TravelRuleMessage, TravelRuleMessageAttachment, TravelRuleMessageAttachmentFiles, TravelRuleNameMatch, TravelRuleNetworkParticipant, TravelRuleNetworkParticipantHistory, TravelRuleNetworkParticipantSummary, TravelRuleNetworkQuestionnaire, TravelRuleNetworkQuestionnaireAnswers, TravelRuleNetworkQuestionnaireAnswersLicences, TravelRuleNetworkQuestionnaireHistory, TravelRuleNetworkState, TravelRuleNetworksOverview, TravelRuleNetworksOverviewNetworks, TravelRuleNetworksUpdateQuestionnaireParams, TravelRuleNetworksUpdateQuestionnaireParamsLicences, TravelRuleNextAction, TravelRuleRegisterInboundParams, TravelRuleRegisterInboundParamsOriginatingVasp, TravelRuleScreenVaspParams, TravelRuleSendComplianceEmailConfirmationResponse, TravelRuleSendVaspQuestionnaireParams, TravelRuleSettingsDetail, TravelRuleSettingsDetailDiditNetwork, TravelRuleSettingsDetailNetworks, TravelRuleStatusUpdatedEvent, TravelRuleTestVaspInboundResponse, TravelRuleTransferDetail, TravelRuleTransferDetailCounterpartyVasp, TravelRuleTransferDetailCounterpartyVaspDdScoreBreakdownValue, TravelRuleTransferDetailTimeline, TravelRuleTransferRow, TravelRuleTransfersListParams, TravelRuleTransfersListResponse, TravelRuleUpdateSettingsParams, TravelRuleUpdateVaspDecisionParams, TravelRuleUtxo, TravelRuleUtxoEntry, TravelRuleWalletAddressesBulkImportParams, TravelRuleWalletAddressesCreateParams, TravelRuleWalletAddressesListParams, TravelRuleWalletAddressesListResponse, TravelRuleWalletAddressesUpdateParams, TravelRuleWalletProofFailureReason, TravelRuleWalletProofReview, TravelRuleWalletProofsDecideParams, TravelRuleWalletProofsListParams, TravelRuleWalletProofsListResponse, TravelRuleWidgetSessionResponse, TravelRuleWorkspace, TravelRuleWorkspaceClaim, TravelRuleWorkspaceClaimParams, TravelRuleWorkspaceConfirmDomainParams, TravelRuleWorkspaceDomain, TravelRuleWorkspaceDomainCodeResponse, TravelRuleWorkspaceEnableBillingParams, TravelRuleWorkspaceTxtRecord, UnknownEvent, Uploadable, UserDataUpdatedEvent, UserDetailItem, UserDetailItemComments, UserDetailItemFeaturesList, UserDetailItemTags, UserDetailItemTagsTag, UserListItem, UserListItemFeaturesList, UserListItemTags, UserSessionListItem, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetails, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsAml, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsAmlScreenedData, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsDatabaseValidation, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsEmailVerification, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsFaceMatch, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsLiveness, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsPhoneVerification, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsPoa, UserSessionListItemEmailAddress, UserSessionListItemFeatures, UserSessionListItemPhoneNumber, UserStatusUpdatedEvent, UsersBatchDeleteParams, UsersBatchDeleteResponse, UsersCreateParams, UsersCreateResponse, UsersCreateResponseComments, UsersCreateResponseFeaturesList, UsersCreateResponseTags, UsersCreateResponseTagsTag, UsersCreateResponseVerificationLink, UsersListParams, UsersListResponse, UsersSetAmlMonitoringParams, UsersSetOngoingMonitoringParams, UsersUpdateParams, UsersUpdateStatusParams, UsersUploadFaceParams, UsersUploadFaceResponse, VaspDirectoryEntry, VaspDirectoryEntryAliases, VaspDirectoryEntryContacts, VaspDirectoryEntryDdScoreBreakdownValue, VaspDirectoryEntryEntities, VaspDirectoryEntryEssentialChecks, VaspDirectoryEntryEssentialChecksChecks, VaspDirectoryEntryNetworks, VaspDirectoryEntryResponsiveness, VaspDirectoryEntryRoutes, VaspDirectoryEntryUmbrella, VerificationLevel, VerifiedClaims, VerifyAccessTokenOptions, VerifyEmailResponse, VerifyIdTokenOptions, VerifyWebhookOptions, VerifyWebhookParsedOptions, WalletAddressEntry, WalletAddressEntryUpdate, WalletAddressImportReport, WalletAddressImportReportRows, WalletScreeningResult, WalletScreeningResultCounterpartyConnections, WalletScreeningResultDestinationOfFunds, WalletScreeningResultRiskFactors, WalletScreeningResultSourceOfFunds, WalletScreeningScreenParams, WebhookConfig, WebhookConfigAvailableEvents, WebhookConfigDestination, WebhookDestinationDelivery, WebhookDestinationDeliveryDetail, WebhookEnvironment, WebhookEvent, WebhookEventBase, WebhookEventType, WebhookHeaders, WebhookSecret, WebhookSubscribedEvents, WebhookVerificationReason, WebhookVerifiedBy, WebhooksDestinationsCreateParams, WebhooksDestinationsCreateResponse, WebhooksDestinationsCreateResponseSummary, WebhooksDestinationsListDeliveriesParams, WebhooksDestinationsListDeliveriesResponse, WebhooksDestinationsListResponse, WebhooksDestinationsListResponseDailyPoints, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveAnalyticsParams, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveAnalyticsResponse, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveAnalyticsResponsePoints, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveAnalyticsResponseSummary, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveResponse, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveResponseSummary, WebhooksDestinationsUpdateParams, WebhooksDestinationsUpdateResponse, WebhooksDestinationsUpdateResponseSummary, WebhooksUpdateConfigParams, WithResponse, WorkflowComplianceChangedEvent, WorkflowDetail, WorkflowListItem, WorkflowListItemCreatedBy, WorkflowsCreateParams, WorkflowsListParams, WorkflowsListResponse, WorkflowsUpdateParams };
+export { APIConnectionError, APIPromise, APIResponseValidationError, APIStatusError, APITimeoutError, Account, AccountApplications, AccountOrganizations, AddressValidation, AgeEstimation, Aml, AmlMonitoring, Analytics, Authentication, AuthenticationError, BadRequestError, Bank, Billing, BiometricTemplates, Blocklist, BusinessSessions, Businesses, Cases, CasesBlueprints, CasesChecklist, CasesLinks, CasesNotes, CasesRegulatoryReports, CasesRequests, CasesRoutingRules, CasesTeams, ConfigurationError, ConflictError, Customization, DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_BASE_URL, DEFAULT_BASE_URL, DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES, DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, DEFAULT_WEBHOOK_TOLERANCE, DatabaseValidation, Didit, DiditError, DiditResources, DocumentAi, Email, FaceMatch, FaceSearch, FraudChecks, IdVerification, IdWallets, InternalServerError, Investigator, Ip, Kyb, Lists, ListsEntries, MonitoringEvents, Networks, NetworksNotes, NotFoundError, PagePromise, PassiveLiveness, PermissionDeniedError, Phone, Pricing, ProofOfAddress, Questionnaires, RateLimitError, RegulatoryReports, ReportTemplates, Sessions, SessionsImports, SessionsReviews, SessionsSignatures, SessionsWebhooks, TokenVerificationError, Transactions, TransactionsNotes, TransactionsRules, TransactionsTravelRule, TravelRule, TravelRuleCounterpartyContacts, TravelRuleNetworks, TravelRuleTransfers, TravelRuleUnmatchedDeposits, TravelRuleWalletAddresses, TravelRuleWalletProofs, TravelRuleWorkspaceResource, UnprocessableEntityError, Users, VERSION, WalletScreening, WebhookVerificationError, Webhooks, WebhooksDestinations, Workflows, canonicalJson, createNonce, createPkce, createState, Didit as default, fileFromPath, parsePublishableKey, toFile, verifyWebhook, verifyWebhookParsed, webhooks };
+export type { AMLDatasetFreshness, AMLDatasetFreshnessSources, AMLDatasetSourceFreshness, AMLMonitoringJob, AMLMonitoringJobEstimate, AMLMonitoringJobOutcomes, AMLMonitoringJobResults, AMLMonitoringToggleResult, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant1, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant2, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant2Estimate, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant2Outcomes, AMLMonitoringToggleResultVariant2Results, AMLScreening, AMLScreeningHits, AMLScreeningHitsAdverseMediaDetails, AMLScreeningHitsAdverseMediaMatches, AMLScreeningHitsLinkedEntities, AMLScreeningHitsPepMatches, AMLScreeningHitsProperties, AMLScreeningHitsRiskView, AMLScreeningHitsRiskViewCategories, AMLScreeningHitsRiskViewCountries, AMLScreeningHitsRiskViewCrimes, AMLScreeningHitsSanctionMatches, AMLScreeningHitsScoreBreakdown, AMLScreeningHitsWarningMatches, AMLScreeningHitsWarningMatchesAdditionalData, AMLScreeningHitsWarningMatchesAdditionalDataData, AMLScreeningHitsWarningMatchesAdditionalDataDataCaseDetails, AMLScreeningRun, AMLScreeningScreenedData, AMLScreeningWarnings, AccessTokenClaims, AccountApplicationsCreateParams, AccountApplicationsListParams, AccountApplicationsUpdateParams, AccountLoginParams, AccountOrganizationsListParams, AccountRegisterParams, AccountResendOtpParams, AccountResendOtpResponse, AccountVerifyEmailParams, ActivityCreatedEvent, ActorClaim, AddressValidationResponse, AddressValidationResult, AddressValidationResultAddress, AddressValidationValidateParams, AgeEstimationEstimateParams, AgeEstimationEstimateResponse, AgeEstimationEstimateResponseAgeEstimation, AgeEstimationEstimateResponseAgeEstimationUserImage, AgeEstimationEstimateResponseAgeEstimationUserImageEntities, AgeEstimationEstimateResponseAgeEstimationWarnings, AmlMonitoringRetrieveJobResponse, AmlMonitoringRetrieveJobResponseOutcomes, AmlMonitoringRetrieveJobResponseResults, AmlRetrieveDatasetFreshnessResponse, AmlScreenParams, AmlScreenResponse, AmlScreenResponseAml, AmlScreenResponseAmlHits, AmlScreenResponseAmlHitsAdverseMediaMatches, AmlScreenResponseAmlHitsLinkedEntities, AmlScreenResponseAmlHitsPepMatches, AmlScreenResponseAmlHitsScoreBreakdown, AmlScreenResponseAmlScreenedData, AmlScreenResponseAmlWarnings, Amount, AnalyticsRetrieveParams, AnalyticsRetrieveTodayParams, Application, ApplicationAnalyticsCountryCount, ApplicationAnalyticsDataPoint, ApplicationAnalyticsDemographicPoint, ApplicationAnalyticsDemographicStats, ApplicationAnalyticsDemographicStatsAgeDistribution, ApplicationAnalyticsDeviceDetails, ApplicationAnalyticsDeviceDetailsBrowsers, ApplicationAnalyticsDeviceDetailsDeviceModels, ApplicationAnalyticsDeviceDetailsOperatingSystems, ApplicationAnalyticsDevicePoint, ApplicationAnalyticsLocationStats, ApplicationAnalyticsLocationStatsCities, ApplicationAnalyticsLocationStatsConversionByCountry, ApplicationAnalyticsOriginalStatusPoint, ApplicationAnalyticsOriginalStatusStats, ApplicationAnalyticsRequestBreakdown, ApplicationAnalyticsResubmissionPoint, ApplicationAnalyticsResubmissionStats, ApplicationAnalyticsSummary, ApplicationAnalyticsToday, ApplicationAnalyticsTodayOutcomes, ApplicationAnalyticsVerificationTimePoint, ApplicationAnalyticsVerificationTimeStats, ApplicationAnalyticsVerificationTimeStatsPerFeatureValue, ApplicationAnalyticsVerificationTimeStatsPerSubStepValueValue, ApplicationAnalyticsWarningStats, ApplicationAnalyticsWarningStatsValue, ApplicationAnalyticsWarningStatsValueRisksValue, ApplicationAnalyticsWidget, ApplicationAnalyticsWidgetResponse, ApplicationAnalyticsWidgetSearch, ApplicationAnalyticsWidgetThresholds, ApplicationAnalyticsWorkflowFunnel, ApplicationAnalyticsWorkflowFunnelValue, ApplicationAnalyticsWorkflowFunnelValueStepsValue, ApplicationCredentialsSummary, ApplicationDataLocation, ApplicationProduct, Audience, AuthenticationOptions, AuthenticationSession, BankAccountCheckBusinessHolder, BankAccountCheckHolder, BankAccountCheckParams, BankAccountCheckParamsAccount, BankAccountCheckPersonHolder, BankAccountCheckPricing, BankAccountCheckResponse, BankSignInPricing, BankSignInPricingAddOns, BankStatementUploadPricing, BankVerificationPricing, BankVerificationPricingCountry, BankVerificationPricingMethods, BankVerificationResult, BankVerificationResultAccount, BankVerificationResultBilling, BankVerificationResultConnection, BankVerificationResultContinuation, BankVerificationResultFinancialData, BankVerificationResultOwnership, BankVerificationResultRoute, BillingRetrieveBalanceResponse, BillingTopUpParams, BillingTopUpResponse, BiometricRetention, BiometricTemplatesBatchDeleteParams, BiometricTemplatesBatchDeleteResponse, BiometricTemplatesBatchDeleteResponseResults, BiometricTemplatesCountParams, BiometricTemplatesCountResponse, BiometricTemplatesDeleteResponse, BiometricTemplatesListParams, BiometricTemplatesListResponse, BiometricTemplatesListResponseResults, BiometricTemplatesRetrieveResponse, BlocklistAddParams, BlocklistAddResponse, BlocklistListParams, BlocklistListResponse, BlocklistRemoveParams, BlocklistRemoveResponse, BlocklistedItem, BrandingCustomization, BusinessDataUpdatedEvent, BusinessDetailItem, BusinessDetailItemFeaturesList, BusinessDetailItemTags, BusinessListItem, BusinessListItemFeaturesList, BusinessListItemTags, BusinessSessionListItem, BusinessStatusUpdatedEvent, BusinessesBatchDeleteParams, BusinessesBatchDeleteResponse, BusinessesCreateParams, BusinessesListParams, BusinessesListResponse, BusinessesSetAmlMonitoringParams, BusinessesSetOngoingMonitoringParams, BusinessesSetSessionOngoingMonitoringParams, BusinessesUpdateParams, BusinessesUpdateStatusParams, CaseActionActionEnum, CaseActionCaseActionReceipt, CaseActionCaseActionReceiptPage, CaseActionCaseEntityActionResult, CaseActionEntityTypeEnum, CaseActionStatusEnum, CaseAssignee, CaseBlueprintDetail, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfig, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigAmlControl, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigChecklist, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigChecklistItems, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigFinancial, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigIdentity, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigReporting, CaseBlueprintDetailContentConfigVerifications, CaseBlueprintDetailCreationSources, CaseBlueprintDetailReceivesEscalationFrom, CaseBlueprintListItem, CaseBlueprintPresetInstallResult, CaseBlueprintSummary, CaseBulkUpdateResult, CaseBulkUpdateResultFailures, CaseChecker, CaseChecklistItem, CaseCollaborationCaseNote, CaseCollaborationCaseNoteReply, CaseCollaborationPaginatedCaseNoteList, CaseContentConfig, CaseContentConfigAmlControl, CaseContentConfigChecklist, CaseContentConfigChecklistItems, CaseContentConfigFinancial, CaseContentConfigIdentity, CaseContentConfigReporting, CaseContentConfigVerifications, CaseDetail, CaseDetailPendingResolution, CaseDuplicateCaseDuplicate, CaseDuplicateCaseDuplicatePage, CaseDuplicateCaseFraudSourceContextRequest, CaseDuplicateCaseLinkCreateRequest, CaseDuplicateCaseSubjectInputRequest, CaseDuplicateEntityTypeEnum, CaseDuplicatePriorityEnum, CaseDuplicateStatusEnum, CaseDuplicateTypeEnum, CaseEvent, CaseLink, CaseListItem, CaseListItemPendingResolution, CaseNote, CaseNoteAttachments, CasePublicationAssignmentMethodEnum, CasePublicationCaseBlueprint, CasePublicationPaginatedPolicyRevisionList, CasePublicationPolicyDraft, CasePublicationPolicyDraftResponse, CasePublicationPolicyRevision, CaseReviewTeam, CaseReviewTeamMember, CaseReviewTeamMemberParam, CaseRoutingCondition, CaseRoutingPreview, CaseRoutingPreviewCandidates, CaseRoutingPreviewMatchedRules, CaseRoutingRule, CaseRoutingRuleCreate, CaseSubject, CaseTeamSummary, CasesApplyEntityActionParams, CasesAssignParams, CasesBlueprintsCreateParams, CasesBlueprintsDiscardDraftParams, CasesBlueprintsInstallPresetsParams, CasesBlueprintsListHistoryParams, CasesBlueprintsListParams, CasesBlueprintsListPresetsResponse, CasesBlueprintsListPresetsResponseResults, CasesBlueprintsListResponse, CasesBlueprintsPublishParams, CasesBlueprintsSaveDraftParams, CasesBlueprintsUpdateParams, CasesBulkAssignParams, CasesBulkUpdateStatusParams, CasesChecklistToggleItemParams, CasesCreateParams, CasesCreateParamsSubject, CasesFindDuplicatesParams, CasesLinksCreateParams, CasesListActionReceiptsParams, CasesListEventsParams, CasesListEventsResponse, CasesListParams, CasesListResponse, CasesListReviewersResponse, CasesListReviewersResponseResults, CasesNotesCreateAttachmentUploadParams, CasesNotesCreateAttachmentUploadResponse, CasesNotesCreateParams, CasesNotesListParams, CasesNotesRetrieveAttachmentUrlParams, CasesNotesRetrieveAttachmentUrlResponse, CasesNotesUpdateParams, CasesPrintResponse, CasesRegulatoryReportsCreateParams, CasesRegulatoryReportsCreateParamsNarrative, CasesRegulatoryReportsListParams, CasesRejectResolutionParams, CasesRequestsCreateParams, CasesRequestsListParams, CasesRequestsPreviewParams, CasesRequestsRemindResponse, CasesResolveParams, CasesRetrieveStatisticsParams, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponse, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseQueue, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseSeries, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTables, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTablesBlueprint, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTablesOfficer, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTablesSource, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTablesStatus, CasesRetrieveStatisticsResponseTotals, CasesRoutingRulesCreateParams, CasesRoutingRulesDiscardDraftParams, CasesRoutingRulesListHistoryParams, CasesRoutingRulesListParams, CasesRoutingRulesListResponse, CasesRoutingRulesPreviewParams, CasesRoutingRulesPublishParams, CasesRoutingRulesSaveDraftParams, CasesRoutingRulesUpdateParams, CasesTeamsCreateParams, CasesTeamsListParams, CasesTeamsListResponse, CasesTeamsUpdateParams, CasesTransferParams, CasesUpdateParams, ClientOptions, ComplianceList, ComplianceListEntry, ComplianceListEntryMetadata, CreateStepUpParams, CustomerMessagingCaseRequest, CustomerMessagingCaseRequestContact, CustomerMessagingCaseRequestOptions, CustomerMessagingCaseRequestPreviewResponse, CustomerMessagingLanguageEnum, CustomerMessagingLanguagesEnum, CustomerMessagingPaginatedCaseRequestList, CustomerMessagingPurposeEnum, CustomerMessagingPurposesEnum, CustomizationUpdateParams, DatabaseValidationValidateParams, DatabaseValidationValidateParamsAddressVariant1, DatabaseValidationValidateResponse, DatabaseValidationValidateResponseDatabaseValidation, DatabaseValidationValidateResponseDatabaseValidationErrors, DatabaseValidationValidateResponseDatabaseValidationValidationsVariant1, DatabaseValidationValidateResponseDatabaseValidationWarnings, DigitalIdWalletApiAudkenniWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiConnectidWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiCountry520Enum, DigitalIdWalletApiCountryAfcEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiCountryE2dEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiCountryEe9Enum, DigitalIdWalletApiDeviceEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiDiiaWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiEparakstsMobileWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiEudiWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiFranceconnectWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiFtnWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiGoogleWalletWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiGovbrWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiIdcardEeWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiIdinWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiInteractionEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiItsmeWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiMitidWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiMobileIdWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiPersonalausweisWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiSmartIdWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiUaePassWalletVerificationStartCountryEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiWallet, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletCatalogEntry, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletCatalogResponse, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletDigitalCredentialsRequest, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletIdentity, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletNextAction, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletNextActionTypeEnum, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResponse, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResult, DigitalIdWalletApiWalletVerificationResultOutcomeEnum, DocumentAIDetectedCode, DocumentAiAnalyzeParams, DocumentAiAnalyzeResponse, DocumentAiAnalyzeResponseDocumentAi, DocumentAiAnalyzeResponseDocumentAiFields, DocumentAiAnalyzeResponseDocumentAiWarnings, EmailAssessRiskParams, EmailCheckCodeParams, EmailIntelligence, EmailIntelligenceReasonCodes, EmailMatchItem, EmailRiskResponse, EmailRiskResponseEmail, EmailRiskResponseEmailBreaches, EmailSendCodeParams, EmailSendCodeParamsOptions, EmailSendCodeParamsSignals, EmailSocialFootprint, EmailVerificationCheckResponse, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmail, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailBreaches, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailLifecycle, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailMatches, EmailVerificationCheckResponseEmailWarnings, EmailVerificationSendResponse, EntityNetworkMembership, EntityNetworkMembershipList, ExchangeCodeParams, FaceMatchCompareParams, FaceMatchCompareResponse, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatch, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchRefImage, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchRefImageEntities, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchUserImage, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchUserImageEntities, FaceMatchCompareResponseFaceMatchWarnings, FaceSearchSearchParams, FaceSearchSearchResponse, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearch, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchMatches, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchMatchesUserDetails, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchUserImage, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchUserImageEntities, FaceSearchSearchResponseFaceSearchWarnings, FeatureStatusOverride, FeatureStatusOverrideRequestedBy, Fetch, FileData, FileUpload, FraudAvailabilityEnum, FraudBandEnum, FraudCheckAttributesRequest, FraudCheckContextRequest, FraudCheckIdentifierRequest, FraudCheckIdentityRelationship, FraudCheckInput, FraudCheckModuleReport, FraudCheckModuleSelectionRequest, FraudCheckPlan, FraudCheckPlannedModule, FraudCheckResponse, FraudCheckRisk, FraudCheckSubjectRequest, FraudChecksCreateParams, FraudChecksPlanParams, FraudDimensionEnum, FraudExcludeEnum, FraudNextActionEnum, FraudProcessingStatusEnum, FraudRecommendationEnum, FraudResultEnum, FraudStatusEnum, FraudTypeEnum, GeolocationAttempt, GeolocationAttemptAnonymizers, GeolocationAttemptConsent, GeolocationAttemptGeofence, GeolocationCheck, GeolocationCheckAnonymizers, GeolocationCheckConsent, GeolocationCheckGeofence, GeolocationCheckWarnings, IPRiskResponse, IPRiskResponseIp, IdTokenClaims, IdVerificationVerifyParams, IdVerificationVerifyResponse, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerification, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationBackImageQualityScore, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationBarcodes, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationFrontImageQualityScore, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationMrz, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationParsedAddress, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationParsedAddressDocumentLocation, IdVerificationVerifyResponseIdVerificationWarnings, IdWalletsStartAudkenniParams, IdWalletsStartBankidCzParams, IdWalletsStartBankidNoParams, IdWalletsStartBankidSeParams, IdWalletsStartBuypassParams, IdWalletsStartConnectidParams, IdWalletsStartDiiaParams, IdWalletsStartEparakstsMobileParams, IdWalletsStartEudiParams, IdWalletsStartFranceconnectParams, IdWalletsStartFrejaidParams, IdWalletsStartFtnParams, IdWalletsStartGoogleWalletParams, IdWalletsStartGovbrParams, IdWalletsStartGovukWalletParams, IdWalletsStartIdcardEeParams, IdWalletsStartIdinParams, IdWalletsStartItsmeParams, IdWalletsStartMitidParams, IdWalletsStartMobileIdParams, IdWalletsStartMojeidParams, IdWalletsStartOneidParams, IdWalletsStartPersonalausweisParams, IdWalletsStartSmartIdParams, IdWalletsStartUaePassParams, IdWalletsStartVippsParams, IdWalletsSubmitVerificationResponseParams, ImportJobSummary, ImportJobSummaryFaceTemplates, ImportJobSummaryProgress, ImportJobSummaryStartedBy, ImportProvider, ImportProviderCredentialFields, InvestigatorAcceptRunParams, InvestigatorBatchAcceptResponse, InvestigatorBatchAcceptResponseResults, InvestigatorBatchAcceptRunsParams, InvestigatorBlock, InvestigatorDecision, InvestigatorDecisionOriginalOutcome, InvestigatorDecisionOverrides, InvestigatorExportActivityParams, InvestigatorListActivityParams, InvestigatorListActivityResponse, InvestigatorListGuardrailsResponse, InvestigatorListGuardrailsResponseResults, InvestigatorListQueueParams, InvestigatorListQueueResponse, InvestigatorOverrideRunParams, InvestigatorQueueRow, InvestigatorRetrieveDashboardParams, InvestigatorRetrieveDashboardResponse, InvestigatorRetrievePerformanceParams, InvestigatorRetrievePerformanceResponse, InvestigatorRetrieveSummaryParams, InvestigatorRetrieveSummaryResponse, InvestigatorRetrieveTransactionResponse, InvestigatorRunDetail, InvestigatorSettings, InvestigatorSettingsSpendLimit, InvestigatorUpdateSettingsParams, IpAssessRiskParams, KYBKeyPeopleParty, KYBKeyPeoplePartyRoles, KYBKeyPeoplePartyVerificationWorkflowFeatures, KYBOwnershipStructure, KYBOwnershipStructureOwner, KYBRegistryAddress, KYBRegistryData, KYBRegistryGroupCompany, KYBRegistryIndustry, KYBRegistryLiteEnrichment, KYBRegistryOwnership, KYBRegistryOwnershipUnresolved, KYBRegistrySearchResults, KYBRegistrySearchResultsCompanies, KYBRegistrySearchResultsPagination, KYBRegistrySectionError, KYBRegistryShareholding, KYBRegistrySource, KYBRegistryUboResolution, KYBRegistryUboResolutionUnresolved, KnownWebhookEvent, KybListShareholdersParams, KybListShareholdersResponse, KybListShareholdersResponse202, KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistry, KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistryOfficers, KybListShareholdersResponse202KybRegistryRegistryMonitoring, KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistry, KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistryOfficers, KybListShareholdersResponseKybRegistryRegistryMonitoring, KybListUbosParams, KybListUbosResponse, KybListUbosResponse202, KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistry, KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistryOfficers, KybListUbosResponse202KybRegistryRegistryMonitoring, KybListUbosResponseKybRegistry, KybListUbosResponseKybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybListUbosResponseKybRegistryOfficers, KybListUbosResponseKybRegistryRegistryMonitoring, KybRegistrySearchResolvedEvent, KybSearchParams, KybSearchResponse, KybSelectParams, KybSelectResponse, KybSelectResponseKybRegistry, KybSelectResponseKybRegistryBeneficialOwners, KybSelectResponseKybRegistryOfficers, KybSelectResponseKybRegistryRegistryMonitoring, ListsCreateParams, ListsEntriesCreateParams, ListsEntriesCreateParamsMetadata, ListsEntriesListParams, ListsEntriesListResponse, ListsEntriesUploadFaceParams, ListsListParams, ListsListResponse, ListsUpdateParams, ListsUpdateResponse, LogLevel, Logger, LoginResponse, MonitoringEvent, MonitoringEventCreateRequest, MonitoringEventCreateRequestBusiness, MonitoringEventCreateRequestDeviceContext, MonitoringEventCreateRequestDeviceContextNetworkContext, MonitoringEventCreateRequestSession, MonitoringEventCreateRequestSubject, MonitoringEventCreateRequestTransactionContext, MonitoringEventDetail, MonitoringEventDetailIpEnrichment, MonitoringEventDetailSubjectProfile, MonitoringEventIngestResult, MonitoringEventIngestResultRuleMatches, MonitoringEventPage, MonitoringEventRuleRun, MonitoringEventsCreateBatchParams, MonitoringEventsCreateBatchResponse, MonitoringEventsCreateBatchResponseResults, MonitoringEventsCreateBatchResponseResultsRuleMatches, MonitoringEventsCreateParams, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsBusiness, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsDeviceContext, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsDeviceContextNetworkContext, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsSession, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsSubject, MonitoringEventsCreateParamsTransactionContext, MonitoringEventsCreateSdkTokenParams, MonitoringEventsCreateSdkTokenResponse, MonitoringEventsListParams, MonitoringEventsRetrieveEnrichmentMetricsParams, MonitoringEventsRetrieveEnrichmentMetricsResponse, MonitoringEventsRetrieveSubjectTimelineParams, NetworkDetail, NetworkDetailResponse, NetworkGraph, NetworkGraphEdge, NetworkGraphMetrics, NetworkGraphNode, NetworkListCounts, NetworkListCountsFacets, NetworkListCountsFacetsAssignee, NetworkListCountsFacetsAssigneeUsers, NetworkListCountsFacetsLastActivityDays, NetworkListCountsFacetsMinSize, NetworkListCountsFacetsPriority, NetworkListCountsFacetsRiskMin, NetworkListCountsFacetsSignalTypes, NetworkListCountsScopes, NetworkListCountsViews, NetworkListItem, NetworkMap, NetworkMapPoints, NetworkMember, NetworkMemberProvenance, NetworkNodeTag, NetworkNote, NetworkOutcomes, NetworkPatternScore, NetworkRiskDisplay, NetworkSignal, NetworkTag, NetworkTimeline, NetworkTimelineAccount, NetworkTimelineAmount, NetworkTimelineAttempt, NetworkTimelineCaseLinked, NetworkTimelineDeclineReason, NetworkTimelineDevice, NetworkTimelineEvent, NetworkTimelineIP, NetworkTimelineLogin, NetworkTimelineNoteAdded, NetworkTimelinePage, NetworkTimelineRoute, NetworkTimelineRuleHit, NetworkTimelineSourceRef, NetworkTimelineTransaction, NetworkTypedTimelineEvent, NetworksAddTagParams, NetworksListMembersResponse, NetworksListParams, NetworksListResponse, NetworksListResponseKpis, NetworksListSignalsResponse, NetworksNotesCreateParams, NetworksNotesListParams, NetworksNotesListResponse, NetworksRemoveTagParams, NetworksRetrieveGraphParams, NetworksRetrieveTimelineParams, OngoingMonitoringJob, OngoingMonitoringJobEstimate, OngoingMonitoringJobOutcomes, OngoingMonitoringToggleResult, OngoingMonitoringToggleResultVariant1, Organization, OrganizationClaim, OrganizationRole, OrganizationSummary, Page, PageMethods, PageResponse, PaginatedApplicationList, PaginatedOrganizationList, PassiveLivenessCheckParams, PassiveLivenessCheckResponse, PassiveLivenessCheckResponseLiveness, PassiveLivenessCheckResponseLivenessUserImage, PassiveLivenessCheckResponseLivenessUserImageEntities, PassiveLivenessCheckResponseLivenessWarnings, PhoneAssessRiskParams, PhoneCheckCodeParams, PhoneIntelligence, PhoneIntelligenceReasonCodes, PhoneMatchItem, PhoneRiskResponse, PhoneRiskResponsePhone, PhoneRiskResponsePhoneCarrier, PhoneSendCodeParams, PhoneSendCodeParamsOptions, PhoneSendCodeParamsSignals, PhoneSocialFootprint, PhoneVerificationCheckResponse, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhone, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneCarrier, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneLifecycle, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneMatches, PhoneVerificationCheckResponsePhoneWarnings, PhoneVerificationSendResponse, PkcePair, ProofOfAddressVerifyParams, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponse, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoa, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoaExtraFields, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoaPoaParsedAddress, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoaPoaParsedAddressDocumentLocation, ProofOfAddressVerifyResponsePoaWarnings, PublishableKey, PublishableKeyEnvironment, QuestionnaireDetail, QuestionnaireListItem, QuestionnairesCreateParams, QuestionnairesListParams, QuestionnairesListResponse, QuestionnairesUpdateParams, RegisterResponse, RegulatoryReportDetail, RegulatoryReportDetailNarrative, RegulatoryReportDetailValidationErrors, RegulatoryReportList, RegulatoryReportsCreateParams, RegulatoryReportsCreateParamsNarrative, RegulatoryReportsDeleteParams, RegulatoryReportsListParams, RegulatoryReportsRetrieveDownloadUrlParams, RegulatoryReportsRetrieveDownloadUrlResponse, RegulatoryReportsUpdateParams, RegulatoryReportsUpdateParamsNarrative, RegulatoryReportsValidateResponse, RegulatoryReportsValidateResponseErrors, ReportTemplateDetail, ReportTemplatesCreateParams, ReportTemplatesListParams, ReportTemplatesListResponse, ReportTemplatesUpdateParams, RequestOptions, ReviewItem, RiskLifecycleEvent, RiskSignals, RiskWarning, RoutingPublicationCaseRoutingRule, RoutingPublicationFieldEnum, RoutingPublicationOperatorEnum, RoutingPublicationPaginatedPolicyRevisionList, RoutingPublicationPolicyDraft, RoutingPublicationPolicyDraftResponse, RoutingPublicationPolicyRevision, RoutingPublicationRoutingCondition, SandboxSimulateResponse, SessionCustomRole, SessionDataUpdatedEvent, SessionDecision, SessionDecisionAssignee, SessionDecisionBiometricConsent, SessionDecisionContactDetails, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationNotPerformedReason, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidations, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsErrors, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsScreenedData, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsValidations, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsValidationsValidation, SessionDecisionDatabaseValidationsWarnings, SessionDecisionDecisionTrace, SessionDecisionDecisionTraceActor, SessionDecisionDecisionTraceStatusWarnings, SessionDecisionDocumentAiDocuments, SessionDecisionDocumentAiDocumentsItems, SessionDecisionDocumentAiDocumentsItemsFields, SessionDecisionDocumentVerifications, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsGroupsValue, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsItems, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsItemsDocumentMetadata, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsItemsDocumentMetadataOverlayManipulation, SessionDecisionDocumentVerificationsItemsDocumentMetadataOverlayManipulationManipulatedRegions, SessionDecisionEmailVerifications, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsBreaches, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsLifecycle, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsLifecycleDetails, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsMatches, SessionDecisionEmailVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionExpectedDetails, SessionDecisionFaceMatches, SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverage, SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverageEyes, SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverageFace, SessionDecisionFaceMatchesFaceCoverageMouth, SessionDecisionFaceMatchesWarnings, SessionDecisionIdVerifications, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsBackImageQualityScore, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentLiveness, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentLivenessPortraitReplace, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentLivenessPrintedCopy, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentLivenessScreenReplay, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentSelfieFaceMatches, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsDocumentSelfieFaceMatchesUserDetails, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsExtraFields, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsFallbackFrom, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsFrontImageQualityScore, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsIdLookup, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsIdLookupComparison, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsMatches, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsMatchesUserDetails, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsMrz, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddress, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressDocumentLocation, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResults, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsAddressComponents, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometry, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometryLocation, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometryViewport, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometryViewportNortheast, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsGeometryViewportSouthwest, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsNavigationPoints, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsParsedAddressRawResultsNavigationPointsLocation, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsWalletVerification, SessionDecisionIdVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionIpAnalyses, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesIdDocument, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesIdDocumentLocation, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesIp, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesIpLocation, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesMatches, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesMatchesDeviceInfo, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesMatchesLocationInfo, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesPoaDocument, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesPoaDocumentLocation, SessionDecisionIpAnalysesWarnings, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecks, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistry, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryBeneficialOwners, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryBeneficialOwnersKycAmlCategories, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryBeneficialOwnersVerificationWorkflowFeatures, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryOfficers, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryOfficersKycAmlCategories, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksRegistryOfficersVerificationWorkflowFeatures, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksSubmitted, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksSubmittedParties, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksSubmittedPartiesRoles, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksSubmittedPartiesVerificationWorkflowFeatures, SessionDecisionKeyPeopleChecksUboKycSummary, SessionDecisionLinkedRecords, SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsEarlierVerifications, SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsNetworks, SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsNetworksItems, SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsSameFace, SessionDecisionLinkedRecordsSameFaceBestMatch, SessionDecisionLivenessChecks, SessionDecisionLivenessChecksMatches, SessionDecisionLivenessChecksMatchesUserDetails, SessionDecisionLivenessChecksWarnings, SessionDecisionNfcVerifications, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsAuthenticity, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsCertificateSummary, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsChipData, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsJpki, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsJpkiAttributes, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsJpkiCertificates, SessionDecisionNfcVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionPhoneVerifications, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsCarrier, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsLifecycle, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsLifecycleDetails, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsMatches, SessionDecisionPhoneVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionPoaVerifications, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsDocumentMetadata, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsDocumentMetadataOverlayManipulation, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsDocumentMetadataOverlayManipulationManipulatedRegions, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsExtraFields, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsPoaParsedAddress, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsPoaParsedAddressDocumentLocation, SessionDecisionPoaVerificationsWarnings, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponses, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponsesSections, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponsesSectionsItems, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponsesSectionsItemsAnswer, SessionDecisionQuestionnaireResponsesSectionsItemsChoices, SessionDecisionRegistryChecks, SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompany, SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompanyBeneficialOwners, SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompanyOfficers, SessionDecisionRegistryChecksCompanyRegistryMonitoring, SessionDecisionResubmissions, SessionDecisionResubmissionsNodes, SessionDecisionResubmissionsRequestedBy, SessionDecisionReviews, SessionDecisionStatusOverride, SessionDeletionJob, SessionDeletionJobOutcomes, SessionEvent, SessionFilesExport, SessionImportError, SessionImportJob, SessionOrganization, SessionSignDocument, SessionStatusUpdatedEvent, SessionWebhookDelivery, SessionsAddImagesParams, SessionsAddImagesResponse, SessionsBatchDeleteParams, SessionsBatchDeleteResponse, SessionsBatchDeleteResponseResults, SessionsBulkUpdateAmlHitStatusParams, SessionsBulkUpdateAmlHitStatusParamsHitUpdates, SessionsBulkUpdateAmlHitStatusResponse, SessionsCreateKybPartyDraftParams, SessionsCreateKybPartyDraftResponse, SessionsCreateKybPartyDraftResponseParty, SessionsCreateParams, SessionsCreateParamsBiometricConsent, SessionsCreateParamsContactDetails, SessionsCreateParamsExpectedDetails, SessionsCreateParamsSign, SessionsCreateResponse, SessionsDeleteKybPartyDraftParams, SessionsDeleteParams, SessionsDeleteResponse, SessionsExportAmlScreeningHistoryParams, SessionsImportSharedParams, SessionsImportsCheckProviderParams, SessionsImportsCheckProviderParamsOptions, SessionsImportsCheckProviderResponse, SessionsImportsCreateParams, SessionsImportsCreateParamsOptions, SessionsImportsListActiveJobsResponse, SessionsImportsListErrorsParams, SessionsImportsListErrorsResponse, SessionsImportsListJobsParams, SessionsImportsListJobsResponse, SessionsImportsListJobsResponseCounts, SessionsImportsListProvidersResponse, SessionsImportsRetrieveTemplateParams, SessionsImportsRetryParams, SessionsImportsStartParams, SessionsListAmlScreeningHistoryParams, SessionsListAmlScreeningHistoryResponse, SessionsListEventsParams, SessionsListEventsResponse, SessionsListFeatureOverridesResponse, SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesParams, SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponse, SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponseParties, SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponsePartiesDocuments, SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponsePartiesRoles, SessionsListKybExtractedPartiesResponsePartiesRolesOwnershipPercent, SessionsListKybPartyDraftsParams, SessionsListKybPartyDraftsResponse, SessionsListKybPartyDraftsResponseParties, SessionsListKybPartyDraftsResponsePartiesParty, SessionsListParams, SessionsListResponse, SessionsPreviewDecisionEmailParams, SessionsPreviewDecisionEmailResponse, SessionsPreviewResubmissionParams, SessionsPreviewResubmissionParamsNodesToResubmit, SessionsPreviewResubmissionResponse, SessionsPreviewResubmissionResponseNodesToResubmit, SessionsRetrieveDecisionParams, SessionsReviewsCreateParams, SessionsReviewsCreateResponse, SessionsReviewsListParams, SessionsReviewsListResponse, SessionsShareParams, SessionsShareResponse, SessionsSignaturesDownloadEvidenceParams, SessionsSignaturesValidateParams, SessionsSignaturesValidateResponse, SessionsSimulateParams, SessionsSubmitKybPartiesParams, SessionsSubmitKybPartiesResponse, SessionsUpdateAmlHitStatusParams, SessionsUpdateAmlHitStatusResponse, SessionsUpdateAmlStatusParams, SessionsUpdateAmlStatusResponse, SessionsUpdateDataParams, SessionsUpdateDataParamsParsedAddress, SessionsUpdateDataResponse, SessionsUpdateDataResponseParsedAddress, SessionsUpdateDocumentAiDataParams, SessionsUpdateDocumentAiDataResponse, SessionsUpdateFeatureStatusParams, SessionsUpdateFeatureStatusResponse, SessionsUpdateKybCompanyDataParams, SessionsUpdateKybCompanyDataResponse, SessionsUpdateKybPartyDraftParams, SessionsUpdateKybPartyDraftResponse, SessionsUpdateKybPartyDraftResponseParty, SessionsUpdateKybPartyParams, SessionsUpdateKybPartyResponse, SessionsUpdatePoaDataParams, SessionsUpdatePoaDataParamsPoaParsedAddress, SessionsUpdatePoaDataResponse, SessionsUpdatePoaDataResponsePoaParsedAddress, SessionsUpdateStatusParams, SessionsUpdateStatusParamsNodesToResubmit, SessionsUpdateStatusResponse, SessionsUploadKybDocumentsParams, SessionsUploadKybDocumentsResponse, SignatureField, SignatureFieldAnchor, SignatureFieldResult, SignatureFieldValidation, SignatureResult, SignatureResultAdoptedSignature, SignatureResultCertificate, SignatureResultConfirmation, SignatureResultDocuments, SignatureResultDocumentsConversion, SignatureResultIdentityUsed, SignatureResultSigner, SignatureResultTimestamp, SignatureResultValidation, SignatureResultValidationDocuments, SignatureResultValidationDocumentsCertificate, SignatureResultValidationDocumentsTimestamp, SignatureResultValidationDocumentsTrustedList, SignatureResultWarnings, SimpleQuestionnaireElement, SimpleQuestionnaireElementOptions, SimpleQuestionnaireElementValidation, SimpleWorkflowFeature, SocialFootprintCategorySummary, SocialFootprintPlatform, SocialFootprintProfile, StepUp, StepUpAction, StepUpMethod, StepUpNotRequired, StepUpRule, StepUpStatus, TokenClaims, TokenResponse, TokenVerificationReason, TransactionCreatedEvent, TransactionDetail, TransactionDetailActivities, TransactionDetailAlerts, TransactionDetailDocuments, TransactionDetailDocumentsFiles, TransactionDetailNetworkSnapshot, TransactionDetailParties, TransactionDetailPartiesDevice, TransactionDetailPartiesDeviceNetworkContext, TransactionDetailPaymentMethods, TransactionDetailProviderResults, TransactionDetailRemediation, TransactionDetailRuleRuns, TransactionDetailTags, TransactionNote, TransactionNoteMetadata, TransactionRuleAction, TransactionRuleActionAddNote, TransactionRuleActionAddScore, TransactionRuleActionAddTags, TransactionRuleActionAddToList, TransactionRuleActionChangeStatus, TransactionRuleActionOpenCase, TransactionRuleAggregation, TransactionRuleBacktestResult, TransactionRuleCondition, TransactionRuleDetail, TransactionRuleInstallResult, TransactionRuleLibraryEntry, TransactionRuleScope, TransactionStatusUpdatedEvent, TransactionSummary, TransactionSummaryTags, TransactionTravelRule, TransactionTravelRuleCounterpartyVasp, TransactionTravelRuleCounterpartyVaspDdScoreBreakdownValue, TransactionVerificationSessionAction, TransactionWalletOwnershipAction, TransactionsBatchDeleteParamsAllTransactions, TransactionsBatchDeleteParamsSelectedTransactions, TransactionsCreateParams, TransactionsCreateParamsCounterparty, TransactionsCreateParamsCounterpartyDeviceContext, TransactionsCreateParamsCounterpartyDeviceContextNetworkContext, TransactionsCreateParamsCounterpartyPaymentMethod, TransactionsCreateParamsNetworkSnapshot, TransactionsCreateParamsSubject, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectAddress, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectDeviceContext, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectDeviceContextNetworkContext, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectInstitutionDetails, TransactionsCreateParamsSubjectPaymentMethod, TransactionsCreateParamsTransactionDetails, TransactionsCreateParamsTransactionDetailsCryptoParams, TransactionsCreateParamsTravelRuleDetails, TransactionsCreateSdkTokenParams, TransactionsCreateSdkTokenResponse, TransactionsListParams, TransactionsListRelatedParams, TransactionsListRelatedResponse, TransactionsListResponse, TransactionsListResponseResults, TransactionsListResponseResultsTags, TransactionsNotesCreateParams, TransactionsNotesListParams, TransactionsNotesListResponse, TransactionsRulesBacktestParams, TransactionsRulesCreateParams, TransactionsRulesInstallLibraryParams, TransactionsRulesListLibraryParams, TransactionsRulesListLibraryResponse, TransactionsRulesListParams, TransactionsRulesListResponse, TransactionsRulesUninstallLibraryParams, TransactionsRulesUpdateParams, TransactionsTravelRuleConfirmOwnershipParams, TransactionsTravelRuleCreateMessageParams, TransactionsTravelRuleTriggerTestVaspInboundParams, TransactionsTravelRuleUpdateTransferParams, TravelRuleChainDetails, TravelRuleChainDetailsUtxo, TravelRuleChainSide, TravelRuleCounterpartyContact, TravelRuleCounterpartyContactsCreateParams, TravelRuleCounterpartyContactsListParams, TravelRuleCounterpartyContactsListResponse, TravelRuleCounterpartyDecision, TravelRuleCounterpartyDecisionInheritedFrom, TravelRuleCounterpartyDecisionResponse, TravelRuleCounterpartyQuestionnaire, TravelRuleCounterpartyQuestionnaireList, TravelRuleCounterpartyScreening, TravelRuleCounterpartyScreeningResult, TravelRuleCounterpartyScreeningStatus, TravelRuleCreateWidgetSessionParams, TravelRuleDataMatch, TravelRuleDataMatchFieldsValue, TravelRuleDataSharingFields, TravelRuleDataUnmasked, TravelRuleDelivery, TravelRuleDiscoveryStep, TravelRuleInboundResponse, TravelRuleListVaspsParams, TravelRuleListVaspsResponse, TravelRuleManualMatchResponse, TravelRuleMatchingRules, TravelRuleMatchingRulesCompany, TravelRuleMatchingRulesIndividual, TravelRuleMessage, TravelRuleMessageAttachment, TravelRuleMessageAttachmentFiles, TravelRuleNameMatch, TravelRuleNetworkParticipant, TravelRuleNetworkParticipantHistory, TravelRuleNetworkParticipantSummary, TravelRuleNetworkQuestionnaire, TravelRuleNetworkQuestionnaireAnswers, TravelRuleNetworkQuestionnaireAnswersLicences, TravelRuleNetworkQuestionnaireHistory, TravelRuleNetworkState, TravelRuleNetworksOverview, TravelRuleNetworksOverviewNetworks, TravelRuleNetworksUpdateQuestionnaireParams, TravelRuleNetworksUpdateQuestionnaireParamsLicences, TravelRuleNextAction, TravelRuleRegisterInboundParams, TravelRuleRegisterInboundParamsOriginatingVasp, TravelRuleScreenVaspParams, TravelRuleSendComplianceEmailConfirmationResponse, TravelRuleSendVaspQuestionnaireParams, TravelRuleSettingsDetail, TravelRuleSettingsDetailDiditNetwork, TravelRuleSettingsDetailNetworks, TravelRuleStatusUpdatedEvent, TravelRuleTestVaspInboundResponse, TravelRuleTransferDetail, TravelRuleTransferDetailCounterpartyVasp, TravelRuleTransferDetailCounterpartyVaspDdScoreBreakdownValue, TravelRuleTransferDetailTimeline, TravelRuleTransferRow, TravelRuleTransfersListParams, TravelRuleTransfersListResponse, TravelRuleUnmatchedDepositsListParams, TravelRuleUnmatchedDepositsListResponse, TravelRuleUnmatchedDepositsMatchParams, TravelRuleUpdateSettingsParams, TravelRuleUpdateVaspDecisionParams, TravelRuleUtxo, TravelRuleUtxoEntry, TravelRuleWalletAddressesBulkImportParams, TravelRuleWalletAddressesCreateParams, TravelRuleWalletAddressesListParams, TravelRuleWalletAddressesListResponse, TravelRuleWalletAddressesUpdateParams, TravelRuleWalletProofFailureReason, TravelRuleWalletProofReview, TravelRuleWalletProofsDecideParams, TravelRuleWalletProofsListParams, TravelRuleWalletProofsListResponse, TravelRuleWidgetSessionResponse, TravelRuleWorkspace, TravelRuleWorkspaceClaim, TravelRuleWorkspaceClaimParams, TravelRuleWorkspaceConfirmDomainParams, TravelRuleWorkspaceDomain, TravelRuleWorkspaceDomainCodeResponse, TravelRuleWorkspaceEnableBillingParams, TravelRuleWorkspaceTxtRecord, UnknownEvent, Uploadable, UserDataUpdatedEvent, UserDetailItem, UserDetailItemComments, UserDetailItemFeaturesList, UserDetailItemTags, UserDetailItemTagsTag, UserListItem, UserListItemFeaturesList, UserListItemTags, UserSessionListItem, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetails, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsAml, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsAmlScreenedData, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsDatabaseValidation, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsEmailVerification, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsFaceMatch, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsLiveness, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsPhoneVerification, UserSessionListItemAdditionalDetailsPoa, UserSessionListItemAssignee, UserSessionListItemEmailAddress, UserSessionListItemFeatures, UserSessionListItemPhoneNumber, UserSessionListItemTopWarnings, UserStatusUpdatedEvent, UsersBatchDeleteParams, UsersBatchDeleteResponse, UsersCreateParams, UsersCreateResponse, UsersCreateResponseComments, UsersCreateResponseFeaturesList, UsersCreateResponseTags, UsersCreateResponseTagsTag, UsersCreateResponseVerificationLink, UsersListParams, UsersListResponse, UsersSetAmlMonitoringParams, UsersSetOngoingMonitoringParams, UsersUpdateParams, UsersUpdateStatusParams, UsersUploadFaceParams, UsersUploadFaceResponse, VaspDirectoryEntry, VaspDirectoryEntryAliases, VaspDirectoryEntryContacts, VaspDirectoryEntryDdScoreBreakdownValue, VaspDirectoryEntryEntities, VaspDirectoryEntryEssentialChecks, VaspDirectoryEntryEssentialChecksChecks, VaspDirectoryEntryNetworks, VaspDirectoryEntryResponsiveness, VaspDirectoryEntryRoutes, VaspDirectoryEntryUmbrella, VerificationLevel, VerifiedClaims, VerifyAccessTokenOptions, VerifyEmailResponse, VerifyIdTokenOptions, VerifyWebhookOptions, VerifyWebhookParsedOptions, WalletAddressEntry, WalletAddressEntryUpdate, WalletAddressImportReport, WalletAddressImportReportRows, WalletScreeningResult, WalletScreeningResultCounterpartyConnections, WalletScreeningResultDestinationOfFunds, WalletScreeningResultRiskFactors, WalletScreeningResultSourceOfFunds, WalletScreeningScreenParams, WebhookConfig, WebhookConfigAvailableEvents, WebhookConfigDestination, WebhookDestinationDelivery, WebhookDestinationDeliveryDetail, WebhookEnvironment, WebhookEvent, WebhookEventBase, WebhookEventType, WebhookHeaders, WebhookSecret, WebhookSubscribedEvents, WebhookVerificationReason, WebhookVerifiedBy, WebhooksDestinationsCreateParams, WebhooksDestinationsCreateResponse, WebhooksDestinationsCreateResponseSummary, WebhooksDestinationsListDeliveriesParams, WebhooksDestinationsListDeliveriesResponse, WebhooksDestinationsListResponse, WebhooksDestinationsListResponseDailyPoints, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveAnalyticsParams, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveAnalyticsResponse, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveAnalyticsResponsePoints, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveAnalyticsResponseSummary, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveResponse, WebhooksDestinationsRetrieveResponseSummary, WebhooksDestinationsUpdateParams, WebhooksDestinationsUpdateResponse, WebhooksDestinationsUpdateResponseSummary, WebhooksUpdateConfigParams, WithResponse, WorkflowComplianceChangedEvent, WorkflowDetail, WorkflowDetailSignatureAvailability, WorkflowListItem, WorkflowListItemCreatedBy, WorkflowsCreateParams, WorkflowsListParams, WorkflowsListResponse, WorkflowsUpdateParams };