@didim365/agent-cli-core 0.1.0

package/dist/src/policy/policy-engine.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1299 @@
+/**
+ * @license
+ * Copyright 2025 Google LLC
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, beforeAll, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { PolicyEngine } from './policy-engine.js';
+import { PolicyDecision, InProcessCheckerType, ApprovalMode, } from './types.js';
+import { SafetyCheckDecision } from '../safety/protocol.js';
+import { initializeShellParsers } from '../utils/shell-utils.js';
+import { buildArgsPatterns } from './utils.js';
+// Mock shell-utils to ensure consistent behavior across platforms (especially Windows CI)
+// We want to test PolicyEngine logic, not the shell parser's ability to parse commands
+vi.mock('../utils/shell-utils.js', async (importOriginal) => {
+    const actual = await importOriginal();
+    return {
+        ...actual,
+        initializeShellParsers: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+        splitCommands: vi.fn().mockImplementation((command) => {
+            // Simple mock splitting logic for test cases
+            if (command.includes('&&')) {
+                return command.split('&&').map((c) => c.trim());
+            }
+            return [command];
+        }),
+        hasRedirection: vi.fn().mockImplementation((command) => 
+        // Simple mock: true if '>' is present, unless it looks like "-> arrow"
+        command.includes('>') && !command.includes('-> arrow')),
+    };
+});
+describe('PolicyEngine', () => {
+    let engine;
+    let mockCheckerRunner;
+    beforeAll(async () => {
+        await initializeShellParsers();
+    });
+    beforeEach(() => {
+        mockCheckerRunner = {
+            runChecker: vi.fn(),
+        };
+        engine = new PolicyEngine({ approvalMode: ApprovalMode.DEFAULT }, mockCheckerRunner);
+    });
+    describe('constructor', () => {
+        it('should use default config when none provided', async () => {
+            const { decision } = await engine.check({ name: 'test' }, undefined);
+            expect(decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should respect custom default decision', async () => {
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ defaultDecision: PolicyDecision.DENY });
+            const { decision } = await engine.check({ name: 'test' }, undefined);
+            expect(decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should sort rules by priority', () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'tool1', decision: PolicyDecision.DENY, priority: 1 },
+                { toolName: 'tool2', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW, priority: 10 },
+                { toolName: 'tool3', decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER, priority: 5 },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const sortedRules = engine.getRules();
+            expect(sortedRules[0].priority).toBe(10);
+            expect(sortedRules[1].priority).toBe(5);
+            expect(sortedRules[2].priority).toBe(1);
+        });
+    });
+    describe('check', () => {
+        it('should match tool by name', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'shell', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW },
+                { toolName: 'edit', decision: PolicyDecision.DENY },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'shell' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'edit' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'other' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should match unqualified tool names with qualified rules when serverName is provided', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'my-server__tool',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Match with qualified name (standard)
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__tool' }, 'my-server')).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            // Match with unqualified name + serverName (the fix)
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'tool' }, 'my-server')).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            // Should NOT match with unqualified name but NO serverName
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'tool' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            // Should NOT match with unqualified name but WRONG serverName
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'tool' }, 'wrong-server')).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should match by args pattern', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'shell',
+                    argsPattern: /rm -rf/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'shell',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const dangerousCall = {
+                name: 'shell',
+                args: { command: 'rm -rf /' },
+            };
+            const safeCall = {
+                name: 'shell',
+                args: { command: 'ls -la' },
+            };
+            expect((await engine.check(dangerousCall, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            expect((await engine.check(safeCall, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should apply rules by priority', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'shell', decision: PolicyDecision.DENY, priority: 1 },
+                { toolName: 'shell', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW, priority: 10 },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Higher priority rule (ALLOW) should win
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'shell' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should apply wildcard rules (no toolName)', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { decision: PolicyDecision.DENY }, // Applies to all tools
+                { toolName: 'safe-tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW, priority: 10 },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'safe-tool' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'any-other-tool' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should handle non-interactive mode', async () => {
+            const config = {
+                nonInteractive: true,
+                rules: [
+                    { toolName: 'interactive-tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER },
+                    { toolName: 'allowed-tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW },
+                ],
+            };
+            engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
+            // ASK_USER should become DENY in non-interactive mode
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'interactive-tool' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            // ALLOW should remain ALLOW
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'allowed-tool' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            // Default ASK_USER should also become DENY
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'unknown-tool' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should dynamically switch between modes and respect rule modes', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'edit',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER,
+                    priority: 10,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'edit',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                    modes: [ApprovalMode.AUTO_EDIT],
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Default mode: priority 20 rule doesn't match, falls back to priority 10
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'edit' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            // Switch to autoEdit mode
+            engine.setApprovalMode(ApprovalMode.AUTO_EDIT);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'edit' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            // Switch back to default
+            engine.setApprovalMode(ApprovalMode.DEFAULT);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'edit' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+    });
+    describe('addRule', () => {
+        it('should add a new rule and maintain priority order', () => {
+            engine.addRule({
+                toolName: 'tool1',
+                decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                priority: 5,
+            });
+            engine.addRule({
+                toolName: 'tool2',
+                decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                priority: 10,
+            });
+            engine.addRule({
+                toolName: 'tool3',
+                decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER,
+                priority: 1,
+            });
+            const rules = engine.getRules();
+            expect(rules).toHaveLength(3);
+            expect(rules[0].priority).toBe(10);
+            expect(rules[1].priority).toBe(5);
+            expect(rules[2].priority).toBe(1);
+        });
+        it('should apply newly added rules', async () => {
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'new-tool' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            engine.addRule({ toolName: 'new-tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW });
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'new-tool' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+    });
+    describe('removeRulesForTool', () => {
+        it('should remove rules for specific tool', () => {
+            engine.addRule({ toolName: 'tool1', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW });
+            engine.addRule({ toolName: 'tool2', decision: PolicyDecision.DENY });
+            engine.addRule({
+                toolName: 'tool1',
+                decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER,
+                priority: 10,
+            });
+            expect(engine.getRules()).toHaveLength(3);
+            engine.removeRulesForTool('tool1');
+            const remainingRules = engine.getRules();
+            expect(remainingRules).toHaveLength(1);
+            expect(remainingRules.some((r) => r.toolName === 'tool1')).toBe(false);
+            expect(remainingRules.some((r) => r.toolName === 'tool2')).toBe(true);
+        });
+        it('should handle removing non-existent tool', () => {
+            engine.addRule({ toolName: 'existing', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW });
+            expect(() => engine.removeRulesForTool('non-existent')).not.toThrow();
+            expect(engine.getRules()).toHaveLength(1);
+        });
+    });
+    describe('getRules', () => {
+        it('should return readonly array of rules', () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'tool1', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW },
+                { toolName: 'tool2', decision: PolicyDecision.DENY },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const retrievedRules = engine.getRules();
+            expect(retrievedRules).toHaveLength(2);
+            expect(retrievedRules[0].toolName).toBe('tool1');
+            expect(retrievedRules[1].toolName).toBe('tool2');
+        });
+    });
+    describe('MCP server wildcard patterns', () => {
+        it('should match MCP server wildcard patterns', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'my-server__*',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 10,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'blocked-server__*',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Should match my-server tools
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__tool1' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__another_tool' }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            // Should match blocked-server tools
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'blocked-server__tool1' }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'blocked-server__dangerous' }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            // Should not match other patterns
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'other-server__tool' }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'my-server-tool' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER); // No __ separator
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'my-server' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER); // No tool name
+        });
+        it('should prioritize specific tool rules over server wildcards', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'my-server__*',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 10,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'my-server__dangerous-tool',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Specific tool deny should override server allow
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__dangerous-tool' }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'my-server__safe-tool' }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should NOT match spoofed server names when using wildcards', async () => {
+            // Vulnerability: A rule for 'prefix__*' matches 'prefix__suffix__tool'
+            // effectively allowing a server named 'prefix__suffix' to spoof 'prefix'.
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'safe_server__*',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // A tool from a different server 'safe_server__malicious'
+            const spoofedToolCall = { name: 'safe_server__malicious__tool' };
+            // CURRENT BEHAVIOR (FIXED): Matches because it starts with 'safe_server__' BUT serverName doesn't match 'safe_server'
+            // We expect this to FAIL matching the ALLOW rule, thus falling back to default (ASK_USER)
+            expect((await engine.check(spoofedToolCall, 'safe_server__malicious'))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should verify tool name prefix even if serverName matches', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'safe_server__*',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // serverName matches, but tool name does not start with prefix
+            const invalidToolCall = { name: 'other_server__tool' };
+            expect((await engine.check(invalidToolCall, 'safe_server')).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should allow when both serverName and tool name prefix match', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'safe_server__*',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const validToolCall = { name: 'safe_server__tool' };
+            expect((await engine.check(validToolCall, 'safe_server')).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+    });
+    describe('complex scenarios', () => {
+        it('should handle multiple matching rules with different priorities', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { decision: PolicyDecision.DENY, priority: 0 }, // Default deny all
+                { toolName: 'shell', decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER, priority: 5 },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'shell',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"ls/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 10,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Matches highest priority rule (ls command)
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'shell', args: { command: 'ls -la' } }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            // Matches middle priority rule (shell without ls)
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'shell', args: { command: 'pwd' } }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            // Matches lowest priority rule (not shell)
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'edit' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should correctly match commands with quotes in commandPrefix', async () => {
+            const prefix = 'git commit -m "fix"';
+            const patterns = buildArgsPatterns(undefined, prefix);
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: new RegExp(patterns[0]),
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'git commit -m "fix"' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should handle tools with no args', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'read',
+                    argsPattern: /secret/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Tool call without args should not match pattern
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'read' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            // Tool call with args not matching pattern
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'read', args: { file: 'public.txt' } }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            // Tool call with args matching pattern
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'read', args: { file: 'secret.txt' } }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should match args pattern regardless of property order', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'shell',
+                    // Pattern matches the stable stringified format
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"rm[^"]*-rf/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Same args with different property order should both match
+            const args1 = { command: 'rm -rf /', path: '/home' };
+            const args2 = { path: '/home', command: 'rm -rf /' };
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'shell', args: args1 }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'shell', args: args2 }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            // Verify safe command doesn't match
+            const safeArgs = { command: 'ls -la', path: '/home' };
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'shell', args: safeArgs }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should handle nested objects in args with stable stringification', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'api',
+                    argsPattern: /"sensitive":true/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Nested objects with different key orders should match consistently
+            const args1 = {
+                data: { sensitive: true, value: 'secret' },
+                method: 'POST',
+            };
+            const args2 = {
+                method: 'POST',
+                data: { value: 'secret', sensitive: true },
+            };
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'api', args: args1 }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'api', args: args2 }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should handle circular references without stack overflow', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /\[Circular\]/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const circularArgs = {
+                name: 'test',
+                data: {},
+            };
+            // Create circular reference - TypeScript allows this since data is Record<string, unknown>
+            circularArgs.data['self'] =
+                circularArgs.data;
+            // Should not throw stack overflow error
+            await expect(engine.check({ name: 'test', args: circularArgs }, undefined)).resolves.not.toThrow();
+            // Should detect the circular reference pattern
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args: circularArgs }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            // Non-circular object should not match
+            const normalArgs = { name: 'test', data: { value: 'normal' } };
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args: normalArgs }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should handle deep circular references', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'deep',
+                    argsPattern: /\[Circular\]/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const deepCircular = {
+                level1: {
+                    level2: {
+                        level3: {},
+                    },
+                },
+            };
+            // Create circular reference with proper type assertions
+            const level3 = deepCircular.level1.level2.level3;
+            level3['back'] = deepCircular.level1;
+            // Should handle without stack overflow
+            await expect(engine.check({ name: 'deep', args: deepCircular }, undefined)).resolves.not.toThrow();
+            // Should detect the circular reference
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'deep', args: deepCircular }, undefined))
+                .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should handle repeated non-circular objects correctly', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /\[Circular\]/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /"value":"shared"/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 10,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Create an object with repeated references but no cycles
+            const sharedObj = { value: 'shared' };
+            const args = {
+                first: sharedObj,
+                second: sharedObj,
+                third: { nested: sharedObj },
+            };
+            // Should NOT mark repeated objects as circular, and should match the shared value pattern
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should omit undefined and function values from objects', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /"definedValue":"test"/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const args = {
+                definedValue: 'test',
+                undefinedValue: undefined,
+                functionValue: () => 'hello',
+                nullValue: null,
+            };
+            // Should match pattern with defined value, undefined and functions omitted
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            // Check that the pattern would NOT match if undefined was included
+            const rulesWithUndefined = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /undefinedValue/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules: rulesWithUndefined });
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            // Check that the pattern would NOT match if function was included
+            const rulesWithFunction = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /functionValue/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules: rulesWithFunction });
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should convert undefined and functions to null in arrays', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /\["value",null,null,null\]/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const args = {
+                array: ['value', undefined, () => 'hello', null],
+            };
+            // Should match pattern with undefined and functions converted to null
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should produce valid JSON for all inputs', async () => {
+            const testCases = [
+                { input: { simple: 'string' }, desc: 'simple object' },
+                {
+                    input: { nested: { deep: { value: 123 } } },
+                    desc: 'nested object',
+                },
+                { input: { data: [1, 2, 3] }, desc: 'simple array' },
+                { input: { mixed: [1, { a: 'b' }, null] }, desc: 'mixed array' },
+                {
+                    input: { undef: undefined, func: () => { }, normal: 'value' },
+                    desc: 'object with undefined and function',
+                },
+                {
+                    input: { data: ['a', undefined, () => { }, null] },
+                    desc: 'array with undefined and function',
+                },
+            ];
+            for (const { input } of testCases) {
+                const rules = [
+                    {
+                        toolName: 'test',
+                        argsPattern: /.*/,
+                        decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    },
+                ];
+                engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+                // Should not throw when checking (which internally uses stableStringify)
+                await expect(engine.check({ name: 'test', args: input }, undefined)).resolves.not.toThrow();
+                // The check should succeed
+                expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args: input }, undefined))
+                    .decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            }
+        });
+        it('should respect toJSON methods on objects', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /"sanitized":"safe"/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /"dangerous":"data"/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Object with toJSON that sanitizes output
+            const args = {
+                data: {
+                    dangerous: 'data',
+                    toJSON: () => ({ sanitized: 'safe' }),
+                },
+            };
+            // Should match the sanitized pattern, not the dangerous one
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should handle toJSON that returns primitives', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /"value":"string-value"/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const args = {
+                value: {
+                    complex: 'object',
+                    toJSON: () => 'string-value',
+                },
+            };
+            // toJSON returns a string, which should be properly stringified
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should handle toJSON that throws an error', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    argsPattern: /"fallback":"value"/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const args = {
+                data: {
+                    fallback: 'value',
+                    toJSON: () => {
+                        throw new Error('toJSON error');
+                    },
+                },
+            };
+            // Should fall back to regular object serialization when toJSON throws
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test', args }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should downgrade ALLOW to ASK_USER for redirected shell commands', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    // Matches "echo" prefix
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"echo/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Safe command should be allowed
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'run_shell_command', args: { command: 'echo "hello"' } }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            // Redirected command should be downgraded to ASK_USER
+            expect((await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo "hello" > file.txt' },
+            }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should allow redirected shell commands when allowRedirection is true', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    // Matches "echo" prefix
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"echo/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    allowRedirection: true,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Redirected command should stay ALLOW
+            expect((await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo "hello" > file.txt' },
+            }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should NOT downgrade ALLOW to ASK_USER for quoted redirection chars', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"echo/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Should remain ALLOW because it's not a real redirection
+            expect((await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo "-> arrow"' },
+            }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should preserve dir_path during recursive shell command checks', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    // Rule that only allows echo in a specific directory
+                    // Note: stableStringify sorts keys alphabetically and has no spaces: {"command":"echo hello","dir_path":"/safe/path"}
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"echo hello".*"dir_path":"\/safe\/path"/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+                {
+                    // Catch-all ALLOW for shell but with low priority
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: -100,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Compound command. The decomposition will call check() for "echo hello"
+            // which should match our specific high-priority rule IF dir_path is preserved.
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo hello && pwd', dir_path: '/safe/path' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should upgrade ASK_USER to ALLOW if all sub-commands are allowed', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"git status/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"ls/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+                {
+                    // Catch-all ASK_USER for shell
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER,
+                    priority: 10,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // "git status && ls" matches the catch-all ASK_USER rule initially.
+            // But since both parts are explicitly ALLOWed, the result should be upgraded to ALLOW.
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'git status && ls' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should respect explicit DENY for compound commands even if parts are allowed', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    // Explicitly DENY the compound command
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"git status && ls"/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                    priority: 30,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"git status/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"ls/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'git status && ls' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should propagate DENY from any sub-command', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"rm/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.DENY,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"echo/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER,
+                    priority: 10,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // "echo hello && rm -rf /" -> echo is ALLOW, rm is DENY -> Result DENY
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo hello && rm -rf /' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should DENY redirected shell commands in non-interactive mode', async () => {
+            const config = {
+                nonInteractive: true,
+                rules: [
+                    {
+                        toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                        decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    },
+                ],
+            };
+            engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
+            // Redirected command should be DENIED in non-interactive mode
+            // (Normally ASK_USER, but ASK_USER -> DENY in non-interactive)
+            expect((await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo "hello" > file.txt' },
+            }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should default to ASK_USER for atomic commands when matching a wildcard ASK_USER rule', async () => {
+            // Regression test: atomic commands were auto-allowing because of optimistic initialization
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Atomic command "whoami" matches the wildcard rule (ASK_USER).
+            // It should NOT be upgraded to ALLOW.
+            expect((await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'whoami' },
+            }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should allow redirected shell commands in non-interactive mode if allowRedirection is true', async () => {
+            const config = {
+                nonInteractive: true,
+                rules: [
+                    {
+                        toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                        decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                        allowRedirection: true,
+                    },
+                ],
+            };
+            engine = new PolicyEngine(config);
+            // Redirected command should stay ALLOW even in non-interactive mode
+            expect((await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo "hello" > file.txt' },
+            }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should avoid infinite recursion for commands with substitution', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // Command with substitution triggers splitCommands returning the same command as its first element.
+            // This verifies the fix for the infinite recursion bug.
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo $(ls)' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should require confirmation for a compound command with redirection even if individual commands are allowed', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"mkdir\b/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"echo\b/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // The full command has redirection, even if the individual split commands do not.
+            // splitCommands will return ['mkdir -p "bar"', 'echo "hello"']
+            // The redirection '> bar/test.md' is stripped by splitCommands.
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'mkdir -p "bar" && echo "hello" > bar/test.md' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should report redirection when a sub-command specifically has redirection', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"mkdir\b/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"echo\b/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // In this case, we mock splitCommands to keep the redirection in the sub-command
+            vi.mocked(initializeShellParsers).mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+            const { splitCommands } = await import('../utils/shell-utils.js');
+            vi.mocked(splitCommands).mockReturnValueOnce([
+                'mkdir bar',
+                'echo hello > bar/test.md',
+            ]);
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'mkdir bar && echo hello > bar/test.md' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should allow redirected shell commands in AUTO_EDIT mode if individual commands are allowed', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"echo\b/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            engine.setApprovalMode(ApprovalMode.AUTO_EDIT);
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo "hello" > test.txt' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+        it('should allow compound commands with safe operators (&&, ||) if individual commands are allowed', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'run_shell_command',
+                    argsPattern: /"command":"echo\b/,
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                    priority: 20,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules });
+            // "echo hello && echo world" should be allowed since both parts are ALLOW and no redirection is present.
+            const result = await engine.check({
+                name: 'run_shell_command',
+                args: { command: 'echo hello && echo world' },
+            }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+        });
+    });
+    describe('safety checker integration', () => {
+        it('should call checker when rule allows and has safety_checker', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test-tool',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test-tool',
+                    checker: {
+                        type: 'external',
+                        name: 'test-checker',
+                        config: { content: 'test-content' },
+                    },
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            vi.mocked(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.ALLOW,
+            });
+            const result = await engine.check({ name: 'test-tool', args: { foo: 'bar' } }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ name: 'test-tool', args: { foo: 'bar' } }, {
+                type: 'external',
+                name: 'test-checker',
+                config: { content: 'test-content' },
+            });
+        });
+        it('should handle checker errors as DENY', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    checker: {
+                        type: 'in-process',
+                        name: InProcessCheckerType.ALLOWED_PATH,
+                    },
+                },
+            ];
+            mockCheckerRunner.runChecker = vi
+                .fn()
+                .mockRejectedValue(new Error('Checker failed'));
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            const { decision } = await engine.check({ name: 'test' }, undefined);
+            expect(decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+        it('should return DENY when checker denies', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test-tool',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test-tool',
+                    checker: {
+                        type: 'external',
+                        name: 'test-checker',
+                        config: { content: 'test-content' },
+                    },
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            vi.mocked(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.DENY,
+                reason: 'test reason',
+            });
+            const result = await engine.check({ name: 'test-tool', args: { foo: 'bar' } }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalled();
+        });
+        it('should not call checker if decision is not ALLOW', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test-tool',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER,
+                },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test-tool',
+                    checker: {
+                        type: 'external',
+                        name: 'test-checker',
+                        config: { content: 'test-content' },
+                    },
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            vi.mocked(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.ALLOW,
+            });
+            const result = await engine.check({ name: 'test-tool', args: { foo: 'bar' } }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalled();
+        });
+        it('should run checkers when rule allows', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    checker: {
+                        type: 'in-process',
+                        name: InProcessCheckerType.ALLOWED_PATH,
+                    },
+                },
+            ];
+            mockCheckerRunner.runChecker = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.ALLOW,
+            });
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            const { decision } = await engine.check({ name: 'test' }, undefined);
+            expect(decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+        });
+        it('should not call checker if rule has no safety_checker', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test-tool',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            const result = await engine.check({ name: 'test-tool', args: { foo: 'bar' } }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ALLOW);
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        });
+    });
+    describe('serverName requirement', () => {
+        it('should require serverName for checks', async () => {
+            // @ts-expect-error - intentionally testing missing serverName
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test' })).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            // When serverName is provided (even undefined), it should work
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test' }, undefined)).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            expect((await engine.check({ name: 'test' }, 'some-server')).decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should run multiple checkers in priority order and stop at first denial', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW,
+                },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    priority: 10,
+                    checker: { type: 'external', name: 'checker1' },
+                },
+                {
+                    toolName: 'test',
+                    priority: 20, // Should run first
+                    checker: { type: 'external', name: 'checker2' },
+                },
+            ];
+            mockCheckerRunner.runChecker = vi
+                .fn()
+                .mockImplementation(async (_toolCall, config) => {
+                if (config.name === 'checker2') {
+                    return {
+                        decision: SafetyCheckDecision.DENY,
+                        reason: 'checker2 denied',
+                    };
+                }
+                return { decision: SafetyCheckDecision.ALLOW };
+            });
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            const { decision, rule } = await engine.check({ name: 'test' }, undefined);
+            expect(decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            expect(rule).toBeDefined();
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.anything(), expect.objectContaining({ name: 'checker2' }));
+        });
+    });
+    describe('addChecker', () => {
+        it('should add a new checker and maintain priority order', () => {
+            const checker1 = {
+                checker: { type: 'external', name: 'checker1' },
+                priority: 5,
+            };
+            const checker2 = {
+                checker: { type: 'external', name: 'checker2' },
+                priority: 10,
+            };
+            engine.addChecker(checker1);
+            engine.addChecker(checker2);
+            const checkers = engine.getCheckers();
+            expect(checkers).toHaveLength(2);
+            expect(checkers[0].priority).toBe(10);
+            expect(checkers[0].checker.name).toBe('checker2');
+            expect(checkers[1].priority).toBe(5);
+            expect(checkers[1].checker.name).toBe('checker1');
+        });
+    });
+    describe('checker matching logic', () => {
+        it('should match checkers using toolName and argsPattern', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW },
+            ];
+            const matchingChecker = {
+                checker: { type: 'external', name: 'matching' },
+                toolName: 'tool',
+                argsPattern: /"safe":true/,
+            };
+            const nonMatchingChecker = {
+                checker: { type: 'external', name: 'non-matching' },
+                toolName: 'other',
+            };
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers: [matchingChecker, nonMatchingChecker] }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            vi.mocked(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.ALLOW,
+            });
+            await engine.check({ name: 'tool', args: { safe: true } }, undefined);
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.anything(), expect.objectContaining({ name: 'matching' }));
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.anything(), expect.objectContaining({ name: 'non-matching' }));
+        });
+        it('should support wildcard patterns for checkers', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'server__tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW },
+            ];
+            const wildcardChecker = {
+                checker: { type: 'external', name: 'wildcard' },
+                toolName: 'server__*',
+            };
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers: [wildcardChecker] }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            vi.mocked(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.ALLOW,
+            });
+            await engine.check({ name: 'server__tool' }, 'server');
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.anything(), expect.objectContaining({ name: 'wildcard' }));
+        });
+        it('should run safety checkers when decision is ASK_USER and downgrade to DENY on failure', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    checker: {
+                        type: 'in-process',
+                        name: InProcessCheckerType.ALLOWED_PATH,
+                    },
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            vi.mocked(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.DENY,
+                reason: 'Safety check failed',
+            });
+            const result = await engine.check({ name: 'tool' }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalled();
+        });
+        it('should run safety checkers when decision is ASK_USER and keep ASK_USER on success', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ASK_USER },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    checker: {
+                        type: 'in-process',
+                        name: InProcessCheckerType.ALLOWED_PATH,
+                    },
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            vi.mocked(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.ALLOW,
+            });
+            const result = await engine.check({ name: 'tool' }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+            expect(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).toHaveBeenCalled();
+        });
+        it('should downgrade ALLOW to ASK_USER if checker returns ASK_USER', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    checker: {
+                        type: 'in-process',
+                        name: InProcessCheckerType.ALLOWED_PATH,
+                    },
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            vi.mocked(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.ASK_USER,
+                reason: 'Suspicious path',
+            });
+            const result = await engine.check({ name: 'tool' }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.ASK_USER);
+        });
+        it('should DENY if checker returns ASK_USER in non-interactive mode', async () => {
+            const rules = [
+                { toolName: 'tool', decision: PolicyDecision.ALLOW },
+            ];
+            const checkers = [
+                {
+                    checker: {
+                        type: 'in-process',
+                        name: InProcessCheckerType.ALLOWED_PATH,
+                    },
+                },
+            ];
+            engine = new PolicyEngine({ rules, checkers, nonInteractive: true }, mockCheckerRunner);
+            vi.mocked(mockCheckerRunner.runChecker).mockResolvedValue({
+                decision: SafetyCheckDecision.ASK_USER,
+                reason: 'Suspicious path',
+            });
+            const result = await engine.check({ name: 'tool' }, undefined);
+            expect(result.decision).toBe(PolicyDecision.DENY);
+        });
+    });
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=policy-engine.test.js.map