@did-btcr2/cli 0.15.0 → 0.17.0

package/src/keystore/passphrase.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,23 @@ export type PassphraseOptions = {
   prompt?: string;
   /** When true, prompt twice and require the entries to match (for a new keystore). */
   confirm?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * When true, skip the environment variable and passphrase file and require a
+   * fresh terminal entry. Used for the *new* passphrase in `change-passphrase`,
+   * where the env var / file holds the *current* passphrase and must not silently
+   * satisfy the new one (which would make the change a no-op).
+   */
+  forcePrompt?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * An optional non-interactive source consulted *after* the env var and
+   * passphrase file and *before* the terminal prompt (and before the "no TTY"
+   * failure). The session unlock agent (ADR 081) wires this to a cached
+   * passphrase, so a returning command consumes the session instead of
+   * prompting, and a non-interactive follow-on command does not hard-fail. It
+   * returns `undefined` when no session is available. Skipped when `forcePrompt`
+   * is set, and never wired during passphrase establishment (`confirm`).
+   */
+  beforePrompt?: () => string | undefined;
 };
 
 /**
@@ -19,16 +36,32 @@ export type PassphraseOptions = {
  * (which would leak into process listings and shell history). Resolution order:
  * the {@link ENV_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE} environment variable, a passphrase file,
  * then a non-echoing terminal prompt. Throws if none is available and standard
- * input is not a terminal.
+ * input is not a terminal. When `forcePrompt` is set, the env var and file are
+ * skipped and a terminal entry is required.
  */
 export function acquirePassphrase(options: PassphraseOptions = {}): string {
   // All sources are normalized identically (at most one trailing newline
   // removed) so the KDF input is source-independent.
-  const fromEnv = process.env[ENV_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE];
-  if (fromEnv) return assertNonEmpty(fromEnv.replace(/\r?\n$/, ''));
+  if (!options.forcePrompt) {
+    const fromEnv = process.env[ENV_KEYSTORE_PASSPHRASE];
+    if (fromEnv) return assertNonEmpty(fromEnv.replace(/\r?\n$/, ''));
 
-  if (options.passphraseFile) {
-    return assertNonEmpty(readFileSync(options.passphraseFile, 'utf-8').replace(/\r?\n$/, ''));
+    if (options.passphraseFile) {
+      return assertNonEmpty(readFileSync(options.passphraseFile, 'utf-8').replace(/\r?\n$/, ''));
+    }
+
+    // A cached session (ADR 081) sits below the env var and file but above the
+    // interactive prompt, so it is consulted before the "no TTY" failure: a
+    // scripted or piped follow-on command consumes the session instead of
+    // hard-failing. Establishment never reaches here (its caller omits it).
+    //
+    // The session already holds the exact, keystore-verified passphrase (encoded
+    // and decoded byte-for-byte), not a raw source needing newline normalization.
+    // Return it verbatim: re-stripping a trailing newline here would corrupt the
+    // KDF input for a passphrase that legitimately ends in one, even though unlock
+    // itself succeeded. assertNonEmpty is a defensive guard only.
+    const fromSession = options.beforePrompt?.();
+    if (fromSession) return assertNonEmpty(fromSession);
   }
 
   if (!process.stdin.isTTY) {
@@ -56,9 +89,34 @@ function assertNonEmpty(passphrase: string): string {
   return passphrase;
 }
 
+/**
+ * A 4-byte shared buffer used only as an {@link Atomics.wait} target. It lets
+ * {@link promptHidden} block briefly on an empty non-blocking TTY instead of
+ * busy-spinning. It is never written to, so the wait always times out.
+ */
+const IDLE_WAIT = new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4));
+
+/**
+ * Milliseconds to block on each empty read. Imperceptible to a typist yet long
+ * enough that an open prompt sits idle rather than pegging a CPU core.
+ */
+const IDLE_POLL_MS = 20;
+
+/**
+ * Removes the last whole UTF-8 character from an accumulating byte array in
+ * place: pops any trailing continuation bytes (0b10xxxxxx) then the leading
+ * byte. Exported for testing; a backspace mid-entry must not strand a fragment
+ * that later decodes to U+FFFD.
+ */
+export function dropLastUtf8Char(bytes: number[]): void {
+  while (bytes.length > 0 && (bytes[bytes.length - 1] & 0xc0) === 0x80) bytes.pop();
+  bytes.pop();
+}
+
 /**
  * Reads a line from the terminal synchronously without echoing keystrokes.
- * Bytes are accumulated and decoded as UTF-8 so multibyte passphrases survive.
+ * Bytes are accumulated and decoded as UTF-8 so multibyte passphrases survive,
+ * including a backspace that spans a whole multibyte character.
  * This path runs only when standard input is a terminal.
  */
 function promptHidden(label: string): string {
@@ -75,7 +133,12 @@ function promptHidden(label: string): string {
         read = readSync(stdin.fd, byte, 0, 1, null);
       } catch (error) {
         const code = (error as { code?: string }).code;
-        if (code === 'EAGAIN') continue; // no byte ready yet on a non-blocking TTY
+        if (code === 'EAGAIN') {
+          // No byte ready yet on a non-blocking TTY. Block briefly instead of
+          // spinning so an open prompt does not peg a CPU core while it waits.
+          Atomics.wait(IDLE_WAIT, 0, 0, IDLE_POLL_MS);
+          continue;
+        }
         if (code === 'EOF') break;
         throw error;
       }
@@ -86,7 +149,7 @@ function promptHidden(label: string): string {
         throw new KeyStoreError('Passphrase entry aborted.', 'PASSPHRASE_REQUIRED_ERROR');
       }
       if (ch === 0x7f || ch === 0x08) { // DEL or backspace
-        bytes.pop();
+        dropLastUtf8Char(bytes);
         continue;
       }
       bytes.push(ch);

package/src/keystore/paths.ts

@@ -1,21 +1,8 @@
-import { homedir } from 'node:os';
-import { join } from 'node:path';
-import { blankToUndef } from '../types.js';
-
 /**
- * Default keystore file path, following the XDG Base Directory Specification's
- * data directory. Secret key material is data a user accumulates, so it lives
- * under the data directory, kept separate from the configuration directory used
- * for portable settings.
- *
- * Resolution order:
- * 1. `$XDG_DATA_HOME/btcr2/keystore.json`
- * 2. `%LOCALAPPDATA%/btcr2/keystore.json` (Windows)
- * 3. `~/.local/share/btcr2/keystore.json` (fallback)
+ * The default keystore path now lives alongside the config file under a single
+ * CLI home root (`<home>/keystore.json`, ADR 079). The implementation lives in
+ * `../paths.ts` (the single source of truth for on-disk state locations); it is
+ * re-exported here so existing `./paths.js` importers in the keystore layer keep
+ * their import surface.
  */
-export function defaultKeystorePath(): string {
-  const base = blankToUndef(process.env.XDG_DATA_HOME)
-    ?? blankToUndef(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA)
-    ?? join(homedir(), '.local', 'share');
-  return join(base, 'btcr2', 'keystore.json');
-}
+export { defaultKeystorePath } from '../paths.js';

package/src/keystore/session.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+import { closeSync, constants, existsSync, fstatSync, openSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { utf8ToBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils.js';
+import { base64urlnopad } from '@scure/base';
+import { ensureDir, writeFileAtomic } from './atomic.js';
+
+/**
+ * The session unlock agent (ADR 081). `keystore unlock` caches the verified
+ * keystore passphrase in a single `<home>/session.json`, and subsequent commands
+ * read it in place of a prompt until it expires or `keystore lock` revokes it.
+ *
+ * This is an on-disk v1 design. The cached passphrase is base64url-*encoded*, not
+ * encrypted: its only protection at rest is the file's `0600` mode. That is the
+ * deliberate, documented cost of a portable, minimal-diff convenience; a future
+ * in-memory agent (v2) that never persists the secret is the real fix. Every read
+ * here is defensive and never throws, so a bad or hostile session degrades to a
+ * passphrase prompt rather than a crash.
+ */
+
+/** Current session-file format version. */
+export const SESSION_VERSION = 1 as const;
+
+/** Default session lifetime: one hour. */
+export const DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
+/** Hard cap on a cached-passphrase lifetime: 24 hours. A longer TTL is refused. */
+export const MAX_SESSION_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+/** Environment variable supplying a default TTL below the `--ttl` flag. */
+export const ENV_KEYSTORE_TTL = 'BTCR2_KEYSTORE_TTL';
+
+/**
+ * The on-disk session file. `passphrase` is base64url(utf8(passphrase)): an
+ * encoding, not encryption. `keystore` binds the session to one keystore, and
+ * `verifierId` (a hash of that keystore's verifier) invalidates the session when
+ * the passphrase is rotated. `allowMainnet` records whether the operator unlocked
+ * with `--allow-mainnet`; a session without it is withheld from a `bitcoin`
+ * operation so mainnet keeps per-use authentication (ADR 081). No derived key,
+ * keystore ciphertext, or signing-key bytes ever appear here.
+ */
+export interface SessionFile {
+  v            : typeof SESSION_VERSION;
+  keystore     : string;
+  verifierId   : string;
+  passphrase   : string;
+  allowMainnet : boolean;
+  createdAt    : number;
+  expiresAt    : number;
+  ttlSeconds   : number;
+}
+
+/** Inputs for {@link writeSession}. */
+export interface WriteSessionInput {
+  /** The keystore this session unlocks (stored resolved/normalized). */
+  keystorePath  : string;
+  /** Fingerprint of the keystore verifier, from `keystoreVerifierId`. */
+  verifierId    : string;
+  /** The verified passphrase to cache. */
+  passphrase    : string;
+  /** Lifetime in milliseconds. */
+  ttlMs         : number;
+  /**
+   * Whether this session may be consumed for a mainnet (`bitcoin`) operation,
+   * from the `unlock --allow-mainnet` flag. Defaults to `false` (deny), so
+   * mainnet operations fall through to a per-use passphrase prompt (ADR 081).
+   */
+  allowMainnet? : boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Writes the session file atomically at `0600` (temp sibling + rename), returning
+ * the written record so the caller can report expiry without re-reading. The
+ * caller is responsible for verifying the passphrase first; this only persists it.
+ */
+export function writeSession(sessionPath: string, input: WriteSessionInput): SessionFile {
+  const createdAt = Date.now();
+  const session: SessionFile = {
+    v            : SESSION_VERSION,
+    keystore     : resolve(input.keystorePath),
+    verifierId   : input.verifierId,
+    passphrase   : base64urlnopad.encode(utf8ToBytes(input.passphrase)),
+    allowMainnet : input.allowMainnet ?? false,
+    createdAt,
+    expiresAt    : createdAt + input.ttlMs,
+    ttlSeconds   : Math.round(input.ttlMs / 1000),
+  };
+  ensureDir(dirname(sessionPath), 0o700);
+  writeFileAtomic(sessionPath, `${JSON.stringify(session, null, 2)}\n`, 0o600);
+  return session;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Deletes the session file and any crash-orphaned `writeFileAtomic` temp sibling
+ * (each of which would hold a plaintext passphrase). Idempotent; needs no
+ * passphrase. Returns whether a session file was present. Unlink is best-effort:
+ * it removes the name, it does not securely erase the bytes (see ADR 081).
+ */
+export function clearSession(sessionPath: string): boolean {
+  let existed = false;
+  try {
+    existed = existsSync(sessionPath);
+    if (existed) rmSync(sessionPath, { force: true });
+  } catch {
+    // Best effort: a session we cannot remove is reported as not-cleared below.
+    existed = false;
+  }
+  sweepSessionTemps(sessionPath);
+  return existed;
+}
+
+/** Removes `.session.json.<pid>.<n>.tmp` leftovers from an interrupted atomic write. */
+function sweepSessionTemps(sessionPath: string): void {
+  const dir = dirname(sessionPath);
+  const prefix = `.${basename(sessionPath)}.`;
+  try {
+    for (const name of readdirSync(dir)) {
+      if (name.startsWith(prefix) && name.endsWith('.tmp')) {
+        try {
+          rmSync(join(dir, name), { force: true });
+        } catch {
+          // A temp file we cannot remove is left for the next sweep.
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // Directory unreadable or absent: nothing to sweep.
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns the cached passphrase for `keystorePath` when a live, matching session
+ * exists, else `undefined`. Never throws. A session that is expired, stale (the
+ * keystore passphrase rotated), future-dated, or malformed is pruned on read; a
+ * live session bound to a *different* keystore is left in place (it prompts for
+ * the current keystore instead).
+ *
+ * `isMainnetOperation` gates the one case the network is known at consumption: a
+ * live session that was not unlocked with `--allow-mainnet` is withheld from a
+ * `bitcoin` operation (returning `undefined` so the caller falls through to a
+ * per-use prompt) but *not* pruned, since it remains valid for the non-mainnet
+ * operations the operator unlocked for (ADR 081).
+ */
+export function readLiveSessionPassphrase(
+  sessionPath        : string,
+  keystorePath       : string,
+  currentVerifierId  : string | undefined,
+  isMainnetOperation = false,
+): string | undefined {
+  const verdict = evaluateSession(sessionPath, keystorePath, currentVerifierId, Date.now());
+  if (verdict.status === 'live') {
+    // Withhold a session lacking mainnet allowance from a mainnet operation, so
+    // signing a `bitcoin` DID still authenticates per use. Leave it in place: it
+    // is a valid session, just not for this operation (like a foreign keystore).
+    if (isMainnetOperation && !verdict.session.allowMainnet) return undefined;
+    try {
+      return Buffer.from(base64urlnopad.decode(verdict.session.passphrase)).toString('utf-8');
+    } catch {
+      clearSession(sessionPath);
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+  // Prune a session that is dead for everyone or dead for this keystore. A
+  // 'foreign' (live, different keystore) or 'none' session is left untouched.
+  if (verdict.status === 'expired' || verdict.status === 'stale'
+    || verdict.status === 'future' || verdict.status === 'malformed') {
+    clearSession(sessionPath);
+  }
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+/** Public, redacted view of the session state for `keystore status`. Never emits the passphrase. */
+export interface SessionStatus {
+  active            : boolean;
+  expiresAt?        : number;
+  secondsRemaining? : number;
+  /** Whether the session may sign a mainnet operation prompt-free (unlocked with `--allow-mainnet`). */
+  allowMainnet?     : boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reports whether a live session exists for `keystorePath` and its remaining
+ * lifetime, without decrypting, prompting, throwing, or emitting the passphrase.
+ * An expired, foreign, stale, or malformed session reports inactive. Read-only:
+ * unlike {@link readLiveSessionPassphrase}, it does not prune.
+ */
+export function readSessionStatus(
+  sessionPath       : string,
+  keystorePath      : string,
+  currentVerifierId : string | undefined,
+): SessionStatus {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const verdict = evaluateSession(sessionPath, keystorePath, currentVerifierId, now);
+  if (verdict.status !== 'live') return { active: false };
+  return {
+    active           : true,
+    expiresAt        : verdict.session.expiresAt,
+    secondsRemaining : Math.max(0, Math.round((verdict.session.expiresAt - now) / 1000)),
+    allowMainnet     : verdict.session.allowMainnet,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parses a TTL string into milliseconds: a bare integer is seconds; an `s`, `m`,
+ * or `h` suffix scales it. Returns `undefined` for any malformed input. The
+ * caller applies the default, the 24h cap, and the `<= 0` rejection.
+ */
+export function parseTtlToMs(raw: string): number | undefined {
+  const match = /^(\d+)([smh]?)$/.exec(raw.trim());
+  if (!match) return undefined;
+  const n = Number(match[1]);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(n)) return undefined;
+  const unitMs = match[2] === 'h' ? 3_600_000 : match[2] === 'm' ? 60_000 : 1_000;
+  return n * unitMs;
+}
+
+/** The outcome of inspecting a session file against the current keystore and clock. */
+type SessionVerdict =
+  | { status: 'live'; session: SessionFile }
+  | { status: 'none' | 'foreign' | 'expired' | 'stale' | 'future' | 'malformed' };
+
+/**
+ * Classifies the session file: read it securely, then check version, shape,
+ * clock, keystore binding, and verifier fingerprint in that order. Ordering
+ * `expired` before `foreign` means an expired session is pruned regardless of
+ * which keystore it was for. Never throws.
+ */
+function evaluateSession(
+  sessionPath       : string,
+  keystorePath      : string,
+  currentVerifierId : string | undefined,
+  now               : number,
+): SessionVerdict {
+  const session = secureReadSession(sessionPath);
+  if (!session) return { status: 'none' };
+  if (session.v !== SESSION_VERSION) return { status: 'malformed' };
+  if (typeof session.passphrase !== 'string' || typeof session.keystore !== 'string'
+    || typeof session.verifierId !== 'string' || typeof session.allowMainnet !== 'boolean'
+    || typeof session.createdAt !== 'number' || typeof session.expiresAt !== 'number') {
+    return { status: 'malformed' };
+  }
+  if (session.createdAt > now) return { status: 'future' };
+  if (now >= session.expiresAt) return { status: 'expired' };
+  if (resolve(session.keystore) !== resolve(keystorePath)) return { status: 'foreign' };
+  if (currentVerifierId === undefined || session.verifierId !== currentVerifierId) return { status: 'stale' };
+  return { status: 'live', session };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads and parses the session file with a plaintext secret in mind. On POSIX,
+ * opens with `O_NOFOLLOW` (refusing a symlink) and refuses a non-regular file, a
+ * file not owned by this user, or one accessible by group or other, best-effort
+ * deleting a rejected file and reading only from the opened descriptor (no TOCTOU
+ * re-open). On Windows those POSIX guards are skipped (they would throw), so the
+ * file is read normally under the same directory ACL the keystore trusts, keeping
+ * the session usable rather than silently ignored. Returns `undefined` on any
+ * failure; never throws.
+ */
+function secureReadSession(sessionPath: string): SessionFile | undefined {
+  let raw: string;
+  if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+    try {
+      raw = readFileSync(sessionPath, 'utf-8');
+    } catch {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  } else {
+    let fd: number;
+    try {
+      fd = openSync(sessionPath, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW);
+    } catch {
+      // ENOENT (no session), ELOOP (symlink refused by O_NOFOLLOW), or any other
+      // open failure: no usable session.
+      return undefined;
+    }
+    try {
+      const st = fstatSync(fd);
+      const myUid = typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? process.getuid() : undefined;
+      if (!st.isFile() || (myUid !== undefined && st.uid !== myUid) || (st.mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
+        // Not a regular file we own with 0600 perms: it was not written by this
+        // process. Best-effort remove it (it may hold a plaintext passphrase) and
+        // fall back to a prompt.
+        try {
+          rmSync(sessionPath, { force: true });
+        } catch {
+          // Cannot remove a file we do not own; ignoring it is enough.
+        }
+        return undefined;
+      }
+      raw = readFileSync(fd, 'utf-8');
+    } catch {
+      return undefined;
+    } finally {
+      try {
+        closeSync(fd);
+      } catch {
+        // Descriptor already gone; nothing to close.
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(raw) as SessionFile;
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}

package/src/paths.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { blankToUndef } from './types.js';
+
+/**
+ * State-location overrides that influence where the CLI keeps its home
+ * directory and its two state files. A subset of the broader
+ * `ConnectionOverrides`, restated here so this module (the single source of
+ * truth for on-disk locations) has no runtime dependency on `config.ts`.
+ */
+export interface PathOverrides {
+  /** Explicit home root from the `--home` flag. Wins over `$BTCR2_HOME`. */
+  home?     : string;
+  /** Explicit config-file path from the `--config` flag. Overrides the home default. */
+  config?   : string;
+  /** Explicit keystore path from the `--keystore` flag. Overrides the home default. */
+  keystore? : string;
+}
+
+/** Environment variable naming the CLI home directory (all state colocated). */
+export const ENV_HOME = 'BTCR2_HOME';
+
+/** The config and keystore file names, kept side by side under the home root. */
+export const CONFIG_FILENAME = 'config.json';
+export const KEYSTORE_FILENAME = 'keystore.json';
+/** The session file name, holding the unlock agent's cached passphrase (ADR 081). */
+export const SESSION_FILENAME = 'session.json';
+
+/**
+ * Resolves the CLI home directory: the single root that holds `config.json` and
+ * `keystore.json` side by side (ADR 079). Resolution order, highest wins:
+ *
+ * 1. `--home <dir>` (the {@link PathOverrides.home} flag)
+ * 2. `$BTCR2_HOME`
+ * 3. the platform default (see {@link platformDefaultHome})
+ *
+ * A blank value at any layer defers to the next, mirroring the `blankToUndef`
+ * treatment every other precedence layer uses, so an exported-but-empty
+ * `BTCR2_HOME` does not resolve the home to a bare relative path.
+ */
+export function resolveHome(overrides?: PathOverrides): string {
+  return blankToUndef(overrides?.home)
+    ?? blankToUndef(process.env[ENV_HOME])
+    ?? platformDefaultHome();
+}
+
+/**
+ * The default home when no `--home` / `$BTCR2_HOME` override is present, chosen
+ * per OS so the location is idiomatic while staying a single colocated dir:
+ *
+ * - Windows: `%LOCALAPPDATA%\btcr2` (fallback `%APPDATA%\btcr2`, then the user
+ *   profile), the native place for per-user application state.
+ * - Linux / macOS: `~/.btcr2`, the short, teachable dot-directory in the same
+ *   family as `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, and `~/.gnupg`.
+ */
+export function platformDefaultHome(): string {
+  if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+    const base = blankToUndef(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA)
+      ?? blankToUndef(process.env.APPDATA)
+      ?? homedir();
+    return join(base, 'btcr2');
+  }
+  return join(homedir(), '.btcr2');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Default config-file path: `<home>/config.json`. The `--config` flag, when
+ * present, overrides it wholesale (it names a specific file, not a home).
+ */
+export function defaultConfigPath(overrides?: PathOverrides): string {
+  return join(resolveHome(overrides), CONFIG_FILENAME);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Default keystore path: `<home>/keystore.json`. The `--keystore` flag and a
+ * profile's `identity.keystore` (resolved in `config.ts`) override it; this
+ * function is the final fallback in that chain.
+ */
+export function defaultKeystorePath(overrides?: PathOverrides): string {
+  return join(resolveHome(overrides), KEYSTORE_FILENAME);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Session file path: `<home>/session.json`, where the unlock agent caches the
+ * keystore passphrase (ADR 081). Deliberately derived from the home root alone,
+ * never from `--config` / `--keystore` or the config file, so `keystore lock`
+ * can revoke a session even under a malformed config, and so the read and write
+ * paths always agree on one location per home.
+ */
+export function defaultSessionPath(overrides?: PathOverrides): string {
+  return join(resolveHome(overrides), SESSION_FILENAME);
+}

package/src/types.ts

@@ -4,10 +4,18 @@ import type { Btcr2DidDocument, ResolutionOptions } from '@did-btcr2/method';
 import type { DidResolutionResult } from '@web5/dids';
 import type { DoctorReport, EffectiveConfig } from './config.js';
 import type { ConfigIssue } from './config-schema.js';
+import type { SessionStatus } from './keystore/session.js';
 
 export type NetworkOption = 'bitcoin' | 'testnet3' | 'testnet4' | 'signet' | 'mutinynet' | 'regtest';
 export type OutputFormat = 'json' | 'text';
 
+/**
+ * How a keystore protects its secrets, as reported by `keystore status` and
+ * `btcr2 init`: `encrypted` (passphrase-sealed), `dev` (plaintext, testnet-only),
+ * or `absent` (no keystore file yet).
+ */
+export type KeystoreProtectionLabel = 'encrypted' | 'dev' | 'absent';
+
 export const SUPPORTED_NETWORKS: NetworkOption[] = [
   'bitcoin', 'testnet3', 'testnet4', 'signet', 'mutinynet', 'regtest'
 ];
@@ -48,6 +56,7 @@ export type CommandResult =
   | { action: 'key-export'; data: { keyId: string; publicKey?: string; secretWrittenTo?: string } }
   | { action: 'key-delete'; data: { keyId: string; deleted: true } }
   | { action: 'key-use'; data: { keyId: string; active: true } }
+  | { action: 'init'; data: { home: string; config: string; keystore: string; created: string[]; protection: KeystoreProtectionLabel } }
   | { action: 'config-init'; data: { path: string } }
   | { action: 'config-get'; data: unknown }
   | { action: 'config-set'; data: { path: string } }
@@ -55,8 +64,13 @@ export type CommandResult =
   | { action: 'config-list'; data: unknown }
   | { action: 'config-validate'; data: { ok: boolean; issues: ConfigIssue[] } }
   | { action: 'config-effective'; data: EffectiveConfig }
-  | { action: 'config-path'; data: { config: string; keystore: string } }
+  | { action: 'config-path'; data: { home: string; config: string; keystore: string } }
   | { action: 'config-doctor'; data: DoctorReport }
+  | { action: 'keystore-init'; data: { path: string; protection: 'encrypted' | 'dev' } }
+  | { action: 'keystore-status'; data: { path: string; protection: KeystoreProtectionLabel; established: boolean; keyCount: number; active: string | undefined; session: SessionStatus } }
+  | { action: 'keystore-change-passphrase'; data: { path: string; rekeyed: number } }
+  | { action: 'keystore-unlock'; data: { keystore: string; expiresAt: number; ttlSeconds: number } }
+  | { action: 'keystore-lock'; data: { path: string; cleared: boolean } }
   | { action: 'profile-add'; data: { profile: string } }
   | { action: 'profile-use'; data: { profile: string } }
   | { action: 'profile-show'; data: unknown }
@@ -66,6 +80,7 @@ export interface GlobalOptions {
   output         : OutputFormat;
   verbose        : boolean;
   quiet          : boolean;
+  home?          : string;
   config?        : string;
   profile?       : string;
   btcRest?       : string;