@dianzhong/create-harness-app 0.1.0

package/templates/harness/minimal/.claude/hooks/guard-tool.cjs

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+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * PreToolUse 安全守护 hook
+ *
+ * 职责：在 Claude Code 执行任何工具之前拦截，阻断危险命令和敏感文件访问。
+ * 覆盖 Bash/Read/Write/Edit/Grep/Agent 等工具调用。
+ * 不改写任何文件，只返回 continue/deny 决策。
+ */
+
+/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports */
+
+const fs = require('node:fs')
+const path = require('node:path')
+
+// 从 stdin 读取 Claude Code 传入的 JSON hook payload
+function readJsonStdin() {
+  const input = fs.readFileSync(0, 'utf8').trim()
+  if (!input) {
+    return {}
+  }
+
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(input)
+  } catch {
+    return {}
+  }
+}
+
+// 构造拦截响应：阻止执行并附带原因
+function deny(reason) {
+  process.stdout.write(
+    JSON.stringify({
+      continue: false,
+      stopReason: reason,
+      permissionDecision: 'deny',
+      permissionDecisionReason: reason,
+    }),
+  )
+}
+
+// 构造放行响应：允许执行，抑制输出
+function allow() {
+  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ continue: true, suppressOutput: true }))
+}
+
+// 统一路径格式：Windows 反斜线 → 正斜线，去除两端引号
+function normalizePath(value) {
+  return String(value ?? '')
+    .replaceAll('\\', '/')
+    .replace(/^["']|["']$/g, '')
+}
+
+// 从嵌套的 toolInput 对象中递归收集所有含路径含义的字符串值
+function collectPaths(value, results = []) {
+  if (!value) {
+    return results
+  }
+
+  if (typeof value === 'string') {
+    results.push(value)
+    return results
+  }
+
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    for (const item of value) {
+      collectPaths(item, results)
+    }
+    return results
+  }
+
+  if (typeof value === 'object') {
+    for (const [key, item] of Object.entries(value)) {
+      if (/path|file|filename/i.test(key) && typeof item === 'string') {
+        results.push(item)
+      } else {
+        collectPaths(item, results)
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return results
+}
+
+// 判断文件路径是否为密钥/凭证等敏感文件（允许 .env.example）
+function isSensitivePath(filePath) {
+  const normalized = normalizePath(filePath)
+  const base = path.posix.basename(normalized)
+
+  if (!normalized) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  if (base === '.env.example') {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  return (
+    /^\.env($|\.)/.test(base) ||
+    /(^|\/)\.env($|\.)/.test(normalized) ||
+    /(^|\/)secrets?\//i.test(normalized) ||
+    /(^|\/)(id_rsa|id_ed25519|known_hosts)$/i.test(normalized) ||
+    /\.(pem|key|p12|pfx|crt|cer)$/i.test(base)
+  )
+}
+
+// 判断 glob pattern 是否匹配敏感文件模式
+function isSensitiveGlob(glob) {
+  const normalized = String(glob ?? '').replaceAll('\\', '/')
+  return (
+    /^\.env($|\*)/.test(normalized) ||
+    /(^|\/)\.env($|\*)/.test(normalized) ||
+    /(^|\/)secrets?\//i.test(normalized) ||
+    /\.(pem|key|p12|pfx|crt|cer)$/i.test(normalized)
+  )
+}
+
+// 从 shell 命令文本中提取可能的路径片段。不能只按空白切分：
+// cat<.env.production、node -e "readFileSync('.env')" 这类写法都不会产生独立空白 token。
+function collectCommandPathCandidates(command) {
+  return String(command ?? '')
+    .replaceAll('\\', '/')
+    .split(/[\s"'`$;&|()<>,={}[\]]+/)
+    .map((token) => token.trim())
+    .filter(Boolean)
+}
+
+// 检测 Bash 命令是否包含危险操作（破坏性 Git、递归删除、低级磁盘写入等）
+// commandStart 匹配命令起始位置：行首、管道/分号后，或环境变量赋值后
+function dangerousCommandReason(command) {
+  const commandStart = String.raw`(?:^|[;&|()])\s*(?:\w+=(?:"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s;|()]+)\s+)*`
+  const checks = [
+    [new RegExp(`${commandStart}git\\s+reset\\s+--hard\\b`, 'i'), 'Blocked destructive git reset.'],
+    [
+      new RegExp(`${commandStart}git\\s+reset\\s+--mixed\\s+HEAD\\b`, 'i'),
+      'Blocked destructive git reset.',
+    ],
+    [
+      new RegExp(`${commandStart}git\\s+push\\s+--force(?:-with-lease)?\\b`, 'i'),
+      'Blocked force push.',
+    ],
+    [
+      new RegExp(`${commandStart}git\\s+push\\s+\\S+\\s+--delete\\b`, 'i'),
+      'Blocked remote branch deletion.',
+    ],
+    [
+      new RegExp(`${commandStart}git\\s+push\\s+\\S+\\s+\\+\\S+\\b`, 'i'),
+      'Blocked force push via refspec.',
+    ],
+    [new RegExp(`${commandStart}git\\s+branch\\s+-D\\b`, 'i'), 'Blocked local branch deletion.'],
+    [new RegExp(`${commandStart}git\\s+stash\\s+(drop|clear)\\b`, 'i'), 'Blocked stash deletion.'],
+    [
+      new RegExp(`${commandStart}git\\s+checkout\\s+(?:--\\s+|\\.)`, 'i'),
+      'Blocked destructive git checkout.',
+    ],
+    [new RegExp(`${commandStart}git\\s+restore\\b`, 'i'), 'Blocked destructive git restore.'],
+    [
+      new RegExp(
+        `${commandStart}git\\s+clean\\s+(?=[^;&|\\n]*-[A-Za-z]*f)(?=[^;&|\\n]*-[A-Za-z]*d)`,
+        'i',
+      ),
+      'Blocked destructive git clean.',
+    ],
+    [
+      new RegExp(`${commandStart}rm\\s+(?=[^;&|\\n]*-[A-Za-z]*r)(?=[^;&|\\n]*-[A-Za-z]*f)`, 'i'),
+      'Blocked recursive force delete.',
+    ],
+    [new RegExp(`${commandStart}del\\s+\\/[fsq]\\b`, 'i'), 'Blocked destructive Windows delete.'],
+    [new RegExp(`${commandStart}rmdir\\s+\\/s\\b`, 'i'), 'Blocked recursive directory delete.'],
+    [
+      new RegExp(`${commandStart}Remove-Item\\b.*\\s-Recurse\\b.*\\s-Force\\b`, 'i'),
+      'Blocked recursive force delete.',
+    ],
+    [new RegExp(`${commandStart}dd\\s+\\b`, 'i'), 'Blocked low-level disk write command.'],
+  ]
+
+  for (const [pattern, reason] of checks) {
+    if (pattern.test(command)) {
+      return reason
+    }
+  }
+
+  return ''
+}
+
+// === 主逻辑 ===
+
+// 1. Bash 命令检查：先检测危险命令，再扫描命令中的敏感路径
+const payload = readJsonStdin()
+const toolName = payload.tool_name || payload.toolName || payload.tool || ''
+const toolInput = payload.tool_input || payload.toolInput || {}
+const command = String(toolInput.command || '')
+
+if (/bash/i.test(toolName) && command) {
+  const reason = dangerousCommandReason(command)
+
+  if (reason) {
+    deny(`${reason} Command: ${command.slice(0, 160)}`)
+    process.exit(0)
+  }
+
+  for (const token of collectCommandPathCandidates(command)) {
+    if (isSensitivePath(token)) {
+      deny(`Blocked command touching sensitive path: ${token}`)
+      process.exit(0)
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// 2. 工具输入路径检查：递归收集所有路径参数，检测敏感文件
+const paths = collectPaths(toolInput).map(normalizePath)
+const sensitive = paths.find(isSensitivePath)
+
+if (sensitive) {
+  deny(`Blocked access to sensitive path: ${sensitive}`)
+  process.exit(0)
+}
+
+// 3. Grep 工具专项检查：glob pattern 和搜索路径中的敏感文件
+if (/grep/i.test(toolName)) {
+  const glob = String(toolInput.glob || '')
+  const grepPath = String(toolInput.path || '')
+
+  if (glob && isSensitiveGlob(glob)) {
+    deny(`Blocked Grep with sensitive glob pattern: ${glob}`)
+    process.exit(0)
+  }
+
+  if (grepPath && isSensitivePath(grepPath)) {
+    deny(`Blocked Grep in sensitive path: ${grepPath}`)
+    process.exit(0)
+  }
+}
+
+allow()

package/templates/harness/minimal/.claude/hooks/quality-gate.cjs

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+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Stop hook
+ *
+ * 职责：
+ * - git 有变更时先自动格式化，再运行 type-check / lint / harness:check。
+ *   失败时阻断 agent 停止，成功时放行并通知。
+ *   注意：不自动暂存（不 git add），由人工决定暂存与提交。
+ */
+
+/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports */
+
+const { spawnSync } = require('node:child_process')
+
+const dryRun = process.argv.includes('--dry-run') || process.env.HARNESS_QUALITY_DRY_RUN === '1'
+
+function writeJson(value) {
+  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(value))
+}
+
+// 跨平台 shell 参数转义：安全字符直接通过，POSIX 用单引号，Windows 用双引号
+function shellQuote(value) {
+  const text = String(value)
+
+  if (!/[^\w@%+=:,./-]/.test(text)) {
+    return text
+  }
+
+  if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+    return `"${text.replaceAll('"', '\\"')}"`
+  }
+
+  return `'${text.replaceAll("'", "'\\''")}'`
+}
+
+// 跨平台执行 shell 命令：Windows 用 cmd.exe，POSIX 用 sh -lc
+function runShell(commandLine, timeout = 180000) {
+  if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+    return spawnSync('cmd.exe', ['/d', '/s', '/c', commandLine], {
+      cwd: process.cwd(),
+      encoding: 'utf8',
+      shell: false,
+      timeout,
+    })
+  }
+
+  return spawnSync('sh', ['-lc', commandLine], {
+    cwd: process.cwd(),
+    encoding: 'utf8',
+    shell: false,
+    timeout,
+  })
+}
+
+// 封装命令执行，支持 --dry-run 模式跳过实际执行
+function run(command, args) {
+  if (dryRun) {
+    return {
+      command: [command, ...args].join(' '),
+      status: 0,
+      stdout: '[dry-run] skipped command execution',
+      stderr: '',
+      error: '',
+    }
+  }
+
+  const commandLine = [command, ...args].map(shellQuote).join(' ')
+  const result = runShell(commandLine)
+
+  return {
+    command: [command, ...args].join(' '),
+    status: result.status ?? 1,
+    stdout: result.stdout || '',
+    stderr: result.stderr || '',
+    error: result.error ? result.error.message : '',
+  }
+}
+
+// 获取 git 变更文件列表（porcelain 格式）
+function gitStatus() {
+  const result = runShell('git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all', 15000)
+
+  if (result.status !== 0) {
+    return null
+  }
+
+  return result.stdout
+    .split(/\r?\n/)
+    .map((line) => line.trim())
+    .filter(Boolean)
+}
+
+// Stop 模式：无变更时跳过门禁，否则运行完整的质量检查流水线
+const changed = gitStatus()
+
+if (changed && changed.length === 0) {
+  writeJson({
+    continue: true,
+    systemMessage: 'Harness 质量门禁跳过：git 未检测到变更文件。',
+  })
+  process.exit(0)
+}
+
+// Stop 收尾阶段允许自动格式化（本项目唯一允许自动格式化的 hook）
+const formatResult = run('pnpm', ['format'])
+const commands = [
+  ['pnpm', ['type-check']],
+  ['pnpm', ['lint']],
+  ['pnpm', ['harness:check']],
+]
+
+const results = [formatResult, ...commands.map(([command, args]) => run(command, args))]
+const failed = results.filter((result) => result.status !== 0)
+
+if (failed.length > 0) {
+  const details = failed
+    .map((result) => {
+      const output = `${result.stdout}\n${result.stderr}\n${result.error}`.trim()
+      return `命令失败：${result.command}\n${output.slice(-2400)}`
+    })
+    .join('\n\n')
+
+  writeJson({
+    continue: false,
+    stopReason: `Harness 质量门禁未通过。请修复以下问题后再继续。\n\n${details}`,
+  })
+  process.exit(0)
+}
+
+writeJson({
+  continue: true,
+  systemMessage: `Harness 质量门禁通过。变更文件数：${
+    changed ? changed.length : 0
+  }。已通过的检查：pnpm format（自动修复）、pnpm type-check、pnpm lint、pnpm harness:check。`,
+})

package/templates/harness/minimal/.claude/settings.json

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+{
+  "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-settings.json",
+  "permissions": {
+    "allow": [
+      "Read", "Glob", "Grep",
+      "Bash(git status*)", "Bash(git diff*)", "Bash(git log*)", "Bash(git show*)",
+      "Bash(pnpm *)", "Bash(node *)"
+    ],
+    "deny": [
+      "Read(.env*)", "Read(**/.env*)",
+      "Read(*.pem)", "Read(**/*.pem)", "Read(*.key)", "Read(**/*.key)",
+      "Bash(git reset --hard*)", "Bash(git push --force*)",
+      "Bash(rm -rf*)", "Bash(git commit*)"
+    ]
+  },
+  "hooks": {
+    "PreToolUse": [{
+      "matcher": "Bash|Read|Write|Edit|MultiEdit|Grep|Agent",
+      "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "node .claude/hooks/guard-tool.cjs", "timeout": 10 }]
+    }],
+    "Stop": [{
+      "matcher": ".*",
+      "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "node .claude/hooks/quality-gate.cjs stop", "timeout": 300 }]
+    }]
+  },
+  "disableBypassPermissionsMode": "disable"
+}

package/templates/harness/minimal/CLAUDE.md

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+# Claude Code 项目指南
+
+本项目使用最小 harness 配置：安全守护（guard-tool）+ 质量门禁（quality-gate）。
+
+## 项目事实
+- 技术栈：Vue 3、TypeScript、Vite
+- 包管理器：pnpm
+
+## 质量门禁
+- 代码变更运行 `pnpm check`（type-check + lint + format:check）。
+- 不读取、不写入密钥文件。
+- 不自动提交。