@devlab.group/agent-commerce 1.4.1 → 1.5.0

package/dist/ap2.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Every failure the AP2 verifier can report.\n *\n * `CommerceError.message` reaches the client, and a mandate carries the\n * buyer's purchase and often personal data, so messages are fixed phrases from\n * the list below. The machine-readable code goes in `details.reason` and the\n * original exception on `cause`, which is never serialised.\n *\n * Three codes: AUTHORIZATION_INVALID when the buyer's mandate is bad,\n * AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED when it is good but spent, and\n * AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE when our verifier never reached a\n * verdict. Blaming the buyer for our outage refuses a good mandate.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Coarse on purpose: a client learns roughly where its mandate was refused,\n * not which check failed. Finer detail is an oracle for probing trust policy.\n */\nexport const AP2_REJECTION_REASONS = [\n  'malformed_presentation',\n  'untrusted_issuer',\n  'unknown_key',\n  'invalid_signature',\n  'unsupported_algorithm',\n  'invalid_claims',\n  'expired',\n  'wrong_audience',\n  'unsupported_mandate_type',\n  'checkout_binding_failed',\n  'purchase_mismatch',\n] as const;\n\nexport type Ap2RejectionReason = (typeof AP2_REJECTION_REASONS)[number];\n\nconst MESSAGES: Readonly<Record<Ap2RejectionReason, string>> = {\n  malformed_presentation: 'The authorization is not a well-formed SD-JWT presentation.',\n  untrusted_issuer: 'The mandate was issued by a party this merchant does not trust.',\n  unknown_key: 'The mandate names a signing key this merchant does not trust.',\n  invalid_signature: 'The mandate signature did not verify.',\n  unsupported_algorithm: 'The mandate uses a signature or digest algorithm that is not accepted.',\n  invalid_claims: 'The mandate is missing required claims or they are malformed.',\n  expired: 'The mandate is expired or not yet valid.',\n  wrong_audience: 'The mandate is addressed to a different audience.',\n  unsupported_mandate_type: 'The mandate is not a closed Direct Checkout Mandate.',\n  checkout_binding_failed: 'The merchant checkout document bound to the mandate did not verify.',\n  purchase_mismatch: 'The mandate does not authorize this purchase.',\n};\n\nexport interface Ap2ErrorContext {\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly cause?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** The buyer's mandate is bad. Fail closed */\nexport function ap2Rejected(\n  reason: Ap2RejectionReason,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', MESSAGES[reason], {\n    details: { method: 'ap2', reason },\n    ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n    ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * The mandate verified but has already been presented. A separate code from\n * a bad mandate: nothing is wrong with this proof except that it is spent\n */\nexport function ap2Replayed(state: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED',\n    'This mandate has already been presented and cannot authorize another purchase.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'replayed', state },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The check never ran (a configured key that will not import, say). Retryable,\n * and never recorded against the payer: the mandate may be perfectly good.\n */\nexport function ap2Unavailable(detail: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n    'Authorization could not be verified right now. This is a merchant-side fault, not a problem with the presented mandate.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'verifier_unavailable', detail },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n      ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * Binds a verified mandate to the purchase in front of us.\n *\n * A perfect mandate authorises exactly one purchase; without this comparison a\n * mandate approved for a $0.01 report would settle a $500 one.\n *\n * Everything is compared against the ALREADY RESOLVED request. Nothing is\n * taken from the mandate and used to shape the purchase, which would invert\n * the control.\n */\nimport canonicalize from 'canonicalize';\nimport type { AuthorizationVerificationContext } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types.js';\n\n/**\n * All required. Absent is a mismatch, never a skipped check: a mandate that\n * will not say which resource or how much authorises nothing in particular.\n */\nconst REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS = [\n  'profile',\n  'resource_id',\n  'input_hash',\n  'amount',\n  'currency',\n  'payment_method',\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * RFC 8785 (JCS) digest of the validated resource input.\n *\n * Binds a mandate to the exact request, not just to a resource and a price:\n * without it, one mandate for `translate` would authorise any translation.\n *\n * `canonicalize` rather than a sorted-key `JSON.stringify`, which differs\n * exactly where it matters. The merchant's signer computes this same digest,\n * probably in another language, and the two agree only if both follow RFC\n * 8785's number formatting and UTF-16 key ordering.\n *\n * The caller passes what the backend will receive: validated, reserved fields\n * stripped, no request id or transport metadata (the buyer could not have\n * known those when they approved).\n */\nexport async function computeInputHash(input: unknown): Promise<string> {\n  const canonical = canonicalize(input ?? {});\n  // undefined means JSON cannot represent it. Input has already passed schema\n  // validation, so this is something exotic getting past it, not a buyer error.\n  if (canonical === undefined) {\n    throw new TypeError('resource input is not canonicalizable JSON');\n  }\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(canonical));\n  return Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url');\n}\n\n/** What the mandate turned out to authorise, once it matched */\nexport interface BoundPurchase {\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly amount: string;\n  readonly currency: string;\n  readonly paymentMethod: string;\n}\n\nfunction asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)\n    ? (value as Record<string, unknown>)\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws on the first mismatch with one coarse reason. Which field disagreed\n * is not reported: a caller able to ask about one field at a time can read a\n * mandate's contents out of the gateway by elimination.\n */\nexport async function bindMandateToPurchase(\n  mandate: VerifiedCheckoutMandate,\n  context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<BoundPurchase> {\n  const profile = asRecord(mandate.checkoutClaims['agent_commerce']);\n  if (profile === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n\n  for (const claim of REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS) {\n    const value = profile[claim];\n    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n      throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const requirement = context.requirement;\n  const expectedInputHash = await computeInputHash(context.input);\n\n  const mustMatch: readonly (readonly [string, unknown])[] = [\n    ['profile', AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE],\n    ['resource_id', context.resourceId],\n    ['input_hash', expectedInputHash],\n    // Decimal strings on both sides. Comparing numerically would make \"0.10\"\n    // and \"0.1\" equal, and a mandate says what it says.\n    ['amount', requirement.amount],\n    ['currency', requirement.currency],\n    ['payment_method', requirement.provider],\n  ];\n\n  for (const [claim, expected] of mustMatch) {\n    if (profile[claim] !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n\n  // Checked whenever EITHER side names one, which is the fail-closed reading.\n  // A mandate silent about the chain must not unlock a mainnet settlement, and\n  // one naming a chain the requirement lacks was approved for another rail.\n  for (const [claim, expected] of [\n    ['destination', requirement.destination],\n    ['network', requirement.network],\n    ['asset', requirement.asset],\n  ] as const) {\n    const declared = profile[claim];\n    if (declared === undefined && expected === undefined) continue;\n    if (declared !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    resourceId: profile['resource_id'] as string,\n    amount: profile['amount'] as string,\n    currency: profile['currency'] as string,\n    paymentMethod: profile['payment_method'] as string,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Merchant-side helper: mint the checkout JWT a Checkout Mandate binds.\n *\n * The gateway only verifies. This is what a merchant runs in their own\n * process, with their own key, to produce the document the buyer approves. It\n * never calls the gateway and the gateway never calls it - the mirror of\n * `createPaymentProof`, which a buyer runs to produce a payment proof.\n *\n * It exists for `input_hash`, an RFC 8785 digest. A signer reaching for a\n * sorted-key `JSON.stringify` agrees on most inputs and disagrees on floats\n * and non-ASCII keys, and the mandate is then refused with a reason that does\n * not say which field disagreed.\n */\nimport { importPKCS8, type JWK, SignJWT } from 'jose';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_JWK_CURVE,\n  AP2_KEY_TYPE,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n} from './constants.js';\nimport { computeInputHash } from './profile.js';\n\n/**\n * A private ES256 key: either a private JWK (the pair of the public one in the\n * gateway's `checkoutIssuers`) or a PKCS#8 PEM, as `openssl` emits it.\n */\nexport type Ap2SigningKey = Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | string;\n\nexport interface CreateCheckoutJwtOptions {\n  readonly privateKey: Ap2SigningKey;\n  /** Must match a `kid` configured under the gateway's `checkoutIssuers` */\n  readonly kid: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `issuer` */\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `audience` */\n  readonly audience: string;\n\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  /**\n   * The resource input this purchase is for, exactly as the buyer will send\n   * it: no reserved fields, no request id, no transport metadata.\n   */\n  readonly input: unknown;\n\n  /**\n   * Decimal string, never a number, and compared as a string: `0.10` and `0.1`\n   * are different mandates. Take it from your own catalogue rather than from\n   * whatever the agent asked for.\n   */\n  readonly amount: string;\n  readonly currency: string;\n  /** The rail that will settle, e.g. `x402` */\n  readonly paymentMethod: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Settlement coordinates. Required whenever the gateway's requirement names\n   * them, which under x402 is always. A mandate silent about the chain will\n   * not unlock a settlement on one.\n   */\n  readonly destination?: string;\n  readonly network?: string;\n  readonly asset?: string;\n\n  /** Defaults to a random UUID. Recorded on the receipt and used for replay defence */\n  readonly jwtId?: string;\n  /** Defaults to 900: a human approval sits inside this window */\n  readonly expiresInSeconds?: number;\n  /** Injectable so a test need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: Date;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS = 900;\n\nfunction requireText(value: unknown, field: string): string {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: ${field} must be a non-empty string, received ${describe(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\nfunction describe(value: unknown): string {\n  return value === null ? 'null' : typeof value;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every rejection here is a mistake that would otherwise surface as an opaque\n * verification failure much later: the public half of the pair, the wrong key\n * type, or a PEM that is not PKCS#8.\n */\nasync function resolveKey(\n  key: Ap2SigningKey,\n): Promise<JWK | Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importPKCS8>>> {\n  if (typeof key === 'string') {\n    if (!key.includes('BEGIN PRIVATE KEY')) {\n      throw new TypeError(\n        'createCheckoutJwt: a string privateKey must be a PKCS#8 PEM beginning \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\"',\n      );\n    }\n    return importPKCS8(key, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n  }\n  if (typeof key !== 'object' || key === null) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be a private JWK or a PKCS#8 PEM');\n  }\n  if (key['d'] === undefined) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: privateKey is a public JWK (no \"d\"). Use the private half of the pair whose public key is configured under checkoutIssuers',\n    );\n  }\n  if (key['kty'] !== AP2_KEY_TYPE || key['crv'] !== AP2_JWK_CURVE) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be ${AP2_KEY_TYPE}/${AP2_JWK_CURVE}, the pair ${AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM} implies`,\n    );\n  }\n  return key as JWK;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the compact JWT to hand to the agent, which wraps it in the Checkout\n * Mandate the buyer signs.\n */\nexport async function createCheckoutJwt(options: CreateCheckoutJwtOptions): Promise<string> {\n  const kid = requireText(options.kid, 'kid');\n  const issuer = requireText(options.issuer, 'issuer');\n  const audience = requireText(options.audience, 'audience');\n  const resourceId = requireText(options.resourceId, 'resourceId');\n  const currency = requireText(options.currency, 'currency');\n  const paymentMethod = requireText(options.paymentMethod, 'paymentMethod');\n\n  if (typeof options.amount === 'number') {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: amount must be a decimal string, not a number. It is compared as a string, so 0.1 and \"0.10\" are different mandates',\n    );\n  }\n  const amount = requireText(options.amount, 'amount');\n\n  const key = await resolveKey(options.privateKey);\n  const issuedAt = Math.floor((options.now ?? new Date()).getTime() / 1000);\n  const expiresIn = options.expiresInSeconds ?? DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS;\n  if (!Number.isInteger(expiresIn) || expiresIn <= 0) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: expiresInSeconds must be a positive whole number');\n  }\n\n  const agentCommerce: Record<string, string> = {\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n    resource_id: resourceId,\n    input_hash: await computeInputHash(options.input),\n    amount,\n    currency,\n    payment_method: paymentMethod,\n    ...(options.destination !== undefined ? { destination: options.destination } : {}),\n    ...(options.network !== undefined ? { network: options.network } : {}),\n    ...(options.asset !== undefined ? { asset: options.asset } : {}),\n  };\n\n  return new SignJWT({ agent_commerce: agentCommerce })\n    .setProtectedHeader({ alg: AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, kid, typ: 'JWT' })\n    .setIssuer(issuer)\n    .setAudience(audience)\n    .setIssuedAt(issuedAt)\n    .setExpirationTime(issuedAt + expiresIn)\n    .setJti(options.jwtId ?? crypto.randomUUID())\n    .sign(key);\n}\n","/**\n * Adapter self-description.\n *\n * Imports nothing but core types and the pins, so `doctor` can report AP2\n * without pulling `jose` or `@sd-jwt/core` into the CLI bundle.\n */\nimport type { AdapterDescriptor } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n} from './constants.js';\n\n/** What this provider actually verifies */\nexport const AP2_CAPABILITIES: readonly string[] = [\n  'direct-mode',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  'sd-jwt-presentation',\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  'static-inline-trust',\n  'merchant-checkout-jwt-binding',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  'purchase-binding',\n  'replay-defence',\n];\n\n/**\n * Everything an AP2 client may reasonably expect and will not get here.\n * Complete on purpose: a short list reads as \"mostly compatible\", which is the\n * blanket claim alpha honesty forbids.\n */\nexport const AP2_UNSUPPORTED: readonly string[] = [\n  // Mandate kinds. Open mandates carry spending constraints nothing here\n  // evaluates, so accepting one would tell a buyer their limits were checked.\n  'autonomous mode',\n  'open checkout mandates (mandate.checkout.open.1)',\n  'intent mandates',\n  'cart mandates',\n  'spending constraint evaluation',\n  'cnf-bound agent keys',\n  // Key handling. Every key is written into config by an operator\n  'JWKS and any key discovery by URL (jku, x5u)',\n  'issuer metadata fetching',\n  'key rotation without a config change',\n  // Algorithms\n  'signature algorithms other than ES256',\n  'digest algorithms other than sha-256',\n  // Roles this gateway does not play\n  'mandate issuance',\n  'merchant checkout JWT issuance',\n  'AP2 over the ACP checkout adapter',\n];\n\nexport function buildAp2Descriptor(implementationVersion: string): AdapterDescriptor {\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    kind: 'authorization',\n    implementationVersion,\n    supportedSpec: `ap2/v${AP2_SPEC_VERSION} mode=direct`,\n    capabilities: AP2_CAPABILITIES,\n    status: 'experimental',\n    unsupported: AP2_UNSUPPORTED,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Durable record of which mandates have been spent.\n *\n * Its own table in its own file: an x402 payment replay key expires with its\n * on-chain authorisation, while a consumed mandate must stay consumed for as\n * long as the merchant can be asked what they delivered. Hence no retention\n * sweep here, unlike the ACP idempotency store next door - deleting a\n * `consumed` row makes that mandate spendable again. If the table ever needs\n * bounding, archive `released` rows and leave the rest.\n *\n * Settlement and a local commit are not one transaction. If the process dies\n * between them the row stays `reserved` and that mandate is refused from then\n * on: a refused retry costs a round trip, the other direction costs a second\n * payment.\n */\nimport type { Database } from 'better-sqlite3';\nimport { type Logger, NOOP_LOGGER } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { openSqliteDatabase } from '../../storage/sqlite.js';\n\n/**\n * `released` is \"nothing happened\" and the only state a mandate can be\n * presented from again. `uncertain` is a settlement whose outcome we never\n * learned: not reusable, but findable by an operator reconciling by hand.\n */\nexport type Ap2AuthorizationState = 'reserved' | 'consumed' | 'released' | 'uncertain';\n\n/**\n * A digest and a few identifiers: everything replay defence needs, and nothing\n * a leaked database would hand an attacker\n */\nexport interface Ap2ReservationRequest {\n  /**\n   * Digest of the ISSUER-SIGNED TOKEN, not of the presentation. Selective\n   * disclosure gives one mandate many presentation strings, so keying on the\n   * presentation would let it be spent once per disclosed subset.\n   */\n  readonly reference: string;\n  /** `jti` of the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds */\n  readonly checkoutJti: string;\n  readonly mandateIssuer: string;\n  readonly checkoutIssuer: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly requestId: string;\n}\n\nexport type Ap2ReservationResult =\n  | { readonly kind: 'reserved' }\n  /** Already reserved, consumed, or of uncertain outcome. Never re-spendable */\n  | { readonly kind: 'replayed'; readonly state: Ap2AuthorizationState };\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStore {\n  /** Atomically claim a mandate, or report that something already holds it */\n  reserve(request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult;\n  /** Settlement succeeded: spend it permanently */\n  consume(reference: string): void;\n  /** Nothing happened: hand it back so a corrected retry can use it */\n  release(reference: string): void;\n  /** Settlement outcome unknown. Not reusable, and flagged for a human */\n  markUncertain(reference: string): void;\n  /** Current state, for tests and diagnostics */\n  stateOf(reference: string): Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n  close(): void;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStoreOptions {\n  /** File path, or ':memory:' for tests */\n  readonly path: string;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: () => number;\n}\n\ninterface StateRow {\n  state: string;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2ReplayStore(options: Ap2ReplayStoreOptions): Ap2ReplayStore {\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n  const now = options.now ?? (() => Date.now());\n\n  const db: Database = openSqliteDatabase({\n    path: options.path,\n    label: 'AP2 authorization database',\n    logger,\n  });\n  migrate(db);\n\n  const selectByReference = db.prepare<[string], StateRow>(\n    'SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations WHERE reference = ?',\n  );\n  // Two mandates can bind one checkout document, giving two references, so\n  // the reference alone would not catch the second one\n  const selectLiveByJti = db.prepare<[string, string], StateRow>(\n    `SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations\n      WHERE checkout_jti = ? AND reference != ? AND state != 'released'`,\n  );\n  const insert = db.prepare(\n    `INSERT INTO ap2_authorizations\n       (reference, checkout_jti, mandate_issuer, checkout_issuer, resource_id, request_id,\n        state, created_at, updated_at)\n     VALUES (@reference, @checkout_jti, @mandate_issuer, @checkout_issuer, @resource_id,\n             @request_id, 'reserved', @at, @at)`,\n  );\n  const reReserve = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations\n        SET state = 'reserved', request_id = @request_id, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'released'`,\n  );\n  // Guarded on `reserved`: releasing a `consumed` row would hand back a\n  // mandate whose money has already moved\n  const transition = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations SET state = @state, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'reserved'`,\n  );\n\n  const reserveTx = db.transaction((request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult => {\n    const at = new Date(now()).toISOString();\n\n    const existing = selectByReference.get(request.reference);\n    if (existing !== undefined) {\n      if (existing.state !== 'released') {\n        return { kind: 'replayed', state: existing.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n      }\n      reReserve.run({ reference: request.reference, request_id: request.requestId, at });\n      return { kind: 'reserved' };\n    }\n\n    const sameCheckout = selectLiveByJti.get(request.checkoutJti, request.reference);\n    if (sameCheckout !== undefined) {\n      return { kind: 'replayed', state: sameCheckout.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n    }\n\n    insert.run({\n      reference: request.reference,\n      checkout_jti: request.checkoutJti,\n      mandate_issuer: request.mandateIssuer,\n      checkout_issuer: request.checkoutIssuer,\n      resource_id: request.resourceId,\n      request_id: request.requestId,\n      at,\n    });\n    return { kind: 'reserved' };\n  });\n\n  const move = (reference: string, state: Ap2AuthorizationState): void => {\n    transition.run({ reference, state, at: new Date(now()).toISOString() });\n  };\n\n  let closed = false;\n  return {\n    reserve(request) {\n      return reserveTx(request);\n    },\n    consume(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'consumed');\n    },\n    release(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'released');\n    },\n    markUncertain(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'uncertain');\n    },\n    stateOf(reference) {\n      return selectByReference.get(reference)?.state as Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n    },\n    close() {\n      if (closed) return;\n      closed = true;\n      db.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n// `PRAGMA user_version`, so reopening an existing file is a no-op check\nfunction migrate(db: Database): void {\n  const current = db.pragma('user_version', { simple: true }) as number;\n  if (current >= 1) return;\n  const apply = db.transaction(() => {\n    db.exec(`\n      CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ap2_authorizations (\n        reference        TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n        checkout_jti     TEXT NOT NULL,\n        mandate_issuer   TEXT NOT NULL,\n        checkout_issuer  TEXT NOT NULL,\n        resource_id      TEXT NOT NULL,\n        request_id       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        state            TEXT NOT NULL\n                         CHECK (state IN ('reserved', 'consumed', 'released', 'uncertain')),\n        created_at       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        updated_at       TEXT NOT NULL\n      );\n      CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ap2_authorizations_checkout_jti\n        ON ap2_authorizations(checkout_jti);\n    `);\n    db.pragma('user_version = 1');\n  });\n  apply();\n}\n","/**\n * Stage two: the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds.\n *\n * Two things have to hold. The hash proves the buyer approved *this* document;\n * the signature proves the merchant issued it. Hash alone accepts a document\n * the buyer wrote themselves; signature alone accepts a genuine merchant\n * document this mandate never covered.\n */\nimport { type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust.js';\n\nexport interface VerifiedCheckoutJwt {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  readonly jwtId: string;\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\nfunction decodeSegment(jwt: string, index: 0 | 1): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  const segment = jwt.split('.')[index];\n  if (segment === undefined) return undefined;\n  try {\n    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(segment, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));\n    return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null && !Array.isArray(parsed)\n      ? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)\n      : undefined;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * `mandateClaims` must come from an already-verified mandate: `checkout_hash`\n * is worth nothing unless the issuer signed it\n */\nexport async function verifyCheckoutJwt(\n  mandateClaims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutJwt> {\n  const compact = mandateClaims['checkout_jwt'];\n  const expectedHash = mandateClaims['checkout_hash'];\n  if (typeof compact !== 'string' || compact.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  if (typeof expectedHash !== 'string' || expectedHash.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n\n  await requireMatchingHash(compact, expectedHash, context);\n\n  const header = decodeSegment(compact, 0);\n  const unverifiedPayload = decodeSegment(compact, 1);\n  if (header === undefined || unverifiedPayload === undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', context);\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(\n    unverifiedPayload['iss'],\n    header['kid'],\n    context,\n  );\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(compact, key, options);\n    claims = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  const exp = claims['exp'];\n  const iat = claims['iat'];\n  const jti = claims['jti'];\n  // jose validates a time claim only when present, so requiring them is ours\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  // `jti` is what replay defence and the receipt record, so it is required\n  if (typeof jti !== 'string' || jti.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, jwtId: jti, claims };\n}\n\n/**\n * Hashed as the bytes that arrived, never re-encoded from parsed claims: a\n * re-serialised payload has a different digest, and normalising first would\n * hash a document other than the one being verified\n */\nasync function requireMatchingHash(\n  compact: string,\n  expected: string,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // sha-256 only: `_sd_alg` was already pinned to it upstream\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(compact));\n  const actual = Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url');\n  // Plain comparison: both sides are public to anyone holding the\n  // presentation, so there is no secret for timing to leak\n  if (actual !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', context);\n}\n","/**\n * Stage one: parse the presentation, verify the issuer's signature, resolve\n * the disclosures.\n *\n * Disclosure mechanics come from `@sd-jwt/core`, which refuses the three\n * attacks that live in that algorithm: an appended disclosure nothing\n * references, the same disclosure twice, and one that will not decode.\n * Cryptography is `jose`'s. This file supplies the policy: which key, which\n * algorithm, which audience, what counts as fresh.\n */\nimport { decodeSdJwt, getClaims, splitSdJwt } from '@sd-jwt/core';\nimport { type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n} from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust.js';\n\nexport interface VerifiedMandate {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Every claim, with the presented disclosures resolved into place */\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  /**\n   * The issuer-signed token on its own, without the disclosures.\n   *\n   * This, not the presentation string, is the stable identity of a mandate:\n   * disclosing or withholding an optional claim rewrites the presentation and\n   * leaves the signed token untouched. Replay defence keys on a digest of it.\n   */\n  readonly signedToken: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * `@sd-jwt/core` passes the algorithm it read from `_sd_alg`, so this is also\n * where a presentation declaring anything but sha-256 is refused\n */\nasync function hasher(data: string | ArrayBuffer, algorithm: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  if (algorithm.toLowerCase() !== AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM) {\n    throw new Error(`unsupported digest algorithm ${algorithm}`);\n  }\n  const bytes = typeof data === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(data) : new Uint8Array(data);\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes));\n}\n\nfunction asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)\n    ? (value as Record<string, unknown>)\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Order is the security boundary here: nothing is trusted until `jwtVerify`\n * returns. `kid` and `iss` are read before that only to pick which configured\n * key to try, and picking wrong just makes the signature fail.\n */\nexport async function verifyMandate(\n  presentation: string,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedMandate> {\n  let decoded: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof decodeSdJwt>>;\n  let encodedJws: string;\n  try {\n    // Covers a malformed base JWT, a disclosure that will not decode, a\n    // duplicate digest, and an `_sd_alg` this release does not implement\n    decoded = await decodeSdJwt(presentation, hasher);\n    encodedJws = splitSdJwt(presentation).jwt;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  // Direct mode issues no key-bound mandates, so one arriving here belongs to\n  // a flow we do not verify. Ignoring it would mean silently not checking a\n  // proof that was sent.\n  if (decoded.kbJwt !== undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n\n  const rawPayload = asRecord(decoded.jwt.payload);\n  const header = asRecord(decoded.jwt.header);\n  if (rawPayload === undefined || header === undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(rawPayload['iss'], header['kid'], context);\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    // Redundant today (the key is EC, so jose already refuses `alg: none` and\n    // a forged HMAC) and kept for the day this resolves a key set instead of\n    // one key, where the header would get to pick\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    // Also redundant, and for the same reason: the key was resolved *from*\n    // `iss` against the configured allowlist, so nothing reaching here can\n    // carry a different one. It backstops a future resolver that matches on\n    // something else. `audience` below is not redundant - `aud` is the\n    // presenter's claim, checked against what the operator configured.\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    // Injected clock, not jose's `Date.now()`, so expiry tests are tests\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let verifiedPayload: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(encodedJws, key, options);\n    verifiedPayload = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected(classifyJoseFailure(cause), { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireFreshness(verifiedPayload, deps, context);\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    // Against the VERIFIED payload: the decoded one would match disclosures\n    // against digests nobody signed\n    claims = (await getClaims(verifiedPayload, decoded.disclosures, hasher)) as Record<\n      string,\n      unknown\n    >;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Where an appended disclosure that no digest references is refused\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireClosedCheckoutMandate(claims, context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, claims, signedToken: encodedJws };\n}\n\n/**\n * Matched on jose's stable error `code`, not its message. A client is owed\n * \"expired\" versus \"did not verify\"; anything finer describes our checks back\n * to whoever is probing them.\n */\nfunction classifyJoseFailure(cause: unknown): 'expired' | 'wrong_audience' | 'invalid_signature' {\n  const code = (cause as { code?: unknown })?.code;\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_EXPIRED') return 'expired';\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_CLAIM_VALIDATION_FAILED') {\n    const claim = (cause as { claim?: unknown }).claim;\n    if (claim === 'aud') return 'wrong_audience';\n    if (claim === 'nbf' || claim === 'exp') return 'expired';\n  }\n  return 'invalid_signature';\n}\n\n/**\n * Required, not merely checked when present: jose validates a time claim only\n * if it is there, so a mandate omitting `exp` would verify and never expire\n */\nfunction requireFreshness(\n  payload: Record<string, unknown>,\n  deps: { readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  const exp = payload['exp'];\n  const iat = payload['iat'];\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  // A future `iat` is a broken signer, or a mandate minted to outlive its own\n  // expiry window\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n}\n\n// Exactly `mandate.checkout.1`; see AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT for why\nfunction requireClosedCheckoutMandate(\n  claims: Record<string, unknown>,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  if (claims['vct'] !== AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Static key resolution.\n *\n * Every key was written into `config.yaml` by an operator. No JWKS fetch, no\n * `jku`, no `x5u`. A mandate's `iss` and `kid` only choose *which* trusted key\n * verifies it; an unrecognised pair is refused, so a mandate can never\n * nominate its own signer.\n *\n * Not a \"try every key\" loop: that would make `kid` advisory and accept a\n * mandate that named a key it was not signed with.\n */\nimport { importJWK, type JWK } from 'jose';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected, ap2Unavailable } from './errors.js';\nimport type { Ap2TrustedIssuer } from './types.js';\n\n/** Named off `importJWK` because `CryptoKey` is a DOM type we do not load */\nexport type VerificationKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importJWK>>;\n\nexport interface ResolvedKey {\n  readonly issuer: Ap2TrustedIssuer;\n  readonly key: VerificationKey;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves `(iss, kid)` against one configured issuer list. Caches the import\n * promise, not the key, so concurrent requests for a cold key share one import.\n */\nexport function createTrustStore(issuers: readonly Ap2TrustedIssuer[]) {\n  const byIssuer = new Map(issuers.map((entry) => [entry.issuer, entry]));\n  const imported = new Map<string, Promise<VerificationKey>>();\n\n  return {\n    /** Every trusted issuer id, for diagnostics. Never the keys themselves */\n    issuerIds(): readonly string[] {\n      return [...byIssuer.keys()];\n    },\n\n    async resolve(iss: unknown, kid: unknown, context: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<ResolvedKey> {\n      if (typeof iss !== 'string' || iss.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n      }\n      const issuer = byIssuer.get(iss);\n      if (issuer === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('untrusted_issuer', context);\n\n      // Not defaulted to the issuer's only key: mid-rotation there are two,\n      // and the gateway should not guess which one signed this\n      if (typeof kid !== 'string' || kid.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n      }\n      const trusted = issuer.keys.find((candidate) => candidate.kid === kid);\n      if (trusted === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n\n      // JSON, not a joined string: both halves are operator-chosen and could\n      // contain whatever separator we picked\n      const cacheKey = JSON.stringify([iss, kid]);\n      let pending = imported.get(cacheKey);\n      if (pending === undefined) {\n        pending = importJWK(trusted.jwk as JWK, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n        imported.set(cacheKey, pending);\n      }\n\n      try {\n        return { issuer, key: await pending };\n      } catch (cause) {\n        // Config already checked this JWK member by member, so reaching here\n        // means our config is broken, not the mandate. Drop the cached\n        // rejection so a fixed config is not still failing against it.\n        imported.delete(cacheKey);\n        throw ap2Unavailable('configured verification key could not be imported', {\n          ...context,\n          cause,\n        });\n      }\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport type TrustStore = ReturnType<typeof createTrustStore>;\n","/**\n * The Direct Checkout Mandate verifier: mandate signature first, then the\n * merchant checkout JWT it binds. Either stage failing is a refusal.\n *\n * What this proves is narrow. A trusted issuer signed this mandate, it has not\n * expired, it is addressed to us, and it binds a checkout document the\n * merchant signed. It does NOT prove the mandate authorises the purchase in\n * front of us: that is profile.ts, and a caller treating this as permission to\n * settle has skipped it.\n */\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { verifyCheckoutJwt } from './checkout-jwt.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport { verifyMandate } from './sd-jwt.js';\nimport { createTrustStore } from './trust.js';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config, VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types.js';\n\nexport interface Ap2VerifierOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock: Clock;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  verify(presentation: string, context?: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate>;\n  /** Trusted issuer ids, for `doctor`. Counts and names only, never keys */\n  trustedIssuers(): { readonly mandate: readonly string[]; readonly checkout: readonly string[] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Algorithm-prefixed so a future digest change is visible in stored references\n * rather than silently producing unequal values for one mandate\n */\nasync function mandateReference(signedToken: string): Promise<string> {\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(signedToken));\n  return `sha256:${Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url')}`;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2MandateVerifier(options: Ap2VerifierOptions): Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  // Two stores, not one list: signing the merchant's checkout documents must\n  // not confer the power to issue mandates\n  const mandateTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.mandateIssuers);\n  const checkoutTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.checkoutIssuers);\n  const deps = { clock: options.clock, clockSkewSeconds: options.config.clockSkewSeconds };\n\n  return {\n    async verify(\n      presentation: string,\n      context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n    ): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate> {\n      if (typeof presentation !== 'string' || presentation.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n      }\n\n      const mandate = await verifyMandate(presentation, { ...deps, trust: mandateTrust }, context);\n      const checkout = await verifyCheckoutJwt(\n        mandate.claims,\n        { ...deps, trust: checkoutTrust },\n        context,\n      );\n\n      return {\n        reference: await mandateReference(mandate.signedToken),\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.issuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: checkout.issuer,\n        checkoutJwtId: checkout.jwtId,\n        checkoutClaims: checkout.claims,\n        mandateClaims: mandate.claims,\n      };\n    },\n\n    trustedIssuers() {\n      return { mandate: mandateTrust.issuerIds(), checkout: checkoutTrust.issuerIds() };\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * The AP2 authorization provider: the seam between core's generic contract and\n * the mandate machinery.\n *\n * Owns the replay database, so the gateway owns this object's lifetime and\n * closes it on shutdown.\n */\nimport type {\n  AdapterHealth,\n  AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  AuthorizationProvider,\n  AuthorizationRequirement,\n  AuthorizationVerification,\n  AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  Clock,\n  Logger,\n} from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { NOOP_LOGGER, systemClock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { PACKAGE_VERSION } from '../../version.js';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_SPEC_VERSION } from './constants.js';\nimport { buildAp2Descriptor } from './descriptor.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Replayed, ap2Unavailable } from './errors.js';\nimport { bindMandateToPurchase } from './profile.js';\nimport { type Ap2ReplayStore, createAp2ReplayStore } from './replay-store.js';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config } from './types.js';\nimport { createAp2MandateVerifier } from './verifier.js';\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock?: Clock;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not touch the filesystem */\n  readonly replayStore?: Ap2ReplayStore;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProvider extends AuthorizationProvider {\n  /** Closes the replay database */\n  close(): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * A reservation is keyed by the mandate reference, so the handle and the\n * receipt's identity are the same digest. Kept as one name rather than two\n * fields that must never disagree.\n */\nexport function createAp2AuthorizationProvider(\n  options: Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions,\n): Ap2AuthorizationProvider {\n  const clock = options.clock ?? systemClock;\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n\n  const verifier = createAp2MandateVerifier({ config: options.config, clock });\n  const replay =\n    options.replayStore ?? createAp2ReplayStore({ path: options.config.replay.path, logger });\n\n  const requirement: AuthorizationRequirement = {\n    method: 'ap2',\n    version: AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  };\n\n  async function verifyAndReserve(\n    context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  ): Promise<AuthorizationVerification> {\n    const errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext = {\n      requestId: context.requestId,\n      resourceId: context.resourceId,\n    };\n\n    const mandate = await verifier.verify(context.submission.payload, errorContext);\n    // Before reserving, not after: a mandate that does not authorize this\n    // purchase must stay spendable on the purchase it does authorize\n    await bindMandateToPurchase(mandate, context, errorContext);\n\n    let reservation: ReturnType<Ap2ReplayStore['reserve']>;\n    try {\n      reservation = replay.reserve({\n        reference: mandate.reference,\n        checkoutJti: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        resourceId: context.resourceId,\n        requestId: context.requestId,\n      });\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable('replay store could not be written', { ...errorContext, cause });\n    }\n\n    if (reservation.kind === 'replayed') {\n      throw ap2Replayed(reservation.state, errorContext);\n    }\n\n    return {\n      status: 'verified',\n      method: 'ap2',\n      reference: mandate.reference,\n      reservationId: mandate.reference,\n      // Opaque identifiers an operator can reconcile with. Never a claim from\n      // the mandate: those carry the buyer's purchase and their personal data.\n      // `checkoutId`, not `checkoutJwtId` - the receipt store redacts any key\n      // that reads as secret-shaped, and \"jwt\" is on that list.\n      metadata: {\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        checkoutId: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  const finalize = (\n    action: 'consume' | 'release' | 'markUncertain',\n    reservationId: string,\n    context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  ): void => {\n    try {\n      replay[action](reservationId);\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable(`replay store could not record ${action}`, { ...context, cause });\n    }\n  };\n\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    descriptor: buildAp2Descriptor(PACKAGE_VERSION),\n    requirement,\n    verifyAndReserve,\n\n    async consume(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('consume', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async release(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('release', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async markUncertain(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('markUncertain', reservationId, context);\n    },\n\n    async health(): Promise<AdapterHealth> {\n      const startedAt = clock.monotonicMs();\n      const trusted = verifier.trustedIssuers();\n      const checkedAt = clock.nowIso();\n      const durationMs = Math.round(clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt);\n      try {\n        // A read against the real table, so a database that opened but cannot\n        // be queried is caught here rather than on the first purchase\n        replay.stateOf('health-probe');\n      } catch {\n        // A fixed token, never a sentence built from the caught error\n        return { status: 'fail', checkedAt, durationMs, detail: 'replay-store-unavailable' };\n      }\n      return {\n        status: 'pass',\n        checkedAt,\n        durationMs,\n        detail: `mandate-issuers=${trusted.mandate.length} checkout-issuers=${trusted.checkout.length}`,\n      };\n    },\n\n    close() {\n      replay.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n"]}
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* Every failure the AP2 verifier can report.\n *\n * `CommerceError.message` reaches the client, and a mandate carries the\n * buyer's purchase and often personal data, so messages are fixed phrases from\n * the list below. The machine-readable code goes in `details.reason` and the\n * original exception on `cause`, which is never serialised.\n *\n * Three codes: AUTHORIZATION_INVALID when the buyer's mandate is bad,\n * AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED when it is good but spent, and\n * AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE when our verifier never reached a\n * verdict. Blaming the buyer for our outage refuses a good mandate.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Coarse on purpose: a client learns roughly where its mandate was refused,\n * not which check failed. Finer detail is an oracle for probing trust policy.\n */\nexport const AP2_REJECTION_REASONS = [\n  'malformed_presentation',\n  'untrusted_issuer',\n  'unknown_key',\n  'invalid_signature',\n  'unsupported_algorithm',\n  'invalid_claims',\n  'expired',\n  'wrong_audience',\n  'unsupported_mandate_type',\n  'checkout_binding_failed',\n  'purchase_mismatch',\n] as const;\n\nexport type Ap2RejectionReason = (typeof AP2_REJECTION_REASONS)[number];\n\nconst MESSAGES: Readonly<Record<Ap2RejectionReason, string>> = {\n  malformed_presentation: 'The authorization is not a well-formed SD-JWT presentation.',\n  untrusted_issuer: 'The mandate was issued by a party this merchant does not trust.',\n  unknown_key: 'The mandate names a signing key this merchant does not trust.',\n  invalid_signature: 'The mandate signature did not verify.',\n  unsupported_algorithm: 'The mandate uses a signature or digest algorithm that is not accepted.',\n  invalid_claims: 'The mandate is missing required claims or they are malformed.',\n  expired: 'The mandate is expired or not yet valid.',\n  wrong_audience: 'The mandate is addressed to a different audience.',\n  unsupported_mandate_type: 'The mandate is not a closed Direct Checkout Mandate.',\n  checkout_binding_failed: 'The merchant checkout document bound to the mandate did not verify.',\n  purchase_mismatch: 'The mandate does not authorize this purchase.',\n};\n\nexport interface Ap2ErrorContext {\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly cause?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** The buyer's mandate is bad. Fail closed */\nexport function ap2Rejected(\n  reason: Ap2RejectionReason,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', MESSAGES[reason], {\n    details: { method: 'ap2', reason },\n    ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n    ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * The mandate verified but has already been presented. A separate code from\n * a bad mandate: nothing is wrong with this proof except that it is spent\n */\nexport function ap2Replayed(state: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED',\n    'This mandate has already been presented and cannot authorize another purchase.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'replayed', state },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The check never ran (a configured key that will not import, say). Retryable,\n * and never recorded against the payer: the mandate may be perfectly good.\n */\nexport function ap2Unavailable(detail: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n    'Authorization could not be verified right now. This is a merchant-side fault, not a problem with the presented mandate.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'verifier_unavailable', detail },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n      ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * Binds a verified mandate to the purchase in front of us.\n *\n * A perfect mandate authorises exactly one purchase; without this comparison a\n * mandate approved for a $0.01 report would settle a $500 one.\n *\n * Everything is compared against the ALREADY RESOLVED request. Nothing is\n * taken from the mandate and used to shape the purchase, which would invert\n * the control.\n */\nimport canonicalize from 'canonicalize';\nimport type { AuthorizationVerificationContext } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types.js';\n\n/**\n * All required. Absent is a mismatch, never a skipped check: a mandate that\n * will not say which resource or how much authorises nothing in particular.\n */\nconst REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS = [\n  'profile',\n  'resource_id',\n  'input_hash',\n  'amount',\n  'currency',\n  'payment_method',\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * RFC 8785 (JCS) digest of the validated resource input.\n *\n * Binds a mandate to the exact request, not just to a resource and a price:\n * without it, one mandate for `translate` would authorise any translation.\n *\n * `canonicalize` rather than a sorted-key `JSON.stringify`, which differs\n * exactly where it matters. The merchant's signer computes this same digest,\n * probably in another language, and the two agree only if both follow RFC\n * 8785's number formatting and UTF-16 key ordering.\n *\n * The caller passes what the backend will receive: validated, reserved fields\n * stripped, no request id or transport metadata (the buyer could not have\n * known those when they approved).\n */\nexport async function computeInputHash(input: unknown): Promise<string> {\n  const canonical = canonicalize(input ?? {});\n  // undefined means JSON cannot represent it. Input has already passed schema\n  // validation, so this is something exotic getting past it, not a buyer error.\n  if (canonical === undefined) {\n    throw new TypeError('resource input is not canonicalizable JSON');\n  }\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(canonical));\n  return Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url');\n}\n\n/** What the mandate turned out to authorise, once it matched */\nexport interface BoundPurchase {\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly amount: string;\n  readonly currency: string;\n  readonly paymentMethod: string;\n}\n\nconst EVM_ADDRESS = /^0x[0-9a-f]{40}$/i;\n\n// EIP-55 encodes an address checksum through letter casing, so lowercase and\n// checksummed forms identify the same account. Other values compare exactly.\nfunction sameCoordinate(declared: unknown, expected: string | undefined): boolean {\n  if (typeof declared === 'string' && expected !== undefined) {\n    if (EVM_ADDRESS.test(declared) && EVM_ADDRESS.test(expected)) {\n      return declared.toLowerCase() === expected.toLowerCase();\n    }\n  }\n  return declared === expected;\n}\n\nfunction asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)\n    ? (value as Record<string, unknown>)\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws on the first mismatch with one coarse reason. Which field disagreed\n * is not reported: a caller able to ask about one field at a time can read a\n * mandate's contents out of the gateway by elimination.\n */\nexport async function bindMandateToPurchase(\n  mandate: VerifiedCheckoutMandate,\n  context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<BoundPurchase> {\n  const profile = asRecord(mandate.checkoutClaims['agent_commerce']);\n  if (profile === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n\n  for (const claim of REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS) {\n    const value = profile[claim];\n    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n      throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const requirement = context.requirement;\n  const expectedInputHash = await computeInputHash(context.input);\n\n  const mustMatch: readonly (readonly [string, unknown])[] = [\n    ['profile', AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE],\n    ['resource_id', context.resourceId],\n    ['input_hash', expectedInputHash],\n    // Decimal strings on both sides. Comparing numerically would make \"0.10\"\n    // and \"0.1\" equal, and a mandate says what it says.\n    ['amount', requirement.amount],\n    ['currency', requirement.currency],\n    ['payment_method', requirement.provider],\n  ];\n\n  for (const [claim, expected] of mustMatch) {\n    if (profile[claim] !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n\n  // Checked whenever EITHER side names one, which is the fail-closed reading.\n  // A mandate silent about the chain must not unlock a mainnet settlement, and\n  // one naming a chain the requirement lacks was approved for another rail.\n  for (const [claim, expected] of [\n    ['destination', requirement.destination],\n    ['network', requirement.network],\n    ['asset', requirement.asset],\n  ] as const) {\n    const declared = profile[claim];\n    if (declared === undefined && expected === undefined) continue;\n    if (!sameCoordinate(declared, expected)) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    resourceId: profile['resource_id'] as string,\n    amount: profile['amount'] as string,\n    currency: profile['currency'] as string,\n    paymentMethod: profile['payment_method'] as string,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Merchant-side helper: mint the checkout JWT a Checkout Mandate binds.\n *\n * The gateway only verifies. This is what a merchant runs in their own\n * process, with their own key, to produce the document the buyer approves. It\n * never calls the gateway and the gateway never calls it - the mirror of\n * `createPaymentProof`, which a buyer runs to produce a payment proof.\n *\n * It exists for `input_hash`, an RFC 8785 digest. A signer reaching for a\n * sorted-key `JSON.stringify` agrees on most inputs and disagrees on floats\n * and non-ASCII keys, and the mandate is then refused with a reason that does\n * not say which field disagreed.\n */\nimport { importPKCS8, type JWK, SignJWT } from 'jose';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_JWK_CURVE,\n  AP2_KEY_TYPE,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n} from './constants.js';\nimport { computeInputHash } from './profile.js';\n\n/**\n * A private ES256 key: either a private JWK (the pair of the public one in the\n * gateway's `checkoutIssuers`) or a PKCS#8 PEM, as `openssl` emits it.\n */\nexport type Ap2SigningKey = Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | string;\n\nexport interface CreateCheckoutJwtOptions {\n  readonly privateKey: Ap2SigningKey;\n  /** Must match a `kid` configured under the gateway's `checkoutIssuers` */\n  readonly kid: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `issuer` */\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `audience` */\n  readonly audience: string;\n\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  /**\n   * The resource input this purchase is for, exactly as the buyer will send\n   * it: no reserved fields, no request id, no transport metadata.\n   */\n  readonly input: unknown;\n\n  /**\n   * Decimal string, never a number, and compared as a string: `0.10` and `0.1`\n   * are different mandates. Take it from your own catalogue rather than from\n   * whatever the agent asked for.\n   */\n  readonly amount: string;\n  readonly currency: string;\n  /** The rail that will settle, e.g. `x402` */\n  readonly paymentMethod: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Settlement coordinates. Required whenever the gateway's requirement names\n   * them, which under x402 is always. A mandate silent about the chain will\n   * not unlock a settlement on one.\n   */\n  readonly destination?: string;\n  readonly network?: string;\n  readonly asset?: string;\n\n  /** Defaults to a random UUID. Recorded on the receipt and used for replay defence */\n  readonly jwtId?: string;\n  /** Defaults to 900: a human approval sits inside this window */\n  readonly expiresInSeconds?: number;\n  /** Injectable so a test need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: Date;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS = 900;\n\nfunction requireText(value: unknown, field: string): string {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: ${field} must be a non-empty string, received ${describe(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\nfunction describe(value: unknown): string {\n  return value === null ? 'null' : typeof value;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every rejection here is a mistake that would otherwise surface as an opaque\n * verification failure much later: the public half of the pair, the wrong key\n * type, or a PEM that is not PKCS#8.\n */\nasync function resolveKey(\n  key: Ap2SigningKey,\n): Promise<JWK | Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importPKCS8>>> {\n  if (typeof key === 'string') {\n    if (!key.includes('BEGIN PRIVATE KEY')) {\n      throw new TypeError(\n        'createCheckoutJwt: a string privateKey must be a PKCS#8 PEM beginning \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\"',\n      );\n    }\n    return importPKCS8(key, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n  }\n  if (typeof key !== 'object' || key === null) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be a private JWK or a PKCS#8 PEM');\n  }\n  if (key['d'] === undefined) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: privateKey is a public JWK (no \"d\"). Use the private half of the pair whose public key is configured under checkoutIssuers',\n    );\n  }\n  if (key['kty'] !== AP2_KEY_TYPE || key['crv'] !== AP2_JWK_CURVE) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be ${AP2_KEY_TYPE}/${AP2_JWK_CURVE}, the pair ${AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM} implies`,\n    );\n  }\n  return key as JWK;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the compact JWT to hand to the agent, which wraps it in the Checkout\n * Mandate the buyer signs.\n */\nexport async function createCheckoutJwt(options: CreateCheckoutJwtOptions): Promise<string> {\n  const kid = requireText(options.kid, 'kid');\n  const issuer = requireText(options.issuer, 'issuer');\n  const audience = requireText(options.audience, 'audience');\n  const resourceId = requireText(options.resourceId, 'resourceId');\n  const currency = requireText(options.currency, 'currency');\n  const paymentMethod = requireText(options.paymentMethod, 'paymentMethod');\n\n  if (typeof options.amount === 'number') {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: amount must be a decimal string, not a number. It is compared as a string, so 0.1 and \"0.10\" are different mandates',\n    );\n  }\n  const amount = requireText(options.amount, 'amount');\n\n  const key = await resolveKey(options.privateKey);\n  const issuedAt = Math.floor((options.now ?? new Date()).getTime() / 1000);\n  const expiresIn = options.expiresInSeconds ?? DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS;\n  if (!Number.isInteger(expiresIn) || expiresIn <= 0) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: expiresInSeconds must be a positive whole number');\n  }\n\n  const agentCommerce: Record<string, string> = {\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n    resource_id: resourceId,\n    input_hash: await computeInputHash(options.input),\n    amount,\n    currency,\n    payment_method: paymentMethod,\n    ...(options.destination !== undefined ? { destination: options.destination } : {}),\n    ...(options.network !== undefined ? { network: options.network } : {}),\n    ...(options.asset !== undefined ? { asset: options.asset } : {}),\n  };\n\n  return new SignJWT({ agent_commerce: agentCommerce })\n    .setProtectedHeader({ alg: AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, kid, typ: 'JWT' })\n    .setIssuer(issuer)\n    .setAudience(audience)\n    .setIssuedAt(issuedAt)\n    .setExpirationTime(issuedAt + expiresIn)\n    .setJti(options.jwtId ?? crypto.randomUUID())\n    .sign(key);\n}\n","/**\n * Adapter self-description.\n *\n * Imports nothing but core types and the pins, so `doctor` can report AP2\n * without pulling `jose` or `@sd-jwt/core` into the CLI bundle.\n */\nimport type { AdapterDescriptor } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n} from './constants.js';\n\n/** What this provider actually verifies */\nexport const AP2_CAPABILITIES: readonly string[] = [\n  'direct-mode',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  'sd-jwt-presentation',\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  'static-inline-trust',\n  'merchant-checkout-jwt-binding',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  'purchase-binding',\n  'replay-defence',\n];\n\n/**\n * Everything an AP2 client may reasonably expect and will not get here.\n * Complete on purpose: a short list reads as \"mostly compatible\", which is the\n * blanket claim alpha honesty forbids.\n */\nexport const AP2_UNSUPPORTED: readonly string[] = [\n  // Mandate kinds. Open mandates carry spending constraints nothing here\n  // evaluates, so accepting one would tell a buyer their limits were checked.\n  'autonomous mode',\n  'open checkout mandates (mandate.checkout.open.1)',\n  'intent mandates',\n  'cart mandates',\n  'spending constraint evaluation',\n  'cnf-bound agent keys',\n  // Key handling. Every key is written into config by an operator\n  'JWKS and any key discovery by URL (jku, x5u)',\n  'issuer metadata fetching',\n  'key rotation without a config change',\n  // Algorithms\n  'signature algorithms other than ES256',\n  'digest algorithms other than sha-256',\n  // Roles this gateway does not play\n  'mandate issuance',\n  'AP2 over the ACP checkout adapter',\n];\n\nexport function buildAp2Descriptor(implementationVersion: string): AdapterDescriptor {\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    kind: 'authorization',\n    implementationVersion,\n    supportedSpec: `ap2/v${AP2_SPEC_VERSION} mode=direct`,\n    capabilities: AP2_CAPABILITIES,\n    status: 'experimental',\n    unsupported: AP2_UNSUPPORTED,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Durable record of which mandates have been spent.\n *\n * Its own table in its own file: an x402 payment replay key expires with its\n * on-chain authorisation, while a consumed mandate must stay consumed for as\n * long as the merchant can be asked what they delivered. Hence no retention\n * sweep here, unlike the ACP idempotency store next door - deleting a\n * `consumed` row makes that mandate spendable again. If the table ever needs\n * bounding, archive `released` rows and leave the rest.\n *\n * Settlement and a local commit are not one transaction. If the process dies\n * between them the row stays `reserved` and that mandate is refused from then\n * on: a refused retry costs a round trip, the other direction costs a second\n * payment.\n */\nimport type { Database } from 'better-sqlite3';\nimport { type Logger, NOOP_LOGGER } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { openSqliteDatabase } from '../../storage/sqlite.js';\n\n/**\n * `released` is \"nothing happened\" and the only state a mandate can be\n * presented from again. `uncertain` is a settlement whose outcome we never\n * learned: not reusable, but findable by an operator reconciling by hand.\n */\nexport type Ap2AuthorizationState = 'reserved' | 'consumed' | 'released' | 'uncertain';\n\n/**\n * A digest and a few identifiers: everything replay defence needs, and nothing\n * a leaked database would hand an attacker\n */\nexport interface Ap2ReservationRequest {\n  /**\n   * Digest of the ISSUER-SIGNED TOKEN, not of the presentation. Selective\n   * disclosure gives one mandate many presentation strings, so keying on the\n   * presentation would let it be spent once per disclosed subset.\n   */\n  readonly reference: string;\n  /** `jti` of the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds */\n  readonly checkoutJti: string;\n  readonly mandateIssuer: string;\n  readonly checkoutIssuer: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly requestId: string;\n}\n\nexport type Ap2ReservationResult =\n  | { readonly kind: 'reserved' }\n  /** Already reserved, consumed, or of uncertain outcome. Never re-spendable */\n  | { readonly kind: 'replayed'; readonly state: Ap2AuthorizationState };\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStore {\n  /** Atomically claim a mandate, or report that something already holds it */\n  reserve(request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult;\n  /** Settlement succeeded: spend it permanently */\n  consume(reference: string): void;\n  /** Nothing happened: hand it back so a corrected retry can use it */\n  release(reference: string): void;\n  /** Settlement outcome unknown. Not reusable, and flagged for a human */\n  markUncertain(reference: string): void;\n  /** Current state, for tests and diagnostics */\n  stateOf(reference: string): Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n  close(): void;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStoreOptions {\n  /** File path, or ':memory:' for tests */\n  readonly path: string;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: () => number;\n}\n\ninterface StateRow {\n  state: string;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2ReplayStore(options: Ap2ReplayStoreOptions): Ap2ReplayStore {\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n  const now = options.now ?? (() => Date.now());\n\n  const db: Database = openSqliteDatabase({\n    path: options.path,\n    label: 'AP2 authorization database',\n    logger,\n  });\n  migrate(db);\n\n  const selectByReference = db.prepare<[string], StateRow>(\n    'SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations WHERE reference = ?',\n  );\n  // Two mandates can bind one checkout document, giving two references, so\n  // the reference alone would not catch the second one\n  const selectLiveByJti = db.prepare<[string, string], StateRow>(\n    `SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations\n      WHERE checkout_jti = ? AND reference != ? AND state != 'released'`,\n  );\n  const insert = db.prepare(\n    `INSERT INTO ap2_authorizations\n       (reference, checkout_jti, mandate_issuer, checkout_issuer, resource_id, request_id,\n        state, created_at, updated_at)\n     VALUES (@reference, @checkout_jti, @mandate_issuer, @checkout_issuer, @resource_id,\n             @request_id, 'reserved', @at, @at)`,\n  );\n  const reReserve = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations\n        SET state = 'reserved', request_id = @request_id, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'released'`,\n  );\n  // Guarded on `reserved`: releasing a `consumed` row would hand back a\n  // mandate whose money has already moved\n  const transition = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations SET state = @state, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'reserved'`,\n  );\n\n  const reserveTx = db.transaction((request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult => {\n    const at = new Date(now()).toISOString();\n\n    const existing = selectByReference.get(request.reference);\n    if (existing !== undefined && existing.state !== 'released') {\n      return { kind: 'replayed', state: existing.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n    }\n\n    // Checked for a released reference too: another mandate may have reserved\n    // or spent the same checkout while this one was released\n    const sameCheckout = selectLiveByJti.get(request.checkoutJti, request.reference);\n    if (sameCheckout !== undefined) {\n      return { kind: 'replayed', state: sameCheckout.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n    }\n\n    if (existing !== undefined) {\n      reReserve.run({ reference: request.reference, request_id: request.requestId, at });\n      return { kind: 'reserved' };\n    }\n\n    insert.run({\n      reference: request.reference,\n      checkout_jti: request.checkoutJti,\n      mandate_issuer: request.mandateIssuer,\n      checkout_issuer: request.checkoutIssuer,\n      resource_id: request.resourceId,\n      request_id: request.requestId,\n      at,\n    });\n    return { kind: 'reserved' };\n  });\n\n  const move = (reference: string, state: Ap2AuthorizationState): void => {\n    transition.run({ reference, state, at: new Date(now()).toISOString() });\n  };\n\n  let closed = false;\n  return {\n    reserve(request) {\n      return reserveTx(request);\n    },\n    consume(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'consumed');\n    },\n    release(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'released');\n    },\n    markUncertain(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'uncertain');\n    },\n    stateOf(reference) {\n      return selectByReference.get(reference)?.state as Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n    },\n    close() {\n      if (closed) return;\n      closed = true;\n      db.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n// `PRAGMA user_version`, so reopening an existing file is a no-op check\nfunction migrate(db: Database): void {\n  const current = db.pragma('user_version', { simple: true }) as number;\n  if (current >= 1) return;\n  const apply = db.transaction(() => {\n    db.exec(`\n      CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ap2_authorizations (\n        reference        TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n        checkout_jti     TEXT NOT NULL,\n        mandate_issuer   TEXT NOT NULL,\n        checkout_issuer  TEXT NOT NULL,\n        resource_id      TEXT NOT NULL,\n        request_id       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        state            TEXT NOT NULL\n                         CHECK (state IN ('reserved', 'consumed', 'released', 'uncertain')),\n        created_at       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        updated_at       TEXT NOT NULL\n      );\n      CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ap2_authorizations_checkout_jti\n        ON ap2_authorizations(checkout_jti);\n    `);\n    db.pragma('user_version = 1');\n  });\n  apply();\n}\n","/**\n * Stage two: the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds.\n *\n * Two things have to hold. The hash proves the buyer approved *this* document;\n * the signature proves the merchant issued it. Hash alone accepts a document\n * the buyer wrote themselves; signature alone accepts a genuine merchant\n * document this mandate never covered.\n */\nimport { type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust.js';\n\nexport interface VerifiedCheckoutJwt {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  readonly jwtId: string;\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\nfunction decodeSegment(jwt: string, index: 0 | 1): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  const segment = jwt.split('.')[index];\n  if (segment === undefined) return undefined;\n  try {\n    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(segment, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));\n    return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null && !Array.isArray(parsed)\n      ? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)\n      : undefined;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * `mandateClaims` must come from an already-verified mandate: `checkout_hash`\n * is worth nothing unless the issuer signed it\n */\nexport async function verifyCheckoutJwt(\n  mandateClaims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutJwt> {\n  const compact = mandateClaims['checkout_jwt'];\n  const expectedHash = mandateClaims['checkout_hash'];\n  if (typeof compact !== 'string' || compact.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  if (typeof expectedHash !== 'string' || expectedHash.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n\n  await requireMatchingHash(compact, expectedHash, context);\n\n  const header = decodeSegment(compact, 0);\n  const unverifiedPayload = decodeSegment(compact, 1);\n  if (header === undefined || unverifiedPayload === undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', context);\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(\n    unverifiedPayload['iss'],\n    header['kid'],\n    context,\n  );\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(compact, key, options);\n    claims = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  const exp = claims['exp'];\n  const iat = claims['iat'];\n  const jti = claims['jti'];\n  // jose validates a time claim only when present, so requiring them is ours\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  // `jti` is what replay defence and the receipt record, so it is required\n  if (typeof jti !== 'string' || jti.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, jwtId: jti, claims };\n}\n\n/**\n * Hashed as the bytes that arrived, never re-encoded from parsed claims: a\n * re-serialised payload has a different digest, and normalising first would\n * hash a document other than the one being verified\n */\nasync function requireMatchingHash(\n  compact: string,\n  expected: string,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // sha-256 only: `_sd_alg` was already pinned to it upstream\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(compact));\n  const actual = Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url');\n  // Plain comparison: both sides are public to anyone holding the\n  // presentation, so there is no secret for timing to leak\n  if (actual !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', context);\n}\n","/**\n * Stage one: parse the presentation, verify the issuer's signature, resolve\n * the disclosures.\n *\n * Disclosure mechanics come from `@sd-jwt/core`, which refuses the three\n * attacks that live in that algorithm: an appended disclosure nothing\n * references, the same disclosure twice, and one that will not decode.\n * Cryptography is `jose`'s. This file supplies the policy: which key, which\n * algorithm, which audience, what counts as fresh.\n */\nimport { decodeSdJwt, getClaims, splitSdJwt } from '@sd-jwt/core';\nimport { type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n} from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust.js';\n\nexport interface VerifiedMandate {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Every claim, with the presented disclosures resolved into place */\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  /**\n   * The issuer-signed token on its own, without the disclosures.\n   *\n   * This, not the presentation string, is the stable identity of a mandate:\n   * disclosing or withholding an optional claim rewrites the presentation and\n   * leaves the signed token untouched. Replay defence keys on a digest of it.\n   */\n  readonly signedToken: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * `@sd-jwt/core` passes the algorithm it read from `_sd_alg`, so this is also\n * where a presentation declaring anything but sha-256 is refused\n */\nasync function hasher(data: string | ArrayBuffer, algorithm: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  if (algorithm.toLowerCase() !== AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM) {\n    throw new Error(`unsupported digest algorithm ${algorithm}`);\n  }\n  const bytes = typeof data === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(data) : new Uint8Array(data);\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes));\n}\n\nfunction asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)\n    ? (value as Record<string, unknown>)\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Order is the security boundary here: nothing is trusted until `jwtVerify`\n * returns. `kid` and `iss` are read before that only to pick which configured\n * key to try, and picking wrong just makes the signature fail.\n */\nexport async function verifyMandate(\n  presentation: string,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedMandate> {\n  let decoded: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof decodeSdJwt>>;\n  let encodedJws: string;\n  try {\n    // Covers a malformed base JWT, a disclosure that will not decode, a\n    // duplicate digest, and an `_sd_alg` this release does not implement\n    decoded = await decodeSdJwt(presentation, hasher);\n    encodedJws = splitSdJwt(presentation).jwt;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  // Direct mode issues no key-bound mandates, so one arriving here belongs to\n  // a flow we do not verify. Ignoring it would mean silently not checking a\n  // proof that was sent.\n  if (decoded.kbJwt !== undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n\n  const rawPayload = asRecord(decoded.jwt.payload);\n  const header = asRecord(decoded.jwt.header);\n  if (rawPayload === undefined || header === undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(rawPayload['iss'], header['kid'], context);\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    // Redundant today (the key is EC, so jose already refuses `alg: none` and\n    // a forged HMAC) and kept for the day this resolves a key set instead of\n    // one key, where the header would get to pick\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    // Also redundant, and for the same reason: the key was resolved *from*\n    // `iss` against the configured allowlist, so nothing reaching here can\n    // carry a different one. It backstops a future resolver that matches on\n    // something else. `audience` below is not redundant - `aud` is the\n    // presenter's claim, checked against what the operator configured.\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    // Injected clock, not jose's `Date.now()`, so expiry tests are tests\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let verifiedPayload: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(encodedJws, key, options);\n    verifiedPayload = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected(classifyJoseFailure(cause), { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireFreshness(verifiedPayload, deps, context);\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    // Against the VERIFIED payload: the decoded one would match disclosures\n    // against digests nobody signed\n    claims = (await getClaims(verifiedPayload, decoded.disclosures, hasher)) as Record<\n      string,\n      unknown\n    >;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Where an appended disclosure that no digest references is refused\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireClosedCheckoutMandate(claims, context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, claims, signedToken: encodedJws };\n}\n\n/**\n * Matched on jose's stable error `code`, not its message. A client is owed\n * \"expired\" versus \"did not verify\"; anything finer describes our checks back\n * to whoever is probing them.\n */\nfunction classifyJoseFailure(cause: unknown): 'expired' | 'wrong_audience' | 'invalid_signature' {\n  const code = (cause as { code?: unknown })?.code;\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_EXPIRED') return 'expired';\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_CLAIM_VALIDATION_FAILED') {\n    const claim = (cause as { claim?: unknown }).claim;\n    if (claim === 'aud') return 'wrong_audience';\n    if (claim === 'nbf' || claim === 'exp') return 'expired';\n  }\n  return 'invalid_signature';\n}\n\n/**\n * Required, not merely checked when present: jose validates a time claim only\n * if it is there, so a mandate omitting `exp` would verify and never expire\n */\nfunction requireFreshness(\n  payload: Record<string, unknown>,\n  deps: { readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  const exp = payload['exp'];\n  const iat = payload['iat'];\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  // A future `iat` is a broken signer, or a mandate minted to outlive its own\n  // expiry window\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n}\n\n// Exactly `mandate.checkout.1`; see AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT for why\nfunction requireClosedCheckoutMandate(\n  claims: Record<string, unknown>,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  if (claims['vct'] !== AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Static key resolution.\n *\n * Every key was written into `config.yaml` by an operator. No JWKS fetch, no\n * `jku`, no `x5u`. A mandate's `iss` and `kid` only choose *which* trusted key\n * verifies it; an unrecognised pair is refused, so a mandate can never\n * nominate its own signer.\n *\n * Not a \"try every key\" loop: that would make `kid` advisory and accept a\n * mandate that named a key it was not signed with.\n */\nimport { importJWK, type JWK } from 'jose';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected, ap2Unavailable } from './errors.js';\nimport type { Ap2TrustedIssuer } from './types.js';\n\n/** Named off `importJWK` because `CryptoKey` is a DOM type we do not load */\nexport type VerificationKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importJWK>>;\n\nexport interface ResolvedKey {\n  readonly issuer: Ap2TrustedIssuer;\n  readonly key: VerificationKey;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves `(iss, kid)` against one configured issuer list. Caches the import\n * promise, not the key, so concurrent requests for a cold key share one import.\n */\nexport function createTrustStore(issuers: readonly Ap2TrustedIssuer[]) {\n  const byIssuer = new Map(issuers.map((entry) => [entry.issuer, entry]));\n  const imported = new Map<string, Promise<VerificationKey>>();\n\n  return {\n    /** Every trusted issuer id, for diagnostics. Never the keys themselves */\n    issuerIds(): readonly string[] {\n      return [...byIssuer.keys()];\n    },\n\n    async resolve(iss: unknown, kid: unknown, context: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<ResolvedKey> {\n      if (typeof iss !== 'string' || iss.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n      }\n      const issuer = byIssuer.get(iss);\n      if (issuer === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('untrusted_issuer', context);\n\n      // Not defaulted to the issuer's only key: mid-rotation there are two,\n      // and the gateway should not guess which one signed this\n      if (typeof kid !== 'string' || kid.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n      }\n      const trusted = issuer.keys.find((candidate) => candidate.kid === kid);\n      if (trusted === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n\n      // JSON, not a joined string: both halves are operator-chosen and could\n      // contain whatever separator we picked\n      const cacheKey = JSON.stringify([iss, kid]);\n      let pending = imported.get(cacheKey);\n      if (pending === undefined) {\n        pending = importJWK(trusted.jwk as JWK, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n        imported.set(cacheKey, pending);\n      }\n\n      try {\n        return { issuer, key: await pending };\n      } catch (cause) {\n        // Config already checked this JWK member by member, so reaching here\n        // means our config is broken, not the mandate. Drop the cached\n        // rejection so a fixed config is not still failing against it.\n        imported.delete(cacheKey);\n        throw ap2Unavailable('configured verification key could not be imported', {\n          ...context,\n          cause,\n        });\n      }\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport type TrustStore = ReturnType<typeof createTrustStore>;\n","/**\n * The Direct Checkout Mandate verifier: mandate signature first, then the\n * merchant checkout JWT it binds. Either stage failing is a refusal.\n *\n * What this proves is narrow. A trusted issuer signed this mandate, it has not\n * expired, it is addressed to us, and it binds a checkout document the\n * merchant signed. It does NOT prove the mandate authorises the purchase in\n * front of us: that is profile.ts, and a caller treating this as permission to\n * settle has skipped it.\n */\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { verifyCheckoutJwt } from './checkout-jwt.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport { verifyMandate } from './sd-jwt.js';\nimport { createTrustStore } from './trust.js';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config, VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types.js';\n\nexport interface Ap2VerifierOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock: Clock;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  verify(presentation: string, context?: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate>;\n  /** Trusted issuer ids, for `doctor`. Counts and names only, never keys */\n  trustedIssuers(): { readonly mandate: readonly string[]; readonly checkout: readonly string[] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Algorithm-prefixed so a future digest change is visible in stored references\n * rather than silently producing unequal values for one mandate\n */\nasync function mandateReference(signedToken: string): Promise<string> {\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(signedToken));\n  return `sha256:${Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url')}`;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2MandateVerifier(options: Ap2VerifierOptions): Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  // Two stores, not one list: signing the merchant's checkout documents must\n  // not confer the power to issue mandates\n  const mandateTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.mandateIssuers);\n  const checkoutTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.checkoutIssuers);\n  const deps = { clock: options.clock, clockSkewSeconds: options.config.clockSkewSeconds };\n\n  return {\n    async verify(\n      presentation: string,\n      context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n    ): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate> {\n      if (typeof presentation !== 'string' || presentation.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n      }\n\n      const mandate = await verifyMandate(presentation, { ...deps, trust: mandateTrust }, context);\n      const checkout = await verifyCheckoutJwt(\n        mandate.claims,\n        { ...deps, trust: checkoutTrust },\n        context,\n      );\n\n      return {\n        reference: await mandateReference(mandate.signedToken),\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.issuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: checkout.issuer,\n        checkoutJwtId: checkout.jwtId,\n        checkoutClaims: checkout.claims,\n        mandateClaims: mandate.claims,\n      };\n    },\n\n    trustedIssuers() {\n      return { mandate: mandateTrust.issuerIds(), checkout: checkoutTrust.issuerIds() };\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * The AP2 authorization provider: the seam between core's generic contract and\n * the mandate machinery.\n *\n * The provider owns its replay store. The caller that creates the provider must\n * call `close()`; `createGateway` does not close authorization providers.\n */\nimport type {\n  AdapterHealth,\n  AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  AuthorizationProvider,\n  AuthorizationRequirement,\n  AuthorizationVerification,\n  AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  Clock,\n  Logger,\n} from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { NOOP_LOGGER, systemClock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { PACKAGE_VERSION } from '../../version.js';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_SPEC_VERSION } from './constants.js';\nimport { buildAp2Descriptor } from './descriptor.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Replayed, ap2Unavailable } from './errors.js';\nimport { bindMandateToPurchase } from './profile.js';\nimport { type Ap2ReplayStore, createAp2ReplayStore } from './replay-store.js';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config } from './types.js';\nimport { createAp2MandateVerifier } from './verifier.js';\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock?: Clock;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not touch the filesystem */\n  readonly replayStore?: Ap2ReplayStore;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProvider extends AuthorizationProvider {\n  /** Closes the replay store */\n  close(): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * A reservation is keyed by the mandate reference, so the handle and the\n * receipt's identity are the same digest. Kept as one name rather than two\n * fields that must never disagree.\n */\nexport function createAp2AuthorizationProvider(\n  options: Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions,\n): Ap2AuthorizationProvider {\n  const clock = options.clock ?? systemClock;\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n\n  const verifier = createAp2MandateVerifier({ config: options.config, clock });\n  const replay =\n    options.replayStore ?? createAp2ReplayStore({ path: options.config.replay.path, logger });\n\n  const requirement: AuthorizationRequirement = {\n    method: 'ap2',\n    version: AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  };\n\n  async function verifyAndReserve(\n    context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  ): Promise<AuthorizationVerification> {\n    const errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext = {\n      requestId: context.requestId,\n      resourceId: context.resourceId,\n    };\n\n    const mandate = await verifier.verify(context.submission.payload, errorContext);\n    // Before reserving, not after: a mandate that does not authorize this\n    // purchase must stay spendable on the purchase it does authorize\n    await bindMandateToPurchase(mandate, context, errorContext);\n\n    let reservation: ReturnType<Ap2ReplayStore['reserve']>;\n    try {\n      reservation = replay.reserve({\n        reference: mandate.reference,\n        checkoutJti: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        resourceId: context.resourceId,\n        requestId: context.requestId,\n      });\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable('replay store could not be written', { ...errorContext, cause });\n    }\n\n    if (reservation.kind === 'replayed') {\n      throw ap2Replayed(reservation.state, errorContext);\n    }\n\n    return {\n      status: 'verified',\n      method: 'ap2',\n      reference: mandate.reference,\n      reservationId: mandate.reference,\n      // Opaque identifiers an operator can reconcile with. Never a claim from\n      // the mandate: those carry the buyer's purchase and their personal data.\n      // `checkoutId`, not `checkoutJwtId` - the receipt store redacts any key\n      // that reads as secret-shaped, and \"jwt\" is on that list.\n      metadata: {\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        checkoutId: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  const finalize = (\n    action: 'consume' | 'release' | 'markUncertain',\n    reservationId: string,\n    context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  ): void => {\n    try {\n      replay[action](reservationId);\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable(`replay store could not record ${action}`, { ...context, cause });\n    }\n  };\n\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    descriptor: buildAp2Descriptor(PACKAGE_VERSION),\n    requirement,\n    verifyAndReserve,\n\n    async consume(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('consume', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async release(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('release', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async markUncertain(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('markUncertain', reservationId, context);\n    },\n\n    async health(): Promise<AdapterHealth> {\n      const startedAt = clock.monotonicMs();\n      const trusted = verifier.trustedIssuers();\n      const checkedAt = clock.nowIso();\n      const durationMs = Math.round(clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt);\n      try {\n        // A read against the real table, so a database that opened but cannot\n        // be queried is caught here rather than on the first purchase\n        replay.stateOf('health-probe');\n      } catch {\n        // A fixed token, never a sentence built from the caught error\n        return { status: 'fail', checkedAt, durationMs, detail: 'replay-store-unavailable' };\n      }\n      return {\n        status: 'pass',\n        checkedAt,\n        durationMs,\n        detail: `mandate-issuers=${trusted.mandate.length} checkout-issuers=${trusted.checkout.length}`,\n      };\n    },\n\n    close() {\n      replay.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/{authorization-CPDcpJVa.d.ts → authorization-DA7mjy_O.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { f as AuthorizationMethodName, A as AdapterDescriptor, l as PaymentRequirement, c as AdapterHealth } from './runtime-CKq3d_3K.js';
+import { f as AuthorizationMethodName, A as AdapterDescriptor, m as PaymentRequirement, c as AdapterHealth } from './runtime-DC5XQ9Cc.js';
 
 /**
  * Canonical authorization model.
@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ import { f as AuthorizationMethodName, A as AdapterDescriptor, l as PaymentRequi
  * header; over MCP and A2A it is the same `{ method, payload }` object carried
  * in the reserved `_authorization` input field.
  *
- * `payload` is preserved byte-for-byte from the wire. Providers derive replay
- * identities by hashing it, so decoding and reserialising it before it reaches
- * the provider would change the identity of an otherwise identical proof.
+ * `payload` is preserved byte-for-byte from the wire. It is opaque to transport
+ * adapters and may contain signed or encoding-sensitive provider data, so they
+ * must not normalise it before passing it to the provider.
  */
 interface AuthorizationSubmission {
     readonly method: AuthorizationMethodName;

package/dist/{chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js → chunk-5GEWKNIH.js}

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import 'module';
 
 // src/core/domain/common.ts
 var PROTOCOL_NAMES = ["http", "mcp", "a2a", "acp"];
+var PAYMENT_METHOD_NAMES = ["x402", "mpp"];
 
 // src/core/domain/event.ts
 var COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES = [
@@ -273,8 +274,8 @@ var systemClock = {
   nowIso: () => (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
   monotonicMs: () => performance.now()
 };
-var PACKAGE_VERSION = "1.4.1" ;
+var PACKAGE_VERSION = "1.5.0" ;
 
-export { AUTHORIZATION_HEADER, AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD, COMMERCE_ERROR_CODES, COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS, COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES, CommerceError, DEFAULT_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS, DELIVERY_SUMMARY_META_KEY, MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES, NOOP_LOGGER, PACKAGE_VERSION, PAYMENT_HEADER, PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD, PAYMENT_REQUIRED_HEADER, PAYMENT_RESPONSE_HEADER, PROTOCOL_NAMES, RESERVED_INPUT_FIELDS, RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES, extractReservedInputFields, isCommerceError, isHttpProtocolAdapter, isPaymentRequiredEnvelope, parseAuthorizationHeader, parseAuthorizationSubmission, systemClock, toCommerceError, toDeliverySummary, toErrorEnvelope, toPaymentRequiredEnvelope };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js.map
+export { AUTHORIZATION_HEADER, AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD, COMMERCE_ERROR_CODES, COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS, COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES, CommerceError, DEFAULT_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS, DELIVERY_SUMMARY_META_KEY, MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES, NOOP_LOGGER, PACKAGE_VERSION, PAYMENT_HEADER, PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD, PAYMENT_METHOD_NAMES, PAYMENT_REQUIRED_HEADER, PAYMENT_RESPONSE_HEADER, PROTOCOL_NAMES, RESERVED_INPUT_FIELDS, RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES, extractReservedInputFields, isCommerceError, isHttpProtocolAdapter, isPaymentRequiredEnvelope, parseAuthorizationHeader, parseAuthorizationSubmission, systemClock, toCommerceError, toDeliverySummary, toErrorEnvelope, toPaymentRequiredEnvelope };
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5GEWKNIH.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5GEWKNIH.js.map

package/dist/chunk-5GEWKNIH.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* Shared primitive aliases used across the canonical domain model.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. Every consumer codes against these shapes; changing one\n * is a breaking change.\n */\n\n/**\n * A JSON Schema document (draft 2020-12 subset in practice).\n *\n * Deliberately loose: protocol adapters translate this to their own schema\n * representation, and the gateway only validates structurally at trust\n * boundaries. Never treat this as trusted input without validation.\n */\nexport type JsonSchema = Record<string, unknown>;\n\n/**\n * Protocol surfaces a resource can be exposed through.\n *\n * The runtime list is the definition and the type is derived from it, so a\n * caller that has to *check* a name (config validation, the OpenAPI\n * importer's `--expose`) reads the same strings the type is built from\n * rather than keeping a second copy that can drift.\n */\nexport type ProtocolName = 'http' | 'mcp' | 'a2a' | 'acp';\n\n/**\n * The same names as a value, for code that has to *check* one at\n * runtime - config validation, the OpenAPI importer's `--expose`. Typed\n * against `ProtocolName` so an unsupported name cannot enter the list, which\n * is what keeps this from becoming a second definition that drifts.\n */\nexport const PROTOCOL_NAMES: readonly ProtocolName[] = ['http', 'mcp', 'a2a', 'acp'];\n\n/**\n * Payment rails a resource can accept.\n *\n * This is an ordered candidate list, not a buyer-selected menu. The pipeline\n * uses the first method with a configured provider; a rejection ends the\n * request instead of trying another rail. Config requires at least one named\n * rail to be enabled but permits additional unavailable candidates.\n */\nexport type PaymentMethodName = 'x402' | 'mpp';\n\n/**\n * The same names as a value, for config validation, which checks a name at\n * runtime. The annotation rejects an entry that is not a\n * `PaymentMethodName`, but nothing makes the list exhaustive, so a new rail\n * has to be added here as well as to the type.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_METHOD_NAMES: readonly PaymentMethodName[] = ['x402', 'mpp'];\n\n/**\n * Authorization methods a resource can require.\n *\n * Deliberately not a `ProtocolName` and not a `PaymentMethodName`: an\n * authorization method is neither a transport nor a payment rail. It proves\n * the purchase was approved, and sits beside the payment rather than\n * replacing it.\n */\nexport type AuthorizationMethodName = 'ap2';\n\n/** ISO-8601 timestamp string, always UTC with millisecond precision. */\nexport type IsoTimestamp = string;\n\n/**\n * A decimal amount expressed as a string in the *display* unit of the currency\n * (for example \"0.01\" USDC), never as a float and never in base units.\n *\n * Conversion to on-chain base units is a payment-provider responsibility.\n */\nexport type DecimalAmount = string;\n\n/** Health of an individual adapter or subsystem. */\nexport interface AdapterHealth {\n  readonly status: 'pass' | 'warn' | 'fail';\n  readonly detail?: string;\n  readonly checkedAt: IsoTimestamp;\n  readonly durationMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Describes an adapter's supported surface for diagnostics\n */\nexport interface AdapterDescriptor {\n  readonly name: string;\n  readonly kind: 'protocol' | 'payment' | 'storage' | 'authorization';\n  /** Version of this adapter implementation (independent of the spec). */\n  readonly implementationVersion: string;\n  /** Exact pinned specification revision this adapter targets. */\n  readonly supportedSpec: string;\n  readonly capabilities: readonly string[];\n  readonly status: 'stable' | 'experimental' | 'planned';\n  /** Capabilities explicitly NOT implemented, surfaced by `doctor`. */\n  readonly unsupported?: readonly string[];\n}\n","/**\n * Canonical commerce events.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. Every event in a single flow shares one `requestId` so that\n * logs, payment attempts, backend calls and receipts are correlatable.\n */\nimport type { IsoTimestamp } from './common.js';\n\nexport const COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES = [\n  'resource.discovered',\n  'resource.requested',\n  'payment.required',\n  'payment.rejected',\n  'payment.verified',\n  'payment.settled',\n  // The same two types whatever the method, so an audit-trail reader never\n  // has to know what AP2 is\n  'authorization.verified',\n  'authorization.rejected',\n  'backend.called',\n  'backend.failed',\n  'resource.delivered',\n] as const;\n\nexport type CommerceEventType = (typeof COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES)[number];\n\nexport interface CommerceEvent {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly type: CommerceEventType;\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly at: IsoTimestamp;\n  /** Protocol adapter that originated the request, e.g. 'mcp' or 'http'. */\n  readonly adapter?: string;\n  readonly paymentProvider?: string;\n  readonly durationMs?: number;\n  readonly status?: 'ok' | 'error';\n  /** Non-secret, structured detail. 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User- or\n * agent-controlled backend URLs are forbidden (see docs/security.md, SSRF).\n * Secret header values must come from `${ENV_VAR}` placeholders resolved by\n * the config loader, never from plaintext configuration.\n */\nexport interface BackendHandler {\n  readonly type: 'http';\n  readonly method: BackendMethod;\n  readonly url: string;\n  readonly headers?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n  /** Hard upper bound on the backend call. Defaults to DEFAULT_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. */\n  readonly timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Names the top-level input properties carrying each part of the request.\n   *\n   * Absent (the default) keeps the original mapping: `{param}` values are read\n   * from top-level input and everything left over becomes either the query\n   * string (GET/DELETE) or the entire JSON body (POST/PUT/PATCH). That mapping\n   * cannot express `POST /users/{userId}/orders?notify=true` with a JSON body\n   * - one perfectly ordinary REST operation with all three parts at once.\n   *\n   * When present, each group is sourced independently and top-level input that\n   * no binding names is not forwarded to the backend at all.\n   */\n  readonly inputBindings?: {\n    readonly path?: string;\n    readonly query?: string;\n    readonly body?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/** Default backend timeout when a resource does not specify one. */\nexport const DEFAULT_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/**\n * Canonical pricing.\n *\n * `dynamic` exists in the type system for forward compatibility but is\n * REJECTED by config validation in this release.\n */\nexport type Pricing =\n  | { readonly type: 'free' }\n  | {\n      readonly type: 'fixed';\n      readonly amount: DecimalAmount;\n      readonly currency: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly type: 'dynamic';\n      readonly resolver: string;\n    };\n\n/**\n * A merchant capability exposed to agents.\n *\n * The canonical resource is the single source of truth: protocol adapters map\n * it outward, they never define their own parallel notion of a resource.\n */\nexport interface CommerceResource {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly name: string;\n  readonly description?: string;\n  readonly inputSchema?: JsonSchema;\n  readonly outputSchema?: JsonSchema;\n  readonly handler: BackendHandler;\n  readonly pricing: Pricing;\n  readonly exposedVia: readonly ProtocolName[];\n  readonly paymentMethods: readonly PaymentMethodName[];\n  /**\n   * Authorization the buyer must present in addition to payment.\n   *\n   * Opt-in per resource and absent by default, so every resource configured\n   * before this existed behaves exactly as it did. It sits beside\n   * `paymentMethods` rather than inside it: an authorization method is not a\n   * payment rail and must never be selectable as one.\n   */\n  readonly authorization?: {\n    readonly required: readonly AuthorizationMethodName[];\n  };\n}\n\n/** Read-only view of every configured resource. */\nexport interface ResourceRegistry {\n  get(id: string): CommerceResource | undefined;\n  list(): readonly CommerceResource[];\n  /** Resources exposed through a given protocol surface. */\n  listExposedVia(protocol: ProtocolName): readonly CommerceResource[];\n  has(id: string): boolean;\n}\n","/**\n * Typed domain error codes.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. Protocol adapters map these codes into their own response\n * format. Never throw a bare string or untyped Error across a package boundary.\n */\nexport const COMMERCE_ERROR_CODES = [\n  'CONFIG_INVALID',\n  'RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND',\n  'INPUT_INVALID',\n  'PAYMENT_REQUIRED',\n  'PAYMENT_INVALID',\n  'PAYMENT_REPLAYED',\n  'PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'PAYMENT_SETTLEMENT_FAILED',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_INVALID',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'BACKEND_TIMEOUT',\n  'BACKEND_ERROR',\n  'PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED',\n  'GATEWAY_BUSY',\n  'STORAGE_ERROR',\n  'INTERNAL_ERROR',\n] as const;\n\nexport type CommerceErrorCode = (typeof COMMERCE_ERROR_CODES)[number];\n\n/**\n * Canonical HTTP status for each error code.\n *\n * Paid resources fail closed: every payment failure maps to a 4xx/5xx status\n * and never to a successful delivery.\n */\nexport const COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS: Readonly<Record<CommerceErrorCode, number>> = {\n  CONFIG_INVALID: 500,\n  RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND: 404,\n  INPUT_INVALID: 400,\n  PAYMENT_REQUIRED: 402,\n  PAYMENT_INVALID: 402,\n  PAYMENT_REPLAYED: 409,\n  PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE: 503,\n  PAYMENT_SETTLEMENT_FAILED: 502,\n  // 403, not 402: the buyer's money is not the problem. A 402 tells a client\n  // \"pay and retry\", which cannot fix a missing or rejected mandate, and a\n  // client that auto-pays on 402 would be charged for a request that was\n  // never going to be delivered.\n  AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED: 403,\n  AUTHORIZATION_INVALID: 403,\n  AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED: 409,\n  AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE: 503,\n  BACKEND_TIMEOUT: 504,\n  BACKEND_ERROR: 502,\n  PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED: 501,\n  GATEWAY_BUSY: 503,\n  STORAGE_ERROR: 500,\n  INTERNAL_ERROR: 500,\n};\n\n/** Codes for which a client may reasonably retry the same request. */\nexport const RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES: ReadonlySet<CommerceErrorCode> = new Set([\n  'PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  // Our verifier or our replay store was unreachable, so no verdict on the\n  // mandate was ever reached. That is an outage on our side, and the same\n  // proof will verify once it clears.\n  'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'BACKEND_TIMEOUT',\n  // Load shedding is transient by definition: the caller should back off and\n  // try again. Before this code existed the MCP adapter's queue-full path threw\n  // PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED — HTTP 501, retryable:false — so an agent framework\n  // keyed on the machine-readable flag (which exists precisely so clients need\n  // not parse prose) would read a momentary throttle as a permanent capability\n  // gap and stop calling the tool.\n  'GATEWAY_BUSY',\n]);\n","/**\n * The single error type crossing package boundaries.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT.\n */\nimport {\n  COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS,\n  type CommerceErrorCode,\n  RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES,\n} from './codes.js';\n\nexport interface CommerceErrorOptions {\n  /** Structured, non-secret detail safe to return to a client. */\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  readonly cause?: unknown;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  /** Override the default HTTP status for this code. */\n  readonly httpStatus?: number;\n}\n\n/** Serialisable wire form of a CommerceError. */\nexport interface CommerceErrorInfo {\n  readonly code: CommerceErrorCode;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly httpStatus: number;\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\nexport class CommerceError extends Error {\n  readonly code: CommerceErrorCode;\n  readonly httpStatus: number;\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n\n  constructor(code: CommerceErrorCode, message: string, options: CommerceErrorOptions = {}) {\n    super(message, options.cause !== undefined ? { cause: options.cause } : undefined);\n    this.name = 'CommerceError';\n    this.code = code;\n    this.httpStatus = options.httpStatus ?? COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS[code];\n    this.retryable = RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES.has(code);\n    if (options.details !== undefined) this.details = options.details;\n    if (options.requestId !== undefined) this.requestId = options.requestId;\n    if (options.resourceId !== undefined) this.resourceId = options.resourceId;\n    Error.captureStackTrace?.(this, CommerceError);\n  }\n\n  /** Non-secret, client-safe representation. */\n  toInfo(): CommerceErrorInfo {\n    return {\n      code: this.code,\n      message: this.message,\n      httpStatus: this.httpStatus,\n      retryable: this.retryable,\n      ...(this.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: this.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(this.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: this.resourceId } : {}),\n      ...(this.details !== undefined ? { details: this.details } : {}),\n    };\n  }\n}\n\nexport function isCommerceError(value: unknown): value is CommerceError {\n  return value instanceof CommerceError;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalise any thrown value into a CommerceError.\n *\n * Used at package boundaries so an unexpected failure never escapes untyped.\n *\n * SECURITY — do not \"improve\" this by propagating `value.message`.\n * `CommerceError.message` is client-visible: it is serialised by `toInfo()`\n * and `toErrorEnvelope()` and returned over HTTP and MCP. An arbitrary thrown\n * Error's message routinely carries internal detail — database connection\n * strings, internal hostnames, filesystem paths, backend URLs. Copying it into\n * a client-facing field turns every unexpected exception into an information\n * disclosure.\n *\n * The original value is preserved on `cause`, which is never serialised, so\n * logs and diagnostics keep the full detail while clients get only the\n * caller's deliberate, reviewed `fallbackMessage`.\n *\n * A caller that *wants* a specific client-facing message passes one:\n * toCommerceError(err, 'BACKEND_ERROR', 'Backend call failed')\n */\nexport function toCommerceError(\n  value: unknown,\n  fallbackCode: CommerceErrorCode = 'INTERNAL_ERROR',\n  fallbackMessage = 'Unexpected internal error',\n): CommerceError {\n  if (isCommerceError(value)) return value;\n  return new CommerceError(fallbackCode, fallbackMessage, { cause: value });\n}\n","/**\n * Gateway-defined wire envelopes.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. These are the *only* representations of \"payment required\"\n * and \"error\" that leave the gateway, whichever protocol carries them. The HTTP\n * routes, the MCP adapter and the demo buyer agent all use these helpers so the\n * three can never drift apart.\n */\n\nimport { CommerceError, type CommerceErrorCode } from '../errors/index.js';\nimport type { AuthorizationRequirement, AuthorizationSubmission } from './authorization.js';\nimport type { DecimalAmount, IsoTimestamp, PaymentMethodName } from './common.js';\nimport type { PaymentSubmission } from './payment.js';\nimport type { DeliveredOutcome, PaymentRequiredOutcome } from './request.js';\nimport type { CommerceResource } from './resource.js';\n\n/**\n * Reserved input property carrying a payment proof on protocols that have no\n * header channel (MCP tool calls). Over HTTP the `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` header is\n * used.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD = '_payment';\n\n/**\n * HTTP request header carrying the payment proof.\n *\n * x402 v2 header names, lowercased because that is how Node presents incoming\n * headers. v1's `X-PAYMENT` / `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` pair is not accepted: this\n * gateway speaks one protocol version, and quietly honouring both would mean\n * two verification paths for the same money.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_HEADER = 'payment-signature';\n\n/** HTTP response header carrying the settlement result. */\nexport const PAYMENT_RESPONSE_HEADER = 'payment-response';\n\n/**\n * Reserved input property carrying an authorization proof, the authorization\n * counterpart of {@link PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD}.\n *\n * Unlike `_payment`, which is a bare string, this one carries an object:\n * `{ method, payload }`. There is exactly one payment rail per resource, so a\n * payment proof's method can be inferred from the resource; an authorization\n * proof cannot lean on that, and guessing the method of a security control is\n * not a thing to do implicitly.\n */\nexport const AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD = '_authorization';\n\n/**\n * Every input property name the gateway claims for itself.\n *\n * One list, read by the config loader (which rejects a resource declaring any\n * of them), by the protocol adapters that lift them out of client input, and\n * by the pipeline that strips them again as defence in depth. Those three\n * agree by construction instead of by three copies of two strings.\n */\nexport const RESERVED_INPUT_FIELDS: readonly string[] = [\n  PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD,\n  AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD,\n];\n\n/**\n * HTTP request header carrying the authorization proof, base64url-encoded\n * JSON of the same `{ method, payload }` envelope the reserved input field\n * carries.\n *\n * This is an Agent Commerce transport carrier, not a header defined by any\n * authorization specification, so it is namespaced rather than borrowing\n * `Authorization`, which already means something else on every one of these\n * routes.\n */\nexport const AUTHORIZATION_HEADER = 'agent-authorization';\n\n/**\n * Hard cap on the encoded `Agent-Authorization` header.\n *\n * Node's own limit is ~16 KiB across *all* request headers, so an\n * authorization near that size would start evicting everything else and fail\n * as an unreadable transport error rather than a legible one. Capping well\n * below it means an oversized proof gets a deterministic\n * AUTHORIZATION_INVALID naming the limit.\n */\nexport const MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES = 8192;\n\n/**\n * HTTP response header carrying the base64 payment challenge on a 402.\n *\n * The 402 body still carries {@link PaymentRequiredEnvelope} — richer, and the\n * only channel MCP has — but an x402 v2 client reads the challenge from this\n * header and ignores the body, so both are sent.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_REQUIRED_HEADER = 'payment-required';\n\n/**\n * Key under which a protocol adapter attaches a {@link DeliverySummary} to its\n * result metadata — MCP's `CallToolResult._meta`, and anywhere else a protocol\n * offers an out-of-band metadata channel.\n *\n * Frozen deliberately. The bug this whole mechanism exists to fix was two\n * surfaces disagreeing about what a payer gets back; a key name enforced only\n * by one side's tests would reintroduce exactly that drift. Producer and\n * consumer both import this constant.\n *\n * Follows MCP's `<namespace>/<name>` convention for `_meta` keys.\n */\nexport const DELIVERY_SUMMARY_META_KEY = 'agent-commerce/delivery';\n\nexport interface PaymentRequiredEnvelope {\n  readonly status: 'payment-required';\n  readonly code: 'PAYMENT_REQUIRED';\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly payment: {\n    readonly provider: PaymentMethodName;\n    readonly version: string;\n    readonly amount: DecimalAmount;\n    readonly currency: string;\n    readonly destination: string;\n    readonly network?: string;\n    readonly asset?: string;\n    readonly expiresAt?: IsoTimestamp;\n    /** Provider-native requirement objects, passed through verbatim. */\n    readonly accepts: readonly Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>[];\n    /**\n     * The provider's own challenge document, verbatim — see\n     * {@link PaymentChallenge.envelope}. Present for providers that have one;\n     * a buyer's protocol client can hand this straight to its SDK.\n     */\n    readonly envelope?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Present only when the resource requires an authorization proof as well.\n   *\n   * Additive: a client that does not understand the field sees exactly the\n   * envelope it saw before. A client that does learns, before it spends\n   * anything, that paying alone will not get the resource delivered.\n   *\n   * This advertises a requirement; it does not issue anything. The proof is\n   * obtained from the merchant's own approval flow, outside the gateway.\n   */\n  readonly authorization?: {\n    readonly required: readonly AuthorizationRequirement[];\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface ErrorEnvelope {\n  readonly status: 'error';\n  readonly code: CommerceErrorCode;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\n/**\n * What a buyer learns about their own completed purchase.\n *\n * A payer is entitled to the record of their own transaction — the request it\n * belonged to, whether it settled, and the settlement reference they can check\n * on-chain. They are NOT entitled to the merchant's ledger, which is why\n * `/api/receipts` is an operator route behind `server.adminToken`.\n *\n * Before this existed the two surfaces disagreed: HTTP callers received a\n * settlement summary in the payment-response header while MCP callers received\n * nothing, so an MCP buyer's only route to their own receipt was the merchant's\n * ledger. Both surfaces now emit this same shape.\n */\nexport interface DeliverySummary {\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly receiptId: string;\n  readonly deliveredAt: IsoTimestamp;\n  readonly payment?: {\n    readonly status: 'verified' | 'settled' | 'rejected';\n    readonly amount: DecimalAmount;\n    readonly currency: string;\n    /** Settlement reference, e.g. an on-chain transaction hash. */\n    readonly externalReference?: string;\n    readonly network?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/** Build the payer-facing summary of a delivered outcome. */\nexport function toDeliverySummary(outcome: DeliveredOutcome): DeliverySummary {\n  const p = outcome.payment;\n  return {\n    requestId: outcome.requestId,\n    resourceId: outcome.resourceId,\n    receiptId: outcome.receipt.id,\n    deliveredAt: outcome.receipt.deliveredAt,\n    ...(p !== undefined\n      ? {\n          payment: {\n            status: p.status,\n            amount: p.amount,\n            currency: p.currency,\n            ...(p.externalReference !== undefined\n              ? { externalReference: p.externalReference }\n              : {}),\n            ...(p.network !== undefined ? { network: p.network } : {}),\n          },\n        }\n      : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function toPaymentRequiredEnvelope(\n  outcome: PaymentRequiredOutcome,\n): PaymentRequiredEnvelope {\n  const r = outcome.requirement;\n  return {\n    status: 'payment-required',\n    code: 'PAYMENT_REQUIRED',\n    requestId: outcome.requestId,\n    resourceId: outcome.resourceId,\n    message: `Payment of ${r.amount} ${r.currency} is required for resource \"${outcome.resourceId}\". Retry with a ${r.provider} payment proof.`,\n    payment: {\n      provider: r.provider,\n      version: r.challenge.version,\n      amount: r.amount,\n      currency: r.currency,\n      destination: r.destination,\n      ...(r.network !== undefined ? { network: r.network } : {}),\n      ...(r.asset !== undefined ? { asset: r.asset } : {}),\n      ...(r.expiresAt !== undefined ? { expiresAt: r.expiresAt } : {}),\n      accepts: r.challenge.accepts,\n      ...(r.challenge.envelope !== undefined ? { envelope: r.challenge.envelope } : {}),\n    },\n    ...(outcome.authorization !== undefined && outcome.authorization.length > 0\n      ? { authorization: { required: outcome.authorization } }\n      : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function toErrorEnvelope(error: CommerceError): ErrorEnvelope {\n  const info = error.toInfo();\n  return {\n    status: 'error',\n    code: info.code,\n    message: info.message,\n    retryable: info.retryable,\n    ...(info.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: info.requestId } : {}),\n    ...(info.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: info.resourceId } : {}),\n    ...(info.details !== undefined ? { details: info.details } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function isPaymentRequiredEnvelope(value: unknown): value is PaymentRequiredEnvelope {\n  return (\n    typeof value === 'object' &&\n    value !== null &&\n    (value as PaymentRequiredEnvelope).status === 'payment-required' &&\n    typeof (value as PaymentRequiredEnvelope).payment === 'object'\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Parses the `{ method, payload }` authorization envelope, whichever carrier\n * brought it.\n *\n * Absent is `undefined`. Present but malformed throws, rather than being\n * dropped the way an unusable `_payment` is. A dropped payment leaves the\n * buyer holding a 402 they can act on. A silently dropped authorization would\n * come back as \"not authorized\" for a proof the client believes it sent, with\n * no way to tell a rejected mandate from a typo in the envelope around it.\n */\nexport function parseAuthorizationSubmission(\n  value: unknown,\n  requestId?: string,\n): AuthorizationSubmission | undefined {\n  if (value === undefined || value === null) return undefined;\n\n  const fail = (detail: string): never => {\n    throw new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', `Malformed authorization: ${detail}`, {\n      ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n    });\n  };\n\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) {\n    fail(`expected an object with \"method\" and \"payload\", got ${typeof value}`);\n  }\n  const record = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const method = record['method'];\n  const payload = record['payload'];\n\n  // 'ap2' is the only method in this release. Compared against the literal\n  // rather than a registry: a second method means a second verifier, and that\n  // is a deliberate addition, not a string that should start working because\n  // a client sent it.\n  if (method !== 'ap2') {\n    fail(`unsupported method ${typeof method === 'string' ? `\"${method}\"` : typeof method}`);\n  }\n  if (typeof payload !== 'string' || payload.length === 0) {\n    fail('\"payload\" must be a non-empty string');\n  }\n\n  return { method: 'ap2', payload: payload as string };\n}\n\n/**\n * Decodes the base64url-JSON `Agent-Authorization` header.\n *\n * The size check runs on the encoded value before any decoding, so an\n * oversized header costs a length comparison rather than a base64 decode and\n * a JSON parse of whatever a caller chose to send.\n */\nexport function parseAuthorizationHeader(\n  raw: string | readonly string[] | undefined,\n  requestId?: string,\n): AuthorizationSubmission | undefined {\n  const value = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw[0] : (raw as string | undefined);\n  if (value === undefined || value.length === 0) return undefined;\n\n  const fail = (detail: string): never => {\n    throw new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', `Malformed authorization: ${detail}`, {\n      ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n    });\n  };\n\n  if (Buffer.byteLength(value, 'utf8') > MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES) {\n    fail(`header exceeds the ${MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES}-byte limit`);\n  }\n\n  let decoded: unknown;\n  try {\n    decoded = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(value, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));\n  } catch {\n    // Nothing from the exception is repeated back: a JSON parse error quotes\n    // the input it choked on, which here is whatever the caller sent.\n    fail('header is not base64url-encoded JSON');\n  }\n  return parseAuthorizationSubmission(decoded, requestId);\n}\n\n/**\n * Splits raw client input into resource input plus the reserved fields the\n * gateway claims, for every protocol that carries them in the input object\n * (MCP tool arguments, A2A message data). HTTP carries both in headers and\n * uses the two parse helpers directly.\n *\n * A payment proof is labelled with the resource's first method. `createGateway`\n * puts provider-backed methods first so the label matches pipeline selection;\n * custom registries must preserve that ordering. Without a method, the proof is\n * dropped and the pipeline receives an unpaid request.\n */\nexport function extractReservedInputFields(\n  rawInput: Record<string, unknown>,\n  resource: CommerceResource | undefined,\n  requestId?: string,\n): {\n  input: Record<string, unknown>;\n  payment?: PaymentSubmission;\n  authorization?: AuthorizationSubmission;\n} {\n  const {\n    [PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD]: paymentValue,\n    [AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD]: authorizationValue,\n    ...input\n  } = rawInput;\n\n  const method = resource?.paymentMethods[0];\n  const payment =\n    typeof paymentValue === 'string' && paymentValue.length > 0 && method !== undefined\n      ? ({ method, payload: paymentValue } satisfies PaymentSubmission)\n      : undefined;\n  const authorization = parseAuthorizationSubmission(authorizationValue, requestId);\n\n  return {\n    input,\n    ...(payment !== undefined ? { payment } : {}),\n    ...(authorization !== undefined ? { authorization } : {}),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal structural logger interface.\n *\n * Core must not depend on pino directly; the gateway injects a pino instance\n * that satisfies this shape. Never log secrets: private keys, seed phrases,\n * Authorization headers or payment authorisation payloads.\n */\nexport interface Logger {\n  debug(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  info(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  warn(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  error(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  child(bindings: Record<string, unknown>): Logger;\n}\n\n/** A logger that discards everything. Useful in unit tests. */\nexport const NOOP_LOGGER: Logger = {\n  debug: () => {},\n  info: () => {},\n  warn: () => {},\n  error: () => {},\n  child: () => NOOP_LOGGER,\n};\n","/**\n * Protocol adapter boundary.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. An adapter translates a protocol's wire format into a\n * `CanonicalRequest`, hands it to the execution pipeline and maps the outcome\n * back. It must not call merchant backends, implement payment logic, or hold\n * its own copy of the canonical model.\n *\n * Adapter isolation: a failure while starting or serving one adapter must not\n * prevent the others from operating.\n */\nimport type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';\nimport type { AdapterDescriptor, AdapterHealth, ProtocolName } from '../domain/common.js';\nimport type { EventSink } from '../domain/event.js';\nimport type { ExecutionPipeline } from '../domain/request.js';\nimport type { ResourceRegistry } from '../domain/resource.js';\nimport type { Logger } from './logger.js';\nimport type { Clock, IdGenerator } from './runtime.js';\n\n/** Everything an adapter is given. Nothing else is available to it. */\nexport interface ProtocolAdapterContext {\n  readonly pipeline: ExecutionPipeline;\n  readonly resources: ResourceRegistry;\n  readonly events: EventSink;\n  readonly logger: Logger;\n  readonly clock: Clock;\n  readonly ids: IdGenerator;\n  /** Externally reachable base URL of the gateway, from config. */\n  readonly publicBaseUrl: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ProtocolAdapter {\n  readonly name: ProtocolName;\n  readonly descriptor: AdapterDescriptor;\n\n  start(context: ProtocolAdapterContext): Promise<void>;\n  health(): Promise<AdapterHealth>;\n  stop(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * A protocol adapter served over HTTP.\n *\n * The gateway mounts `handleHttp` at `mountPath` using raw Node request and\n * response objects, so adapters stay independent of the HTTP framework.\n *\n * GUARANTEE — the request body is **unconsumed**.\n *\n * `req` is handed over with its stream unread: the gateway suppresses every\n * body parser on this mount, so an adapter whose SDK reads the body itself\n * (MCP's Streamable HTTP transport does) can do so. The adapter owns reading,\n * size-limiting beyond the gateway's own cap, and parsing.\n *\n * This is load-bearing and easy to break silently. Fastify pre-registers\n * exact-match parsers for `application/json` and `text/plain` and prefers them\n * over a `'*'` wildcard, so registering only a wildcard no-op leaves the\n * built-in JSON parser draining the body first — the adapter then reads an\n * empty stream and every request fails to parse. That exact regression shipped\n * once and no unit test caught it, because adapter conformance suites drive\n * `handleHttp` over a bare `node:http` server and never traverse the gateway.\n *\n * Any change to how adapters are mounted must be covered by a test that POSTs\n * a real JSON body through the real gateway and asserts the adapter received\n * it intact.\n */\nexport interface HttpProtocolAdapter extends ProtocolAdapter {\n  /** Path prefix the gateway mounts this adapter at, e.g. '/mcp'. */\n  readonly mountPath: string;\n  handleHttp(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Fixed paths this adapter owns *outside* its mount, for protocols whose\n   * specification pins a discovery URL (A2A's `/.well-known/agent-card.json`).\n   * The gateway mounts them with the same guarantees as `mountPath` — same\n   * unconsumed body, same concurrency cap, same failure isolation — so the\n   * gateway needs no per-protocol routing knowledge.\n   *\n   * Omitted by adapters that need none.\n   */\n  readonly additionalHttpRoutes?: readonly AdapterHttpRoute[];\n}\n\n/**\n * One fixed, method-scoped route owned by an adapter. Unlike `mountPath` it\n * registers no wildcard: it matches exactly the path given.\n */\nexport interface AdapterHttpRoute {\n  readonly method: 'GET' | 'POST';\n  /** Absolute gateway path, e.g. '/.well-known/agent-card.json'. */\n  readonly path: string;\n  handleHttp(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nexport function isHttpProtocolAdapter(adapter: ProtocolAdapter): adapter is HttpProtocolAdapter {\n  return typeof (adapter as HttpProtocolAdapter).handleHttp === 'function';\n}\n","/**\n * Injected runtime primitives.\n *\n * Everything non-deterministic (time, ids) is injected so tests can be exact.\n */\nimport type { IsoTimestamp } from '../domain/common.js';\n\nexport interface Clock {\n  now(): Date;\n  nowIso(): IsoTimestamp;\n  /** Milliseconds since an arbitrary origin; use for durations only. */\n  monotonicMs(): number;\n}\n\nexport interface IdGenerator {\n  /** Opaque, collision-resistant identifier. */\n  next(prefix?: string): string;\n}\n\nexport const systemClock: Clock = {\n  now: () => new Date(),\n  nowIso: () => new Date().toISOString(),\n  monotonicMs: () => performance.now(),\n};\n","/**\n * The package version, resolved once for the whole package.\n *\n * Two paths, deliberately:\n *\n * - **Development** reads the root manifest, so the number is always live.\n * - **The published bundle cannot.** tsup collapses `src/**` into\n * `dist/index.js` and `dist/cli/index.js`, so any `require('../../package.json')`\n * written against a source path resolves from the wrong depth once bundled —\n * which is exactly how this broke during the single-package refactor, and how\n * it earlier produced a CLI reporting `v0.0.0-unknown`. The build injects\n * `__OAC_PACKAGE_VERSION__` instead (see tsup.config.ts).\n *\n * `typeof` on an undeclared identifier is safe in JS, so the dev path is\n * unaffected by the constant not existing.\n */\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\n\ndeclare const __OAC_PACKAGE_VERSION__: string | undefined;\n\nfunction readFromManifest(): string {\n  try {\n    const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n    // src/version.ts -> repository root\n    return (require('../package.json') as { version?: string }).version ?? '0.0.0-unknown';\n  } catch {\n    return '0.0.0-unknown';\n  }\n}\n\nexport const PACKAGE_VERSION: string =\n  typeof __OAC_PACKAGE_VERSION__ === 'string' ? __OAC_PACKAGE_VERSION__ : readFromManifest();\n"]}

package/dist/chunk-6D2EZ5ME.js

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// src/payments/mpp/constants.ts
+var MPP_SPEC_REPOSITORY = "https://github.com/tempoxyz/mpp-specs";
+var MPP_SPEC_COMMIT = "806fdb8b8c92cda5c84b8660558921b6bbeef7e0";
+var MPP_SPEC_DRAFTS = {
+  core: "draft-httpauth-payment-00",
+  intent: "draft-payment-intent-charge-00",
+  method: "draft-evm-charge-00"
+};
+var MPP_MIN_CHALLENGE_SECRET_LENGTH = 32;
+var MPPX_VERSION = "0.10.1";
+var MPP_PROFILE = {
+  intent: "charge",
+  method: "evm",
+  credentialType: "authorization",
+  assetSymbol: "USDC",
+  assetDecimals: 6
+};
+var MPP_NETWORKS = ["eip155:84532", "eip155:8453"];
+var MPP_DEFAULT_NETWORK = "eip155:84532";
+function isMppNetwork(value) {
+  return MPP_NETWORKS.includes(value);
+}
+var MPP_SUPPORTED_SPEC = `mpp/${MPP_SPEC_DRAFTS.core} intent=${MPP_PROFILE.intent} method=${MPP_PROFILE.method}`;
+
+export { MPPX_VERSION, MPP_DEFAULT_NETWORK, MPP_MIN_CHALLENGE_SECRET_LENGTH, MPP_NETWORKS, MPP_PROFILE, MPP_SPEC_COMMIT, MPP_SPEC_DRAFTS, MPP_SPEC_REPOSITORY, MPP_SUPPORTED_SPEC, isMppNetwork };
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6D2EZ5ME.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6D2EZ5ME.js.map

package/dist/chunk-6D2EZ5ME.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/payments/mpp/constants.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAWO,IAAM,mBAAA,GAAsB;AAQ5B,IAAM,eAAA,GAAkB;AAGxB,IAAM,eAAA,GAAkB;AAAA,EAC7B,IAAA,EAAM,2BAAA;AAAA,EACN,MAAA,EAAQ,gCAAA;AAAA,EACR,MAAA,EAAQ;AACV;AAMO,IAAM,+BAAA,GAAkC;AAGxC,IAAM,YAAA,GAAe;AAUrB,IAAM,WAAA,GAAc;AAAA,EACzB,MAAA,EAAQ,QAAA;AAAA,EACR,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA;AAAA,EACR,cAAA,EAAgB,eAAA;AAAA,EAChB,WAAA,EAAa,MAAA;AAAA,EACb,aAAA,EAAe;AACjB;AAGO,IAAM,YAAA,GAAe,CAAC,cAAA,EAAgB,aAAa;AAKnD,IAAM,mBAAA,GAAkC;AAExC,SAAS,aAAa,KAAA,EAAoC;AAC/D,EAAA,OAAQ,YAAA,CAAmC,SAAS,KAAK,CAAA;AAC3D;AAKO,IAAM,kBAAA,GAAqB,OAAO,eAAA,CAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAA,QAAA,EAAW,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAA","file":"chunk-6D2EZ5ME.js","sourcesContent":["/**\n * The one MPP profile this rail targets.\n *\n * MPP combines a core HTTP authentication layer, an intent, a method and\n * optional extensions. These constants identify the selected combination and\n * the exact specification revision.\n *\n * Importing this metadata does not load `mppx`.\n */\n\n/** Upstream specification repository the pinned drafts were read from */\nexport const MPP_SPEC_REPOSITORY = 'https://github.com/tempoxyz/mpp-specs';\n\n/**\n * Upstream commit the pinned drafts were read at.\n *\n * A draft's content can change without its `-00` name changing, so the name\n * alone does not identify a document; the commit does.\n */\nexport const MPP_SPEC_COMMIT = '806fdb8b8c92cda5c84b8660558921b6bbeef7e0';\n\n/** The core HTTP authentication draft, the `charge` intent, and its EVM method */\nexport const MPP_SPEC_DRAFTS = {\n  core: 'draft-httpauth-payment-00',\n  intent: 'draft-payment-intent-charge-00',\n  method: 'draft-evm-charge-00',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * Minimum accepted `challengeSecret.length`. This is a configuration floor,\n * not an entropy check.\n */\nexport const MPP_MIN_CHALLENGE_SECRET_LENGTH = 32;\n\n/** Exact `mppx` release the rail is pinned to */\nexport const MPPX_VERSION = '0.10.1';\n\n/**\n * The pinned profile.\n *\n * `intent`, `method` and `credentialType` copy MPP wire identifiers from\n * `mppx` so this module has no peer import; tests detect drift. `assetSymbol`\n * is the pricing currency an MPP resource must use. EVM charge requests carry a\n * numeric `chainId` and token address instead.\n */\nexport const MPP_PROFILE = {\n  intent: 'charge',\n  method: 'evm',\n  credentialType: 'authorization',\n  assetSymbol: 'USDC',\n  assetDecimals: 6,\n} as const;\n\n/** Supported CAIP-2 networks; gateway config applies the x402 mainnet guardrails */\nexport const MPP_NETWORKS = ['eip155:84532', 'eip155:8453'] as const;\n\nexport type MppNetwork = (typeof MPP_NETWORKS)[number];\n\n/** Default network ID, shared by Base Sepolia and the local development chain */\nexport const MPP_DEFAULT_NETWORK: MppNetwork = 'eip155:84532';\n\nexport function isMppNetwork(value: string): value is MppNetwork {\n  return (MPP_NETWORKS as readonly string[]).includes(value);\n}\n\n/**\n * Compact descriptor value naming the core draft, intent and method\n */\nexport const MPP_SUPPORTED_SPEC = `mpp/${MPP_SPEC_DRAFTS.core} intent=${MPP_PROFILE.intent} method=${MPP_PROFILE.method}`;\n"]}