@devlab.group/agent-commerce 1.4.0 → 1.4.1

package/README.md

@@ -79,9 +79,15 @@ onboarding an existing API is the CLI's main job.
 import { createGateway, loadConfig, receipts } from '@devlab.group/agent-commerce';
 
 const config = await loadConfig({ path: 'config.yaml' });
+const store = receipts({ path: './receipts.sqlite' });
+// Every ReceiptStore must be initialised before anything else touches it -
+// for the SQLite one this is where a schema written by a newer version is
+// caught, at boot rather than at the first query
+await store.init();
+
 const gateway = await createGateway({
   config,
-  store: receipts({ path: './receipts.sqlite' }),
+  store,
   paymentProviders: [],
   protocolAdapters: [],
 });

package/dist/ap2.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-import { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_SPEC_VERSION, AP2_KEY_TYPE, AP2_JWK_CURVE, openSqliteDatabase } from './chunk-7NKWFGBY.js';
-export { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_SPEC_VERSION } from './chunk-7NKWFGBY.js';
-import { systemClock, NOOP_LOGGER, CommerceError, PACKAGE_VERSION } from './chunk-ZDVJ7EVL.js';
+import { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_SPEC_VERSION, AP2_KEY_TYPE, AP2_JWK_CURVE, openSqliteDatabase } from './chunk-GF6KHHKL.js';
+export { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_SPEC_VERSION } from './chunk-GF6KHHKL.js';
+import { systemClock, NOOP_LOGGER, CommerceError, PACKAGE_VERSION } from './chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js';
 import { SignJWT, importPKCS8, importJWK, jwtVerify } from 'jose';
 import canonicalize from 'canonicalize';
 import { decodeSdJwt, splitSdJwt, getClaims } from '@sd-jwt/core';

package/dist/{chunk-7NKWFGBY.js → chunk-GF6KHHKL.js}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { CommerceError } from './chunk-ZDVJ7EVL.js';
+import { CommerceError } from './chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js';
 import { existsSync, mkdirSync, accessSync, constants, closeSync, openSync, chmodSync } from 'fs';
 import { dirname } from 'path';
 import Database from 'better-sqlite3';
@@ -64,5 +64,5 @@ function restrictDatabasePermissions(path, label, logger) {
 }
 
 export { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, AP2_JWK_COORDINATE_BYTES, AP2_JWK_CURVE, AP2_JWK_MEMBERS, AP2_KEY_TYPE, AP2_MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_MODES, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_SPEC_VERSION, openSqliteDatabase };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7NKWFGBY.js.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7NKWFGBY.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-GF6KHHKL.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-GF6KHHKL.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-7NKWFGBY.js.map → chunk-GF6KHHKL.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Config,\n * the verifier and `doctor` all read these, so a bump lands in one place.\n */\n\nexport const AP2_SPEC_VERSION = '0.2.0';\n\n/**\n * Autonomous mode needs open mandates, cnf-bound agent keys and constraint\n * evaluation over `checkout.line_items`. Half of that would be worse than a\n * declared Direct-only profile, so it is refused rather than partly served.\n */\nexport const AP2_MODES = ['direct'] as const;\nexport type Ap2Mode = (typeof AP2_MODES)[number];\n\n/**\n * One entry, so `alg=none` and the HMAC family are excluded by construction\n * rather than by a check that has to remember them\n */\nexport const AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM = 'ES256';\n\n/** The key type and curve ES256 implies. 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The chmod below only narrows the mode after the fact: a\n  // local co-tenant who opens the file inside that window keeps a readable\n  // descriptor across the chmod and reads everything written afterwards.\n  // SQLite copies the main file's mode onto the -wal/-shm sidecars, so this one\n  // call covers all three. `mode` applies on creation only, so an existing file\n  // is untouched here and left to the chmod.\n  if (isFileBacked) {\n    try {\n      closeSync(openSync(path, 'a', 0o600));\n    } catch {\n      // Deliberately silent: whatever stopped us (unwritable directory, exotic\n      // filesystem) is about to be reported by `new Database` with a better\n      // message, or is harmless and covered by the chmod below.\n    }\n  }\n\n  const db = new Database(path);\n  db.pragma('journal_mode = WAL');\n  db.pragma('foreign_keys = ON');\n  if (isFileBacked) restrictDatabasePermissions(path, label, logger);\n  return db;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow the database and its WAL sidecars to owner-only.\n *\n * `new Database(path)` opens with `0666 & ~umask`, so on a standard host the\n * `.sqlite`, `-wal` and `-shm` files landed at 0644 - any other local user\n * could read the whole commerce ledger: payer and payee addresses, amounts,\n * settlement transaction hashes, replay keys and the entire event stream. 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An existing directory is the\n      // operator's to own and is deliberately left alone.\n      mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Fail at startup, not on the first write. `new Database(path)` happily opens\n  // a file the process cannot write, and SQLite only says \"attempt to write a\n  // readonly database\" once a write is attempted - which on a paid resource is\n  // *after* the payment attempt reservation, surfacing as an opaque\n  // STORAGE_ERROR per request. Readiness does catch it (503), but the operator\n  // is left guessing. This is not hypothetical: switching the demo containers\n  // to a non-root user left an existing named volume root-owned, and that is\n  // exactly how it presented.\n  if (isFileBacked && existsSync(path)) {\n    try {\n      accessSync(path, fsConstants.W_OK);\n    } catch {\n      throw new CommerceError(\n        'STORAGE_ERROR',\n        `${label} \"${path}\" exists but is not writable by this process (uid ${typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? process.getuid() : 'unknown'}). If this is a container that recently changed user, an existing volume may still be owned by the previous one - recreate it (docker compose down -v) or fix its ownership.`,\n        { details: { path } },\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Create the file ourselves, at 0600, *before* SQLite can create it at\n  // `0666 & ~umask`. The chmod below only narrows the mode after the fact: a\n  // local co-tenant who opens the file inside that window keeps a readable\n  // descriptor across the chmod and reads everything written afterwards.\n  // SQLite copies the main file's mode onto the -wal/-shm sidecars, so this one\n  // call covers all three. `mode` applies on creation only, so an existing file\n  // is untouched here and left to the chmod.\n  if (isFileBacked) {\n    try {\n      closeSync(openSync(path, 'a', 0o600));\n    } catch {\n      // Deliberately silent: whatever stopped us (unwritable directory, exotic\n      // filesystem) is about to be reported by `new Database` with a better\n      // message, or is harmless and covered by the chmod below.\n    }\n  }\n\n  const db = new Database(path);\n  db.pragma('journal_mode = WAL');\n  db.pragma('foreign_keys = ON');\n  if (isFileBacked) restrictDatabasePermissions(path, label, logger);\n  return db;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow the database and its WAL sidecars to owner-only.\n *\n * `new Database(path)` opens with `0666 & ~umask`, so on a standard host the\n * `.sqlite`, `-wal` and `-shm` files landed at 0644 - any other local user\n * could read the whole commerce ledger: payer and payee addresses, amounts,\n * settlement transaction hashes, replay keys and the entire event stream. No\n * key material (the gateway is non-custodial and `redact.ts` is recursive), but\n * business metadata all the same.\n *\n * Called *after* `journal_mode = WAL`, because the sidecars do not exist until\n * then. Belt-and-braces since the main file is pre-created at 0600 above: this\n * still tightens a database that already existed with a looser mode.\n * Best-effort by design: a filesystem without POSIX modes must not stop the\n * gateway from starting, so a failure warns rather than throws.\n */\nfunction restrictDatabasePermissions(path: string, label: string, logger: Logger): void {\n  for (const file of [path, `${path}-wal`, `${path}-shm`]) {\n    try {\n      chmodSync(file, 0o600);\n    } catch (error) {\n      const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;\n      if (code === 'ENOENT') continue;\n      logger.warn(\n        { file, label, error: code ?? 'unknown' },\n        'could not restrict database permissions to owner-only',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/{chunk-IUR3Q7DE.js → chunk-NWIQLJNU.js}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { CommerceError } from './chunk-ZDVJ7EVL.js';
+import { CommerceError } from './chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js';
 
 // src/payments/x402/networks.ts
 var PROFILES = [
@@ -251,5 +251,5 @@ function sameAddress(a, b) {
 }
 
 export { SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS, assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly, assertPayToIsNotDevAddress, describeDeploymentMode, requireNetworkProfile, resolveDeploymentMode, resolveX402Deployment };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IUR3Q7DE.js.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IUR3Q7DE.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NWIQLJNU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NWIQLJNU.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-IUR3Q7DE.js.map → chunk-NWIQLJNU.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Supported CAIP-2 identifiers: ${SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS.join(', ')}`,\n      { details: { path, network: id } },\n    );\n  }\n  return profile;\n}\n\n/**\n * What this deployment actually is, as opposed to what it is called.\n *\n * `local` is a property of the *facilitator*, not the network: settling\n * through the in-process facilitator against a dev node is local regardless of\n * the CAIP-2 id that node answers to. This distinction is the whole reason\n * diagnostics can say `eip155:84532` without claiming to be on public Base\n * Sepolia.\n */\nexport type DeploymentMode = 'local' | 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n\nexport function resolveDeploymentMode(\n  profile: NetworkProfile,\n  facilitatorMode: 'local' | 'remote',\n): DeploymentMode {\n  if (facilitatorMode === 'local') return 'local';\n  return profile.kind;\n}\n\n/** The banner an operator must not be able to miss. Never printed for anything else. */\nexport const LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER = 'LIVE MAINNET MODE — REAL FUNDS';\n\nexport function describeDeploymentMode(mode: DeploymentMode): string {\n  return mode === 'mainnet' ? LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER : mode.toUpperCase();\n}\n","/**\n * Anvil's well-known development accounts.\n *\n * LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY — DO NOT FUND. These addresses and private keys are\n * derived from Foundry's public, well-documented default test mnemonic\n * (\"test test test test test test test test test test test junk\") and are\n * known to everyone who has ever run `anvil`. Anyone who sends real value to\n * one of these addresses on a real network will lose it.\n *\n * Index layout used by the local demo chain (see docs/contracts.md):\n * 0 — deployer / local facilitator signer (pays gas, broadcasts settlement)\n * 1 — merchant settlement destination (`payTo`)\n * 2 — buyer (signs EIP-3009 authorisations; never held by the gateway)\n */\nexport interface AnvilWellKnownAccount {\n  readonly address: `0x${string}`;\n  readonly privateKey: `0x${string}`;\n}\n\n/** Fixed-length tuple (not a bare array) so indexing by the documented layout above is fully typed. */\nexport const ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS: readonly [\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n] = [\n  {\n    address: '0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266',\n    privateKey: '0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8',\n    privateKey: '0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC',\n    privateKey: '0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a',\n  },\n];\n\nexport const LOCAL_FACILITATOR_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[0];\nexport const LOCAL_MERCHANT_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[1];\nexport const LOCAL_BUYER_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[2];\n\n/** Safe label used everywhere a dev key appears in output, logs or manifests. */\nexport const DEV_KEY_LABEL = 'LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY - DO NOT FUND';\n","/**\n * Prevents a well-known Anvil development private key — or a well-known\n * Anvil development *address* — from ever being used against anything other\n * than a loopback/private/dev RPC. Two symmetric mistakes, both covered:\n * signing settlement with a dev key (`assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`), and routing\n * settlement revenue to a dev address (`assertPayToIsNotDevAddress`). The\n * second is the more consequential of the two — a wrong key merely fails to\n * sign, a wrong payTo silently succeeds and gives the money away, since the\n * private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n *\n * Chain id alone cannot tell a real network from this project's local dev\n * chain: Base Sepolia's own chain id is 84532, the same id this project\n * deliberately reuses for the local chain so the unmodified x402 SDK can talk\n * to it. A dev key or dev payTo pointed at a real RPC by a config mistake is\n * instantly drainable — this is checked once at provider construction, not per\n * payment.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS } from './local-chain/accounts.js';\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.privateKey.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.address.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\n/** `0x` + 64 hex chars — the only shape `privateKeyToAccount` accepts. */\nconst PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevKey(privateKey: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS.has(privateKey.toLowerCase());\n}\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevAddress(address: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES.has(address.toLowerCase());\n}\n\n/**\n * True for loopback addresses, RFC1918 private ranges, and bare (dot-free)\n * hostnames — the shape of a docker-compose/k8s service name (e.g.\n * \"anvil\"), which a real public DNS name essentially never has.\n *\n * ASSUMPTION, and the loosest edge of this guard: every dot-free, colon-free\n * hostname is treated as private, with no exceptions. A single-label *public* hostname (no dots) is\n * essentially nonexistent in practice — ICANN does not delegate bare\n * gTLDs/TLDs as public A/AAAA records — but this function cannot tell \"no\n * dots because it's a compose service name\" from \"no dots because it's an\n * unusual real host\" if one somehow existed. If that assumption ever stops\n * holding, this is the line to revisit.\n */\nexport function isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '');\n  if (h === 'localhost' || h === '127.0.0.1' || h === '::1') return true;\n  if (/^127\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^10\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^192\\.168\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (!h.includes('.') && !h.includes(':')) return true; // bare hostname\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).hostname;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Not the URL itself: every commercial EVM RPC provider embeds an API key\n    // in the path, and these messages reach `validate`, `doctor`, startup\n    // output and CI logs.\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', 'x402 provider: rpcUrl is not a valid URL', {\n      cause,\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/** Host only, for diagnostics. An RPC URL's path routinely carries a key. */\nfunction describeRpc(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable rpcUrl]';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if a well-known dev key would sign against a non-local\n * RPC — or if `signerPrivateKey` isn't shaped like a private key at all.\n *\n * The shape check runs first and unconditionally. \"Not a key I recognise\"\n * (falls through `isWellKnownDevKey`, silently treated as someone's own real\n * facilitator key) and \"not a key at all\" (e.g. a truncated 63-char string)\n * must never share a code path: a malformed key that slips past this guard\n * only fails later, inside `settle()`, after the buyer's replayKey is already\n * reserved.\n */\nexport function assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly(rpcUrl: string, signerPrivateKey: string): void {\n  if (!PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE.test(signerPrivateKey)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is not a well-formed private key ' +\n        '(expected \"0x\" followed by exactly 64 hex characters).',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!isWellKnownDevKey(signerPrivateKey)) return; // a real facilitator key: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is a well-known Anvil development key, but rpcUrl ' +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. A public dev key must never sign against ` +\n        'a public network — it is instantly drainable and can grief real settlements via nonce exhaustion. ' +\n        'Use a real facilitator key for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if `payTo` (the settlement destination) is a\n * well-known Anvil development address and `rpcUrl` doesn't look\n * local/private.\n *\n * Mirrors `assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`, but guards the *receiving* side of the\n * payment instead of the signing side, and — unlike the key guard — applies\n * regardless of facilitator mode: which account signs the settlement\n * transaction has no bearing on whether the destination address is one whose\n * private key is public knowledge. `agent-commerce init` defaults `payTo` to\n * a well-known Anvil address as a local-demo convenience; on a real network\n * that default routes every payment to an address anyone on earth can sweep.\n */\nexport function assertPayToIsNotDevAddress(rpcUrl: string, payTo: string): void {\n  if (!isWellKnownDevAddress(payTo)) return; // not a dev address: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `x402 provider: \"payTo\" (${payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address, but rpcUrl ` +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. The private key behind that address ` +\n        'is public knowledge, so any revenue settled to it is immediately spendable by anyone. Set ' +\n        '\"payTo\" to your own merchant wallet for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your ' +\n        'local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Everything that must be true before this gateway is allowed to settle a\n * payment on the configured network.\n *\n * One definition, two callers: the provider runs it at construction so a\n * library consumer who never touches our config loader still gets the checks,\n * and `doctor` runs it against the parsed config so an operator sees the same\n * verdict without starting the gateway. Sharing a *call* is not sharing a\n * definition — the checks live here, and nothing re-implements them.\n *\n * Every failure is a startup failure. None of these are request-time\n * decisions: a deployment that is unsafe is unsafe before the first buyer\n * arrives, and finding out during `settle()` means the buyer's authorisation\n * is already burned.\n *\n * Peer-free by construction (no viem, no `@x402/*`) so the CLI can import it.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost, isWellKnownDevAddress } from './dev-key-guard.js';\nimport {\n  type DeploymentMode,\n  type NetworkProfile,\n  requireNetworkProfile,\n  resolveDeploymentMode,\n} from './networks.js';\n\n/**\n * How the gateway authenticates to a remote facilitator.\n *\n * Deliberately a list, not a vendor: x402 facilitators are not a Coinbase-only\n * category, and a scheme that only fitted one vendor's credentials would make\n * the abstraction a fiction.\n *\n * - `none` — the facilitator takes no credential (the public testnet one).\n * - `bearer` — a static token. Covers most self-hosted and third-party\n * facilitators, and needs nothing installed.\n * - `cdp` — Coinbase Developer Platform, which signs a fresh JWT per request\n * over method + host + path, so a static header cannot express it. Handled by\n * the optional peer `@coinbase/x402`, imported only when this type is\n * configured. Anyone not using CDP never installs it.\n *\n * A facilitator whose scheme is none of these is refused at config load rather\n * than sent nothing.\n */\nexport type FacilitatorAuth =\n  | { readonly type: 'none' }\n  | { readonly type: 'bearer'; readonly token: string }\n  | { readonly type: 'cdp'; readonly apiKeyId: string; readonly apiKeySecret: string };\n\nexport type X402FacilitatorConfig =\n  | { readonly mode: 'local'; readonly signerPrivateKey: string }\n  | { readonly mode: 'remote'; readonly url: string; readonly auth: FacilitatorAuth };\n\nexport interface X402DeploymentInput {\n  readonly network: string;\n  readonly payTo: string;\n  readonly asset: string;\n  /** EIP-712 domain of the asset, as the token itself reports it. */\n  readonly assetName?: string;\n  readonly assetVersion?: string;\n  readonly facilitator: X402FacilitatorConfig;\n  /** Required, and required to be `true`, before anything settles on a mainnet. */\n  readonly allowMainnet?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Required, and required to be `true`, to settle on a mainnet through a\n   * facilitator that takes no credential.\n   *\n   * Separate from `allowMainnet` because it names a different decision: not\n   * \"I meant to use real money\" but \"I accept this particular counterparty\n   * without an account, terms, or anyone to call\".\n   */\n  readonly allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface X402Deployment {\n  readonly profile: NetworkProfile;\n  readonly mode: DeploymentMode;\n}\n\nfunction invalid(message: string, path: string): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', message, { details: { path } });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves the deployment and refuses every combination that could move real\n * money by accident. Order matters only in that the network must resolve\n * first; the rest are independent.\n */\nexport function resolveX402Deployment(input: X402DeploymentInput): X402Deployment {\n  const profile = requireNetworkProfile(input.network, 'payments.x402.network');\n  const mode = resolveDeploymentMode(profile, input.facilitator.mode);\n\n  // The in-process facilitator signs with a key this process holds. Not a\n  // custody problem — that signer never holds buyer or merchant funds, it pays\n  // gas and broadcasts `transferWithAuthorization`, and the money moves buyer\n  // to merchant directly on-chain. What it *is*, on a mainnet, is a funded key\n  // inside the resource server: compromise that process and an attacker drains\n  // the gas wallet and broadcasts from it. Separate processes, separate blast\n  // radius — so it is refused, not warned about.\n  if (profile.kind === 'mainnet' && input.facilitator.mode === 'local') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) is a mainnet and cannot be served by facilitator.mode \"local\". A mainnet deployment must settle through a remote facilitator.`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.mode',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && input.allowMainnet !== true) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) settles real funds. Set payments.x402.allowMainnet: true to acknowledge this explicitly — it is never the default.`,\n      'payments.x402.allowMainnet',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (input.facilitator.mode === 'remote') {\n    assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(input.facilitator.url, mode);\n    // Not a funds check. An EIP-3009 authorisation names its recipient, its\n    // amount and its chain, so a facilitator can broadcast exactly that\n    // transfer or nothing — it cannot redirect the money. What a credential\n    // buys is a *relationship*: rate limits, terms, someone to call when\n    // settlement stops. Running production payments through a counterparty you\n    // have none of that with is a real choice, and this is where it gets made\n    // explicitly rather than by omission.\n    if (\n      mode === 'mainnet' &&\n      input.facilitator.auth.type === 'none' &&\n      input.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== true\n    ) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(input.facilitator.url)} takes no credential, and this is a mainnet deployment. It will see every payment authorisation you handle, with no account, terms or support behind it. Set payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: true to accept that, or configure facilitator.auth.`,\n        'payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator',\n      );\n    }\n    // An empty credential is refused rather than sent: a blank token or key\n    // reaches the facilitator as \"unauthenticated\" and fails every payment\n    // after the buyer has already signed. `${VAR:- }` resolving to whitespace\n    // is the realistic way this happens.\n    for (const [field, value] of credentialFields(input.facilitator.auth)) {\n      if (value.trim() === '') {\n        throw invalid(\n          `payments.x402: facilitator.auth.type is \"${input.facilitator.auth.type}\" but ${field} is empty. An empty credential is refused rather than sent.`,\n          `payments.x402.facilitator.auth.${field}`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // The private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n  // `dev-key-guard` already refuses one against a public *RPC*; this refuses\n  // one on any non-local *deployment*, which is the case a remote facilitator\n  // creates — there the RPC host says nothing about where settlement lands.\n  // The zero address lived only in the config loader, so a library consumer\n  // calling `createX402PaymentProvider` directly — the path this shared\n  // definition exists to cover — could boot a mainnet provider whose every\n  // payment burns — sharing a *call* is not sharing a definition, and this\n  // check had drifted out of the shared one.\n  if (/^0x0{40}$/i.test(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      'payments.x402: \"payTo\" is the zero address. Every payment settled there is destroyed.',\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode !== 'local' && isWellKnownDevAddress(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: \"payTo\" (${input.payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address and this is a ${mode} deployment. Anyone can spend what settles there. Set payTo to your own merchant wallet.`,\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Mainnet only. A testnet is exactly where pointing at a mock token is the\n  // right thing to do, so the same check there would block the normal case.\n  const canonical = profile.canonicalAsset;\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && canonical) {\n    if (!sameAddress(input.asset, canonical.address)) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: asset ${input.asset} is not ${canonical.symbol} on ${profile.displayName} (expected ${canonical.address}). Settling a mainnet payment in an unintended token is refused.`,\n        'payments.x402.asset',\n      );\n    }\n    // The EIP-712 domain is signed by the buyer and checked by the scheme. Get\n    // it wrong and every payment is refused `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch`\n    // *after* the buyer signed — a config error charged to the buyer's patience.\n    // Caught here instead, before the gateway starts.\n    if (input.assetName !== undefined && input.assetName !== canonical.name) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetName \"${input.assetName}\" is not the EIP-712 domain name ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.name}\"). Every payment would be refused after the buyer signed.`,\n        'payments.x402.assetName',\n      );\n    }\n    if (input.assetVersion !== undefined && input.assetVersion !== canonical.version) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetVersion \"${input.assetVersion}\" is not the EIP-712 domain version ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.version}\").`,\n        'payments.x402.assetVersion',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { profile, mode };\n}\n\n/**\n * A facilitator sees every payment authorisation this gateway handles. Plain\n * HTTP to one on a public network puts those on the wire in the clear and\n * lets anyone in the path rewrite a settlement result, so it is allowed only\n * where the endpoint cannot leave the host — a local or private address.\n */\nfunction assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(url: string, mode: DeploymentMode): void {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', `payments.x402: facilitator.url is not a valid URL`, {\n      cause,\n      details: { path: 'payments.x402.facilitator.url' },\n    });\n  }\n\n  if (parsed.protocol === 'https:') return;\n  if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} must be reached over https (or http on a local/private host); got \"${parsed.protocol}//\"`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n    );\n  }\n  if (mode !== 'mainnet' && isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(parsed.hostname)) return;\n\n  // The origin, never the whole URL: the path can carry a tenant or an API\n  // key, which is why `/.well-known` withholds this field entirely. A refusal\n  // message goes to `validate`, `doctor`, startup output and CI logs.\n  throw invalid(\n    `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} is reached over plain HTTP. Payment authorisations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,\n    'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n  );\n}\n\n/** Host only — a facilitator URL can carry a tenant path or an API key. */\nfunction describeOrigin(url: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable facilitator.url]';\n  }\n}\n\n/** The secret-bearing fields of an auth block, for emptiness checks only. Never logged. */\nfunction credentialFields(auth: FacilitatorAuth): readonly (readonly [string, string])[] {\n  switch (auth.type) {\n    case 'bearer':\n      return [['token', auth.token]];\n    case 'cdp':\n      return [\n        ['apiKeyId', auth.apiKeyId],\n        ['apiKeySecret', auth.apiKeySecret],\n      ];\n    default:\n      return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction sameAddress(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();\n}\n"]}
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* The networks this gateway will settle on, as data.\n *\n * x402 v2 identifies a network by its CAIP-2 id, so the only thing an\n * operator has to change to move between environments is that string. What\n * the code needs on top of it — the chain id to sign against, a name a human\n * recognises, and whether real money is involved — lives here rather than\n * being derived at each call site.\n *\n * A registry rather than \"parse any `eip155:*`\" on purpose. The chain id is\n * parseable from any such string, but `mainnet` is not, and every guardrail in\n * `guardrails.ts` keys off it. An unknown id is refused at startup instead of\n * being quietly treated as a testnet.\n *\n * Base Sepolia and the local dev chain share the id `eip155:84532`: the local\n * chain deliberately reuses Base Sepolia's chain id so the unmodified x402 SDK\n * can talk to it. Nothing may infer \"public network\" from the network id alone\n * — that is what `resolveDeploymentMode` and the Anvil probe in `provider.ts`\n * are for.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\nexport interface NetworkProfile {\n  /** CAIP-2 identifier, e.g. `eip155:84532`. */\n  readonly id: string;\n  /** Signed into the buyer's EIP-712 domain. */\n  readonly chainId: number;\n  readonly displayName: string;\n  readonly kind: 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n  /**\n   * The USDC deployment this network is expected to settle in, with the EIP-712\n   * domain the token actually reports. Enforced only on mainnet (see\n   * `guardrails.ts`) — a testnet is where a mock token is a legitimate thing to\n   * point at.\n   *\n   * `name` is not decorative and is not the symbol: it is signed into every\n   * buyer's EIP-712 domain, and the two USDC deployments disagree. Base Sepolia\n   * reports `\"USDC\"`; Base mainnet reports `\"USD Coin\"`. Configure the wrong\n   * one and every payment is refused `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch`\n   * after the buyer has signed. Read back from the contracts, not assumed.\n   */\n  readonly canonicalAsset?: {\n    readonly symbol: string;\n    readonly address: string;\n    readonly name: string;\n    readonly version: string;\n  };\n}\n\nconst PROFILES: readonly NetworkProfile[] = [\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:84532',\n    chainId: 84532,\n    displayName: 'Base Sepolia',\n    kind: 'testnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e',\n      name: 'USDC',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:8453',\n    chainId: 8453,\n    displayName: 'Base',\n    kind: 'mainnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913',\n      name: 'USD Coin',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n];\n\nconst BY_ID = new Map(PROFILES.map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));\n\nexport const SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS: readonly string[] = PROFILES.map((p) => p.id);\n\nexport function findNetworkProfile(id: string): NetworkProfile | undefined {\n  return BY_ID.get(id);\n}\n\nexport function requireNetworkProfile(id: string, path: string): NetworkProfile {\n  const profile = BY_ID.get(id);\n  if (!profile) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `${path}: \"${id}\" is not a supported network. Supported CAIP-2 identifiers: ${SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS.join(', ')}`,\n      { details: { path, network: id } },\n    );\n  }\n  return profile;\n}\n\n/**\n * What this deployment actually is, as opposed to what it is called.\n *\n * `local` is a property of the *facilitator*, not the network: settling\n * through the in-process facilitator against a dev node is local regardless of\n * the CAIP-2 id that node answers to. This distinction is the whole reason\n * diagnostics can say `eip155:84532` without claiming to be on public Base\n * Sepolia.\n */\nexport type DeploymentMode = 'local' | 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n\nexport function resolveDeploymentMode(\n  profile: NetworkProfile,\n  facilitatorMode: 'local' | 'remote',\n): DeploymentMode {\n  if (facilitatorMode === 'local') return 'local';\n  return profile.kind;\n}\n\n/** The banner an operator must not be able to miss. Never printed for anything else. */\nexport const LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER = 'LIVE MAINNET MODE — REAL FUNDS';\n\nexport function describeDeploymentMode(mode: DeploymentMode): string {\n  return mode === 'mainnet' ? LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER : mode.toUpperCase();\n}\n","/**\n * Anvil's well-known development accounts.\n *\n * LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY — DO NOT FUND. These addresses and private keys are\n * derived from Foundry's public, well-documented default test mnemonic\n * (\"test test test test test test test test test test test junk\") and are\n * known to everyone who has ever run `anvil`. Anyone who sends real value to\n * one of these addresses on a real network will lose it.\n *\n * Index layout used by the local demo chain (see docs/contracts.md):\n * 0 — deployer / local facilitator signer (pays gas, broadcasts settlement)\n * 1 — merchant settlement destination (`payTo`)\n * 2 — buyer (signs EIP-3009 authorisations; never held by the gateway)\n */\nexport interface AnvilWellKnownAccount {\n  readonly address: `0x${string}`;\n  readonly privateKey: `0x${string}`;\n}\n\n/** Fixed-length tuple (not a bare array) so indexing by the documented layout above is fully typed. */\nexport const ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS: readonly [\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n] = [\n  {\n    address: '0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266',\n    privateKey: '0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8',\n    privateKey: '0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC',\n    privateKey: '0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a',\n  },\n];\n\nexport const LOCAL_FACILITATOR_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[0];\nexport const LOCAL_MERCHANT_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[1];\nexport const LOCAL_BUYER_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[2];\n\n/** Safe label used everywhere a dev key appears in output, logs or manifests. */\nexport const DEV_KEY_LABEL = 'LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY - DO NOT FUND';\n","/**\n * Prevents a well-known Anvil development private key — or a well-known\n * Anvil development *address* — from ever being used against anything other\n * than a loopback/private/dev RPC. Two symmetric mistakes, both covered:\n * signing settlement with a dev key (`assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`), and routing\n * settlement revenue to a dev address (`assertPayToIsNotDevAddress`). The\n * second is the more consequential of the two — a wrong key merely fails to\n * sign, a wrong payTo silently succeeds and gives the money away, since the\n * private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n *\n * Chain id alone cannot tell a real network from this project's local dev\n * chain: Base Sepolia's own chain id is 84532, the same id this project\n * deliberately reuses for the local chain so the unmodified x402 SDK can talk\n * to it. A dev key or dev payTo pointed at a real RPC by a config mistake is\n * instantly drainable — this is checked once at provider construction, not per\n * payment.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS } from './local-chain/accounts.js';\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.privateKey.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.address.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\n/** `0x` + 64 hex chars — the only shape `privateKeyToAccount` accepts. */\nconst PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevKey(privateKey: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS.has(privateKey.toLowerCase());\n}\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevAddress(address: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES.has(address.toLowerCase());\n}\n\n/**\n * True for loopback addresses, RFC1918 private ranges, and bare (dot-free)\n * hostnames — the shape of a docker-compose/k8s service name (e.g.\n * \"anvil\"), which a real public DNS name essentially never has.\n *\n * ASSUMPTION, and the loosest edge of this guard: every dot-free, colon-free\n * hostname is treated as private, with no exceptions. A single-label *public* hostname (no dots) is\n * essentially nonexistent in practice — ICANN does not delegate bare\n * gTLDs/TLDs as public A/AAAA records — but this function cannot tell \"no\n * dots because it's a compose service name\" from \"no dots because it's an\n * unusual real host\" if one somehow existed. If that assumption ever stops\n * holding, this is the line to revisit.\n */\nexport function isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '');\n  if (h === 'localhost' || h === '127.0.0.1' || h === '::1') return true;\n  if (/^127\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^10\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^192\\.168\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (!h.includes('.') && !h.includes(':')) return true; // bare hostname\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).hostname;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Not the URL itself: every commercial EVM RPC provider embeds an API key\n    // in the path, and these messages reach `validate`, `doctor`, startup\n    // output and CI logs.\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', 'x402 provider: rpcUrl is not a valid URL', {\n      cause,\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/** Host only, for diagnostics. An RPC URL's path routinely carries a key. */\nfunction describeRpc(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable rpcUrl]';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if a well-known dev key would sign against a non-local\n * RPC — or if `signerPrivateKey` isn't shaped like a private key at all.\n *\n * The shape check runs first and unconditionally. \"Not a key I recognise\"\n * (falls through `isWellKnownDevKey`, silently treated as someone's own real\n * facilitator key) and \"not a key at all\" (e.g. a truncated 63-char string)\n * must never share a code path: a malformed key that slips past this guard\n * only fails later, inside `settle()`, after the buyer's replayKey is already\n * reserved.\n */\nexport function assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly(rpcUrl: string, signerPrivateKey: string): void {\n  if (!PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE.test(signerPrivateKey)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is not a well-formed private key ' +\n        '(expected \"0x\" followed by exactly 64 hex characters).',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!isWellKnownDevKey(signerPrivateKey)) return; // a real facilitator key: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is a well-known Anvil development key, but rpcUrl ' +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. A public dev key must never sign against ` +\n        'a public network — it is instantly drainable and can grief real settlements via nonce exhaustion. ' +\n        'Use a real facilitator key for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if `payTo` (the settlement destination) is a\n * well-known Anvil development address and `rpcUrl` doesn't look\n * local/private.\n *\n * Mirrors `assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`, but guards the *receiving* side of the\n * payment instead of the signing side, and — unlike the key guard — applies\n * regardless of facilitator mode: which account signs the settlement\n * transaction has no bearing on whether the destination address is one whose\n * private key is public knowledge. `agent-commerce init` defaults `payTo` to\n * a well-known Anvil address as a local-demo convenience; on a real network\n * that default routes every payment to an address anyone on earth can sweep.\n */\nexport function assertPayToIsNotDevAddress(rpcUrl: string, payTo: string): void {\n  if (!isWellKnownDevAddress(payTo)) return; // not a dev address: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `x402 provider: \"payTo\" (${payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address, but rpcUrl ` +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. The private key behind that address ` +\n        'is public knowledge, so any revenue settled to it is immediately spendable by anyone. Set ' +\n        '\"payTo\" to your own merchant wallet for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your ' +\n        'local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Everything that must be true before this gateway is allowed to settle a\n * payment on the configured network.\n *\n * One definition, two callers: the provider runs it at construction so a\n * library consumer who never touches our config loader still gets the checks,\n * and `doctor` runs it against the parsed config so an operator sees the same\n * verdict without starting the gateway. Sharing a *call* is not sharing a\n * definition — the checks live here, and nothing re-implements them.\n *\n * Every failure is a startup failure. None of these are request-time\n * decisions: a deployment that is unsafe is unsafe before the first buyer\n * arrives, and finding out during `settle()` means the buyer's authorisation\n * is already burned.\n *\n * Peer-free by construction (no viem, no `@x402/*`) so the CLI can import it.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost, isWellKnownDevAddress } from './dev-key-guard.js';\nimport {\n  type DeploymentMode,\n  type NetworkProfile,\n  requireNetworkProfile,\n  resolveDeploymentMode,\n} from './networks.js';\n\n/**\n * How the gateway authenticates to a remote facilitator.\n *\n * Deliberately a list, not a vendor: x402 facilitators are not a Coinbase-only\n * category, and a scheme that only fitted one vendor's credentials would make\n * the abstraction a fiction.\n *\n * - `none` — the facilitator takes no credential (the public testnet one).\n * - `bearer` — a static token. Covers most self-hosted and third-party\n * facilitators, and needs nothing installed.\n * - `cdp` — Coinbase Developer Platform, which signs a fresh JWT per request\n * over method + host + path, so a static header cannot express it. Handled by\n * the optional peer `@coinbase/x402`, imported only when this type is\n * configured. Anyone not using CDP never installs it.\n *\n * A facilitator whose scheme is none of these is refused at config load rather\n * than sent nothing.\n */\nexport type FacilitatorAuth =\n  | { readonly type: 'none' }\n  | { readonly type: 'bearer'; readonly token: string }\n  | { readonly type: 'cdp'; readonly apiKeyId: string; readonly apiKeySecret: string };\n\nexport type X402FacilitatorConfig =\n  | { readonly mode: 'local'; readonly signerPrivateKey: string }\n  | { readonly mode: 'remote'; readonly url: string; readonly auth: FacilitatorAuth };\n\nexport interface X402DeploymentInput {\n  readonly network: string;\n  readonly payTo: string;\n  readonly asset: string;\n  /** EIP-712 domain of the asset, as the token itself reports it. */\n  readonly assetName?: string;\n  readonly assetVersion?: string;\n  readonly facilitator: X402FacilitatorConfig;\n  /** Required, and required to be `true`, before anything settles on a mainnet. */\n  readonly allowMainnet?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Required, and required to be `true`, to settle on a mainnet through a\n   * facilitator that takes no credential.\n   *\n   * Separate from `allowMainnet` because it names a different decision: not\n   * \"I meant to use real money\" but \"I accept this particular counterparty\n   * without an account, terms, or anyone to call\".\n   */\n  readonly allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface X402Deployment {\n  readonly profile: NetworkProfile;\n  readonly mode: DeploymentMode;\n}\n\nfunction invalid(message: string, path: string): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', message, { details: { path } });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves the deployment and refuses every combination that could move real\n * money by accident. Order matters only in that the network must resolve\n * first; the rest are independent.\n */\nexport function resolveX402Deployment(input: X402DeploymentInput): X402Deployment {\n  const profile = requireNetworkProfile(input.network, 'payments.x402.network');\n  const mode = resolveDeploymentMode(profile, input.facilitator.mode);\n\n  // The in-process facilitator signs with a key this process holds. Not a\n  // custody problem — that signer never holds buyer or merchant funds, it pays\n  // gas and broadcasts `transferWithAuthorization`, and the money moves buyer\n  // to merchant directly on-chain. What it *is*, on a mainnet, is a funded key\n  // inside the resource server: compromise that process and an attacker drains\n  // the gas wallet and broadcasts from it. Separate processes, separate blast\n  // radius — so it is refused, not warned about.\n  if (profile.kind === 'mainnet' && input.facilitator.mode === 'local') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) is a mainnet and cannot be served by facilitator.mode \"local\". A mainnet deployment must settle through a remote facilitator.`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.mode',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && input.allowMainnet !== true) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) settles real funds. Set payments.x402.allowMainnet: true to acknowledge this explicitly — it is never the default.`,\n      'payments.x402.allowMainnet',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (input.facilitator.mode === 'remote') {\n    assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(input.facilitator.url, mode);\n    // Not a funds check. An EIP-3009 authorisation names its recipient, its\n    // amount and its chain, so a facilitator can broadcast exactly that\n    // transfer or nothing — it cannot redirect the money. What a credential\n    // buys is a *relationship*: rate limits, terms, someone to call when\n    // settlement stops. Running production payments through a counterparty you\n    // have none of that with is a real choice, and this is where it gets made\n    // explicitly rather than by omission.\n    if (\n      mode === 'mainnet' &&\n      input.facilitator.auth.type === 'none' &&\n      input.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== true\n    ) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(input.facilitator.url)} takes no credential, and this is a mainnet deployment. It will see every payment authorisation you handle, with no account, terms or support behind it. Set payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: true to accept that, or configure facilitator.auth.`,\n        'payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator',\n      );\n    }\n    // An empty credential is refused rather than sent: a blank token or key\n    // reaches the facilitator as \"unauthenticated\" and fails every payment\n    // after the buyer has already signed. `${VAR:- }` resolving to whitespace\n    // is the realistic way this happens.\n    for (const [field, value] of credentialFields(input.facilitator.auth)) {\n      if (value.trim() === '') {\n        throw invalid(\n          `payments.x402: facilitator.auth.type is \"${input.facilitator.auth.type}\" but ${field} is empty. An empty credential is refused rather than sent.`,\n          `payments.x402.facilitator.auth.${field}`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // The private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n  // `dev-key-guard` already refuses one against a public *RPC*; this refuses\n  // one on any non-local *deployment*, which is the case a remote facilitator\n  // creates — there the RPC host says nothing about where settlement lands.\n  // The zero address lived only in the config loader, so a library consumer\n  // calling `createX402PaymentProvider` directly — the path this shared\n  // definition exists to cover — could boot a mainnet provider whose every\n  // payment burns — sharing a *call* is not sharing a definition, and this\n  // check had drifted out of the shared one.\n  if (/^0x0{40}$/i.test(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      'payments.x402: \"payTo\" is the zero address. Every payment settled there is destroyed.',\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode !== 'local' && isWellKnownDevAddress(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: \"payTo\" (${input.payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address and this is a ${mode} deployment. Anyone can spend what settles there. Set payTo to your own merchant wallet.`,\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Mainnet only. A testnet is exactly where pointing at a mock token is the\n  // right thing to do, so the same check there would block the normal case.\n  const canonical = profile.canonicalAsset;\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && canonical) {\n    if (!sameAddress(input.asset, canonical.address)) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: asset ${input.asset} is not ${canonical.symbol} on ${profile.displayName} (expected ${canonical.address}). Settling a mainnet payment in an unintended token is refused.`,\n        'payments.x402.asset',\n      );\n    }\n    // The EIP-712 domain is signed by the buyer and checked by the scheme. Get\n    // it wrong and every payment is refused `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch`\n    // *after* the buyer signed — a config error charged to the buyer's patience.\n    // Caught here instead, before the gateway starts.\n    if (input.assetName !== undefined && input.assetName !== canonical.name) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetName \"${input.assetName}\" is not the EIP-712 domain name ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.name}\"). Every payment would be refused after the buyer signed.`,\n        'payments.x402.assetName',\n      );\n    }\n    if (input.assetVersion !== undefined && input.assetVersion !== canonical.version) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetVersion \"${input.assetVersion}\" is not the EIP-712 domain version ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.version}\").`,\n        'payments.x402.assetVersion',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { profile, mode };\n}\n\n/**\n * A facilitator sees every payment authorisation this gateway handles. Plain\n * HTTP to one on a public network puts those on the wire in the clear and\n * lets anyone in the path rewrite a settlement result, so it is allowed only\n * where the endpoint cannot leave the host — a local or private address.\n */\nfunction assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(url: string, mode: DeploymentMode): void {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', `payments.x402: facilitator.url is not a valid URL`, {\n      cause,\n      details: { path: 'payments.x402.facilitator.url' },\n    });\n  }\n\n  if (parsed.protocol === 'https:') return;\n  if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} must be reached over https (or http on a local/private host); got \"${parsed.protocol}//\"`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n    );\n  }\n  if (mode !== 'mainnet' && isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(parsed.hostname)) return;\n\n  // The origin, never the whole URL: the path can carry a tenant or an API\n  // key, which is why `/.well-known` withholds this field entirely. A refusal\n  // message goes to `validate`, `doctor`, startup output and CI logs.\n  throw invalid(\n    `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} is reached over plain HTTP. Payment authorisations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,\n    'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n  );\n}\n\n/** Host only — a facilitator URL can carry a tenant path or an API key. */\nfunction describeOrigin(url: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable facilitator.url]';\n  }\n}\n\n/** The secret-bearing fields of an auth block, for emptiness checks only. Never logged. */\nfunction credentialFields(auth: FacilitatorAuth): readonly (readonly [string, string])[] {\n  switch (auth.type) {\n    case 'bearer':\n      return [['token', auth.token]];\n    case 'cdp':\n      return [\n        ['apiKeyId', auth.apiKeyId],\n        ['apiKeySecret', auth.apiKeySecret],\n      ];\n    default:\n      return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction sameAddress(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();\n}\n"]}

package/dist/{chunk-ZDVJ7EVL.js → chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js}

@@ -273,8 +273,8 @@ var systemClock = {
   nowIso: () => (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
   monotonicMs: () => performance.now()
 };
-var PACKAGE_VERSION = "1.4.0" ;
+var PACKAGE_VERSION = "1.4.1" ;
 
 export { AUTHORIZATION_HEADER, AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD, COMMERCE_ERROR_CODES, COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS, COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES, CommerceError, DEFAULT_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS, DELIVERY_SUMMARY_META_KEY, MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES, NOOP_LOGGER, PACKAGE_VERSION, PAYMENT_HEADER, PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD, PAYMENT_REQUIRED_HEADER, PAYMENT_RESPONSE_HEADER, PROTOCOL_NAMES, RESERVED_INPUT_FIELDS, RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES, extractReservedInputFields, isCommerceError, isHttpProtocolAdapter, isPaymentRequiredEnvelope, parseAuthorizationHeader, parseAuthorizationSubmission, systemClock, toCommerceError, toDeliverySummary, toErrorEnvelope, toPaymentRequiredEnvelope };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZDVJ7EVL.js.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZDVJ7EVL.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-ZDVJ7EVL.js.map → chunk-ZEGFLRGV.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Shared primitive aliases used across the canonical domain model.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. Every consumer codes against these shapes; changing one\n * is a breaking change.\n */\n\n/**\n * A JSON Schema document (draft 2020-12 subset in practice).\n *\n * Deliberately loose: protocol adapters translate this to their own schema\n * representation, and the gateway only validates structurally at trust\n * boundaries. 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Every event in a single flow shares one `requestId` so that\n * logs, payment attempts, backend calls and receipts are correlatable.\n */\nimport type { IsoTimestamp } from './common.js';\n\nexport const COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES = [\n  'resource.discovered',\n  'resource.requested',\n  'payment.required',\n  'payment.rejected',\n  'payment.verified',\n  'payment.settled',\n  // The same two types whatever the method, so an audit-trail reader never\n  // has to know what AP2 is\n  'authorization.verified',\n  'authorization.rejected',\n  'backend.called',\n  'backend.failed',\n  'resource.delivered',\n] as const;\n\nexport type CommerceEventType = (typeof COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES)[number];\n\nexport interface CommerceEvent {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly type: CommerceEventType;\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly at: IsoTimestamp;\n  /** Protocol adapter that originated the request, e.g. 'mcp' or 'http'. */\n  readonly adapter?: string;\n  readonly paymentProvider?: string;\n  readonly durationMs?: number;\n  readonly status?: 'ok' | 'error';\n  /** Non-secret, structured detail. 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That mapping\n   * cannot express `POST /users/{userId}/orders?notify=true` with a JSON body\n   * - one perfectly ordinary REST operation with all three parts at once.\n   *\n   * When present, each group is sourced independently and top-level input that\n   * no binding names is not forwarded to the backend at all.\n   */\n  readonly inputBindings?: {\n    readonly path?: string;\n    readonly query?: string;\n    readonly body?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/** Default backend timeout when a resource does not specify one. */\nexport const DEFAULT_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/**\n * Canonical pricing.\n *\n * `dynamic` exists in the type system for forward compatibility but is\n * REJECTED by config validation in this release.\n */\nexport type Pricing =\n  | { readonly type: 'free' }\n  | {\n      readonly type: 'fixed';\n      readonly amount: DecimalAmount;\n      readonly currency: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly type: 'dynamic';\n      readonly resolver: string;\n    };\n\n/**\n * A merchant capability exposed to agents.\n *\n * The canonical resource is the single source of truth: protocol adapters map\n * it outward, they never define their own parallel notion of a resource.\n */\nexport interface CommerceResource {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly name: string;\n  readonly description?: string;\n  readonly inputSchema?: JsonSchema;\n  readonly outputSchema?: JsonSchema;\n  readonly handler: BackendHandler;\n  readonly pricing: Pricing;\n  readonly exposedVia: readonly ProtocolName[];\n  readonly paymentMethods: readonly PaymentMethodName[];\n  /**\n   * Authorization the buyer must present in addition to payment.\n   *\n   * Opt-in per resource and absent by default, so every resource configured\n   * before this existed behaves exactly as it did. It sits beside\n   * `paymentMethods` rather than inside it: an authorization method is not a\n   * payment rail and must never be selectable as one.\n   */\n  readonly authorization?: {\n    readonly required: readonly AuthorizationMethodName[];\n  };\n}\n\n/** Read-only view of every configured resource. */\nexport interface ResourceRegistry {\n  get(id: string): CommerceResource | undefined;\n  list(): readonly CommerceResource[];\n  /** Resources exposed through a given protocol surface. */\n  listExposedVia(protocol: ProtocolName): readonly CommerceResource[];\n  has(id: string): boolean;\n}\n","/**\n * Typed domain error codes.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. Protocol adapters map these codes into their own response\n * format. Never throw a bare string or untyped Error across a package boundary.\n */\nexport const COMMERCE_ERROR_CODES = [\n  'CONFIG_INVALID',\n  'RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND',\n  'INPUT_INVALID',\n  'PAYMENT_REQUIRED',\n  'PAYMENT_INVALID',\n  'PAYMENT_REPLAYED',\n  'PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'PAYMENT_SETTLEMENT_FAILED',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_INVALID',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'BACKEND_TIMEOUT',\n  'BACKEND_ERROR',\n  'PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED',\n  'GATEWAY_BUSY',\n  'STORAGE_ERROR',\n  'INTERNAL_ERROR',\n] as const;\n\nexport type CommerceErrorCode = (typeof COMMERCE_ERROR_CODES)[number];\n\n/**\n * Canonical HTTP status for each error code.\n *\n * Paid resources fail closed: every payment failure maps to a 4xx/5xx status\n * and never to a successful delivery.\n */\nexport const COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS: Readonly<Record<CommerceErrorCode, number>> = {\n  CONFIG_INVALID: 500,\n  RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND: 404,\n  INPUT_INVALID: 400,\n  PAYMENT_REQUIRED: 402,\n  PAYMENT_INVALID: 402,\n  PAYMENT_REPLAYED: 409,\n  PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE: 503,\n  PAYMENT_SETTLEMENT_FAILED: 502,\n  // 403, not 402: the buyer's money is not the problem. A 402 tells a client\n  // \"pay and retry\", which cannot fix a missing or rejected mandate, and a\n  // client that auto-pays on 402 would be charged for a request that was\n  // never going to be delivered.\n  AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED: 403,\n  AUTHORIZATION_INVALID: 403,\n  AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED: 409,\n  AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE: 503,\n  BACKEND_TIMEOUT: 504,\n  BACKEND_ERROR: 502,\n  PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED: 501,\n  GATEWAY_BUSY: 503,\n  STORAGE_ERROR: 500,\n  INTERNAL_ERROR: 500,\n};\n\n/** Codes for which a client may reasonably retry the same request. */\nexport const RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES: ReadonlySet<CommerceErrorCode> = new Set([\n  'PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  // Our verifier or our replay store was unreachable, so no verdict on the\n  // mandate was ever reached. That is an outage on our side, and the same\n  // proof will verify once it clears.\n  'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'BACKEND_TIMEOUT',\n  // Load shedding is transient by definition: the caller should back off and\n  // try again. Before this code existed the MCP adapter's queue-full path threw\n  // PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED — HTTP 501, retryable:false — so an agent framework\n  // keyed on the machine-readable flag (which exists precisely so clients need\n  // not parse prose) would read a momentary throttle as a permanent capability\n  // gap and stop calling the tool.\n  'GATEWAY_BUSY',\n]);\n","/**\n * The single error type crossing package boundaries.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT.\n */\nimport {\n  COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS,\n  type CommerceErrorCode,\n  RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES,\n} from './codes.js';\n\nexport interface CommerceErrorOptions {\n  /** Structured, non-secret detail safe to return to a client. */\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  readonly cause?: unknown;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  /** Override the default HTTP status for this code. */\n  readonly httpStatus?: number;\n}\n\n/** Serialisable wire form of a CommerceError. */\nexport interface CommerceErrorInfo {\n  readonly code: CommerceErrorCode;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly httpStatus: number;\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\nexport class CommerceError extends Error {\n  readonly code: CommerceErrorCode;\n  readonly httpStatus: number;\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n\n  constructor(code: CommerceErrorCode, message: string, options: CommerceErrorOptions = {}) {\n    super(message, options.cause !== undefined ? { cause: options.cause } : undefined);\n    this.name = 'CommerceError';\n    this.code = code;\n    this.httpStatus = options.httpStatus ?? COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS[code];\n    this.retryable = RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES.has(code);\n    if (options.details !== undefined) this.details = options.details;\n    if (options.requestId !== undefined) this.requestId = options.requestId;\n    if (options.resourceId !== undefined) this.resourceId = options.resourceId;\n    Error.captureStackTrace?.(this, CommerceError);\n  }\n\n  /** Non-secret, client-safe representation. */\n  toInfo(): CommerceErrorInfo {\n    return {\n      code: this.code,\n      message: this.message,\n      httpStatus: this.httpStatus,\n      retryable: this.retryable,\n      ...(this.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: this.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(this.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: this.resourceId } : {}),\n      ...(this.details !== undefined ? { details: this.details } : {}),\n    };\n  }\n}\n\nexport function isCommerceError(value: unknown): value is CommerceError {\n  return value instanceof CommerceError;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalise any thrown value into a CommerceError.\n *\n * Used at package boundaries so an unexpected failure never escapes untyped.\n *\n * SECURITY — do not \"improve\" this by propagating `value.message`.\n * `CommerceError.message` is client-visible: it is serialised by `toInfo()`\n * and `toErrorEnvelope()` and returned over HTTP and MCP. An arbitrary thrown\n * Error's message routinely carries internal detail — database connection\n * strings, internal hostnames, filesystem paths, backend URLs. Copying it into\n * a client-facing field turns every unexpected exception into an information\n * disclosure.\n *\n * The original value is preserved on `cause`, which is never serialised, so\n * logs and diagnostics keep the full detail while clients get only the\n * caller's deliberate, reviewed `fallbackMessage`.\n *\n * A caller that *wants* a specific client-facing message passes one:\n * toCommerceError(err, 'BACKEND_ERROR', 'Backend call failed')\n */\nexport function toCommerceError(\n  value: unknown,\n  fallbackCode: CommerceErrorCode = 'INTERNAL_ERROR',\n  fallbackMessage = 'Unexpected internal error',\n): CommerceError {\n  if (isCommerceError(value)) return value;\n  return new CommerceError(fallbackCode, fallbackMessage, { cause: value });\n}\n","/**\n * Gateway-defined wire envelopes.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. These are the *only* representations of \"payment required\"\n * and \"error\" that leave the gateway, whichever protocol carries them. The HTTP\n * routes, the MCP adapter and the demo buyer agent all use these helpers so the\n * three can never drift apart.\n */\n\nimport { CommerceError, type CommerceErrorCode } from '../errors/index.js';\nimport type { AuthorizationRequirement, AuthorizationSubmission } from './authorization.js';\nimport type { DecimalAmount, IsoTimestamp, PaymentMethodName } from './common.js';\nimport type { PaymentSubmission } from './payment.js';\nimport type { DeliveredOutcome, PaymentRequiredOutcome } from './request.js';\nimport type { CommerceResource } from './resource.js';\n\n/**\n * Reserved input property carrying a payment proof on protocols that have no\n * header channel (MCP tool calls). Over HTTP the `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` header is\n * used.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD = '_payment';\n\n/**\n * HTTP request header carrying the payment proof.\n *\n * x402 v2 header names, lowercased because that is how Node presents incoming\n * headers. v1's `X-PAYMENT` / `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` pair is not accepted: this\n * gateway speaks one protocol version, and quietly honouring both would mean\n * two verification paths for the same money.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_HEADER = 'payment-signature';\n\n/** HTTP response header carrying the settlement result. */\nexport const PAYMENT_RESPONSE_HEADER = 'payment-response';\n\n/**\n * Reserved input property carrying an authorization proof, the authorization\n * counterpart of {@link PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD}.\n *\n * Unlike `_payment`, which is a bare string, this one carries an object:\n * `{ method, payload }`. There is exactly one payment rail per resource, so a\n * payment proof's method can be inferred from the resource; an authorization\n * proof cannot lean on that, and guessing the method of a security control is\n * not a thing to do implicitly.\n */\nexport const AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD = '_authorization';\n\n/**\n * Every input property name the gateway claims for itself.\n *\n * One list, read by the config loader (which rejects a resource declaring any\n * of them), by the protocol adapters that lift them out of client input, and\n * by the pipeline that strips them again as defence in depth. Those three\n * agree by construction instead of by three copies of two strings.\n */\nexport const RESERVED_INPUT_FIELDS: readonly string[] = [\n  PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD,\n  AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD,\n];\n\n/**\n * HTTP request header carrying the authorization proof, base64url-encoded\n * JSON of the same `{ method, payload }` envelope the reserved input field\n * carries.\n *\n * This is an Agent Commerce transport carrier, not a header defined by any\n * authorization specification, so it is namespaced rather than borrowing\n * `Authorization`, which already means something else on every one of these\n * routes.\n */\nexport const AUTHORIZATION_HEADER = 'agent-authorization';\n\n/**\n * Hard cap on the encoded `Agent-Authorization` header.\n *\n * Node's own limit is ~16 KiB across *all* request headers, so an\n * authorization near that size would start evicting everything else and fail\n * as an unreadable transport error rather than a legible one. Capping well\n * below it means an oversized proof gets a deterministic\n * AUTHORIZATION_INVALID naming the limit.\n */\nexport const MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES = 8192;\n\n/**\n * HTTP response header carrying the base64 payment challenge on a 402.\n *\n * The 402 body still carries {@link PaymentRequiredEnvelope} — richer, and the\n * only channel MCP has — but an x402 v2 client reads the challenge from this\n * header and ignores the body, so both are sent.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_REQUIRED_HEADER = 'payment-required';\n\n/**\n * Key under which a protocol adapter attaches a {@link DeliverySummary} to its\n * result metadata — MCP's `CallToolResult._meta`, and anywhere else a protocol\n * offers an out-of-band metadata channel.\n *\n * Frozen deliberately. The bug this whole mechanism exists to fix was two\n * surfaces disagreeing about what a payer gets back; a key name enforced only\n * by one side's tests would reintroduce exactly that drift. Producer and\n * consumer both import this constant.\n *\n * Follows MCP's `<namespace>/<name>` convention for `_meta` keys.\n */\nexport const DELIVERY_SUMMARY_META_KEY = 'agent-commerce/delivery';\n\nexport interface PaymentRequiredEnvelope {\n  readonly status: 'payment-required';\n  readonly code: 'PAYMENT_REQUIRED';\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly payment: {\n    readonly provider: PaymentMethodName;\n    readonly version: string;\n    readonly amount: DecimalAmount;\n    readonly currency: string;\n    readonly destination: string;\n    readonly network?: string;\n    readonly asset?: string;\n    readonly expiresAt?: IsoTimestamp;\n    /** Provider-native requirement objects, passed through verbatim. */\n    readonly accepts: readonly Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>[];\n    /**\n     * The provider's own challenge document, verbatim — see\n     * {@link PaymentChallenge.envelope}. Present for providers that have one;\n     * a buyer's protocol client can hand this straight to its SDK.\n     */\n    readonly envelope?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Present only when the resource requires an authorization proof as well.\n   *\n   * Additive: a client that does not understand the field sees exactly the\n   * envelope it saw before. A client that does learns, before it spends\n   * anything, that paying alone will not get the resource delivered.\n   *\n   * This advertises a requirement; it does not issue anything. The proof is\n   * obtained from the merchant's own approval flow, outside the gateway.\n   */\n  readonly authorization?: {\n    readonly required: readonly AuthorizationRequirement[];\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface ErrorEnvelope {\n  readonly status: 'error';\n  readonly code: CommerceErrorCode;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\n/**\n * What a buyer learns about their own completed purchase.\n *\n * A payer is entitled to the record of their own transaction — the request it\n * belonged to, whether it settled, and the settlement reference they can check\n * on-chain. They are NOT entitled to the merchant's ledger, which is why\n * `/api/receipts` is an operator route behind `server.adminToken`.\n *\n * Before this existed the two surfaces disagreed: HTTP callers received a\n * settlement summary in the payment-response header while MCP callers received\n * nothing, so an MCP buyer's only route to their own receipt was the merchant's\n * ledger. Both surfaces now emit this same shape.\n */\nexport interface DeliverySummary {\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly receiptId: string;\n  readonly deliveredAt: IsoTimestamp;\n  readonly payment?: {\n    readonly status: 'verified' | 'settled' | 'rejected';\n    readonly amount: DecimalAmount;\n    readonly currency: string;\n    /** Settlement reference, e.g. an on-chain transaction hash. */\n    readonly externalReference?: string;\n    readonly network?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/** Build the payer-facing summary of a delivered outcome. */\nexport function toDeliverySummary(outcome: DeliveredOutcome): DeliverySummary {\n  const p = outcome.payment;\n  return {\n    requestId: outcome.requestId,\n    resourceId: outcome.resourceId,\n    receiptId: outcome.receipt.id,\n    deliveredAt: outcome.receipt.deliveredAt,\n    ...(p !== undefined\n      ? {\n          payment: {\n            status: p.status,\n            amount: p.amount,\n            currency: p.currency,\n            ...(p.externalReference !== undefined\n              ? { externalReference: p.externalReference }\n              : {}),\n            ...(p.network !== undefined ? { network: p.network } : {}),\n          },\n        }\n      : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function toPaymentRequiredEnvelope(\n  outcome: PaymentRequiredOutcome,\n): PaymentRequiredEnvelope {\n  const r = outcome.requirement;\n  return {\n    status: 'payment-required',\n    code: 'PAYMENT_REQUIRED',\n    requestId: outcome.requestId,\n    resourceId: outcome.resourceId,\n    message: `Payment of ${r.amount} ${r.currency} is required for resource \"${outcome.resourceId}\". Retry with a ${r.provider} payment proof.`,\n    payment: {\n      provider: r.provider,\n      version: r.challenge.version,\n      amount: r.amount,\n      currency: r.currency,\n      destination: r.destination,\n      ...(r.network !== undefined ? { network: r.network } : {}),\n      ...(r.asset !== undefined ? { asset: r.asset } : {}),\n      ...(r.expiresAt !== undefined ? { expiresAt: r.expiresAt } : {}),\n      accepts: r.challenge.accepts,\n      ...(r.challenge.envelope !== undefined ? { envelope: r.challenge.envelope } : {}),\n    },\n    ...(outcome.authorization !== undefined && outcome.authorization.length > 0\n      ? { authorization: { required: outcome.authorization } }\n      : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function toErrorEnvelope(error: CommerceError): ErrorEnvelope {\n  const info = error.toInfo();\n  return {\n    status: 'error',\n    code: info.code,\n    message: info.message,\n    retryable: info.retryable,\n    ...(info.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: info.requestId } : {}),\n    ...(info.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: info.resourceId } : {}),\n    ...(info.details !== undefined ? { details: info.details } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function isPaymentRequiredEnvelope(value: unknown): value is PaymentRequiredEnvelope {\n  return (\n    typeof value === 'object' &&\n    value !== null &&\n    (value as PaymentRequiredEnvelope).status === 'payment-required' &&\n    typeof (value as PaymentRequiredEnvelope).payment === 'object'\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Parses the `{ method, payload }` authorization envelope, whichever carrier\n * brought it.\n *\n * Absent is `undefined`. Present but malformed throws, rather than being\n * dropped the way an unusable `_payment` is. A dropped payment leaves the\n * buyer holding a 402 they can act on. A silently dropped authorization would\n * come back as \"not authorized\" for a proof the client believes it sent, with\n * no way to tell a rejected mandate from a typo in the envelope around it.\n */\nexport function parseAuthorizationSubmission(\n  value: unknown,\n  requestId?: string,\n): AuthorizationSubmission | undefined {\n  if (value === undefined || value === null) return undefined;\n\n  const fail = (detail: string): never => {\n    throw new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', `Malformed authorization: ${detail}`, {\n      ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n    });\n  };\n\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) {\n    fail(`expected an object with \"method\" and \"payload\", got ${typeof value}`);\n  }\n  const record = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const method = record['method'];\n  const payload = record['payload'];\n\n  // 'ap2' is the only method in this release. Compared against the literal\n  // rather than a registry: a second method means a second verifier, and that\n  // is a deliberate addition, not a string that should start working because\n  // a client sent it.\n  if (method !== 'ap2') {\n    fail(`unsupported method ${typeof method === 'string' ? `\"${method}\"` : typeof method}`);\n  }\n  if (typeof payload !== 'string' || payload.length === 0) {\n    fail('\"payload\" must be a non-empty string');\n  }\n\n  return { method: 'ap2', payload: payload as string };\n}\n\n/**\n * Decodes the base64url-JSON `Agent-Authorization` header.\n *\n * The size check runs on the encoded value before any decoding, so an\n * oversized header costs a length comparison rather than a base64 decode and\n * a JSON parse of whatever a caller chose to send.\n */\nexport function parseAuthorizationHeader(\n  raw: string | readonly string[] | undefined,\n  requestId?: string,\n): AuthorizationSubmission | undefined {\n  const value = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw[0] : (raw as string | undefined);\n  if (value === undefined || value.length === 0) return undefined;\n\n  const fail = (detail: string): never => {\n    throw new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', `Malformed authorization: ${detail}`, {\n      ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n    });\n  };\n\n  if (Buffer.byteLength(value, 'utf8') > MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES) {\n    fail(`header exceeds the ${MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES}-byte limit`);\n  }\n\n  let decoded: unknown;\n  try {\n    decoded = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(value, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));\n  } catch {\n    // Nothing from the exception is repeated back: a JSON parse error quotes\n    // the input it choked on, which here is whatever the caller sent.\n    fail('header is not base64url-encoded JSON');\n  }\n  return parseAuthorizationSubmission(decoded, requestId);\n}\n\n/**\n * Splits raw client input into resource input plus the reserved fields the\n * gateway claims, for every protocol that carries them in the input object\n * (MCP tool arguments, A2A message data). HTTP carries both in headers and\n * uses the two parse helpers directly.\n *\n * The payment method comes from the resource's own declaration. This is not\n * the place that decides which rail a resource uses, so a proof for a\n * resource with no configured rail is dropped rather than forwarded under an\n * invented method. The pipeline then treats the request as unpaid and decides\n * on its own terms.\n */\nexport function extractReservedInputFields(\n  rawInput: Record<string, unknown>,\n  resource: CommerceResource | undefined,\n  requestId?: string,\n): {\n  input: Record<string, unknown>;\n  payment?: PaymentSubmission;\n  authorization?: AuthorizationSubmission;\n} {\n  const {\n    [PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD]: paymentValue,\n    [AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD]: authorizationValue,\n    ...input\n  } = rawInput;\n\n  const method = resource?.paymentMethods[0];\n  const payment =\n    typeof paymentValue === 'string' && paymentValue.length > 0 && method !== undefined\n      ? ({ method, payload: paymentValue } satisfies PaymentSubmission)\n      : undefined;\n  const authorization = parseAuthorizationSubmission(authorizationValue, requestId);\n\n  return {\n    input,\n    ...(payment !== undefined ? { payment } : {}),\n    ...(authorization !== undefined ? { authorization } : {}),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal structural logger interface.\n *\n * Core must not depend on pino directly; the gateway injects a pino instance\n * that satisfies this shape. Never log secrets: private keys, seed phrases,\n * Authorization headers or payment authorisation payloads.\n */\nexport interface Logger {\n  debug(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  info(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  warn(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  error(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  child(bindings: Record<string, unknown>): Logger;\n}\n\n/** A logger that discards everything. Useful in unit tests. */\nexport const NOOP_LOGGER: Logger = {\n  debug: () => {},\n  info: () => {},\n  warn: () => {},\n  error: () => {},\n  child: () => NOOP_LOGGER,\n};\n","/**\n * Protocol adapter boundary.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. An adapter translates a protocol's wire format into a\n * `CanonicalRequest`, hands it to the execution pipeline and maps the outcome\n * back. It must not call merchant backends, implement payment logic, or hold\n * its own copy of the canonical model.\n *\n * Adapter isolation: a failure while starting or serving one adapter must not\n * prevent the others from operating.\n */\nimport type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';\nimport type { AdapterDescriptor, AdapterHealth, ProtocolName } from '../domain/common.js';\nimport type { EventSink } from '../domain/event.js';\nimport type { ExecutionPipeline } from '../domain/request.js';\nimport type { ResourceRegistry } from '../domain/resource.js';\nimport type { Logger } from './logger.js';\nimport type { Clock, IdGenerator } from './runtime.js';\n\n/** Everything an adapter is given. Nothing else is available to it. */\nexport interface ProtocolAdapterContext {\n  readonly pipeline: ExecutionPipeline;\n  readonly resources: ResourceRegistry;\n  readonly events: EventSink;\n  readonly logger: Logger;\n  readonly clock: Clock;\n  readonly ids: IdGenerator;\n  /** Externally reachable base URL of the gateway, from config. */\n  readonly publicBaseUrl: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ProtocolAdapter {\n  readonly name: ProtocolName;\n  readonly descriptor: AdapterDescriptor;\n\n  start(context: ProtocolAdapterContext): Promise<void>;\n  health(): Promise<AdapterHealth>;\n  stop(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * A protocol adapter served over HTTP.\n *\n * The gateway mounts `handleHttp` at `mountPath` using raw Node request and\n * response objects, so adapters stay independent of the HTTP framework.\n *\n * GUARANTEE — the request body is **unconsumed**.\n *\n * `req` is handed over with its stream unread: the gateway suppresses every\n * body parser on this mount, so an adapter whose SDK reads the body itself\n * (MCP's Streamable HTTP transport does) can do so. The adapter owns reading,\n * size-limiting beyond the gateway's own cap, and parsing.\n *\n * This is load-bearing and easy to break silently. Fastify pre-registers\n * exact-match parsers for `application/json` and `text/plain` and prefers them\n * over a `'*'` wildcard, so registering only a wildcard no-op leaves the\n * built-in JSON parser draining the body first — the adapter then reads an\n * empty stream and every request fails to parse. That exact regression shipped\n * once and no unit test caught it, because adapter conformance suites drive\n * `handleHttp` over a bare `node:http` server and never traverse the gateway.\n *\n * Any change to how adapters are mounted must be covered by a test that POSTs\n * a real JSON body through the real gateway and asserts the adapter received\n * it intact.\n */\nexport interface HttpProtocolAdapter extends ProtocolAdapter {\n  /** Path prefix the gateway mounts this adapter at, e.g. '/mcp'. */\n  readonly mountPath: string;\n  handleHttp(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Fixed paths this adapter owns *outside* its mount, for protocols whose\n   * specification pins a discovery URL (A2A's `/.well-known/agent-card.json`).\n   * The gateway mounts them with the same guarantees as `mountPath` — same\n   * unconsumed body, same concurrency cap, same failure isolation — so the\n   * gateway needs no per-protocol routing knowledge.\n   *\n   * Omitted by adapters that need none.\n   */\n  readonly additionalHttpRoutes?: readonly AdapterHttpRoute[];\n}\n\n/**\n * One fixed, method-scoped route owned by an adapter. 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Every event in a single flow shares one `requestId` so that\n * logs, payment attempts, backend calls and receipts are correlatable.\n */\nimport type { IsoTimestamp } from './common.js';\n\nexport const COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES = [\n  'resource.discovered',\n  'resource.requested',\n  'payment.required',\n  'payment.rejected',\n  'payment.verified',\n  'payment.settled',\n  // The same two types whatever the method, so an audit-trail reader never\n  // has to know what AP2 is\n  'authorization.verified',\n  'authorization.rejected',\n  'backend.called',\n  'backend.failed',\n  'resource.delivered',\n] as const;\n\nexport type CommerceEventType = (typeof COMMERCE_EVENT_TYPES)[number];\n\nexport interface CommerceEvent {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly type: CommerceEventType;\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly at: IsoTimestamp;\n  /** Protocol adapter that originated the request, e.g. 'mcp' or 'http'. */\n  readonly adapter?: string;\n  readonly paymentProvider?: string;\n  readonly durationMs?: number;\n  readonly status?: 'ok' | 'error';\n  /** Non-secret, structured detail. Must never contain keys, headers or proofs. */\n  readonly data?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sink for canonical events.\n *\n * Implementations must be non-throwing from the caller's perspective: an event\n * sink failure must never fail an otherwise successful commerce flow.\n */\nexport interface EventSink {\n  emit(event: CommerceEvent): Promise<void>;\n}\n","/**\n * Canonical resource model.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT.\n */\nimport type {\n  AuthorizationMethodName,\n  DecimalAmount,\n  JsonSchema,\n  PaymentMethodName,\n  ProtocolName,\n} from './common.js';\n\n/** HTTP methods a backend handler may use. */\nexport type BackendMethod = 'GET' | 'POST' | 'PUT' | 'PATCH' | 'DELETE';\n\n/**\n * Describes how the gateway calls the merchant's existing backend.\n *\n * Backend URLs are administrator-controlled configuration only. User- or\n * agent-controlled backend URLs are forbidden (see docs/security.md, SSRF).\n * Secret header values must come from `${ENV_VAR}` placeholders resolved by\n * the config loader, never from plaintext configuration.\n */\nexport interface BackendHandler {\n  readonly type: 'http';\n  readonly method: BackendMethod;\n  readonly url: string;\n  readonly headers?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n  /** Hard upper bound on the backend call. Defaults to DEFAULT_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. */\n  readonly timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Names the top-level input properties carrying each part of the request.\n   *\n   * Absent (the default) keeps the original mapping: `{param}` values are read\n   * from top-level input and everything left over becomes either the query\n   * string (GET/DELETE) or the entire JSON body (POST/PUT/PATCH). That mapping\n   * cannot express `POST /users/{userId}/orders?notify=true` with a JSON body\n   * - one perfectly ordinary REST operation with all three parts at once.\n   *\n   * When present, each group is sourced independently and top-level input that\n   * no binding names is not forwarded to the backend at all.\n   */\n  readonly inputBindings?: {\n    readonly path?: string;\n    readonly query?: string;\n    readonly body?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/** Default backend timeout when a resource does not specify one. */\nexport const DEFAULT_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/**\n * Canonical pricing.\n *\n * `dynamic` exists in the type system for forward compatibility but is\n * REJECTED by config validation in this release.\n */\nexport type Pricing =\n  | { readonly type: 'free' }\n  | {\n      readonly type: 'fixed';\n      readonly amount: DecimalAmount;\n      readonly currency: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly type: 'dynamic';\n      readonly resolver: string;\n    };\n\n/**\n * A merchant capability exposed to agents.\n *\n * The canonical resource is the single source of truth: protocol adapters map\n * it outward, they never define their own parallel notion of a resource.\n */\nexport interface CommerceResource {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly name: string;\n  readonly description?: string;\n  readonly inputSchema?: JsonSchema;\n  readonly outputSchema?: JsonSchema;\n  readonly handler: BackendHandler;\n  readonly pricing: Pricing;\n  readonly exposedVia: readonly ProtocolName[];\n  readonly paymentMethods: readonly PaymentMethodName[];\n  /**\n   * Authorization the buyer must present in addition to payment.\n   *\n   * Opt-in per resource and absent by default, so every resource configured\n   * before this existed behaves exactly as it did. It sits beside\n   * `paymentMethods` rather than inside it: an authorization method is not a\n   * payment rail and must never be selectable as one.\n   */\n  readonly authorization?: {\n    readonly required: readonly AuthorizationMethodName[];\n  };\n}\n\n/** Read-only view of every configured resource. */\nexport interface ResourceRegistry {\n  get(id: string): CommerceResource | undefined;\n  list(): readonly CommerceResource[];\n  /** Resources exposed through a given protocol surface. */\n  listExposedVia(protocol: ProtocolName): readonly CommerceResource[];\n  has(id: string): boolean;\n}\n","/**\n * Typed domain error codes.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. Protocol adapters map these codes into their own response\n * format. Never throw a bare string or untyped Error across a package boundary.\n */\nexport const COMMERCE_ERROR_CODES = [\n  'CONFIG_INVALID',\n  'RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND',\n  'INPUT_INVALID',\n  'PAYMENT_REQUIRED',\n  'PAYMENT_INVALID',\n  'PAYMENT_REPLAYED',\n  'PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'PAYMENT_SETTLEMENT_FAILED',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_INVALID',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED',\n  'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'BACKEND_TIMEOUT',\n  'BACKEND_ERROR',\n  'PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED',\n  'GATEWAY_BUSY',\n  'STORAGE_ERROR',\n  'INTERNAL_ERROR',\n] as const;\n\nexport type CommerceErrorCode = (typeof COMMERCE_ERROR_CODES)[number];\n\n/**\n * Canonical HTTP status for each error code.\n *\n * Paid resources fail closed: every payment failure maps to a 4xx/5xx status\n * and never to a successful delivery.\n */\nexport const COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS: Readonly<Record<CommerceErrorCode, number>> = {\n  CONFIG_INVALID: 500,\n  RESOURCE_NOT_FOUND: 404,\n  INPUT_INVALID: 400,\n  PAYMENT_REQUIRED: 402,\n  PAYMENT_INVALID: 402,\n  PAYMENT_REPLAYED: 409,\n  PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE: 503,\n  PAYMENT_SETTLEMENT_FAILED: 502,\n  // 403, not 402: the buyer's money is not the problem. A 402 tells a client\n  // \"pay and retry\", which cannot fix a missing or rejected mandate, and a\n  // client that auto-pays on 402 would be charged for a request that was\n  // never going to be delivered.\n  AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED: 403,\n  AUTHORIZATION_INVALID: 403,\n  AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED: 409,\n  AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE: 503,\n  BACKEND_TIMEOUT: 504,\n  BACKEND_ERROR: 502,\n  PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED: 501,\n  GATEWAY_BUSY: 503,\n  STORAGE_ERROR: 500,\n  INTERNAL_ERROR: 500,\n};\n\n/** Codes for which a client may reasonably retry the same request. */\nexport const RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES: ReadonlySet<CommerceErrorCode> = new Set([\n  'PAYMENT_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  // Our verifier or our replay store was unreachable, so no verdict on the\n  // mandate was ever reached. That is an outage on our side, and the same\n  // proof will verify once it clears.\n  'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'BACKEND_TIMEOUT',\n  // Load shedding is transient by definition: the caller should back off and\n  // try again. Before this code existed the MCP adapter's queue-full path threw\n  // PROTOCOL_UNSUPPORTED — HTTP 501, retryable:false — so an agent framework\n  // keyed on the machine-readable flag (which exists precisely so clients need\n  // not parse prose) would read a momentary throttle as a permanent capability\n  // gap and stop calling the tool.\n  'GATEWAY_BUSY',\n]);\n","/**\n * The single error type crossing package boundaries.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT.\n */\nimport {\n  COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS,\n  type CommerceErrorCode,\n  RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES,\n} from './codes.js';\n\nexport interface CommerceErrorOptions {\n  /** Structured, non-secret detail safe to return to a client. */\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  readonly cause?: unknown;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  /** Override the default HTTP status for this code. */\n  readonly httpStatus?: number;\n}\n\n/** Serialisable wire form of a CommerceError. */\nexport interface CommerceErrorInfo {\n  readonly code: CommerceErrorCode;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly httpStatus: number;\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\nexport class CommerceError extends Error {\n  readonly code: CommerceErrorCode;\n  readonly httpStatus: number;\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n\n  constructor(code: CommerceErrorCode, message: string, options: CommerceErrorOptions = {}) {\n    super(message, options.cause !== undefined ? { cause: options.cause } : undefined);\n    this.name = 'CommerceError';\n    this.code = code;\n    this.httpStatus = options.httpStatus ?? COMMERCE_ERROR_HTTP_STATUS[code];\n    this.retryable = RETRYABLE_ERROR_CODES.has(code);\n    if (options.details !== undefined) this.details = options.details;\n    if (options.requestId !== undefined) this.requestId = options.requestId;\n    if (options.resourceId !== undefined) this.resourceId = options.resourceId;\n    Error.captureStackTrace?.(this, CommerceError);\n  }\n\n  /** Non-secret, client-safe representation. */\n  toInfo(): CommerceErrorInfo {\n    return {\n      code: this.code,\n      message: this.message,\n      httpStatus: this.httpStatus,\n      retryable: this.retryable,\n      ...(this.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: this.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(this.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: this.resourceId } : {}),\n      ...(this.details !== undefined ? { details: this.details } : {}),\n    };\n  }\n}\n\nexport function isCommerceError(value: unknown): value is CommerceError {\n  return value instanceof CommerceError;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalise any thrown value into a CommerceError.\n *\n * Used at package boundaries so an unexpected failure never escapes untyped.\n *\n * SECURITY — do not \"improve\" this by propagating `value.message`.\n * `CommerceError.message` is client-visible: it is serialised by `toInfo()`\n * and `toErrorEnvelope()` and returned over HTTP and MCP. An arbitrary thrown\n * Error's message routinely carries internal detail — database connection\n * strings, internal hostnames, filesystem paths, backend URLs. Copying it into\n * a client-facing field turns every unexpected exception into an information\n * disclosure.\n *\n * The original value is preserved on `cause`, which is never serialised, so\n * logs and diagnostics keep the full detail while clients get only the\n * caller's deliberate, reviewed `fallbackMessage`.\n *\n * A caller that *wants* a specific client-facing message passes one:\n * toCommerceError(err, 'BACKEND_ERROR', 'Backend call failed')\n */\nexport function toCommerceError(\n  value: unknown,\n  fallbackCode: CommerceErrorCode = 'INTERNAL_ERROR',\n  fallbackMessage = 'Unexpected internal error',\n): CommerceError {\n  if (isCommerceError(value)) return value;\n  return new CommerceError(fallbackCode, fallbackMessage, { cause: value });\n}\n","/**\n * Gateway-defined wire envelopes.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. These are the *only* representations of \"payment required\"\n * and \"error\" that leave the gateway, whichever protocol carries them. The HTTP\n * routes, the MCP adapter and the demo buyer agent all use these helpers so the\n * three can never drift apart.\n */\n\nimport { CommerceError, type CommerceErrorCode } from '../errors/index.js';\nimport type { AuthorizationRequirement, AuthorizationSubmission } from './authorization.js';\nimport type { DecimalAmount, IsoTimestamp, PaymentMethodName } from './common.js';\nimport type { PaymentSubmission } from './payment.js';\nimport type { DeliveredOutcome, PaymentRequiredOutcome } from './request.js';\nimport type { CommerceResource } from './resource.js';\n\n/**\n * Reserved input property carrying a payment proof on protocols that have no\n * header channel (MCP tool calls). Over HTTP the `PAYMENT-SIGNATURE` header is\n * used.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD = '_payment';\n\n/**\n * HTTP request header carrying the payment proof.\n *\n * x402 v2 header names, lowercased because that is how Node presents incoming\n * headers. v1's `X-PAYMENT` / `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` pair is not accepted: this\n * gateway speaks one protocol version, and quietly honouring both would mean\n * two verification paths for the same money.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_HEADER = 'payment-signature';\n\n/** HTTP response header carrying the settlement result. */\nexport const PAYMENT_RESPONSE_HEADER = 'payment-response';\n\n/**\n * Reserved input property carrying an authorization proof, the authorization\n * counterpart of {@link PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD}.\n *\n * Unlike `_payment`, which is a bare string, this one carries an object:\n * `{ method, payload }`. There is exactly one payment rail per resource, so a\n * payment proof's method can be inferred from the resource; an authorization\n * proof cannot lean on that, and guessing the method of a security control is\n * not a thing to do implicitly.\n */\nexport const AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD = '_authorization';\n\n/**\n * Every input property name the gateway claims for itself.\n *\n * One list, read by the config loader (which rejects a resource declaring any\n * of them), by the protocol adapters that lift them out of client input, and\n * by the pipeline that strips them again as defence in depth. Those three\n * agree by construction instead of by three copies of two strings.\n */\nexport const RESERVED_INPUT_FIELDS: readonly string[] = [\n  PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD,\n  AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD,\n];\n\n/**\n * HTTP request header carrying the authorization proof, base64url-encoded\n * JSON of the same `{ method, payload }` envelope the reserved input field\n * carries.\n *\n * This is an Agent Commerce transport carrier, not a header defined by any\n * authorization specification, so it is namespaced rather than borrowing\n * `Authorization`, which already means something else on every one of these\n * routes.\n */\nexport const AUTHORIZATION_HEADER = 'agent-authorization';\n\n/**\n * Hard cap on the encoded `Agent-Authorization` header.\n *\n * Node's own limit is ~16 KiB across *all* request headers, so an\n * authorization near that size would start evicting everything else and fail\n * as an unreadable transport error rather than a legible one. Capping well\n * below it means an oversized proof gets a deterministic\n * AUTHORIZATION_INVALID naming the limit.\n */\nexport const MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES = 8192;\n\n/**\n * HTTP response header carrying the base64 payment challenge on a 402.\n *\n * The 402 body still carries {@link PaymentRequiredEnvelope} — richer, and the\n * only channel MCP has — but an x402 v2 client reads the challenge from this\n * header and ignores the body, so both are sent.\n */\nexport const PAYMENT_REQUIRED_HEADER = 'payment-required';\n\n/**\n * Key under which a protocol adapter attaches a {@link DeliverySummary} to its\n * result metadata — MCP's `CallToolResult._meta`, and anywhere else a protocol\n * offers an out-of-band metadata channel.\n *\n * Frozen deliberately. The bug this whole mechanism exists to fix was two\n * surfaces disagreeing about what a payer gets back; a key name enforced only\n * by one side's tests would reintroduce exactly that drift. Producer and\n * consumer both import this constant.\n *\n * Follows MCP's `<namespace>/<name>` convention for `_meta` keys.\n */\nexport const DELIVERY_SUMMARY_META_KEY = 'agent-commerce/delivery';\n\nexport interface PaymentRequiredEnvelope {\n  readonly status: 'payment-required';\n  readonly code: 'PAYMENT_REQUIRED';\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly payment: {\n    readonly provider: PaymentMethodName;\n    readonly version: string;\n    readonly amount: DecimalAmount;\n    readonly currency: string;\n    readonly destination: string;\n    readonly network?: string;\n    readonly asset?: string;\n    readonly expiresAt?: IsoTimestamp;\n    /** Provider-native requirement objects, passed through verbatim. */\n    readonly accepts: readonly Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>[];\n    /**\n     * The provider's own challenge document, verbatim — see\n     * {@link PaymentChallenge.envelope}. Present for providers that have one;\n     * a buyer's protocol client can hand this straight to its SDK.\n     */\n    readonly envelope?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Present only when the resource requires an authorization proof as well.\n   *\n   * Additive: a client that does not understand the field sees exactly the\n   * envelope it saw before. A client that does learns, before it spends\n   * anything, that paying alone will not get the resource delivered.\n   *\n   * This advertises a requirement; it does not issue anything. The proof is\n   * obtained from the merchant's own approval flow, outside the gateway.\n   */\n  readonly authorization?: {\n    readonly required: readonly AuthorizationRequirement[];\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface ErrorEnvelope {\n  readonly status: 'error';\n  readonly code: CommerceErrorCode;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly retryable: boolean;\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly details?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\n/**\n * What a buyer learns about their own completed purchase.\n *\n * A payer is entitled to the record of their own transaction — the request it\n * belonged to, whether it settled, and the settlement reference they can check\n * on-chain. They are NOT entitled to the merchant's ledger, which is why\n * `/api/receipts` is an operator route behind `server.adminToken`.\n *\n * Before this existed the two surfaces disagreed: HTTP callers received a\n * settlement summary in the payment-response header while MCP callers received\n * nothing, so an MCP buyer's only route to their own receipt was the merchant's\n * ledger. Both surfaces now emit this same shape.\n */\nexport interface DeliverySummary {\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly receiptId: string;\n  readonly deliveredAt: IsoTimestamp;\n  readonly payment?: {\n    readonly status: 'verified' | 'settled' | 'rejected';\n    readonly amount: DecimalAmount;\n    readonly currency: string;\n    /** Settlement reference, e.g. an on-chain transaction hash. */\n    readonly externalReference?: string;\n    readonly network?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/** Build the payer-facing summary of a delivered outcome. */\nexport function toDeliverySummary(outcome: DeliveredOutcome): DeliverySummary {\n  const p = outcome.payment;\n  return {\n    requestId: outcome.requestId,\n    resourceId: outcome.resourceId,\n    receiptId: outcome.receipt.id,\n    deliveredAt: outcome.receipt.deliveredAt,\n    ...(p !== undefined\n      ? {\n          payment: {\n            status: p.status,\n            amount: p.amount,\n            currency: p.currency,\n            ...(p.externalReference !== undefined\n              ? { externalReference: p.externalReference }\n              : {}),\n            ...(p.network !== undefined ? { network: p.network } : {}),\n          },\n        }\n      : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function toPaymentRequiredEnvelope(\n  outcome: PaymentRequiredOutcome,\n): PaymentRequiredEnvelope {\n  const r = outcome.requirement;\n  return {\n    status: 'payment-required',\n    code: 'PAYMENT_REQUIRED',\n    requestId: outcome.requestId,\n    resourceId: outcome.resourceId,\n    message: `Payment of ${r.amount} ${r.currency} is required for resource \"${outcome.resourceId}\". Retry with a ${r.provider} payment proof.`,\n    payment: {\n      provider: r.provider,\n      version: r.challenge.version,\n      amount: r.amount,\n      currency: r.currency,\n      destination: r.destination,\n      ...(r.network !== undefined ? { network: r.network } : {}),\n      ...(r.asset !== undefined ? { asset: r.asset } : {}),\n      ...(r.expiresAt !== undefined ? { expiresAt: r.expiresAt } : {}),\n      accepts: r.challenge.accepts,\n      ...(r.challenge.envelope !== undefined ? { envelope: r.challenge.envelope } : {}),\n    },\n    ...(outcome.authorization !== undefined && outcome.authorization.length > 0\n      ? { authorization: { required: outcome.authorization } }\n      : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function toErrorEnvelope(error: CommerceError): ErrorEnvelope {\n  const info = error.toInfo();\n  return {\n    status: 'error',\n    code: info.code,\n    message: info.message,\n    retryable: info.retryable,\n    ...(info.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: info.requestId } : {}),\n    ...(info.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: info.resourceId } : {}),\n    ...(info.details !== undefined ? { details: info.details } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function isPaymentRequiredEnvelope(value: unknown): value is PaymentRequiredEnvelope {\n  return (\n    typeof value === 'object' &&\n    value !== null &&\n    (value as PaymentRequiredEnvelope).status === 'payment-required' &&\n    typeof (value as PaymentRequiredEnvelope).payment === 'object'\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Parses the `{ method, payload }` authorization envelope, whichever carrier\n * brought it.\n *\n * Absent is `undefined`. Present but malformed throws, rather than being\n * dropped the way an unusable `_payment` is. A dropped payment leaves the\n * buyer holding a 402 they can act on. A silently dropped authorization would\n * come back as \"not authorized\" for a proof the client believes it sent, with\n * no way to tell a rejected mandate from a typo in the envelope around it.\n */\nexport function parseAuthorizationSubmission(\n  value: unknown,\n  requestId?: string,\n): AuthorizationSubmission | undefined {\n  if (value === undefined || value === null) return undefined;\n\n  const fail = (detail: string): never => {\n    throw new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', `Malformed authorization: ${detail}`, {\n      ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n    });\n  };\n\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) {\n    fail(`expected an object with \"method\" and \"payload\", got ${typeof value}`);\n  }\n  const record = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const method = record['method'];\n  const payload = record['payload'];\n\n  // 'ap2' is the only method in this release. Compared against the literal\n  // rather than a registry: a second method means a second verifier, and that\n  // is a deliberate addition, not a string that should start working because\n  // a client sent it.\n  if (method !== 'ap2') {\n    fail(`unsupported method ${typeof method === 'string' ? `\"${method}\"` : typeof method}`);\n  }\n  if (typeof payload !== 'string' || payload.length === 0) {\n    fail('\"payload\" must be a non-empty string');\n  }\n\n  return { method: 'ap2', payload: payload as string };\n}\n\n/**\n * Decodes the base64url-JSON `Agent-Authorization` header.\n *\n * The size check runs on the encoded value before any decoding, so an\n * oversized header costs a length comparison rather than a base64 decode and\n * a JSON parse of whatever a caller chose to send.\n */\nexport function parseAuthorizationHeader(\n  raw: string | readonly string[] | undefined,\n  requestId?: string,\n): AuthorizationSubmission | undefined {\n  const value = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw[0] : (raw as string | undefined);\n  if (value === undefined || value.length === 0) return undefined;\n\n  const fail = (detail: string): never => {\n    throw new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', `Malformed authorization: ${detail}`, {\n      ...(requestId !== undefined ? { requestId } : {}),\n    });\n  };\n\n  if (Buffer.byteLength(value, 'utf8') > MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES) {\n    fail(`header exceeds the ${MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_BYTES}-byte limit`);\n  }\n\n  let decoded: unknown;\n  try {\n    decoded = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(value, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));\n  } catch {\n    // Nothing from the exception is repeated back: a JSON parse error quotes\n    // the input it choked on, which here is whatever the caller sent.\n    fail('header is not base64url-encoded JSON');\n  }\n  return parseAuthorizationSubmission(decoded, requestId);\n}\n\n/**\n * Splits raw client input into resource input plus the reserved fields the\n * gateway claims, for every protocol that carries them in the input object\n * (MCP tool arguments, A2A message data). HTTP carries both in headers and\n * uses the two parse helpers directly.\n *\n * The payment method comes from the resource's own declaration. This is not\n * the place that decides which rail a resource uses, so a proof for a\n * resource with no configured rail is dropped rather than forwarded under an\n * invented method. The pipeline then treats the request as unpaid and decides\n * on its own terms.\n */\nexport function extractReservedInputFields(\n  rawInput: Record<string, unknown>,\n  resource: CommerceResource | undefined,\n  requestId?: string,\n): {\n  input: Record<string, unknown>;\n  payment?: PaymentSubmission;\n  authorization?: AuthorizationSubmission;\n} {\n  const {\n    [PAYMENT_INPUT_FIELD]: paymentValue,\n    [AUTHORIZATION_INPUT_FIELD]: authorizationValue,\n    ...input\n  } = rawInput;\n\n  const method = resource?.paymentMethods[0];\n  const payment =\n    typeof paymentValue === 'string' && paymentValue.length > 0 && method !== undefined\n      ? ({ method, payload: paymentValue } satisfies PaymentSubmission)\n      : undefined;\n  const authorization = parseAuthorizationSubmission(authorizationValue, requestId);\n\n  return {\n    input,\n    ...(payment !== undefined ? { payment } : {}),\n    ...(authorization !== undefined ? { authorization } : {}),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Minimal structural logger interface.\n *\n * Core must not depend on pino directly; the gateway injects a pino instance\n * that satisfies this shape. Never log secrets: private keys, seed phrases,\n * Authorization headers or payment authorisation payloads.\n */\nexport interface Logger {\n  debug(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  info(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  warn(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  error(obj: Record<string, unknown>, msg?: string): void;\n  child(bindings: Record<string, unknown>): Logger;\n}\n\n/** A logger that discards everything. Useful in unit tests. */\nexport const NOOP_LOGGER: Logger = {\n  debug: () => {},\n  info: () => {},\n  warn: () => {},\n  error: () => {},\n  child: () => NOOP_LOGGER,\n};\n","/**\n * Protocol adapter boundary.\n *\n * FROZEN CONTRACT. An adapter translates a protocol's wire format into a\n * `CanonicalRequest`, hands it to the execution pipeline and maps the outcome\n * back. It must not call merchant backends, implement payment logic, or hold\n * its own copy of the canonical model.\n *\n * Adapter isolation: a failure while starting or serving one adapter must not\n * prevent the others from operating.\n */\nimport type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';\nimport type { AdapterDescriptor, AdapterHealth, ProtocolName } from '../domain/common.js';\nimport type { EventSink } from '../domain/event.js';\nimport type { ExecutionPipeline } from '../domain/request.js';\nimport type { ResourceRegistry } from '../domain/resource.js';\nimport type { Logger } from './logger.js';\nimport type { Clock, IdGenerator } from './runtime.js';\n\n/** Everything an adapter is given. Nothing else is available to it. */\nexport interface ProtocolAdapterContext {\n  readonly pipeline: ExecutionPipeline;\n  readonly resources: ResourceRegistry;\n  readonly events: EventSink;\n  readonly logger: Logger;\n  readonly clock: Clock;\n  readonly ids: IdGenerator;\n  /** Externally reachable base URL of the gateway, from config. */\n  readonly publicBaseUrl: string;\n}\n\nexport interface ProtocolAdapter {\n  readonly name: ProtocolName;\n  readonly descriptor: AdapterDescriptor;\n\n  start(context: ProtocolAdapterContext): Promise<void>;\n  health(): Promise<AdapterHealth>;\n  stop(): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * A protocol adapter served over HTTP.\n *\n * The gateway mounts `handleHttp` at `mountPath` using raw Node request and\n * response objects, so adapters stay independent of the HTTP framework.\n *\n * GUARANTEE — the request body is **unconsumed**.\n *\n * `req` is handed over with its stream unread: the gateway suppresses every\n * body parser on this mount, so an adapter whose SDK reads the body itself\n * (MCP's Streamable HTTP transport does) can do so. The adapter owns reading,\n * size-limiting beyond the gateway's own cap, and parsing.\n *\n * This is load-bearing and easy to break silently. Fastify pre-registers\n * exact-match parsers for `application/json` and `text/plain` and prefers them\n * over a `'*'` wildcard, so registering only a wildcard no-op leaves the\n * built-in JSON parser draining the body first — the adapter then reads an\n * empty stream and every request fails to parse. That exact regression shipped\n * once and no unit test caught it, because adapter conformance suites drive\n * `handleHttp` over a bare `node:http` server and never traverse the gateway.\n *\n * Any change to how adapters are mounted must be covered by a test that POSTs\n * a real JSON body through the real gateway and asserts the adapter received\n * it intact.\n */\nexport interface HttpProtocolAdapter extends ProtocolAdapter {\n  /** Path prefix the gateway mounts this adapter at, e.g. '/mcp'. */\n  readonly mountPath: string;\n  handleHttp(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Fixed paths this adapter owns *outside* its mount, for protocols whose\n   * specification pins a discovery URL (A2A's `/.well-known/agent-card.json`).\n   * The gateway mounts them with the same guarantees as `mountPath` — same\n   * unconsumed body, same concurrency cap, same failure isolation — so the\n   * gateway needs no per-protocol routing knowledge.\n   *\n   * Omitted by adapters that need none.\n   */\n  readonly additionalHttpRoutes?: readonly AdapterHttpRoute[];\n}\n\n/**\n * One fixed, method-scoped route owned by an adapter. Unlike `mountPath` it\n * registers no wildcard: it matches exactly the path given.\n */\nexport interface AdapterHttpRoute {\n  readonly method: 'GET' | 'POST';\n  /** Absolute gateway path, e.g. '/.well-known/agent-card.json'. */\n  readonly path: string;\n  handleHttp(req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise<void>;\n}\n\nexport function isHttpProtocolAdapter(adapter: ProtocolAdapter): adapter is HttpProtocolAdapter {\n  return typeof (adapter as HttpProtocolAdapter).handleHttp === 'function';\n}\n","/**\n * Injected runtime primitives.\n *\n * Everything non-deterministic (time, ids) is injected so tests can be exact.\n */\nimport type { IsoTimestamp } from '../domain/common.js';\n\nexport interface Clock {\n  now(): Date;\n  nowIso(): IsoTimestamp;\n  /** Milliseconds since an arbitrary origin; use for durations only. */\n  monotonicMs(): number;\n}\n\nexport interface IdGenerator {\n  /** Opaque, collision-resistant identifier. */\n  next(prefix?: string): string;\n}\n\nexport const systemClock: Clock = {\n  now: () => new Date(),\n  nowIso: () => new Date().toISOString(),\n  monotonicMs: () => performance.now(),\n};\n","/**\n * The package version, resolved once for the whole package.\n *\n * Two paths, deliberately:\n *\n * - **Development** reads the root manifest, so the number is always live.\n * - **The published bundle cannot.** tsup collapses `src/**` into\n * `dist/index.js` and `dist/cli/index.js`, so any `require('../../package.json')`\n * written against a source path resolves from the wrong depth once bundled —\n * which is exactly how this broke during the single-package refactor, and how\n * it earlier produced a CLI reporting `v0.0.0-unknown`. The build injects\n * `__OAC_PACKAGE_VERSION__` instead (see tsup.config.ts).\n *\n * `typeof` on an undeclared identifier is safe in JS, so the dev path is\n * unaffected by the constant not existing.\n */\nimport { createRequire } from 'node:module';\n\ndeclare const __OAC_PACKAGE_VERSION__: string | undefined;\n\nfunction readFromManifest(): string {\n  try {\n    const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\n    // src/version.ts -> repository root\n    return (require('../package.json') as { version?: string }).version ?? '0.0.0-unknown';\n  } catch {\n    return '0.0.0-unknown';\n  }\n}\n\nexport const PACKAGE_VERSION: string =\n  typeof __OAC_PACKAGE_VERSION__ === 'string' ? __OAC_PACKAGE_VERSION__ : readFromManifest();\n"]}

package/dist/cli/index.js

@@ -2113,7 +2113,7 @@ var ACP_UNSUPPORTED = [
 
 // src/storage/receipts/store.ts
 init_core();
-var PACKAGE_VERSION = "1.4.0" ;
+var PACKAGE_VERSION = "1.4.1" ;
 
 // src/storage/sqlite.ts
 init_core();
@@ -2884,7 +2884,7 @@ function maskMiddle(value, keep = 6) {
 }
 createRequire(import.meta.url);
 function readVersionReport() {
-  const injected = '{"cliVersion":"1.4.0","pinned":[{"name":"@coinbase/x402","version":"2.1.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk","version":"1.30.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@x402/core","version":"2.23.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@x402/evm","version":"2.23.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"viem","version":"2.55.18","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"better-sqlite3","version":"13.0.3","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"fastify","version":"5.12.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"pino","version":"10.3.1","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"zod","version":"3.25.76","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"}]}' ;
+  const injected = '{"cliVersion":"1.4.1","pinned":[{"name":"@coinbase/x402","version":"2.1.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk","version":"1.30.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@x402/core","version":"2.23.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@x402/evm","version":"2.23.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"viem","version":"2.55.18","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"better-sqlite3","version":"13.0.3","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"fastify","version":"5.12.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"pino","version":"10.3.1","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"zod","version":"3.25.76","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"}]}' ;
   {
     return JSON.parse(injected);
   }