@devlab.group/agent-commerce 1.2.0 → 1.4.0

package/dist/ap2.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/authorization/ap2/errors.ts","../src/authorization/ap2/profile.ts","../src/authorization/ap2/checkout-signer.ts","../src/authorization/ap2/descriptor.ts","../src/authorization/ap2/replay-store.ts","../src/authorization/ap2/checkout-jwt.ts","../src/authorization/ap2/sd-jwt.ts","../src/authorization/ap2/trust.ts","../src/authorization/ap2/verifier.ts","../src/authorization/ap2/provider.ts"],"names":["asRecord","jwtVerify"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAmBO,IAAM,qBAAA,GAAwB;AAAA,EACnC,wBAAA;AAAA,EACA,kBAAA;AAAA,EACA,aAAA;AAAA,EACA,mBAAA;AAAA,EACA,uBAAA;AAAA,EACA,gBAAA;AAAA,EACA,SAAA;AAAA,EACA,gBAAA;AAAA,EACA,0BAAA;AAAA,EACA,yBAAA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAIA,IAAM,QAAA,GAAyD;AAAA,EAC7D,sBAAA,EAAwB,6DAAA;AAAA,EACxB,gBAAA,EAAkB,iEAAA;AAAA,EAClB,WAAA,EAAa,+DAAA;AAAA,EACb,iBAAA,EAAmB,uCAAA;AAAA,EACnB,qBAAA,EAAuB,wEAAA;AAAA,EACvB,cAAA,EAAgB,+DAAA;AAAA,EAChB,OAAA,EAAS,0CAAA;AAAA,EACT,cAAA,EAAgB,mDAAA;AAAA,EAChB,wBAAA,EAA0B,sDAAA;AAAA,EAC1B,uBAAA,EAAyB,qEAAA;AAAA,EACzB,iBAAA,EAAmB;AACrB,CAAA;AASO,SAAS,WAAA,CACd,MAAA,EACA,OAAA,GAA2B,EAAC,EACb;AACf,EAAA,OAAO,IAAI,aAAA,CAAc,uBAAA,EAAyB,QAAA,CAAS,MAAM,CAAA,EAAG;AAAA,IAClE,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA,EAAO,MAAA,EAAO;AAAA,IACjC,GAAI,QAAQ,SAAA,KAAc,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,SAAA,EAAW,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA,EAAU,GAAI,EAAC;AAAA,IAC1E,GAAI,QAAQ,UAAA,KAAe,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,UAAA,EAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAA,EAAW,GAAI,EAAC;AAAA,IAC7E,GAAI,QAAQ,KAAA,KAAU,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,KAAA,EAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,KAAA,EAAM,GAAI;AAAC,GAC/D,CAAA;AACH;AAMO,SAAS,WAAA,CAAY,KAAA,EAAe,OAAA,GAA2B,EAAC,EAAkB;AACvF,EAAA,OAAO,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,IACT,wBAAA;AAAA,IACA,gFAAA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,MACE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA,EAAO,MAAA,EAAQ,YAAY,KAAA,EAAM;AAAA,MACpD,GAAI,QAAQ,SAAA,KAAc,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,SAAA,EAAW,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA,EAAU,GAAI,EAAC;AAAA,MAC1E,GAAI,QAAQ,UAAA,KAAe,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,UAAA,EAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAA,EAAW,GAAI;AAAC;AAC/E,GACF;AACF;AAMO,SAAS,cAAA,CAAe,MAAA,EAAgB,OAAA,GAA2B,EAAC,EAAkB;AAC3F,EAAA,OAAO,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,IACT,oCAAA;AAAA,IACA,yHAAA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,MACE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA,EAAO,MAAA,EAAQ,wBAAwB,MAAA,EAAO;AAAA,MACjE,GAAI,QAAQ,SAAA,KAAc,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,SAAA,EAAW,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA,EAAU,GAAI,EAAC;AAAA,MAC1E,GAAI,QAAQ,UAAA,KAAe,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,UAAA,EAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAA,EAAW,GAAI,EAAC;AAAA,MAC7E,GAAI,QAAQ,KAAA,KAAU,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,KAAA,EAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,KAAA,EAAM,GAAI;AAAC;AAChE,GACF;AACF;;;AC/EA,IAAM,uBAAA,GAA0B;AAAA,EAC9B,SAAA;AAAA,EACA,aAAA;AAAA,EACA,YAAA;AAAA,EACA,QAAA;AAAA,EACA,UAAA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAA;AAiBA,eAAsB,iBAAiB,KAAA,EAAiC;AACtE,EAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAY,YAAA,CAAa,KAAA,IAAS,EAAE,CAAA;AAG1C,EAAA,IAAI,cAAc,MAAA,EAAW;AAC3B,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,4CAA4C,CAAA;AAAA,EAClE;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA,CAAO,SAAA,EAAW,IAAI,WAAA,EAAY,CAAE,MAAA,CAAO,SAAS,CAAC,CAAA;AACxF,EAAA,OAAO,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,SAAS,WAAW,CAAA;AACjD;AAUA,SAAS,SAAS,KAAA,EAAqD;AACrE,EAAA,OAAO,OAAO,KAAA,KAAU,QAAA,IAAY,KAAA,KAAU,IAAA,IAAQ,CAAC,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,KAAK,CAAA,GACrE,KAAA,GACD,MAAA;AACN;AAOA,eAAsB,qBAAA,CACpB,OAAA,EACA,OAAA,EACA,YAAA,EACwB;AACxB,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,QAAA,CAAS,OAAA,CAAQ,cAAA,CAAe,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAA;AACjE,EAAA,IAAI,OAAA,KAAY,MAAA,EAAW,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,qBAAqB,YAAY,CAAA;AAE9E,EAAA,KAAA,MAAW,SAAS,uBAAA,EAAyB;AAC3C,IAAA,MAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAA;AAC3B,IAAA,IAAI,OAAO,KAAA,KAAU,QAAA,IAAY,KAAA,CAAM,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AACnD,MAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,qBAAqB,YAAY,CAAA;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,cAAc,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA;AAC5B,EAAA,MAAM,iBAAA,GAAoB,MAAM,gBAAA,CAAiB,OAAA,CAAQ,KAAK,CAAA;AAE9D,EAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAqD;AAAA,IACzD,CAAC,WAAW,oBAAoB,CAAA;AAAA,IAChC,CAAC,aAAA,EAAe,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAU,CAAA;AAAA,IAClC,CAAC,cAAc,iBAAiB,CAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAGhC,CAAC,QAAA,EAAU,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAA;AAAA,IAC7B,CAAC,UAAA,EAAY,WAAA,CAAY,QAAQ,CAAA;AAAA,IACjC,CAAC,gBAAA,EAAkB,WAAA,CAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,GACzC;AAEA,EAAA,KAAA,MAAW,CAAC,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,CAAA,IAAK,SAAA,EAAW;AACzC,IAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAA,KAAM,UAAU,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,qBAAqB,YAAY,CAAA;AAAA,EACtF;AAKA,EAAA,KAAA,MAAW,CAAC,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,CAAA,IAAK;AAAA,IAC9B,CAAC,aAAA,EAAe,WAAA,CAAY,WAAW,CAAA;AAAA,IACvC,CAAC,SAAA,EAAW,WAAA,CAAY,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,IAC/B,CAAC,OAAA,EAAS,WAAA,CAAY,KAAK;AAAA,GAC7B,EAAY;AACV,IAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAA;AAC9B,IAAA,IAAI,QAAA,KAAa,MAAA,IAAa,QAAA,KAAa,MAAA,EAAW;AACtD,IAAA,IAAI,QAAA,KAAa,QAAA,EAAU,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,qBAAqB,YAAY,CAAA;AAAA,EAChF;AAEA,EAAA,OAAO;AAAA,IACL,UAAA,EAAY,QAAQ,aAAa,CAAA;AAAA,IACjC,MAAA,EAAQ,QAAQ,QAAQ,CAAA;AAAA,IACxB,QAAA,EAAU,QAAQ,UAAU,CAAA;AAAA,IAC5B,aAAA,EAAe,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,GACzC;AACF;;;ACvDA,IAAM,0BAAA,GAA6B,GAAA;AAEnC,SAAS,WAAA,CAAY,OAAgB,KAAA,EAAuB;AAC1D,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,KAAA,KAAU,QAAA,IAAY,KAAA,CAAM,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AACnD,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,SAAA;AAAA,MACR,CAAA,mBAAA,EAAsB,KAAK,CAAA,sCAAA,EAAyC,QAAA,CAAS,KAAK,CAAC,CAAA;AAAA,KACrF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,KAAA;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,SAAS,KAAA,EAAwB;AACxC,EAAA,OAAO,KAAA,KAAU,IAAA,GAAO,MAAA,GAAS,OAAO,KAAA;AAC1C;AAOA,eAAe,WACb,GAAA,EACwD;AACxD,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAA,EAAU;AAC3B,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,GAAA,CAAI,QAAA,CAAS,mBAAmB,CAAA,EAAG;AACtC,MAAA,MAAM,IAAI,SAAA;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,IAAA,OAAO,WAAA,CAAY,KAAK,qBAAqB,CAAA;AAAA,EAC/C;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,QAAA,IAAY,GAAA,KAAQ,IAAA,EAAM;AAC3C,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,qEAAqE,CAAA;AAAA,EAC3F;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,GAAG,CAAA,KAAM,MAAA,EAAW;AAC1B,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,SAAA;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,CAAA,KAAM,gBAAgB,GAAA,CAAI,KAAK,MAAM,aAAA,EAAe;AAC/D,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,SAAA;AAAA,MACR,CAAA,sCAAA,EAAyC,YAAY,CAAA,CAAA,EAAI,aAAa,cAAc,qBAAqB,CAAA,QAAA;AAAA,KAC3G;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,GAAA;AACT;AAMA,eAAsB,kBAAkB,OAAA,EAAoD;AAC1F,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,WAAA,CAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,EAAK,KAAK,CAAA;AAC1C,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,WAAA,CAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,EAAQ,QAAQ,CAAA;AACnD,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,WAAA,CAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,QAAA,EAAU,UAAU,CAAA;AACzD,EAAA,MAAM,UAAA,GAAa,WAAA,CAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAA,EAAY,YAAY,CAAA;AAC/D,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,WAAA,CAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,QAAA,EAAU,UAAU,CAAA;AACzD,EAAA,MAAM,aAAA,GAAgB,WAAA,CAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAA,EAAe,eAAe,CAAA;AAExE,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,KAAW,QAAA,EAAU;AACtC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,SAAA;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,WAAA,CAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,EAAQ,QAAQ,CAAA;AAEnD,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,MAAM,UAAA,CAAW,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAU,CAAA;AAC/C,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAA,CAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,wBAAW,IAAA,EAAK,EAAG,OAAA,EAAQ,GAAI,GAAI,CAAA;AACxE,EAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAY,QAAQ,gBAAA,IAAoB,0BAAA;AAC9C,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,MAAA,CAAO,SAAA,CAAU,SAAS,CAAA,IAAK,aAAa,CAAA,EAAG;AAClD,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,qEAAqE,CAAA;AAAA,EAC3F;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,aAAA,GAAwC;AAAA,IAC5C,OAAA,EAAS,oBAAA;AAAA,IACT,WAAA,EAAa,UAAA;AAAA,IACb,UAAA,EAAY,MAAM,gBAAA,CAAiB,OAAA,CAAQ,KAAK,CAAA;AAAA,IAChD,MAAA;AAAA,IACA,QAAA;AAAA,IACA,cAAA,EAAgB,aAAA;AAAA,IAChB,GAAI,QAAQ,WAAA,KAAgB,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,WAAA,EAAa,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA,EAAY,GAAI,EAAC;AAAA,IAChF,GAAI,QAAQ,OAAA,KAAY,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,OAAA,EAAS,OAAA,CAAQ,OAAA,EAAQ,GAAI,EAAC;AAAA,IACpE,GAAI,QAAQ,KAAA,KAAU,MAAA,GAAY,EAAE,KAAA,EAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,KAAA,EAAM,GAAI;AAAC,GAChE;AAEA,EAAA,OAAO,IAAI,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAE,cAAA,EAAgB,aAAA,EAAe,CAAA,CACjD,kBAAA,CAAmB,EAAE,GAAA,EAAK,uBAAuB,GAAA,EAAK,GAAA,EAAK,KAAA,EAAO,EAClE,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,CAAA,CAChB,WAAA,CAAY,QAAQ,CAAA,CACpB,WAAA,CAAY,QAAQ,CAAA,CACpB,kBAAkB,QAAA,GAAW,SAAS,CAAA,CACtC,MAAA,CAAO,QAAQ,KAAA,IAAS,MAAA,CAAO,YAAY,CAAA,CAC3C,KAAK,GAAG,CAAA;AACb;;;ACpJO,IAAM,gBAAA,GAAsC;AAAA,EACjD,aAAA;AAAA,EACA,wBAAA;AAAA,EACA,qBAAA;AAAA,EACA,qBAAA;AAAA,EACA,oBAAA;AAAA,EACA,qBAAA;AAAA,EACA,+BAAA;AAAA,EACA,oBAAA;AAAA,EACA,kBAAA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAOO,IAAM,eAAA,GAAqC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGhD,iBAAA;AAAA,EACA,kDAAA;AAAA,EACA,iBAAA;AAAA,EACA,eAAA;AAAA,EACA,gCAAA;AAAA,EACA,sBAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA,8CAAA;AAAA,EACA,0BAAA;AAAA,EACA,sCAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA,uCAAA;AAAA,EACA,sCAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA,kBAAA;AAAA,EACA,gCAAA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAEO,SAAS,mBAAmB,qBAAA,EAAkD;AACnF,EAAA,OAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAA,EAAM,KAAA;AAAA,IACN,IAAA,EAAM,eAAA;AAAA,IACN,qBAAA;AAAA,IACA,aAAA,EAAe,QAAQ,gBAAgB,CAAA,YAAA,CAAA;AAAA,IACvC,YAAA,EAAc,gBAAA;AAAA,IACd,MAAA,EAAQ,cAAA;AAAA,IACR,WAAA,EAAa;AAAA,GACf;AACF;;;ACUO,SAAS,qBAAqB,OAAA,EAAgD;AACnF,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,QAAQ,MAAA,IAAU,WAAA;AACjC,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,KAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,GAAA,EAAI,CAAA;AAE3C,EAAA,MAAM,KAAe,kBAAA,CAAmB;AAAA,IACtC,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,IAAA;AAAA,IACd,KAAA,EAAO,4BAAA;AAAA,IACP;AAAA,GACD,CAAA;AACD,EAAA,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAE,CAAA;AAEV,EAAA,MAAM,oBAAoB,EAAA,CAAG,OAAA;AAAA,IAC3B;AAAA,GACF;AAGA,EAAA,MAAM,kBAAkB,EAAA,CAAG,OAAA;AAAA,IACzB,CAAA;AAAA,uEAAA;AAAA,GAEF;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,SAAS,EAAA,CAAG,OAAA;AAAA,IAChB,CAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,+CAAA;AAAA,GAKF;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,YAAY,EAAA,CAAG,OAAA;AAAA,IACnB,CAAA;AAAA;AAAA,yDAAA;AAAA,GAGF;AAGA,EAAA,MAAM,aAAa,EAAA,CAAG,OAAA;AAAA,IACpB,CAAA;AAAA,yDAAA;AAAA,GAEF;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAY,EAAA,CAAG,WAAA,CAAY,CAAC,OAAA,KAAyD;AACzF,IAAA,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,EAAK,EAAE,WAAA,EAAY;AAEvC,IAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,iBAAA,CAAkB,GAAA,CAAI,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAS,CAAA;AACxD,IAAA,IAAI,aAAa,MAAA,EAAW;AAC1B,MAAA,IAAI,QAAA,CAAS,UAAU,UAAA,EAAY;AACjC,QAAA,OAAO,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,UAAA,EAAY,KAAA,EAAO,SAAS,KAAA,EAA+B;AAAA,MAC5E;AACA,MAAA,SAAA,CAAU,GAAA,CAAI,EAAE,SAAA,EAAW,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,UAAA,EAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA,EAAW,EAAA,EAAI,CAAA;AACjF,MAAA,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,UAAA,EAAW;AAAA,IAC5B;AAEA,IAAA,MAAM,eAAe,eAAA,CAAgB,GAAA,CAAI,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA,EAAa,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAA;AAC/E,IAAA,IAAI,iBAAiB,MAAA,EAAW;AAC9B,MAAA,OAAO,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,UAAA,EAAY,KAAA,EAAO,aAAa,KAAA,EAA+B;AAAA,IAChF;AAEA,IAAA,MAAA,CAAO,GAAA,CAAI;AAAA,MACT,WAAW,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA;AAAA,MACnB,cAAc,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA;AAAA,MACtB,gBAAgB,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAA;AAAA,MACxB,iBAAiB,OAAA,CAAQ,cAAA;AAAA,MACzB,aAAa,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAA;AAAA,MACrB,YAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA;AAAA,MACpB;AAAA,KACD,CAAA;AACD,IAAA,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,UAAA,EAAW;AAAA,EAC5B,CAAC,CAAA;AAED,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,CAAC,SAAA,EAAmB,KAAA,KAAuC;AACtE,IAAA,UAAA,CAAW,GAAA,CAAI,EAAE,SAAA,EAAW,KAAA,EAAO,EAAA,EAAI,IAAI,IAAA,CAAK,GAAA,EAAK,CAAA,CAAE,WAAA,EAAY,EAAG,CAAA;AAAA,EACxE,CAAA;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA,GAAS,KAAA;AACb,EAAA,OAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ,OAAA,EAAS;AACf,MAAA,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,IAC1B,CAAA;AAAA,IACA,QAAQ,SAAA,EAAW;AACjB,MAAA,IAAA,CAAK,WAAW,UAAU,CAAA;AAAA,IAC5B,CAAA;AAAA,IACA,QAAQ,SAAA,EAAW;AACjB,MAAA,IAAA,CAAK,WAAW,UAAU,CAAA;AAAA,IAC5B,CAAA;AAAA,IACA,cAAc,SAAA,EAAW;AACvB,MAAA,IAAA,CAAK,WAAW,WAAW,CAAA;AAAA,IAC7B,CAAA;AAAA,IACA,QAAQ,SAAA,EAAW;AACjB,MAAA,OAAO,iBAAA,CAAkB,GAAA,CAAI,SAAS,CAAA,EAAG,KAAA;AAAA,IAC3C,CAAA;AAAA,IACA,KAAA,GAAQ;AACN,MAAA,IAAI,MAAA,EAAQ;AACZ,MAAA,MAAA,GAAS,IAAA;AACT,MAAA,EAAA,CAAG,KAAA,EAAM;AAAA,IACX;AAAA,GACF;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,QAAQ,EAAA,EAAoB;AACnC,EAAA,MAAM,UAAU,EAAA,CAAG,MAAA,CAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAM,CAAA;AAC1D,EAAA,IAAI,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AAClB,EAAA,MAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,EAAA,CAAG,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM;AACjC,IAAA,EAAA,CAAG,IAAA,CAAK;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAAA,CAeP,CAAA;AACD,IAAA,EAAA,CAAG,OAAO,kBAAkB,CAAA;AAAA,EAC9B,CAAC,CAAA;AACD,EAAA,KAAA,EAAM;AACR;ACjLA,SAAS,aAAA,CAAc,KAAa,KAAA,EAAmD;AACrF,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,GAAA,CAAI,KAAA,CAAM,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,CAAA;AACpC,EAAA,IAAI,OAAA,KAAY,QAAW,OAAO,MAAA;AAClC,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAkB,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,SAAS,WAAW,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA;AACrF,IAAA,OAAO,OAAO,MAAA,KAAW,QAAA,IAAY,MAAA,KAAW,IAAA,IAAQ,CAAC,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAM,CAAA,GACxE,MAAA,GACD,KAAA,CAAA;AAAA,EACN,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AACN,IAAA,OAAO,MAAA;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAMA,eAAsB,iBAAA,CACpB,aAAA,EACA,IAAA,EACA,OAAA,EAC8B;AAC9B,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,cAAc,cAAc,CAAA;AAC5C,EAAA,MAAM,YAAA,GAAe,cAAc,eAAe,CAAA;AAClD,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,OAAA,KAAY,QAAA,IAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AACvD,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,kBAAkB,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EAC7C;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,YAAA,KAAiB,QAAA,IAAY,YAAA,CAAa,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AACjE,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,kBAAkB,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EAC7C;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,mBAAA,CAAoB,OAAA,EAAS,YAAA,EAAc,OAAO,CAAA;AAExD,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,aAAA,CAAc,OAAA,EAAS,CAAC,CAAA;AACvC,EAAA,MAAM,iBAAA,GAAoB,aAAA,CAAc,OAAA,EAAS,CAAC,CAAA;AAClD,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA,KAAW,MAAA,IAAa,iBAAA,KAAsB,MAAA,EAAW;AAC3D,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,2BAA2B,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EACtD;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,GAAA,EAAI,GAAI,MAAM,KAAK,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA;AAAA,IACvC,kBAAkB,KAAK,CAAA;AAAA,IACvB,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,GACF;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAA4B;AAAA,IAChC,UAAA,EAAY,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAA;AAAA,IAClC,QAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA;AAAA,IACf,UAAU,MAAA,CAAO,QAAA;AAAA,IACjB,gBAAgB,IAAA,CAAK,gBAAA;AAAA,IACrB,WAAA,EAAa,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,GAAA;AAAI,GAC9B;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,SAAA,CAAU,OAAA,EAAS,KAAK,OAAO,CAAA;AACpD,IAAA,MAAA,GAAS,MAAA,CAAO,OAAA;AAAA,EAClB,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AACd,IAAA,MAAM,YAAY,yBAAA,EAA2B,EAAE,GAAG,OAAA,EAAS,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EACpE;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;AACxB,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;AACxB,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;AAExB,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,QAAA,IAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAA,EAAU;AACtD,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,kBAAkB,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EAC7C;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,QAAA,IAAY,GAAA,CAAI,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AAC/C,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,kBAAkB,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EAC7C;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,UAAA,GAAa,KAAK,KAAA,CAAM,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,GAAA,EAAI,CAAE,OAAA,EAAQ,GAAI,GAAI,CAAA;AAC/D,EAAA,IAAI,MAAM,UAAA,GAAa,IAAA,CAAK,kBAAkB,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,WAAW,OAAO,CAAA;AAElF,EAAA,OAAO,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,MAAA,EAAO;AACrD;AAOA,eAAe,mBAAA,CACb,OAAA,EACA,QAAA,EACA,OAAA,EACe;AAEf,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA,CAAO,SAAA,EAAW,IAAI,WAAA,EAAY,CAAE,MAAA,CAAO,OAAO,CAAC,CAAA;AACtF,EAAA,MAAM,SAAS,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,SAAS,WAAW,CAAA;AAGvD,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA,KAAW,QAAA,EAAU,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,2BAA2B,OAAO,CAAA;AAC/E;AC3EA,eAAe,MAAA,CAAO,MAA4B,SAAA,EAAwC;AACxF,EAAA,IAAI,SAAA,CAAU,WAAA,EAAY,KAAM,oBAAA,EAAsB;AACpD,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,CAAA,6BAAA,EAAgC,SAAS,CAAA,CAAE,CAAA;AAAA,EAC7D;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,OAAO,IAAA,KAAS,QAAA,GAAW,IAAI,WAAA,EAAY,CAAE,MAAA,CAAO,IAAI,CAAA,GAAI,IAAI,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA;AAC7F,EAAA,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,MAAA,CAAO,OAAO,MAAA,CAAO,SAAA,EAAW,KAAK,CAAC,CAAA;AACpE;AAEA,SAASA,UAAS,KAAA,EAAqD;AACrE,EAAA,OAAO,OAAO,KAAA,KAAU,QAAA,IAAY,KAAA,KAAU,IAAA,IAAQ,CAAC,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,KAAK,CAAA,GACrE,KAAA,GACD,MAAA;AACN;AAOA,eAAsB,aAAA,CACpB,YAAA,EACA,IAAA,EACA,OAAA,EAC0B;AAC1B,EAAA,IAAI,OAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI,UAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI;AAGF,IAAA,OAAA,GAAU,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,YAAA,EAAc,MAAM,CAAA;AAChD,IAAA,UAAA,GAAa,UAAA,CAAW,YAAY,CAAA,CAAE,GAAA;AAAA,EACxC,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AACd,IAAA,MAAM,YAAY,wBAAA,EAA0B,EAAE,GAAG,OAAA,EAAS,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EACnE;AAKA,EAAA,IAAI,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAU,MAAA,EAAW;AAC/B,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,4BAA4B,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EACvD;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,UAAA,GAAaA,SAAAA,CAAS,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,CAAI,OAAO,CAAA;AAC/C,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAASA,SAAAA,CAAS,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,CAAI,MAAM,CAAA;AAC1C,EAAA,IAAI,UAAA,KAAe,MAAA,IAAa,MAAA,KAAW,MAAA,EAAW;AACpD,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,0BAA0B,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EACrD;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,GAAA,EAAI,GAAI,MAAM,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAA,CAAW,KAAK,CAAA,EAAG,MAAA,CAAO,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,CAAA;AAE1F,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAA4B;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAIhC,UAAA,EAAY,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAMlC,QAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA;AAAA,IACf,UAAU,MAAA,CAAO,QAAA;AAAA,IACjB,gBAAgB,IAAA,CAAK,gBAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAErB,WAAA,EAAa,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,GAAA;AAAI,GAC9B;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,eAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAMC,SAAAA,CAAU,UAAA,EAAY,KAAK,OAAO,CAAA;AACvD,IAAA,eAAA,GAAkB,MAAA,CAAO,OAAA;AAAA,EAC3B,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AACd,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,oBAAoB,KAAK,CAAA,EAAG,EAAE,GAAG,OAAA,EAAS,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EACrE;AAEA,EAAA,gBAAA,CAAiB,eAAA,EAAiB,MAAM,OAAO,CAAA;AAE/C,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI;AAGF,IAAA,MAAA,GAAU,MAAM,SAAA,CAAU,eAAA,EAAiB,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAa,MAAM,CAAA;AAAA,EAIxE,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AAEd,IAAA,MAAM,YAAY,wBAAA,EAA0B,EAAE,GAAG,OAAA,EAAS,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EACnE;AAEA,EAAA,4BAAA,CAA6B,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAA;AAE5C,EAAA,OAAO,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA,EAAQ,aAAa,UAAA,EAAW;AAClE;AAOA,SAAS,oBAAoB,KAAA,EAAoE;AAC/F,EAAA,MAAM,OAAQ,KAAA,EAA8B,IAAA;AAC5C,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,mBAAmB,OAAO,SAAA;AACvC,EAAA,IAAI,SAAS,iCAAA,EAAmC;AAC9C,IAAA,MAAM,QAAS,KAAA,CAA8B,KAAA;AAC7C,IAAA,IAAI,KAAA,KAAU,OAAO,OAAO,gBAAA;AAC5B,IAAA,IAAI,KAAA,KAAU,KAAA,IAAS,KAAA,KAAU,KAAA,EAAO,OAAO,SAAA;AAAA,EACjD;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,mBAAA;AACT;AAMA,SAAS,gBAAA,CACP,OAAA,EACA,IAAA,EACA,OAAA,EACM;AACN,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAA;AACzB,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAA;AACzB,EAAA,IAAI,OAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,QAAA,IAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAA,EAAU;AACtD,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,kBAAkB,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EAC7C;AACA,EAAA,MAAM,UAAA,GAAa,KAAK,KAAA,CAAM,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,GAAA,EAAI,CAAE,OAAA,EAAQ,GAAI,GAAI,CAAA;AAG/D,EAAA,IAAI,MAAM,UAAA,GAAa,IAAA,CAAK,kBAAkB,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,WAAW,OAAO,CAAA;AACpF;AAGA,SAAS,4BAAA,CACP,QACA,OAAA,EACM;AACN,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA,CAAO,KAAK,CAAA,KAAM,wBAAA,EAA0B;AAC9C,IAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,4BAA4B,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,EACvD;AACF;ACtJO,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAAA,EAAsC;AACrE,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,KAAA,KAAU,CAAC,KAAA,CAAM,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;AACtE,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,uBAAe,GAAA,EAAsC;AAE3D,EAAA,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA,IAEL,SAAA,GAA+B;AAC7B,MAAA,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,QAAA,CAAS,IAAA,EAAM,CAAA;AAAA,IAC5B,CAAA;AAAA,IAEA,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,EAAc,GAAA,EAAc,OAAA,EAAgD;AACxF,MAAA,IAAI,OAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,QAAA,IAAY,GAAA,CAAI,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AAC/C,QAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,kBAAkB,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,MAC7C;AACA,MAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,CAAI,GAAG,CAAA;AAC/B,MAAA,IAAI,MAAA,KAAW,MAAA,EAAW,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,oBAAoB,OAAO,CAAA;AAIvE,MAAA,IAAI,OAAO,GAAA,KAAQ,QAAA,IAAY,GAAA,CAAI,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AAC/C,QAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,eAAe,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,MAC1C;AACA,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,OAAO,IAAA,CAAK,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,SAAA,KAAc,SAAA,CAAU,QAAQ,GAAG,CAAA;AACrE,MAAA,IAAI,OAAA,KAAY,MAAA,EAAW,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,eAAe,OAAO,CAAA;AAInE,MAAA,MAAM,WAAW,IAAA,CAAK,SAAA,CAAU,CAAC,GAAA,EAAK,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA;AAC1C,MAAA,IAAI,OAAA,GAAU,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,CAAI,QAAQ,CAAA;AACnC,MAAA,IAAI,YAAY,MAAA,EAAW;AACzB,QAAA,OAAA,GAAU,SAAA,CAAU,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,EAAY,qBAAqB,CAAA;AAC7D,QAAA,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,CAAI,UAAU,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,MAChC;AAEA,MAAA,IAAI;AACF,QAAA,OAAO,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,GAAA,EAAK,MAAM,OAAA,EAAQ;AAAA,MACtC,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AAId,QAAA,QAAA,CAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAA;AACxB,QAAA,MAAM,eAAe,mDAAA,EAAqD;AAAA,UACxE,GAAG,OAAA;AAAA,UACH;AAAA,SACD,CAAA;AAAA,MACH;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,GACF;AACF;;;AC5CA,eAAe,iBAAiB,WAAA,EAAsC;AACpE,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,MAAM,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA,CAAO,SAAA,EAAW,IAAI,WAAA,EAAY,CAAE,MAAA,CAAO,WAAW,CAAC,CAAA;AAC1F,EAAA,OAAO,UAAU,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,CAAK,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,WAAW,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA;AAC5D;AAEO,SAAS,yBAAyB,OAAA,EAAiD;AAGxF,EAAA,MAAM,YAAA,GAAe,gBAAA,CAAiB,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AACzE,EAAA,MAAM,aAAA,GAAgB,gBAAA,CAAiB,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,MAAM,eAAe,CAAA;AAC3E,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,EAAE,KAAA,EAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,OAAO,gBAAA,EAAkB,OAAA,CAAQ,OAAO,gBAAA,EAAiB;AAEvF,EAAA,OAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,MAAA,CACJ,YAAA,EACA,OAAA,GAA2B,EAAC,EACM;AAClC,MAAA,IAAI,OAAO,YAAA,KAAiB,QAAA,IAAY,YAAA,CAAa,WAAW,CAAA,EAAG;AACjE,QAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,0BAA0B,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,MACrD;AAEA,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,MAAM,aAAA,CAAc,YAAA,EAAc,EAAE,GAAG,IAAA,EAAM,KAAA,EAAO,YAAA,EAAa,EAAG,OAAO,CAAA;AAC3F,MAAA,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,iBAAA;AAAA,QACrB,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA;AAAA,QACR,EAAE,GAAG,IAAA,EAAM,KAAA,EAAO,aAAA,EAAc;AAAA,QAChC;AAAA,OACF;AAEA,MAAA,OAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAA,EAAW,MAAM,gBAAA,CAAiB,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,CAAA;AAAA,QACrD,eAAe,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA;AAAA,QACvB,gBAAgB,QAAA,CAAS,MAAA;AAAA,QACzB,eAAe,QAAA,CAAS,KAAA;AAAA,QACxB,gBAAgB,QAAA,CAAS,MAAA;AAAA,QACzB,eAAe,OAAA,CAAQ;AAAA,OACzB;AAAA,IACF,CAAA;AAAA,IAEA,cAAA,GAAiB;AACf,MAAA,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,YAAA,CAAa,SAAA,IAAa,QAAA,EAAU,aAAA,CAAc,WAAU,EAAE;AAAA,IAClF;AAAA,GACF;AACF;;;AC7BO,SAAS,+BACd,OAAA,EAC0B;AAC1B,EAAA,MAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,QAAQ,KAAA,IAAS,WAAA;AAC/B,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAS,QAAQ,MAAA,IAAU,WAAA;AAEjC,EAAA,MAAM,WAAW,wBAAA,CAAyB,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,EAAQ,OAAO,CAAA;AAC3E,EAAA,MAAM,MAAA,GACJ,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA,IAAe,oBAAA,CAAqB,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,CAAO,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA,EAAM,MAAA,EAAQ,CAAA;AAE1F,EAAA,MAAM,WAAA,GAAwC;AAAA,IAC5C,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA;AAAA,IACR,OAAA,EAAS,gBAAA;AAAA,IACT,OAAA,EAAS;AAAA,GACX;AAEA,EAAA,eAAe,iBACb,OAAA,EACoC;AACpC,IAAA,MAAM,YAAA,GAAgC;AAAA,MACpC,WAAW,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA;AAAA,MACnB,YAAY,OAAA,CAAQ;AAAA,KACtB;AAEA,IAAA,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAA,CAAS,OAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAA,CAAW,SAAS,YAAY,CAAA;AAG9E,IAAA,MAAM,qBAAA,CAAsB,OAAA,EAAS,OAAA,EAAS,YAAY,CAAA;AAE1D,IAAA,IAAI,WAAA;AACJ,IAAA,IAAI;AACF,MAAA,WAAA,GAAc,OAAO,OAAA,CAAQ;AAAA,QAC3B,WAAW,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA;AAAA,QACnB,aAAa,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAA;AAAA,QACrB,eAAe,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAA;AAAA,QACvB,gBAAgB,OAAA,CAAQ,cAAA;AAAA,QACxB,YAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,UAAA;AAAA,QACpB,WAAW,OAAA,CAAQ;AAAA,OACpB,CAAA;AAAA,IACH,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AACd,MAAA,MAAM,eAAe,mCAAA,EAAqC,EAAE,GAAG,YAAA,EAAc,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,IACtF;AAEA,IAAA,IAAI,WAAA,CAAY,SAAS,UAAA,EAAY;AACnC,MAAA,MAAM,WAAA,CAAY,WAAA,CAAY,KAAA,EAAO,YAAY,CAAA;AAAA,IACnD;AAEA,IAAA,OAAO;AAAA,MACL,MAAA,EAAQ,UAAA;AAAA,MACR,MAAA,EAAQ,KAAA;AAAA,MACR,WAAW,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA;AAAA,MACnB,eAAe,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAKvB,QAAA,EAAU;AAAA,QACR,eAAe,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAA;AAAA,QACvB,gBAAgB,OAAA,CAAQ,cAAA;AAAA,QACxB,YAAY,OAAA,CAAQ;AAAA;AACtB,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,CACf,MAAA,EACA,aAAA,EACA,OAAA,KACS;AACT,IAAA,IAAI;AACF,MAAA,MAAA,CAAO,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,CAAA;AAAA,IAC9B,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AACd,MAAA,MAAM,cAAA,CAAe,iCAAiC,MAAM,CAAA,CAAA,EAAI,EAAE,GAAG,OAAA,EAAS,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,IACvF;AAAA,EACF,CAAA;AAEA,EAAA,OAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAA,EAAM,KAAA;AAAA,IACN,UAAA,EAAY,mBAAmB,eAAe,CAAA;AAAA,IAC9C,WAAA;AAAA,IACA,gBAAA;AAAA,IAEA,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAA,EAAe,OAAA,EAAS;AACpC,MAAA,QAAA,CAAS,SAAA,EAAW,eAAe,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,IAC5C,CAAA;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAA,EAAe,OAAA,EAAS;AACpC,MAAA,QAAA,CAAS,SAAA,EAAW,eAAe,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,IAC5C,CAAA;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,aAAA,CAAc,aAAA,EAAe,OAAA,EAAS;AAC1C,MAAA,QAAA,CAAS,eAAA,EAAiB,eAAe,OAAO,CAAA;AAAA,IAClD,CAAA;AAAA,IAEA,MAAM,MAAA,GAAiC;AACrC,MAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAY,MAAM,WAAA,EAAY;AACpC,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,SAAS,cAAA,EAAe;AACxC,MAAA,MAAM,SAAA,GAAY,MAAM,MAAA,EAAO;AAC/B,MAAA,MAAM,aAAa,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,KAAgB,SAAS,CAAA;AAC7D,MAAA,IAAI;AAGF,QAAA,MAAA,CAAO,QAAQ,cAAc,CAAA;AAAA,MAC/B,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AAEN,QAAA,OAAO,EAAE,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA,EAAQ,SAAA,EAAW,UAAA,EAAY,QAAQ,0BAAA,EAA2B;AAAA,MACrF;AACA,MAAA,OAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA;AAAA,QACR,SAAA;AAAA,QACA,UAAA;AAAA,QACA,MAAA,EAAQ,mBAAmB,OAAA,CAAQ,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAM,CAAA,kBAAA,EAAqB,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,CAAA;AAAA,OAC/F;AAAA,IACF,CAAA;AAAA,IAEA,KAAA,GAAQ;AACN,MAAA,MAAA,CAAO,KAAA,EAAM;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,GACF;AACF","file":"ap2.js","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Every failure the AP2 verifier can report.\n *\n * `CommerceError.message` reaches the client, and a mandate carries the\n * buyer's purchase and often personal data, so messages are fixed phrases from\n * the list below. The machine-readable code goes in `details.reason` and the\n * original exception on `cause`, which is never serialised.\n *\n * Three codes: AUTHORIZATION_INVALID when the buyer's mandate is bad,\n * AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED when it is good but spent, and\n * AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE when our verifier never reached a\n * verdict. Blaming the buyer for our outage refuses a good mandate.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Coarse on purpose: a client learns roughly where its mandate was refused,\n * not which check failed. Finer detail is an oracle for probing trust policy.\n */\nexport const AP2_REJECTION_REASONS = [\n  'malformed_presentation',\n  'untrusted_issuer',\n  'unknown_key',\n  'invalid_signature',\n  'unsupported_algorithm',\n  'invalid_claims',\n  'expired',\n  'wrong_audience',\n  'unsupported_mandate_type',\n  'checkout_binding_failed',\n  'purchase_mismatch',\n] as const;\n\nexport type Ap2RejectionReason = (typeof AP2_REJECTION_REASONS)[number];\n\nconst MESSAGES: Readonly<Record<Ap2RejectionReason, string>> = {\n  malformed_presentation: 'The authorization is not a well-formed SD-JWT presentation.',\n  untrusted_issuer: 'The mandate was issued by a party this merchant does not trust.',\n  unknown_key: 'The mandate names a signing key this merchant does not trust.',\n  invalid_signature: 'The mandate signature did not verify.',\n  unsupported_algorithm: 'The mandate uses a signature or digest algorithm that is not accepted.',\n  invalid_claims: 'The mandate is missing required claims or they are malformed.',\n  expired: 'The mandate is expired or not yet valid.',\n  wrong_audience: 'The mandate is addressed to a different audience.',\n  unsupported_mandate_type: 'The mandate is not a closed Direct Checkout Mandate.',\n  checkout_binding_failed: 'The merchant checkout document bound to the mandate did not verify.',\n  purchase_mismatch: 'The mandate does not authorize this purchase.',\n};\n\nexport interface Ap2ErrorContext {\n  readonly requestId?: string;\n  readonly resourceId?: string;\n  readonly cause?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** The buyer's mandate is bad. Fail closed */\nexport function ap2Rejected(\n  reason: Ap2RejectionReason,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('AUTHORIZATION_INVALID', MESSAGES[reason], {\n    details: { method: 'ap2', reason },\n    ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n    ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * The mandate verified but has already been presented. A separate code from\n * a bad mandate: nothing is wrong with this proof except that it is spent\n */\nexport function ap2Replayed(state: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_REPLAYED',\n    'This mandate has already been presented and cannot authorize another purchase.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'replayed', state },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The check never ran (a configured key that will not import, say). Retryable,\n * and never recorded against the payer: the mandate may be perfectly good.\n */\nexport function ap2Unavailable(detail: string, context: Ap2ErrorContext = {}): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError(\n    'AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE',\n    'Authorization could not be verified right now. This is a merchant-side fault, not a problem with the presented mandate.',\n    {\n      details: { method: 'ap2', reason: 'verifier_unavailable', detail },\n      ...(context.requestId !== undefined ? { requestId: context.requestId } : {}),\n      ...(context.resourceId !== undefined ? { resourceId: context.resourceId } : {}),\n      ...(context.cause !== undefined ? { cause: context.cause } : {}),\n    },\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * Binds a verified mandate to the purchase in front of us.\n *\n * A perfect mandate authorises exactly one purchase; without this comparison a\n * mandate approved for a $0.01 report would settle a $500 one.\n *\n * Everything is compared against the ALREADY RESOLVED request. Nothing is\n * taken from the mandate and used to shape the purchase, which would invert\n * the control.\n */\nimport canonicalize from 'canonicalize';\nimport type { AuthorizationVerificationContext } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types.js';\n\n/**\n * All required. Absent is a mismatch, never a skipped check: a mandate that\n * will not say which resource or how much authorises nothing in particular.\n */\nconst REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS = [\n  'profile',\n  'resource_id',\n  'input_hash',\n  'amount',\n  'currency',\n  'payment_method',\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * RFC 8785 (JCS) digest of the validated resource input.\n *\n * Binds a mandate to the exact request, not just to a resource and a price:\n * without it, one mandate for `translate` would authorise any translation.\n *\n * `canonicalize` rather than a sorted-key `JSON.stringify`, which differs\n * exactly where it matters. The merchant's signer computes this same digest,\n * probably in another language, and the two agree only if both follow RFC\n * 8785's number formatting and UTF-16 key ordering.\n *\n * The caller passes what the backend will receive: validated, reserved fields\n * stripped, no request id or transport metadata (the buyer could not have\n * known those when they approved).\n */\nexport async function computeInputHash(input: unknown): Promise<string> {\n  const canonical = canonicalize(input ?? {});\n  // undefined means JSON cannot represent it. Input has already passed schema\n  // validation, so this is something exotic getting past it, not a buyer error.\n  if (canonical === undefined) {\n    throw new TypeError('resource input is not canonicalizable JSON');\n  }\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(canonical));\n  return Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url');\n}\n\n/** What the mandate turned out to authorise, once it matched */\nexport interface BoundPurchase {\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly amount: string;\n  readonly currency: string;\n  readonly paymentMethod: string;\n}\n\nfunction asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)\n    ? (value as Record<string, unknown>)\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws on the first mismatch with one coarse reason. Which field disagreed\n * is not reported: a caller able to ask about one field at a time can read a\n * mandate's contents out of the gateway by elimination.\n */\nexport async function bindMandateToPurchase(\n  mandate: VerifiedCheckoutMandate,\n  context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<BoundPurchase> {\n  const profile = asRecord(mandate.checkoutClaims['agent_commerce']);\n  if (profile === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n\n  for (const claim of REQUIRED_PROFILE_CLAIMS) {\n    const value = profile[claim];\n    if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n      throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const requirement = context.requirement;\n  const expectedInputHash = await computeInputHash(context.input);\n\n  const mustMatch: readonly (readonly [string, unknown])[] = [\n    ['profile', AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE],\n    ['resource_id', context.resourceId],\n    ['input_hash', expectedInputHash],\n    // Decimal strings on both sides. Comparing numerically would make \"0.10\"\n    // and \"0.1\" equal, and a mandate says what it says.\n    ['amount', requirement.amount],\n    ['currency', requirement.currency],\n    ['payment_method', requirement.provider],\n  ];\n\n  for (const [claim, expected] of mustMatch) {\n    if (profile[claim] !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n\n  // Checked whenever EITHER side names one, which is the fail-closed reading.\n  // A mandate silent about the chain must not unlock a mainnet settlement, and\n  // one naming a chain the requirement lacks was approved for another rail.\n  for (const [claim, expected] of [\n    ['destination', requirement.destination],\n    ['network', requirement.network],\n    ['asset', requirement.asset],\n  ] as const) {\n    const declared = profile[claim];\n    if (declared === undefined && expected === undefined) continue;\n    if (declared !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('purchase_mismatch', errorContext);\n  }\n\n  return {\n    resourceId: profile['resource_id'] as string,\n    amount: profile['amount'] as string,\n    currency: profile['currency'] as string,\n    paymentMethod: profile['payment_method'] as string,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Merchant-side helper: mint the checkout JWT a Checkout Mandate binds.\n *\n * The gateway only verifies. This is what a merchant runs in their own\n * process, with their own key, to produce the document the buyer approves. It\n * never calls the gateway and the gateway never calls it - the mirror of\n * `createPaymentProof`, which a buyer runs to produce a payment proof.\n *\n * It exists for `input_hash`, an RFC 8785 digest. A signer reaching for a\n * sorted-key `JSON.stringify` agrees on most inputs and disagrees on floats\n * and non-ASCII keys, and the mandate is then refused with a reason that does\n * not say which field disagreed.\n */\nimport { importPKCS8, type JWK, SignJWT } from 'jose';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_JWK_CURVE,\n  AP2_KEY_TYPE,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n} from './constants.js';\nimport { computeInputHash } from './profile.js';\n\n/**\n * A private ES256 key: either a private JWK (the pair of the public one in the\n * gateway's `checkoutIssuers`) or a PKCS#8 PEM, as `openssl` emits it.\n */\nexport type Ap2SigningKey = Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | string;\n\nexport interface CreateCheckoutJwtOptions {\n  readonly privateKey: Ap2SigningKey;\n  /** Must match a `kid` configured under the gateway's `checkoutIssuers` */\n  readonly kid: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `issuer` */\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Must match that issuer's configured `audience` */\n  readonly audience: string;\n\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  /**\n   * The resource input this purchase is for, exactly as the buyer will send\n   * it: no reserved fields, no request id, no transport metadata.\n   */\n  readonly input: unknown;\n\n  /**\n   * Decimal string, never a number, and compared as a string: `0.10` and `0.1`\n   * are different mandates. Take it from your own catalogue rather than from\n   * whatever the agent asked for.\n   */\n  readonly amount: string;\n  readonly currency: string;\n  /** The rail that will settle, e.g. `x402` */\n  readonly paymentMethod: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Settlement coordinates. Required whenever the gateway's requirement names\n   * them, which under x402 is always. A mandate silent about the chain will\n   * not unlock a settlement on one.\n   */\n  readonly destination?: string;\n  readonly network?: string;\n  readonly asset?: string;\n\n  /** Defaults to a random UUID. Recorded on the receipt and used for replay defence */\n  readonly jwtId?: string;\n  /** Defaults to 900: a human approval sits inside this window */\n  readonly expiresInSeconds?: number;\n  /** Injectable so a test need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: Date;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS = 900;\n\nfunction requireText(value: unknown, field: string): string {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length === 0) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: ${field} must be a non-empty string, received ${describe(value)}`,\n    );\n  }\n  return value;\n}\n\nfunction describe(value: unknown): string {\n  return value === null ? 'null' : typeof value;\n}\n\n/**\n * Every rejection here is a mistake that would otherwise surface as an opaque\n * verification failure much later: the public half of the pair, the wrong key\n * type, or a PEM that is not PKCS#8.\n */\nasync function resolveKey(\n  key: Ap2SigningKey,\n): Promise<JWK | Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importPKCS8>>> {\n  if (typeof key === 'string') {\n    if (!key.includes('BEGIN PRIVATE KEY')) {\n      throw new TypeError(\n        'createCheckoutJwt: a string privateKey must be a PKCS#8 PEM beginning \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\"',\n      );\n    }\n    return importPKCS8(key, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n  }\n  if (typeof key !== 'object' || key === null) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be a private JWK or a PKCS#8 PEM');\n  }\n  if (key['d'] === undefined) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: privateKey is a public JWK (no \"d\"). Use the private half of the pair whose public key is configured under checkoutIssuers',\n    );\n  }\n  if (key['kty'] !== AP2_KEY_TYPE || key['crv'] !== AP2_JWK_CURVE) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `createCheckoutJwt: privateKey must be ${AP2_KEY_TYPE}/${AP2_JWK_CURVE}, the pair ${AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM} implies`,\n    );\n  }\n  return key as JWK;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the compact JWT to hand to the agent, which wraps it in the Checkout\n * Mandate the buyer signs.\n */\nexport async function createCheckoutJwt(options: CreateCheckoutJwtOptions): Promise<string> {\n  const kid = requireText(options.kid, 'kid');\n  const issuer = requireText(options.issuer, 'issuer');\n  const audience = requireText(options.audience, 'audience');\n  const resourceId = requireText(options.resourceId, 'resourceId');\n  const currency = requireText(options.currency, 'currency');\n  const paymentMethod = requireText(options.paymentMethod, 'paymentMethod');\n\n  if (typeof options.amount === 'number') {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'createCheckoutJwt: amount must be a decimal string, not a number. It is compared as a string, so 0.1 and \"0.10\" are different mandates',\n    );\n  }\n  const amount = requireText(options.amount, 'amount');\n\n  const key = await resolveKey(options.privateKey);\n  const issuedAt = Math.floor((options.now ?? new Date()).getTime() / 1000);\n  const expiresIn = options.expiresInSeconds ?? DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS;\n  if (!Number.isInteger(expiresIn) || expiresIn <= 0) {\n    throw new TypeError('createCheckoutJwt: expiresInSeconds must be a positive whole number');\n  }\n\n  const agentCommerce: Record<string, string> = {\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n    resource_id: resourceId,\n    input_hash: await computeInputHash(options.input),\n    amount,\n    currency,\n    payment_method: paymentMethod,\n    ...(options.destination !== undefined ? { destination: options.destination } : {}),\n    ...(options.network !== undefined ? { network: options.network } : {}),\n    ...(options.asset !== undefined ? { asset: options.asset } : {}),\n  };\n\n  return new SignJWT({ agent_commerce: agentCommerce })\n    .setProtectedHeader({ alg: AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, kid, typ: 'JWT' })\n    .setIssuer(issuer)\n    .setAudience(audience)\n    .setIssuedAt(issuedAt)\n    .setExpirationTime(issuedAt + expiresIn)\n    .setJti(options.jwtId ?? crypto.randomUUID())\n    .sign(key);\n}\n","/**\n * Adapter self-description.\n *\n * Imports nothing but core types and the pins, so `doctor` can report AP2\n * without pulling `jose` or `@sd-jwt/core` into the CLI bundle.\n */\nimport type { AdapterDescriptor } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n} from './constants.js';\n\n/** What this provider actually verifies */\nexport const AP2_CAPABILITIES: readonly string[] = [\n  'direct-mode',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  'sd-jwt-presentation',\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  'static-inline-trust',\n  'merchant-checkout-jwt-binding',\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  'purchase-binding',\n  'replay-defence',\n];\n\n/**\n * Everything an AP2 client may reasonably expect and will not get here.\n * Complete on purpose: a short list reads as \"mostly compatible\", which is the\n * blanket claim alpha honesty forbids.\n */\nexport const AP2_UNSUPPORTED: readonly string[] = [\n  // Mandate kinds. Open mandates carry spending constraints nothing here\n  // evaluates, so accepting one would tell a buyer their limits were checked.\n  'autonomous mode',\n  'open checkout mandates (mandate.checkout.open.1)',\n  'intent mandates',\n  'cart mandates',\n  'spending constraint evaluation',\n  'cnf-bound agent keys',\n  // Key handling. Every key is written into config by an operator\n  'JWKS and any key discovery by URL (jku, x5u)',\n  'issuer metadata fetching',\n  'key rotation without a config change',\n  // Algorithms\n  'signature algorithms other than ES256',\n  'digest algorithms other than sha-256',\n  // Roles this gateway does not play\n  'mandate issuance',\n  'merchant checkout JWT issuance',\n  'AP2 over the ACP checkout adapter',\n];\n\nexport function buildAp2Descriptor(implementationVersion: string): AdapterDescriptor {\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    kind: 'authorization',\n    implementationVersion,\n    supportedSpec: `ap2/v${AP2_SPEC_VERSION} mode=direct`,\n    capabilities: AP2_CAPABILITIES,\n    status: 'experimental',\n    unsupported: AP2_UNSUPPORTED,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Durable record of which mandates have been spent.\n *\n * Its own table in its own file: an x402 payment replay key expires with its\n * on-chain authorisation, while a consumed mandate must stay consumed for as\n * long as the merchant can be asked what they delivered. Hence no retention\n * sweep here, unlike the ACP idempotency store next door - deleting a\n * `consumed` row makes that mandate spendable again. If the table ever needs\n * bounding, archive `released` rows and leave the rest.\n *\n * Settlement and a local commit are not one transaction. If the process dies\n * between them the row stays `reserved` and that mandate is refused from then\n * on: a refused retry costs a round trip, the other direction costs a second\n * payment.\n */\nimport type { Database } from 'better-sqlite3';\nimport { type Logger, NOOP_LOGGER } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { openSqliteDatabase } from '../../storage/sqlite.js';\n\n/**\n * `released` is \"nothing happened\" and the only state a mandate can be\n * presented from again. `uncertain` is a settlement whose outcome we never\n * learned: not reusable, but findable by an operator reconciling by hand.\n */\nexport type Ap2AuthorizationState = 'reserved' | 'consumed' | 'released' | 'uncertain';\n\n/**\n * A digest and a few identifiers: everything replay defence needs, and nothing\n * a leaked database would hand an attacker\n */\nexport interface Ap2ReservationRequest {\n  /**\n   * Digest of the ISSUER-SIGNED TOKEN, not of the presentation. Selective\n   * disclosure gives one mandate many presentation strings, so keying on the\n   * presentation would let it be spent once per disclosed subset.\n   */\n  readonly reference: string;\n  /** `jti` of the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds */\n  readonly checkoutJti: string;\n  readonly mandateIssuer: string;\n  readonly checkoutIssuer: string;\n  readonly resourceId: string;\n  readonly requestId: string;\n}\n\nexport type Ap2ReservationResult =\n  | { readonly kind: 'reserved' }\n  /** Already reserved, consumed, or of uncertain outcome. Never re-spendable */\n  | { readonly kind: 'replayed'; readonly state: Ap2AuthorizationState };\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStore {\n  /** Atomically claim a mandate, or report that something already holds it */\n  reserve(request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult;\n  /** Settlement succeeded: spend it permanently */\n  consume(reference: string): void;\n  /** Nothing happened: hand it back so a corrected retry can use it */\n  release(reference: string): void;\n  /** Settlement outcome unknown. Not reusable, and flagged for a human */\n  markUncertain(reference: string): void;\n  /** Current state, for tests and diagnostics */\n  stateOf(reference: string): Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n  close(): void;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2ReplayStoreOptions {\n  /** File path, or ':memory:' for tests */\n  readonly path: string;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not move the wall clock */\n  readonly now?: () => number;\n}\n\ninterface StateRow {\n  state: string;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2ReplayStore(options: Ap2ReplayStoreOptions): Ap2ReplayStore {\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n  const now = options.now ?? (() => Date.now());\n\n  const db: Database = openSqliteDatabase({\n    path: options.path,\n    label: 'AP2 authorization database',\n    logger,\n  });\n  migrate(db);\n\n  const selectByReference = db.prepare<[string], StateRow>(\n    'SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations WHERE reference = ?',\n  );\n  // Two mandates can bind one checkout document, giving two references, so\n  // the reference alone would not catch the second one\n  const selectLiveByJti = db.prepare<[string, string], StateRow>(\n    `SELECT state FROM ap2_authorizations\n      WHERE checkout_jti = ? AND reference != ? AND state != 'released'`,\n  );\n  const insert = db.prepare(\n    `INSERT INTO ap2_authorizations\n       (reference, checkout_jti, mandate_issuer, checkout_issuer, resource_id, request_id,\n        state, created_at, updated_at)\n     VALUES (@reference, @checkout_jti, @mandate_issuer, @checkout_issuer, @resource_id,\n             @request_id, 'reserved', @at, @at)`,\n  );\n  const reReserve = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations\n        SET state = 'reserved', request_id = @request_id, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'released'`,\n  );\n  // Guarded on `reserved`: releasing a `consumed` row would hand back a\n  // mandate whose money has already moved\n  const transition = db.prepare(\n    `UPDATE ap2_authorizations SET state = @state, updated_at = @at\n      WHERE reference = @reference AND state = 'reserved'`,\n  );\n\n  const reserveTx = db.transaction((request: Ap2ReservationRequest): Ap2ReservationResult => {\n    const at = new Date(now()).toISOString();\n\n    const existing = selectByReference.get(request.reference);\n    if (existing !== undefined) {\n      if (existing.state !== 'released') {\n        return { kind: 'replayed', state: existing.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n      }\n      reReserve.run({ reference: request.reference, request_id: request.requestId, at });\n      return { kind: 'reserved' };\n    }\n\n    const sameCheckout = selectLiveByJti.get(request.checkoutJti, request.reference);\n    if (sameCheckout !== undefined) {\n      return { kind: 'replayed', state: sameCheckout.state as Ap2AuthorizationState };\n    }\n\n    insert.run({\n      reference: request.reference,\n      checkout_jti: request.checkoutJti,\n      mandate_issuer: request.mandateIssuer,\n      checkout_issuer: request.checkoutIssuer,\n      resource_id: request.resourceId,\n      request_id: request.requestId,\n      at,\n    });\n    return { kind: 'reserved' };\n  });\n\n  const move = (reference: string, state: Ap2AuthorizationState): void => {\n    transition.run({ reference, state, at: new Date(now()).toISOString() });\n  };\n\n  let closed = false;\n  return {\n    reserve(request) {\n      return reserveTx(request);\n    },\n    consume(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'consumed');\n    },\n    release(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'released');\n    },\n    markUncertain(reference) {\n      move(reference, 'uncertain');\n    },\n    stateOf(reference) {\n      return selectByReference.get(reference)?.state as Ap2AuthorizationState | undefined;\n    },\n    close() {\n      if (closed) return;\n      closed = true;\n      db.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n// `PRAGMA user_version`, so reopening an existing file is a no-op check\nfunction migrate(db: Database): void {\n  const current = db.pragma('user_version', { simple: true }) as number;\n  if (current >= 1) return;\n  const apply = db.transaction(() => {\n    db.exec(`\n      CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ap2_authorizations (\n        reference        TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n        checkout_jti     TEXT NOT NULL,\n        mandate_issuer   TEXT NOT NULL,\n        checkout_issuer  TEXT NOT NULL,\n        resource_id      TEXT NOT NULL,\n        request_id       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        state            TEXT NOT NULL\n                         CHECK (state IN ('reserved', 'consumed', 'released', 'uncertain')),\n        created_at       TEXT NOT NULL,\n        updated_at       TEXT NOT NULL\n      );\n      CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_ap2_authorizations_checkout_jti\n        ON ap2_authorizations(checkout_jti);\n    `);\n    db.pragma('user_version = 1');\n  });\n  apply();\n}\n","/**\n * Stage two: the merchant checkout JWT the mandate binds.\n *\n * Two things have to hold. The hash proves the buyer approved *this* document;\n * the signature proves the merchant issued it. Hash alone accepts a document\n * the buyer wrote themselves; signature alone accepts a genuine merchant\n * document this mandate never covered.\n */\nimport { type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust.js';\n\nexport interface VerifiedCheckoutJwt {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  readonly jwtId: string;\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\nfunction decodeSegment(jwt: string, index: 0 | 1): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  const segment = jwt.split('.')[index];\n  if (segment === undefined) return undefined;\n  try {\n    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(segment, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));\n    return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null && !Array.isArray(parsed)\n      ? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)\n      : undefined;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * `mandateClaims` must come from an already-verified mandate: `checkout_hash`\n * is worth nothing unless the issuer signed it\n */\nexport async function verifyCheckoutJwt(\n  mandateClaims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutJwt> {\n  const compact = mandateClaims['checkout_jwt'];\n  const expectedHash = mandateClaims['checkout_hash'];\n  if (typeof compact !== 'string' || compact.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  if (typeof expectedHash !== 'string' || expectedHash.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n\n  await requireMatchingHash(compact, expectedHash, context);\n\n  const header = decodeSegment(compact, 0);\n  const unverifiedPayload = decodeSegment(compact, 1);\n  if (header === undefined || unverifiedPayload === undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', context);\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(\n    unverifiedPayload['iss'],\n    header['kid'],\n    context,\n  );\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(compact, key, options);\n    claims = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  const exp = claims['exp'];\n  const iat = claims['iat'];\n  const jti = claims['jti'];\n  // jose validates a time claim only when present, so requiring them is ours\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  // `jti` is what replay defence and the receipt record, so it is required\n  if (typeof jti !== 'string' || jti.length === 0) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, jwtId: jti, claims };\n}\n\n/**\n * Hashed as the bytes that arrived, never re-encoded from parsed claims: a\n * re-serialised payload has a different digest, and normalising first would\n * hash a document other than the one being verified\n */\nasync function requireMatchingHash(\n  compact: string,\n  expected: string,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // sha-256 only: `_sd_alg` was already pinned to it upstream\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(compact));\n  const actual = Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url');\n  // Plain comparison: both sides are public to anyone holding the\n  // presentation, so there is no secret for timing to leak\n  if (actual !== expected) throw ap2Rejected('checkout_binding_failed', context);\n}\n","/**\n * Stage one: parse the presentation, verify the issuer's signature, resolve\n * the disclosures.\n *\n * Disclosure mechanics come from `@sd-jwt/core`, which refuses the three\n * attacks that live in that algorithm: an appended disclosure nothing\n * references, the same disclosure twice, and one that will not decode.\n * Cryptography is `jose`'s. This file supplies the policy: which key, which\n * algorithm, which audience, what counts as fresh.\n */\nimport { decodeSdJwt, getClaims, splitSdJwt } from '@sd-jwt/core';\nimport { type JWTVerifyOptions, jwtVerify } from 'jose';\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT,\n  AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM,\n  AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM,\n} from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport type { TrustStore } from './trust.js';\n\nexport interface VerifiedMandate {\n  readonly issuer: string;\n  /** Every claim, with the presented disclosures resolved into place */\n  readonly claims: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n  /**\n   * The issuer-signed token on its own, without the disclosures.\n   *\n   * This, not the presentation string, is the stable identity of a mandate:\n   * disclosing or withholding an optional claim rewrites the presentation and\n   * leaves the signed token untouched. Replay defence keys on a digest of it.\n   */\n  readonly signedToken: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * `@sd-jwt/core` passes the algorithm it read from `_sd_alg`, so this is also\n * where a presentation declaring anything but sha-256 is refused\n */\nasync function hasher(data: string | ArrayBuffer, algorithm: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  if (algorithm.toLowerCase() !== AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM) {\n    throw new Error(`unsupported digest algorithm ${algorithm}`);\n  }\n  const bytes = typeof data === 'string' ? new TextEncoder().encode(data) : new Uint8Array(data);\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', bytes));\n}\n\nfunction asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)\n    ? (value as Record<string, unknown>)\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Order is the security boundary here: nothing is trusted until `jwtVerify`\n * returns. `kid` and `iss` are read before that only to pick which configured\n * key to try, and picking wrong just makes the signature fail.\n */\nexport async function verifyMandate(\n  presentation: string,\n  deps: { readonly trust: TrustStore; readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): Promise<VerifiedMandate> {\n  let decoded: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof decodeSdJwt>>;\n  let encodedJws: string;\n  try {\n    // Covers a malformed base JWT, a disclosure that will not decode, a\n    // duplicate digest, and an `_sd_alg` this release does not implement\n    decoded = await decodeSdJwt(presentation, hasher);\n    encodedJws = splitSdJwt(presentation).jwt;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  // Direct mode issues no key-bound mandates, so one arriving here belongs to\n  // a flow we do not verify. Ignoring it would mean silently not checking a\n  // proof that was sent.\n  if (decoded.kbJwt !== undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n\n  const rawPayload = asRecord(decoded.jwt.payload);\n  const header = asRecord(decoded.jwt.header);\n  if (rawPayload === undefined || header === undefined) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n  }\n\n  const { issuer, key } = await deps.trust.resolve(rawPayload['iss'], header['kid'], context);\n\n  const options: JWTVerifyOptions = {\n    // Redundant today (the key is EC, so jose already refuses `alg: none` and\n    // a forged HMAC) and kept for the day this resolves a key set instead of\n    // one key, where the header would get to pick\n    algorithms: [AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM],\n    // Also redundant, and for the same reason: the key was resolved *from*\n    // `iss` against the configured allowlist, so nothing reaching here can\n    // carry a different one. It backstops a future resolver that matches on\n    // something else. `audience` below is not redundant - `aud` is the\n    // presenter's claim, checked against what the operator configured.\n    issuer: issuer.issuer,\n    audience: issuer.audience,\n    clockTolerance: deps.clockSkewSeconds,\n    // Injected clock, not jose's `Date.now()`, so expiry tests are tests\n    currentDate: deps.clock.now(),\n  };\n\n  let verifiedPayload: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    const result = await jwtVerify(encodedJws, key, options);\n    verifiedPayload = result.payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw ap2Rejected(classifyJoseFailure(cause), { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireFreshness(verifiedPayload, deps, context);\n\n  let claims: Record<string, unknown>;\n  try {\n    // Against the VERIFIED payload: the decoded one would match disclosures\n    // against digests nobody signed\n    claims = (await getClaims(verifiedPayload, decoded.disclosures, hasher)) as Record<\n      string,\n      unknown\n    >;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Where an appended disclosure that no digest references is refused\n    throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', { ...context, cause });\n  }\n\n  requireClosedCheckoutMandate(claims, context);\n\n  return { issuer: issuer.issuer, claims, signedToken: encodedJws };\n}\n\n/**\n * Matched on jose's stable error `code`, not its message. A client is owed\n * \"expired\" versus \"did not verify\"; anything finer describes our checks back\n * to whoever is probing them.\n */\nfunction classifyJoseFailure(cause: unknown): 'expired' | 'wrong_audience' | 'invalid_signature' {\n  const code = (cause as { code?: unknown })?.code;\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_EXPIRED') return 'expired';\n  if (code === 'ERR_JWT_CLAIM_VALIDATION_FAILED') {\n    const claim = (cause as { claim?: unknown }).claim;\n    if (claim === 'aud') return 'wrong_audience';\n    if (claim === 'nbf' || claim === 'exp') return 'expired';\n  }\n  return 'invalid_signature';\n}\n\n/**\n * Required, not merely checked when present: jose validates a time claim only\n * if it is there, so a mandate omitting `exp` would verify and never expire\n */\nfunction requireFreshness(\n  payload: Record<string, unknown>,\n  deps: { readonly clock: Clock; readonly clockSkewSeconds: number },\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  const exp = payload['exp'];\n  const iat = payload['iat'];\n  if (typeof exp !== 'number' || typeof iat !== 'number') {\n    throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n  }\n  const nowSeconds = Math.floor(deps.clock.now().getTime() / 1000);\n  // A future `iat` is a broken signer, or a mandate minted to outlive its own\n  // expiry window\n  if (iat > nowSeconds + deps.clockSkewSeconds) throw ap2Rejected('expired', context);\n}\n\n// Exactly `mandate.checkout.1`; see AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT for why\nfunction requireClosedCheckoutMandate(\n  claims: Record<string, unknown>,\n  context: Ap2ErrorContext,\n): void {\n  if (claims['vct'] !== AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT) {\n    throw ap2Rejected('unsupported_mandate_type', context);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Static key resolution.\n *\n * Every key was written into `config.yaml` by an operator. No JWKS fetch, no\n * `jku`, no `x5u`. A mandate's `iss` and `kid` only choose *which* trusted key\n * verifies it; an unrecognised pair is refused, so a mandate can never\n * nominate its own signer.\n *\n * Not a \"try every key\" loop: that would make `kid` advisory and accept a\n * mandate that named a key it was not signed with.\n */\nimport { importJWK, type JWK } from 'jose';\nimport { AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM } from './constants.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected, ap2Unavailable } from './errors.js';\nimport type { Ap2TrustedIssuer } from './types.js';\n\n/** Named off `importJWK` because `CryptoKey` is a DOM type we do not load */\nexport type VerificationKey = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof importJWK>>;\n\nexport interface ResolvedKey {\n  readonly issuer: Ap2TrustedIssuer;\n  readonly key: VerificationKey;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves `(iss, kid)` against one configured issuer list. Caches the import\n * promise, not the key, so concurrent requests for a cold key share one import.\n */\nexport function createTrustStore(issuers: readonly Ap2TrustedIssuer[]) {\n  const byIssuer = new Map(issuers.map((entry) => [entry.issuer, entry]));\n  const imported = new Map<string, Promise<VerificationKey>>();\n\n  return {\n    /** Every trusted issuer id, for diagnostics. Never the keys themselves */\n    issuerIds(): readonly string[] {\n      return [...byIssuer.keys()];\n    },\n\n    async resolve(iss: unknown, kid: unknown, context: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<ResolvedKey> {\n      if (typeof iss !== 'string' || iss.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('invalid_claims', context);\n      }\n      const issuer = byIssuer.get(iss);\n      if (issuer === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('untrusted_issuer', context);\n\n      // Not defaulted to the issuer's only key: mid-rotation there are two,\n      // and the gateway should not guess which one signed this\n      if (typeof kid !== 'string' || kid.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n      }\n      const trusted = issuer.keys.find((candidate) => candidate.kid === kid);\n      if (trusted === undefined) throw ap2Rejected('unknown_key', context);\n\n      // JSON, not a joined string: both halves are operator-chosen and could\n      // contain whatever separator we picked\n      const cacheKey = JSON.stringify([iss, kid]);\n      let pending = imported.get(cacheKey);\n      if (pending === undefined) {\n        pending = importJWK(trusted.jwk as JWK, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM);\n        imported.set(cacheKey, pending);\n      }\n\n      try {\n        return { issuer, key: await pending };\n      } catch (cause) {\n        // Config already checked this JWK member by member, so reaching here\n        // means our config is broken, not the mandate. Drop the cached\n        // rejection so a fixed config is not still failing against it.\n        imported.delete(cacheKey);\n        throw ap2Unavailable('configured verification key could not be imported', {\n          ...context,\n          cause,\n        });\n      }\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport type TrustStore = ReturnType<typeof createTrustStore>;\n","/**\n * The Direct Checkout Mandate verifier: mandate signature first, then the\n * merchant checkout JWT it binds. Either stage failing is a refusal.\n *\n * What this proves is narrow. A trusted issuer signed this mandate, it has not\n * expired, it is addressed to us, and it binds a checkout document the\n * merchant signed. It does NOT prove the mandate authorises the purchase in\n * front of us: that is profile.ts, and a caller treating this as permission to\n * settle has skipped it.\n */\nimport type { Clock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { verifyCheckoutJwt } from './checkout-jwt.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Rejected } from './errors.js';\nimport { verifyMandate } from './sd-jwt.js';\nimport { createTrustStore } from './trust.js';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config, VerifiedCheckoutMandate } from './types.js';\n\nexport interface Ap2VerifierOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock: Clock;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  verify(presentation: string, context?: Ap2ErrorContext): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate>;\n  /** Trusted issuer ids, for `doctor`. Counts and names only, never keys */\n  trustedIssuers(): { readonly mandate: readonly string[]; readonly checkout: readonly string[] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Algorithm-prefixed so a future digest change is visible in stored references\n * rather than silently producing unequal values for one mandate\n */\nasync function mandateReference(signedToken: string): Promise<string> {\n  const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new TextEncoder().encode(signedToken));\n  return `sha256:${Buffer.from(digest).toString('base64url')}`;\n}\n\nexport function createAp2MandateVerifier(options: Ap2VerifierOptions): Ap2MandateVerifier {\n  // Two stores, not one list: signing the merchant's checkout documents must\n  // not confer the power to issue mandates\n  const mandateTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.mandateIssuers);\n  const checkoutTrust = createTrustStore(options.config.trust.checkoutIssuers);\n  const deps = { clock: options.clock, clockSkewSeconds: options.config.clockSkewSeconds };\n\n  return {\n    async verify(\n      presentation: string,\n      context: Ap2ErrorContext = {},\n    ): Promise<VerifiedCheckoutMandate> {\n      if (typeof presentation !== 'string' || presentation.length === 0) {\n        throw ap2Rejected('malformed_presentation', context);\n      }\n\n      const mandate = await verifyMandate(presentation, { ...deps, trust: mandateTrust }, context);\n      const checkout = await verifyCheckoutJwt(\n        mandate.claims,\n        { ...deps, trust: checkoutTrust },\n        context,\n      );\n\n      return {\n        reference: await mandateReference(mandate.signedToken),\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.issuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: checkout.issuer,\n        checkoutJwtId: checkout.jwtId,\n        checkoutClaims: checkout.claims,\n        mandateClaims: mandate.claims,\n      };\n    },\n\n    trustedIssuers() {\n      return { mandate: mandateTrust.issuerIds(), checkout: checkoutTrust.issuerIds() };\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * The AP2 authorization provider: the seam between core's generic contract and\n * the mandate machinery.\n *\n * Owns the replay database, so the gateway owns this object's lifetime and\n * closes it on shutdown.\n */\nimport type {\n  AdapterHealth,\n  AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  AuthorizationProvider,\n  AuthorizationRequirement,\n  AuthorizationVerification,\n  AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  Clock,\n  Logger,\n} from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { NOOP_LOGGER, systemClock } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { PACKAGE_VERSION } from '../../version.js';\nimport { AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_SPEC_VERSION } from './constants.js';\nimport { buildAp2Descriptor } from './descriptor.js';\nimport { type Ap2ErrorContext, ap2Replayed, ap2Unavailable } from './errors.js';\nimport { bindMandateToPurchase } from './profile.js';\nimport { type Ap2ReplayStore, createAp2ReplayStore } from './replay-store.js';\nimport type { EnabledAp2Config } from './types.js';\nimport { createAp2MandateVerifier } from './verifier.js';\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions {\n  readonly config: EnabledAp2Config;\n  readonly clock?: Clock;\n  readonly logger?: Logger;\n  /** Injectable so tests need not touch the filesystem */\n  readonly replayStore?: Ap2ReplayStore;\n}\n\nexport interface Ap2AuthorizationProvider extends AuthorizationProvider {\n  /** Closes the replay database */\n  close(): void;\n}\n\n/**\n * A reservation is keyed by the mandate reference, so the handle and the\n * receipt's identity are the same digest. Kept as one name rather than two\n * fields that must never disagree.\n */\nexport function createAp2AuthorizationProvider(\n  options: Ap2AuthorizationProviderOptions,\n): Ap2AuthorizationProvider {\n  const clock = options.clock ?? systemClock;\n  const logger = options.logger ?? NOOP_LOGGER;\n\n  const verifier = createAp2MandateVerifier({ config: options.config, clock });\n  const replay =\n    options.replayStore ?? createAp2ReplayStore({ path: options.config.replay.path, logger });\n\n  const requirement: AuthorizationRequirement = {\n    method: 'ap2',\n    version: AP2_SPEC_VERSION,\n    profile: AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE,\n  };\n\n  async function verifyAndReserve(\n    context: AuthorizationVerificationContext,\n  ): Promise<AuthorizationVerification> {\n    const errorContext: Ap2ErrorContext = {\n      requestId: context.requestId,\n      resourceId: context.resourceId,\n    };\n\n    const mandate = await verifier.verify(context.submission.payload, errorContext);\n    // Before reserving, not after: a mandate that does not authorize this\n    // purchase must stay spendable on the purchase it does authorize\n    await bindMandateToPurchase(mandate, context, errorContext);\n\n    let reservation: ReturnType<Ap2ReplayStore['reserve']>;\n    try {\n      reservation = replay.reserve({\n        reference: mandate.reference,\n        checkoutJti: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        resourceId: context.resourceId,\n        requestId: context.requestId,\n      });\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable('replay store could not be written', { ...errorContext, cause });\n    }\n\n    if (reservation.kind === 'replayed') {\n      throw ap2Replayed(reservation.state, errorContext);\n    }\n\n    return {\n      status: 'verified',\n      method: 'ap2',\n      reference: mandate.reference,\n      reservationId: mandate.reference,\n      // Opaque identifiers an operator can reconcile with. Never a claim from\n      // the mandate: those carry the buyer's purchase and their personal data.\n      // `checkoutId`, not `checkoutJwtId` - the receipt store redacts any key\n      // that reads as secret-shaped, and \"jwt\" is on that list.\n      metadata: {\n        mandateIssuer: mandate.mandateIssuer,\n        checkoutIssuer: mandate.checkoutIssuer,\n        checkoutId: mandate.checkoutJwtId,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  const finalize = (\n    action: 'consume' | 'release' | 'markUncertain',\n    reservationId: string,\n    context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext,\n  ): void => {\n    try {\n      replay[action](reservationId);\n    } catch (cause) {\n      throw ap2Unavailable(`replay store could not record ${action}`, { ...context, cause });\n    }\n  };\n\n  return {\n    name: 'ap2',\n    descriptor: buildAp2Descriptor(PACKAGE_VERSION),\n    requirement,\n    verifyAndReserve,\n\n    async consume(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('consume', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async release(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('release', reservationId, context);\n    },\n    async markUncertain(reservationId, context) {\n      finalize('markUncertain', reservationId, context);\n    },\n\n    async health(): Promise<AdapterHealth> {\n      const startedAt = clock.monotonicMs();\n      const trusted = verifier.trustedIssuers();\n      const checkedAt = clock.nowIso();\n      const durationMs = Math.round(clock.monotonicMs() - startedAt);\n      try {\n        // A read against the real table, so a database that opened but cannot\n        // be queried is caught here rather than on the first purchase\n        replay.stateOf('health-probe');\n      } catch {\n        // A fixed token, never a sentence built from the caught error\n        return { status: 'fail', checkedAt, durationMs, detail: 'replay-store-unavailable' };\n      }\n      return {\n        status: 'pass',\n        checkedAt,\n        durationMs,\n        detail: `mandate-issuers=${trusted.mandate.length} checkout-issuers=${trusted.checkout.length}`,\n      };\n    },\n\n    close() {\n      replay.close();\n    },\n  };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/authorization-CPDcpJVa.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+import { f as AuthorizationMethodName, A as AdapterDescriptor, l as PaymentRequirement, c as AdapterHealth } from './runtime-CKq3d_3K.js';
+
+/**
+ * Canonical authorization model.
+ *
+ * FROZEN CONTRACT.
+ *
+ * Authorization answers a different question from payment. Payment proves
+ * that funds moved; authorization proves that the human behind the agent
+ * approved *this exact purchase*. A valid authorization never unlocks a paid
+ * resource on its own and never moves money. It gates settlement, and a
+ * resource that requires one still needs a real payment proof as well.
+ *
+ * Core decides *that* a resource requires authorization and *when* in the
+ * pipeline it is checked. Authorization providers decide how a submission is
+ * parsed, verified and bound to the purchase. No AP2, SD-JWT or JWT type may
+ * appear in this file.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Opaque authorization proof supplied by the buyer's client.
+ *
+ * Over HTTP this arrives base64url-JSON-encoded in the `Agent-Authorization`
+ * header; over MCP and A2A it is the same `{ method, payload }` object carried
+ * in the reserved `_authorization` input field.
+ *
+ * `payload` is preserved byte-for-byte from the wire. Providers derive replay
+ * identities by hashing it, so decoding and reserialising it before it reaches
+ * the provider would change the identity of an otherwise identical proof.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationSubmission {
+    readonly method: AuthorizationMethodName;
+    readonly payload: string;
+}
+/**
+ * What a buyer must present, advertised alongside the payment challenge so a
+ * client learns before it pays that a proof of payment alone will not do.
+ *
+ * The gateway never issues the authorization itself. It states the method,
+ * the spec version it verifies against, and the payload profile it expects.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationRequirement {
+    readonly method: AuthorizationMethodName;
+    readonly version: string;
+    readonly profile?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Safe audit identity of an authorization, fit for a receipt. `reference` is a
+ * digest: a receipt outlives its request, and a stored proof would be a
+ * spendable secret at rest.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationRecord {
+    readonly method: AuthorizationMethodName;
+    readonly reference: string;
+    /** Safe audit summary only. Never the proof, its disclosures, or PII */
+    readonly metadata?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+}
+/**
+ * A verified, reserved authorization. `reservationId` is the live handle the
+ * pipeline consumes, releases or marks uncertain once settlement resolves; it
+ * stays out of the record above because a handle is not an audit fact.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationVerification extends AuthorizationRecord {
+    readonly status: 'verified';
+    readonly reservationId: string;
+}
+/** Input to {@link AuthorizationProvider.verifyAndReserve}. */
+interface AuthorizationVerificationContext {
+    readonly requestId: string;
+    readonly resourceId: string;
+    /**
+     * The validated resource input, reserved fields already stripped: the same
+     * bytes the merchant backend will be called with. A provider that binds a
+     * proof to the request hashes this, so it must not include `_payment`,
+     * `_authorization`, the request id or any transport metadata.
+     */
+    readonly input: unknown;
+    readonly submission: AuthorizationSubmission;
+    /** The resolved price and destination the proof must match. */
+    readonly requirement: PaymentRequirement;
+}
+/** Input to {@link AuthorizationProvider.consume} and `release`. */
+interface AuthorizationFinalizeContext {
+    readonly requestId: string;
+    readonly resourceId: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Contract every authorization method implements.
+ *
+ * The lifecycle straddles settlement: a proof must be reserved *before* funds
+ * move so a replay cannot race one, and its fate is only known *after*.
+ *
+ * Release only for a failure that provably moved no money. Anything ambiguous
+ * is marked uncertain: a proof handed back after a settlement that may have
+ * landed can be spent twice.
+ */
+interface AuthorizationProvider {
+    readonly name: AuthorizationMethodName;
+    readonly descriptor: AdapterDescriptor;
+    /** What a buyer must present, advertised beside the payment challenge */
+    readonly requirement: AuthorizationRequirement;
+    /**
+     * Verify a submission against the resolved purchase and atomically reserve
+     * it against reuse.
+     *
+     * Throws a `CommerceError` with an `AUTHORIZATION_*` code, never a payment
+     * code. A verifier or store outage is
+     * `AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER_UNAVAILABLE`, not the buyer's fault.
+     */
+    verifyAndReserve(context: AuthorizationVerificationContext): Promise<AuthorizationVerification>;
+    /** Mark a reservation permanently spent. Called after settlement succeeds. */
+    consume(reservationId: string, context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext): Promise<void>;
+    /** Return a reservation to unused. Only for failures that moved no funds. */
+    release(reservationId: string, context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Settlement broadcast but never confirmed: neither spend the reservation
+     * nor hand it back, and flag it for an operator
+     */
+    markUncertain(reservationId: string, context: AuthorizationFinalizeContext): Promise<void>;
+    health(): Promise<AdapterHealth>;
+}
+
+export type { AuthorizationProvider as A, AuthorizationRequirement as a, AuthorizationSubmission as b, AuthorizationFinalizeContext as c, AuthorizationRecord as d, AuthorizationVerification as e, AuthorizationVerificationContext as f };

package/dist/chunk-7NKWFGBY.js

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+import { CommerceError } from './chunk-ZDVJ7EVL.js';
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, accessSync, constants, closeSync, openSync, chmodSync } from 'fs';
+import { dirname } from 'path';
+import Database from 'better-sqlite3';
+
+// src/authorization/ap2/constants.ts
+var AP2_SPEC_VERSION = "0.2.0";
+var AP2_MODES = ["direct"];
+var AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM = "ES256";
+var AP2_KEY_TYPE = "EC";
+var AP2_JWK_CURVE = "P-256";
+var AP2_JWK_COORDINATE_BYTES = 32;
+var AP2_JWK_MEMBERS = ["kty", "crv", "x", "y", "kid", "alg", "use"];
+var AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT = "mandate.checkout.1";
+var AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE = "agent-commerce/ap2/checkout/v1";
+var AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM = "sha-256";
+var AP2_DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;
+var AP2_MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 300;
+function openSqliteDatabase(options) {
+  const { path, label, logger } = options;
+  const isFileBacked = path !== ":memory:";
+  if (isFileBacked) {
+    const dir = dirname(path);
+    if (dir !== "" && dir !== "." && !existsSync(dir)) {
+      mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 448 });
+    }
+  }
+  if (isFileBacked && existsSync(path)) {
+    try {
+      accessSync(path, constants.W_OK);
+    } catch {
+      throw new CommerceError(
+        "STORAGE_ERROR",
+        `${label} "${path}" exists but is not writable by this process (uid ${typeof process.getuid === "function" ? process.getuid() : "unknown"}). If this is a container that recently changed user, an existing volume may still be owned by the previous one - recreate it (docker compose down -v) or fix its ownership.`,
+        { details: { path } }
+      );
+    }
+  }
+  if (isFileBacked) {
+    try {
+      closeSync(openSync(path, "a", 384));
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  const db = new Database(path);
+  db.pragma("journal_mode = WAL");
+  db.pragma("foreign_keys = ON");
+  if (isFileBacked) restrictDatabasePermissions(path, label, logger);
+  return db;
+}
+function restrictDatabasePermissions(path, label, logger) {
+  for (const file of [path, `${path}-wal`, `${path}-shm`]) {
+    try {
+      chmodSync(file, 384);
+    } catch (error) {
+      const code = error.code;
+      if (code === "ENOENT") continue;
+      logger.warn(
+        { file, label, error: code ?? "unknown" },
+        "could not restrict database permissions to owner-only"
+      );
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+export { AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT, AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE, AP2_DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, AP2_JWK_COORDINATE_BYTES, AP2_JWK_CURVE, AP2_JWK_MEMBERS, AP2_KEY_TYPE, AP2_MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, AP2_MODES, AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM, AP2_SPEC_VERSION, openSqliteDatabase };
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7NKWFGBY.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7NKWFGBY.js.map

package/dist/chunk-7NKWFGBY.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/authorization/ap2/constants.ts","../src/storage/sqlite.ts"],"names":["fsConstants"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAQO,IAAM,gBAAA,GAAmB;AAOzB,IAAM,SAAA,GAAY,CAAC,QAAQ;AAO3B,IAAM,qBAAA,GAAwB;AAG9B,IAAM,YAAA,GAAe;AACrB,IAAM,aAAA,GAAgB;AAGtB,IAAM,wBAAA,GAA2B;AASjC,IAAM,eAAA,GAAkB,CAAC,KAAA,EAAO,KAAA,EAAO,KAAK,GAAA,EAAK,KAAA,EAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAOpE,IAAM,wBAAA,GAA2B;AAajC,IAAM,oBAAA,GAAuB;AAO7B,IAAM,oBAAA,GAAuB;AAG7B,IAAM,8BAAA,GAAiC;AAMvC,IAAM,0BAAA,GAA6B;ACzCnC,SAAS,mBAAmB,OAAA,EAA+C;AAChF,EAAA,MAAM,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,KAAA,EAAO,MAAA,EAAO,GAAI,OAAA;AAChC,EAAA,MAAM,eAAe,IAAA,KAAS,UAAA;AAE9B,EAAA,IAAI,YAAA,EAAc;AAChB,IAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAA;AACxB,IAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAA,IAAM,GAAA,KAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,UAAA,CAAW,GAAG,CAAA,EAAG;AAGjD,MAAA,SAAA,CAAU,KAAK,EAAE,SAAA,EAAW,IAAA,EAAM,IAAA,EAAM,KAAO,CAAA;AAAA,IACjD;AAAA,EACF;AAUA,EAAA,IAAI,YAAA,IAAgB,UAAA,CAAW,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AACpC,IAAA,IAAI;AACF,MAAA,UAAA,CAAW,IAAA,EAAMA,UAAY,IAAI,CAAA;AAAA,IACnC,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AACN,MAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,QACR,eAAA;AAAA,QACA,CAAA,EAAG,KAAK,CAAA,EAAA,EAAK,IAAI,CAAA,kDAAA,EAAqD,OAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,KAAW,UAAA,GAAa,OAAA,CAAQ,MAAA,EAAO,GAAI,SAAS,CAAA,4KAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QACzI,EAAE,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,IAAA,EAAK;AAAE,OACtB;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AASA,EAAA,IAAI,YAAA,EAAc;AAChB,IAAA,IAAI;AACF,MAAA,SAAA,CAAU,QAAA,CAAS,IAAA,EAAM,GAAA,EAAK,GAAK,CAAC,CAAA;AAAA,IACtC,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AAAA,IAIR;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,MAAM,EAAA,GAAK,IAAI,QAAA,CAAS,IAAI,CAAA;AAC5B,EAAA,EAAA,CAAG,OAAO,oBAAoB,CAAA;AAC9B,EAAA,EAAA,CAAG,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAA;AAC7B,EAAA,IAAI,YAAA,EAAc,2BAAA,CAA4B,IAAA,EAAM,KAAA,EAAO,MAAM,CAAA;AACjE,EAAA,OAAO,EAAA;AACT;AAkBA,SAAS,2BAAA,CAA4B,IAAA,EAAc,KAAA,EAAe,MAAA,EAAsB;AACtF,EAAA,KAAA,MAAW,IAAA,IAAQ,CAAC,IAAA,EAAM,CAAA,EAAG,IAAI,CAAA,IAAA,CAAA,EAAQ,CAAA,EAAG,IAAI,CAAA,IAAA,CAAM,CAAA,EAAG;AACvD,IAAA,IAAI;AACF,MAAA,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,GAAK,CAAA;AAAA,IACvB,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AACd,MAAA,MAAM,OAAQ,KAAA,CAAgC,IAAA;AAC9C,MAAA,IAAI,SAAS,QAAA,EAAU;AACvB,MAAA,MAAA,CAAO,IAAA;AAAA,QACL,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,KAAA,EAAO,KAAA,EAAO,QAAQ,SAAA,EAAU;AAAA,QACxC;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF","file":"chunk-7NKWFGBY.js","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Pinned AP2 identifiers and key policy.\n *\n * AP2 v0.2.0 (2026-04-28, commit b4587ac) is the tagged release this gateway\n * verifies against; unversioned `main` is never implemented against. Config,\n * the verifier and `doctor` all read these, so a bump lands in one place.\n */\n\nexport const AP2_SPEC_VERSION = '0.2.0';\n\n/**\n * Autonomous mode needs open mandates, cnf-bound agent keys and constraint\n * evaluation over `checkout.line_items`. Half of that would be worse than a\n * declared Direct-only profile, so it is refused rather than partly served.\n */\nexport const AP2_MODES = ['direct'] as const;\nexport type Ap2Mode = (typeof AP2_MODES)[number];\n\n/**\n * One entry, so `alg=none` and the HMAC family are excluded by construction\n * rather than by a check that has to remember them\n */\nexport const AP2_SIGNING_ALGORITHM = 'ES256';\n\n/** The key type and curve ES256 implies. Any other pair is refused at load */\nexport const AP2_KEY_TYPE = 'EC';\nexport const AP2_JWK_CURVE = 'P-256';\n\n/** Byte length of a P-256 coordinate, before base64url encoding */\nexport const AP2_JWK_COORDINATE_BYTES = 32;\n\n/**\n * JWK members a verification key may carry.\n *\n * An allowlist, so private material (`d`) and anything naming a URL (`x5u`,\n * or a smuggled `jku`) is refused without this list having to name it. Keys\n * are configured inline and never fetched; see docs/security.md.\n */\nexport const AP2_JWK_MEMBERS = ['kty', 'crv', 'x', 'y', 'kid', 'alg', 'use'] as const;\n\n/**\n * Compared against this literal, never as a prefix. `mandate.checkout.open.1`\n * carries spending constraints this release does not evaluate, so accepting it\n * would tell a buyer their limits were checked when nothing read them.\n */\nexport const AP2_CHECKOUT_MANDATE_VCT = 'mandate.checkout.1';\n\n/**\n * The checkout profile every merchant checkout JWT must declare.\n *\n * Ours, not AP2's: AP2 leaves the checkout payload outside its scope, so the\n * claims a paid-resource invocation needs had to be specified somewhere.\n *\n * A bare name, matching the gateway's other wire identifiers\n * (`agent-commerce/delivery`, `agent-commerce/v1.0.0`). A profile id is a\n * namespace and is never dereferenced, so a URL would only tie the wire format\n * to a domain. Frozen once released: merchants sign it into every checkout JWT.\n */\nexport const AP2_CHECKOUT_PROFILE = 'agent-commerce/ap2/checkout/v1';\n\n/**\n * Taken from the SD-JWT `_sd_alg`, which defaults to sha-256 when absent.\n * Anything else is refused rather than hashed as sha-256 anyway, which would\n * check a presentation under an algorithm it never claimed.\n */\nexport const AP2_DIGEST_ALGORITHM = 'sha-256';\n\n/** Seconds of clock skew tolerated on mandate and checkout time claims */\nexport const AP2_DEFAULT_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 60;\n\n/**\n * Skew wide enough to cover a mandate's validity window stops `exp` rejecting\n * anything. An operator needing more than five minutes has a clock to fix.\n */\nexport const AP2_MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 300;\n","/**\n * Opening a SQLite file safely.\n *\n * One definition, because every rule below was learned once and must not be\n * re-learned per store: the file is pre-created at 0600 before SQLite can\n * create it at `0666 & ~umask`, the WAL sidecars are narrowed after WAL is\n * enabled (they do not exist until then), and an existing but unwritable file\n * fails at startup instead of on the first write.\n *\n * Callers own their schema. This function opens and hardens; it migrates\n * nothing.\n */\nimport {\n  accessSync,\n  chmodSync,\n  closeSync,\n  existsSync,\n  constants as fsConstants,\n  mkdirSync,\n  openSync,\n} from 'node:fs';\nimport { dirname } from 'node:path';\nimport Database from 'better-sqlite3';\nimport { CommerceError, type Logger } from '../core/index.js';\n\nexport interface OpenSqliteOptions {\n  /** File path, or ':memory:' for tests. Parent directory is created if missing. */\n  readonly path: string;\n  /** Names the database in operator-facing errors, e.g. \"Receipt database\". */\n  readonly label: string;\n  readonly logger: Logger;\n}\n\nexport function openSqliteDatabase(options: OpenSqliteOptions): Database.Database {\n  const { path, label, logger } = options;\n  const isFileBacked = path !== ':memory:';\n\n  if (isFileBacked) {\n    const dir = dirname(path);\n    if (dir !== '' && dir !== '.' && !existsSync(dir)) {\n      // 0700 on directories we create ourselves. An existing directory is the\n      // operator's to own and is deliberately left alone.\n      mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Fail at startup, not on the first write. `new Database(path)` happily opens\n  // a file the process cannot write, and SQLite only says \"attempt to write a\n  // readonly database\" once a write is attempted - which on a paid resource is\n  // *after* the payment attempt reservation, surfacing as an opaque\n  // STORAGE_ERROR per request. Readiness does catch it (503), but the operator\n  // is left guessing. This is not hypothetical: switching the demo containers\n  // to a non-root user left an existing named volume root-owned, and that is\n  // exactly how it presented.\n  if (isFileBacked && existsSync(path)) {\n    try {\n      accessSync(path, fsConstants.W_OK);\n    } catch {\n      throw new CommerceError(\n        'STORAGE_ERROR',\n        `${label} \"${path}\" exists but is not writable by this process (uid ${typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? process.getuid() : 'unknown'}). If this is a container that recently changed user, an existing volume may still be owned by the previous one - recreate it (docker compose down -v) or fix its ownership.`,\n        { details: { path } },\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Create the file ourselves, at 0600, *before* SQLite can create it at\n  // `0666 & ~umask`. The chmod below only narrows the mode after the fact: a\n  // local co-tenant who opens the file inside that window keeps a readable\n  // descriptor across the chmod and reads everything written afterwards.\n  // SQLite copies the main file's mode onto the -wal/-shm sidecars, so this one\n  // call covers all three. `mode` applies on creation only, so an existing file\n  // is untouched here and left to the chmod.\n  if (isFileBacked) {\n    try {\n      closeSync(openSync(path, 'a', 0o600));\n    } catch {\n      // Deliberately silent: whatever stopped us (unwritable directory, exotic\n      // filesystem) is about to be reported by `new Database` with a better\n      // message, or is harmless and covered by the chmod below.\n    }\n  }\n\n  const db = new Database(path);\n  db.pragma('journal_mode = WAL');\n  db.pragma('foreign_keys = ON');\n  if (isFileBacked) restrictDatabasePermissions(path, label, logger);\n  return db;\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow the database and its WAL sidecars to owner-only.\n *\n * `new Database(path)` opens with `0666 & ~umask`, so on a standard host the\n * `.sqlite`, `-wal` and `-shm` files landed at 0644 - any other local user\n * could read the whole commerce ledger: payer and payee addresses, amounts,\n * settlement transaction hashes, replay keys and the entire event stream. No\n * key material (the gateway is non-custodial and `redact.ts` is recursive), but\n * business metadata all the same.\n *\n * Called *after* `journal_mode = WAL`, because the sidecars do not exist until\n * then. Belt-and-braces since the main file is pre-created at 0600 above: this\n * still tightens a database that already existed with a looser mode.\n * Best-effort by design: a filesystem without POSIX modes must not stop the\n * gateway from starting, so a failure warns rather than throws.\n */\nfunction restrictDatabasePermissions(path: string, label: string, logger: Logger): void {\n  for (const file of [path, `${path}-wal`, `${path}-shm`]) {\n    try {\n      chmodSync(file, 0o600);\n    } catch (error) {\n      const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;\n      if (code === 'ENOENT') continue;\n      logger.warn(\n        { file, label, error: code ?? 'unknown' },\n        'could not restrict database permissions to owner-only',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n"]}

package/dist/{chunk-5TKNTWMC.js → chunk-IUR3Q7DE.js}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { CommerceError } from './chunk-EIACECVM.js';
+import { CommerceError } from './chunk-ZDVJ7EVL.js';
 
 // src/payments/x402/networks.ts
 var PROFILES = [
@@ -251,5 +251,5 @@ function sameAddress(a, b) {
 }
 
 export { SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS, assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly, assertPayToIsNotDevAddress, describeDeploymentMode, requireNetworkProfile, resolveDeploymentMode, resolveX402Deployment };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5TKNTWMC.js.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5TKNTWMC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IUR3Q7DE.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IUR3Q7DE.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-5TKNTWMC.js.map → chunk-IUR3Q7DE.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/payments/x402/networks.ts","../src/payments/x402/local-chain/accounts.ts","../src/payments/x402/dev-key-guard.ts","../src/payments/x402/guardrails.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAiDA,IAAM,QAAA,GAAsC;AAAA,EAC1C;AAAA,IACE,EAAA,EAAI,cAAA;AAAA,IACJ,OAAA,EAAS,KAAA;AAAA,IACT,WAAA,EAAa,cAAA;AAAA,IACb,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA;AAAA,IACN,cAAA,EAAgB;AAAA,MACd,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA;AAAA,MACR,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,MACT,IAAA,EAAM,MAAA;AAAA,MACN,OAAA,EAAS;AAAA;AACX,GACF;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,EAAA,EAAI,aAAA;AAAA,IACJ,OAAA,EAAS,IAAA;AAAA,IACT,WAAA,EAAa,MAAA;AAAA,IACb,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA;AAAA,IACN,cAAA,EAAgB;AAAA,MACd,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA;AAAA,MACR,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,MACT,IAAA,EAAM,UAAA;AAAA,MACN,OAAA,EAAS;AAAA;AACX;AAEJ,CAAA;AAEA,IAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,OAAA,KAAY,CAAC,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAA,EAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;AAE/D,IAAM,wBAA2C,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,CAAA,KAAM,EAAE,EAAE;AAMzE,SAAS,qBAAA,CAAsB,IAAY,IAAA,EAA8B;AAC9E,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,KAAA,CAAM,GAAA,CAAI,EAAE,CAAA;AAC5B,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,OAAA,EAAS;AACZ,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA,CAAA,EAAG,IAAI,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,EAAE,+DAA+D,qBAAA,CAAsB,IAAA,CAAK,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAC9G,EAAE,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,OAAA,EAAS,IAAG;AAAE,KACnC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,OAAA;AACT;AAaO,SAAS,qBAAA,CACd,SACA,eAAA,EACgB;AAChB,EAAA,IAAI,eAAA,KAAoB,SAAS,OAAO,OAAA;AACxC,EAAA,OAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,IAAA;AACjB;AAGO,IAAM,mBAAA,GAAsB,qCAAA;AAE5B,SAAS,uBAAuB,IAAA,EAA8B;AACnE,EAAA,OAAO,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,GAAY,mBAAA,GAAsB,IAAA,CAAK,WAAA,EAAY;AACrE;;;ACpGO,IAAM,yBAAA,GAIT;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,IACE,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,IACT,UAAA,EAAY;AAAA,GACd;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,IACT,UAAA,EAAY;AAAA,GACd;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,IACT,UAAA,EAAY;AAAA;AAEhB,CAAA;;;ACjBA,IAAM,sBAA2C,IAAI,GAAA;AAAA,EACnD,0BAA0B,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,UAAA,CAAW,aAAa;AACjE,CAAA;AAEA,IAAM,2BAAgD,IAAI,GAAA;AAAA,EACxD,0BAA0B,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAa;AAC9D,CAAA;AAGA,IAAM,iBAAA,GAAoB,qBAAA;AAEnB,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAAA,EAA6B;AAC7D,EAAA,OAAO,mBAAA,CAAoB,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,WAAA,EAAa,CAAA;AACzD;AAEO,SAAS,sBAAsB,OAAA,EAA0B;AAC9D,EAAA,OAAO,wBAAA,CAAyB,GAAA,CAAI,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA,EAAa,CAAA;AAC3D;AAeO,SAAS,2BAA2B,QAAA,EAA2B;AACpE,EAAA,MAAM,IAAI,QAAA,CAAS,WAAA,EAAY,CAAE,OAAA,CAAQ,YAAY,EAAE,CAAA;AACvD,EAAA,IAAI,MAAM,WAAA,IAAe,CAAA,KAAM,WAAA,IAAe,CAAA,KAAM,OAAO,OAAO,IAAA;AAClE,EAAA,IAAI,kCAAA,CAAmC,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACvD,EAAA,IAAI,iCAAA,CAAkC,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACtD,EAAA,IAAI,8BAAA,CAA+B,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACnD,EAAA,IAAI,6CAAA,CAA8C,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AAClE,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,GAAG,CAAA,IAAK,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,GAAG,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACjD,EAAA,OAAO,KAAA;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,qBAAqB,MAAA,EAAwB;AACpD,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,OAAO,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA;AAAA,EACzB,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AAId,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA,CAAc,gBAAA,EAAkB,0CAAA,EAA4C;AAAA,MACpF;AAAA,KACD,CAAA;AAAA,EACH;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,YAAY,MAAA,EAAwB;AAC3C,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,OAAO,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA;AAAA,EACzB,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AACN,IAAA,OAAO,sBAAA;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAaO,SAAS,uBAAA,CAAwB,QAAgB,gBAAA,EAAgC;AACtF,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAA,CAAkB,IAAA,CAAK,gBAAgB,CAAA,EAAG;AAC7C,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,KAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAA,CAAkB,gBAAgB,CAAA,EAAG;AAE1C,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,qBAAqB,MAAM,CAAA;AAE5C,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,0BAAA,CAA2B,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAG;AACzC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA,CAAA,8FAAA,EACK,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,qRAAA;AAAA,KAG1B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAeO,SAAS,0BAAA,CAA2B,QAAgB,KAAA,EAAqB;AAC9E,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,qBAAA,CAAsB,KAAK,CAAA,EAAG;AAEnC,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,qBAAqB,MAAM,CAAA;AAE5C,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,0BAAA,CAA2B,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAG;AACzC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,KAAK,CAAA,wDAAA,EAC3B,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,4QAAA;AAAA,KAI1B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACrEA,SAAS,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAiB,IAAA,EAA6B;AAC7D,EAAA,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,gBAAA,EAAkB,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,IAAA,EAAK,EAAG,CAAA;AAC3E;AAOO,SAAS,sBAAsB,KAAA,EAA4C;AAChF,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,qBAAA,CAAsB,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,EAAS,uBAAuB,CAAA;AAC5E,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,qBAAA,CAAsB,OAAA,EAAS,KAAA,CAAM,YAAY,IAAI,CAAA;AASlE,EAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,SAAS,OAAA,EAAS;AACpE,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAE,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,+HAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAC9D;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,YAAA,KAAiB,IAAA,EAAM;AACrD,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAE,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,yHAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAC9D;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,IAAA,KAAS,QAAA,EAAU;AACvC,IAAA,0BAAA,CAA2B,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,GAAA,EAAK,IAAI,CAAA;AAQtD,IAAA,IACE,IAAA,KAAS,aACT,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,KAAK,IAAA,KAAS,MAAA,IAChC,KAAA,CAAM,+BAAA,KAAoC,IAAA,EAC1C;AACA,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,QACJ,CAAA,2BAAA,EAA8B,cAAA,CAAe,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA,+PAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QACnE;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AAKA,IAAA,KAAA,MAAW,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA,IAAK,iBAAiB,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AACrE,MAAA,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,IAAA,EAAK,KAAM,EAAA,EAAI;AACvB,QAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,UACJ,4CAA4C,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,IAAA,CAAK,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,CAAA,2DAAA,CAAA;AAAA,UACrF,kCAAkC,KAAK,CAAA;AAAA,SACzC;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAWA,EAAA,IAAI,YAAA,CAAa,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,KAAK,CAAA,EAAG;AAClC,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,uFAAA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,OAAA,IAAW,qBAAA,CAAsB,KAAA,CAAM,KAAK,CAAA,EAAG;AAC1D,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,KAAA,CAAM,KAAK,CAAA,0DAAA,EAA6D,IAAI,CAAA,wFAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MACvG;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAIA,EAAA,MAAM,YAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,cAAA;AAC1B,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,aAAa,SAAA,EAAW;AACnC,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,WAAA,CAAY,KAAA,CAAM,KAAA,EAAO,SAAA,CAAU,OAAO,CAAA,EAAG;AAChD,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,QACJ,CAAA,qBAAA,EAAwB,KAAA,CAAM,KAAK,CAAA,QAAA,EAAW,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,CAAA,IAAA,EAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,WAAA,EAAc,SAAA,CAAU,OAAO,CAAA,gEAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QACvH;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AAKA,IAAA,IAAI,MAAM,SAAA,KAAc,MAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,SAAA,KAAc,UAAU,IAAA,EAAM;AACvE,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,QACJ,CAAA,0BAAA,EAA6B,KAAA,CAAM,SAAS,CAAA,iCAAA,EAAoC,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,CAAA,YAAA,EAAe,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,YAAA,EAAe,SAAA,CAAU,IAAI,CAAA,0DAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QAC/J;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,IAAA,IAAI,MAAM,YAAA,KAAiB,MAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,YAAA,KAAiB,UAAU,OAAA,EAAS;AAChF,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,QACJ,CAAA,6BAAA,EAAgC,KAAA,CAAM,YAAY,CAAA,oCAAA,EAAuC,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,CAAA,YAAA,EAAe,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,YAAA,EAAe,SAAA,CAAU,OAAO,CAAA,GAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QAC3K;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,IAAA,EAAK;AACzB;AAQA,SAAS,0BAAA,CAA2B,KAAa,IAAA,EAA4B;AAC3E,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,MAAA,GAAS,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,CAAA;AAAA,EACtB,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AACd,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA,CAAc,gBAAA,EAAkB,CAAA,iDAAA,CAAA,EAAqD;AAAA,MAC7F,KAAA;AAAA,MACA,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,+BAAA;AAAgC,KAClD,CAAA;AAAA,EACH;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA,CAAO,aAAa,QAAA,EAAU;AAClC,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA,CAAO,aAAa,OAAA,EAAS;AAC/B,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,8BAA8B,cAAA,CAAe,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA,oEAAA,EAAuE,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAA,GAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MACvI;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,IAAa,0BAAA,CAA2B,MAAA,CAAO,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAG;AAKvE,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,IACJ,CAAA,2BAAA,EAA8B,cAAA,CAAe,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA,6KAAA,CAAA;AAAA,IACjD;AAAA,GACF;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,eAAe,GAAA,EAAqB;AAC3C,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,OAAO,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,GAAG,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA;AAAA,EACtB,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AACN,IAAA,OAAO,+BAAA;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,iBAAiB,IAAA,EAA+D;AACvF,EAAA,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAA;AAAM,IACjB,KAAK,QAAA;AACH,MAAA,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAA,EAAS,IAAA,CAAK,KAAK,CAAC,CAAA;AAAA,IAC/B,KAAK,KAAA;AACH,MAAA,OAAO;AAAA,QACL,CAAC,UAAA,EAAY,IAAA,CAAK,QAAQ,CAAA;AAAA,QAC1B,CAAC,cAAA,EAAgB,IAAA,CAAK,YAAY;AAAA,OACpC;AAAA,IACF;AACE,MAAA,OAAO,EAAC;AAAA;AAEd;AAEA,SAAS,WAAA,CAAY,GAAW,CAAA,EAAoB;AAClD,EAAA,OAAO,CAAA,CAAE,WAAA,EAAY,KAAM,CAAA,CAAE,WAAA,EAAY;AAC3C","file":"chunk-5TKNTWMC.js","sourcesContent":["/**\n * The networks this gateway will settle on, as data.\n *\n * x402 v2 identifies a network by its CAIP-2 id, so the only thing an\n * operator has to change to move between environments is that string. What\n * the code needs on top of it — the chain id to sign against, a name a human\n * recognises, and whether real money is involved — lives here rather than\n * being derived at each call site.\n *\n * A registry rather than \"parse any `eip155:*`\" on purpose. The chain id is\n * parseable from any such string, but `mainnet` is not, and every guardrail in\n * `guardrails.ts` keys off it. An unknown id is refused at startup instead of\n * being quietly treated as a testnet.\n *\n * Base Sepolia and the local dev chain share the id `eip155:84532`: the local\n * chain deliberately reuses Base Sepolia's chain id so the unmodified x402 SDK\n * can talk to it. Nothing may infer \"public network\" from the network id alone\n * — that is what `resolveDeploymentMode` and the Anvil probe in `provider.ts`\n * are for.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\nexport interface NetworkProfile {\n  /** CAIP-2 identifier, e.g. `eip155:84532`. */\n  readonly id: string;\n  /** Signed into the buyer's EIP-712 domain. */\n  readonly chainId: number;\n  readonly displayName: string;\n  readonly kind: 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n  /**\n   * The USDC deployment this network is expected to settle in, with the EIP-712\n   * domain the token actually reports. Enforced only on mainnet (see\n   * `guardrails.ts`) — a testnet is where a mock token is a legitimate thing to\n   * point at.\n   *\n   * `name` is not decorative and is not the symbol: it is signed into every\n   * buyer's EIP-712 domain, and the two USDC deployments disagree. Base Sepolia\n   * reports `\"USDC\"`; Base mainnet reports `\"USD Coin\"`. Configure the wrong\n   * one and every payment is refused `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch`\n   * after the buyer has signed. Read back from the contracts, not assumed.\n   */\n  readonly canonicalAsset?: {\n    readonly symbol: string;\n    readonly address: string;\n    readonly name: string;\n    readonly version: string;\n  };\n}\n\nconst PROFILES: readonly NetworkProfile[] = [\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:84532',\n    chainId: 84532,\n    displayName: 'Base Sepolia',\n    kind: 'testnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e',\n      name: 'USDC',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:8453',\n    chainId: 8453,\n    displayName: 'Base',\n    kind: 'mainnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913',\n      name: 'USD Coin',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n];\n\nconst BY_ID = new Map(PROFILES.map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));\n\nexport const SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS: readonly string[] = PROFILES.map((p) => p.id);\n\nexport function findNetworkProfile(id: string): NetworkProfile | undefined {\n  return BY_ID.get(id);\n}\n\nexport function requireNetworkProfile(id: string, path: string): NetworkProfile {\n  const profile = BY_ID.get(id);\n  if (!profile) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `${path}: \"${id}\" is not a supported network. Supported CAIP-2 identifiers: ${SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS.join(', ')}`,\n      { details: { path, network: id } },\n    );\n  }\n  return profile;\n}\n\n/**\n * What this deployment actually is, as opposed to what it is called.\n *\n * `local` is a property of the *facilitator*, not the network: settling\n * through the in-process facilitator against a dev node is local regardless of\n * the CAIP-2 id that node answers to. This distinction is the whole reason\n * diagnostics can say `eip155:84532` without claiming to be on public Base\n * Sepolia.\n */\nexport type DeploymentMode = 'local' | 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n\nexport function resolveDeploymentMode(\n  profile: NetworkProfile,\n  facilitatorMode: 'local' | 'remote',\n): DeploymentMode {\n  if (facilitatorMode === 'local') return 'local';\n  return profile.kind;\n}\n\n/** The banner an operator must not be able to miss. Never printed for anything else. */\nexport const LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER = 'LIVE MAINNET MODE — REAL FUNDS';\n\nexport function describeDeploymentMode(mode: DeploymentMode): string {\n  return mode === 'mainnet' ? LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER : mode.toUpperCase();\n}\n","/**\n * Anvil's well-known development accounts.\n *\n * LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY — DO NOT FUND. These addresses and private keys are\n * derived from Foundry's public, well-documented default test mnemonic\n * (\"test test test test test test test test test test test junk\") and are\n * known to everyone who has ever run `anvil`. Anyone who sends real value to\n * one of these addresses on a real network will lose it.\n *\n * Index layout used by the local demo chain (see docs/contracts.md):\n * 0 — deployer / local facilitator signer (pays gas, broadcasts settlement)\n * 1 — merchant settlement destination (`payTo`)\n * 2 — buyer (signs EIP-3009 authorisations; never held by the gateway)\n */\nexport interface AnvilWellKnownAccount {\n  readonly address: `0x${string}`;\n  readonly privateKey: `0x${string}`;\n}\n\n/** Fixed-length tuple (not a bare array) so indexing by the documented layout above is fully typed. */\nexport const ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS: readonly [\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n] = [\n  {\n    address: '0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266',\n    privateKey: '0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8',\n    privateKey: '0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC',\n    privateKey: '0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a',\n  },\n];\n\nexport const LOCAL_FACILITATOR_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[0];\nexport const LOCAL_MERCHANT_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[1];\nexport const LOCAL_BUYER_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[2];\n\n/** Safe label used everywhere a dev key appears in output, logs or manifests. */\nexport const DEV_KEY_LABEL = 'LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY - DO NOT FUND';\n","/**\n * Prevents a well-known Anvil development private key — or a well-known\n * Anvil development *address* — from ever being used against anything other\n * than a loopback/private/dev RPC. Two symmetric mistakes, both covered:\n * signing settlement with a dev key (`assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`), and routing\n * settlement revenue to a dev address (`assertPayToIsNotDevAddress`). The\n * second is the more consequential of the two — a wrong key merely fails to\n * sign, a wrong payTo silently succeeds and gives the money away, since the\n * private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n *\n * Chain id alone cannot tell a real network from this project's local dev\n * chain: Base Sepolia's own chain id is 84532, the same id this project\n * deliberately reuses for the local chain so the unmodified x402 SDK can talk\n * to it. A dev key or dev payTo pointed at a real RPC by a config mistake is\n * instantly drainable — this is checked once at provider construction, not per\n * payment.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS } from './local-chain/accounts.js';\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.privateKey.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.address.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\n/** `0x` + 64 hex chars — the only shape `privateKeyToAccount` accepts. */\nconst PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevKey(privateKey: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS.has(privateKey.toLowerCase());\n}\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevAddress(address: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES.has(address.toLowerCase());\n}\n\n/**\n * True for loopback addresses, RFC1918 private ranges, and bare (dot-free)\n * hostnames — the shape of a docker-compose/k8s service name (e.g.\n * \"anvil\"), which a real public DNS name essentially never has.\n *\n * ASSUMPTION, and the loosest edge of this guard: every dot-free, colon-free\n * hostname is treated as private, with no exceptions. A single-label *public* hostname (no dots) is\n * essentially nonexistent in practice — ICANN does not delegate bare\n * gTLDs/TLDs as public A/AAAA records — but this function cannot tell \"no\n * dots because it's a compose service name\" from \"no dots because it's an\n * unusual real host\" if one somehow existed. If that assumption ever stops\n * holding, this is the line to revisit.\n */\nexport function isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '');\n  if (h === 'localhost' || h === '127.0.0.1' || h === '::1') return true;\n  if (/^127\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^10\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^192\\.168\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (!h.includes('.') && !h.includes(':')) return true; // bare hostname\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).hostname;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Not the URL itself: every commercial EVM RPC provider embeds an API key\n    // in the path, and these messages reach `validate`, `doctor`, startup\n    // output and CI logs.\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', 'x402 provider: rpcUrl is not a valid URL', {\n      cause,\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/** Host only, for diagnostics. An RPC URL's path routinely carries a key. */\nfunction describeRpc(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable rpcUrl]';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if a well-known dev key would sign against a non-local\n * RPC — or if `signerPrivateKey` isn't shaped like a private key at all.\n *\n * The shape check runs first and unconditionally. \"Not a key I recognise\"\n * (falls through `isWellKnownDevKey`, silently treated as someone's own real\n * facilitator key) and \"not a key at all\" (e.g. a truncated 63-char string)\n * must never share a code path: a malformed key that slips past this guard\n * only fails later, inside `settle()`, after the buyer's replayKey is already\n * reserved.\n */\nexport function assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly(rpcUrl: string, signerPrivateKey: string): void {\n  if (!PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE.test(signerPrivateKey)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is not a well-formed private key ' +\n        '(expected \"0x\" followed by exactly 64 hex characters).',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!isWellKnownDevKey(signerPrivateKey)) return; // a real facilitator key: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is a well-known Anvil development key, but rpcUrl ' +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. A public dev key must never sign against ` +\n        'a public network — it is instantly drainable and can grief real settlements via nonce exhaustion. ' +\n        'Use a real facilitator key for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if `payTo` (the settlement destination) is a\n * well-known Anvil development address and `rpcUrl` doesn't look\n * local/private.\n *\n * Mirrors `assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`, but guards the *receiving* side of the\n * payment instead of the signing side, and — unlike the key guard — applies\n * regardless of facilitator mode: which account signs the settlement\n * transaction has no bearing on whether the destination address is one whose\n * private key is public knowledge. `agent-commerce init` defaults `payTo` to\n * a well-known Anvil address as a local-demo convenience; on a real network\n * that default routes every payment to an address anyone on earth can sweep.\n */\nexport function assertPayToIsNotDevAddress(rpcUrl: string, payTo: string): void {\n  if (!isWellKnownDevAddress(payTo)) return; // not a dev address: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `x402 provider: \"payTo\" (${payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address, but rpcUrl ` +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. The private key behind that address ` +\n        'is public knowledge, so any revenue settled to it is immediately spendable by anyone. Set ' +\n        '\"payTo\" to your own merchant wallet for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your ' +\n        'local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Everything that must be true before this gateway is allowed to settle a\n * payment on the configured network.\n *\n * One definition, two callers: the provider runs it at construction so a\n * library consumer who never touches our config loader still gets the checks,\n * and `doctor` runs it against the parsed config so an operator sees the same\n * verdict without starting the gateway. Sharing a *call* is not sharing a\n * definition — the checks live here, and nothing re-implements them.\n *\n * Every failure is a startup failure. None of these are request-time\n * decisions: a deployment that is unsafe is unsafe before the first buyer\n * arrives, and finding out during `settle()` means the buyer's authorisation\n * is already burned.\n *\n * Peer-free by construction (no viem, no `@x402/*`) so the CLI can import it.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost, isWellKnownDevAddress } from './dev-key-guard.js';\nimport {\n  type DeploymentMode,\n  type NetworkProfile,\n  requireNetworkProfile,\n  resolveDeploymentMode,\n} from './networks.js';\n\n/**\n * How the gateway authenticates to a remote facilitator.\n *\n * Deliberately a list, not a vendor: x402 facilitators are not a Coinbase-only\n * category, and a scheme that only fitted one vendor's credentials would make\n * the abstraction a fiction.\n *\n * - `none` — the facilitator takes no credential (the public testnet one).\n * - `bearer` — a static token. Covers most self-hosted and third-party\n * facilitators, and needs nothing installed.\n * - `cdp` — Coinbase Developer Platform, which signs a fresh JWT per request\n * over method + host + path, so a static header cannot express it. Handled by\n * the optional peer `@coinbase/x402`, imported only when this type is\n * configured. Anyone not using CDP never installs it.\n *\n * A facilitator whose scheme is none of these is refused at config load rather\n * than sent nothing.\n */\nexport type FacilitatorAuth =\n  | { readonly type: 'none' }\n  | { readonly type: 'bearer'; readonly token: string }\n  | { readonly type: 'cdp'; readonly apiKeyId: string; readonly apiKeySecret: string };\n\nexport type X402FacilitatorConfig =\n  | { readonly mode: 'local'; readonly signerPrivateKey: string }\n  | { readonly mode: 'remote'; readonly url: string; readonly auth: FacilitatorAuth };\n\nexport interface X402DeploymentInput {\n  readonly network: string;\n  readonly payTo: string;\n  readonly asset: string;\n  /** EIP-712 domain of the asset, as the token itself reports it. */\n  readonly assetName?: string;\n  readonly assetVersion?: string;\n  readonly facilitator: X402FacilitatorConfig;\n  /** Required, and required to be `true`, before anything settles on a mainnet. */\n  readonly allowMainnet?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Required, and required to be `true`, to settle on a mainnet through a\n   * facilitator that takes no credential.\n   *\n   * Separate from `allowMainnet` because it names a different decision: not\n   * \"I meant to use real money\" but \"I accept this particular counterparty\n   * without an account, terms, or anyone to call\".\n   */\n  readonly allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface X402Deployment {\n  readonly profile: NetworkProfile;\n  readonly mode: DeploymentMode;\n}\n\nfunction invalid(message: string, path: string): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', message, { details: { path } });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves the deployment and refuses every combination that could move real\n * money by accident. Order matters only in that the network must resolve\n * first; the rest are independent.\n */\nexport function resolveX402Deployment(input: X402DeploymentInput): X402Deployment {\n  const profile = requireNetworkProfile(input.network, 'payments.x402.network');\n  const mode = resolveDeploymentMode(profile, input.facilitator.mode);\n\n  // The in-process facilitator signs with a key this process holds. Not a\n  // custody problem — that signer never holds buyer or merchant funds, it pays\n  // gas and broadcasts `transferWithAuthorization`, and the money moves buyer\n  // to merchant directly on-chain. What it *is*, on a mainnet, is a funded key\n  // inside the resource server: compromise that process and an attacker drains\n  // the gas wallet and broadcasts from it. Separate processes, separate blast\n  // radius — so it is refused, not warned about.\n  if (profile.kind === 'mainnet' && input.facilitator.mode === 'local') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) is a mainnet and cannot be served by facilitator.mode \"local\". A mainnet deployment must settle through a remote facilitator.`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.mode',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && input.allowMainnet !== true) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) settles real funds. Set payments.x402.allowMainnet: true to acknowledge this explicitly — it is never the default.`,\n      'payments.x402.allowMainnet',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (input.facilitator.mode === 'remote') {\n    assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(input.facilitator.url, mode);\n    // Not a funds check. An EIP-3009 authorisation names its recipient, its\n    // amount and its chain, so a facilitator can broadcast exactly that\n    // transfer or nothing — it cannot redirect the money. What a credential\n    // buys is a *relationship*: rate limits, terms, someone to call when\n    // settlement stops. Running production payments through a counterparty you\n    // have none of that with is a real choice, and this is where it gets made\n    // explicitly rather than by omission.\n    if (\n      mode === 'mainnet' &&\n      input.facilitator.auth.type === 'none' &&\n      input.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== true\n    ) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(input.facilitator.url)} takes no credential, and this is a mainnet deployment. It will see every payment authorisation you handle, with no account, terms or support behind it. Set payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: true to accept that, or configure facilitator.auth.`,\n        'payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator',\n      );\n    }\n    // An empty credential is refused rather than sent: a blank token or key\n    // reaches the facilitator as \"unauthenticated\" and fails every payment\n    // after the buyer has already signed. `${VAR:- }` resolving to whitespace\n    // is the realistic way this happens.\n    for (const [field, value] of credentialFields(input.facilitator.auth)) {\n      if (value.trim() === '') {\n        throw invalid(\n          `payments.x402: facilitator.auth.type is \"${input.facilitator.auth.type}\" but ${field} is empty. An empty credential is refused rather than sent.`,\n          `payments.x402.facilitator.auth.${field}`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // The private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n  // `dev-key-guard` already refuses one against a public *RPC*; this refuses\n  // one on any non-local *deployment*, which is the case a remote facilitator\n  // creates — there the RPC host says nothing about where settlement lands.\n  // The zero address lived only in the config loader, so a library consumer\n  // calling `createX402PaymentProvider` directly — the path this shared\n  // definition exists to cover — could boot a mainnet provider whose every\n  // payment burns — sharing a *call* is not sharing a definition, and this\n  // check had drifted out of the shared one.\n  if (/^0x0{40}$/i.test(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      'payments.x402: \"payTo\" is the zero address. Every payment settled there is destroyed.',\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode !== 'local' && isWellKnownDevAddress(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: \"payTo\" (${input.payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address and this is a ${mode} deployment. Anyone can spend what settles there. Set payTo to your own merchant wallet.`,\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Mainnet only. A testnet is exactly where pointing at a mock token is the\n  // right thing to do, so the same check there would block the normal case.\n  const canonical = profile.canonicalAsset;\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && canonical) {\n    if (!sameAddress(input.asset, canonical.address)) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: asset ${input.asset} is not ${canonical.symbol} on ${profile.displayName} (expected ${canonical.address}). Settling a mainnet payment in an unintended token is refused.`,\n        'payments.x402.asset',\n      );\n    }\n    // The EIP-712 domain is signed by the buyer and checked by the scheme. Get\n    // it wrong and every payment is refused `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch`\n    // *after* the buyer signed — a config error charged to the buyer's patience.\n    // Caught here instead, before the gateway starts.\n    if (input.assetName !== undefined && input.assetName !== canonical.name) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetName \"${input.assetName}\" is not the EIP-712 domain name ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.name}\"). Every payment would be refused after the buyer signed.`,\n        'payments.x402.assetName',\n      );\n    }\n    if (input.assetVersion !== undefined && input.assetVersion !== canonical.version) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetVersion \"${input.assetVersion}\" is not the EIP-712 domain version ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.version}\").`,\n        'payments.x402.assetVersion',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { profile, mode };\n}\n\n/**\n * A facilitator sees every payment authorisation this gateway handles. Plain\n * HTTP to one on a public network puts those on the wire in the clear and\n * lets anyone in the path rewrite a settlement result, so it is allowed only\n * where the endpoint cannot leave the host — a local or private address.\n */\nfunction assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(url: string, mode: DeploymentMode): void {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', `payments.x402: facilitator.url is not a valid URL`, {\n      cause,\n      details: { path: 'payments.x402.facilitator.url' },\n    });\n  }\n\n  if (parsed.protocol === 'https:') return;\n  if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} must be reached over https (or http on a local/private host); got \"${parsed.protocol}//\"`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n    );\n  }\n  if (mode !== 'mainnet' && isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(parsed.hostname)) return;\n\n  // The origin, never the whole URL: the path can carry a tenant or an API\n  // key, which is why `/.well-known` withholds this field entirely. A refusal\n  // message goes to `validate`, `doctor`, startup output and CI logs.\n  throw invalid(\n    `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} is reached over plain HTTP. Payment authorisations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,\n    'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n  );\n}\n\n/** Host only — a facilitator URL can carry a tenant path or an API key. */\nfunction describeOrigin(url: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable facilitator.url]';\n  }\n}\n\n/** The secret-bearing fields of an auth block, for emptiness checks only. Never logged. */\nfunction credentialFields(auth: FacilitatorAuth): readonly (readonly [string, string])[] {\n  switch (auth.type) {\n    case 'bearer':\n      return [['token', auth.token]];\n    case 'cdp':\n      return [\n        ['apiKeyId', auth.apiKeyId],\n        ['apiKeySecret', auth.apiKeySecret],\n      ];\n    default:\n      return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction sameAddress(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();\n}\n"]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/payments/x402/networks.ts","../src/payments/x402/local-chain/accounts.ts","../src/payments/x402/dev-key-guard.ts","../src/payments/x402/guardrails.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAiDA,IAAM,QAAA,GAAsC;AAAA,EAC1C;AAAA,IACE,EAAA,EAAI,cAAA;AAAA,IACJ,OAAA,EAAS,KAAA;AAAA,IACT,WAAA,EAAa,cAAA;AAAA,IACb,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA;AAAA,IACN,cAAA,EAAgB;AAAA,MACd,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA;AAAA,MACR,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,MACT,IAAA,EAAM,MAAA;AAAA,MACN,OAAA,EAAS;AAAA;AACX,GACF;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,EAAA,EAAI,aAAA;AAAA,IACJ,OAAA,EAAS,IAAA;AAAA,IACT,WAAA,EAAa,MAAA;AAAA,IACb,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA;AAAA,IACN,cAAA,EAAgB;AAAA,MACd,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA;AAAA,MACR,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,MACT,IAAA,EAAM,UAAA;AAAA,MACN,OAAA,EAAS;AAAA;AACX;AAEJ,CAAA;AAEA,IAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,OAAA,KAAY,CAAC,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAA,EAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;AAE/D,IAAM,wBAA2C,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,CAAA,KAAM,EAAE,EAAE;AAMzE,SAAS,qBAAA,CAAsB,IAAY,IAAA,EAA8B;AAC9E,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,KAAA,CAAM,GAAA,CAAI,EAAE,CAAA;AAC5B,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,OAAA,EAAS;AACZ,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA,CAAA,EAAG,IAAI,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,EAAE,+DAA+D,qBAAA,CAAsB,IAAA,CAAK,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAC9G,EAAE,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,OAAA,EAAS,IAAG;AAAE,KACnC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,OAAA;AACT;AAaO,SAAS,qBAAA,CACd,SACA,eAAA,EACgB;AAChB,EAAA,IAAI,eAAA,KAAoB,SAAS,OAAO,OAAA;AACxC,EAAA,OAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,IAAA;AACjB;AAGO,IAAM,mBAAA,GAAsB,qCAAA;AAE5B,SAAS,uBAAuB,IAAA,EAA8B;AACnE,EAAA,OAAO,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,GAAY,mBAAA,GAAsB,IAAA,CAAK,WAAA,EAAY;AACrE;;;ACpGO,IAAM,yBAAA,GAIT;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,IACE,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,IACT,UAAA,EAAY;AAAA,GACd;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,IACT,UAAA,EAAY;AAAA,GACd;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,IACT,UAAA,EAAY;AAAA;AAEhB,CAAA;;;ACjBA,IAAM,sBAA2C,IAAI,GAAA;AAAA,EACnD,0BAA0B,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,UAAA,CAAW,aAAa;AACjE,CAAA;AAEA,IAAM,2BAAgD,IAAI,GAAA;AAAA,EACxD,0BAA0B,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAa;AAC9D,CAAA;AAGA,IAAM,iBAAA,GAAoB,qBAAA;AAEnB,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAAA,EAA6B;AAC7D,EAAA,OAAO,mBAAA,CAAoB,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,WAAA,EAAa,CAAA;AACzD;AAEO,SAAS,sBAAsB,OAAA,EAA0B;AAC9D,EAAA,OAAO,wBAAA,CAAyB,GAAA,CAAI,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA,EAAa,CAAA;AAC3D;AAeO,SAAS,2BAA2B,QAAA,EAA2B;AACpE,EAAA,MAAM,IAAI,QAAA,CAAS,WAAA,EAAY,CAAE,OAAA,CAAQ,YAAY,EAAE,CAAA;AACvD,EAAA,IAAI,MAAM,WAAA,IAAe,CAAA,KAAM,WAAA,IAAe,CAAA,KAAM,OAAO,OAAO,IAAA;AAClE,EAAA,IAAI,kCAAA,CAAmC,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACvD,EAAA,IAAI,iCAAA,CAAkC,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACtD,EAAA,IAAI,8BAAA,CAA+B,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACnD,EAAA,IAAI,6CAAA,CAA8C,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AAClE,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,GAAG,CAAA,IAAK,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,GAAG,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACjD,EAAA,OAAO,KAAA;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,qBAAqB,MAAA,EAAwB;AACpD,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,OAAO,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA;AAAA,EACzB,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AAId,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA,CAAc,gBAAA,EAAkB,0CAAA,EAA4C;AAAA,MACpF;AAAA,KACD,CAAA;AAAA,EACH;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,YAAY,MAAA,EAAwB;AAC3C,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,OAAO,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA;AAAA,EACzB,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AACN,IAAA,OAAO,sBAAA;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAaO,SAAS,uBAAA,CAAwB,QAAgB,gBAAA,EAAgC;AACtF,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAA,CAAkB,IAAA,CAAK,gBAAgB,CAAA,EAAG;AAC7C,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,KAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAA,CAAkB,gBAAgB,CAAA,EAAG;AAE1C,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,qBAAqB,MAAM,CAAA;AAE5C,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,0BAAA,CAA2B,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAG;AACzC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA,CAAA,8FAAA,EACK,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,qRAAA;AAAA,KAG1B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAeO,SAAS,0BAAA,CAA2B,QAAgB,KAAA,EAAqB;AAC9E,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,qBAAA,CAAsB,KAAK,CAAA,EAAG;AAEnC,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,qBAAqB,MAAM,CAAA;AAE5C,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,0BAAA,CAA2B,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAG;AACzC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,KAAK,CAAA,wDAAA,EAC3B,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,4QAAA;AAAA,KAI1B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACrEA,SAAS,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAiB,IAAA,EAA6B;AAC7D,EAAA,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,gBAAA,EAAkB,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,IAAA,EAAK,EAAG,CAAA;AAC3E;AAOO,SAAS,sBAAsB,KAAA,EAA4C;AAChF,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,qBAAA,CAAsB,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,EAAS,uBAAuB,CAAA;AAC5E,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,qBAAA,CAAsB,OAAA,EAAS,KAAA,CAAM,YAAY,IAAI,CAAA;AASlE,EAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,SAAS,OAAA,EAAS;AACpE,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAE,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,+HAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAC9D;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,YAAA,KAAiB,IAAA,EAAM;AACrD,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAE,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,yHAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAC9D;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,IAAA,KAAS,QAAA,EAAU;AACvC,IAAA,0BAAA,CAA2B,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,GAAA,EAAK,IAAI,CAAA;AAQtD,IAAA,IACE,IAAA,KAAS,aACT,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,KAAK,IAAA,KAAS,MAAA,IAChC,KAAA,CAAM,+BAAA,KAAoC,IAAA,EAC1C;AACA,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,QACJ,CAAA,2BAAA,EAA8B,cAAA,CAAe,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA,+PAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QACnE;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AAKA,IAAA,KAAA,MAAW,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA,IAAK,iBAAiB,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,IAAI,CAAA,EAAG;AACrE,MAAA,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,IAAA,EAAK,KAAM,EAAA,EAAI;AACvB,QAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,UACJ,4CAA4C,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,IAAA,CAAK,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,CAAA,2DAAA,CAAA;AAAA,UACrF,kCAAkC,KAAK,CAAA;AAAA,SACzC;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAWA,EAAA,IAAI,YAAA,CAAa,IAAA,CAAK,KAAA,CAAM,KAAK,CAAA,EAAG;AAClC,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,uFAAA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,OAAA,IAAW,qBAAA,CAAsB,KAAA,CAAM,KAAK,CAAA,EAAG;AAC1D,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,KAAA,CAAM,KAAK,CAAA,0DAAA,EAA6D,IAAI,CAAA,wFAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MACvG;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAIA,EAAA,MAAM,YAAY,OAAA,CAAQ,cAAA;AAC1B,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,aAAa,SAAA,EAAW;AACnC,IAAA,IAAI,CAAC,WAAA,CAAY,KAAA,CAAM,KAAA,EAAO,SAAA,CAAU,OAAO,CAAA,EAAG;AAChD,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,QACJ,CAAA,qBAAA,EAAwB,KAAA,CAAM,KAAK,CAAA,QAAA,EAAW,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,CAAA,IAAA,EAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,WAAA,EAAc,SAAA,CAAU,OAAO,CAAA,gEAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QACvH;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AAKA,IAAA,IAAI,MAAM,SAAA,KAAc,MAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,SAAA,KAAc,UAAU,IAAA,EAAM;AACvE,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,QACJ,CAAA,0BAAA,EAA6B,KAAA,CAAM,SAAS,CAAA,iCAAA,EAAoC,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,CAAA,YAAA,EAAe,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,YAAA,EAAe,SAAA,CAAU,IAAI,CAAA,0DAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QAC/J;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,IAAA,IAAI,MAAM,YAAA,KAAiB,MAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,YAAA,KAAiB,UAAU,OAAA,EAAS;AAChF,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,QACJ,CAAA,6BAAA,EAAgC,KAAA,CAAM,YAAY,CAAA,oCAAA,EAAuC,SAAA,CAAU,MAAM,CAAA,YAAA,EAAe,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,YAAA,EAAe,SAAA,CAAU,OAAO,CAAA,GAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QAC3K;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,IAAA,EAAK;AACzB;AAQA,SAAS,0BAAA,CAA2B,KAAa,IAAA,EAA4B;AAC3E,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA;AACJ,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,MAAA,GAAS,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,CAAA;AAAA,EACtB,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AACd,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA,CAAc,gBAAA,EAAkB,CAAA,iDAAA,CAAA,EAAqD;AAAA,MAC7F,KAAA;AAAA,MACA,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,+BAAA;AAAgC,KAClD,CAAA;AAAA,EACH;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA,CAAO,aAAa,QAAA,EAAU;AAClC,EAAA,IAAI,MAAA,CAAO,aAAa,OAAA,EAAS;AAC/B,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,8BAA8B,cAAA,CAAe,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA,oEAAA,EAAuE,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAA,GAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MACvI;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,IAAa,0BAAA,CAA2B,MAAA,CAAO,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAG;AAKvE,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,IACJ,CAAA,2BAAA,EAA8B,cAAA,CAAe,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA,6KAAA,CAAA;AAAA,IACjD;AAAA,GACF;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,eAAe,GAAA,EAAqB;AAC3C,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,OAAO,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,GAAG,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA;AAAA,EACtB,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AACN,IAAA,OAAO,+BAAA;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,iBAAiB,IAAA,EAA+D;AACvF,EAAA,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAA;AAAM,IACjB,KAAK,QAAA;AACH,MAAA,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAA,EAAS,IAAA,CAAK,KAAK,CAAC,CAAA;AAAA,IAC/B,KAAK,KAAA;AACH,MAAA,OAAO;AAAA,QACL,CAAC,UAAA,EAAY,IAAA,CAAK,QAAQ,CAAA;AAAA,QAC1B,CAAC,cAAA,EAAgB,IAAA,CAAK,YAAY;AAAA,OACpC;AAAA,IACF;AACE,MAAA,OAAO,EAAC;AAAA;AAEd;AAEA,SAAS,WAAA,CAAY,GAAW,CAAA,EAAoB;AAClD,EAAA,OAAO,CAAA,CAAE,WAAA,EAAY,KAAM,CAAA,CAAE,WAAA,EAAY;AAC3C","file":"chunk-IUR3Q7DE.js","sourcesContent":["/**\n * The networks this gateway will settle on, as data.\n *\n * x402 v2 identifies a network by its CAIP-2 id, so the only thing an\n * operator has to change to move between environments is that string. What\n * the code needs on top of it — the chain id to sign against, a name a human\n * recognises, and whether real money is involved — lives here rather than\n * being derived at each call site.\n *\n * A registry rather than \"parse any `eip155:*`\" on purpose. The chain id is\n * parseable from any such string, but `mainnet` is not, and every guardrail in\n * `guardrails.ts` keys off it. An unknown id is refused at startup instead of\n * being quietly treated as a testnet.\n *\n * Base Sepolia and the local dev chain share the id `eip155:84532`: the local\n * chain deliberately reuses Base Sepolia's chain id so the unmodified x402 SDK\n * can talk to it. Nothing may infer \"public network\" from the network id alone\n * — that is what `resolveDeploymentMode` and the Anvil probe in `provider.ts`\n * are for.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\nexport interface NetworkProfile {\n  /** CAIP-2 identifier, e.g. `eip155:84532`. */\n  readonly id: string;\n  /** Signed into the buyer's EIP-712 domain. */\n  readonly chainId: number;\n  readonly displayName: string;\n  readonly kind: 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n  /**\n   * The USDC deployment this network is expected to settle in, with the EIP-712\n   * domain the token actually reports. Enforced only on mainnet (see\n   * `guardrails.ts`) — a testnet is where a mock token is a legitimate thing to\n   * point at.\n   *\n   * `name` is not decorative and is not the symbol: it is signed into every\n   * buyer's EIP-712 domain, and the two USDC deployments disagree. Base Sepolia\n   * reports `\"USDC\"`; Base mainnet reports `\"USD Coin\"`. Configure the wrong\n   * one and every payment is refused `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch`\n   * after the buyer has signed. Read back from the contracts, not assumed.\n   */\n  readonly canonicalAsset?: {\n    readonly symbol: string;\n    readonly address: string;\n    readonly name: string;\n    readonly version: string;\n  };\n}\n\nconst PROFILES: readonly NetworkProfile[] = [\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:84532',\n    chainId: 84532,\n    displayName: 'Base Sepolia',\n    kind: 'testnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e',\n      name: 'USDC',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:8453',\n    chainId: 8453,\n    displayName: 'Base',\n    kind: 'mainnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913',\n      name: 'USD Coin',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n];\n\nconst BY_ID = new Map(PROFILES.map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));\n\nexport const SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS: readonly string[] = PROFILES.map((p) => p.id);\n\nexport function findNetworkProfile(id: string): NetworkProfile | undefined {\n  return BY_ID.get(id);\n}\n\nexport function requireNetworkProfile(id: string, path: string): NetworkProfile {\n  const profile = BY_ID.get(id);\n  if (!profile) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `${path}: \"${id}\" is not a supported network. Supported CAIP-2 identifiers: ${SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS.join(', ')}`,\n      { details: { path, network: id } },\n    );\n  }\n  return profile;\n}\n\n/**\n * What this deployment actually is, as opposed to what it is called.\n *\n * `local` is a property of the *facilitator*, not the network: settling\n * through the in-process facilitator against a dev node is local regardless of\n * the CAIP-2 id that node answers to. This distinction is the whole reason\n * diagnostics can say `eip155:84532` without claiming to be on public Base\n * Sepolia.\n */\nexport type DeploymentMode = 'local' | 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n\nexport function resolveDeploymentMode(\n  profile: NetworkProfile,\n  facilitatorMode: 'local' | 'remote',\n): DeploymentMode {\n  if (facilitatorMode === 'local') return 'local';\n  return profile.kind;\n}\n\n/** The banner an operator must not be able to miss. Never printed for anything else. */\nexport const LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER = 'LIVE MAINNET MODE — REAL FUNDS';\n\nexport function describeDeploymentMode(mode: DeploymentMode): string {\n  return mode === 'mainnet' ? LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER : mode.toUpperCase();\n}\n","/**\n * Anvil's well-known development accounts.\n *\n * LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY — DO NOT FUND. These addresses and private keys are\n * derived from Foundry's public, well-documented default test mnemonic\n * (\"test test test test test test test test test test test junk\") and are\n * known to everyone who has ever run `anvil`. Anyone who sends real value to\n * one of these addresses on a real network will lose it.\n *\n * Index layout used by the local demo chain (see docs/contracts.md):\n * 0 — deployer / local facilitator signer (pays gas, broadcasts settlement)\n * 1 — merchant settlement destination (`payTo`)\n * 2 — buyer (signs EIP-3009 authorisations; never held by the gateway)\n */\nexport interface AnvilWellKnownAccount {\n  readonly address: `0x${string}`;\n  readonly privateKey: `0x${string}`;\n}\n\n/** Fixed-length tuple (not a bare array) so indexing by the documented layout above is fully typed. */\nexport const ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS: readonly [\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n] = [\n  {\n    address: '0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266',\n    privateKey: '0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8',\n    privateKey: '0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC',\n    privateKey: '0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a',\n  },\n];\n\nexport const LOCAL_FACILITATOR_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[0];\nexport const LOCAL_MERCHANT_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[1];\nexport const LOCAL_BUYER_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[2];\n\n/** Safe label used everywhere a dev key appears in output, logs or manifests. */\nexport const DEV_KEY_LABEL = 'LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY - DO NOT FUND';\n","/**\n * Prevents a well-known Anvil development private key — or a well-known\n * Anvil development *address* — from ever being used against anything other\n * than a loopback/private/dev RPC. Two symmetric mistakes, both covered:\n * signing settlement with a dev key (`assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`), and routing\n * settlement revenue to a dev address (`assertPayToIsNotDevAddress`). The\n * second is the more consequential of the two — a wrong key merely fails to\n * sign, a wrong payTo silently succeeds and gives the money away, since the\n * private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n *\n * Chain id alone cannot tell a real network from this project's local dev\n * chain: Base Sepolia's own chain id is 84532, the same id this project\n * deliberately reuses for the local chain so the unmodified x402 SDK can talk\n * to it. A dev key or dev payTo pointed at a real RPC by a config mistake is\n * instantly drainable — this is checked once at provider construction, not per\n * payment.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS } from './local-chain/accounts.js';\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.privateKey.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.address.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\n/** `0x` + 64 hex chars — the only shape `privateKeyToAccount` accepts. */\nconst PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevKey(privateKey: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS.has(privateKey.toLowerCase());\n}\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevAddress(address: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES.has(address.toLowerCase());\n}\n\n/**\n * True for loopback addresses, RFC1918 private ranges, and bare (dot-free)\n * hostnames — the shape of a docker-compose/k8s service name (e.g.\n * \"anvil\"), which a real public DNS name essentially never has.\n *\n * ASSUMPTION, and the loosest edge of this guard: every dot-free, colon-free\n * hostname is treated as private, with no exceptions. A single-label *public* hostname (no dots) is\n * essentially nonexistent in practice — ICANN does not delegate bare\n * gTLDs/TLDs as public A/AAAA records — but this function cannot tell \"no\n * dots because it's a compose service name\" from \"no dots because it's an\n * unusual real host\" if one somehow existed. If that assumption ever stops\n * holding, this is the line to revisit.\n */\nexport function isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '');\n  if (h === 'localhost' || h === '127.0.0.1' || h === '::1') return true;\n  if (/^127\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^10\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^192\\.168\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (!h.includes('.') && !h.includes(':')) return true; // bare hostname\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).hostname;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Not the URL itself: every commercial EVM RPC provider embeds an API key\n    // in the path, and these messages reach `validate`, `doctor`, startup\n    // output and CI logs.\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', 'x402 provider: rpcUrl is not a valid URL', {\n      cause,\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/** Host only, for diagnostics. An RPC URL's path routinely carries a key. */\nfunction describeRpc(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable rpcUrl]';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if a well-known dev key would sign against a non-local\n * RPC — or if `signerPrivateKey` isn't shaped like a private key at all.\n *\n * The shape check runs first and unconditionally. \"Not a key I recognise\"\n * (falls through `isWellKnownDevKey`, silently treated as someone's own real\n * facilitator key) and \"not a key at all\" (e.g. a truncated 63-char string)\n * must never share a code path: a malformed key that slips past this guard\n * only fails later, inside `settle()`, after the buyer's replayKey is already\n * reserved.\n */\nexport function assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly(rpcUrl: string, signerPrivateKey: string): void {\n  if (!PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE.test(signerPrivateKey)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is not a well-formed private key ' +\n        '(expected \"0x\" followed by exactly 64 hex characters).',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!isWellKnownDevKey(signerPrivateKey)) return; // a real facilitator key: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is a well-known Anvil development key, but rpcUrl ' +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. A public dev key must never sign against ` +\n        'a public network — it is instantly drainable and can grief real settlements via nonce exhaustion. ' +\n        'Use a real facilitator key for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if `payTo` (the settlement destination) is a\n * well-known Anvil development address and `rpcUrl` doesn't look\n * local/private.\n *\n * Mirrors `assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`, but guards the *receiving* side of the\n * payment instead of the signing side, and — unlike the key guard — applies\n * regardless of facilitator mode: which account signs the settlement\n * transaction has no bearing on whether the destination address is one whose\n * private key is public knowledge. `agent-commerce init` defaults `payTo` to\n * a well-known Anvil address as a local-demo convenience; on a real network\n * that default routes every payment to an address anyone on earth can sweep.\n */\nexport function assertPayToIsNotDevAddress(rpcUrl: string, payTo: string): void {\n  if (!isWellKnownDevAddress(payTo)) return; // not a dev address: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `x402 provider: \"payTo\" (${payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address, but rpcUrl ` +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. The private key behind that address ` +\n        'is public knowledge, so any revenue settled to it is immediately spendable by anyone. Set ' +\n        '\"payTo\" to your own merchant wallet for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your ' +\n        'local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Everything that must be true before this gateway is allowed to settle a\n * payment on the configured network.\n *\n * One definition, two callers: the provider runs it at construction so a\n * library consumer who never touches our config loader still gets the checks,\n * and `doctor` runs it against the parsed config so an operator sees the same\n * verdict without starting the gateway. Sharing a *call* is not sharing a\n * definition — the checks live here, and nothing re-implements them.\n *\n * Every failure is a startup failure. None of these are request-time\n * decisions: a deployment that is unsafe is unsafe before the first buyer\n * arrives, and finding out during `settle()` means the buyer's authorisation\n * is already burned.\n *\n * Peer-free by construction (no viem, no `@x402/*`) so the CLI can import it.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost, isWellKnownDevAddress } from './dev-key-guard.js';\nimport {\n  type DeploymentMode,\n  type NetworkProfile,\n  requireNetworkProfile,\n  resolveDeploymentMode,\n} from './networks.js';\n\n/**\n * How the gateway authenticates to a remote facilitator.\n *\n * Deliberately a list, not a vendor: x402 facilitators are not a Coinbase-only\n * category, and a scheme that only fitted one vendor's credentials would make\n * the abstraction a fiction.\n *\n * - `none` — the facilitator takes no credential (the public testnet one).\n * - `bearer` — a static token. Covers most self-hosted and third-party\n * facilitators, and needs nothing installed.\n * - `cdp` — Coinbase Developer Platform, which signs a fresh JWT per request\n * over method + host + path, so a static header cannot express it. Handled by\n * the optional peer `@coinbase/x402`, imported only when this type is\n * configured. Anyone not using CDP never installs it.\n *\n * A facilitator whose scheme is none of these is refused at config load rather\n * than sent nothing.\n */\nexport type FacilitatorAuth =\n  | { readonly type: 'none' }\n  | { readonly type: 'bearer'; readonly token: string }\n  | { readonly type: 'cdp'; readonly apiKeyId: string; readonly apiKeySecret: string };\n\nexport type X402FacilitatorConfig =\n  | { readonly mode: 'local'; readonly signerPrivateKey: string }\n  | { readonly mode: 'remote'; readonly url: string; readonly auth: FacilitatorAuth };\n\nexport interface X402DeploymentInput {\n  readonly network: string;\n  readonly payTo: string;\n  readonly asset: string;\n  /** EIP-712 domain of the asset, as the token itself reports it. */\n  readonly assetName?: string;\n  readonly assetVersion?: string;\n  readonly facilitator: X402FacilitatorConfig;\n  /** Required, and required to be `true`, before anything settles on a mainnet. */\n  readonly allowMainnet?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Required, and required to be `true`, to settle on a mainnet through a\n   * facilitator that takes no credential.\n   *\n   * Separate from `allowMainnet` because it names a different decision: not\n   * \"I meant to use real money\" but \"I accept this particular counterparty\n   * without an account, terms, or anyone to call\".\n   */\n  readonly allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface X402Deployment {\n  readonly profile: NetworkProfile;\n  readonly mode: DeploymentMode;\n}\n\nfunction invalid(message: string, path: string): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', message, { details: { path } });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves the deployment and refuses every combination that could move real\n * money by accident. Order matters only in that the network must resolve\n * first; the rest are independent.\n */\nexport function resolveX402Deployment(input: X402DeploymentInput): X402Deployment {\n  const profile = requireNetworkProfile(input.network, 'payments.x402.network');\n  const mode = resolveDeploymentMode(profile, input.facilitator.mode);\n\n  // The in-process facilitator signs with a key this process holds. Not a\n  // custody problem — that signer never holds buyer or merchant funds, it pays\n  // gas and broadcasts `transferWithAuthorization`, and the money moves buyer\n  // to merchant directly on-chain. What it *is*, on a mainnet, is a funded key\n  // inside the resource server: compromise that process and an attacker drains\n  // the gas wallet and broadcasts from it. Separate processes, separate blast\n  // radius — so it is refused, not warned about.\n  if (profile.kind === 'mainnet' && input.facilitator.mode === 'local') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) is a mainnet and cannot be served by facilitator.mode \"local\". A mainnet deployment must settle through a remote facilitator.`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.mode',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && input.allowMainnet !== true) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) settles real funds. Set payments.x402.allowMainnet: true to acknowledge this explicitly — it is never the default.`,\n      'payments.x402.allowMainnet',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (input.facilitator.mode === 'remote') {\n    assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(input.facilitator.url, mode);\n    // Not a funds check. An EIP-3009 authorisation names its recipient, its\n    // amount and its chain, so a facilitator can broadcast exactly that\n    // transfer or nothing — it cannot redirect the money. What a credential\n    // buys is a *relationship*: rate limits, terms, someone to call when\n    // settlement stops. Running production payments through a counterparty you\n    // have none of that with is a real choice, and this is where it gets made\n    // explicitly rather than by omission.\n    if (\n      mode === 'mainnet' &&\n      input.facilitator.auth.type === 'none' &&\n      input.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== true\n    ) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(input.facilitator.url)} takes no credential, and this is a mainnet deployment. It will see every payment authorisation you handle, with no account, terms or support behind it. Set payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: true to accept that, or configure facilitator.auth.`,\n        'payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator',\n      );\n    }\n    // An empty credential is refused rather than sent: a blank token or key\n    // reaches the facilitator as \"unauthenticated\" and fails every payment\n    // after the buyer has already signed. `${VAR:- }` resolving to whitespace\n    // is the realistic way this happens.\n    for (const [field, value] of credentialFields(input.facilitator.auth)) {\n      if (value.trim() === '') {\n        throw invalid(\n          `payments.x402: facilitator.auth.type is \"${input.facilitator.auth.type}\" but ${field} is empty. An empty credential is refused rather than sent.`,\n          `payments.x402.facilitator.auth.${field}`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // The private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n  // `dev-key-guard` already refuses one against a public *RPC*; this refuses\n  // one on any non-local *deployment*, which is the case a remote facilitator\n  // creates — there the RPC host says nothing about where settlement lands.\n  // The zero address lived only in the config loader, so a library consumer\n  // calling `createX402PaymentProvider` directly — the path this shared\n  // definition exists to cover — could boot a mainnet provider whose every\n  // payment burns — sharing a *call* is not sharing a definition, and this\n  // check had drifted out of the shared one.\n  if (/^0x0{40}$/i.test(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      'payments.x402: \"payTo\" is the zero address. Every payment settled there is destroyed.',\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode !== 'local' && isWellKnownDevAddress(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: \"payTo\" (${input.payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address and this is a ${mode} deployment. Anyone can spend what settles there. Set payTo to your own merchant wallet.`,\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Mainnet only. A testnet is exactly where pointing at a mock token is the\n  // right thing to do, so the same check there would block the normal case.\n  const canonical = profile.canonicalAsset;\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && canonical) {\n    if (!sameAddress(input.asset, canonical.address)) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: asset ${input.asset} is not ${canonical.symbol} on ${profile.displayName} (expected ${canonical.address}). Settling a mainnet payment in an unintended token is refused.`,\n        'payments.x402.asset',\n      );\n    }\n    // The EIP-712 domain is signed by the buyer and checked by the scheme. Get\n    // it wrong and every payment is refused `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch`\n    // *after* the buyer signed — a config error charged to the buyer's patience.\n    // Caught here instead, before the gateway starts.\n    if (input.assetName !== undefined && input.assetName !== canonical.name) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetName \"${input.assetName}\" is not the EIP-712 domain name ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.name}\"). Every payment would be refused after the buyer signed.`,\n        'payments.x402.assetName',\n      );\n    }\n    if (input.assetVersion !== undefined && input.assetVersion !== canonical.version) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetVersion \"${input.assetVersion}\" is not the EIP-712 domain version ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.version}\").`,\n        'payments.x402.assetVersion',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { profile, mode };\n}\n\n/**\n * A facilitator sees every payment authorisation this gateway handles. Plain\n * HTTP to one on a public network puts those on the wire in the clear and\n * lets anyone in the path rewrite a settlement result, so it is allowed only\n * where the endpoint cannot leave the host — a local or private address.\n */\nfunction assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(url: string, mode: DeploymentMode): void {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', `payments.x402: facilitator.url is not a valid URL`, {\n      cause,\n      details: { path: 'payments.x402.facilitator.url' },\n    });\n  }\n\n  if (parsed.protocol === 'https:') return;\n  if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} must be reached over https (or http on a local/private host); got \"${parsed.protocol}//\"`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n    );\n  }\n  if (mode !== 'mainnet' && isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(parsed.hostname)) return;\n\n  // The origin, never the whole URL: the path can carry a tenant or an API\n  // key, which is why `/.well-known` withholds this field entirely. A refusal\n  // message goes to `validate`, `doctor`, startup output and CI logs.\n  throw invalid(\n    `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} is reached over plain HTTP. Payment authorisations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,\n    'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n  );\n}\n\n/** Host only — a facilitator URL can carry a tenant path or an API key. */\nfunction describeOrigin(url: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable facilitator.url]';\n  }\n}\n\n/** The secret-bearing fields of an auth block, for emptiness checks only. Never logged. */\nfunction credentialFields(auth: FacilitatorAuth): readonly (readonly [string, string])[] {\n  switch (auth.type) {\n    case 'bearer':\n      return [['token', auth.token]];\n    case 'cdp':\n      return [\n        ['apiKeyId', auth.apiKeyId],\n        ['apiKeySecret', auth.apiKeySecret],\n      ];\n    default:\n      return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction sameAddress(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();\n}\n"]}