@devlab.group/agent-commerce 0.2.0-beta.0 → 1.0.0

package/dist/chunk-MEPETSP6.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/payments/x402/networks.ts","../src/payments/x402/local-chain/accounts.ts","../src/payments/x402/dev-key-guard.ts","../src/payments/x402/guardrails.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAiDA,IAAM,QAAA,GAAsC;AAAA,EAC1C;AAAA,IACE,EAAA,EAAI,cAAA;AAAA,IACJ,OAAA,EAAS,KAAA;AAAA,IACT,WAAA,EAAa,cAAA;AAAA,IACb,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA;AAAA,IACN,cAAA,EAAgB;AAAA,MACd,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA;AAAA,MACR,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,MACT,IAAA,EAAM,MAAA;AAAA,MACN,OAAA,EAAS;AAAA;AACX,GACF;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,EAAA,EAAI,aAAA;AAAA,IACJ,OAAA,EAAS,IAAA;AAAA,IACT,WAAA,EAAa,MAAA;AAAA,IACb,IAAA,EAAM,SAAA;AAAA,IACN,cAAA,EAAgB;AAAA,MACd,MAAA,EAAQ,MAAA;AAAA,MACR,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,MACT,IAAA,EAAM,UAAA;AAAA,MACN,OAAA,EAAS;AAAA;AACX;AAEJ,CAAA;AAEA,IAAM,KAAA,GAAQ,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,OAAA,KAAY,CAAC,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAA,EAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;AAE/D,IAAM,wBAA2C,QAAA,CAAS,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,CAAA,KAAM,EAAE,EAAE;AAMzE,SAAS,qBAAA,CAAsB,IAAY,IAAA,EAA8B;AAC9E,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,KAAA,CAAM,GAAA,CAAI,EAAE,CAAA;AAC5B,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,OAAA,EAAS;AACZ,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA,CAAA,EAAG,IAAI,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,EAAE,+DAA+D,qBAAA,CAAsB,IAAA,CAAK,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAC9G,EAAE,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,IAAA,EAAM,OAAA,EAAS,IAAG;AAAE,KACnC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,EAAA,OAAO,OAAA;AACT;AAaO,SAAS,qBAAA,CACd,SACA,eAAA,EACgB;AAChB,EAAA,IAAI,eAAA,KAAoB,SAAS,OAAO,OAAA;AACxC,EAAA,OAAO,OAAA,CAAQ,IAAA;AACjB;AAGO,IAAM,mBAAA,GAAsB,qCAAA;AAE5B,SAAS,uBAAuB,IAAA,EAA8B;AACnE,EAAA,OAAO,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,GAAY,mBAAA,GAAsB,IAAA,CAAK,WAAA,EAAY;AACrE;;;ACpGO,IAAM,yBAAA,GAIT;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,IACE,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,IACT,UAAA,EAAY;AAAA,GACd;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,IACT,UAAA,EAAY;AAAA,GACd;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,IACE,OAAA,EAAS,4CAAA;AAAA,IACT,UAAA,EAAY;AAAA;AAEhB,CAAA;;;ACjBA,IAAM,sBAA2C,IAAI,GAAA;AAAA,EACnD,0BAA0B,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,UAAA,CAAW,aAAa;AACjE,CAAA;AAEA,IAAM,2BAAgD,IAAI,GAAA;AAAA,EACxD,0BAA0B,GAAA,CAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,OAAA,CAAQ,aAAa;AAC9D,CAAA;AAGA,IAAM,iBAAA,GAAoB,qBAAA;AAEnB,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAAA,EAA6B;AAC7D,EAAA,OAAO,mBAAA,CAAoB,GAAA,CAAI,UAAA,CAAW,WAAA,EAAa,CAAA;AACzD;AAEO,SAAS,sBAAsB,OAAA,EAA0B;AAC9D,EAAA,OAAO,wBAAA,CAAyB,GAAA,CAAI,OAAA,CAAQ,WAAA,EAAa,CAAA;AAC3D;AAeO,SAAS,2BAA2B,QAAA,EAA2B;AACpE,EAAA,MAAM,IAAI,QAAA,CAAS,WAAA,EAAY,CAAE,OAAA,CAAQ,YAAY,EAAE,CAAA;AACvD,EAAA,IAAI,MAAM,WAAA,IAAe,CAAA,KAAM,WAAA,IAAe,CAAA,KAAM,OAAO,OAAO,IAAA;AAClE,EAAA,IAAI,kCAAA,CAAmC,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACvD,EAAA,IAAI,iCAAA,CAAkC,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACtD,EAAA,IAAI,8BAAA,CAA+B,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACnD,EAAA,IAAI,6CAAA,CAA8C,IAAA,CAAK,CAAC,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AAClE,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,GAAG,CAAA,IAAK,CAAC,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA,CAAS,GAAG,CAAA,EAAG,OAAO,IAAA;AACjD,EAAA,OAAO,KAAA;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,qBAAqB,MAAA,EAAwB;AACpD,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,OAAO,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,QAAA;AAAA,EACzB,SAAS,KAAA,EAAO;AAId,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA,CAAc,gBAAA,EAAkB,0CAAA,EAA4C;AAAA,MACpF;AAAA,KACD,CAAA;AAAA,EACH;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,YAAY,MAAA,EAAwB;AAC3C,EAAA,IAAI;AACF,IAAA,OAAO,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAM,CAAA,CAAE,MAAA;AAAA,EACzB,CAAA,CAAA,MAAQ;AACN,IAAA,OAAO,sBAAA;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAaO,SAAS,uBAAA,CAAwB,QAAgB,gBAAA,EAAgC;AACtF,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAA,CAAkB,IAAA,CAAK,gBAAgB,CAAA,EAAG;AAC7C,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,KAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAA,CAAkB,gBAAgB,CAAA,EAAG;AAE1C,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,qBAAqB,MAAM,CAAA;AAE5C,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,0BAAA,CAA2B,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAG;AACzC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA,CAAA,8FAAA,EACK,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,qRAAA;AAAA,KAG1B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAeO,SAAS,0BAAA,CAA2B,QAAgB,KAAA,EAAqB;AAC9E,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,qBAAA,CAAsB,KAAK,CAAA,EAAG;AAEnC,EAAA,MAAM,QAAA,GAAW,qBAAqB,MAAM,CAAA;AAE5C,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,0BAAA,CAA2B,QAAQ,CAAA,EAAG;AACzC,IAAA,MAAM,IAAI,aAAA;AAAA,MACR,gBAAA;AAAA,MACA,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,KAAK,CAAA,wDAAA,EAC3B,WAAA,CAAY,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA,4QAAA;AAAA,KAI1B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACrEA,SAAS,OAAA,CAAQ,SAAiB,IAAA,EAA6B;AAC7D,EAAA,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,gBAAA,EAAkB,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,OAAA,EAAS,EAAE,IAAA,EAAK,EAAG,CAAA;AAC3E;AAOO,SAAS,sBAAsB,KAAA,EAA4C;AAChF,EAAA,MAAM,OAAA,GAAU,qBAAA,CAAsB,KAAA,CAAM,OAAA,EAAS,uBAAuB,CAAA;AAC5E,EAAA,MAAM,IAAA,GAAO,qBAAA,CAAsB,OAAA,EAAS,KAAA,CAAM,YAAY,IAAI,CAAA;AASlE,EAAA,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,SAAS,OAAA,EAAS;AACpE,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAE,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,+HAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAC9D;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,IAAA,KAAS,SAAA,IAAa,KAAA,CAAM,YAAA,KAAiB,IAAA,EAAM;AACrD,IAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,MACJ,CAAA,wBAAA,EAA2B,OAAA,CAAQ,EAAE,CAAA,GAAA,EAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAA,yHAAA,CAAA;AAAA,MAC9D;AAAA,KACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,EAAA,IAAI,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,IAAA,KAAS,QAAA,EAAU;AACvC,IAAA,0BAAA,CAA2B,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,GAAA,EAAK,IAAI,CAAA;AAQtD,IAAA,IACE,IAAA,KAAS,aACT,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,KAAK,IAAA,KAAS,MAAA,IAChC,KAAA,CAAM,+BAAA,KAAoC,IAAA,EAC1C;AACA,MAAA,MAAM,OAAA;AAAA,QACJ,CAAA,2BAAA,EAA8B,cAAA,CAAe,KAAA,CAAM,WAAA,CAAY,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA,+PAAA,CAAA;AAAA,QACnE;AAAA,OACF;AAAA,IACF;AAKA,IAAA,KAAA,MAAW,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA,IAAK,iBAAiB,KAAA,CAAM,W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* The networks this gateway will settle on, as data.\n *\n * x402 v2 identifies a network by its CAIP-2 id, so the only thing an\n * operator has to change to move between environments is that string. What\n * the code needs on top of it — the chain id to sign against, a name a human\n * recognises, and whether real money is involved — lives here rather than\n * being derived at each call site.\n *\n * A registry rather than \"parse any `eip155:*`\" on purpose. The chain id is\n * parseable from any such string, but `mainnet` is not, and every guardrail in\n * `guardrails.ts` keys off it. An unknown id is refused at startup instead of\n * being quietly treated as a testnet.\n *\n * Base Sepolia and the local dev chain share the id `eip155:84532`: the local\n * chain deliberately reuses Base Sepolia's chain id so the unmodified x402 SDK\n * can talk to it. Nothing may infer \"public network\" from the network id alone\n * — that is what `resolveDeploymentMode` and the Anvil probe in `provider.ts`\n * are for.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\nexport interface NetworkProfile {\n  /** CAIP-2 identifier, e.g. `eip155:84532`. */\n  readonly id: string;\n  /** Signed into the buyer's EIP-712 domain. */\n  readonly chainId: number;\n  readonly displayName: string;\n  readonly kind: 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n  /**\n   * The USDC deployment this network is expected to settle in, with the EIP-712\n   * domain the token actually reports. Enforced only on mainnet (see\n   * `guardrails.ts`) — a testnet is where a mock token is a legitimate thing to\n   * point at.\n   *\n   * `name` is not decorative and is not the symbol: it is signed into every\n   * buyer's EIP-712 domain, and the two USDC deployments disagree. Base Sepolia\n   * reports `\"USDC\"`; Base mainnet reports `\"USD Coin\"`. Configure the wrong\n   * one and every payment is refused `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch`\n   * after the buyer has signed. Read back from the contracts, not assumed.\n   */\n  readonly canonicalAsset?: {\n    readonly symbol: string;\n    readonly address: string;\n    readonly name: string;\n    readonly version: string;\n  };\n}\n\nconst PROFILES: readonly NetworkProfile[] = [\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:84532',\n    chainId: 84532,\n    displayName: 'Base Sepolia',\n    kind: 'testnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e',\n      name: 'USDC',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n  {\n    id: 'eip155:8453',\n    chainId: 8453,\n    displayName: 'Base',\n    kind: 'mainnet',\n    canonicalAsset: {\n      symbol: 'USDC',\n      address: '0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913',\n      name: 'USD Coin',\n      version: '2',\n    },\n  },\n];\n\nconst BY_ID = new Map(PROFILES.map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));\n\nexport const SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS: readonly string[] = PROFILES.map((p) => p.id);\n\nexport function findNetworkProfile(id: string): NetworkProfile | undefined {\n  return BY_ID.get(id);\n}\n\nexport function requireNetworkProfile(id: string, path: string): NetworkProfile {\n  const profile = BY_ID.get(id);\n  if (!profile) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `${path}: \"${id}\" is not a supported network. Supported CAIP-2 identifiers: ${SUPPORTED_NETWORK_IDS.join(', ')}`,\n      { details: { path, network: id } },\n    );\n  }\n  return profile;\n}\n\n/**\n * What this deployment actually is, as opposed to what it is called.\n *\n * `local` is a property of the *facilitator*, not the network: settling\n * through the in-process facilitator against a dev node is local regardless of\n * the CAIP-2 id that node answers to. This distinction is the whole reason\n * diagnostics can say `eip155:84532` without claiming to be on public Base\n * Sepolia.\n */\nexport type DeploymentMode = 'local' | 'testnet' | 'mainnet';\n\nexport function resolveDeploymentMode(\n  profile: NetworkProfile,\n  facilitatorMode: 'local' | 'remote',\n): DeploymentMode {\n  if (facilitatorMode === 'local') return 'local';\n  return profile.kind;\n}\n\n/** The banner an operator must not be able to miss. Never printed for anything else. */\nexport const LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER = 'LIVE MAINNET MODE — REAL FUNDS';\n\nexport function describeDeploymentMode(mode: DeploymentMode): string {\n  return mode === 'mainnet' ? LIVE_MAINNET_BANNER : mode.toUpperCase();\n}\n","/**\n * Anvil's well-known development accounts.\n *\n * LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY — DO NOT FUND. These addresses and private keys are\n * derived from Foundry's public, well-documented default test mnemonic\n * (\"test test test test test test test test test test test junk\") and are\n * known to everyone who has ever run `anvil`. Anyone who sends real value to\n * one of these addresses on a real network will lose it.\n *\n * Index layout used by the local demo chain (see docs/contracts.md):\n * 0 — deployer / local facilitator signer (pays gas, broadcasts settlement)\n * 1 — merchant settlement destination (`payTo`)\n * 2 — buyer (signs EIP-3009 authorisations; never held by the gateway)\n */\nexport interface AnvilWellKnownAccount {\n  readonly address: `0x${string}`;\n  readonly privateKey: `0x${string}`;\n}\n\n/** Fixed-length tuple (not a bare array) so indexing by the documented layout above is fully typed. */\nexport const ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS: readonly [\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n  AnvilWellKnownAccount,\n] = [\n  {\n    address: '0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cffFb92266',\n    privateKey: '0xac0974bec39a17e36ba4a6b4d238ff944bacb478cbed5efcae784d7bf4f2ff80',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x70997970C51812dc3A010C7d01b50e0d17dc79C8',\n    privateKey: '0x59c6995e998f97a5a0044966f0945389dc9e86dae88c7a8412f4603b6b78690d',\n  },\n  {\n    address: '0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA4293BC',\n    privateKey: '0x5de4111afa1a4b94908f83103eb1f1706367c2e68ca870fc3fb9a804cdab365a',\n  },\n];\n\nexport const LOCAL_FACILITATOR_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[0];\nexport const LOCAL_MERCHANT_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[1];\nexport const LOCAL_BUYER_ACCOUNT = ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS[2];\n\n/** Safe label used everywhere a dev key appears in output, logs or manifests. */\nexport const DEV_KEY_LABEL = 'LOCAL DEVELOPMENT ONLY - DO NOT FUND';\n","/**\n * Prevents a well-known Anvil development private key — or a well-known\n * Anvil development *address* — from ever being used against anything other\n * than a loopback/private/dev RPC. Two symmetric mistakes, both covered:\n * signing settlement with a dev key (`assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`), and routing\n * settlement revenue to a dev address (`assertPayToIsNotDevAddress`). The\n * second is the more consequential of the two — a wrong key merely fails to\n * sign, a wrong payTo silently succeeds and gives the money away, since the\n * private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n *\n * Chain id alone cannot tell a real network from this project's local dev\n * chain: Base Sepolia's own chain id is 84532, the same id this project\n * deliberately reuses for the local chain so the unmodified x402 SDK can talk\n * to it. A dev key or dev payTo pointed at a real RPC by a config mistake is\n * instantly drainable — this is checked once at provider construction, not per\n * payment.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS } from './local-chain/accounts.js';\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.privateKey.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\nconst WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(\n  ANVIL_WELL_KNOWN_ACCOUNTS.map((a) => a.address.toLowerCase()),\n);\n\n/** `0x` + 64 hex chars — the only shape `privateKeyToAccount` accepts. */\nconst PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/;\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevKey(privateKey: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_KEYS.has(privateKey.toLowerCase());\n}\n\nexport function isWellKnownDevAddress(address: string): boolean {\n  return WELL_KNOWN_DEV_ADDRESSES.has(address.toLowerCase());\n}\n\n/**\n * True for loopback addresses, RFC1918 private ranges, and bare (dot-free)\n * hostnames — the shape of a docker-compose/k8s service name (e.g.\n * \"anvil\"), which a real public DNS name essentially never has.\n *\n * ASSUMPTION, and the loosest edge of this guard: every dot-free, colon-free\n * hostname is treated as private, with no exceptions. A single-label *public* hostname (no dots) is\n * essentially nonexistent in practice — ICANN does not delegate bare\n * gTLDs/TLDs as public A/AAAA records — but this function cannot tell \"no\n * dots because it's a compose service name\" from \"no dots because it's an\n * unusual real host\" if one somehow existed. If that assumption ever stops\n * holding, this is the line to revisit.\n */\nexport function isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  const h = hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '');\n  if (h === 'localhost' || h === '127.0.0.1' || h === '::1') return true;\n  if (/^127\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^10\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^192\\.168\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (/^172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/.test(h)) return true;\n  if (!h.includes('.') && !h.includes(':')) return true; // bare hostname\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).hostname;\n  } catch (cause) {\n    // Not the URL itself: every commercial EVM RPC provider embeds an API key\n    // in the path, and these messages reach `validate`, `doctor`, startup\n    // output and CI logs.\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', 'x402 provider: rpcUrl is not a valid URL', {\n      cause,\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/** Host only, for diagnostics. An RPC URL's path routinely carries a key. */\nfunction describeRpc(rpcUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(rpcUrl).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable rpcUrl]';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if a well-known dev key would sign against a non-local\n * RPC — or if `signerPrivateKey` isn't shaped like a private key at all.\n *\n * The shape check runs first and unconditionally. \"Not a key I recognise\"\n * (falls through `isWellKnownDevKey`, silently treated as someone's own real\n * facilitator key) and \"not a key at all\" (e.g. a truncated 63-char string)\n * must never share a code path: a malformed key that slips past this guard\n * only fails later, inside `settle()`, after the buyer's replayKey is already\n * reserved.\n */\nexport function assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly(rpcUrl: string, signerPrivateKey: string): void {\n  if (!PRIVATE_KEY_SHAPE.test(signerPrivateKey)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is not a well-formed private key ' +\n        '(expected \"0x\" followed by exactly 64 hex characters).',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!isWellKnownDevKey(signerPrivateKey)) return; // a real facilitator key: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      'x402 provider: facilitator.signerPrivateKey is a well-known Anvil development key, but rpcUrl ' +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. A public dev key must never sign against ` +\n        'a public network — it is instantly drainable and can grief real settlements via nonce exhaustion. ' +\n        'Use a real facilitator key for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws CONFIG_INVALID if `payTo` (the settlement destination) is a\n * well-known Anvil development address and `rpcUrl` doesn't look\n * local/private.\n *\n * Mirrors `assertDevKeyIsLocalOnly`, but guards the *receiving* side of the\n * payment instead of the signing side, and — unlike the key guard — applies\n * regardless of facilitator mode: which account signs the settlement\n * transaction has no bearing on whether the destination address is one whose\n * private key is public knowledge. `agent-commerce init` defaults `payTo` to\n * a well-known Anvil address as a local-demo convenience; on a real network\n * that default routes every payment to an address anyone on earth can sweep.\n */\nexport function assertPayToIsNotDevAddress(rpcUrl: string, payTo: string): void {\n  if (!isWellKnownDevAddress(payTo)) return; // not a dev address: not our business\n\n  const hostname = parseHostnameOrThrow(rpcUrl);\n\n  if (!isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(hostname)) {\n    throw new CommerceError(\n      'CONFIG_INVALID',\n      `x402 provider: \"payTo\" (${payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address, but rpcUrl ` +\n        `${describeRpc(rpcUrl)} does not look like a local/private chain. The private key behind that address ` +\n        'is public knowledge, so any revenue settled to it is immediately spendable by anyone. Set ' +\n        '\"payTo\" to your own merchant wallet for any non-local RPC, or point rpcUrl at your ' +\n        'local/dev chain.',\n    );\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Everything that must be true before this gateway is allowed to settle a\n * payment on the configured network.\n *\n * One definition, two callers: the provider runs it at construction so a\n * library consumer who never touches our config loader still gets the checks,\n * and `doctor` runs it against the parsed config so an operator sees the same\n * verdict without starting the gateway. Sharing a *call* is not sharing a\n * definition — the checks live here, and nothing re-implements them.\n *\n * Every failure is a startup failure. None of these are request-time\n * decisions: a deployment that is unsafe is unsafe before the first buyer\n * arrives, and finding out during `settle()` means the buyer's authorisation\n * is already burned.\n *\n * Peer-free by construction (no viem, no `@x402/*`) so the CLI can import it.\n */\nimport { CommerceError } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost, isWellKnownDevAddress } from './dev-key-guard.js';\nimport {\n  type DeploymentMode,\n  type NetworkProfile,\n  requireNetworkProfile,\n  resolveDeploymentMode,\n} from './networks.js';\n\n/**\n * How the gateway authenticates to a remote facilitator.\n *\n * Deliberately a list, not a vendor: x402 facilitators are not a Coinbase-only\n * category, and a scheme that only fitted one vendor's credentials would make\n * the abstraction a fiction.\n *\n * - `none` — the facilitator takes no credential (the public testnet one).\n * - `bearer` — a static token. Covers most self-hosted and third-party\n * facilitators, and needs nothing installed.\n * - `cdp` — Coinbase Developer Platform, which signs a fresh JWT per request\n * over method + host + path, so a static header cannot express it. Handled by\n * the optional peer `@coinbase/x402`, imported only when this type is\n * configured. Anyone not using CDP never installs it.\n *\n * A facilitator whose scheme is none of these is refused at config load rather\n * than sent nothing.\n */\nexport type FacilitatorAuth =\n  | { readonly type: 'none' }\n  | { readonly type: 'bearer'; readonly token: string }\n  | { readonly type: 'cdp'; readonly apiKeyId: string; readonly apiKeySecret: string };\n\nexport type X402FacilitatorConfig =\n  | { readonly mode: 'local'; readonly signerPrivateKey: string }\n  | { readonly mode: 'remote'; readonly url: string; readonly auth: FacilitatorAuth };\n\nexport interface X402DeploymentInput {\n  readonly network: string;\n  readonly payTo: string;\n  readonly asset: string;\n  /** EIP-712 domain of the asset, as the token itself reports it. */\n  readonly assetName?: string;\n  readonly assetVersion?: string;\n  readonly facilitator: X402FacilitatorConfig;\n  /** Required, and required to be `true`, before anything settles on a mainnet. */\n  readonly allowMainnet?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Required, and required to be `true`, to settle on a mainnet through a\n   * facilitator that takes no credential.\n   *\n   * Separate from `allowMainnet` because it names a different decision: not\n   * \"I meant to use real money\" but \"I accept this particular counterparty\n   * without an account, terms, or anyone to call\".\n   */\n  readonly allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface X402Deployment {\n  readonly profile: NetworkProfile;\n  readonly mode: DeploymentMode;\n}\n\nfunction invalid(message: string, path: string): CommerceError {\n  return new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', message, { details: { path } });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves the deployment and refuses every combination that could move real\n * money by accident. Order matters only in that the network must resolve\n * first; the rest are independent.\n */\nexport function resolveX402Deployment(input: X402DeploymentInput): X402Deployment {\n  const profile = requireNetworkProfile(input.network, 'payments.x402.network');\n  const mode = resolveDeploymentMode(profile, input.facilitator.mode);\n\n  // The in-process facilitator signs with a key this process holds. Not a\n  // custody problem — that signer never holds buyer or merchant funds, it pays\n  // gas and broadcasts `transferWithAuthorization`, and the money moves buyer\n  // to merchant directly on-chain. What it *is*, on a mainnet, is a funded key\n  // inside the resource server: compromise that process and an attacker drains\n  // the gas wallet and broadcasts from it. Separate processes, separate blast\n  // radius — so it is refused, not warned about.\n  if (profile.kind === 'mainnet' && input.facilitator.mode === 'local') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) is a mainnet and cannot be served by facilitator.mode \"local\". A mainnet deployment must settle through a remote facilitator.`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.mode',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && input.allowMainnet !== true) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: network \"${profile.id}\" (${profile.displayName}) settles real funds. Set payments.x402.allowMainnet: true to acknowledge this explicitly — it is never the default.`,\n      'payments.x402.allowMainnet',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (input.facilitator.mode === 'remote') {\n    assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(input.facilitator.url, mode);\n    // Not a funds check. An EIP-3009 authorisation names its recipient, its\n    // amount and its chain, so a facilitator can broadcast exactly that\n    // transfer or nothing — it cannot redirect the money. What a credential\n    // buys is a *relationship*: rate limits, terms, someone to call when\n    // settlement stops. Running production payments through a counterparty you\n    // have none of that with is a real choice, and this is where it gets made\n    // explicitly rather than by omission.\n    if (\n      mode === 'mainnet' &&\n      input.facilitator.auth.type === 'none' &&\n      input.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== true\n    ) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(input.facilitator.url)} takes no credential, and this is a mainnet deployment. It will see every payment authorisation you handle, with no account, terms or support behind it. Set payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: true to accept that, or configure facilitator.auth.`,\n        'payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator',\n      );\n    }\n    // An empty credential is refused rather than sent: a blank token or key\n    // reaches the facilitator as \"unauthenticated\" and fails every payment\n    // after the buyer has already signed. `${VAR:- }` resolving to whitespace\n    // is the realistic way this happens.\n    for (const [field, value] of credentialFields(input.facilitator.auth)) {\n      if (value.trim() === '') {\n        throw invalid(\n          `payments.x402: facilitator.auth.type is \"${input.facilitator.auth.type}\" but ${field} is empty. An empty credential is refused rather than sent.`,\n          `payments.x402.facilitator.auth.${field}`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // The private key behind every well-known Anvil address is public knowledge.\n  // `dev-key-guard` already refuses one against a public *RPC*; this refuses\n  // one on any non-local *deployment*, which is the case a remote facilitator\n  // creates — there the RPC host says nothing about where settlement lands.\n  // The zero address lived only in the config loader, so a library consumer\n  // calling `createX402PaymentProvider` directly — the path this shared\n  // definition exists to cover — could boot a mainnet provider whose every\n  // payment burns — sharing a *call* is not sharing a definition, and this\n  // check had drifted out of the shared one.\n  if (/^0x0{40}$/i.test(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      'payments.x402: \"payTo\" is the zero address. Every payment settled there is destroyed.',\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (mode !== 'local' && isWellKnownDevAddress(input.payTo)) {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: \"payTo\" (${input.payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address and this is a ${mode} deployment. Anyone can spend what settles there. Set payTo to your own merchant wallet.`,\n      'payments.x402.payTo',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Mainnet only. A testnet is exactly where pointing at a mock token is the\n  // right thing to do, so the same check there would block the normal case.\n  const canonical = profile.canonicalAsset;\n  if (mode === 'mainnet' && canonical) {\n    if (!sameAddress(input.asset, canonical.address)) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: asset ${input.asset} is not ${canonical.symbol} on ${profile.displayName} (expected ${canonical.address}). Settling a mainnet payment in an unintended token is refused.`,\n        'payments.x402.asset',\n      );\n    }\n    // The EIP-712 domain is signed by the buyer and checked by the scheme. Get\n    // it wrong and every payment is refused `invalid_exact_evm_token_name_mismatch`\n    // *after* the buyer signed — a config error charged to the buyer's patience.\n    // Caught here instead, before the gateway starts.\n    if (input.assetName !== undefined && input.assetName !== canonical.name) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetName \"${input.assetName}\" is not the EIP-712 domain name ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.name}\"). Every payment would be refused after the buyer signed.`,\n        'payments.x402.assetName',\n      );\n    }\n    if (input.assetVersion !== undefined && input.assetVersion !== canonical.version) {\n      throw invalid(\n        `payments.x402: assetVersion \"${input.assetVersion}\" is not the EIP-712 domain version ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected \"${canonical.version}\").`,\n        'payments.x402.assetVersion',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { profile, mode };\n}\n\n/**\n * A facilitator sees every payment authorisation this gateway handles. Plain\n * HTTP to one on a public network puts those on the wire in the clear and\n * lets anyone in the path rewrite a settlement result, so it is allowed only\n * where the endpoint cannot leave the host — a local or private address.\n */\nfunction assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(url: string, mode: DeploymentMode): void {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch (cause) {\n    throw new CommerceError('CONFIG_INVALID', `payments.x402: facilitator.url is not a valid URL`, {\n      cause,\n      details: { path: 'payments.x402.facilitator.url' },\n    });\n  }\n\n  if (parsed.protocol === 'https:') return;\n  if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:') {\n    throw invalid(\n      `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} must be reached over https (or http on a local/private host); got \"${parsed.protocol}//\"`,\n      'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n    );\n  }\n  if (mode !== 'mainnet' && isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(parsed.hostname)) return;\n\n  // The origin, never the whole URL: the path can carry a tenant or an API\n  // key, which is why `/.well-known` withholds this field entirely. A refusal\n  // message goes to `validate`, `doctor`, startup output and CI logs.\n  throw invalid(\n    `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} is reached over plain HTTP. Payment authorisations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,\n    'payments.x402.facilitator.url',\n  );\n}\n\n/** Host only — a facilitator URL can carry a tenant path or an API key. */\nfunction describeOrigin(url: string): string {\n  try {\n    return new URL(url).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return '[unparseable facilitator.url]';\n  }\n}\n\n/** The secret-bearing fields of an auth block, for emptiness checks only. Never logged. */\nfunction credentialFields(auth: FacilitatorAuth): readonly (readonly [string, string])[] {\n  switch (auth.type) {\n    case 'bearer':\n      return [['token', auth.token]];\n    case 'cdp':\n      return [\n        ['apiKeyId', auth.apiKeyId],\n        ['apiKeySecret', auth.apiKeySecret],\n      ];\n    default:\n      return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction sameAddress(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();\n}\n"]}

package/dist/cli/index.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 import { ZodError, z } from 'zod';
-import { existsSync, mkdirSync, accessSync, constants, readFileSync, chmodSync, promises } from 'fs';
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, accessSync, constants, closeSync, openSync, readFileSync, chmodSync, promises } from 'fs';
 import * as path from 'path';
 import { resolve, dirname, join } from 'path';
 import { stringify, parse, YAMLError } from 'yaml';
@@ -299,14 +299,24 @@ var init_networks = __esm({
         chainId: 84532,
         displayName: "Base Sepolia",
         kind: "testnet",
-        canonicalAsset: { symbol: "USDC", address: "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e" }
+        canonicalAsset: {
+          symbol: "USDC",
+          address: "0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e",
+          name: "USDC",
+          version: "2"
+        }
       },
       {
         id: "eip155:8453",
         chainId: 8453,
         displayName: "Base",
         kind: "mainnet",
-        canonicalAsset: { symbol: "USDC", address: "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913" }
+        canonicalAsset: {
+          symbol: "USDC",
+          address: "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
+          name: "USD Coin",
+          version: "2"
+        }
       }
     ];
     BY_ID = new Map(PROFILES.map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));
@@ -333,19 +343,26 @@ function substituteEnv(value, env, path2 = "$") {
   return value;
 }
 function substituteString(value, env, path2) {
-  const substituted = substituteOnce(value, env, path2);
-  PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;
-  if (PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN.test(substituted)) {
-    PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;
-    const residual = PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN.exec(substituted)?.[0] ?? "${\u2026}";
-    PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;
+  assertTemplateIsSupported(value, path2);
+  return substituteOnce(value, env, path2);
+}
+function assertTemplateIsSupported(value, path2) {
+  if (NESTED_PLACEHOLDER.test(value)) {
+    throw new CommerceError(
+      "CONFIG_INVALID",
+      `Configuration value at "${path2}" nests placeholders (e.g. "\${A:-\${B}}"), which is not supported \u2014 the inner one is not resolved and its closing brace ends up in the value. Use a plain default, or set the variable.`,
+      { details: { path: path2 } }
+    );
+  }
+  BRACE_TOKEN.lastIndex = 0;
+  for (const [token] of value.matchAll(BRACE_TOKEN)) {
+    if (SUPPORTED_TOKEN.test(token)) continue;
     throw new CommerceError(
       "CONFIG_INVALID",
-      `Configuration value at "${path2}" still contains the unresolved placeholder "${residual}" after substitution \u2014 nested placeholders (e.g. "\${A:-\${B}}") are not supported. Use a plain default, or set the variable.`,
-      { details: { path: path2, residual } }
+      `Configuration value at "${path2}" contains "${token}", which is not a supported placeholder. Only "\${VAR}" and "\${VAR:-default}" are recognised; shell forms such as "\${VAR-default}", "\${VAR:=default}" and "\${VAR:?message}" would load as literal text.`,
+      { details: { path: path2, token } }
     );
   }
-  return substituted;
 }
 function substituteOnce(value, env, path2) {
   return value.replace(
@@ -370,11 +387,14 @@ function substituteOnce(value, env, path2) {
 function isPlainObject(value) {
   return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
 }
-var PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN;
+var PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN, BRACE_TOKEN, SUPPORTED_TOKEN, NESTED_PLACEHOLDER;
 var init_env = __esm({
   "src/config/env.ts"() {
     init_core();
     PLACEHOLDER_PATTERN = /\$\{([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)(:-([^}]*))?\}/g;
+    BRACE_TOKEN = /\$\{[^{}]*\}/g;
+    SUPPORTED_TOKEN = /^\$\{[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*(:-[^}]*)?\}$/;
+    NESTED_PLACEHOLDER = /\$\{[^{}]*\$\{/;
   }
 });
 
@@ -451,19 +471,27 @@ function resolveX402Deployment(input) {
   }
   if (input.facilitator.mode === "remote") {
     assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(input.facilitator.url, mode);
-    if (mode === "mainnet" && input.facilitator.auth.type === "none") {
+    if (mode === "mainnet" && input.facilitator.auth.type === "none" && input.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== true) {
       throw invalid(
-        "payments.x402: a mainnet facilitator must be authenticated. Set payments.x402.facilitator.auth to a supported type \u2014 an unauthenticated production facilitator is refused.",
-        "payments.x402.facilitator.auth"
+        `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(input.facilitator.url)} takes no credential, and this is a mainnet deployment. It will see every payment authorisation you handle, with no account, terms or support behind it. Set payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: true to accept that, or configure facilitator.auth.`,
+        "payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator"
       );
     }
-    if (input.facilitator.auth.type === "bearer" && input.facilitator.auth.token.trim() === "") {
-      throw invalid(
-        'payments.x402: facilitator.auth.type is "bearer" but the token is empty. An empty credential is refused rather than sent.',
-        "payments.x402.facilitator.auth.token"
-      );
+    for (const [field, value] of credentialFields(input.facilitator.auth)) {
+      if (value.trim() === "") {
+        throw invalid(
+          `payments.x402: facilitator.auth.type is "${input.facilitator.auth.type}" but ${field} is empty. An empty credential is refused rather than sent.`,
+          `payments.x402.facilitator.auth.${field}`
+        );
+      }
     }
   }
+  if (/^0x0{40}$/i.test(input.payTo)) {
+    throw invalid(
+      'payments.x402: "payTo" is the zero address. Every payment settled there is destroyed.',
+      "payments.x402.payTo"
+    );
+  }
   if (mode !== "local" && isWellKnownDevAddress(input.payTo)) {
     throw invalid(
       `payments.x402: "payTo" (${input.payTo}) is a well-known Anvil development address and this is a ${mode} deployment. Anyone can spend what settles there. Set payTo to your own merchant wallet.`,
@@ -471,11 +499,25 @@ function resolveX402Deployment(input) {
     );
   }
   const canonical = profile.canonicalAsset;
-  if (mode === "mainnet" && canonical && !sameAddress(input.asset, canonical.address)) {
-    throw invalid(
-      `payments.x402: asset ${input.asset} is not ${canonical.symbol} on ${profile.displayName} (expected ${canonical.address}). Settling a mainnet payment in an unintended token is refused.`,
-      "payments.x402.asset"
-    );
+  if (mode === "mainnet" && canonical) {
+    if (!sameAddress(input.asset, canonical.address)) {
+      throw invalid(
+        `payments.x402: asset ${input.asset} is not ${canonical.symbol} on ${profile.displayName} (expected ${canonical.address}). Settling a mainnet payment in an unintended token is refused.`,
+        "payments.x402.asset"
+      );
+    }
+    if (input.assetName !== void 0 && input.assetName !== canonical.name) {
+      throw invalid(
+        `payments.x402: assetName "${input.assetName}" is not the EIP-712 domain name ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected "${canonical.name}"). Every payment would be refused after the buyer signed.`,
+        "payments.x402.assetName"
+      );
+    }
+    if (input.assetVersion !== void 0 && input.assetVersion !== canonical.version) {
+      throw invalid(
+        `payments.x402: assetVersion "${input.assetVersion}" is not the EIP-712 domain version ${canonical.symbol} reports on ${profile.displayName} (expected "${canonical.version}").`,
+        "payments.x402.assetVersion"
+      );
+    }
   }
   return { profile, mode };
 }
@@ -484,25 +526,44 @@ function assertFacilitatorUrlIsSafe(url, mode) {
   try {
     parsed = new URL(url);
   } catch (cause) {
-    throw new CommerceError(
-      "CONFIG_INVALID",
-      `payments.x402: facilitator.url "${url}" is not a valid URL`,
-      { cause, details: { path: "payments.x402.facilitator.url" } }
-    );
+    throw new CommerceError("CONFIG_INVALID", `payments.x402: facilitator.url is not a valid URL`, {
+      cause,
+      details: { path: "payments.x402.facilitator.url" }
+    });
   }
   if (parsed.protocol === "https:") return;
   if (parsed.protocol !== "http:") {
     throw invalid(
-      `payments.x402: facilitator.url must be https (or http on a local/private host); got "${parsed.protocol}//"`,
+      `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} must be reached over https (or http on a local/private host); got "${parsed.protocol}//"`,
       "payments.x402.facilitator.url"
     );
   }
   if (mode !== "mainnet" && isLikelyLocalOrPrivateHost(parsed.hostname)) return;
   throw invalid(
-    `payments.x402: facilitator.url "${url}" uses plain HTTP. Payment authorisations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,
+    `payments.x402: facilitator ${describeOrigin(url)} is reached over plain HTTP. Payment authorisations and settlement results would travel unencrypted. Use https, or point at a local/private host on a non-mainnet deployment.`,
     "payments.x402.facilitator.url"
   );
 }
+function describeOrigin(url) {
+  try {
+    return new URL(url).origin;
+  } catch {
+    return "[unparseable facilitator.url]";
+  }
+}
+function credentialFields(auth) {
+  switch (auth.type) {
+    case "bearer":
+      return [["token", auth.token]];
+    case "cdp":
+      return [
+        ["apiKeyId", auth.apiKeyId],
+        ["apiKeySecret", auth.apiKeySecret]
+      ];
+    default:
+      return [];
+  }
+}
 function sameAddress(a, b) {
   return a.toLowerCase() === b.toLowerCase();
 }
@@ -644,7 +705,13 @@ function normalise(raw) {
       }
     ),
     facilitator,
-    ...x402Raw.allowMainnet !== void 0 ? { allowMainnet: toBoolean(x402Raw.allowMainnet, "payments.x402.allowMainnet") } : {}
+    ...x402Raw.allowMainnet !== void 0 ? { allowMainnet: toBoolean(x402Raw.allowMainnet, "payments.x402.allowMainnet") } : {},
+    ...x402Raw.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== void 0 ? {
+      allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: toBoolean(
+        x402Raw.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator,
+        "payments.x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator"
+      )
+    } : {}
   } : void 0;
   if (x402) {
     validateAddress("payments.x402.payTo", x402.payTo);
@@ -653,8 +720,11 @@ function normalise(raw) {
       network: x402.network,
       payTo: x402.payTo,
       asset: x402.asset,
+      assetName: x402.assetName,
+      assetVersion: x402.assetVersion,
       facilitator: x402.facilitator,
-      ...x402.allowMainnet !== void 0 ? { allowMainnet: x402.allowMainnet } : {}
+      ...x402.allowMainnet !== void 0 ? { allowMainnet: x402.allowMainnet } : {},
+      ...x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator !== void 0 ? { allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: x402.allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator } : {}
     });
   }
   const resources = Object.entries(raw.resources).map(
@@ -813,6 +883,10 @@ function defaultClosedObjectSchema(schema) {
   if (isPlainObject2(items)) {
     result["items"] = defaultClosedObjectSchema(items);
   }
+  const additional = schema["additionalProperties"];
+  if (isPlainObject2(additional)) {
+    result["additionalProperties"] = defaultClosedObjectSchema(additional);
+  }
   return result;
 }
 function isPlainObject2(value) {
@@ -860,6 +934,10 @@ function validateResourceSchemaKeywords(id, path2, schema) {
       if (isPlainObject2(sub)) validateResourceSchemaKeywords(id, `${path2}.properties.${key}`, sub);
     }
   }
+  const additional = schema["additionalProperties"];
+  if (isPlainObject2(additional)) {
+    validateResourceSchemaKeywords(id, `${path2}.additionalProperties`, additional);
+  }
   const items = schema["items"];
   if (isPlainObject2(items)) {
     validateResourceSchemaKeywords(id, `${path2}.items`, items);
@@ -907,6 +985,23 @@ function validatePathParametersDeclared(id, url, input) {
   }
   const params = extractPathParameterNames(url);
   if (params.length === 0) return;
+  const firstBrace = url.indexOf("{");
+  if (firstBrace !== -1) {
+    const prefix = url.slice(0, firstBrace);
+    let origin;
+    try {
+      const parsedPrefix = new URL(prefix);
+      origin = parsedPrefix.hostname === "" ? void 0 : parsedPrefix.origin;
+    } catch {
+    }
+    if (origin === void 0 || !prefix.startsWith(`${origin}/`)) {
+      throw new CommerceError(
+        "CONFIG_INVALID",
+        `Resource "${id}" has a backend.url parameter before the end of the host ("${url}"). A caller-supplied value would choose which host the gateway calls, which is request forgery with the gateway's own network position. Parameters are supported inside the path and query only`,
+        { details: { path: `resources.${id}.backend.url`, resourceId: id } }
+      );
+    }
+  }
   const propertiesRaw = input?.["properties"];
   const properties = isPlainObject2(propertiesRaw) ? propertiesRaw : {};
   const requiredRaw = input?.["required"];
@@ -968,7 +1063,7 @@ function validateAddress(path2, value) {
     );
   }
 }
-var SUPPORTED_CONFIG_VERSION, ADDRESS_PATTERN, ZERO_ADDRESS_PATTERN, MCP_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN, NumberOrString, BooleanOrString, MerchantSchema, ServerSchema, StorageSchema, ProtocolsSchema, BackendMethodSchema, BackendHandlerSchema, PricingSchema, JsonSchemaValueSchema, ResourceEntrySchema, ResourcesMapSchema, FacilitatorAuthSchema, FacilitatorSchema, X402Schema, PaymentsSchema, RawConfigSchema, SUPPORTED_PROTOCOLS, SUPPORTED_PAYMENT_METHODS, EMPTY_CLOSED_OBJECT_SCHEMA, UNSUPPORTED_SCHEMA_KEYWORDS, PRICING_AMOUNT_PATTERN, ZERO_AMOUNT_PATTERN;
+var SUPPORTED_CONFIG_VERSION, ADDRESS_PATTERN, ZERO_ADDRESS_PATTERN, MCP_TOOL_NAME_PATTERN, NumberOrString, BooleanOrString, MerchantSchema, ServerSchema, StorageSchema, RESERVED_GATEWAY_PATHS, McpMountPathSchema, ProtocolsSchema, BackendMethodSchema, BackendHandlerSchema, PricingSchema, JsonSchemaValueSchema, ResourceEntrySchema, ResourcesMapSchema, FacilitatorAuthSchema, FacilitatorSchema, X402Schema, PaymentsSchema, RawConfigSchema, SUPPORTED_PROTOCOLS, SUPPORTED_PAYMENT_METHODS, EMPTY_CLOSED_OBJECT_SCHEMA, UNSUPPORTED_SCHEMA_KEYWORDS, PRICING_AMOUNT_PATTERN, ZERO_AMOUNT_PATTERN;
 var init_schema = __esm({
   "src/config/schema.ts"() {
     init_execution();
@@ -1011,11 +1106,36 @@ var init_schema = __esm({
         path: z.string().min(1)
       }).strict()
     }).strict();
+    RESERVED_GATEWAY_PATHS = [
+      "/health",
+      "/ready",
+      "/.well-known/agent-commerce",
+      "/api/resources",
+      "/api/resources/:id/invoke",
+      "/api/receipts",
+      "/api/events",
+      "/api/events/stream"
+    ];
+    McpMountPathSchema = z.string().min(1).refine((value) => value.startsWith("/"), {
+      message: 'must start with "/" \u2014 it is an absolute gateway path, e.g. "/mcp".'
+    }).refine((value) => !/[:*?\s]/.test(value), {
+      message: 'must not contain ":", "*", "?" or whitespace \u2014 the mount is a literal path prefix, not a Fastify route pattern, and registers its own wildcard.'
+    }).refine(
+      (value) => {
+        const base = value.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+        return !RESERVED_GATEWAY_PATHS.some(
+          (reserved) => reserved === base || reserved.startsWith(`${base}/`)
+        );
+      },
+      {
+        message: `must not collide with a route the gateway already serves (${RESERVED_GATEWAY_PATHS.join(", ")}); pick a dedicated prefix such as "/mcp".`
+      }
+    );
     ProtocolsSchema = z.object({
       http: z.object({ enabled: BooleanOrString }).strict(),
       mcp: z.object({
         enabled: BooleanOrString,
-        mountPath: z.string().min(1)
+        mountPath: McpMountPathSchema
       }).strict()
     }).strict();
     BackendMethodSchema = z.enum(["GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]);
@@ -1052,7 +1172,14 @@ var init_schema = __esm({
     ResourcesMapSchema = z.record(z.string().min(1), ResourceEntrySchema);
     FacilitatorAuthSchema = z.discriminatedUnion("type", [
       z.object({ type: z.literal("none") }).strict(),
-      z.object({ type: z.literal("bearer"), token: z.string().min(1) }).strict()
+      z.object({ type: z.literal("bearer"), token: z.string().min(1) }).strict(),
+      // Coinbase Developer Platform. Needs the optional peer `@coinbase/x402`,
+      // which signs a fresh JWT per request; a static header cannot express it.
+      z.object({
+        type: z.literal("cdp"),
+        apiKeyId: z.string().min(1),
+        apiKeySecret: z.string().min(1)
+      }).strict()
     ]);
     FacilitatorSchema = z.discriminatedUnion("mode", [
       z.object({
@@ -1081,7 +1208,9 @@ var init_schema = __esm({
       maxTimeoutSeconds: NumberOrString,
       facilitator: FacilitatorSchema,
       /** Real funds. Never defaulted — see src/payments/x402/guardrails.ts. */
-      allowMainnet: BooleanOrString.optional()
+      allowMainnet: BooleanOrString.optional(),
+      /** Accepts a mainnet facilitator that takes no credential. Never defaulted. */
+      allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator: BooleanOrString.optional()
     }).strict();
     PaymentsSchema = z.object({
       x402: X402Schema.optional()
@@ -1286,7 +1415,7 @@ init_networks();
 
 // src/storage/receipts/store.ts
 init_core();
-var PACKAGE_VERSION = "0.2.0-beta.0" ;
+var PACKAGE_VERSION = "1.0.0" ;
 
 // src/storage/receipts/redact.ts
 var SECRET_KEY_PATTERN = /private[-_ ]?key|secret|password|mnemonic|seed[-_ ]?phrase|api[-_ ]?key|authoriz(e|ation)|^auth$|auth[-_]?header|payment[-_ ]?proof|^proof$|x-payment|signature|signed[-_ ]?message|token|bearer|credential|cookie|session|jwt/i;
@@ -1511,6 +1640,12 @@ function createSqliteReceiptStore(options) {
       );
     }
   }
+  if (isFileBacked) {
+    try {
+      closeSync(openSync(path2, "a", 384));
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
   const db = new Database(path2);
   db.pragma("journal_mode = WAL");
   db.pragma("foreign_keys = ON");
@@ -2033,7 +2168,7 @@ function maskMiddle(value, keep = 6) {
 }
 createRequire(import.meta.url);
 function readVersionReport() {
-  const injected = '{"cliVersion":"0.2.0-beta.0","pinned":[{"name":"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk","version":"1.30.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@x402/core","version":"2.23.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@x402/evm","version":"2.23.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"viem","version":"2.55.18","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"better-sqlite3","version":"13.0.3","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"fastify","version":"5.12.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"pino","version":"10.3.1","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"zod","version":"3.25.76","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"}]}' ;
+  const injected = '{"cliVersion":"1.0.0","pinned":[{"name":"@coinbase/x402","version":"2.1.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk","version":"1.30.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@x402/core","version":"2.23.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"@x402/evm","version":"2.23.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"viem","version":"2.55.18","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"better-sqlite3","version":"13.0.3","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"fastify","version":"5.12.0","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"pino","version":"10.3.1","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"},{"name":"zod","version":"3.25.76","via":"@devlab.group/agent-commerce"}]}' ;
   {
     return JSON.parse(injected);
   }
@@ -2213,10 +2348,11 @@ async function runDoctor(options, deps = {}) {
       );
     }
     if (mode === "mainnet") {
+      const unauthenticated = x402.facilitator.mode === "remote" && x402.facilitator.auth.type === "none";
       checks.push({
         name: "Mainnet safety",
-        status: "INFO",
-        detail: `${describeDeploymentMode("mainnet")} \u2014 enforced at config load: explicit allowMainnet opt-in, remote facilitator over HTTPS with a credential, non-development payTo, and the canonical asset for this network. Payments are fail-closed.`
+        status: unauthenticated ? "WARN" : "INFO",
+        detail: unauthenticated ? `${describeDeploymentMode("mainnet")} \u2014 settling through a facilitator that takes no credential, accepted via allowUnauthenticatedFacilitator. It sees every payment authorisation you handle, with no account or terms behind it. Everything else is enforced at config load: explicit allowMainnet opt-in, HTTPS, non-development payTo, canonical asset. Payments are fail-closed.` : `${describeDeploymentMode("mainnet")} \u2014 enforced at config load: explicit allowMainnet opt-in, remote facilitator over HTTPS with a credential, non-development payTo, and the canonical asset for this network. Payments are fail-closed.`
       });
     }
   }