@dev.sail.money/sailor 1.3.0-226 → 1.3.0-228

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@dev.sail.money/sailor",
-  "version": "1.3.0-226",
+  "version": "1.3.0-228",
   "description": "Operator toolkit for Sail Protocol",
   "bin": {
     "sailor": "packages/cli/dist/index.cjs"
@@ -17,9 +17,6 @@
     "packages/sdk/package.json",
     "packages/ui/dist",
     "templates",
-    "examples",
-    "docs",
-    "scripts",
     "README.md",
     "AGENTS.md"
   ],
@@ -33,7 +30,6 @@
     "docs:check": "node scripts/check-docs.mjs",
     "init:check": "node scripts/check-init.mjs",
     "update:check": "node scripts/check-update.mjs",
-    "eval": "node evals/run.mjs",
     "lint": "biome check ."
   },
   "devDependencies": {

package/packages/cli/dist/index.cjs

@@ -40545,15 +40545,36 @@ var IPERMISSION_ABI = [
           { name: "selector", type: "bytes4" },
           { name: "value", type: "uint256" },
           { name: "blockTimestamp", type: "uint256" },
-          { name: "blockNumber", type: "uint256" }
+          { name: "blockNumber", type: "uint256" },
+          { name: "configEpoch", type: "uint256" }
         ]
       }
     ],
     outputs: [{ type: "bool" }]
   }
 ];
+var REGISTRATION_EPOCH_ABI2 = [
+  {
+    type: "function",
+    name: "registrationEpoch",
+    stateMutability: "view",
+    inputs: [
+      { name: "account", type: "address" },
+      { name: "permission", type: "address" }
+    ],
+    outputs: [{ type: "uint256" }]
+  }
+];
+async function readRegistrationEpoch(publicClient, kernel, account2, permission) {
+  return await publicClient.readContract({
+    address: kernel,
+    abi: REGISTRATION_EPOCH_ABI2,
+    functionName: "registrationEpoch",
+    args: [account2, permission]
+  });
+}
 function buildPermissionContext(params) {
-  const { account: account2, manager, call: call2, blockInfo } = params;
+  const { account: account2, manager, call: call2, blockInfo, configEpoch } = params;
   const selector = call2.data.length >= 10 ? call2.data.slice(0, 10) : "0x00000000";
   return {
     account: account2,
@@ -40564,12 +40585,23 @@ function buildPermissionContext(params) {
     selector,
     value: call2.value,
     blockTimestamp: blockInfo.timestamp,
-    blockNumber: blockInfo.number
+    blockNumber: blockInfo.number,
+    configEpoch
   };
 }
 async function probePermissionForCall(params) {
-  const { publicClient, permission, account: account2, manager, call: call2, blockInfo } = params;
-  const ctx = buildPermissionContext({ account: account2, manager, call: call2, blockInfo });
+  const { publicClient, kernel, permission, account: account2, manager, call: call2, blockInfo } = params;
+  let configEpoch;
+  try {
+    configEpoch = await readRegistrationEpoch(publicClient, kernel, account2, permission);
+  } catch (err) {
+    return {
+      accepted: false,
+      reverted: true,
+      error: `could not read registrationEpoch from kernel ${kernel} (${err.message.split("\n")[0]})`
+    };
+  }
+  const ctx = buildPermissionContext({ account: account2, manager, call: call2, blockInfo, configEpoch });
   try {
     const accepted = await publicClient.readContract({
       address: permission,
@@ -40583,10 +40615,11 @@ async function probePermissionForCall(params) {
   }
 }
 async function resolvePermissionForCall(params) {
-  const { publicClient, account: account2, manager, call: call2, registeredPermissions, blockInfo } = params;
-  const ctx = buildPermissionContext({ account: account2, manager, call: call2, blockInfo });
+  const { publicClient, kernel, account: account2, manager, call: call2, registeredPermissions, blockInfo } = params;
   for (const permission of registeredPermissions) {
     try {
+      const configEpoch = await readRegistrationEpoch(publicClient, kernel, account2, permission);
+      const ctx = buildPermissionContext({ account: account2, manager, call: call2, blockInfo, configEpoch });
       const accepted = await publicClient.readContract({
         address: permission,
         abi: IPERMISSION_ABI,
@@ -40656,7 +40689,10 @@ async function probePassThrough(pc, permission, account2) {
           selector: PROBE_SELECTOR,
           value: 0n,
           blockTimestamp: 0n,
-          blockNumber: 0n
+          blockNumber: 0n,
+          // Pass-through probes only run on conjunctive kernels, which predate
+          // registrationEpoch — there is no live epoch to read, so probe with 0.
+          configEpoch: 0n
         }
       ]
     });
@@ -40952,6 +40988,10 @@ struct Context {
     uint256 value;          // native ETH forwarded (wei)
     uint256 blockTimestamp; // block.timestamp at dispatch
     uint256 blockNumber;    // block.number at dispatch
+    uint256 configEpoch;    // kernel registrationEpoch(account, permission) at dispatch;
+                            // configurable permissions fail closed on a mismatch with the
+                            // epoch stamped at configure() time. Custom permissions that
+                            // take no post-deploy configuration can ignore it.
 }
 
 /// @title  IPermission
@@ -40987,6 +41027,8 @@ struct BatchContext {
     bytes32 batchHash;      // keccak256(abi.encode(calls)) \u2014 stable id for the exact sequence
     uint256 blockTimestamp; // block.timestamp at dispatch
     uint256 blockNumber;    // block.number at dispatch
+    uint256 configEpoch;    // kernel registrationEpoch(account, permission) at dispatch \u2014
+                            // same fail-closed freshness check as Context.configEpoch
 }
 
 /// @title  IBatchPermission
@@ -41291,20 +41333,6 @@ Pass --force to scaffold into it anyway (existing files with the same name are o
     }
   })() : null;
   copyDirSync(templateSrc, dest);
-  const pkgRoot = packageRoot();
-  const examplesPermSrc = import_node_path8.default.join(pkgRoot, "examples", "permissions");
-  if (import_node_fs10.default.existsSync(examplesPermSrc)) {
-    copyDirSync(examplesPermSrc, import_node_path8.default.join(dest, "examples", "permissions"));
-  }
-  const customMandateSrc = import_node_path8.default.join(pkgRoot, "examples", "custom-mandate");
-  if (import_node_fs10.default.existsSync(customMandateSrc)) {
-    copyDirSync(customMandateSrc, import_node_path8.default.join(dest, "examples", "custom-mandate"));
-  }
-  const permModelSrc = import_node_path8.default.join(pkgRoot, "docs", "PERMISSION_MODEL.md");
-  if (import_node_fs10.default.existsSync(permModelSrc)) {
-    import_node_fs10.default.mkdirSync(import_node_path8.default.join(dest, "docs"), { recursive: true });
-    writeIfMissing2(import_node_path8.default.join(dest, "docs", "PERMISSION_MODEL.md"), import_node_fs10.default.readFileSync(permModelSrc, "utf-8"));
-  }
   const pkgPath = import_node_path8.default.join(dest, "package.json");
   if (import_node_fs10.default.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
     const pkg = JSON.parse(import_node_fs10.default.readFileSync(pkgPath, "utf-8"));
@@ -44364,6 +44392,7 @@ async function mandateSimulate(options) {
       const [probe, codeCheck] = await Promise.all([
         probePermissionForCall({
           publicClient: pc,
+          kernel: project.contracts.kernel,
           permission,
           account: account2,
           manager,
@@ -45323,6 +45352,8 @@ Configure the chain in the SDK chain registry or set KERNEL_ADDRESS in .sail/.en
         } else {
           permission = await resolvePermissionForCall({
             publicClient,
+            kernel,
+            // narrowed: runCommand validates kernel before runTick runs
             account: accountAddr,
             manager: agentManager.address,
             call: firstCall,

package/packages/sdk/dist/fees.d.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ import { type Address, type PublicClient } from "viem";
  *
  * This is THE single source of truth for the registration fee. The kernel
  * charges `fee × N` for N permissions, bounded by MAX_PERMISSION_FEE_WEI
- * (0.001 ETH) and refunding any excess; there is NO bytecode/size-based
+ * (0.01 ETH — the constitutional cap in SailGovernance; the seeded launch
+ * default fee is 0.001 ETH) and refunding any excess; there is NO bytecode/size-based
  * component in the live contracts (that "variable" formula existed only in
  * stale protocol docs describing an abandoned design). Underpaying reverts with
  * InsufficientFee(required, provided).

package/packages/sdk/dist/fees.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/packages/sdk/dist/fees.js

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ import { SailGovernanceAbi } from "./abis/SailGovernance.js";
  *
  * This is THE single source of truth for the registration fee. The kernel
  * charges `fee × N` for N permissions, bounded by MAX_PERMISSION_FEE_WEI
- * (0.001 ETH) and refunding any excess; there is NO bytecode/size-based
+ * (0.01 ETH — the constitutional cap in SailGovernance; the seeded launch
+ * default fee is 0.001 ETH) and refunding any excess; there is NO bytecode/size-based
  * component in the live contracts (that "variable" formula existed only in
  * stale protocol docs describing an abandoned design). Underpaying reverts with
  * InsufficientFee(required, provided).

package/packages/sdk/dist/fees.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/packages/sdk/dist/intelligence.d.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * Do not edit manually — run `pnpm build` to regenerate.
  *
  * Spec version : 1.2.1
- * Generated at : 2026-07-02T15:07:10.282Z
+ * Generated at : 2026-07-02T17:23:23.707Z
  */
 export declare const SAIL_INTELLIGENCE_BASE_URL = "https://api.sail.money";
 export declare const SAIL_INTELLIGENCE_DOCS_URL = "https://api.sail.money/docs";

package/packages/sdk/dist/intelligence.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * Do not edit manually — run `pnpm build` to regenerate.
  *
  * Spec version : 1.2.1
- * Generated at : 2026-07-02T15:07:10.282Z
+ * Generated at : 2026-07-02T17:23:23.707Z
  */
 export const SAIL_INTELLIGENCE_BASE_URL = "https://api.sail.money";
 export const SAIL_INTELLIGENCE_DOCS_URL = "https://api.sail.money/docs";

package/packages/sdk/package.json

@@ -52,12 +52,12 @@
   ],
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",
-    "url": "https://github.com/SailAgent/Sailor.git",
+    "url": "https://github.com/sail-money/Sailor.git",
     "directory": "packages/sdk"
   },
   "homepage": "https://sail.money",
   "bugs": {
-    "url": "https://github.com/SailAgent/Sailor/issues"
+    "url": "https://github.com/sail-money/Sailor/issues"
   },
   "engines": {
     "node": ">=18.0.0"

package/templates/default/.agents/skills/sail-mandates/references/examples-index.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Permissions only bound on-chain actions: venues with off-chain order matching (P
 | `BoundedStake_Venice_Base.sol` | Venice (VVV) staking · Base | Recipient binding on stake; claim() structurally routes rewards to caller (the SMA) | `0xadc9772e` stake(address,uint256), `0x4e71d92d` claim() |
 | `BoundedTransfer_ERC20_Ethereum.sol` | ERC-20 · any EVM | Token allowlist + recipient allowlist + per-transfer cap; caps are per-token base units (USDC 6 decimals, WETH 18) — one permission per token if amounts differ | `0xa9059cbb` transfer(address,uint256) |
 | `BoundedPerp_GMXv2_Arbitrum.sol` | GMX v2 ExchangeRouter · Arbitrum | Market allowlist + collateral cap + size cap (USD is 1e30-scaled) + long/short flags on a struct-typed call | `0x212234c3` createOrder(CreateOrderParams) — MUST re-verify, see below |
-| `BoundedBet_Limitless_Base.sol` | Limitless CTF exchange · Base | Condition allowlist + stake cap + outcome allowlist on a prediction market | buy(bytes32,uint256,uint256) — **ABI UNVERIFIED**, see below |
+| `BoundedLimitless_Base.sol` | Limitless CTF exchange · Base | Condition allowlist + stake cap + outcome allowlist on a prediction market | buy(bytes32,uint256,uint256) — **ABI UNVERIFIED**, see below |
 | `BoundedApproveAndCallBatch.sol` | Sail batch dispatch · any selective kernel | `IBatchPermission`: atomic approve → consume → reset-to-0 in exactly 3 calls; single-call evaluate() deliberately returns false | `0x095ea7b3` approve (calls 0 and 2) |
 
 ## Lessons the examples encode
@@ -29,6 +29,6 @@ Permissions only bound on-chain actions: venues with off-chain order matching (P
 
 ## Interfaces (vendored in `examples/permissions/interfaces/`)
 
-- `IPermission.evaluate(bytes txData, Context ctx) → bool`; Context: `account, manager, submitter, target, selector, value, blockTimestamp, blockNumber`.
-- `IBatchPermission.evaluateBatch(Call[] calls, BatchContext ctx) → bool` + `isBatchPermission() → true`; Call: `(target, value, data)`; BatchContext: `account, manager, submitter, permission, batchHash, blockTimestamp, blockNumber`.
+- `IPermission.evaluate(bytes txData, Context ctx) → bool`; Context: `account, manager, submitter, target, selector, value, blockTimestamp, blockNumber, configEpoch`.
+- `IBatchPermission.evaluateBatch(Call[] calls, BatchContext ctx) → bool` + `isBatchPermission() → true`; Call: `(target, value, data)`; BatchContext: `account, manager, submitter, permission, batchHash, blockTimestamp, blockNumber, configEpoch`.
 - `SailCalldata.sol`: bounded slot-indexed calldata readers (`hasParams`, `asAddress`, `asUint256`, …) — use these instead of `abi.decode` to avoid wrong-offset reads.

package/templates/default/.agents/skills/sail-template-swap/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: sail-template-swap
-description: Gate an SMA's DEX swaps by REUSING the shared SwapPermission singleton (Protocol/contracts/templates/SwapPermission.sol) — register + configure, no per-SMA deploy. Use for a bounded swap / DCA mandate on Uniswap V3, V3-02, or V2 with router + token-in/out allowlists, a per-tx cap, and a MANDATORY oracle slippage band (priceOracle is required — for no-oracle tokens use sail-template-swap-no-oracle). For the LI.FI aggregator use sail-lifi-swap; for Pendle use sail-pendle. NOTE: `sailor mandate attach` only registers — you must also configure per-account (see steps).
+description: Gate an SMA's DEX swaps by REUSING the shared SwapPermission singleton (Protocol/contracts/templates/SwapPermission.sol) — register + configure, no per-SMA deploy. Use for a bounded swap / DCA mandate on Uniswap V3, V3-02, or V2 with router + token-in/out allowlists, a per-tx cap, and a MANDATORY oracle slippage band (priceOracle is required — for no-oracle tokens use sail-template-swap-no-oracle). For the LI.FI aggregator or Pendle, author a bespoke permission via sail-mandates. NOTE: `sailor mandate attach` only registers — you must also configure per-account (see steps).
 compatibility: A Sailor project (`@sail/sdk`, `sailor` CLI). Requires SwapPermission deployed on the target chain (recorded in sail-templates/deployed.json); run sail-templates first.
 metadata:
   workspace: sailor-harness
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ it is below `amountIn`.
   (live-pool hallucination band — catches honest mistakes, NOT MEV/flash-loan attacks) or author a
   bespoke permission. There is no oracle-off mode on `SwapPermission`.
 - **Aggregator (LI.FI) or opaque calldata** → the mandate can't inspect the route; use
-  [`sail-lifi-swap`](../sail-lifi-swap/SKILL.md) or [`sail-mandates`](../sail-mandates/SKILL.md).
+  [`sail-mandates`](../sail-mandates/SKILL.md).
 - **`SwapPermission` not deployed on your chain** → check `deployed.json` first (it's live on all
   11 Sailor-bundled chains as of the current deploy); for anything outside that set, author your
   own via [`sail-mandates`](../sail-mandates/SKILL.md).

package/templates/default/.agents/skills/sail-template-swap-no-oracle/SKILL.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 name: sail-template-swap-no-oracle
-description: Gate an SMA's DEX swaps for tokens that have NO oracle by REUSING the shared SwapPermissionNoOracle singleton (Protocol/contracts/templates/SwapPermissionNoOracle.sol) — register + configure, no per-SMA deploy. Use for a bounded swap mandate on Uniswap V3/V3-02/V2 (and forks) where no manipulation-resistant price feed exists: router + token-in/out allowlists, a per-tx cap, recipient pinned to the SMA, and a per-pair live-pool "hallucination band". NOT manipulation-resistant — if the token HAS an oracle use sail-template-swap instead; for the LI.FI aggregator use sail-lifi-swap. Deployed on all 11 Sailor-bundled chains (recorded in sail-templates/deployed.json).
+description: Gate an SMA's DEX swaps for tokens that have NO oracle by REUSING the shared SwapPermissionNoOracle singleton (Protocol/contracts/templates/SwapPermissionNoOracle.sol) — register + configure, no per-SMA deploy. Use for a bounded swap mandate on Uniswap V3/V3-02/V2 (and forks) where no manipulation-resistant price feed exists: router + token-in/out allowlists, a per-tx cap, recipient pinned to the SMA, and a per-pair live-pool "hallucination band". NOT manipulation-resistant — if the token HAS an oracle use sail-template-swap instead; for the LI.FI aggregator author a bespoke permission via sail-mandates. Deployed on all 11 Sailor-bundled chains (recorded in sail-templates/deployed.json).
 compatibility: A Sailor project (`@sail/sdk`, `sailor` CLI). Requires SwapPermissionNoOracle deployed on the target chain (recorded in sail-templates/deployed.json); run sail-templates first.
 metadata:
   workspace: sailor-harness
@@ -97,4 +97,4 @@ Template-specific bits:
   [`sail-template-swap`](../sail-template-swap/SKILL.md) wherever an oracle exists.
 - `toleranceBps` is capped at 50% in source; a wider band is meaningless and rejected at configure.
 - Unaudited example — step 4 is mandatory.
-- Aggregator routing (opaque calldata) → [`sail-lifi-swap`](../sail-lifi-swap/SKILL.md).
+- Aggregator routing (opaque calldata) → author a bespoke permission via [`sail-mandates`](../sail-mandates/SKILL.md).

package/templates/default/.agents/skills/sail-templates/SKILL.md

@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ Full mechanics (EIP-712 sigs, `configure`/`configureDirect`, `attachBatch`, `rep
 
 No shared template covers: **perps** (GMX, Gains, Synthetix), **prediction markets** (Azuro,
 Limitless), or the **LI.FI aggregator**. For those, author a bespoke `IPermission` via
-`sailor mandate deploy` — see [`sail-lifi-swap`](../sail-lifi-swap/SKILL.md) for the
-custody-bound aggregator pattern and [`sail-pendle`](../sail-pendle/SKILL.md) for Pendle.
+`sailor mandate deploy` — see [`sail-mandates`](../sail-mandates/SKILL.md) for the
+authoring flow and `examples/permissions/` for worked per-protocol patterns.
 
 ## Notes
 

package/templates/default/docs/PERMISSION_MODEL.md

@@ -89,5 +89,5 @@ Run `sailor doctor` (read-only, no gas, no keys):
 - on a conjunctive kernel, **probes each permission for pass-through** and flags any
   that would brick dispatch.
 
-See [AGENT_PLAYBOOK.md](../AGENT_PLAYBOOK.md) for the operational decision tree and the
-revert failure-mode catalog.
+See [AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md) (and the skills it routes to under `.agents/skills/`)
+for the operational decision tree and the revert failure-mode catalog.

package/{examples → templates/default/examples}/custom-mandate/.sail/contracts/interfaces/IPermission.sol

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ struct Context {
     uint256 value;
     uint256 blockTimestamp;
     uint256 blockNumber;
+    /// @dev Kernel registrationEpoch(account, permission) at dispatch. Configurable
+    ///      permissions fail closed on a mismatch with the epoch stamped at configure()
+    ///      time; permissions without post-deploy configuration can ignore it.
+    uint256 configEpoch;
 }
 
 interface IPermission {

package/{examples → templates/default/examples}/custom-mandate/README.md

@@ -36,11 +36,14 @@ struct Context {
     uint256 value;          // msg.value (native asset) sent with the call
     uint256 blockTimestamp; // block.timestamp at evaluation
     uint256 blockNumber;    // block.number at evaluation
+    uint256 configEpoch;    // kernel registrationEpoch(account, permission) at dispatch;
+                            // ignore it unless your permission takes post-deploy configuration
 }
 ```
 
 - `evaluate` — your policy. Return `true` to permit the call, `false` to block it. Runs under a
-  100k-gas `staticcall`; a revert or gas overage is treated as `false`.
+  150,000-gas `staticcall` (`SailKernel.PERMISSION_GAS_CAP`); a revert or gas overage is treated
+  as `false`.
 - `discriminator` — a stable `bytes32` name for your permission (e.g. `keccak256("MyMandate")`).
 
 Keep all policy parameters constructor-configured so each deployment is a complete, reviewable

package/{examples → templates/default/examples}/permissions/interfaces/IBatchPermission.sol

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct BatchContext {
     bytes32 batchHash;      // keccak256(abi.encode(calls)) — stable id for the exact sequence
     uint256 blockTimestamp; // block.timestamp at dispatch
     uint256 blockNumber;    // block.number at dispatch
+    uint256 configEpoch;    // kernel registrationEpoch(account, permission) at dispatch —
+                            // same fail-closed freshness check as Context.configEpoch
 }
 
 interface IBatchPermission {

package/{examples → templates/default/examples}/permissions/interfaces/IPermission.sol

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ struct Context {
     uint256 value;
     uint256 blockTimestamp;
     uint256 blockNumber;
+    /// @dev Kernel registrationEpoch(account, permission) at dispatch. Configurable
+    ///      permissions fail closed on a mismatch with the epoch stamped at configure()
+    ///      time; permissions without post-deploy configuration can ignore it.
+    uint256 configEpoch;
 }
 
 interface IPermission {

package/templates/default/test/BoundedCallPermission.t.sol

@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ contract BoundedCallPermissionTest {
             selector: selector,
             value: value,
             blockTimestamp: block.timestamp,
-            blockNumber: block.number
+            blockNumber: block.number,
+            configEpoch: 0 // BoundedCallPermission takes no post-deploy config; value unused
         });
     }
 

package/docs/PERMISSION_MODEL.md

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-# Sail permission model: conjunctive vs selective
-
-The deployed SailKernel ships in **two incompatible dispatch models**. Which one a
-chain runs changes how dispatches are signed *and* how permissions must be written.
-Get this wrong and every dispatch reverts with an opaque selector. This is the single
-most important thing to understand before operating an SMA.
-
-## TL;DR
-
-| | **Conjunctive** (older) | **Selective** (newer) |
-|---|---|---|
-| Chains today (bundled kernels) | None — all bundled kernels moved to selective | Base (8453), Base Sepolia (84532), Arbitrum (42161), Unichain (130) |
-| `dispatch(...)` | `(account, target, value, data, sig, deadline)` — **no `permission`** | `(account, permission, target, value, data, sig, deadline)` |
-| Which permissions are checked | **ALL** registered permissions; **all must return true** | only the **one** permission named in the call |
-| EIP-712 `Dispatch` struct | no `permission` field | includes `permission` |
-| Batch (`dispatchBatch`/`previewBatch`) | **not available** | available |
-| **Permission design rule** | **MUST pass through calls outside its domain** | may return false freely |
-
-Don't guess from a version string — **detect it on-chain** (see below).
-
-## The conjunctive pass-through rule (the big footgun)
-
-On a conjunctive kernel the kernel calls `evaluate(txData, ctx)` on **every**
-registered permission and ANDs the results. A single `false` blocks the whole
-dispatch (`PermissionDenied`).
-
-So a permission that only cares about, say, approvals **must still return `true` for
-every call it doesn't govern**:
-
-```solidity
-function evaluate(bytes calldata txData, Context calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
-    // Pass through calls outside this permission's domain (conjunctive model).
-    if (ctx.selector != APPROVE) return true;   // <-- without this line, this
-                                                 //     permission bricks swaps,
-                                                 //     transfers, everything.
-    // ...domain-specific checks for approve...
-}
-```
-
-A permission that returns `false` (or reverts, or runs out of gas — both treated as
-`false`) on unrelated calls **bricks the entire account**: no dispatch of any kind
-can pass. We hit exactly this during bring-up with permissions that "blocked each
-other." The fix was to redeploy every permission with pass-through semantics.
-
-Corollary: on a conjunctive kernel you **cannot** have two permissions that each
-enforce a different token's approve — each would reject the other's token. To support
-approving both DAI and USDC you need **one** approve permission that allows both (see
-`examples/lifi-permissions/`), not two narrow ones.
-
-Selective kernels don't have this problem: each dispatch names one permission and
-only that one is consulted.
-
-## Detect the model on-chain
-
-The SDK reads each kernel's public `DISPATCH_TYPEHASH` constant and matches it
-against the canonical hashes for each model. Never assume.
-
-```ts
-const caps = await client.capabilities();
-// caps.dispatchModel: "conjunctive" | "selective"
-// caps.dispatchTypehash, caps.source ("onchain-typehash" | "static-hint")
-```
-
-Verified typehashes:
-
-- conjunctive `DISPATCH_TYPEHASH` = `0x7510c80e…`
-  `Dispatch(address account,address target,uint256 value,bytes32 dataHash,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)`
-- selective `DISPATCH_TYPEHASH` =
-  `Dispatch(address account,address permission,address target,uint256 value,bytes32 dataHash,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)`
-
-`client.dispatch.single(...)` already signs the correct struct and uses the correct
-ABI for the detected model — you don't sign by hand. `client.dispatch.batch` /
-`preview` throw a clear error on conjunctive kernels (no `dispatchBatch`).
-
-## Roles (unchanged across models)
-
-| Role | Authority |
-|------|-----------|
-| **Owner** | Holds the Safe; custody anchor. |
-| **Permission Signer** | Authorizes which `IPermission` contracts apply (EIP-712 `RegisterPermissions` / `RevokePermissions`). Signed in the browser signing station — the agent never holds this key. |
-| **Manager** | Executes dispatches within the registered permissions (ECDSA / ERC-1271). The agent's hot key. |
-
-## Preflight before spending gas
-
-Run `sailor doctor` (read-only, no gas, no keys):
-
-- detects the dispatch model,
-- lists registered permissions,
-- on a conjunctive kernel, **probes each permission for pass-through** and flags any
-  that would brick dispatch.
-
-See [AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md) for the operational decision tree and the
-revert failure-mode catalog.

package/examples/README.md

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# examples/
-
-Reference material for building Sail permission contracts. Nothing here is part of
-Sail Protocol and nothing here is audited.
-
-## What's in here
-
-### `permissions/`
-
-Protocol-specific permission examples (Uniswap, Aave, GMX, Vault, Pendle, and others).
-These are copied into your project by `sailor init` so you have local starting points to
-adapt. They are not a supported or exhaustive library — review them before using.
-
-### `custom-mandate/`
-
-A standalone Foundry workspace scaffold for authoring your own `IPermission` contract as a
-separate project. Fork it, rename it, and build from `BoundedCallPermission.sol`.
-
-### `lifi-permissions/`
-
-Reference-only source for the deployed LiFi EIP-1167 clone implementations
-(`LifiBoundedApprovePermissionCloneable`, `LifiDiamondSwapPermissionCloneable`).
-These document live deployed contracts — do not adapt them directly for new projects.
-See the `README.md` inside for deployment addresses and the conjunctive-kernel caveat.

package/examples/lifi-permissions/LifiBoundedApprovePermissionCloneable.sol

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-pragma solidity 0.8.26;
-
-import {IPermission, Context} from "../../.sail/contracts/interfaces/IPermission.sol";
-import {CloneInitializable} from "../../.sail/contracts/templates/base/CloneInitializable.sol";
-
-/// @title  LifiBoundedApprovePermissionCloneable
-/// @notice EIP-1167 clone-template approval permission with PER-TOKEN caps. The
-///         logic contract is deployed once and registered in the SDK's
-///         standaloneTemplates; each account clones it via
-///         PermissionFactory.deployAndAttach and configures via initialize().
-///
-///         The manager may ONLY approve the LiFi Diamond, and only on tokens that
-///         have a configured cap, up to that token's cap. Passes through any
-///         non-approve call (conjunctive model).
-///
-///         Caps are PER TOKEN (not one global cap) because token value and decimals
-///         differ — e.g. 1 DAI = 1e18 base units vs 1 USDC = 1e6. A single cap can't
-///         bound both sensibly.
-contract LifiBoundedApprovePermissionCloneable is IPermission, CloneInitializable {
-    bytes4 private constant APPROVE = 0x095ea7b3;
-    address public constant LIFI_DIAMOND = 0x1231DEB6f5749EF6cE6943a275A1D3E7486F4EaE;
-
-    // Per-token approve cap, in the token's base units. 0 = token not allowed.
-    // A mapping occupies its own slot pointer and does not pack with the
-    // CloneInitializable `_initialized` bool at slot 0.
-    mapping(address token => uint256 cap) public maxApprovePerToken;
-    address public permissionSigner;
-
-    error NotPermissionSigner();
-    error ZeroAddress();
-    error LengthMismatch();
-
-    modifier onlyPermissionSigner() {
-        if (msg.sender != permissionSigner) revert NotPermissionSigner();
-        _;
-    }
-
-    /// @dev Lock the logic contract; only clones (fresh storage) can be initialized.
-    constructor() {
-        _disableInitializers();
-    }
-
-    /// @notice One-time per-clone configuration.
-    /// @param tokens            Tokens the manager may approve to the LiFi Diamond.
-    /// @param caps              Per-token cap (token base units); index-aligned with `tokens`.
-    /// @param _permissionSigner Owner wallet; sole authority for post-init updates.
-    function initialize(
-        address[] memory tokens,
-        uint256[] memory caps,
-        address _permissionSigner
-    ) external initializer {
-        if (_permissionSigner == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
-        if (tokens.length != caps.length) revert LengthMismatch();
-        permissionSigner = _permissionSigner;
-        for (uint256 i; i < tokens.length; i++) {
-            maxApprovePerToken[tokens[i]] = caps[i];
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// @notice Set (cap > 0) or clear (cap == 0) a token's per-tx approve cap.
-    function setTokenCap(address token, uint256 cap) external onlyPermissionSigner {
-        maxApprovePerToken[token] = cap;
-    }
-
-    function evaluate(bytes calldata txData, Context calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
-        // Pass through calls outside this permission's domain (conjunctive model).
-        if (ctx.selector != APPROVE) return true;
-        if (ctx.target == address(0)) return false; // token is ctx.target
-        if (txData.length < 68) return false;
-
-        (address spender, uint256 amount) = abi.decode(txData[4:], (address, uint256));
-        if (spender != LIFI_DIAMOND) return false;
-
-        uint256 cap = maxApprovePerToken[ctx.target];
-        if (cap == 0) return false; // token not allowed
-        if (amount > cap) return false; // over the per-token cap
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    function discriminator() external pure returns (bytes32) {
-        return keccak256("LifiBoundedApprovePermissionCloneable.v1");
-    }
-}