@dev.sail.money/sailor 0.1.0-local → 1.0.0-38

package/docs/PERMISSION_MODEL.md

@@ -1,93 +1,93 @@
-# Sail permission model: conjunctive vs selective
-
-The deployed SailKernel ships in **two incompatible dispatch models**. Which one a
-chain runs changes how dispatches are signed *and* how permissions must be written.
-Get this wrong and every dispatch reverts with an opaque selector. This is the single
-most important thing to understand before operating an SMA.
-
-## TL;DR
-
-| | **Conjunctive** (older) | **Selective** (newer) |
-|---|---|---|
-| Chains today (bundled kernels) | None — all bundled kernels moved to selective | Base (8453), Base Sepolia (84532), Arbitrum (42161), Unichain (130) |
-| `dispatch(...)` | `(account, target, value, data, sig, deadline)` — **no `permission`** | `(account, permission, target, value, data, sig, deadline)` |
-| Which permissions are checked | **ALL** registered permissions; **all must return true** | only the **one** permission named in the call |
-| EIP-712 `Dispatch` struct | no `permission` field | includes `permission` |
-| Batch (`dispatchBatch`/`previewBatch`) | **not available** | available |
-| **Permission design rule** | **MUST pass through calls outside its domain** | may return false freely |
-
-Don't guess from a version string — **detect it on-chain** (see below).
-
-## The conjunctive pass-through rule (the big footgun)
-
-On a conjunctive kernel the kernel calls `evaluate(txData, ctx)` on **every**
-registered permission and ANDs the results. A single `false` blocks the whole
-dispatch (`PermissionDenied`).
-
-So a permission that only cares about, say, approvals **must still return `true` for
-every call it doesn't govern**:
-
-```solidity
-function evaluate(bytes calldata txData, Context calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
-    // Pass through calls outside this permission's domain (conjunctive model).
-    if (ctx.selector != APPROVE) return true;   // <-- without this line, this
-                                                 //     permission bricks swaps,
-                                                 //     transfers, everything.
-    // ...domain-specific checks for approve...
-}
-```
-
-A permission that returns `false` (or reverts, or runs out of gas — both treated as
-`false`) on unrelated calls **bricks the entire account**: no dispatch of any kind
-can pass. We hit exactly this during bring-up with permissions that "blocked each
-other." The fix was to redeploy every permission with pass-through semantics.
-
-Corollary: on a conjunctive kernel you **cannot** have two permissions that each
-enforce a different token's approve — each would reject the other's token. To support
-approving both DAI and USDC you need **one** approve permission that allows both (see
-`templates/lifi-permissions/`), not two narrow ones.
-
-Selective kernels don't have this problem: each dispatch names one permission and
-only that one is consulted.
-
-## Detect the model on-chain
-
-The SDK reads each kernel's public `DISPATCH_TYPEHASH` constant and matches it
-against the canonical hashes for each model. Never assume.
-
-```ts
-const caps = await client.capabilities();
-// caps.dispatchModel: "conjunctive" | "selective"
-// caps.dispatchTypehash, caps.source ("onchain-typehash" | "static-hint")
-```
-
-Verified typehashes:
-
-- conjunctive `DISPATCH_TYPEHASH` = `0x7510c80e…`
-  `Dispatch(address account,address target,uint256 value,bytes32 dataHash,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)`
-- selective `DISPATCH_TYPEHASH` =
-  `Dispatch(address account,address permission,address target,uint256 value,bytes32 dataHash,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)`
-
-`client.dispatch.single(...)` already signs the correct struct and uses the correct
-ABI for the detected model — you don't sign by hand. `client.dispatch.batch` /
-`preview` throw a clear error on conjunctive kernels (no `dispatchBatch`).
-
-## Roles (unchanged across models)
-
-| Role | Authority |
-|------|-----------|
-| **Owner** | Holds the Safe; custody anchor. |
-| **Permission Signer** | Authorizes which `IPermission` contracts apply (EIP-712 `RegisterPermissions` / `RevokePermissions`). Signed in the browser signing station — the agent never holds this key. |
-| **Manager** | Executes dispatches within the registered permissions (ECDSA / ERC-1271). The agent's hot key. |
-
-## Preflight before spending gas
-
-Run `sailor doctor` (read-only, no gas, no keys):
-
-- detects the dispatch model,
-- lists registered permissions,
-- on a conjunctive kernel, **probes each permission for pass-through** and flags any
-  that would brick dispatch.
-
-See [AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md) for the operational decision tree and the
-revert failure-mode catalog.
+# Sail permission model: conjunctive vs selective
+
+The deployed SailKernel ships in **two incompatible dispatch models**. Which one a
+chain runs changes how dispatches are signed *and* how permissions must be written.
+Get this wrong and every dispatch reverts with an opaque selector. This is the single
+most important thing to understand before operating an SMA.
+
+## TL;DR
+
+| | **Conjunctive** (older) | **Selective** (newer) |
+|---|---|---|
+| Chains today (bundled kernels) | None — all bundled kernels moved to selective | Base (8453), Base Sepolia (84532), Arbitrum (42161), Unichain (130) |
+| `dispatch(...)` | `(account, target, value, data, sig, deadline)` — **no `permission`** | `(account, permission, target, value, data, sig, deadline)` |
+| Which permissions are checked | **ALL** registered permissions; **all must return true** | only the **one** permission named in the call |
+| EIP-712 `Dispatch` struct | no `permission` field | includes `permission` |
+| Batch (`dispatchBatch`/`previewBatch`) | **not available** | available |
+| **Permission design rule** | **MUST pass through calls outside its domain** | may return false freely |
+
+Don't guess from a version string — **detect it on-chain** (see below).
+
+## The conjunctive pass-through rule (the big footgun)
+
+On a conjunctive kernel the kernel calls `evaluate(txData, ctx)` on **every**
+registered permission and ANDs the results. A single `false` blocks the whole
+dispatch (`PermissionDenied`).
+
+So a permission that only cares about, say, approvals **must still return `true` for
+every call it doesn't govern**:
+
+```solidity
+function evaluate(bytes calldata txData, Context calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
+    // Pass through calls outside this permission's domain (conjunctive model).
+    if (ctx.selector != APPROVE) return true;   // <-- without this line, this
+                                                 //     permission bricks swaps,
+                                                 //     transfers, everything.
+    // ...domain-specific checks for approve...
+}
+```
+
+A permission that returns `false` (or reverts, or runs out of gas — both treated as
+`false`) on unrelated calls **bricks the entire account**: no dispatch of any kind
+can pass. We hit exactly this during bring-up with permissions that "blocked each
+other." The fix was to redeploy every permission with pass-through semantics.
+
+Corollary: on a conjunctive kernel you **cannot** have two permissions that each
+enforce a different token's approve — each would reject the other's token. To support
+approving both DAI and USDC you need **one** approve permission that allows both (see
+`templates/lifi-permissions/`), not two narrow ones.
+
+Selective kernels don't have this problem: each dispatch names one permission and
+only that one is consulted.
+
+## Detect the model on-chain
+
+The SDK reads each kernel's public `DISPATCH_TYPEHASH` constant and matches it
+against the canonical hashes for each model. Never assume.
+
+```ts
+const caps = await client.capabilities();
+// caps.dispatchModel: "conjunctive" | "selective"
+// caps.dispatchTypehash, caps.source ("onchain-typehash" | "static-hint")
+```
+
+Verified typehashes:
+
+- conjunctive `DISPATCH_TYPEHASH` = `0x7510c80e…`
+  `Dispatch(address account,address target,uint256 value,bytes32 dataHash,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)`
+- selective `DISPATCH_TYPEHASH` =
+  `Dispatch(address account,address permission,address target,uint256 value,bytes32 dataHash,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)`
+
+`client.dispatch.single(...)` already signs the correct struct and uses the correct
+ABI for the detected model — you don't sign by hand. `client.dispatch.batch` /
+`preview` throw a clear error on conjunctive kernels (no `dispatchBatch`).
+
+## Roles (unchanged across models)
+
+| Role | Authority |
+|------|-----------|
+| **Owner** | Holds the Safe; custody anchor. |
+| **Permission Signer** | Authorizes which `IPermission` contracts apply (EIP-712 `RegisterPermissions` / `RevokePermissions`). Signed in the browser signing station — the agent never holds this key. |
+| **Manager** | Executes dispatches within the registered permissions (ECDSA / ERC-1271). The agent's hot key. |
+
+## Preflight before spending gas
+
+Run `sailor doctor` (read-only, no gas, no keys):
+
+- detects the dispatch model,
+- lists registered permissions,
+- on a conjunctive kernel, **probes each permission for pass-through** and flags any
+  that would brick dispatch.
+
+See [AGENTS.md](../AGENTS.md) for the operational decision tree and the
+revert failure-mode catalog.

package/examples/permissions/BoundedApproveAndCallBatch.sol

@@ -1,179 +1,179 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-pragma solidity 0.8.26;
-
-// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// Protocol : Sail batch dispatch (IBatchPermission) — protocol-agnostic
-// Version  : Single-tenant, constructor-configured (mirrors the multi-tenant
-//            SharedApproveAndCallBatchPermission shape from SailProtocol)
-// Chain    : Any EVM with a SELECTIVE kernel (Base, Arbitrum, Unichain, Base Sepolia)
-//
-// WHAT THIS TEACHES — the atomic approve → call → reset pattern.
-//   A bare ERC-20 approve is dangerous: it leaves a standing allowance an attacker can drain.
-//   The safe shape is to approve, consume the allowance in the SAME transaction, then reset it
-//   to zero — all-or-nothing. No single-call IPermission can enforce "the reset must be the
-//   final call", because per-call evaluation never sees the other calls. A batch permission
-//   sees the WHOLE sequence at once, so it can.
-//
-//   Gated via the kernel's dispatchBatch (NOT dispatch). This contract's single-call evaluate()
-//   deliberately returns false — it is batch-only. The manager names this permission in the
-//   batch signature; only it is consulted (selective model).
-//
-// ENFORCES ON-CHAIN (kernel calls evaluateBatch() via staticcall; false/revert ⇒ batch blocked):
-//   The batch MUST be exactly these 3 calls, in this order, each with value == 0:
-//     calls[0] = approve(spender,amount)  selector 0x095ea7b3  on an allowlisted token
-//                • token (calls[0].target) must be in ALLOWED_TOKENS (cap > 0)
-//                • spender must be in ALLOWED_SPENDERS
-//                • 0 < amount ≤ maxApprovalAmount[token]
-//     calls[1] = <consuming call>         on an allowlisted (target, selector)
-//                • target must be in ALLOWED_CONSUMING_TARGETS
-//                • selector must be in ALLOWED_CONSUMING_SELECTORS
-//                • if REQUIRE_AMOUNT_MATCH: c1.data[4:36] (the first ABI-encoded argument of the
-//                  consuming call) must equal the approve amount. Only enable this flag if the
-//                  consuming function's FIRST parameter is the amount — if the amount appears in a
-//                  later position the check reads the wrong slot and is silently bypassed.
-//     calls[2] = approve(spender,0)       selector 0x095ea7b3  — mandatory reset
-//                • same token and same spender as calls[0]
-//                • amount must be exactly 0
-//   Any deviation (wrong length, wrong token/spender/target/selector, over-cap, non-zero reset,
-//   reordering, non-zero value, malformed calldata) ⇒ false or revert.
-//
-// ⚠ FUND DESTINATION NOT BOUNDED: unlike every single-call permission in this repo, this contract
-//   makes NO assertion that the consuming call routes funds to ctx.account. The recipient, receiver,
-//   or beneficiary inside calls[1] is unchecked. An agent bug that names an external address in the
-//   consuming call's arguments will not be blocked here. To close this gap, either:
-//     a) use a consuming target/selector that structurally routes output to msg.sender (the SMA), or
-//     b) pair this contract with a protocol-specific single-call permission that bounds the recipient.
-//
-// AGENT-ENFORCED / NOT BOUNDED HERE (off-chain — can change without redeploying this contract):
-//   • The full calldata of the consuming call beyond its leading uint256 (recipients, paths, etc.)
-//     — bound those with a protocol-specific permission if the consuming call needs tighter limits.
-//
-// VERIFY BEFORE USE:
-//   • approve selector 0x095ea7b3 is the ERC-20 standard. ALLOWED_CONSUMING_SELECTORS must match
-//     the real selector(s) of the protocol call you intend to bracket.
-//   • Per-token caps are in each token's base units (decimals differ — USDC 6, WETH 18).
-//   • Requires a SELECTIVE kernel (dispatchBatch exists). Conjunctive kernels have no batch path.
-//   • `sailor mandate simulate` probes single evaluate() only; it cannot probe evaluateBatch().
-//     Verify this contract by calling evaluateBatch(calls, ctx) directly (eth_call) with PASS/FAIL
-//     batches before authorizing on-chain.
-// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-import {IPermission, Context}                 from "@sail/interfaces/IPermission.sol";
-import {IBatchPermission, Call, BatchContext} from "@sail/interfaces/IBatchPermission.sol";
-
-contract BoundedApproveAndCallBatch is IPermission, IBatchPermission {
-    bytes32 private constant DISCRIMINATOR = keccak256("BoundedApproveAndCallBatch");
-
-    bytes4  private constant SEL_APPROVE       = 0x095ea7b3; // approve(address,uint256)
-    uint256 private constant APPROVE_CALLDATA_LEN = 68;       // 4 + 32 (spender) + 32 (amount)
-    uint256 private constant CONSUMING_MIN_LEN    = 36;       // 4 + 32 (leading uint256 arg)
-
-    mapping(address => uint256) public maxApprovalAmount;   // token  => cap (0 = not allowed)
-    mapping(address => bool)    public isSpender;           // spender allowlist
-    mapping(address => bool)    public isConsumingTarget;   // consuming-call target allowlist
-    mapping(bytes4  => bool)    public isConsumingSelector; // consuming-call selector allowlist
-    bool public immutable REQUIRE_AMOUNT_MATCH;
-
-    /// @param tokens              Allowlisted ERC-20 tokens that may be approved
-    /// @param maxApprovalAmounts  Per-token approve cap, index-parallel with `tokens` (each > 0)
-    /// @param spenders            Allowlisted spenders that may receive the allowance
-    /// @param consumingTargets    Allowlisted targets for the middle (consuming) call
-    /// @param consumingSelectors  Allowlisted selectors for the middle (consuming) call
-    /// @param requireAmountMatch  If true, the consuming call's leading uint256 must equal the approve amount
-    constructor(
-        address[] memory tokens,
-        uint256[] memory maxApprovalAmounts,
-        address[] memory spenders,
-        address[] memory consumingTargets,
-        bytes4[]  memory consumingSelectors,
-        bool requireAmountMatch
-    ) {
-        require(tokens.length == maxApprovalAmounts.length, "tokens/amounts length mismatch");
-        require(tokens.length > 0 && spenders.length > 0, "empty token/spender allowlist");
-        require(consumingTargets.length > 0 && consumingSelectors.length > 0, "empty consuming allowlist");
-
-        for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
-            require(tokens[i] != address(0) && maxApprovalAmounts[i] > 0, "bad token/cap");
-            maxApprovalAmount[tokens[i]] = maxApprovalAmounts[i];
-        }
-        for (uint256 i = 0; i < spenders.length; i++) {
-            require(spenders[i] != address(0), "zero spender");
-            isSpender[spenders[i]] = true;
-        }
-        for (uint256 i = 0; i < consumingTargets.length; i++) {
-            require(consumingTargets[i] != address(0), "zero target");
-            isConsumingTarget[consumingTargets[i]] = true;
-        }
-        for (uint256 i = 0; i < consumingSelectors.length; i++) {
-            require(consumingSelectors[i] != bytes4(0), "zero selector");
-            isConsumingSelector[consumingSelectors[i]] = true;
-        }
-        REQUIRE_AMOUNT_MATCH = requireAmountMatch;
-    }
-
-    // ── IBatchPermission ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-    /// @inheritdoc IBatchPermission
-    function isBatchPermission() external pure returns (bool) { return true; }
-
-    /// @inheritdoc IBatchPermission
-    function evaluateBatch(Call[] calldata calls, BatchContext calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
-        ctx; // batch context unused — bounds depend only on the call sequence, not the SMA
-        if (calls.length != 3) return false;
-
-        // ── calls[0]: approve(spender, amount) on an allowlisted token ───────
-        Call calldata c0 = calls[0];
-        if (c0.value != 0)                            return false;
-        if (c0.data.length != APPROVE_CALLDATA_LEN)   return false;
-        if (bytes4(c0.data[0:4]) != SEL_APPROVE)      return false;
-
-        address token = c0.target;
-        uint256 cap   = maxApprovalAmount[token];
-        if (cap == 0) return false; // token not allowlisted
-
-        (address spender, uint256 approveAmount) = _decodeApprove(c0.data);
-        if (!isSpender[spender])      return false;
-        if (approveAmount == 0)       return false;
-        if (approveAmount > cap)      return false;
-
-        // ── calls[1]: consuming call on an allowlisted (target, selector) ────
-        Call calldata c1 = calls[1];
-        if (c1.value != 0)                          return false;
-        if (!isConsumingTarget[c1.target])          return false;
-        if (c1.data.length < CONSUMING_MIN_LEN)     return false;
-        if (!isConsumingSelector[bytes4(c1.data[0:4])]) return false;
-        if (REQUIRE_AMOUNT_MATCH) {
-            if (uint256(bytes32(c1.data[4:36])) != approveAmount) return false;
-        }
-
-        // ── calls[2]: approve(spender, 0) — mandatory reset of same token+spender ─
-        Call calldata c2 = calls[2];
-        if (c2.value != 0)                            return false;
-        if (c2.target != token)                       return false;
-        if (c2.data.length != APPROVE_CALLDATA_LEN)   return false;
-        if (bytes4(c2.data[0:4]) != SEL_APPROVE)      return false;
-
-        (address resetSpender, uint256 resetAmount) = _decodeApprove(c2.data);
-        if (resetSpender != spender) return false;
-        if (resetAmount != 0)        return false;
-
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    // ── IPermission (batch-only: single dispatch is never authorised) ────────
-
-    /// @inheritdoc IPermission
-    function evaluate(bytes calldata, Context calldata) external pure returns (bool) {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    /// @inheritdoc IPermission
-    function discriminator() external pure returns (bytes32) { return DISCRIMINATOR; }
-
-    // ── internal calldata decoding (bounds-checked by callers above) ─────────
-
-    function _decodeApprove(bytes calldata data) internal pure returns (address spender, uint256 amount) {
-        spender = address(uint160(uint256(bytes32(data[4:36]))));
-        amount  = uint256(bytes32(data[36:68]));
-    }
-}
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity 0.8.26;
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Protocol : Sail batch dispatch (IBatchPermission) — protocol-agnostic
+// Version  : Single-tenant, constructor-configured (mirrors the multi-tenant
+//            SharedApproveAndCallBatchPermission shape from SailProtocol)
+// Chain    : Any EVM with a SELECTIVE kernel (Base, Arbitrum, Unichain, Base Sepolia)
+//
+// WHAT THIS TEACHES — the atomic approve → call → reset pattern.
+//   A bare ERC-20 approve is dangerous: it leaves a standing allowance an attacker can drain.
+//   The safe shape is to approve, consume the allowance in the SAME transaction, then reset it
+//   to zero — all-or-nothing. No single-call IPermission can enforce "the reset must be the
+//   final call", because per-call evaluation never sees the other calls. A batch permission
+//   sees the WHOLE sequence at once, so it can.
+//
+//   Gated via the kernel's dispatchBatch (NOT dispatch). This contract's single-call evaluate()
+//   deliberately returns false — it is batch-only. The manager names this permission in the
+//   batch signature; only it is consulted (selective model).
+//
+// ENFORCES ON-CHAIN (kernel calls evaluateBatch() via staticcall; false/revert ⇒ batch blocked):
+//   The batch MUST be exactly these 3 calls, in this order, each with value == 0:
+//     calls[0] = approve(spender,amount)  selector 0x095ea7b3  on an allowlisted token
+//                • token (calls[0].target) must be in ALLOWED_TOKENS (cap > 0)
+//                • spender must be in ALLOWED_SPENDERS
+//                • 0 < amount ≤ maxApprovalAmount[token]
+//     calls[1] = <consuming call>         on an allowlisted (target, selector)
+//                • target must be in ALLOWED_CONSUMING_TARGETS
+//                • selector must be in ALLOWED_CONSUMING_SELECTORS
+//                • if REQUIRE_AMOUNT_MATCH: c1.data[4:36] (the first ABI-encoded argument of the
+//                  consuming call) must equal the approve amount. Only enable this flag if the
+//                  consuming function's FIRST parameter is the amount — if the amount appears in a
+//                  later position the check reads the wrong slot and is silently bypassed.
+//     calls[2] = approve(spender,0)       selector 0x095ea7b3  — mandatory reset
+//                • same token and same spender as calls[0]
+//                • amount must be exactly 0
+//   Any deviation (wrong length, wrong token/spender/target/selector, over-cap, non-zero reset,
+//   reordering, non-zero value, malformed calldata) ⇒ false or revert.
+//
+// ⚠ FUND DESTINATION NOT BOUNDED: unlike every single-call permission in this repo, this contract
+//   makes NO assertion that the consuming call routes funds to ctx.account. The recipient, receiver,
+//   or beneficiary inside calls[1] is unchecked. An agent bug that names an external address in the
+//   consuming call's arguments will not be blocked here. To close this gap, either:
+//     a) use a consuming target/selector that structurally routes output to msg.sender (the SMA), or
+//     b) pair this contract with a protocol-specific single-call permission that bounds the recipient.
+//
+// AGENT-ENFORCED / NOT BOUNDED HERE (off-chain — can change without redeploying this contract):
+//   • The full calldata of the consuming call beyond its leading uint256 (recipients, paths, etc.)
+//     — bound those with a protocol-specific permission if the consuming call needs tighter limits.
+//
+// VERIFY BEFORE USE:
+//   • approve selector 0x095ea7b3 is the ERC-20 standard. ALLOWED_CONSUMING_SELECTORS must match
+//     the real selector(s) of the protocol call you intend to bracket.
+//   • Per-token caps are in each token's base units (decimals differ — USDC 6, WETH 18).
+//   • Requires a SELECTIVE kernel (dispatchBatch exists). Conjunctive kernels have no batch path.
+//   • `sailor mandate simulate` probes single evaluate() only; it cannot probe evaluateBatch().
+//     Verify this contract by calling evaluateBatch(calls, ctx) directly (eth_call) with PASS/FAIL
+//     batches before authorizing on-chain.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+import {IPermission, Context}                 from "@sail/interfaces/IPermission.sol";
+import {IBatchPermission, Call, BatchContext} from "@sail/interfaces/IBatchPermission.sol";
+
+contract BoundedApproveAndCallBatch is IPermission, IBatchPermission {
+    bytes32 private constant DISCRIMINATOR = keccak256("BoundedApproveAndCallBatch");
+
+    bytes4  private constant SEL_APPROVE       = 0x095ea7b3; // approve(address,uint256)
+    uint256 private constant APPROVE_CALLDATA_LEN = 68;       // 4 + 32 (spender) + 32 (amount)
+    uint256 private constant CONSUMING_MIN_LEN    = 36;       // 4 + 32 (leading uint256 arg)
+
+    mapping(address => uint256) public maxApprovalAmount;   // token  => cap (0 = not allowed)
+    mapping(address => bool)    public isSpender;           // spender allowlist
+    mapping(address => bool)    public isConsumingTarget;   // consuming-call target allowlist
+    mapping(bytes4  => bool)    public isConsumingSelector; // consuming-call selector allowlist
+    bool public immutable REQUIRE_AMOUNT_MATCH;
+
+    /// @param tokens              Allowlisted ERC-20 tokens that may be approved
+    /// @param maxApprovalAmounts  Per-token approve cap, index-parallel with `tokens` (each > 0)
+    /// @param spenders            Allowlisted spenders that may receive the allowance
+    /// @param consumingTargets    Allowlisted targets for the middle (consuming) call
+    /// @param consumingSelectors  Allowlisted selectors for the middle (consuming) call
+    /// @param requireAmountMatch  If true, the consuming call's leading uint256 must equal the approve amount
+    constructor(
+        address[] memory tokens,
+        uint256[] memory maxApprovalAmounts,
+        address[] memory spenders,
+        address[] memory consumingTargets,
+        bytes4[]  memory consumingSelectors,
+        bool requireAmountMatch
+    ) {
+        require(tokens.length == maxApprovalAmounts.length, "tokens/amounts length mismatch");
+        require(tokens.length > 0 && spenders.length > 0, "empty token/spender allowlist");
+        require(consumingTargets.length > 0 && consumingSelectors.length > 0, "empty consuming allowlist");
+
+        for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
+            require(tokens[i] != address(0) && maxApprovalAmounts[i] > 0, "bad token/cap");
+            maxApprovalAmount[tokens[i]] = maxApprovalAmounts[i];
+        }
+        for (uint256 i = 0; i < spenders.length; i++) {
+            require(spenders[i] != address(0), "zero spender");
+            isSpender[spenders[i]] = true;
+        }
+        for (uint256 i = 0; i < consumingTargets.length; i++) {
+            require(consumingTargets[i] != address(0), "zero target");
+            isConsumingTarget[consumingTargets[i]] = true;
+        }
+        for (uint256 i = 0; i < consumingSelectors.length; i++) {
+            require(consumingSelectors[i] != bytes4(0), "zero selector");
+            isConsumingSelector[consumingSelectors[i]] = true;
+        }
+        REQUIRE_AMOUNT_MATCH = requireAmountMatch;
+    }
+
+    // ── IBatchPermission ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IBatchPermission
+    function isBatchPermission() external pure returns (bool) { return true; }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IBatchPermission
+    function evaluateBatch(Call[] calldata calls, BatchContext calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
+        ctx; // batch context unused — bounds depend only on the call sequence, not the SMA
+        if (calls.length != 3) return false;
+
+        // ── calls[0]: approve(spender, amount) on an allowlisted token ───────
+        Call calldata c0 = calls[0];
+        if (c0.value != 0)                            return false;
+        if (c0.data.length != APPROVE_CALLDATA_LEN)   return false;
+        if (bytes4(c0.data[0:4]) != SEL_APPROVE)      return false;
+
+        address token = c0.target;
+        uint256 cap   = maxApprovalAmount[token];
+        if (cap == 0) return false; // token not allowlisted
+
+        (address spender, uint256 approveAmount) = _decodeApprove(c0.data);
+        if (!isSpender[spender])      return false;
+        if (approveAmount == 0)       return false;
+        if (approveAmount > cap)      return false;
+
+        // ── calls[1]: consuming call on an allowlisted (target, selector) ────
+        Call calldata c1 = calls[1];
+        if (c1.value != 0)                          return false;
+        if (!isConsumingTarget[c1.target])          return false;
+        if (c1.data.length < CONSUMING_MIN_LEN)     return false;
+        if (!isConsumingSelector[bytes4(c1.data[0:4])]) return false;
+        if (REQUIRE_AMOUNT_MATCH) {
+            if (uint256(bytes32(c1.data[4:36])) != approveAmount) return false;
+        }
+
+        // ── calls[2]: approve(spender, 0) — mandatory reset of same token+spender ─
+        Call calldata c2 = calls[2];
+        if (c2.value != 0)                            return false;
+        if (c2.target != token)                       return false;
+        if (c2.data.length != APPROVE_CALLDATA_LEN)   return false;
+        if (bytes4(c2.data[0:4]) != SEL_APPROVE)      return false;
+
+        (address resetSpender, uint256 resetAmount) = _decodeApprove(c2.data);
+        if (resetSpender != spender) return false;
+        if (resetAmount != 0)        return false;
+
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    // ── IPermission (batch-only: single dispatch is never authorised) ────────
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IPermission
+    function evaluate(bytes calldata, Context calldata) external pure returns (bool) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    /// @inheritdoc IPermission
+    function discriminator() external pure returns (bytes32) { return DISCRIMINATOR; }
+
+    // ── internal calldata decoding (bounds-checked by callers above) ─────────
+
+    function _decodeApprove(bytes calldata data) internal pure returns (address spender, uint256 amount) {
+        spender = address(uint160(uint256(bytes32(data[4:36]))));
+        amount  = uint256(bytes32(data[36:68]));
+    }
+}