@dev.sail.money/sailor 0.0.2 → 0.1.0-local

package/examples/permissions/BoundedSupply_AaveV3_Arbitrum.sol

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity 0.8.26;
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Protocol : Aave V3
+// Version  : Pool (proxy) — fully on-chain, oracle-based accounting
+// Chain    : Arbitrum mainnet (42161)
+// Target   : Aave V3 Pool  0x794a61358D6845594F94dc1DB02A252b5b4814aD  (verified on Arbiscan;
+//            same Pool as BoundedBorrow_AaveV3_Arbitrum — supply 0x617ba037 confirmed present
+//            in the live implementation 0xf05fd3cc...)
+//
+// ENFORCES ON-CHAIN (kernel calls evaluate() on every dispatch; false ⇒ dispatch blocked):
+//   supply(address asset,uint256 amount,address onBehalfOf,uint16 referralCode)  selector 0x617ba037
+//     • target must be AAVE_POOL
+//     • asset must be in ALLOWED_ASSETS
+//     • amount ≤ MAX_SUPPLY_AMOUNT
+//     • onBehalfOf must equal ctx.account (the SMA — collateral is credited to the SMA, not
+//       to another account)
+//
+// AGENT-ENFORCED / NOT BOUNDED HERE (off-chain — can change without redeploying this contract):
+//   • referralCode (informational only, does not affect fund safety)
+//   • Supply timing / cadence and choice of asset within ALLOWED_ASSETS
+//   • Withdrawal: not gated here (add a withdraw(asset,amount,to) permission with to==SMA if needed)
+//   • A supply also needs a prior ERC-20 approve of the Pool — gate that separately
+//     (see BoundedApproveAndCallBatch.sol for the atomic approve→call→reset pattern).
+//
+// VERIFY BEFORE USE:
+//   • Selector 0x617ba037 = supply(address,uint256,address,uint16) — verified via `cast sig`
+//     and confirmed present in the deployed Pool implementation on Arbitrum.
+//   • This is the canonical Aave V3 Pool.supply. (V3.x also exposes supplyWithPermit — not
+//     gated here; add it if your agent supplies via EIP-2612 permits.)
+//   • MAX_SUPPLY_AMOUNT is in the asset's base units (e.g. USDC = 6 decimals).
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+import {IPermission, Context} from "@sail/interfaces/IPermission.sol";
+import {SailCalldata} from "./SailCalldata.sol";
+
+contract BoundedSupply_AaveV3_Arbitrum is IPermission {
+    bytes32 private constant DISCRIMINATOR = keccak256("BoundedSupply_AaveV3_Arbitrum");
+
+    address public immutable AAVE_POOL;
+    mapping(address => bool) public isAllowedAsset;
+    uint256 public immutable MAX_SUPPLY_AMOUNT;
+
+    // supply(address,uint256,address,uint16) — verified 0x617ba037
+    bytes4 private constant SEL_SUPPLY = 0x617ba037;
+
+    /// @param aavePool         Aave V3 Pool proxy address
+    /// @param allowedAssets    Assets the agent may supply (must be non-empty)
+    /// @param maxSupplyAmount  Per-call supply cap in asset base units (must be > 0)
+    constructor(address aavePool, address[] memory allowedAssets, uint256 maxSupplyAmount) {
+        require(aavePool != address(0),      "zero pool address");
+        require(allowedAssets.length > 0,    "empty asset allowlist");
+        require(maxSupplyAmount > 0,         "zero supply cap");
+        AAVE_POOL        = aavePool;
+        MAX_SUPPLY_AMOUNT = maxSupplyAmount;
+        for (uint256 i = 0; i < allowedAssets.length; i++) {
+            require(allowedAssets[i] != address(0), "zero asset address");
+            isAllowedAsset[allowedAssets[i]] = true;
+        }
+    }
+
+    function evaluate(bytes calldata txData, Context calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
+        if (ctx.target != AAVE_POOL)    return false;
+        if (ctx.selector != SEL_SUPPLY) return false;
+        // supply(address asset, uint256 amount, address onBehalfOf, uint16 referralCode)
+        if (!SailCalldata.hasParams(txData, 4)) return false;
+
+        address asset      = SailCalldata.asAddress(txData, 0);
+        uint256 amount     = SailCalldata.asUint256(txData, 1);
+        address onBehalfOf = SailCalldata.asAddress(txData, 2);
+        // slot 3 = referralCode (uint16) — informational, not bounded
+
+        if (!isAllowedAsset[asset])       return false;
+        if (amount > MAX_SUPPLY_AMOUNT)   return false;
+        if (onBehalfOf != ctx.account)    return false; // collateral credited only to the SMA
+
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    function discriminator() external pure returns (bytes32) { return DISCRIMINATOR; }
+}

package/examples/permissions/BoundedSwap_UniswapV3_Base.sol

@@ -1,113 +1,116 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-pragma solidity 0.8.26;
-
-// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// Protocol : Uniswap V3
-// Version  : SwapRouter02 (NOT the older SwapRouter — different selectors)
-// Chain    : Base mainnet
-// Target   : SwapRouter02  0x2626664c2603336E57B271c5C0b26F421741e481
-//
-// ENFORCED ON-CHAIN (via kernel evaluate() on every dispatch):
-//   exactInputSingle path (selector 0x04e45aaf):
-//     • target must be SWAP_ROUTER
-//     • tokenIn  must equal FIXED_TOKEN_IN
-//     • tokenOut must be in ALLOWED_TOKENS_OUT
-//     • amountIn ≤ MAX_AMOUNT_IN
-//     • amountOutMinimum ≥ amountIn × MIN_BPS / 10 000  (slippage floor)
-//   approve path (selector 0x095ea7b3):
-//     • target must be FIXED_TOKEN_IN (the ERC-20 being approved)
-//     • spender must be SWAP_ROUTER
-//     • amount  ≤ MAX_AMOUNT_IN
-//
-// NOT ENFORCED (agent code — can change without a new contract):
-//   • fee tier, sqrtPriceLimitX96, recipient address
-//   • swap frequency / cadence
-//
-// VERIFY BEFORE USE:
-//   • Confirm SwapRouter02 address on your chain (Base default shown above).
-//   • Selector 0x04e45aaf = exactInputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint160))
-//     on SwapRouter02. The older SwapRouter uses a different selector (0x414577b7).
-//   • Confirm that amountOutMinimum slippage floor fits your price-impact expectations for the
-//     chosen pool. Large amountIn values may trigger price impact beyond MIN_BPS.
-// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-import {IPermission, Context} from "@sail/interfaces/IPermission.sol";
-
-contract BoundedSwap_UniswapV3_Base is IPermission {
-    bytes32 private constant DISCRIMINATOR = keccak256("BoundedSwap_UniswapV3_Base");
-
-    address public immutable SWAP_ROUTER;
-    address public immutable FIXED_TOKEN_IN;
-    mapping(address => bool) public isAllowedTokenOut;
-    uint256 public immutable MAX_AMOUNT_IN;
-    /// @dev Slippage floor in basis points. 9 900 = allow at most 1% slippage.
-    uint256 public immutable MIN_BPS;
-
-    bytes4 private constant SEL_EXACT_INPUT_SINGLE = 0x04e45aaf;
-    bytes4 private constant SEL_APPROVE            = 0x095ea7b3;
-
-    struct ExactInputSingleParams {
-        address tokenIn;
-        address tokenOut;
-        uint24  fee;
-        address recipient;
-        uint256 amountIn;
-        uint256 amountOutMinimum;
-        uint160 sqrtPriceLimitX96;
-    }
-
-    /// @param swapRouter      SwapRouter02 address (0x2626... on Base)
-    /// @param fixedTokenIn    The one token the agent is allowed to sell
-    /// @param allowedTokensOut  Tokens the agent may receive
-    /// @param maxAmountIn     Per-call spend cap in fixedTokenIn base units
-    /// @param minBps          Minimum amountOutMinimum as fraction of amountIn ×10 000
-    ///                        e.g. 9900 → require amountOutMinimum ≥ 99% of amountIn
-    ///                        (denominated in fixedTokenIn units, not USD — set per your pair)
-    constructor(
-        address swapRouter,
-        address fixedTokenIn,
-        address[] memory allowedTokensOut,
-        uint256 maxAmountIn,
-        uint256 minBps
-    ) {
-        require(minBps <= 10_000, "minBps > 10000");
-        SWAP_ROUTER    = swapRouter;
-        FIXED_TOKEN_IN = fixedTokenIn;
-        MAX_AMOUNT_IN  = maxAmountIn;
-        MIN_BPS        = minBps;
-        for (uint256 i = 0; i < allowedTokensOut.length; i++) {
-            isAllowedTokenOut[allowedTokensOut[i]] = true;
-        }
-    }
-
-    function evaluate(bytes calldata txData, Context calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
-        if (txData.length < 4) return false;
-
-        // exactInputSingle: agent swaps FIXED_TOKEN_IN for an allowed output token
-        if (ctx.target == SWAP_ROUTER && ctx.selector == SEL_EXACT_INPUT_SINGLE) {
-            if (txData.length < 4 + 7 * 32) return false;
-            ExactInputSingleParams memory p = abi.decode(txData[4:], (ExactInputSingleParams));
-            if (p.tokenIn != FIXED_TOKEN_IN)         return false;
-            if (!isAllowedTokenOut[p.tokenOut])      return false;
-            if (p.amountIn > MAX_AMOUNT_IN)          return false;
-            // Slippage floor: require amountOutMinimum ≥ amountIn * MIN_BPS / 10 000.
-            // This is not a USD check — it's a ratio check in tokenIn units.
-            // For a USDC→WETH swap, set MIN_BPS conservatively (e.g. 9 900 for 1% slippage).
-            if (p.amountOutMinimum < (p.amountIn * MIN_BPS) / 10_000) return false;
-            return true;
-        }
-
-        // approve: agent approves the router to spend FIXED_TOKEN_IN
-        if (ctx.target == FIXED_TOKEN_IN && ctx.selector == SEL_APPROVE) {
-            if (txData.length < 4 + 2 * 32) return false;
-            (address spender, uint256 amount) = abi.decode(txData[4:], (address, uint256));
-            if (spender != SWAP_ROUTER)  return false;
-            if (amount > MAX_AMOUNT_IN)  return false;
-            return true;
-        }
-
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    function discriminator() external pure returns (bytes32) { return DISCRIMINATOR; }
-}
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity 0.8.26;
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Protocol : Uniswap V3
+// Version  : SwapRouter02 (NOT the older SwapRouter — different selectors)
+// Chain    : Base mainnet (8453)
+// Target   : SwapRouter02  0x2626664c2603336E57B271c5C0b26F421741e481  (verified on Basescan)
+//
+// ENFORCES ON-CHAIN (kernel calls evaluate() on every dispatch; false ⇒ dispatch blocked):
+//   exactInputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint160))  selector 0x04e45aaf
+//     • target must be SWAP_ROUTER
+//     • tokenIn  must equal FIXED_TOKEN_IN
+//     • tokenOut must be in ALLOWED_TOKENS_OUT
+//     • amountIn ≤ MAX_AMOUNT_IN
+//     • amountOutMinimum ≥ amountIn × MIN_BPS / 10 000  (slippage floor — see caveat below)
+//   approve(address,uint256)  selector 0x095ea7b3
+//     • target must be FIXED_TOKEN_IN (the ERC-20 being approved)
+//     • spender must be SWAP_ROUTER
+//     • amount  ≤ MAX_AMOUNT_IN
+//
+// AGENT-ENFORCED / NOT BOUNDED HERE (off-chain — can change without redeploying this contract):
+//   • fee tier, sqrtPriceLimitX96, recipient address
+//   • swap frequency / cadence
+//   • real (cross-denomination) slippage — see MIN_BPS caveat in evaluate()
+//
+// VERIFY BEFORE USE:
+//   • Confirm SwapRouter02 address on your chain (Base default shown above; verified on Basescan).
+//   • Selector 0x04e45aaf = exactInputSingle((address,address,uint24,address,uint256,uint256,uint160))
+//     on SwapRouter02 (verified via `cast sig`). The OLDER SwapRouter's exactInputSingle (the
+//     deadline variant) is 0x414bf389 — a different selector; do not confuse the two.
+//   • Confirm that amountOutMinimum slippage floor fits your price-impact expectations for the
+//     chosen pool. Large amountIn values may trigger price impact beyond MIN_BPS.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+import {IPermission, Context} from "@sail/interfaces/IPermission.sol";
+
+contract BoundedSwap_UniswapV3_Base is IPermission {
+    bytes32 private constant DISCRIMINATOR = keccak256("BoundedSwap_UniswapV3_Base");
+
+    address public immutable SWAP_ROUTER;
+    address public immutable FIXED_TOKEN_IN;
+    mapping(address => bool) public isAllowedTokenOut;
+    uint256 public immutable MAX_AMOUNT_IN;
+    /// @dev Slippage floor in basis points. 9 900 = allow at most 1% slippage.
+    uint256 public immutable MIN_BPS;
+
+    bytes4 private constant SEL_EXACT_INPUT_SINGLE = 0x04e45aaf;
+    bytes4 private constant SEL_APPROVE            = 0x095ea7b3;
+
+    struct ExactInputSingleParams {
+        address tokenIn;
+        address tokenOut;
+        uint24  fee;
+        address recipient;
+        uint256 amountIn;
+        uint256 amountOutMinimum;
+        uint160 sqrtPriceLimitX96;
+    }
+
+    /// @param swapRouter      SwapRouter02 address (0x2626... on Base)
+    /// @param fixedTokenIn    The one token the agent is allowed to sell
+    /// @param allowedTokensOut  Tokens the agent may receive
+    /// @param maxAmountIn     Per-call spend cap in fixedTokenIn base units
+    /// @param minBps          Minimum amountOutMinimum as fraction of amountIn ×10 000
+    ///                        e.g. 9900 → require amountOutMinimum ≥ 99% of amountIn
+    ///                        (denominated in fixedTokenIn units, not USD — set per your pair)
+    constructor(
+        address swapRouter,
+        address fixedTokenIn,
+        address[] memory allowedTokensOut,
+        uint256 maxAmountIn,
+        uint256 minBps
+    ) {
+        require(minBps <= 10_000, "minBps > 10000");
+        SWAP_ROUTER    = swapRouter;
+        FIXED_TOKEN_IN = fixedTokenIn;
+        MAX_AMOUNT_IN  = maxAmountIn;
+        MIN_BPS        = minBps;
+        for (uint256 i = 0; i < allowedTokensOut.length; i++) {
+            isAllowedTokenOut[allowedTokensOut[i]] = true;
+        }
+    }
+
+    function evaluate(bytes calldata txData, Context calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
+        if (txData.length < 4) return false;
+
+        // exactInputSingle: agent swaps FIXED_TOKEN_IN for an allowed output token
+        if (ctx.target == SWAP_ROUTER && ctx.selector == SEL_EXACT_INPUT_SINGLE) {
+            if (txData.length < 4 + 7 * 32) return false;
+            ExactInputSingleParams memory p = abi.decode(txData[4:], (ExactInputSingleParams));
+            if (p.tokenIn != FIXED_TOKEN_IN)         return false;
+            if (!isAllowedTokenOut[p.tokenOut])      return false;
+            if (p.amountIn > MAX_AMOUNT_IN)          return false;
+            // Slippage floor: amountOutMinimum ≥ amountIn × MIN_BPS / 10 000.
+            // WARNING: compares tokenOut against tokenIn base units. For same-price/same-decimal
+            // pairs this maps to a slippage %. For cross-price pairs (e.g. USDC→WETH) it is
+            // trivially satisfied — real slippage is enforced by the agent off-chain, not here.
+            if (p.amountOutMinimum < (p.amountIn * MIN_BPS) / 10_000) return false;
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        // approve: agent approves the router to spend FIXED_TOKEN_IN
+        if (ctx.target == FIXED_TOKEN_IN && ctx.selector == SEL_APPROVE) {
+            if (txData.length < 4 + 2 * 32) return false;
+            (address spender, uint256 amount) = abi.decode(txData[4:], (address, uint256));
+            if (spender != SWAP_ROUTER)  return false;
+            if (amount > MAX_AMOUNT_IN)  return false;
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    function discriminator() external pure returns (bytes32) { return DISCRIMINATOR; }
+}

package/examples/permissions/BoundedSwap_UniswapV4_Unichain.sol

@@ -1,144 +1,150 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-pragma solidity 0.8.26;
-
-// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// Protocol : Uniswap V4
-// Version  : Universal Router + PoolManager (V4 singleton)
-//            NOTE: V4 is NOT the same as V3. Calldata encoding is completely
-//            different — do NOT adapt a V3 permission for V4.
-// Chain    : Unichain mainnet
-// Target   : Universal Router  0xef740bf23acae26f6492b10de645d6b98dc8eaf3
-//            (verify on Uniscan before use)
-//
-// ENFORCED ON-CHAIN (via kernel evaluate() on every dispatch):
-//   execute(bytes,bytes[]) or execute(bytes,bytes[],uint256):
-//     • target must be UNIVERSAL_ROUTER
-//     • first command byte (masking the allow-failure MSB) must be V4_SWAP (0x10)
-//     • exactly one command (single-swap path — disallow multi-hop command strings)
-//     • V4 action inside must be SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE (0x00)
-//     • tokenIn (from poolKey, derived by zeroForOne) must be FIXED_CURRENCY_IN
-//     • tokenOut must be in ALLOWED_CURRENCIES_OUT
-//     • amountIn ≤ MAX_AMOUNT_IN
-//     • amountOutMinimum ≥ amountIn × MIN_BPS / 10 000
-//
-// NOT ENFORCED — documented limitations:
-//   • hookData is not inspected (hooks can alter swap behavior on-chain; if the
-//     pool uses a hook that significantly changes execution, this permission cannot
-//     constrain it. Deploy against pools with address(0) hooks or audited hooks only.)
-//   • fee tier and tickSpacing within the PoolKey are not constrained here
-//     (add pool-key checks if you want to restrict to a specific pool)
-//   • The ALL_CURRENCY_PAIR constant (FIXED_CURRENCY_IN, allowedCurrenciesOut) does
-//     not constrain which pool is used when multiple pools share the same currency pair
-//
-// VERIFY BEFORE USE:
-//   • Confirm Universal Router address on Unichain (shown above; verify on Uniscan).
-//   • V4_SWAP command byte = 0x10, SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE action = 0x00 — verify
-//     against deployed UniversalRouter and V4Router on Unichain if contract is updated.
-//   • PoolKey struct layout (currency0, currency1, fee, tickSpacing, hooks) must
-//     match the deployed PoolManager on Unichain. If layout changes, update struct.
-//   • hookData is not bounded. Only use with unhookyed pools or audited, bounded hooks.
-//   • Calldata revert = false (kernel treats revert as denial) — malformed inputs
-//     are safely rejected, but verify with actual calldata samples before deployment.
-// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-import {IPermission, Context} from "@sail/interfaces/IPermission.sol";
-
-contract BoundedSwap_UniswapV4_Unichain is IPermission {
-    bytes32 private constant DISCRIMINATOR = keccak256("BoundedSwap_UniswapV4_Unichain");
-
-    address public immutable UNIVERSAL_ROUTER;
-    address public immutable FIXED_CURRENCY_IN;
-    mapping(address => bool) public isAllowedCurrencyOut;
-    uint256 public immutable MAX_AMOUNT_IN;
-    uint256 public immutable MIN_BPS;
-
-    // execute(bytes,bytes[],uint256) — with deadline
-    bytes4 private constant SEL_EXECUTE_DEADLINE = 0x3593564c;
-    // execute(bytes,bytes[])          — without deadline
-    bytes4 private constant SEL_EXECUTE           = 0x24856bc3;
-    // Universal Router command byte for V4_SWAP
-    uint8 private constant CMD_V4_SWAP = 0x10;
-    // Bit mask to strip the "allow failure" MSB from a command byte
-    uint8 private constant CMD_MASK = 0x3f;
-    // V4Router action: SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE
-    uint8 private constant ACT_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE = 0x00;
-
-    // PoolKey layout must match the deployed V4 PoolManager on Unichain
-    struct PoolKey {
-        address currency0;  // Currency — address type in V4
-        address currency1;
-        uint24  fee;
-        int24   tickSpacing;
-        address hooks;      // IHooks — address(0) for unhookyed pools
-    }
-
-    struct ExactInputSingleParams {
-        PoolKey poolKey;
-        bool    zeroForOne;
-        uint128 amountIn;
-        uint128 amountOutMinimum;
-        bytes   hookData;   // not inspected — see limitations header
-    }
-
-    constructor(
-        address universalRouter,
-        address fixedCurrencyIn,
-        address[] memory allowedCurrenciesOut,
-        uint256 maxAmountIn,
-        uint256 minBps
-    ) {
-        require(minBps <= 10_000, "minBps > 10000");
-        UNIVERSAL_ROUTER  = universalRouter;
-        FIXED_CURRENCY_IN = fixedCurrencyIn;
-        MAX_AMOUNT_IN     = maxAmountIn;
-        MIN_BPS           = minBps;
-        for (uint256 i = 0; i < allowedCurrenciesOut.length; i++) {
-            isAllowedCurrenciesOut[allowedCurrenciesOut[i]] = true;
-        }
-    }
-
-    mapping(address => bool) private isAllowedCurrenciesOut;
-
-    function evaluate(bytes calldata txData, Context calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
-        if (ctx.target != UNIVERSAL_ROUTER) return false;
-        if (ctx.selector != SEL_EXECUTE_DEADLINE && ctx.selector != SEL_EXECUTE) return false;
-        if (txData.length < 4) return false;
-
-        // Decode the execute call. Both overloads start with (bytes commands, bytes[] inputs).
-        // abi.decode ignores trailing fields, so decoding as (bytes, bytes[]) works for both.
-        (bytes memory commands, bytes[] memory inputs) = abi.decode(txData[4:], (bytes, bytes[]));
-
-        // Enforce: exactly one command, and it must be V4_SWAP
-        if (commands.length != 1)                              return false;
-        if ((uint8(commands[0]) & CMD_MASK) != CMD_V4_SWAP)   return false;
-        if (inputs.length != 1)                                return false;
-
-        // Decode the V4 router call (actions + per-action params)
-        (bytes memory v4Actions, bytes[] memory v4Params) =
-            abi.decode(inputs[0], (bytes, bytes[]));
-
-        // Enforce: exactly one V4 action, and it must be SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE
-        if (v4Actions.length != 1)                                                    return false;
-        if (uint8(v4Actions[0]) != ACT_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE)                         return false;
-        if (v4Params.length != 1)                                                     return false;
-
-        // Decode ExactInputSingleParams from the action param.
-        // hookData is a dynamic bytes field — revert here means false (fail closed).
-        ExactInputSingleParams memory p = abi.decode(v4Params[0], (ExactInputSingleParams));
-
-        // Derive tokenIn and tokenOut from the PoolKey and zeroForOne flag.
-        // In V4, currency0 < currency1 (sorted by address). zeroForOne = true means
-        // trading currency0 for currency1.
-        address tokenIn  = p.zeroForOne ? p.poolKey.currency0 : p.poolKey.currency1;
-        address tokenOut = p.zeroForOne ? p.poolKey.currency1 : p.poolKey.currency0;
-
-        if (tokenIn != FIXED_CURRENCY_IN)            return false;
-        if (!isAllowedCurrenciesOut[tokenOut])       return false;
-        if (p.amountIn > MAX_AMOUNT_IN)              return false;
-        if (p.amountOutMinimum < (uint256(p.amountIn) * MIN_BPS) / 10_000) return false;
-
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    function discriminator() external pure returns (bytes32) { return DISCRIMINATOR; }
-}
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+pragma solidity 0.8.26;
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Protocol : Uniswap V4
+// Version  : Universal Router + PoolManager (V4 singleton)
+//            NOTE: V4 is NOT the same as V3. Calldata encoding is completely
+//            different — do NOT adapt a V3 permission for V4.
+// Chain    : Unichain mainnet
+// Target   : Universal Router  0xef740bf23acae26f6492b10de645d6b98dc8eaf3
+//            (verify on Uniscan before use)
+//
+// ENFORCES ON-CHAIN (kernel calls evaluate() on every dispatch; false ⇒ dispatch blocked):
+//   execute(bytes,bytes[],uint256) selector 0x3593564c  /  execute(bytes,bytes[]) selector 0x24856bc3
+//     • target must be UNIVERSAL_ROUTER
+//     • first command byte (masking the allow-failure MSB) must be V4_SWAP (0x10)
+//     • exactly one command (single-swap path — disallow multi-hop command strings)
+//     • V4 action inside must be SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE (0x00)
+//     • tokenIn (from poolKey, derived by zeroForOne) must be FIXED_CURRENCY_IN
+//     • tokenOut must be in ALLOWED_CURRENCIES_OUT
+//     • amountIn ≤ MAX_AMOUNT_IN
+//     • amountOutMinimum ≥ amountIn × MIN_BPS / 10 000  (slippage floor — see caveat below)
+//
+// AGENT-ENFORCED / NOT BOUNDED HERE (off-chain — can change without redeploying this contract):
+//   • real (cross-denomination) slippage — see MIN_BPS caveat in evaluate()
+//   • swap frequency / cadence
+//
+// DOCUMENTED LIMITATIONS (on-chain, but intentionally not constrained):
+//   • hookData is not inspected (hooks can alter swap behavior on-chain; if the
+//     pool uses a hook that significantly changes execution, this permission cannot
+//     constrain it. Deploy against pools with address(0) hooks or audited hooks only.)
+//   • fee tier and tickSpacing within the PoolKey are not constrained here
+//     (add pool-key checks if you want to restrict to a specific pool)
+//   • The ALL_CURRENCY_PAIR constant (FIXED_CURRENCY_IN, allowedCurrenciesOut) does
+//     not constrain which pool is used when multiple pools share the same currency pair
+//
+// VERIFY BEFORE USE:
+//   • Confirm Universal Router address on Unichain (shown above; verify on Uniscan).
+//   • V4_SWAP command byte = 0x10, SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE action = 0x00 — verify
+//     against deployed UniversalRouter and V4Router on Unichain if contract is updated.
+//   • PoolKey struct layout (currency0, currency1, fee, tickSpacing, hooks) must
+//     match the deployed PoolManager on Unichain. If layout changes, update struct.
+//   • hookData is not bounded. Only use with unhookyed pools or audited, bounded hooks.
+//   • Calldata revert = false (kernel treats revert as denial) — malformed inputs
+//     are safely rejected, but verify with actual calldata samples before deployment.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+import {IPermission, Context} from "@sail/interfaces/IPermission.sol";
+
+contract BoundedSwap_UniswapV4_Unichain is IPermission {
+    bytes32 private constant DISCRIMINATOR = keccak256("BoundedSwap_UniswapV4_Unichain");
+
+    address public immutable UNIVERSAL_ROUTER;
+    address public immutable FIXED_CURRENCY_IN;
+    mapping(address => bool) public isAllowedCurrencyOut;
+    uint256 public immutable MAX_AMOUNT_IN;
+    uint256 public immutable MIN_BPS;
+
+    // execute(bytes,bytes[],uint256) — with deadline
+    bytes4 private constant SEL_EXECUTE_DEADLINE = 0x3593564c;
+    // execute(bytes,bytes[])          — without deadline
+    bytes4 private constant SEL_EXECUTE           = 0x24856bc3;
+    // Universal Router command byte for V4_SWAP
+    uint8 private constant CMD_V4_SWAP = 0x10;
+    // Bit mask to strip the "allow failure" MSB from a command byte
+    uint8 private constant CMD_MASK = 0x3f;
+    // V4Router action: SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE
+    uint8 private constant ACT_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE = 0x00;
+
+    // PoolKey layout must match the deployed V4 PoolManager on Unichain
+    struct PoolKey {
+        address currency0;  // Currency — address type in V4
+        address currency1;
+        uint24  fee;
+        int24   tickSpacing;
+        address hooks;      // IHooks — address(0) for unhookyed pools
+    }
+
+    struct ExactInputSingleParams {
+        PoolKey poolKey;
+        bool    zeroForOne;
+        uint128 amountIn;
+        uint128 amountOutMinimum;
+        bytes   hookData;   // not inspected — see limitations header
+    }
+
+    constructor(
+        address universalRouter,
+        address fixedCurrencyIn,
+        address[] memory allowedCurrenciesOut,
+        uint256 maxAmountIn,
+        uint256 minBps
+    ) {
+        require(minBps <= 10_000, "minBps > 10000");
+        UNIVERSAL_ROUTER  = universalRouter;
+        FIXED_CURRENCY_IN = fixedCurrencyIn;
+        MAX_AMOUNT_IN     = maxAmountIn;
+        MIN_BPS           = minBps;
+        for (uint256 i = 0; i < allowedCurrenciesOut.length; i++) {
+            isAllowedCurrencyOut[allowedCurrenciesOut[i]] = true;
+        }
+    }
+
+    function evaluate(bytes calldata txData, Context calldata ctx) external view returns (bool) {
+        if (ctx.target != UNIVERSAL_ROUTER) return false;
+        if (ctx.selector != SEL_EXECUTE_DEADLINE && ctx.selector != SEL_EXECUTE) return false;
+        if (txData.length < 4) return false;
+
+        // Decode the execute call. Both overloads start with (bytes commands, bytes[] inputs).
+        // abi.decode ignores trailing fields, so decoding as (bytes, bytes[]) works for both.
+        (bytes memory commands, bytes[] memory inputs) = abi.decode(txData[4:], (bytes, bytes[]));
+
+        // Enforce: exactly one command, and it must be V4_SWAP
+        if (commands.length != 1)                              return false;
+        if ((uint8(commands[0]) & CMD_MASK) != CMD_V4_SWAP)   return false;
+        if (inputs.length != 1)                                return false;
+
+        // Decode the V4 router call (actions + per-action params)
+        (bytes memory v4Actions, bytes[] memory v4Params) =
+            abi.decode(inputs[0], (bytes, bytes[]));
+
+        // Enforce: exactly one V4 action, and it must be SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE
+        if (v4Actions.length != 1)                                                    return false;
+        if (uint8(v4Actions[0]) != ACT_SWAP_EXACT_IN_SINGLE)                         return false;
+        if (v4Params.length != 1)                                                     return false;
+
+        // Decode ExactInputSingleParams from the action param.
+        // hookData is a dynamic bytes field — revert here means false (fail closed).
+        ExactInputSingleParams memory p = abi.decode(v4Params[0], (ExactInputSingleParams));
+
+        // Derive tokenIn and tokenOut from the PoolKey and zeroForOne flag.
+        // In V4, currency0 < currency1 (sorted by address). zeroForOne = true means
+        // trading currency0 for currency1.
+        address tokenIn  = p.zeroForOne ? p.poolKey.currency0 : p.poolKey.currency1;
+        address tokenOut = p.zeroForOne ? p.poolKey.currency1 : p.poolKey.currency0;
+
+        if (tokenIn != FIXED_CURRENCY_IN)            return false;
+        if (!isAllowedCurrencyOut[tokenOut])         return false;
+        if (p.amountIn > MAX_AMOUNT_IN)              return false;
+        // Slippage floor: amountOutMinimum ≥ amountIn × MIN_BPS / 10 000.
+        // WARNING: compares tokenOut against tokenIn base units. For same-price/same-decimal
+        // pairs this maps to a slippage %. For cross-price pairs it is trivially satisfied —
+        // real slippage is enforced by the agent off-chain, not by this contract.
+        if (p.amountOutMinimum < (uint256(p.amountIn) * MIN_BPS) / 10_000) return false;
+
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    function discriminator() external pure returns (bytes32) { return DISCRIMINATOR; }
+}