npm - @desplega.ai/agent-swarm - Versions diffs - 1.78.0 → 1.79.0 - Mend

@desplega.ai/agent-swarm 1.78.0 → 1.79.0

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Files changed (48) hide show

package/openapi.json +542 -1
package/package.json +1 -1
package/plugin/skills/artifacts/SKILL.md +151 -0
package/plugin/skills/artifacts/examples/static-report.sh +1 -1
package/plugin/skills/pages/SKILL.md +274 -0
package/src/artifact-sdk/browser-sdk.ts +105 -20
package/src/be/db.ts +239 -0
package/src/be/migrations/059_pages.sql +34 -0
package/src/be/migrations/060_page_versions.sql +19 -0
package/src/commands/artifact.ts +17 -11
package/src/http/index.ts +7 -1
package/src/http/page-proxy.ts +208 -0
package/src/http/pages-public.ts +466 -0
package/src/http/pages.ts +608 -0
package/src/http/utils.ts +68 -5
package/src/pages/version.ts +44 -0
package/src/prompts/session-templates.ts +51 -0
package/src/server.ts +10 -1
package/src/tests/artifact-commands.test.ts +92 -0
package/src/tests/artifact-sdk.test.ts +80 -74
package/src/tests/create-page-tool.test.ts +197 -0
package/src/tests/error-tracker.test.ts +30 -0
package/src/tests/fixtures/sample-json-page.json +52 -0
package/src/tests/launch-password-rejection.test.ts +139 -0
package/src/tests/page-proxy-authed.test.ts +146 -0
package/src/tests/page-proxy.test.ts +266 -0
package/src/tests/page-session.test.ts +164 -0
package/src/tests/pages-actions-endpoint.test.ts +102 -0
package/src/tests/pages-authed-mode.test.ts +207 -0
package/src/tests/pages-http.test.ts +193 -0
package/src/tests/pages-list-endpoint.test.ts +149 -0
package/src/tests/pages-password-hash.test.ts +57 -0
package/src/tests/pages-password-mode.test.ts +265 -0
package/src/tests/pages-public-authed-401.test.ts +102 -0
package/src/tests/pages-public-html.test.ts +151 -0
package/src/tests/pages-public-json-redirect.test.ts +86 -0
package/src/tests/pages-storage.test.ts +196 -0
package/src/tests/pages-versioning.test.ts +231 -0
package/src/tests/prompt-template-session.test.ts +3 -2
package/src/tests/skill-update-scope.test.ts +165 -0
package/src/tests/workflow-wait-event.test.ts +4 -7
package/src/tools/create-page.ts +263 -0
package/src/tools/skills/skill-update.ts +26 -0
package/src/tools/tool-config.ts +3 -0
package/src/types.ts +54 -0
package/src/utils/error-tracker.ts +55 -1
package/src/utils/page-session.ts +254 -0
package/plugin/skills/artifacts/skill.md +0 -70

package/src/http/pages-public.ts ADDED Viewed

@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+/**
+ * Public-facing page routes — `/p/:id` and `/p/:id.json`.
+ *
+ * Distinct from `src/http/pages.ts` (bearer-authed REST) — these are the
+ * surfaces an end-user's browser actually hits. Both routes are declared
+ * with `auth: { apiKey: false }` so the global bearer gate skips them.
+ *
+ * Scope of THIS module (step-3):
+ *   - `auth_mode === 'public'`: ungated. HTML responses inline-inject the
+ *     `BROWSER_SDK_JS` constant from `src/artifact-sdk/browser-sdk.ts` (reused
+ *     verbatim — no token-injection hook on the client). JSON responses
+ *     302-redirect to the SPA `/pages/:id` route (the JSON renderer lives
+ *     in the SPA, not the API — step-6/7).
+ *   - `auth_mode === 'authed'`: returns 401. step-4 narrows this to also
+ *     accept a valid `page_session` cookie.
+ *   - `auth_mode === 'password'`: returns 401. step-5 narrows this to also
+ *     accept `?key=` query param + HTTP Basic.
+ *
+ * No request/response body is ever scrubbed in the served stream — page
+ * bodies are agent-authored content and pass through verbatim. Logging
+ * paths (errors only) DO scrub via `scrubSecrets`.
+ */
+import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from "node:http";
+import { z } from "zod";
+import { BROWSER_SDK_JS } from "../artifact-sdk/browser-sdk";
+import { getPage } from "../be/db";
+import type { Page } from "../types";
+import { extractAndVerifyCookie, issuePageSessionCookie } from "../utils/page-session";
+import { scrubSecrets } from "../utils/secret-scrubber";
+import { route } from "./route-def";
+// ─── Route definitions (registered with auth: { apiKey: false }) ────────────
+const publicPageRoute = route({
+  method: "get",
+  path: "/p/{id}",
+  pattern: ["p", null],
+  summary: "Render a page (HTML inline; JSON redirects to SPA)",
+  tags: ["Pages"],
+  params: z.object({ id: z.string() }),
+  responses: {
+    200: { description: "Rendered HTML page" },
+    302: { description: "Redirect to SPA for JSON content" },
+    401: { description: "Page requires an authenticated session" },
+    403: { description: "Cookie does not match this page id" },
+    404: { description: "Page not found" },
+  },
+  auth: { apiKey: false },
+});
+const publicPageJsonRoute = route({
+  method: "get",
+  path: "/p/{id}.json",
+  pattern: ["p", null],
+  summary: "Page metadata + body as JSON (used by SPA renderer)",
+  tags: ["Pages"],
+  params: z.object({ id: z.string() }),
+  responses: {
+    200: { description: "Page JSON" },
+    401: { description: "Page requires an authenticated session" },
+    403: { description: "Cookie does not match this page id" },
+    404: { description: "Page not found" },
+  },
+  auth: { apiKey: false },
+});
+// ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Inject the BROWSER_SDK script tag into an HTML body. Insert immediately
+ * after `<head>` if present; otherwise prepend so partial fragments still get
+ * the SDK. The script is wrapped in `<script>...</script>` with no token
+ * injection (the SDK relies on server-side header injection at the
+ * `/@swarm/api/*` proxy boundary).
+ *
+ * Also injects `<base target="_blank">` so links inside the iframed page
+ * open in the parent window — avoids the user being trapped inside an
+ * iframe by a misbehaving page.
+ */
+/**
+ * Default `<head>` injection: `<base>` so links escape the iframe, Tailwind
+ * Play CDN so agent pages can use utility classes out of the box, Space
+ * Grotesk / Space Mono fonts to match the swarm SPA, a small reset that
+ * makes pages theme-aware (dark by default) so an agent who writes zero CSS
+ * still gets a presentable page, and finally the Browser SDK so
+ * `window.swarmSdk` works.
+ *
+ * Agent-provided styles ALWAYS win — the reset uses generic selectors with
+ * low specificity. Tailwind is loaded as an opt-in tool, not an enforced
+ * theme.
+ */
+const PAGE_HEAD_DEFAULTS = `<base target="_blank">
+<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com">
+<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossorigin>
+<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Space+Grotesk:wght@400;500;600;700&family=Space+Mono:wght@400;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">
+<script src="https://cdn.tailwindcss.com"></script>
+<style>
+  :root {
+    --swarm-bg: #0b0f17;
+    --swarm-card: #121826;
+    --swarm-border: #22304a;
+    --swarm-text: #e6eaf2;
+    --swarm-muted: #7c8aa6;
+    --swarm-primary: #3b82f6;
+  }
+  html, body { background: var(--swarm-bg); color: var(--swarm-text); }
+  body {
+    font-family: "Space Grotesk", system-ui, sans-serif;
+    margin: 0;
+    padding: 24px;
+    line-height: 1.5;
+  }
+  code, pre, kbd, samp { font-family: "Space Mono", ui-monospace, monospace; }
+  a { color: var(--swarm-primary); }
+  ::selection { background: var(--swarm-primary); color: #fff; }
+</style>`;
+function injectBrowserSdk(html: string): string {
+  const injection = `${PAGE_HEAD_DEFAULTS}<script>${BROWSER_SDK_JS}</script>`;
+  // Use the first occurrence of `<head>` (case-insensitive). A page that
+  // doesn't have a `<head>` element (raw fragment) still gets the SDK at the
+  // front of the document.
+  const headOpenMatch = html.match(/<head\b[^>]*>/i);
+  if (headOpenMatch) {
+    const idx = headOpenMatch.index! + headOpenMatch[0].length;
+    return html.slice(0, idx) + injection + html.slice(idx);
+  }
+  return injection + html;
+}
+/**
+ * Trim `.json` off the last path segment, returning the bare id. Returns
+ * `null` if the segment doesn't end in `.json` (caller should fall through
+ * to the plain `/p/:id` matcher).
+ */
+function stripJsonSuffix(idSegment: string): string | null {
+  return idSegment.endsWith(".json") ? idSegment.slice(0, -".json".length) : null;
+}
+/**
+ * Compute the SPA base URL (`APP_URL`). Mirrors `getAppBaseUrl` in pages.ts —
+ * duplicated here to keep this module standalone (no cross-import inside the
+ * http/ layer).
+ */
+function getAppBaseUrl(): string {
+  const env = process.env.APP_URL?.trim();
+  if (env) return env.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+  return "http://localhost:5274";
+}
+/**
+ * Build the `Content-Security-Policy` for the served HTML. Allows inline
+ * scripts (required for `BROWSER_SDK_JS`) but locks down everything else to
+ * `'self'`. The SPA iframes the page in step-6 with `sandbox="allow-scripts
+ * allow-forms"`; the CSP is a defence-in-depth layer.
+ */
+function buildCsp(): string {
+  // `frame-ancestors` lists every origin allowed to iframe `/p/:id`. We must
+  // include the SPA origin(s). `APP_URL` may carry a comma-separated list so
+  // portless dev (`https://ui.swarm.localhost`), a Vite port (`http://localhost:5274`),
+  // and a tunnel/staging origin can all coexist. Additionally, in non-production
+  // we always allow `http://localhost:*` and `https://*.localhost` so swapping
+  // between Vite ports / portless dev doesn't require restarting the API.
+  const configured = (process.env.APP_URL ?? "")
+    .split(",")
+    .map((s) => s.trim().replace(/\/+$/, ""))
+    .filter(Boolean);
+  const devFallbacks =
+    process.env.NODE_ENV === "production"
+      ? []
+      : [
+          "http://localhost:5274",
+          "http://localhost:5175",
+          "http://127.0.0.1:5274",
+          "http://127.0.0.1:5175",
+          "https://*.localhost",
+          "http://*.localhost",
+        ];
+  const ancestors = Array.from(new Set([...configured, ...devFallbacks]));
+  // Allow Tailwind Play CDN (`cdn.tailwindcss.com`) for scripts, Google
+  // Fonts (`fonts.googleapis.com` stylesheets + `fonts.gstatic.com` font
+  // files) for the swarm default typography, and same-origin /@swarm/api/*
+  // for the Browser SDK. Inline scripts/styles remain allowed so
+  // agent-emitted styles work.
+  return [
+    "default-src 'self'",
+    "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://cdn.tailwindcss.com",
+    "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com https://cdn.tailwindcss.com",
+    "font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com data:",
+    "img-src 'self' data: https:",
+    "connect-src 'self'",
+    `frame-ancestors 'self' ${ancestors.join(" ")}`.trim(),
+  ].join("; ");
+}
+/**
+ * Decide whether a page is reachable based on cookie alone. Public pages are
+ * always reachable; authed AND password pages can ALSO pass via a valid
+ * `page_session` cookie scoped to the same page id (the cookie is the proof
+ * once the user has successfully unlocked once). For password pages, when
+ * the cookie is absent/invalid the caller falls through to the `?key=` +
+ * Basic-auth resolution path; for authed pages the caller surfaces 401.
+ *
+ * The caller passes the cookie payload (already verified by
+ * `extractAndVerifyCookie`) — `null` when no cookie was sent or it failed
+ * verification. Cross-page reuse (cookie for page A presented for page B)
+ * surfaces as a distinct `403` so misconfigurations are debuggable, NOT a
+ * generic 401.
+ *
+ * For password pages with no/bad cookie, returns `{ ok: false, status: 401,
+ * needsPassword: true }` so the handler knows to try the password flow before
+ * sending the WWW-Authenticate response.
+ */
+type AccessResult =
+  | { ok: true }
+  | { ok: false; status: 401 | 403; reason: string; needsPassword?: boolean };
+function isAccessible(
+  page: Page,
+  cookiePayload: { pageId: string; exp: number } | null,
+): AccessResult {
+  if (page.authMode === "public") return { ok: true };
+  // Cookie-first path. A cookie scoped to a DIFFERENT page id is "stale" —
+  // for password mode we silently ignore it and fall through to the password
+  // flow so the user can recover via `?key=` / Basic without manual cookie
+  // clearing. For authed mode we surface 403 (the SPA's launch-retry path
+  // handles recovery; direct browser access to authed pages is rare).
+  if (cookiePayload) {
+    if (cookiePayload.pageId === page.id) return { ok: true };
+    if (page.authMode === "password") {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        status: 401,
+        reason: "password required",
+        needsPassword: true,
+      };
+    }
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      status: 403,
+      reason: "page-session cookie scoped to a different page id",
+    };
+  }
+  if (page.authMode === "authed") {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      status: 401,
+      reason: "authed mode requires page-session cookie; POST /api/pages/:id/launch first",
+    };
+  }
+  // password mode, no cookie yet — caller will try ?key= / Basic.
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    status: 401,
+    reason: "password required",
+    needsPassword: true,
+  };
+}
+/**
+ * Extract a password candidate from the request. Order of precedence:
+ *   1. `?key=` query param (if present, returns it verbatim — empty string is
+ *      still "present", caller decides what to do with it).
+ *   2. `Authorization: Basic <base64(user:pass)>` header — decodes the base64
+ *      blob, splits on the FIRST `:`, and returns the part AFTER the colon
+ *      (the username is ignored — Basic auth has no notion of "username
+ *      doesn't matter" so we treat anything as the username).
+ *
+ * Returns `null` when neither input is present, or when the Basic header is
+ * malformed (bad base64, no colon, etc.). NEVER throws — malformed Basic
+ * collapses to "no candidate" so the caller falls through to the 401 path.
+ */
+function extractPasswordCandidate(
+  req: IncomingMessage,
+  queryParams: URLSearchParams,
+): string | null {
+  const fromQuery = queryParams.get("key");
+  if (fromQuery !== null) return fromQuery;
+  const rawAuth = req.headers.authorization;
+  const auth = Array.isArray(rawAuth) ? rawAuth[0] : rawAuth;
+  if (!auth) return null;
+  // Format: `Basic <base64>`. Match case-insensitively per RFC 7617.
+  const m = /^Basic\s+(.+)$/i.exec(auth.trim());
+  if (!m) return null;
+  let decoded: string;
+  try {
+    decoded = Buffer.from(m[1]!, "base64").toString("utf-8");
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const colonIdx = decoded.indexOf(":");
+  if (colonIdx === -1) return null;
+  return decoded.slice(colonIdx + 1);
+}
+/**
+ * Detect whether the originating request is from a "dev" / localhost context,
+ * mirroring the same logic used by the bearer-launch endpoint in
+ * `src/http/pages.ts`. Used to decide whether to issue cookies with
+ * `SameSite=Lax` (dev) vs `SameSite=None; Secure` (prod).
+ */
+function isLocalhostRequest(req: IncomingMessage): boolean {
+  if (process.env.NODE_ENV === "production") return false;
+  // Only emit `SameSite=Lax` (no Secure) when the request comes from the
+  // SAME http://localhost origin as the API — Lax cookies don't travel on
+  // cross-site fetches, so portless `*.localhost` setups (SPA on https
+  // talking to the API on http) must use `SameSite=None; Secure`. Chrome
+  // treats localhost as a secure origin so Secure is honored on HTTP.
+  const origin = (req.headers.origin as string | undefined) ?? "";
+  if (origin === "") {
+    const rawHost = req.headers.host;
+    const host = Array.isArray(rawHost) ? rawHost[0] : rawHost;
+    if (!host) return true; // best-effort dev default
+    return host.startsWith("localhost") || host.startsWith("127.0.0.1");
+  }
+  return origin.startsWith("http://localhost") || origin.startsWith("http://127.0.0.1");
+}
+// ─── Handler ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export async function handlePagesPublic(
+  req: IncomingMessage,
+  res: ServerResponse,
+  pathSegments: string[],
+  queryParams: URLSearchParams,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  // Both routes share the same `["p", null]` pattern; we discriminate by
+  // suffix on the second segment. The route() registrations exist mainly so
+  // isPublicRoute() lets these through the bearer gate — actual dispatch is
+  // handled here.
+  if (pathSegments.length !== 2 || pathSegments[0] !== "p") return false;
+  if (req.method !== "GET") return false;
+  const second = pathSegments[1]!;
+  const jsonStripped = stripJsonSuffix(second);
+  const isJsonRoute = jsonStripped !== null;
+  const id = jsonStripped ?? second;
+  // Touch parse() to (a) honour Zod validation on the id segment and (b)
+  // keep the OpenAPI machinery happy. Mismatched segment counts have
+  // already been handled above.
+  if (isJsonRoute) {
+    // Re-shim pathSegments so the route parser sees `[p, <id>]` not `[p, <id>.json]`.
+    const reshim = ["p", id];
+    const parsed = await publicPageJsonRoute.parse(req, res, reshim, queryParams);
+    if (!parsed) return true;
+  } else {
+    const parsed = await publicPageRoute.parse(req, res, pathSegments, queryParams);
+    if (!parsed) return true;
+  }
+  const page = getPage(id);
+  if (!page) {
+    res.writeHead(404, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
+    res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "Page not found" }));
+    return true;
+  }
+  // Pull + verify the page-session cookie ONCE — `null` covers "no cookie",
+  // "tampered signature", "expired", "malformed". The access decision below
+  // discriminates per-authMode.
+  const cookiePayload = await extractAndVerifyCookie(req);
+  const access = isAccessible(page, cookiePayload);
+  // Set-Cookie that we'll attach to the eventual 200 response when the
+  // password flow mints a fresh cookie inline. Empty string = no cookie to
+  // attach. We thread this through the handler so the existing 200-response
+  // paths below can opt-in without duplicating their branch logic.
+  let inlineSetCookie = "";
+  if (!access.ok) {
+    // Password flow: cookie missing/invalid, try `?key=` then Basic.
+    if (access.needsPassword) {
+      const candidate = extractPasswordCandidate(req, queryParams);
+      if (candidate !== null && page.passwordHash) {
+        // Bun.password.verify is constant-time (bcrypt). NEVER log the
+        // candidate or hash — they may carry user-provided secrets.
+        let matched = false;
+        try {
+          matched = await Bun.password.verify(candidate, page.passwordHash);
+        } catch {
+          matched = false;
+        }
+        if (matched) {
+          inlineSetCookie = await issuePageSessionCookie(page.id, {
+            dev: isLocalhostRequest(req),
+          });
+          // fall through to the regular 200 path below.
+        } else {
+          // Wrong password → 401 + WWW-Authenticate so the browser re-prompts.
+          res.writeHead(401, {
+            "Content-Type": "application/json",
+            "WWW-Authenticate": `Basic realm="page ${page.id}"`,
+          });
+          res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "incorrect password" }));
+          return true;
+        }
+      } else {
+        // No candidate at all → 401 + WWW-Authenticate so the browser shows
+        // the native Basic auth dialog.
+        res.writeHead(401, {
+          "Content-Type": "application/json",
+          "WWW-Authenticate": `Basic realm="page ${page.id}"`,
+        });
+        res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "password required" }));
+        return true;
+      }
+    } else {
+      res.writeHead(access.status, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: scrubSecrets(access.reason) }));
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  if (isJsonRoute) {
+    // `/p/:id.json` — JSON description of the page used by the SPA renderer.
+    // Returns the current head state (no version history). Body included
+    // verbatim. NOTE: passwordHash / agentId are NOT exposed here — these
+    // are private. step-4 may revisit if needed.
+    const headers: Record<string, string> = {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Cache-Control": "no-store",
+    };
+    if (inlineSetCookie) headers["Set-Cookie"] = inlineSetCookie;
+    res.writeHead(200, headers);
+    res.end(
+      JSON.stringify({
+        id: page.id,
+        version: 1, // edit-counter is API-internal; SPA reads via /api/pages/:id/versions
+        title: page.title,
+        description: page.description,
+        contentType: page.contentType,
+        authMode: page.authMode,
+        body: page.body,
+      }),
+    );
+    return true;
+  }
+  // `/p/:id` — render either HTML directly or 302→SPA for JSON.
+  if (page.contentType === "application/json") {
+    const headers: Record<string, string> = { Location: `${getAppBaseUrl()}/pages/${page.id}` };
+    if (inlineSetCookie) headers["Set-Cookie"] = inlineSetCookie;
+    res.writeHead(302, headers);
+    res.end();
+    return true;
+  }
+  // text/html — inject SDK + serve.
+  const html = injectBrowserSdk(page.body);
+  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
+    "Content-Type": "text/html; charset=utf-8",
+    "Cache-Control": "no-store",
+    "Content-Security-Policy": buildCsp(),
+    // Defence-in-depth: prevent MIME sniffing and clickjacking outside the SPA.
+    "X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
+  };
+  if (inlineSetCookie) headers["Set-Cookie"] = inlineSetCookie;
+  res.writeHead(200, headers);
+  res.end(html);
+  return true;
+}