@descryy/runtime-controller 0.3.8 → 0.4.0

package/dist/sandbox.js

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+/**
+ * §21's execution boundary, real isolation half. RT-070/RT-193 gave this runtime a
+ * *named* boundary (trusted-local, resource limits, privilege reporting) but not an
+ * *isolating* one -- nothing stopped a spawned process from reading any file, or
+ * reaching any host, the invoking user could. This module closes that gap for real,
+ * on Linux, for processes this runtime SPAWNS.
+ *
+ * **Architectural constraint this module cannot solve around:** isolation can only
+ * wrap a process Descry itself launches. Attach-mode reaches a process already
+ * running, unconfined, before Descry touched it -- there is no honest way to
+ * retroactively contain it (ptrace-based interception was investigated and rejected
+ * elsewhere as not honestly generalizable). Attach-mode stays permanently and
+ * explicitly unsandboxed -- `SANDBOX_BOUNDARY_DISCLOSURE` in `execution-safety.ts`
+ * discloses this in-product; this module does not and structurally cannot change it.
+ *
+ * **Mechanism: bubblewrap (bwrap), not raw `unshare`/`clone`.** bwrap is the
+ * unprivileged sandboxing helper behind Flatpak -- small, auditable, actively
+ * maintained, not a bespoke native module this repo builds per-platform. Runs
+ * setuid-free on any kernel with unprivileged user namespaces enabled (checked
+ * below, never assumed) and gives one process a new mount namespace (real
+ * filesystem visibility control) and network namespace (real network denial) in one
+ * exec. Composes with `applyResourceLimits`'s `prlimit` wrap and with
+ * `process-manager.ts`'s process-group kill -- verified directly: bwrap does not
+ * create a new process group unless asked, so the existing group-kill reaches it
+ * unchanged. The one dependency this buys: `bwrap` must be on PATH, reported as a
+ * capability exactly like `prlimit` -- refused, never silently unconstrained, when
+ * requested and absent.
+ *
+ * **NOT attempted, deliberately: a native macOS or Windows sandbox.** `sandbox-exec`/
+ * Seatbelt is deprecated with no public API replacement; the Endpoint Security
+ * Framework needs an Apple entitlement this project doesn't have; Windows Job
+ * Objects + AppContainer + WFP would be a second and third bespoke native sandbox.
+ * This is an explicit decision not to build native sandboxes for those platforms at
+ * all -- `../container-sandbox.ts` closes the gap instead, routing macOS/Windows
+ * through a real Docker container that reuses this module's proven Linux mechanism
+ * (see that module's doc for what's real-tested there vs unverified on real
+ * hardware). `filesystemIsolationCapability`/`networkIsolationCapability` below
+ * still report `unavailable` with a reason on non-Linux -- never silently claimed
+ * as covered.
+ */
+import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { accessSync, constants as fsConstants, readFileSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
+import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative } from "node:path";
+/**
+ * Whether unprivileged user namespaces -- the kernel feature bwrap needs to build a
+ * mount/network namespace without running setuid-root -- are actually enabled on
+ * this host, never merely assumed from "the kernel supports namespaces in general."
+ * Two independent sysctls can each disable it. IMPORTANT: a sysctl file not existing
+ * is NOT evidence it's unrestricted -- only Debian/Ubuntu-derived kernels gate it
+ * through `unprivileged_userns_clone` at all, so a missing file proves nothing
+ * either way. We can't tell from absence, so we don't read it as a positive signal:
+ * `ok: true` here means "neither sysctl was found to explicitly disable it," not
+ * "isolation is confirmed available" -- it only rules out these two specific,
+ * explicit-disable signals.
+ */
+function unprivilegedUserNamespaceStatus() {
+    try {
+        const clone = readFileSync("/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_userns_clone", "utf8").trim();
+        if (clone === "0") {
+            return { ok: false, reason: "kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0 -- unprivileged user namespaces are disabled on this host" };
+        }
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Sysctl absent -- not evidence either way, not just non-Debian kernels.
+    }
+    try {
+        const max = readFileSync("/proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces", "utf8").trim();
+        if (max === "0") {
+            return { ok: false, reason: "user.max_user_namespaces=0 -- unprivileged user namespaces are disabled on this host" };
+        }
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Same reasoning: absent is not evidence of a restriction.
+    }
+    return { ok: true, reason: null };
+}
+/** Real capability check, same shape as `resourceLimitCapability`: PATH existence first, then the Linux-specific precondition existence alone doesn't prove -- unprivileged user namespaces actually usable, not just bwrap installed. */
+export function filesystemIsolationCapability(env = process.env, platform = process.platform) {
+    if (platform !== "linux") {
+        return {
+            availability: "unavailable",
+            reason: `no filesystem isolation mechanism is wired up on "${platform}" for bwrap -- by design, not by omission (native sandbox-exec/Seatbelt and Job Objects/AppContainer were researched and rejected); see container-sandbox.ts, which routes "${platform}" through a real Docker container instead`,
+        };
+    }
+    try {
+        execFileSync("bwrap", ["--version"], { env, stdio: "ignore" });
+    }
+    catch {
+        return {
+            availability: "unavailable",
+            reason: "bubblewrap (bwrap) is not on PATH -- filesystem isolation cannot be enforced without it",
+        };
+    }
+    const userns = unprivilegedUserNamespaceStatus();
+    if (!userns.ok) {
+        return { availability: "unavailable", reason: `bubblewrap is installed but unprivileged user namespaces are unavailable: ${userns.reason}` };
+    }
+    return { availability: "available", reason: null };
+}
+/** Same underlying mechanism as `filesystemIsolationCapability` (one bwrap namespace set covers both) -- delegates rather than duplicating. Kept as its own function because the two policies are declared and reasoned about independently. */
+export function networkIsolationCapability(env = process.env, platform = process.platform) {
+    return filesystemIsolationCapability(env, platform);
+}
+/**
+ * `NetworkPolicy`'s general shape (arbitrary allow/deny host lists) is not what
+ * this mechanism enforces -- only full denial. Returns the reason a policy can't be
+ * applied, or `null` if it's the one shape that can. Checked independently of
+ * `networkIsolationCapability`: "nothing here can enforce any policy" and "this
+ * specific policy asks for something not built yet" are different claims.
+ */
+export function unsupportedNetworkPolicyReason(policy) {
+    if (policy.mode === "allow" && policy.hosts.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    return ('only full network denial ({ mode: "allow", hosts: [] }) is enforced -- selective allow- or deny-listing of ' +
+        "specific hosts needs DNS interception and IP filtering inside the sandbox's network namespace (a veth pair, " +
+        "NAT, iptables/nftables rules), not built in this iteration");
+}
+function isWithin(root, target) {
+    const rel = relative(root, target);
+    return rel === "" || (!rel.startsWith("..") && !isAbsolute(rel));
+}
+/**
+ * Resolves the real, symlink-followed directory containing the executable
+ * `command` would run as -- the one extra host path a sandboxed process needs
+ * beyond standard OS dirs and whatever the caller declared. Computed generically,
+ * not per-language: an interpreter installed outside `/usr` (nvm, rbenv, pyenv,
+ * sdkman) would otherwise be invisible inside the sandbox regardless of language.
+ * Returns `null` when unresolvable -- the caller proceeds without an extra bind;
+ * the exec fails inside the sandbox the same honest way it would outside one.
+ */
+export function resolveExecutableDirectory(command, cwd, env) {
+    let candidate = null;
+    if (command.includes("/")) {
+        candidate = isAbsolute(command) ? command : join(cwd, command);
+    }
+    else {
+        const pathVar = env.PATH ?? "";
+        for (const dir of pathVar.split(":")) {
+            if (dir === "")
+                continue;
+            const full = join(dir, command);
+            try {
+                accessSync(full, fsConstants.X_OK);
+                candidate = full;
+                break;
+            }
+            catch {
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (candidate === null)
+        return null;
+    try {
+        return dirname(realpathSync(candidate));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Wraps `command`/`args` with `bwrap` so the OS enforces `filesystemPolicy`/
+ * `networkPolicy`. Neither declared returns them unchanged -- same non-regression
+ * contract as `applyResourceLimits`.
+ *
+ * **Throws rather than silently spawning unconstrained** when a policy is
+ * requested and the real mechanism can't back it -- no mechanism on this platform,
+ * or a declared shape this mechanism doesn't implement.
+ *
+ * Composes with `applyResourceLimits` by wrapping *outside* it (`bwrap … --
+ * prlimit … -- realCommand`) -- the mount namespace must exist before `prlimit` or
+ * the real command run inside it; `prlimit` (in `/usr/bin`) is reachable through
+ * the same base OS binding every sandboxed process gets.
+ */
+export function applySandbox(options) {
+    const { filesystemPolicy, networkPolicy } = options;
+    if (filesystemPolicy === undefined && networkPolicy === undefined) {
+        return { command: options.command, args: options.args };
+    }
+    const env = options.env ?? process.env;
+    const platform = options.platform ?? process.platform;
+    if (networkPolicy !== undefined) {
+        const shapeReason = unsupportedNetworkPolicyReason(networkPolicy);
+        if (shapeReason !== null) {
+            throw new Error(`networkPolicy was configured but cannot be enforced: ${shapeReason}`);
+        }
+        const capability = networkIsolationCapability(env, platform);
+        if (capability.availability !== "available") {
+            throw new Error(`networkPolicy was configured but cannot be enforced on this platform: ${capability.reason}`);
+        }
+    }
+    if (filesystemPolicy !== undefined) {
+        const capability = filesystemIsolationCapability(env, platform);
+        if (capability.availability !== "available") {
+            throw new Error(`filesystemPolicy was configured but cannot be enforced on this platform: ${capability.reason}`);
+        }
+    }
+    const bwrapArgs = [];
+    if (filesystemPolicy !== undefined) {
+        bwrapArgs.push("--ro-bind", "/usr", "/usr", "--symlink", "/usr/bin", "/bin", "--symlink", "/usr/lib", "/lib", "--symlink", "/usr/lib64", "/lib64", "--proc", "/proc", "--dev", "/dev", "--tmpfs", "/tmp", "--bind", options.cwd, options.cwd);
+        const boundRoots = ["/usr", options.cwd, ...filesystemPolicy.allowedRoots];
+        for (const root of filesystemPolicy.allowedRoots) {
+            bwrapArgs.push("--bind", root, root);
+        }
+        const interpreterDir = resolveExecutableDirectory(options.interpreterCommand, options.cwd, env);
+        if (interpreterDir !== null && !boundRoots.some((root) => isWithin(root, interpreterDir))) {
+            bwrapArgs.push("--ro-bind", interpreterDir, interpreterDir);
+        }
+    }
+    else {
+        // No filesystem restriction declared -- mirror the host root exactly (matches
+        // FilesystemPolicy's "absent means unconstrained" default). A mount namespace
+        // is still created (bwrap always builds one; --unshare-net below needs it), so
+        // /proc, /dev, /tmp are remounted explicitly -- a plain `--bind / /` is not
+        // recursive and would leave them looking empty inside otherwise.
+        bwrapArgs.push("--bind", "/", "/", "--dev", "/dev", "--proc", "/proc", "--bind", "/tmp", "/tmp");
+    }
+    bwrapArgs.push("--chdir", options.cwd);
+    if (networkPolicy !== undefined) {
+        bwrapArgs.push("--unshare-net");
+    }
+    // Kills the sandboxed tree if bwrap's parent (this Node process) dies
+    // unexpectedly -- a second, independent backstop alongside process-manager.ts's
+    // group-kill, not a replacement for it.
+    bwrapArgs.push("--die-with-parent", "--", options.command, ...options.args);
+    return { command: "bwrap", args: bwrapArgs };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=sandbox.js.map

package/dist/sandbox.js.map

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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@descryy/runtime-controller",
-  "version": "0.3.8",
+  "version": "0.4.0",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Runtime controller: process manager, readiness, timeout/cancellation, execution IDs, cleanup. Deliverable 2 of the runtime phase — depends on @descryy/runtime-contracts, builds no collectors.",
   "license": "UNLICENSED",
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
     "access": "public"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@descryy/runtime-contracts": "0.3.3"
+    "@descryy/runtime-contracts": "0.4.0"
   },
   "scripts": {
     "build": "tsc -b"