@derec-alliance/nodejs 0.0.1-alpha.6 → 0.0.1-alpha.9

package/derec_library.d.ts

@@ -2,263 +2,411 @@
 /* eslint-disable */
 
 /**
- * Creates a serialized `ContactMessage` used to bootstrap pairing.
+ * Fluent builder for [`DeRecProtocolWasm`]. Mirrors the Rust
+ * [`crate::protocol::DeRecProtocolBuilder`] and the dotnet
+ * `DeRecProtocolBuilder` method-for-method so a developer who already
+ * knows one SDK can move between them without reaching for reference
+ * docs.
+ *
+ * Required setters: `withChannelStore`, `withShareStore`,
+ * `withSecretStore`, `withTransport`, `withOwnTransport`. Calling
+ * `build()` without all five throws.
+ *
+ * All optional setters carry the defaults documented on the Rust
+ * builder.
+ */
+export class DeRecProtocolBuilder {
+    free(): void;
+    [Symbol.dispose](): void;
+    /**
+     * Finalize the configuration. Throws if any of the required
+     * setters was not called.
+     */
+    build(): DeRecProtocolWasm;
+    /**
+     * `secretId` is a JS `bigint` or `number`. Identifies the single
+     * secret this protocol instance manages; apps that juggle multiple
+     * secrets instantiate one protocol per id.
+     */
+    constructor(secret_id: any);
+    /**
+     * Per-flow auto-accept policy.
+     *
+     * `policy` shape (all fields optional, default `false`):
+     * `{ pairing, prePair, storeShare, verifyShare, discovery, getShare, unpair, updateChannelInfo }`.
+     *
+     * When a field is `true`, `process()` internally accepts the
+     * matching incoming request and emits an `AutoAccepted` event in
+     * place of `ActionRequired`. See the Rust-side
+     * `AutoAcceptPolicy` rustdoc for the per-flow trade-offs.
+     * Default: every field `false`.
+     */
+    withAutoAccept(policy: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * Whether outbound requests stamp `replyTo = ownTransport`.
+     * Default: false.
+     */
+    withAutoReplyTo(enabled: boolean): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * Whether the protocol auto-replies on failed inbound processing.
+     * Default: false.
+     */
+    withAutoRespondOnFailure(enabled: boolean): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    withChannelStore(store: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * `info` shape: `Record<string, string>`. Default: empty.
+     */
+    withCommunicationInfo(info: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * Number of recent versions each helper must retain. Default: 3.
+     */
+    withKeepVersionsCount(count: number): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * `endpoint` shape: `{ uri: string, protocol: string }`.
+     * `protocol` must be `"https"` (the only protocol supported today).
+     */
+    withOwnTransport(endpoint: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * Declare the local node's acceptable parameter range for pair
+     * negotiation. `range` is a JS object whose keys mirror the
+     * `ParameterRange` proto (`minShareSize`, `maxShareSize`,
+     * `minTimeBetweenVerifications`, ...). Each field is `i64` —
+     * accept either a number or a `BigInt` on the JS side. Default:
+     * unset (no constraints advertised, every peer range accepted).
+     */
+    withParameterRange(range: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * `id` is a JS `bigint` or `number`. Default: unset.
+     */
+    withReplicaId(id: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    withSecretStore(store: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    withShareStore(store: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    withStateStore(store: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * Minimum number of shares required to reconstruct the secret.
+     * Default: 3.
+     */
+    withThreshold(threshold: number): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * Protocol-wide staleness boundary (seconds). Clamped to at least
+     * 1. Default: 300.
+     */
+    withTimeout(timeout_in_secs: number): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    withTransport(transport: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    /**
+     * `ack` is `"required"` (default) or `"not_required"`.
+     */
+    withUnpairAck(ack: string): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+    withUserSecretStore(store: any): DeRecProtocolBuilder;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Higher-level DeRec protocol orchestrator for TypeScript/JavaScript consumers.
+ *
+ * Wraps [`DeRecProtocol`](crate::protocol::DeRecProtocol) with JS-side store
+ * and transport adapters so that a TypeScript application can drive all five
+ * protocol flows without routing raw bytes manually.
  *
- * # Arguments
+ * # Stores
  *
- * * `channel_id` - Channel identifier associated with the generated pairing material
- * * `transport_uri` - Transport endpoint that the peer should use for subsequent traffic
+ * Pass four JS objects that implement the interfaces documented on each
+ * parameter.  All store methods must return `Promise`s — synchronous
+ * implementations can wrap their result with `Promise.resolve(...)`.
  *
- * # Returns
+ * # Events
  *
- * A JS object with:
+ * [`process`](DeRecProtocolWasm::process) returns an `Array` of plain JS
+ * objects, each with a `type` discriminant field:
  *
- * - `wire_bytes`: serialized `ContactMessage` protobuf bytes
- * - `secret_key_material`: serialized `PairingSecretKeyMaterial`
+ * | `type`             | Additional fields                                      |
+ * |--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
+ * | `PairingCompleted`  | `channel_id: string`, `pairing_channel_id: string`, `kind: number` |
+ * | `ShareStored`      | `channel_id: string`, `version: number`                |
+ * | `ShareConfirmed`   | `channel_id: string`, `version: number`                |
+ * | `ShareVerified`    | `channel_id: string`, `version: number`                |
+ * | `SecretsDiscovered`| `channel_id: string`, `secrets: SecretVersionEntry[]`  |
+ * | `SecretRecovered`  | `secret: { helpers, secrets, replicas, owner_replica_id }` (same nested shape as `ReplicaSecretReceived.secret`) |
+ * | `NoOp`             | _(none)_                                               |
+ *
+ * `SecretVersionEntry = { secret_id: bigint, versions: { version: number, description: string }[] }`
  */
-export function create_contact_message(channel_id: bigint, transport_uri: string): any;
+export class DeRecProtocolWasm {
+    private constructor();
+    free(): void;
+    [Symbol.dispose](): void;
+    /**
+     * Accept a pending action from an `ActionRequired` event.
+     *
+     * # Arguments
+     *
+     * * `action_bytes` — Opaque `Uint8Array` from the `action` field of an `ActionRequired` event.
+     *
+     * # Returns
+     *
+     * An `Array` of event objects (same format as `process()`).
+     */
+    accept(action_bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<any>;
+    /**
+     * Single entry point for all three contact modes (`InlineKeys`,
+     * `HashedKeys`, `NoKeys`).
+     *
+     * * `channel_id` — `null`/`undefined` lets the library mint a
+     *   random id; otherwise `bigint` / `number` is used verbatim.
+     * * `contact_mode` — `0` (InlineKeys), `1` (HashedKeys), `2` (NoKeys).
+     * * `nonce` — `null`/`undefined` lets the library generate a fresh
+     *   random `u64`; otherwise the supplied `bigint`/`number` is used.
+     *   Required for `NoKeys` where callers typically pick a small
+     *   human-typable value.
+     */
+    createContact(channel_id: any, contact_mode: number, nonce: any): Promise<any>;
+    /**
+     * Derive the human-readable fingerprint for a paired channel. Both
+     * sides of a replica pair derive the same fingerprint from the
+     * shared key, enabling out-of-band confirmation before the channel
+     * transitions from `Pending` to `Paired`.
+     */
+    getFingerprint(channel_id: any): Promise<string>;
+    /**
+     * Feed any incoming wire bytes to the protocol.
+     *
+     * Returns an `Array` of plain JS event objects (see struct-level docs for shapes).
+     * All five flows (pairing, sharing, verification, discovery, recovery) are
+     * handled through this single entry point.
+     *
+     * # Arguments
+     *
+     * * `message` — Raw wire bytes of an incoming `DeRecMessage`.
+     */
+    process(message: Uint8Array): Promise<any>;
+    /**
+     * Reject a pending action from an `ActionRequired` event.
+     *
+     * # Arguments
+     *
+     * * `action_bytes` — Opaque `Uint8Array` from the `action` field of an `ActionRequired` event.
+     * * `status` — Numeric status code from `StatusEnum` (e.g. 2 for FAIL, 10 for REJECTED).
+     * * `memo` — Human-readable rejection reason.
+     */
+    reject(action_bytes: Uint8Array, status: number, memo: string): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Rebuild this protocol's `secret_id` namespace from a recovered
+     * `Secret`. Mirrors [`crate::protocol::DeRecProtocol::restore`] —
+     * see that method for the full contract.
+     *
+     * `recoveredSecret` is the typed `Secret` object carried by the
+     * `SecretRecovered` event; pass it verbatim.
+     *
+     * Errors surface as structured JS errors with a `code` field:
+     *
+     * | code               | meaning                                                          |
+     * |--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+     * | `ALREADY_RESTORED` | A user-secret snapshot already exists for this `secret_id`.      |
+     * | `CONFLICT`         | Channels live at canonical helper / replica ids. The error       |
+     * |                    | carries `channel_ids: string[]` listing the collisions.          |
+     * | `INVARIANT`        | The recovered `Secret` is internally inconsistent.               |
+     * | `STORAGE`          | A store I/O call failed mid-restore.                             |
+     */
+    restore(recovered_secret: any, version: number): Promise<any>;
+    /**
+     * Generate an out-of-band contact message (QR code payload, deep link, …).
+     *
+     * Returns a plain JS `ContactMessage` object. The `channel_id` field identifies
+     * the pairing session and will match the `channel_id` in the eventual
+     * `PairingCompleted` event — read it directly from the returned object.
+     *
+     * The caller is responsible for serializing the contact for out-of-band
+     * delivery (QR code, deep link, etc.). The peer passes the deserialized object
+     * to [`start`](Self::start) with `FlowKind::Pairing`.
+     *
+     * # Arguments
+     *
+     * * `channel_id` — Optional `BigInt` channel identifier. Pass `null` or
+     *   `undefined` to have the library generate a random one.
+     * * `contact_mode` — `0` for `InlineKeys` (keys embedded directly), `1`
+     *   for `HashedKeys` (contact carries only a SHA-384 binding hash; the
+     *   scanner fetches keys via a `PrePair` round-trip). `HashedKeys`
+     *   requires the protocol's `own_transport` to be ephemeral.
+     * The secret identifier this protocol instance is bound to.
+     */
+    secretId(): bigint;
+    /**
+     * Replace this node's local communication info. Does not contact peers —
+     * follow up with a `start(UpdateChannelInfo, ...)` to propagate.
+     */
+    setCommunicationInfo(info: any): void;
+    /**
+     * Replace this node's local transport endpoint. See
+     * `setCommunicationInfo` for the matching update-propagation flow.
+     * IMPORTANT: keep the old endpoint operational during the changeover —
+     * see the Rust docs on `set_own_transport` for the discipline.
+     */
+    setOwnTransport(uri: string, protocol: string): void;
+    /**
+     * Unified entry point for initiating any protocol flow.
+     *
+     * # Arguments
+     *
+     * * `flow_kind` — Flow discriminant:
+     *   - `0` = Pairing (params: `{ kind: number, contact: ContactMessage, name?: string }`)
+     *   - `1` = Discovery (params: `{ target: BigInt | BigInt[] | null }`)
+     *   - `2` = ProtectSecret (params: `{ secrets: UserSecret[], description?: string }`)
+     *   - `3` = VerifyShares (params: `{ version: number, target: BigInt | BigInt[] | null }`)
+     *   - `4` = RecoverSecret (params: `{ secretId: Uint8Array, version: number }`)
+     *
+     * # Returns
+     *
+     * An `Array` of `*Started` / `*Failed` events describing the
+     * dispatched requests. Same shape as `process()`.
+     */
+    start(flow_kind: number, params: any): Promise<any>;
+    /**
+     * Verify a fingerprint against the channel's locally-derived one. On
+     * match, the channel transitions from `Pending` to `Paired`. Returns
+     * `true` when the fingerprint matches and the channel is confirmed,
+     * `false` otherwise.
+     */
+    verifyFingerprint(channel_id: any, fingerprint: string): Promise<boolean>;
+}
+
+export function discovery_request_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function discovery_request_produce(channel_id: bigint, shared_key: Uint8Array, reply_to: any): any;
+
+export function discovery_response_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function discovery_response_process(response: any): any;
+
+export function discovery_response_produce(channel_id: bigint, secret_list: any, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
 
 /**
- * Generates a recovery request envelope.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `channel_id` - Helper channel identifier
- * * `secret_id` - Secret identifier being recovered
- * * `version` - Share version being requested
- * * `shared_key` - 32-byte symmetric key established during pairing
- *
- * # Returns
+ * Overwrite `trace_id` on a primitive-produced envelope and return the
+ * re-encoded bytes. The outer envelope is plaintext, so this does no
+ * crypto work.
  *
- * Serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes carrying an encrypted inner
- * `GetShareRequestMessage`.
+ * Useful for consumers driving the protocol through primitives directly
+ * (the orchestrator-level `DeRecProtocol` already handles trace_id
+ * end-to-end on its own).
  */
-export function generate_share_request(channel_id: bigint, secret_id: Uint8Array, version: number, shared_key: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
+export function envelope_apply_trace_id(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, trace_id: bigint): Uint8Array;
 
 /**
- * Generates a recovery response envelope.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `secret_id` - Secret identifier being recovered
- * * `channel_id` - Helper channel identifier
- * * `stored_share_request_wire_bytes` - Serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes
- *   carrying the encrypted inner `StoreShareRequestMessage` previously produced
- *   by the sharing flow for this helper
- * * `request_wire_bytes` - Serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes carrying the
- *   encrypted inner `GetShareRequestMessage`
- * * `shared_key` - 32-byte symmetric key established during pairing
- *
- * # Returns
- *
- * Serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes carrying an encrypted inner
- * `GetShareResponseMessage`.
+ * Read `trace_id` off an inbound envelope without touching the encrypted
+ * inner payload. Returns `0` when the sender didn't set one — the protobuf
+ * default is indistinguishable from an explicit zero.
  */
-export function generate_share_response(secret_id: Uint8Array, channel_id: bigint, stored_share_request_wire_bytes: Uint8Array, request_wire_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
+export function envelope_read_trace_id(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array): bigint;
 
 /**
- * Generates a verification request envelope.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `secret_id` - Secret identifier
- * * `channel_id` - Helper channel identifier
- * * `version` - Share-distribution version being verified
- * * `shared_key` - 32-byte symmetric key established during pairing
- *
- * # Returns
- *
- * A JS object with:
- *
- * - `wire_bytes`: serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes carrying an encrypted
- *   inner `VerifyShareRequestMessage`
+ * Structurally validate a JS-side [`ContactMessage`]. Throws on any
+ * mode/field inconsistency (unknown `contact_mode`, mode/field mismatch,
+ * wrong binding-hash length).
  */
-export function generate_verification_request(secret_id: Uint8Array, channel_id: bigint, version: number, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+export function pairing_contact_message_validate(contact_message: any): void;
+
+export function pairing_request_create_contact(channel_id: bigint, contact_mode: number, transport_protocol: any, nonce: any): any;
 
 /**
- * Generates a verification response envelope.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `secret_id` - Secret identifier
- * * `channel_id` - Helper channel identifier
- * * `shared_key` - 32-byte symmetric key established during pairing
- * * `share_content` - Share bytes whose possession is being proven
- * * `request_bytes` - Serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes carrying encrypted
- *   inner `VerifyShareRequestMessage`
- *
- * # Returns
- *
- * A JS object with:
- *
- * - `wire_bytes`: serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes carrying an encrypted
- *   inner `VerifyShareResponseMessage`
+ * Decodes a proto-encoded [`ContactMessage`]. Structurally validates the
+ * decoded value before returning it to application code so consumers can
+ * trust the mode/field invariants documented on the wire format.
  */
-export function generate_verification_response(secret_id: Uint8Array, channel_id: bigint, shared_key: Uint8Array, share_content: Uint8Array, request_bytes: Uint8Array): any;
+export function pairing_request_decode_contact(bytes: Uint8Array): any;
 
 /**
- * Processes a serialized pairing response envelope and derives the responder-side shared key.
- *
- * This is the **responder-side** finalization step: the party that created the pairing request
- * processes the pairing response and derives the same final shared key.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `contact_message_bytes` - Plain serialized `ContactMessage` bytes
- * * `pair_response_wire_bytes` - Serialized outer `DeRecMessage` carrying encrypted inner response bytes
- * * `pairing_secret_key_material` - Serialized responder-side `PairingSecretKeyMaterial`
- *
- * # Returns
- *
- * A JS object with:
- *
- * - `pairing_shared_key`: final shared pairing key
+ * Encodes a [`ContactMessage`] to proto wire bytes. Structurally validates
+ * the input first so a locally-constructed contact that violates the
+ * mode/field invariant is rejected at the boundary rather than silently
+ * serialized.
  */
-export function process_pairing_response_message(contact_message_bytes: Uint8Array, pair_response_wire_bytes: Uint8Array, pairing_secret_key_material: Uint8Array): any;
+export function pairing_request_encode_contact(contact_message: any): Uint8Array;
+
+export function pairing_request_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, secret_key: Uint8Array): any;
 
 /**
- * Produces a serialized pairing request envelope from a contact message.
- *
- * This is the **responder-side** step: the party that received the out-of-band
- * contact creates the pairing request.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `kind` - Sender role encoded as:
- *   - `0` => `SharerNonRecovery`
- *   - `1` => `SharerRecovery`
- *   - `2` => `Helper`
- * * `transport_uri` - Transport endpoint the responder can use to receive follow-up traffic
- * * `contact_message_bytes` - Plain serialized `ContactMessage` bytes
- *
- * # Returns
- *
- * A JS object with:
- *
- * - `wire_bytes`: serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes
- * - `secret_key_material`: serialized responder-side `PairingSecretKeyMaterial`
+ * Initiator-side: decode an inbound plaintext `PrePairRequest` envelope.
  */
-export function produce_pairing_request_message(kind: number, transport_uri: string, contact_message_bytes: Uint8Array): any;
+export function pairing_request_extract_pre_pair(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function pairing_request_produce(kind: number, transport_protocol: any, contact_message: any, communication_info: any, parameter_range: any): any;
 
 /**
- * Produces a serialized pairing response envelope and derives the initiator-side shared key.
- *
- * This is the **initiator-side** step: the party that originally created the contact
- * processes the incoming pairing request and returns the pairing response.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `kind` - Sender role encoded as:
- *   - `0` => `SharerNonRecovery`
- *   - `1` => `SharerRecovery`
- *   - `2` => `Helper`
- * * `pair_request_wire_bytes` - Serialized outer `DeRecMessage` carrying encrypted inner request bytes
- * * `pairing_secret_key_material` - Serialized initiator-side `PairingSecretKeyMaterial`
- *
- * # Returns
- *
- * A JS object with:
- *
- * - `wire_bytes`: serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes carrying encrypted inner response bytes
- * - `transport_protocol`: transport information extracted from the pairing request
- * - `pairing_shared_key`: final shared pairing key
+ * Scanner-side: build the plaintext `PrePairRequest` envelope for a
+ * `HASHED_KEYS` contact.
+ */
+export function pairing_request_produce_pre_pair(transport_protocol: any, contact_message: any): any;
+
+export function pairing_response_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, secret_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+/**
+ * Scanner-side: decode the inbound plaintext `PrePairResponse` envelope.
  */
-export function produce_pairing_response_message(kind: number, pair_request_wire_bytes: Uint8Array, pairing_secret_key_material: Uint8Array): any;
+export function pairing_response_extract_pre_pair(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function pairing_response_process(contact_message: any, response: any, secret_key: Uint8Array): any;
 
 /**
- * Generates verifiable secret shares and returns one serialized outer `DeRecMessage`
- * envelope per helper channel.
- *
- * # JavaScript input shape
- *
- * The `channels` argument must be a JS array of objects like:
- *
- * ```ts
- * [
- *   { channel_id: 1, shared_key: new Uint8Array(32) },
- *   { channel_id: 2, shared_key: new Uint8Array(32) },
- * ]
- * ```
- *
- * Each `shared_key` must be exactly 32 bytes.
- *
- * The `keep_list` argument may be:
- *
- * - `undefined` or `null`, meaning no keep-list is provided
- * - an array of integers, for example:
- *
- * ```ts
- * [1, 2, 3]
- * ```
- *
- * The `description` argument may be:
- *
- * - `undefined` or `null`, meaning no description is provided
- * - a string, for example:
- *
- * ```ts
- * "initial distribution"
- * ```
- *
- * # Returns
- *
- * A JS object of the form:
- *
- * ```ts
- * {
- *   value: {
- *     [channelId: number]: Uint8Array
- *   }
- * }
- * ```
- *
- * where each value is a serialized outer `DeRecMessage` envelope.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `secret_id` - Secret identifier embedded into each generated share
- * * `secret_data` - Secret bytes to split and distribute
- * * `channels` - JS array of `{ channel_id, shared_key }` entries
- * * `threshold` - Minimum number of shares required for reconstruction
- * * `version` - Share-distribution version embedded into the generated messages
- * * `keep_list` - Optional JS array of versions helpers should retain
- * * `description` - Optional version description
+ * Scanner-side: validate the `PrePairResponse` against the contact's
+ * SHA-384 binding hash. Returns the validated keys + nonce on match.
  */
-export function protect_secret(secret_id: Uint8Array, secret_data: Uint8Array, channels: any, threshold: number, version: number, keep_list: any, description?: string | null): any;
+export function pairing_response_process_pre_pair(contact_message: any, response: any): any;
+
+export function pairing_response_produce(channel_id: bigint, request: any, secret_key: Uint8Array, communication_info: any, parameter_range: any): any;
 
 /**
- * Recovers the original secret from helper recovery responses.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `responses` - JS array of recovery response inputs. Each entry must contain:
- *   - `response_bytes`: serialized outer `DeRecMessage` response envelope
- *   - `shared_key`: 32-byte symmetric key for decrypting that response
- * * `secret_id` - Secret identifier being recovered
- * * `version` - Secret version being recovered
- *
- * # Returns
- *
- * The reconstructed secret bytes.
+ * Contact-creator side: publish the actual public keys back to the scanner.
  */
-export function recover_from_share_responses(responses: any, secret_id: Uint8Array, version: number): Uint8Array;
+export function pairing_response_produce_pre_pair(channel_id: bigint, request: any, secret_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function recovery_request_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function recovery_request_produce(channel_id: bigint, secret_id: bigint, version: number, shared_key: Uint8Array, reply_to: any): any;
+
+export function recovery_response_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function recovery_response_produce(channel_id: bigint, request: any, stored_share_request: any, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function recovery_response_recover(secret_id: bigint, version: number, responses: any): any;
+
+export function sharing_request_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function sharing_request_produce(channel_id: bigint, version: number, secret_id: bigint, committed_share: any, keep_list: any, description: string, shared_key: Uint8Array, reply_to: any, replica_id: any): any;
+
+export function sharing_request_split(channels: any, secret_id: bigint, version: number, secret_data: Uint8Array, threshold: number): any;
+
+export function sharing_response_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function sharing_response_process(version: number, response: any): void;
+
+export function sharing_response_produce(channel_id: bigint, request: any, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function unpairing_request_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function unpairing_request_produce(channel_id: bigint, memo: string, shared_key: Uint8Array, reply_to: any): any;
+
+export function unpairing_response_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function unpairing_response_process(response: any): any;
+
+export function unpairing_response_produce(channel_id: bigint, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function verification_request_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
+
+export function verification_request_produce(channel_id: bigint, secret_id: bigint, version: number, shared_key: Uint8Array, reply_to: any): any;
+
+export function verification_response_extract(envelope_bytes: Uint8Array, shared_key: Uint8Array): any;
 
 /**
- * Verifies a verification response envelope.
- *
- * # Arguments
- *
- * * `secret_id` - Secret identifier
- * * `channel_id` - Helper channel identifier
- * * `shared_key` - 32-byte symmetric key established during pairing
- * * `share_content` - Expected share bytes
- * * `response_bytes` - Serialized outer `DeRecMessage` bytes carrying encrypted
- *   inner `VerifyShareResponseMessage`
- *
- * # Returns
- *
- * `true` if the verification response is valid, otherwise `false`.
+ * Verify a `VerifyShareResponseMessage` against the originating
+ * `VerifyShareRequestMessage` and the expected share content.
+ *
+ * `request` must be the request the **owner** previously produced for
+ * this challenge (kept by the caller in a per-`channel_id` pending-
+ * verification map). The primitive rejects any response whose
+ * `(nonce, secret_id, version)` triple doesn't match — that's the
+ * anti-replay gate.
  */
-export function verify_share_response(secret_id: Uint8Array, channel_id: bigint, shared_key: Uint8Array, share_content: Uint8Array, response_bytes: Uint8Array): boolean;
+export function verification_response_process(request: any, response: any, share_content: Uint8Array): boolean;
+
+export function verification_response_produce(channel_id: bigint, request: any, shared_key: Uint8Array, share_content: Uint8Array): any;
 
 export function wasm_start(): void;